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hibits all nuclear weapons and
leads ideally to global nuclear
disarmament where the threat
of
nuclear war is minimized.
This article is concerned with
several initiatives that could be tak-
en
in
order to follow the Nuclear
Right Path and perhaps achieve
global nuclear disarmament.
U.S.
GOVERNMENTOLE
On July 16, 1945, the world’s
first nuclear weapon was detonated
by the United States of America
(U.S.) in a remote desert region of
New Mexico aptly named Journado
del Muerto (Journey of Death).
Code-named “Trinity,” the test
explosion gave birth to the Nuclear
Age and set humanity on a long
and perilous ourney with an uncer-
tain future [1]. The atomic bomb-
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
followed soon thereafter and, sub-
sequently, the unconditional sur-
render of Japan. Thus ended World
War I1 and Nuclear War I.
By using nuclear weapons, the
U.S.
perhaps avoided one million
casualties by not having to invade
Japan, and thus became the
world’s first nuclear superpower.
However, by releasing the nuclear
genie, the U.S. initiated a nuclear
arms race of enormous proportions
that now threatens the survival of
the human race. It therefore seems
morally correct that the U S
should now serve as the world
leader in seeking to contain the
nuclear genie through initiatives
that will
help
to prevent future
nuclear
war(s).
A good beginning
is to consult the opinions of mili-
tary experts who have direct expe-
rience with the potential use of
nuclear weapons.
U S GENERALSPEAK OUT
AGAINST UCLEAR EAFQNS
In July 1994, General C.A.
Horner, commander of the
U S .
Air Force Space Command, sur-
prised the nation and the world by
declaring
[ 2 ] ,
“The nuclear weapon is obso-
lete; I want to get rid of them all.”
General Horner based his argu-
ments on moral principles when he
stated [3]:
“Nuclear weapons are such
a
gross instrument of power that
they really have no utility they
are best used to destroy cities, and
kill women and children that’s
morally wrong ”
General Horner was most con-
cerned about countering the new
military threat from smaller, less
stable nations who might obtain
nuclear weapons and/or other
weapons of mass destruction. He
argued that it will be very difficult
to convince other nations to not
develop nuclear weapons when the
U S .
has thousands of them. It
should be noted that General
Horner was “talking long-term”
and that nuclear disarmament
would require similar commit-
ments from Russia and the other
nuclear weapon states [2].
In December 1996, two retired
American generals made public
statements in favor of a world free
of nuclear weapons[4]. General A.
Goodpaster (former supreme allied
commander in Europe) and Gener-
al
L.
Butler (former commander-
in-chief of the
U.S.
Strategic Air
Command) released a joint state-
ment that recommended the
nuclear weapon states reduce their
nuclear arsenals in phases “to the
lowest verifiable levels consistent
with stable security.” The ultimate
objective “should be the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons
from all nations.” The next day, a
total
of
61 retired generals and
admirals from 17 nations (includ-
ing 19 Americans) issued a similar
statement for the eventual elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons.
Generals Goodpaster and But-
Fig.
1 .
Diagram illustrating the nuclear fork in the road with the Nuclear Right Path leading to global nuclear
disarmament.
6
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ler were later featured in a televi-
sion documentary [ ] that repre-
sented their views as well as those
of other military leaders. The fol-
lowing points were emphasized:
0 The only real purpose for U.S.
nuclear weapons is to assure that
they are not used against us or our
allies. This can be accomplished
at any level of nuclear weapons
as long as we are not at a great
disadvantage. Thus, the U.S.
could reduce its nuclear arsenal,
in conjunction with the other
nuclear weapon states, to 100-
200 warheads. This is the lowest
verifiable level consistent with
stable security.
0 Total nuclear disarmament car-
ries the risk of cheating. Howev-
er, the risks associated with a
world full of nuclear weapon
states far outweigh the risks
associated with a world where
nuclear weapons are prohibited.
0 The argument that the U.S.
needs nuclear weapons to main-
tain stability is a dangerous one.
That is, other nations can
use
the
same argument to justify their
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
0 In 1968, the U S . signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and thereby
pledged to pursue systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce
nuclear weapons on a global
scale with the ultimate objective
being elimination of these
weapons. In July 1996, the Inter-
national Court of Justice ruled
that this agreement is an obliga-
tion to achieve nuclear disarma-
ment under international control.
