some observations on the management of the apalachicola-chattahoochee-flint (acf) basin

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE

APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) BASIN

By:

Steve Leitman

#

#

#

#

Flint River

# Apalachicola River

Atlanta

Albany

Columbus

Gulf of Mexico

AtlanticOcean

#

Chattahoochee River

Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint BasinAREA = 20,000 SQUARE MILES

FEDERALSTORAGE RESERVOIRS

LAKE LANIER

AVERAGE FLOW = 25,000 cfs5th LARGEST IN US

THE APALACHICOLA RIVER

ELEVATIONIN FEET PROFILEPROFILE

APALACHICOLA APALACHICOLA AND AND

CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVERSCHATTAHOOCHEE RIVERS

Head of NavigationHead of Navigation

BUFORD DAM (Lake Sidney Lanier)

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER

400

200

0

WEST POINT LAKE

WALTER F. GEORGE L&D

GEORGE W. ANDREWS L&D

JIM WOODRUFF L&D

500 400 300 200 100 0

APALACHICOLA RIVER

MILES

Atlanta, GA

Columbus, GA

Median Monthly Flows (1939-2001)

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep

month

flo

w (

cfs)

CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER at Columbia,

FLINT RIVER at Bainbridge,

APALACHICOLA RIVER at Chattahoochee, Florida

Monthly Low Flows (90% Exceeded) (1939-2001)

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep

month

flo

w (

cfs)

CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER at Columbia, Ala

FLINT RIVER at Bainbridge, Ga

APALACHICOLA RIVER at Chattahoochee, Florida

TOTAL CONSUMPTIVE DEPLETIONS FROM FLINT AND CHATTAHOOCHEE BASINS

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

VOLU

ME

(CFS

)

2000 DEMANDS

90% EXCEEDED FLOW (1939-2001)

MINIMUM FLOW (1939-2001)

A problem with water management in our society is that there seems to

be an expectation that we can support infinite demands from a

finite supply.

Although some speak to “market solutions” to such problems, the management of water seems to follow an economic paradigm of

commonizing the costs and privatizing the profits, not that of a

“free market”.

Jim Woodruff Dam and Lake Seminole

THE ACF “WATER WARS”

In listening to my critiques of how the three states and federal

government have handled the ACF issue it must be remembered that this effort was a prototype. Earlier

Compacts did not deal with the issue of environmental flow needs.

The ACF Basin Water Wars: A Brief History

1989: Atlanta applies to the Corps for increased water withdrawals and Alabama sues the Corps. States already had contentious relationship over federal navigation project for over a decade. 1992-1997: Comprehensive Study of water use in the basin conducted after negotiated agreement.

1998: ACF Compact approved by Congress and three states requires development of a Water Allocation Formula by December 1998. First such Compact in the southeast and first in US since passage of major environmental laws in the 1970s.

1999 – 2003: Compact negotiation extended 14 times when agreement could not be reached by three States.

The ACF Basin Water Wars: A Brief History

2003: Memorandum of Understanding between States on principles of Water Allocation Formula and then the termination of ACF Compact.

2004-2005: Multiple lawsuits relating to the ACF water management proceed through courts in Washington, D.C., Birmingham and Atlanta.

2006: Corps of Engineers and U.S. Fish and Wildlife present Interim Operating Procedures (IOP) for managing ACF reservoir system.

2007: Severe drought requires modifying IOP to include Emergency Drought Operations (EDO) as the Apalachicola River experiences record low flows and endangered species are threatened. Court case consolidated to single court.

2008: District Court of Appeals rules in favor of Florida and Alabama on case relating to water supply withdrawals from Lake Lanier. Georgia appeals decision. Corps of Engineers announce preparation of new Water Control Plan for ACF basin.

To address basin wide water quantity issues in a multi-state basin

in the U.S., there are four options:

1) A lawsuit through the U.S. Supreme Court,

2) Federal legislation requiring interstate management,

3) Creating an Interstate Water Compact, and

4) Pretend you have no problems and pass them on to unsuspecting

future generations.

OBSERVATION 1: IT TAKES A CRISIS OR MAJOR EVENT TO

INITIATE AN EFFORT TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE

MANAGEMENT OF A WATERSHED. THE 1989 LAWSUIT PROVIDED THIS

INCENTIVE.

CRISIS CAN BE SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE. JUST

BE PATIENT BECAUSE THE NEXT CRISIS IS ON ITS WAY AND IF YOU HAVE A VISION DURING A CRISIS OF WHAT TO DO YOU TYPICALLY

ARE THE ONLY ONE.

