space for religion- a belfast case study
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Pergamon
Pdi t i c ul Geog r a p h y , Vol. 1 1, No . 2 , pp . 1 4 5 - 1 7 0, 1998
0 1998 Elwier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
PII:SO 2-6298(97)00039-5
0962 - 6298 / 98 19 . 00 +O. OO
Space for religion: a Belfast case study
DAVII N. LIVINGSTONE
The
Queens University of
Belfast, Belfast, Northern I reland, UK
MARGARET
C.
DEANE
St. Ma ys College, Belfast, Northern I reland, UK
FREDERICK
W.
BOAL
The Queen s University of Belfast, Belfast, Nor thern I reland, UK
.~~SIRKT. In the recent reassertion of the importance of spatiality in the proc-
esses of social reproduction, the significance of religious space has been very
largely ignored. This omission is nowhere more evident than in Northern Ireland
where, despite high levels of religious observance, remarkably little attention
has been devoted to the spaces of religious life and practice. Religious space is
not uniform: it is multi-dimensional, incorporating both the material and the
metaphysical. In this paper we focus attention on the spaces of denominational
allegiance and theological conviction, and use these as vehicles for elucidating
social, political, and moral attitudes of Catholic and Protestant churchgoers in
Belfast. Our findings reveal that, save for issues to do with constitutional identity,
the monolithising of the Catholic and Protestant communities conceals the rich
variety of religious cultures that profoundly influence everyday life in Northern
Ireland. Focusing exclusively on bi-polar constitutional objectives, therefore,
tends to deflect attention away from the diversity of underlying motivations.
0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
KEYWOIUX.eligion, churchgoers, denominations, Belfast
Religious space
In
recent times there
has been a growing insistence among students of human society
that physical and social space is fundamental to the constitution of social relations.
Observers-from Goffmann (1969, 1971) to Giddens (1984)-have sought to show just
how significant the various arenas in which social life is transacted really are in the proc-
esses of societal reproduction. Among these the variety of domestic, employment,
recreational, political, medical and other cultural spaces readily spring to mind. Much of
this work, moreover, has drawn inspiration from the writings of figures like Michel
Foucault (e.g. Foucault, 1980) who has uncovered some of the ways in which diverse
discourse-producing sites (like the hospital, the prison, the asylum, the school, the theatre)
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146
Space or reli gion: a Belfast case study
exercise profound power in modern society. From these sites emanate knowledge claims
and practices that are so powerful as to constitute human agency through their capacity
to produce the very social realities in which we all transact the affairs of everyday life.
One particular suite of spaces, however, does not yet seem to have fallen under the
systematic scrutiny of social theorists, namely, religious spaces, Certainly there have been
a number of geographical accounts of religion (Park, 1994; Sopher, 1967; Zelinsky, 1991),
but these have tended to ignore the significance of the interior spaces of religious cultures.
This surely is a conspicuous absence since the sites of religious practice-church, temple,
mosque, synagogue -are, for many people, highly significant social arenas; in these places
values, attitudes, and practices are promulgated which have profound ramifications in the
taken-for-granted life-world. Failure to take these seriously will inescapably result in an
impoverished understanding of a societys diverse human geographies.
In routinized ways, churchgoers come together at specified times to engage in a variety
of religious and non-religious practices that condition everyday life. Many come to places
of worship several times in a week; they bring their children to a variety of organizations;
they engage in recreational activities with other co-religionists, In all, we believe these
ecclesiastical spaces afford occasions for the constitution and reproduction of com-
munity life at least as important as, and in some cases much more important than, other
domains in which the affairs of life are played out.
Religious spaces, of course, come in a variety of forms, both material and metaphysi-
cal Most obviously, to take the Christian religion, there are the specific church sites-
material places-which provide the arenas for religious and social interaction. Church
spaces,
of course, do not exist in isolation from broader institutional religious structures.
They are frequently connected to other churches through systems of denominational
affiliation. These denominational spaces-less material than church spaces-are dif-
ferentially influential on the people who inhabit them. At the least material, and most
metaphysical, end of the spectrum, are the belief spaces that religious practitioners
occupy. Some are more orthodox or conservative in their outlook than others, and these
stances over doctrine and practice condition the everyday lives of their advocates.
Churches, then, are multi-dimensional spaces, material and metaphorical, physical and
social, in which ideology, iconography, and sociability are explicitly and/or tacitly
integrated.
In the political discourse on Northern Ireland commentators have frequently preferred
to interpret community conflict in political or economic terms. This does not mean that
religious accounts have been entirely absent. For example, Rose (1971) p. 20) depicted
Northern Ireland as a b&confessional society and in the following year OBrien (1972)
p. 307) felt drawn back to the rather obvious fact of a conflict between groups defined
by religion, And even those who assert that the conflict is not religious have sometimes
conceded that it involves a sizeable religious component (Galliher and DeGregory,
1985, p. 58). Regardless of the precise significance of religion in the continuing political
strife, there is no doubt that it has an important role to play in the construction and
maintenance of ethnic identity in Northern Ireland (Akenson, 1988; Whyte, 1986).
Nevertheless the complexity of religious commitment and experience has remained largely
unexplored despite recent analyses of the attitudes of clergy and of particular
denominational traditions (Morrow et ul.,
199
1; Bruce, 1986; McElroy, 1991). Even those
advocating the central significance of religious factors typically present the problem in
terms of bipolar religious monoliths. It is precisely because such interpretations of
Northern Ireland society have been dominated by a conllictual mode1 of social life that
Protestants and Catholics have been portrayed all too often as occupying monochrome
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DAVII)N. LIVINGSTONE,AKGAICET
C.
KFANE AND FKELXKICK. BOAL
147
oppositional camps. In contrast, we believe that each religious tradition merits scrutiny
in its own terms, and not merely in juxtaposition to its significant other.
Churchgoers in Belfast: exploring the monoliths
Recognizing the salience of religious belief and practice in Northern Irish society, we
undertook-during the winter of 1993-an extensive survey of Protestant and Catholic
churchgoers in Belfast with a view to ascertaining their attitudes on a wide variety of
contemporary issues.