If the nuclear weapon states fail
to achieve this goal, other nations
may seek nuclear weapons argu-
ing that the U.S. (and the other
nuclear powers) have demon-
strated that they are needed “to be
a player in the world.” The net
result would be a less secure situ-
ation for every nation on earth.
Conventional weapons can do
just as much damage as nuclear
weapons due to recent advances
in technology. The
U.S.
has
overwhelming superiority of
conventional forces.
Suggested steps towards nuclear
disarmament include the fol-
lowing:
0 Disassembling nuclear
and allowing on-site veri-
fication.
Continue progress with
the START treaties by ~
securing Russian ratifica-
tion of START I1 and
negotiate START 111.
0
Include all nuclear weapon
states in negotiations to the
lowest levels possible
(perhaps down to 100 to
200
nuclear weapons).
0 Account for all fissile
materials that could be
used to make nuclear
weapons.
THENUCLEARON-PROLIF-
ERATION
TREATYNPT)
The NPT was established in
July 1968, to help deter the spread
of nuclear weapons. The five
nuclear weapon states (U.S., Sovi-
et Union, Great Britain, France,
and China) agreed, under Article
VI of this treaty, as follows:
“to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating
to the cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on
a
treaty on
general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective interna-
tional controls.”
Note that this agreement does
not actually compel the five
nuclear weapon states to reduce
their nuclear weapon arsenals.
Rather, the agreement is to pursue
nuclear disarmament “in good
faith’ without strict deadlines [6].
Despite its lack of specificity, the
NPT has been credited with limiting
the spread of nuclear weapons.
However, some nations have not
signed the treaty; notably India, Pak-
istan, Israel, and Cuba. And there
has been at least one cheater (Iraq).
It is worthy of note that theU.S.
and the former Soviet Union made
significant progress in nuclear
arms reductions via the START
agreements.
Today, the U.S. and
Russia continue these efforts to
control nuclear arms, nuclear
materials, and to prevent nuclear
smuggling. What is lacking, how-
ever, is
a
concerted, joint effort by
all five of the declared nuclear
weapon states to engage in reduc-
tions of nuclear arms and the con-
trol of fissile materials. This must
be a priority in the near future if
the non-nuclear weapon states are
to continue their confidence and
commitment to the
NPT.
As an example of a loss of con-
fidence in the NPT, India followed
its recent round of nuclear tests by
derisively calling on the five origi-
nal nuclear weapon states “to get
rid of their own atomic arsenals
rather than preach abstinence to
India” [7]. The new Prime Minister
of India, A.B. Vajpayee, reacted to
a demand by the five nuclear
weapon states (plus
41
other
nations) that India and Pakistan
should stop testing nuclear
weapons and join the global cam-
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paign to eliminate these weapons.
Vajpayee insisted India has the
right to defend itself and referred
to endless meetings and seminars
on disarmament but no steps to get
rid of nuclear weapons.
The decision by India to con-
duct five nuclear tests seems to
have been motivated by President
Clinton’s decision to allow U.S.
satellite technology to be exported
to China. Also included was tech-
nology that helped China improve
their guidance systems for long-
range ballistic missiles (the tech-
nologies to orbit satellites and to
guide long-range missiles are sim-
ilar). According to Rep. D.
Rohrabacher (Chairman of the
House Science subcommittee on
space and aeronautics), “The Indi-
an detonations are a predictable
result of America’s upgrading of
China’s missile technology” [SI.
There is concern that China may
share this missile technology with
its Pakistani ally. The end result
could be a nuclear arms race in
southeast Asia with the emerging
nuclear weapon state, Pakistan,
serving as one-half of a possible
pincers strategy if China chal-
lenges India in some future con-
flict. It is noted that China and
India fought a border war some 30
years ago. As evidence of an accel-
erating arms race in Asia, India
plans to build a nuclear-powered
submarine and equip it with
nuclear warhead missiles [9]. Rus-
sia has agreed to help India com-
plete this project by the year 2004.
Another Asian nation that could
develop nuclear weapons in the
near future is North Korea who
recently suggested it might reopen
a nuclear power plant that is capa-
ble of producing plutonium for
nuclear weapons [lo]. The power
plant was closed in 1994
as
part of
an agreement to acquire two light-
water nuclear reactors with help
from the U.S.
In summary, the NPT has had
some success but its greatest fail-
ure is not moving decisively to
8
reduce the nuclear weapon arse-
nals of all five declared nuclear
weapon states, including China.
CHINA:
HEEMERGING
MILITARYUPERPOWER?