In the ACF Compact legislation, the three States were required under the Compact to negotiate an Allocation Formula instead of including such a formula in the Compact legislation.

OBSERVATION 2: WE NEED TO LEARN FROM OUR FAILURES, NOT

HIDE FROM THEM OR PRETEND THEY ARE NOT OCCURRING.

In Working Through Environmental Conflict, Daniels and Walker have defined a fundamental paradox in making water decisions which is applicable to the ACF situation:

The paradox is that although citizens demand technically sound decisions and their involvement, as situations become more complex, fewer people

have the technical competence to either contribute to the decision or

even critique the decision.

It is a curious fact that the university community was for the most excluded from this complex

decision-making process, although in hindsight it is obvious that the expertise in the university system

would have been helpful.

OBSERVATION 3: MANY OF OUR PROBLEMS ARE IN THE PROCESS,

NOT IN THE AVAILBILITY OF ADEQUATE INFORMATION OR

KNOWLEDGE.

To illustrate this problem I want to discuss the response to several

issues. The first is the use of models in the process and the

second the lowering of Lake Lanier in the summer of 2007.

EXAMPLE 1

THE USE OF MODELS IN THE PROCESS

0.0

0.0 1.0

?

UseAllStorForBLMin

0.000

0.000 1.000

?U

BUOffPeakSwitch

Andrews Target

eqn on

0.00 1.00

?~

WPMinFlwSupFraction

eqn on

0.00 1.00

?~

WFGMinFlwSupFraction

0.00

0.00 1.00

?~

BUMinFlwSupFraction

WFGMin Cont

?

Zone1ResRel

?U

Zone2ResRel

?U

Zone3ResRel

?U

Zone4ResRel

?U

0.500

0.000 1.000

~

WP RES VOL RATIO

1.000

0.000 1.000

~

LANIER RES VOL RATIO

2.000

1.000 3.000

?U

ZONE RELEASE SWITCH

1.0

0.0 1.0

?U

ZONE DEF SWITCH

COMPOSITE STORAG…

?U

NEWTON MONTHLY R…

-2.290

-3.000 -1.000

PHDI INDEX TRIGGER

-1.400

-2.000 0.000

SPI INDEX TRIGGER

100.00%PTCReliability

Relief Zone 4

Relief Zone 1

Relief Zone 3

U

0.00PTCVulnerabilty

Relief Zone 2

100.00%COLReliabilityZone 1 Max Aug

U

Zone 2 Max Aug

U

Zone 3 Max Aug

U

0.00COLVulnerabilty

0.25BLVulnerabilty

ColumbusReliefTargetFlow

U

0%BLReliability

0PTCShortCount

0COLShortCount

1BLShortCount

0NewtonShortCount

0Whitesburg Short Count

100.00WhitesburgReliability

0.0Whitesburg Vulnerabilty

100.00NewtonReliability

0.0NewtonVulnerabilty

Whitesburg Zone 1 Tar

?

Whitesburg Zone 2 Tar

?

Whitesburg Zone 3 Tar

?

Whitesburg Zone 4 Tar

?U

WPMin Cont

?

BUMinOffPeakBase

?

ColumbusTarFlow cfs

?U

JWMin

?

PtreeCrkTarFlow cfs

?

3

1 4

?U

BlountMinSwitch

BUOffPeakMult

?U

DROUGHT TRIGGER SETTINGS

AUGMENTATION

RELIEF MINIMUM

Number of failures, reliability and vulnerability of min flows with reference to the selected target. Reliability (%). Vulnerability (cfs).

Whitesburg Target

Instream Flow Controls

NON RELIEF MINIMUM FLOWSNAVIGATION

WATER MANAGEMENT MODELS WERE CREATED INBOTH STELLA AND HEC-5

Vertical Cross-section of Salinity on an Ebb and Flood Tide

OBSERVATION 4: IT OFTEN ASSUMED THAT TECHNICAL PEOPLE KNOW EVERYTHING THERE IS TO BE KNOWN TO

EFFECTIVELY MANAGE A WATERSHED. THEY JUST NEED TO BE ASKED THE RIGHT QUESTION.

LEARNING AND ADAPTING MANAGEMENT EFFORTS TO WHAT

IS LEARNED MUST BE PART OF THE PROCESS.

OBSERVATION 5: DEFINING HOW TO EVALUATE OUTPUT FROM

MODELING EFFORTS IS JUST AS CHALLENGING AND DIFFICULT AS

DEVELOPING MODELS TO SIMULATE THE SYSTEM.