This research was animated by the conviction that the Protestant and Catholic com-
munities in Northern Ireland were too frequently represented as two, monolithic, oppos-
ing blocs, and that this typecasting failed to take with sufficient seriousness the real
complexities of the two communities. The results of such a project, we believed, could.
at once, display the extent of cultural and religious variation both across and within the
Catholic and the Protestant traditions, and at the same time afford the opportunity of cor-
relating religious belief and practice with attitudinal conviction. In this way something of
the significance of religious space in the construction of identity might be unveiled.
Each of the 81 individual church settings which was investigated is certainly worthy of
examination sui generi s. For these are the material spaces upon which religious identity
is focused; indeed given the meaning of church attendance for many in Northern Ireland-
what C.S. Lewis once referred to as the semi-political churchgoing of Ulster (Lewis, 1966
p. 19)-these sites are imbued with a particular symbolic significance. There is not time,
however, to pursue this essentially ethnographic exercise in the present context. Rather,
our attention will focus on the somewhat less material spaces of denominational allegiance
and doctrinal persuasion to determine just how important these are in accounting for
attitudinal variation.
The denominational landscape
Whereas church-going Protestantism in Northern Ireland expresses itself through a very
wide range of denominational allegiance, Catholicism constitutes a single denomination,
a universal self-contained Church. judging by returns in the 1991
Census of Popul at i on,
it stands alongside over 30 identifiable Protestant denominations in Belfast alone, twelve
of which are represented in our present analysis. Once again, while each of these
denominational traditions is worthy of individual investigation, the analytical complexity
of such a task prompted us to seek some means of imposing a manageable taxonomy on
the extensive range of Protestant institutional religious expression. Beyond the Catholic
Church we devised the scheme portrayed in Figure I whereby the Protestant denomina-
tions could be organized into a coherent framework.
In terms of demographic structure the three largest Protestant denominations-
Church of Ireland. Presbyterian and Methodist-have a relatively older age profile than
the other groups. Indeed the Pentecostal/Charismatic cluster has much lower numbers
in the 65+ age group (14 percent) compared with Presbyterian (47 percent) and Method-
ist (45 percent). In some measure at least this variation arises from the character of
recently formed independent Fellowship churches which draw heavy support from young
people. These differences directly relate to another facet of Protestant religious experi-
ence to which we will presently return, namely, inter-denominational migration. These
age profiles are further reflected in patterns of educational attainment. This means that
those denominations with more conservative theological commitments are just as likely
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148
Space
for religion:
a Beyast case study
I
of Ireland
I
Reformed ;ao 1
/
f
f
>
Non-Subscribing Presbyterian
Baptistic
mI
lb
ongregational
I
f
Independent
Assemblies
Pentecostal
of God
I
Pentecostal/Charismatic
I
Church of God
FIWIRE1. Denominational clusters showing perceived closest denominations
as their more liberal counterparts-contrary to conventional stereotypes-to have achieved
the highest levels of academic attainment. These findings subvert the standard image of
the red-neck fundamentalist disdainful of intellectual pursuits. Indeed the largest percent-
age with a University education, for example, is to be found among the Baptistic groups
(30 percent), compared with Church of Ireland (22 percent), Presbyterian (22 percent)
and Methodist (13 percent).
As a denomination, Catholicism also attracts the middle-aged or elderly (some two
thirds over 45 and a third over 65) and has few participants under the age of 25 (7
percent). The whole spectrum of education levels is represented but given the age
structure, it is no surprise that nearly 40 percent finished their schooling at primary level
while 17 percent have a university education.
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DAVID .
LMNGSTONE, ARGARET
.
KEANE ND
FKEDERICK. BOAL
149
We should recall
that not all denominations are purely self-contained entities. In COtmaSt
to Catholicism, into which 99 percent of Catholic churchgoers were born, many Protestant
denominations are, instead, more-or-less contingent affiliations of people depending on
historical and contemporary circumstances; this has a bearing on the question of internal
migration between denominations. Some reveal much higher proportions of adherents
who have crossed denominational lines. For example, while only 17 percent of Church
of Ireland and 18 percent of Presbyterian churchgoers have ever been members of another
denomination, this is true for 67 percent in the Pentecostal/Charismatic, and 68 percent
in the Other Presbyterian, groupings. In some cases these figures reflect the historical
emergence of newer denominations as splinter groups from much longer established
traditions. In others, migration may be the result of factors as diverse as marriage patterns
and theological preference. Taken overall the three larger denominations (Church of
Ireland, Presbyterian and Methodist) are decidedly more likely to be composed of people
brought up in those denominations, whereas their smaller counterparts, typically, have
considerable majorities who have transferred from elsewhere. These migration patterns
clearly display the relative growth of more evangelical denominations. The comparative
constancy displayed by Catholics as distinct from the migrational behaviour of Protestant
denominations is referred to by Dunlop (1995, p. 96) who, no doubt controversially, sug-
gests that for theological reasons, the Catholic culture of hospitality is gentler and more
accommodating with sinners and that Catholics, therefore, may find it possible to stay
within the Catholic Church whilst disagreeing with some of its teachings. In such
circumstances Protestants would be much more likely to leave in their search for theologi-
cal precision.
On matters of faith and practice something of a cleavage is evident between the three
larger Protestant churches and the remaining four denominational clusters. Consider, for
example, the variation in attitude to a number of issues bearing on inter-church relations.
While the vast majority of those from the larger Protestant groups are happy to participate
in inter-denominational ventures with each other, rather less than half of them find joint
services with Brethren and Free Presbyterians congenial (see Figure 2).5 Indeed, it is
worth noting that respondents from these larger denominations are more willing to join
with Catholics than they are with the more fundamentalist elements within the Protestant
fold.
The contrast between the larger and smaller Protestant denominations is striking. The
latter are much more willing to join with other conservative evangelical groups, and
overall find joint services with Presbyterians and Methodists more acceptable than with
the Church of Ireland. Not surprisingly, rather less than one-quarter are willing to take
part in joint acts of worship with Roman Catholics (see
Figure 3 .
It is noticeable too that
Free Presbyterians are the least prepared of any group to participate in interdenominational
services, and particularly, are unwilling to join with the Catholic Church or indeed with
the three main Protestant denominations.