China became a member of the
nuclear club in 1964 when it con-
ducted its first test of a nuclear
weapon. The nuclear byword for
China has been “never again” in
reference to what it claims to be
“nuclear blackmail” suffered at the
hands of the U.S. during the Kore-
an War and the Taiwan crises of
1954-1955 and 1958. Consequent-
ly, China’s current nuclear strategy
is designed to preclude nuclear
blackmail by adopting a city-
destroying deterrent posture 1 I].
With a population in excess of
1.22 billion and growing at more
than 12 million per year, China
faces unique challenges in meeting
the basic needs of its people. Its
population program, “the one child
family,” is crucial to their future
since “no supplier on Earth could
feed them if they fail” [121. If ever
faced with a starving population,
China might feel compelled to
expand its borders.
It is perhaps with these two
problems in mind (a hungry popu-
lation and nuclear weapons), that
prompted Mao Zedong, Chairman
of the Peoples Republic of China,
to shock the Russians in 1954.
Chairman Mao seemed to wel-
come the prospect of nuclear war
with the following statement 131:
“We may lose more than 300
million people.
So
what?
War is war.
The years will pass and we’ll
get to work producing more babies
than ever before.”
Today China is an emerging
economic superpower with the
potential to eventually challenge
the
U.S.
militarily. Currently, U.S.
intelligence sees China as a region-
al rather than global power. Its
nuclear arsenal includes 18 long-
range nuclear missiles of which 13
are reportedly targeted on U.S .
cities [14]. Overall, China has
about 300 nuclear warheads
deployed on land-based ballistic
missiles, aircraft, and submarines
151 Military modernization
includes converting from liquid to
solid fuel missiles and a slow
expansion of its ballistic missile
forces. However, with its enor-
mous industrial capacity, China
might be able to produce as many
as 1000 new ballistic missiles over
the next ten years 161.
China has been compared with
pre-World War
I1
Germany by
retired Air Force Col. W.J. Boyne
[171. Boyne sees China emerging
from the humiliation of past
defeats and using its arms industry
as
“the engine of its economy for
the next 20 years.” Eventually,
according to Boyne, China will
eclipse the
U.S.
both economically
and militarily. A possible scenario
is for China to continue its support
of Pakistan and to manipulate a
fourth (and final) war between
India and Pakistan [17] In the ash-
es of that conflict, China would
find room for expansion and per-
haps make its move for military
superpower status.
In view of the emerging status
of China, the U.S. would be wise
to include China in future negotia-
tions that seek to reduce the size of
nuclear weapon arsenals. It will be
much less problematic to work
with China now on nuclear
arms
reductions before a massive
buildup of Chinese nuclear mis-
siles occurs. A Cold War-type
competition between the U.S. and
China could be potentially disas-
trous for the U.S., both economi-
cally and militarily. It is better to
start working now with China on
an agreement that reduces nuclear
arsenals in a fair and equitable
manner.
REDUCTIONS
N
NUCLEAR
DELIVERY
YSTEMS
On December 8, 1987, the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
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(INF) treaty was signed by Presi-
dent Reagan and Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev. The purpose
of the treaty was to eliminate all
U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear
missiles with ranges between 300
and 3400 miles
[
181. The signifi-
cance of this treaty is that it was
the first to ban an entire class of
missiles [19]. The
U.S.
Senate rat-
ified the treaty on May 27, 1988
and by May 12, 1991, all U.S. and
Soviet missiles covered by the
treaty had been destroyed [20].
Some other features of the INF
treaty are as follows [181:
Central to the treaty is a very
comprehensive and intrusive ver-
ification regime established to
monitor compliance. Verification
includes on-site inspections such
as round-the-clock monitoring of
certain production plants, obser-
vation of the actual destruction
of the other party’s missiles, and
short-notice inspections of suspi-
cious sites.
0 Curiously, the nuclear warheads
removed from the INF missiles
were not required to be
destroyed. This was at the behest
of the U.S. apparently due to a
claim of “a shortage of nuclear
materials such as plutonium and
uranium” as well as a desire to
maintain secrets of U.S. warhead
designs.
Naval and aircraft nuclear deliv-
ery systems were not covered by
this treaty. Neither were long-
range, strategic nuclear weapon
delivery systems (ranges greater
than 3400 miles).
In retrospect, the INF treaty
serves as an excellent precedent
for future arms control agreements
that seek to reduce and eventually
prohibit all nuclear weapon sys-
tems by reducing their delivery
systems and destroying the materi-
als (plutonium and uranium) used
to make nuclear weapons.