EXAMPLE 2

THE DROPPING OF ELEVATIONS AT LAKE

LANEIR

#

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#

#

Flint River

# Apalachicola River

Atlanta

Albany

Columbus

Gulf of Mexico

AtlanticOcean

#

Chattahoochee RiverLake Lanier

IN 2006-2008 THE ACF BASIN HAS EXPERIENCED A MAJOR DROUGHT EVENT

LAKE LANIER ELEVATIONS (2006 - 2008)

1035

1040

1045

1050

1055

1060

1065

1070

Jan-06 Apr-06 Jul-06 Oct-06 Jan-07 Apr-07 Jul-07 Oct-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Oct-08

EL

EV

AT

ION

(F

T)

BOTTOM OF CONSERVATION POOL

Storage between 1035 and 1050 = 193,000 cfs-daysor 380,000 acre-feet (125,000 MGD)

GEORGIA RESPONSES TO DROUGHT

1. Prayer meetings2. Move border north

3. Reduce downstream flows

PRO-RATING OF CAUSAL FACTORS FOR CHANGES IN LANIER ELEVATION IN 2007

1,030

1,035

1,040

1,045

1,050

1,055

1,060

1,065

1,070

1,075

0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000 700000 800000 900000 1000000

STORAGE VOLUME (dsf)

Ele

va

tio

n (

ft)

DIRECT WITHDRAWALS AND EVAPORATION FROM LAKE LANIER

RELEASES TO SUPPORT CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVERWATER QUALITYAND METRO ATLANTA WITHDRAWALS

RELEASES TO SUPPORT FARLEY NUCLEAR

RELEASES TO SUPPORTAPALACHICOLA RIVERFLOW

ACTIVE STORAGE REMAINING

INACTIVE STORAGE

70% OF THE DRAWDOWN CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE METRO ATLANTA REGION AND <10% TO RELEASES TO APALACHICOLA RIVER

SUMMARY OF CUMULATIVE FLOW DEFICIT FROM AVERAGE OBSERVED FLOW DURING MAJOR DROUGHT EVENTS

-400000

-350000

-300000

-250000

-200000

-150000

-100000

-50000

0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

MONTHS INTO DROUGHT

FLO

W D

EFIC

IT (c

fs)

1950'S DROUGHT

1980'S DROUGHT

1999 -2002 DROUGHT

2006 - 2007 DROUGHT

-35.00

-30.00

-25.00

-20.00

-15.00

-10.00

-5.00

0.00

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

MONTHS INTO DROUGHT

PR

EC

IPIT

ATI

ON

DE

FIC

IT (i

nche

s)

1950'S DROUGHT

2006 - 2007 DROUGHT

COMPARISON OF CUMULATIVE PRECIPITATIONDEFICITS DURING 1950s AND CURRENT DROUGHTS

Georgia governmental interests have contended that Georgia has not

impacted flows in Florida.

OBSERVATION 6: IN AMERICA, WE ALSO NEED TO USE OUR

TRACTORS APPROPRIATELY.

For the balance of this presentation I would like to focus on the reasons for the termination of the Compact negotiations and where to go in the

future to address these observations.

A major reason for the termination of the Compact was a breakdown in

trust among the negotiating parties.

This breakdown in trust was caused by multiple factors including:

1. The insertion of new data and information into the negotiating

process which was not put through the same collaborative process as

was called for in the Comprehensive Study.

2. The State of Georgia entering into a negotiated agreement on litigation

which involved use of the storage pool at Lake Lanier while

simultaneously being involved in negotiations on the Allocation

Formula for use of the same water.

3. The process for developing and content of a Memorandum

Agreement in 2003 which was intended to define the boundaries of

an acceptable agreement.

Another major problem was the negotiators failure to define what

constituted a successful agreement.

This created the dilemma where there was ample data and tools to

evaluate alternative Allocation Formula alternatives, but no agreed upon standards to evaluate results

against.

Deciding on what constitutes an acceptable results is a policy

decision that needs to be made by negotiators and policy decision-

makers, not a decision to be left to technical staff developing and

running models.

Many of the process problems in the Allocation Formula negotiations

could possibly have been avoided if there had been a neutral facilitator or

mediator who was responsible for the negotiation process.

WHERE TO FROM HERE?

1. The boundaries of an interstate agreement need to be defined by the

three states (e.g. environmental flows for the Apalachicola River,

acceptable reservoir elevations, etc.)

2. A group of technical people need to define multiple options of

reservoir management and demand management using modeling tools

to meet defined boundaries.

3. A program to monitor system performance and implementation of agreements to be established and

sustained.

4. The limits of the system need to be understood and adhered to and the paradigm of commonizing the costs and privatizing the profits

abandoned.