Broadly similar alignments are also to be found in responses to questions to do with
future relations between Protestant and Catholic churches, as
Table I
shows. Generally
speaking, the smaller denominations are unwilling to go beyond social co-operation;
whereas larger denominations are rather more willing to engage in social and religious
inter-church relations. Church unity, however, does not seem to be particularly welcomed
by any of the Protestant groups, though Church of Ireland respondents seem rather more
inclined to aim for unity than the other larger denominations. It is particularly noticeable
from this table that those expressing greatest interest in church unity come from the
Pentecostal/Charismatic group. This might seem surprising given the solidly evangelical
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DA\II N. LMNGSTONE, ARGARET. KFANE NI FREL ERK:K. BOAL
151
t
t
IXI
E
3
h
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152 Space o r r el i g i on : a Be l f as t case stu dy
TABLE. Future relations between Protestant and Catholic churches
Denom i n a t i o n /
d e n om i n a t i o n a l
c l u s t e r
U n i t y Rel i g i o u s a n d
soc ia l
co -ope ra t i on
Soc i a l
co -ope ra t i on
N o associ a t i o n
Catholic
Church of Ireland
Presbyterian
Methodist
Baptistic
Pentecostal/
Charismatic
Other
Presbyterian
Congregational
47%
14%
9%
11%
5%
21%
3%
16%
33
46%
54x
60
57
19
22
3
6
25
28
26
59
40
43
39
1%
6
41
5
17%
18%
49
12
but an even stronger preference (65 percent) for a Catholic ethos in the school. Neverthe-
less, the strong attachment to Catholic education overall does not imply that Catholics
are against mixing in other respects; a massive 96 percent favoured Protestant and Catholic
children working together on joint projects (see F igu re 4 ) .
Apart from the Church of Ireland (48 percent), all Protestant denominational group-
ings reveal a majority of respondents who prefer to have their children educated in a
school with exclusively Protestant values. But while for Methodists and Presbyterians the
figures are 5 1 percent and 57 percent respectively, it rises to 69 percent for those in the
Baptistic category and to 92 percent for Other Presbyterians. Correspondingly, schools
with shared Protestant and Catholic values draw almost no support-a mere 3 percent
from Other Presbyterians, rising to around a quarter from Baptistic and Pentecostal/
Charismatic groups, and to just under a half of those from the Church of Ireland,
Presbyterian and Methodist churches. And yet these figures conceal some interesting
variations. The Pentecostal/Charismatic grouping, for example, is composed of traditional
Pentecostal churches of various types, and a large independent charismatic fellowship.
When we disaggregate the responses to these two subgroups, we discover that a full 50
percent from the independent charismatic fellowship are supportive of schools with
shared Protestant and Catholic values compared with 17 percent from other Pentecostal
churches. The monolithic application of labels like fundamentalist to such denomina-
tions can effectively obscure significant variations which make it dangerous to assume
that such churchgoers inevitably adopt highly traditional attitudes to cross-community
endeavours. These findings are closely correlated with attitudes to the type of school to
which Protestants prefer to send their children. Again we see that those groups most in
favour of a school with mixed religious ethos are also those most in favour of a school
with equal numbers of Protestant and Catholic children. F i gu r e 4 shows the pattern of
response to school type from our seven denominational clusters.
Attitudes to the type of school to which churchgoers would prefer to send their children
provide only one measure of potential social interaction across the communities. Views
about mixed Protestant/Catholic marriage provide another indicator and whilst no great
support for mixed schooling is evident, in the case of mixed marriage an even less open
stance is discernible. Indeed Protestant churchgoers, taken over all, are rather more will-
ing to accept inter-racial marriage than Protestant/Catholic marriage-a pattern which
is at its most evident amongst the smaller denominations. Precisely the same feelings are
manifest among Catholic churchgoers (see F igu re 5 ) .
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DAVID N. LMNGSTONE.MARGARET . KEANEANDFREDEM: ;W. BUM
153
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DAVIDN. LMNGSTONE,MARGAFSTC. KME ANDFREDERICK. BOAL
155
A third
indicator of attitudes towards cross-community relations is to be found in mat-
ters to do with neighbourhood composition, an arena where contact may be important
in the formation of political attitudes and where the processes of social reproduction are
effected (Boal, 1987). Being brought up in a segregated area (experienced by 6 out of 10
Protestants and 7 out of 10 Catholics) provides a sense of physical and psychological
security, particularly given the history of forced population movement in Belfast over the
last quarter of a century (Keane, 1990) and may contribute to the fact that more than
half-57 percent of Protestants and 55 percent of Catholics-would prefer to maintain
residentially separate or almost separate communities. The one Protestant group where
support for such residential exclusivity is conspicuously higher among Other Presbyterians
where the figure rises to 85 percent.
Two very different but disaffected attitudes are apparent in matters to do with religion
and employment. On the one hand, a marked sense of Protestant alienation is detectable.
Responses to questions about fairness in employment in Northern Irish society show that
an overwhelming majority of all Protestant denominations (95 percent+) is convinced
that Catholics generally get a fair deal while a minority of between 20-30 percent feel
that Protestants do not get a fair deal; indeed in the case of Other Presbyterians a major-
ity feel this way. In contrast, there is a strong Catholic sense that, in its employment
practices, Northern Ireland has been less than kind to Catholics; only a quarter agree that
Catholics are equitably treated while a massive 96 believe that Protestants get a fair deal.
It is plain, then, that both communities shoulder some sense of grievance, though this is
more widely felt amongst Catholics. At the same time, neither community seems to have
much sense that the other is disadvantaged in the job market. For each community the
geographical distribution of perceived disadvantage follows the contours of their own
ethnic group.
These guarded attitudes to sharing employment opportunities indicate an unenthusiastic
openness to mixing in general. This mindset is evident also in respect of education where
mixed schooling will not be at the expense of preserving the values of the respective
religious cultures. When considered alongside attitudes to marriage and residential mix-
ing, these views reflect the universal tendency of being more comfortable with ones
own, especially in times of political tension.