It is proposed, then, to engage
the five members of the nuclear
club in negotiations to extend the
provisions of the INF treaty and
gradually eliminate all weapon
delivery systems with ranges
greater than
300
miles. It is also
proposed to initiate procedures to
dispose of nuclear weapon materi-
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The current
U.S.
strategic
nuclear triad consists of the fol-
lowing, as per the National
Defense Authorization Act for fis-
cal year 1998 [21]:
18 Trident submarines.
71 B-52 bombers
0 5 Minutemen and 50MX mis-
siles
These levels are consistent with
the START I treaty and will be
maintained until the Russian
Duma ratifies START 11.
The principal strategy proposed
here is to work towards the elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons by reduc-
ing their strategic delivery ~
systems.This can be accom-
plished by agreements to ~
reduce their numbers and/or
to restrict (or eliminate) test-
ing of long-range missiles.
Verification of compliance
with such agreements should
be feasible with existing
reconnaissance satellites and
other “national technical
means” described in [22], ~
since bombers, nuclear sub-
marines, and silo-based
ICBMs are highly observ-
~
able, as are long-range mis-
sile tests.
As regards restrictions on
missile tests, H.A. Bethe
indicates such tests are easy
to
verify and limiting such
tests “would more effectively
halt the development of new
weapons than would a comprehen-
sive nuclear test ban” [23]. As an
example of
a
recent missile test,
Iran successfully tested its Shahab-
3 missile which is capable of
reaching all of Israel [24]. The test
was detected by U.S. intelligence
~
satellites despite only about 100
seconds of flight before the rocket
exploded or was detonated. Note
that Iran has received missile tech-
nology from Russia, China, and
North Korea. One
U.S.
reaction to
the test was “renewed calls for
a
national missile defense system”
[24]. Shanebrook has discussed the
benefits of a world-wide ban on
the flight testing of long-range
missiles, as regards halting their
proliferation, and also reducing
pressures to weaponize space for
the purpose of attacking these mis-
siles while in flight [25].
The issue of a
U.S.
national
missile defense system is directly
affected by any international
agreement to reduce or eliminate
all missiles with a range in excess
of 300 miles. The need for such
a
system for missile defense would
be greatly alleviated by an agree-
ment of this type.
NUCLEARUYOUTLAN
R.M. Bowman has presented an
interesting idea on how to protect
the U.S. from ballistic missile
attack instead of continuing to
invest billions of dollars in a multi-
layered, high technology missile
defense system (since 1984, the
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U.S. has spent more than 70 bil-
lion on “Star Wars”-type systems).
The Bowman plan would take
money intended for missile
defense and use it to buy ballistic
missiles from other nations [26].
Presumably this would be part of
an international agreement to
reduce or eliminate ballistic mis-
siles. The purchased nuclear war-
heads would be dismantled and the
recovered fissile materials (pluto-
nium and enriched uranium)
mixed with natural uranium. The
resulting mixture could be used as
reactor fuel for nuclear power
plants and/or vitrified in glass for
storage as high level nuclear waste.
The Bowman proposal makes
sense for aiding a country like Rus-
sia which needs economic help
with its nuclear disarmament
efforts. The Russian economy has
been shrinking during the 1990s
and suffered a collapse of its finan-
cial markets in spring 1998. To pre-
vent another economic downturn
the International Monetary Fund,
in conjunction with the World
Bank and Japan, provided Russia
with a bailout package of 22.6 bil-
lion in loans “to rescue the coun-
try’s precarious economy” [27].
Russia’s economic woes are
probably a direct consequence of
its excessive military spending dur-
ing the Cold War period. Similarly,
the U.S. spent billions of dollars on
high technology weapons systems
and emerged from the Cold War
burdened by debt. It is even debat-
able if the Cold War had a winner
[28]. A recent report, issued by the
Brookings Institution, indicates the
U.S. has spent 5.82 trillion ( 5.82
x 1012) since 1940 on nuclear
weapons and related delivery sys-
tems [29]. This expenditure corre-
lates closely with the current
U.S.
national debt of 5.9 trillion, which
costs taxpayers an additional 240
billion per year just in interest pay-
ments. Thus a family of four, on
average, funds these interest pay-
ments at the rate of 5000 annually
[30]. And these interest payments
3
will continue d
injnitum
until
some effort is made to pay off the
principal of the debt. This same
family of four also suffers econom-
ically from long-term interest rates,
(such as home mortgages), since
U.S.
borrowing has a significant
effect on the loan market where
this extra demand contributes to
higher interest rates. In other
words, the
U.S.
nuclear war
machine has been purchased on
credit and no effort has been made
to pay for it. Perhaps the lesson to
be learned from all this is that the
US.-U.S.S .R.
