severely wrong or slightly wrong? sanctions and moral behavior laetitia mulder tilburg university,...

Severely wrong or slightly wrong?

Sanctions and Moral Behavior

Laetitia MulderTilburg University, The Netherlands

My previous research

Context: social dilemmas

Sanctions’ effect on trust

Alternative behavioral options

Sanctions and trust

Expectations of cooperative behavior“assurance” (Yamagishi)

Expectations of cooperative intentions“trust” (Yamagishi)

Sanction

+

_

“Removing the Sanction” Paradigm

No sanction:Trust

Sanction:Assurance

Phase 1: Phase 2:

No sanction:Trust

No sanction

No-sanction

Sanction

Condition:

Phase 2 trust(data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in

press)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Low initial trust High initial trust

No sanction in phase 1 Sanction in phase 1

Phase 2 cooperation (data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in press)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Low initial trust High initial trust

No sanction in phase 1 Sanction in phase 1

My previous research

Context: social dilemmas

Sanctions’ effect on trust

Alternative behavioral options

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

No garbagereduction

Garbage reduction

DumpingGarbage reduction

No garbage reduction

Moving to Belgium

Paying taxes Tax fraud

Expectations

Authority

Focus on moderating factors:

Alternative defective option

0,3 0,63

2,9

0,5

low expectations high expectations

no sanction

sanction

Contribution to group(in three—options condition)

6,196,55

4,12

7,2

low expectations high expectations

no sanction

sanction

Conclusions from my previous research

Sanctioning systems may foster negative motivational effects (i.e. distrust in cooperative intentions)

Social decisions more complex than a simple dichitomous decision. Essential for the issue of sanctions.

Present research

Influence of sanction on moral norms

Sanctions may trigger business-like considerations and induce a business frame (e.g. Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Frey, 1999; Fehr & Falk, 2000)

But may they also trigger moral considerations and induce a moral frame?

When does a sanction trigger a business frame and when a moral frame?

First factor of research: sanction size

Research question:

How does the size of a sanction on a certain rule affect moral considerations? How does it affect moral judgement of how “wrong” breaking the rule is?

How sanction size may affect moral judgements

Sanction indicates “how bad” certain behavior is.

Hypothesis: Large sanction higher moral judgments than a small sanction

2 experiments to test this

Experiment 1

Participant: unknown number of lottery tickets.

“Participants of an other experiment” no lottery tickets (i.e. no chance of winning)

Possibility to donate tickets to participants of other experiment.

Request: “please donate 2 tickets”

“When you donate less than 2 tickets: fine of €0,20 (small sanction) / €2,50 (large sanction)”Control condition: no fine, only the request.

Dependent variables

Moral dissapproval (5 items):Donating less than 2 tickets…- …seems morally wrong- …is something I would morally dissapprove of- etc.

Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter (4 items):- The experimenters think that donating less than 2 tickets is very unfair- The experimenters morally dissapprove of donating less than 2 tickets to the other participants

Results

Moral dissapproval:no sanction: 3.41

small sanction: 3.47

large sanction: 4.27

Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter :no sanction: 3.64

small sanction: 3.86

large sanction: 5.04

Experiment 2

The effect of sanction size on social dissapproval of someone who does not follow the rule.

Role of authorities: Sanction installed by authority. Therefore sanction shows the moral judgement of the authority. Whether people adopt this judgement, depends on their trust in authorities.

Hypothesis: Sanction size influences moral judgements to a greater extent when people have high rather than low trust in the authority.

Experiment 2

General trust in authorities (8 items):-“Generally I completely trust authorities’ decisions”-“Authorities often do not know what they are talking about”-“Authorities usually know what is best for the group”

Dependent variables:-Social dissapproval (preferring a rule-complier to a rule-breaker)-Moral judgement

Sanction size: small vs large

Experiment 2

Participant in observer role. Observed the following situation:

10 chips

Allocator:each chip €2

Recipient:each chip €?

division

Experimentator requested a 3/7 division

Fine of €0,50 or €5 (uncertain whether they would be monitored)

Allocator A (“Susan”) obeyed and proposed 3/7

Allocator B (“Eve”) disobeyed and proposed 5/5

Dependent variables

Moral dissapproval (7 items):That divider B donated less than 7 chips…- …I found morally wrong- …is something (s)he should feel ashamed of- etc.

Social dissapprovalWhich would you prefer:- a division of €3/ €3 with you and allocator A (“Susan”)- a division of €4/ €4 with you and allocator B (“Eve”)

Results

Figure 2: Moral judgment as a function of sanction size and general regard for authorities

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Small sanction Large sanction

Mo

ral

jud

gm

ent

low general trust inauthorities (SD = -1)

high general trust inauthorities (SD = 1)

Results

Figure 1: Social Dissaproval (percentage of participants choosing to split money with allocater A rather than B) as a function of sanction size and general regard for authorities

01020304050607080

Small sanction Large sanction

So

cial

dis

sap

pro

val

low general trust inauthorities (SD = -1)

high general trust inauthorities (SD = 1)

Conclusion

Sanctions can increase moral norms. Large sanctions increase moral norms more than small ones.

Especially when people trust authorities

Further research

Large sanctions may be excessive/unjust. Effect of sanction size may be moderated by perceived (in)justice of sanction.

Recognizing the goal behind rule/sanction? Influence self-benefitting or self-sacrificing leadership

Difference sanctions and rewards?

Do sanctions work through anticipated shame? And if so, do rewards work through anticipated pride?