Political identity
Despite the attitudinal variation we have so far identified, on a number of key issues to do
with the fundamentals of political identity, there is overwhelming agreement across the
Protestant denominational divides. In this respect, over 80 percent of Protestants are
convinced that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. Similar
proportions agree that the security situation in Northern Ireland should be left entirely
to the security forces. At the same time, the vast majority of all Protestant denominations
feels that there is either very little or no understanding by people across the water of
why many Ulster Protestants want to maintain the Union with Great Britain. Ironically,
this sense of isolation, exacerbated by a perceived lack of empathetic understanding, has
done nothing to diminish the Protestant sense of Britishness. Thus, on the question of
national identity a majority of all Protestant denominations wants to incorporate a strongly
British component, by designating themselves British or to a lesser extent Ulster Brit-
ish. It is worth noting, however, that the strongest support for the designation Ulsterman/
woman is forthcoming from the Other Presbyterian group, where 35 percent identify
themselves by this label, compared with less than 20 percent from all other denominational
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156 Space o r r el i g i on : a Be I f as t case s tudy
groupings. These patterns find predictable expression in party political preference among
Protestant churchgoers. Beyond the broad band of support for the Ulster Unionist Party,
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) derives proportionately greater support from the
smaIler denominations, while the Alliance Party attracts a quarter of Church of Ireland,
Presbyterian and Methodist churchgoers.
Protestant churchgoers are evidently concerned to retain their British identity. When it
comes to reasons why they feel that Protestants object to a United Ireland, fear of the
power the Roman Catholic church would have in a United Ireland was the most com-
mon answer. What is noticeable, however, is that while for the larger denominations the
difference between this response and a fear of losing British identity was only in the
order of 2 to 3 percent, among the smaller denominational groupings the gap widened to
15 percent for the Baptistic cluster and 43 percent for Other Presbyterians.
These findings should be placed alongside the reasons expressed by Catholics themselves
as to why over 70 percent of them want a United Ireland. By far the most common
response was that it would enable them to express their Irish identity (65 percent) and
only 7 percent indicated that it was because they would prefer to live in a Catholic
country. There was no such consensus in Catholic perceptions of Protestant opposition
to a United Ireland. Only a quarter believed that Protestants fear the power that the
Catholic church might have in such a political environment but slightly more of them
suggested that, as they saw it, Protestants want to keep their privileged position in
Northern Ireland.
It is clear that Northern Ireland Catholics are worlds apart from Protestant denomina-
tions with regard to national identity, no more than 2 percent considering themselves to
be British. Rather, the overwhelming majority identify with some form of Irishness, 7 out
of 10 as unequivocally Irish and 2 out of 10 as Northern Irish. This strong sense of Irish-
ness finds political expression in preference for parties which are nationalist in political
philosophy and which see Northern Irelands future within an all-Ireland framework;
around 70% support the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) while another 12
percent find Sinn Fein to be closest to their views. In contrast, unlike the mainstream
Protestant denominations, only 7 percent expressed a preference for the cross-
community but prounion Alliance party.
Because for Protestants opposition to a United lreland springs from an uneasiness about
the loss of national or religious identity, it is highly significant that more than 75 percent
of all Protestant denominations (except for Other Presbyterian-69 percent) believe
that at some stage in the future, more than half the population of Northern Ireland will
be Roman Catholic, with all the political and religious implications inherent in that
circumstance. Indeed, around half of al1 Protestant denominations are assured that this
demographic change will be effected in the next 20 years.8 Such findings run directly
counter to the political aspirations that the vast majority of al1 Protestant denominations
(SO-95 percent) share, namely, that Northern Irelands long term political future should
be to remain part of the United Kingdom. Here we find exposed a siege mentality amongst
Protestants, who whilst perceiving themselves likely to be outnumbered in the not-too
distant future, nevertheless remain overwhelmingly committed to a future within the
United Kingdom. Demographic trends elicit a different reaction from Catholics. The fact
that 85 percent of Catholic churchgoers believe that there will be a Catholic majority in
Northern Ireland-and for almost 80 percent of these that circumstance is believed to be
no more than 30 years away-induces considerable psychological confidence.
Given these expressions of both ecclesiastical and civic identity, it is clear that for a
large minority of Protestant churchgoers (unlike their Catholic counterparts) theological
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DAVID
N.
LMNCSTONE,MARCARET
.
KEANEAND
FREDERICK. BOAL
157
convictions are tied to Northern Irelands geographical
space. Between one-quarter and
one-third of denominations (rising to almost a half of Other Presbyterians) expressed a
view that the flourishing of the gospel depends upon the continuance of the protective
shield of the state. Here we find expressed that intimate connection between territory
and theology such that the preservation of the theology requires the maintenance of the
geography. For a considerable minority of Protestant churchgoers, it seems, grace and
space belong together. Catholics, it seems, do not see things this way: no more than 12
percent considered that the Catholic faith can only flourish in the northern part of Ireland
if Ireland is united and more than half of these were over
65.
Nevertheless, the system
of Catholic education in Ireland is sometimes defended in the categories of national-
spatial identity. According to one prominent Catholic educationahst, Monsignor Denis
Faul, Catholic schools have a special obligation to preserve a specific religious ethic and
moral training in family life as well as the distinctive Irish culture. (Belfast Telegraph, 26
September 1996).
Having analysed the nature of religious space in Northern Ireland through the filter of
denominational allegiance, we propose now to turn to the social and political
significance of the least material and most metaphysical of religious spaces-that of
doctrinal conviction.
Doctrinal space
While denominational affiliation makes a demonstrable difference to a wide range of
attitudes among Belfast churchgoers, other studies both here and elsewhere have pointed
to the even greater significance of theological convictions, lying on a spectrum from
conservative to liberal (Boa1
et al .,
1991; MacGrSl, 1991; Bruce, 1984; Martin, 1967). If
indeed this is the case, it becomes important to determine the nature of the beliefs
espoused by churchgoers. Accordingly, we now turn to an examination of the influence
of theological convictions in conditioning the attitudes of contemporary Protestant and
Catholic churchgoers.
Protestant churchgoers fall into three relatively distinct categories based on beliefs
about conversion and the Bible: conservative, liberal-conservative, and liberal. While
these relate in significant ways to other conventional terms of religious description-like
evangelical or fundamentalist-we have chosen to make scarce use of these labels because
they carry a range of associations not necessarily implied in our typology. Amongst the
Protestant churchgoers sampled, 50 percent occupy the conservative category, with 25
percent liberal, and a further one quarter falling into the middle 1iberaIconservative
group. The numerical predominance of conservatives that these figures reveal further
confirms the findings of an earlier survey in 1983 (Boal et al ., 1985); indeed if anything
there has been a marginal increase in the proportion of those of conservative persuasion.