Cold War was (and
still is) very costly and any other
such competition (for example
with China) should be vigorously
avoided.
Another consequence of the
Cold War is that the U.S. must pro-
vide world leadership in achieving
nuclear disarmament. This means
helping nations, economically,
with nuclear warhead dismantle-
ment as per the current Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program
that “assists the states of the former
Soviet Union in destroying nuclear
weapons and disposing of the plu-
tonium before it can fall into the
hands of terrorists” [26]. The
U.S.
has committed
300
million to
this
program and should expand it by
purchasing nuclear warheads from
other nations that commit to
nuclear weapons disarmament.
In addition to destroying existing
nuclear weapons, it is also necessary
to stop producing weapons-grade
fissile materials such as plutonium
and highly enriched uranium.
A
step-by-step approach to a global,
verified ban on the production of
fis-
sile materials for nuclear weapons
has been proposed by Fetter and von
Hippel [31].
The key nation in achieving a
global agreement to prohibit all
nations from producing fissile
materials for nuclear weapons is
China. The basic difficulty is Chi-
na’s concern with U.S. intentions
to develop defenses against longer
range missiles than current sys-
tems [32] and possible U.S. efforts
“to loosen the constraints of the
ABM Treaty” [31]. China fears
such defenses could easily neutral-
ize its relatively small nuclear
force and again leave China sus-
ceptible to nuclear blackmail.
Thus, China prefers to maintain its
option to counter U.S. (and possi-
bly Russian) missile defenses by
expanding and modernizing its
nuclear weapons arsenal in order
to overwhelm such defenses [32].
This chilling scenario brings to
mind the potential use of radiolog-
ical weapons (e.g., the cobalt
bomb) as a possible countermea-
sure to strategic defense systems as
discussed by Shanebrook [331.
Thus, all human life on earth could
be at risk.
NUCLEAR IGHT ATH
The Nuclear Right Path to glob-
al nuclear disarmament requires a
commitment of leadership from the
U.S. to vigorously promote new
initiatives that seek to reduce, and
perhaps totally eliminate, all
nuclear weapons from earth. These
include, but are not limited, to the
following:
Multilateral, phased-reductions
in strategic nuclear weapons
delivery systems.
Complete cessation of all flight
tests of long-range missiles.
A
global nuclear warhead dis-
mantlement plan with effective
economic incentives.
A firm commitment from all
nations to stop producing fissile
materials for nuclear weapons.
Besides Russia, the key nation
in future negotiations to reduce
nuclear weapon arsenals is China
which faces unique challenges in
providing for its burgeoning popu-
lation and who stands today at the
threshold of economic superpower
status. Before China faces the
decision on whether or not to
embark on the road towards mili-
tary superpower status, it is imper-
ative to engage China in negotia-
tions to reduce nuclear weapons in
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conjunction with the U S and
Rus-
sia. If this is successful, other
nuclear weapon states could be
induced to follow this example of
arms reductions possibly leading
to global nuclear disarmament.
The final goal should and must be,
a nuclear-free world.
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Letters
(Continuedfrom page
5 )
been involved in sticky ethical problems, as you (we)
now are, and I have some suggestions.
1)
It is both our (as members of the IEEE-SSIT)
responsibility and your responsibility
as an
elected
EC Chair, both from a need as well
as
an ethical posi-
tion to maintain the Ethics Hotline.
2) I
question whether the ExCom can, on their
own, cut the Ethics Hotline off, if we refuse to cut it
off. The full board of directors maybe can, but proba-
bly not
the
ExCom on their own.
3) I suggest we get the backing of the SSIT board
(and even better the backing
of
the Society, by
a
spe-
cial ballot) to continue the Hotline and then reiniti-
ate the Hotline. This will force the ExCom
to
get the
full
BOD
o deal with the issue. If the BODsides with
the ExCom we may want to go to the press.
4) Although a circuit theorist,
I
believe theory
should be put into practice. One
of
the jobs
of
our
Society is to put ethics into practice. If we can’t put
our resources into the reinstatement of the Ethics Hot-
line, we should disband the society.
Robert
A
Johnson
L e Fellow
IEEE
Tustin, C A
IEEETechnology and Society Magazine Summer 999
3
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