Theological conservatism is continuing to thrive and theories assuming the decline of
either fundamentalism or evangelicalism with the progress of industrial modernism must
be seriously questioned (Martin, 1982; Bruce, 1990).
Theological space, we must further note, does not map directly onto denominational
space: almost every denomination encompasses churchgoers occupying different points
on this theological spectrum (see Table 2). Indeed in some cases within a single denomina-
tion it is possible to find congregations that are predominantly liberal and others
predominantly conservative. Nevertheless, certain denominations are more heavily
concentrated in one of the categories while others are spread across the three groups.
Amongst Presbyterians and Methodists, for example, 38 percent and 43 percent respectively
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158
Space o r r e l i g i o n : a
Belfast case study
TABLE2. Theological composition of Protestant denominational clusters
Denom i n a t i o n a l
c l u s t e r
I n Conser va t i v e ( j L i b er a l -Conser va t i v e
L i b er a l ( j
C h j
Ch&ch of Ireland
Presbyterian
Methodist
Congregational
Baptistic
Pentecostal/
Charismatic
Other Presbyterian
27
28 45
38
29 33
43
35 23
79
17 4
83
I5 1
87
12 0
94
6 0
can be described as theologically conservative; among some smaller denominations virtu-
ally no theological liberals are to be found.
So far as Catholic churchgoers are concerned, three categories of doctrinal orthodoxy-
high, moderate and low-were developed to relate to the Protestant conservative-liberal
range by using respondents degree of commitment to a range of Catholic church teach-
ings. At the conservative end the high orthodoxy group (48 percent) show no doctrinal
doubts, whilst the moderates (38 percent) and those of low orthodoxy (14 percent)
exhibit decreasing levels of conformism.3
Th e demog r a ph i c
dimension
While, for both Catholics and Protestants, gender does not make any appreciable dif-
ference to doctrinal conviction, age turns out to be strikingly important. Protestant
churchgoers in the younger age cohorts are overwhelmingly conservative in their
doctrinal beliefs compared with those in the older age groups. Of those between the
age of 18-24, 76 percent are conservative compared with only 10 percent who are
liberal. For the over 65s, by contrast, the proportions change to 41 percent and 32
percent respectively.
Generally speaking the percentage of conservatives declines as one moves upward
through the different age bands (see F igu re 6 ) . Age is also a crucial factor among Catholics
but, unlike their Protestant counterparts, those of higher orthodoxy are the older group,
8 out of 10 of whom are over 45. Correspondingly, low orthodoxy is much more
characteristic of younger Catholics (see
F igu re 7 ) .
Of course it is not at all obvious just
how Protestant and Catholic religious conservatism relate to each other or how important
different strategies of retention might be in accounting for these patterns. Nevertheless,
these contrasts between Catholic and Protestant young people suggest markedly differ-
ent future scenarios. For Protestants increasing theological conservatism seems likely,
while the Catholic Church seems set to experience either an increasing theological
liberalism or the inroads of secularization.*
Not surprisingly, the contours of the theological spectrum closely map on to a range of
related matters such as the practice of personal and family devotion, frequency of church
attendance, and attitudes to women clergy. Here, however, we choose to turn attention
to their bearing on other affairs by ascertaining the significance of individual doctrinal
conviction as a conditioner of social and political attitudes.
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DAVID
N.
LMNGSTONE,ARGARET. KFANE ND REDERICK. BOAI
159
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Y Conservative
---+-- Lib-Cons
- Liberal
I I
I
I I
I I
Under 17 18 - 24 25- 34 35 -44 45 - 54 55 -64 65 +
FIGURE. Protestants--theological spectrum and age.
Community relations
Profound differences in attitudes to community relations are immediately apparent. Deal-
ing first with the more purely religious aspect of this issue we find that among churchgo-
ing Protestants, only 19 of conservatives express a willingness to participate in joint
services of worship with Catholics whereas for liberals the figure rises dramatically to 71
percent. Having said this, however, very few church-going Protestants of any theological
stripe express much interest in church unity (around one in ten) though it should be
noted that liberals are far more enthusiastic about church services with Catholics than
with fellow Protestants from the more religiously conservative denominations. All this
points to highly significant religious cleavages within Ulster Protestantism: for some, the
culture of Protestant Fundamentalism is much less congenial than the traditions of Catholic
worship.
Among Catholic churchgoers, in spite of a strong denominational commitment in
religious practice and belief, there is evidence of a general willingness to compromise on
the matter of worshipping with members of Protestant denominations, at least on occa-
sions. Indeed, only 15 percent expressed any reservation and this group cannot be
distinguished in respect of theological conviction. Nevertheless, the fact that strongest
support for church unity is among the most highly orthodox Catholics, 55 percent of
them as compared with 42 percent at the low orthodoxy end of the spectrum, leads to
the conclusion that they may view such unity as a return of their separated brethren to
the Catholic fold-a view that may share something with that of the Free Presbyterian
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160
Space or reli gion: a Belfat case study
70 -
60 -
50 -
40 -
% -
30 -
20 -
10 -
High
Moderate
Low
n&l7 18:4
25: 34 35: 44 45: 54 55: 64 6;+
FKXIRE
.
Catholics-orthodoxy and age
respondent
who observed that church unity was to be welcomed when the Church of
Rome is reconciled to the God of the Bible.
A broadly similar range of attitudes also manifests itself on the issue of mixed marriage.
Taken overall among Protestants there is an overwhelming opposition to Protestant and
Catholic marriage, although understandably this is strongest among conservatives-a
mere 7 percent indicate a willingness to marry a Catholic compared with 28 percent of
liberals. Beyond this a majority of conservatives are willing to take a marriage partner
from the range of Protestant denominations. By contrast liberals seem to be much more
selective in the Protestant denominations from which they would happily choose a mar-
riage partner; over 90 percent are favourably disposed to members of the Presbyterian,
Church of Ireland and Methodist denominations, whereas for such groups as the Brethren,
Pentecostalists and Free Presbyterians the number is closer to one in four-a figure even
smaller than for Catholics.
As with Protestants, Catholics strongly favour endogamous marriage relationships. This
is in line with the traditional Catholic church expectation that Catholics should marry
Catholics, a view still valued by many older churchgoers of a high orthodox outlook, only
12 of whom would be happy to marry a Protestant as compared with just over half of
their low orthodox coreligionists. It should be noted, however, that intermarriage with
the mainstream Protestant denominations, and most especially with members of the
Church of Ireland, is markedly more attractive to Catholics at all points on the theologi-
cal spectrum.
If there is this variety of attitudes expressed towards mixed marriage then it is likely
that it will have an impact on views about schooling since in the school environment
future marriage partners may be found. As far as Protestants are concerned, three-quarters
of conservatives prefer to have their children educated in a school with exclusively
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DAVID . LMNGSTONE,ARGARET. KE NE ND FREDERICK. Boa
161
Protestant values and therefore want to send their children to either an all Protestant or
mostly Protestant school. Correspondingly, only around one in five want a shared Protestant
and Catholic ethos for their childrens education compared with three in five liberals.
Much the same attitude is revealed by Catholics. The pattern suggests that for them
also,
separate denominational schooling has a secure future; indeed, nearly 8 out of 10 of the
high orthodox group indicated their preference for a religiously exclusive educational
ethos for their children. This is a less popular choice among those at the other end of the
theological scale where it drops to 4 in 10 churchgoers; they are also less insistent that all
pupils must be Catholic. It is among this latter, if numerically smaller, low orthodox group
that most support for a shared Catholic-Protestant school ethos lies.
The same basic pattern of response also surfaces in attitudes towards the neighbour-
hood type in which respondents would like to live. Conservatives among Protestants are
much more inclined to favour an all Protestant neighbourhood--2 1 percent-compared
with 6 percent of liberals. This pattern of residential preference is even more strongly
manifest amongst high orthodox Catholics, 46 percent of whom express a wish for
residence in a segregated neighbourhood-contrasting with 22 percent of the low
orthodox. Neighbourhood preference is, of course, quite closely linked to current
neighbourhood experience. Here we find that conservative/high orthodox churchgo-
ers are much more likely to reside in segregated neighbourhoods than their liberal/
low orthodox counterparts. Thus, with Catholics, just over half of the high orthodox
group live in all Catholic neighbourhoods-for the low orthodox the figure is only 10
percent. Likewise with Protestants-68 percent of conservative Protestant churchgo-
ers live in all-Protestant neighbourhoods, a proportion that falls to a mere 6 percent
for liberals.
These findings point to the existence of a set of very significant socio-spatial milieux.
Conservative Protestants are, on average, likely to reside amongst other Protestants. In
turn. those of their Protestant neighbours who are churchgoers are likely to be conserva-
tive and, relative to the experience of liberal Protestants, are also likely to be working
class. Similarly with Catholics-high orthodoxy Catholics are likely to reside amongst
other Catholics. And again, churchgoers in their neighbourhoods are likely to be high
orthodox and are also more likely to be working class. The reverse situation will apply
with the low orthodox/liberal amongst Belfasts churchgoers. They are more likely to
experience neighbourhoods that are religiously mixed, where a significant proportion of
the churchgoers amongst the residents will be a melange of low orthodoxy Catholics and
liberal Protestants, in both cases predominantly of middle class background. Our data
do not permit exploration of the social dynamics of these contexts, but reinforcement of
conservatism/high orthodoxy on the one hand, and liberalism/low orthodoxy on the
other-and their class connections-would seem a possible consequence of the neighbour-
hood environments described.
Attitudes to mixed marriage, school ethos, school type, neighbourhood prefer-
ence and work environment form a spectrum concerning aspects of cross-
community interaction. The differences between conservative, liberal-conservative
and liberal Protestants and between high, moderate, and low orthodoxy Catholics
are recorded below (see Figure 8 and Figure 7). Here we can clearly see that,
whereas the
extent
of exclusivity varies between the sub-groups, the attitudinalpat-
tern for Catholics and Protestants alike is remarkably consistent. For both religious
groups exclusivity seems in every case to be more important for conservatives than
for either of the other two groups.
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Space
or e l i g i o n
a Belfast
case study
80
80
20
T
Conservative
q
iberal/Conservative
Liberal
Marriage
School
Ethos
School Type
Neighbourhood
Work
Cross-Community Arenas
Marriage:
Those who would not be happy to marry a Northern Irish Catholic
School Ethos:
Those preferring to send their children to a school with Protestant values
School Type:
Those preferring to send their children to an all-Protestant school
Neighbourhood: Those preferring to live in an all-Protestant neighbourhood
Work:
Those who would not be happy to work with a Northern Irish Catholic
FIGURE. Protestant exclusivity.
Pub l i c a n d p r i u a t e mo r a l i t y
Given the very considerable disparities that we have just identified, the question arises as
to whether these attitudes permeate other aspects of social life. Here we consider a
number of moral issues ranging from public disciplinary procedures and institutions in
society to matters of private morality in general and sexual mores in particular.
Turning first to the public arena and to its most extreme expression of judgement-
capital punishment-we find that a majority of Protestant churchgoers of all theological
opinions would support its re-introduction (conservative 75 percent; liberal-conservative
68 percent; liberal, 61 percent), with the strongest supporting expression stemming from
the conservatives. The depth of concern over this issue that is recorded by conservatives
also comes through in their feelings that the courts let wrong-doers off too lightly and
that corporal punishment in schools should be brought back. Nevertheless, this should
not obscure the overwhelming agreement across the spectrum that is voiced concerning
the judicial system; nine out of every ten Protestant churchgoers, across the theological
range, are convinced that the courts are too lenient these days.
Catholic opinion across their theological range, in contrast to that of Protestants, is
generally resistant to the re-introduction of capital punishment and only around a quarter
accept the need for it, whatever their religious bent. That is not to say, however, that
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DAVID . LMNGSTONE,MARGARET. KEANEANDFREDERICK . BOAI
163
80 -
60 -
40 -
20 -
0-r
High Orthodox
q
Moderate Orthodox
q OW
Orthodox
7
v
Marriage School Ethos School Type
Neighbourhood Work
Cross-Community Arenas
Marriage:
Those who would not be happy to marry a Northern Irish Protestant
School Ethos: Those preferring to send their children to a school with Catholic values
School Type: Those preferring to send their children to an all-Catholic school
Neighbourhood: Those preferring to live in an
all-Catholic neighbourhood
Work: Those who would not be happy to work with a Northern Irish Protestant
FIGURE. Catholic exclusivity.
other disciplinary procedures such as bringing back the cane in schools would be regarded
unfavourably; rather, this disciplinary measure finds approval with two-thirds of the
religiously more conservative, although only with around two in five of those of a more
liberal outlook. And what is more, the view that the courts are too lenient with offenders
is a shared one (83 percent of the high orthodox and 75 percent of their low orthodox
counterparts).
Position on the theological spectrum also counts in the private domain. Thus differ-
ences between conservative and liberal Protestants widen substantially when it comes to
matters of divorce (see F i gu r e 20) . Whether on the grounds of violence, mental cruelty,
desertion, incompatibility, or irretrievable breakdown, Protestant liberals are in every
case at least 25 percent more likely (and in some cases nearly 50 percent more likely)
than conservatives to countenance divorce. There is, moreover, some difference of opinion
on whether adultery provides legitimate grounds for divorce. While 67 percent of conserva-
tives believe that this is so, the figure for liberals drops to 59 percent. Clearly the issue of
sexual fidelity remains a salient component of the conservative psyche and is, correspond-
ingly, less prominent within the liberal mindset, at least compared with other divorce-
related circumstances.
In spite of the fact that the Catholic Church has long frowned on divorce, it is prepared
to accept it as long as there is no re-marriage. In these circumstances around 4 out of 5
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a 6
4 2
0
v
v
H
L
b
a
A
a
e
C
r
c
u
m
a
A
a
e
C
r
c
u
m
a
1
t
g
O
h
m
L
w
O
h
8
6
4
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o
e
a
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DAVIDN. LIVINGSTONE, ARGARET . KUNE ANI FREDEKICKW. BOAL
165
respondents indicated a willingness to accept divorce in some contexts especially where
physical violence or mental cruelty has occurred (around 60% in both cases). Even so,
those of a highly orthodox mindset display greater steadfastness in the face of societal
pressures: 36 percent of them, as compared to only 6 percent of the low orthodox, would
not countenance divorce in any circumstances. These cleavages in moral stance are even
more accentuated when it comes to the question of abortion. There is an overwhelm-
ingly anti-abortion ethic shared by churchgoers across the various theological positions
in the sense that there is practically no support for the view that abortion is always, or
even generally, morally acceptable. Having said that, the strongest opposition to abortion
is forthcoming from Catholics, and especially from the more religiously conservative
Catholics among whom opposition is almost universal: 93 percent of them declare it to
be wrong, comparedwith 74 percent of the moderates and 43 percent of the low orthodox
group. Compare this pattern to 53 percent of Protestant conservatives who regard it as
always wrong, a conviction which finds support among 25 percent of liberal conserva-
tives and only 11 percent of liberals. Correspondingly, it is not surprising that the great-
est sense of equivocation is expressed by liberals, On the abortion issue, we cannot fail
to note that conservative Protestants stand much closer to Catholics than to fellow
Protestants of liberal outlook.
On matters of morality in Northern Ireland it does not come as a surprise that the dif-
ferences between conservatives and liberals are at their sharpest on questions of sexual
behaviour. An overwhelming percentage of conservatives thus find sex before marriage,
cohabitation, and homosexual practices to be always wrong. Among Protestants this
amounts to 88 percent, 85 percent, and 94 percent of conservative opinion respectively
while for liberals these figures drop to 31 percent, 28 percent and 56 percent. Catholic
attitudes are fairly similar
if
a shade less strict; 82 percent, 81 percent and 87 percent for
the conservatives and at the other end of the orthodoxy scale, 23 percent, 20 percent
and 39 percent. These figures clearly reveal substantial disparity in judgements about
sexual morality and underline the significance of religious space in Northern Ireland.
Pol i t ica l
pe r suas i on
Despite all the divergences in the religious, moral, and cultural spheres that have been
observed, when it comes to issues of politics and identity in Northern Ireland there is
remarkably little internal variation in attitude within each of the two traditions. Of
course this is not to say that there is
no
intramural difference of outlook, and in the case
of both Protestants and Catholics there is evidence of subtle nuances conditioned by
religious conviction.
Consider, for example, our findings on the question of which political party comes
closest to respondents current views. Protestant respondents confirm that there is a
broad band of support across the theological spectrum for the Ulster Unionist Party;
beyond that, liberals are more inclined towards the Alliance Party and conservatives
towards the Democratic Unionist Party (see Figure I .
As for Catholics, 70 percent of churchgoers across all shades of religious opinion are
strongly in agreement that the Social Democratic and Labour Party comes closest to
expressing their views but, on balance, it is a party which receives stronger support from
the more orthodox churchgoers (see
Figure 12 .
Many among the 7 percent who sup
port the Alliance Party express moderate to low levels of orthodoxy. Further, it is interest-
ing that much Sinn Fein support comes from those convinced that individual conscience
is the most important guide to leading a Christian life; these supporters are, however,
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166
Space
for reli gion: a Belfast case study
60
Conservative
q
iberal-Conservative
Liberal
DUP
Unionist
Alliance
Political Party
FIGURE1. Protestant party political preference and theological spectrum
70 -
80 -
50 -
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
o+
High Orthodox
q
Moderate Orthodox
q
ow Orthodox
Sinn Fein
SDLP
Alliance
Political Party
FIGURE2. Catholic party political preference and religious orthodoxy.
only a shade
more likely to be in the low orthodoxy segment of the theological spectrum.
For Protestants the only other political matter on which much divergence of opinion
surfaces is in attitudes towards the Orange Order. The strongest expression of support is
forthcoming from those of conservative opinion-
65
percent, with the figures falling to
62 percent for liberal-conservatives and 50 percent for liberals. In some ways this is a lit-
de surprising given the traditional antipathy to the Orange Order from certain fundamental-
ist denominations. However, we now find that the Orange Order attracts approval from
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DA~~L). LMNGSTONE, ARGAJIET. KFANE NUFREDERICK. BOAL 167
nearly halfof Brethren and Baptist churchgoers. This hints at some changes to the traditional
position adopted by these groups. Historically their non-political stance was partly
grounded in religious conviction and perhaps partly in a sense that others might be relied
upon to preserve a staunch Protestant bulwark. If so this shift would seem to indicate an
increasing politicisation in the wake of perceived constitutional uncertainty.
As for attitudes to the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, there is no more than
a small margin of disagreement across either Catholicism or Protestantism. In the first
place, the majority of Catholics aspire to an all-Ireland solution. It is also clear that this
aspiration does not vary according to position on the orthodoxy scale; around 70 percent
of the high orthodox group show support for a united Ireland and this does not fall below
60 percent even at other end of the scale. As for Protestants. lack of disagreement on
politic,al issues across the theological spectrum is nowhere more clearly revealed than in
the constitutional question, where around 9 out of 10 of both conservatives and liberals
insist that the long-term political future of Northern Ireland should be within the United
Kingdom.
Given the remarkable diversity of opinion that conservative, liberal-conservative and
liberal Protestants and high, moderate and low orthodoxy Catholics espouse on so many
moral and social issues this political unanimity may well seem surprising. Beyond the
obvious connections at the macro-scale between Catholicism and nationalism, and
Protestantism and unionism, what our findings clearly do reveal is that intra Protestant
and Catholic religious identities do not map on to political identities in any simple way.
Doctrinal conviction, it seems, has little direct bearing on political identity. By contrast,
when we take an indicator of Protestant religious identity-the experience of conversion-
the differences across the theological spectrum are immense (93 percent of conservatives
report a born-again experience, compared with 69 percent of liberal conservatives and
22 percent of liberals). And as for Catholics (who find religious conversion to be of much
less significance) their enormous range of religious identity is uncovered in the variety of
convictions expressed regarding the Catholic Church being the one true church (100
percent, 60 percent and 15 percent across the orthodoxy scale). The unanimity of politi-
cal identity thus stands in marked contrast to the diverse expressions of religious identity.
However, underlying this political equiiinality-the final objectives of constitutional
aspiration-is a continuum of social and political motivations and strategies that runs
from the exclusionist to the inclusionist.
It is clear that the only way in which many Protestants feel that they can maintain their
religious and cultural pluralism is within a constitutionally secure political monolith.
Precisely the same is true of Catholics-only the desired political monolith differs. Advocacy
of a singular constitutional arrangement can evidently spring from a diversity of motiva-
tions. Au pays des assieges, le monolithisme est de rigueur (Frere Untel, 1960, p. 35).
Conclusion
The findings we have presented in this paper are designed to illustrate something of the
complexities of religious life in Northern Ireland. Consider the deceptive simplicity of
the labels Protestant and Catholic. In the first place, despite the apparently religious
connotations of these terms, they are typically invested with almost exclusively political
meaning. However, our survey clearly demonstrates that religion matters in Belfast and
that the religious spaces that dot the urban landscape are of immense significance even
though they remain largely terrue incognita to the eye of much scholarship and politi-
cal commentary. Furthermore, it is clear that these Catholic and Protestant spaces are
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168
Space or reli gion: a Belfbst case study
themselves far from monochrome. Rather they constitute a diverse array of sites and
social spaces within which culture is differentially reproduced.
On issues of religious belief and practice, public and private morality, community relations
and experience, and motivations for political stance, we have discerned signiIicant variation
correlated in complex ways with denominational affiliation and the nature of individual
religious conviction. The stereotypical portrayal of two traditions, we believe, fails to do
justice to these realities, however analytically convenient or politically expedient such a
rudimentary taxonomy may be. That there are a number of key political issues on which
Protestants and Catholics are diametrically opposed is undoubted. But to subsume every
aspect of social life and cultural identity under the bi-polar rubric of constitutional antithesis
is to fall captive to a political reductionism whose status is, at the very least, contestable.
Acknowledgements
This
project was part funded by the European Regional Development Fund. Additional suppon was
received from the Central Community Relations Unit of the Northern Ireland Office. We are also
grateful for the helpful comments of two anonymous referees.
Notes
Historical and social circumstances contribute to the generally very high levels of church participa-
tion in Northern Ireland with affiliation rates at 91 here compared with a European average of
75 or the Great Britain average of 58 . In terms of church attendance, just over half the
population attend at least once a week whereas only three out of every 10 in Continental Europe
and one out of every 10 in Britain now do so (Whelan, 1994). However, even within Northern
Ireland, there are denominational differences; for instance in Belfast 75 of Catholics are regular
churchgoers compared to 30 of Protestants (tabulations derived from the Northern Ireland
Continuous Household Survey 1988-1991).
This attitudinal survey of regular churchgoers, both Protestant and Catholic, was carried out
during November-December
1993
n a variety of social areas in Belfast. A total of 5255 completed
questionnaire responses was obtained from 81 churches located in seven different areas of the
city chosen to cover social class characteristics, religious affiliation, ethnic pressure edges, inner
city locations, and suburbs. The information gathered from this source was supplemented by a
sequence of clergy interviews that had already been conducted between March and May 1993.
Full details of the methodology are available in Boa1 et al., 1997.
These were, respectively, Church of Ireland (11 congregations); Presbyterian (11); Methodist
(8); Baptist (7); Pentecostal (6); Free Presbyterian (4); Brethren (3); Congregational (2); Evangeli-
cal Presbyterian (2); Independent Evangelical Church (1); Non-Denominational Fellowship (1);
Non-Subscribing Presbyterian (1). Twenty-one Catholic churches were also surveyed.
Two of the largest denominations, Church of Ireland, and Methodist, were each left as separate
denominational groups. By examining Protestant respondents answers to the question Which
other denomination do you think is closest in doctrine to your own? we identified five further
denominational coalitions-Presbyterian, Baptistic, Pentecostal/Charismatic, Other Presbyterian
and Congregational. The appropriateness of this scheme was reinforced both from in-depth
interviews with clergy and from historical factors which connect certain traditions with each
other. For example the category Other Presbyterian encompasses two groups, which, though
conservative Presbyterian in theological persuasion, have historically seen their identity as distinct
from mainstream Ulster Presbyterianism. Again, the group labelled Baptistic is consistently scepti-
cal about a variety of charismatic claims and shares a fundamental commitment to the importance
of adult Baptism.
5.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 include respondents indicating that they would be happy to have a joint
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DAVID
N.
LMNGSTONE,MAR(.AKET. KE.ANE NDFREDERI~X . BOAL 169
service of worship with their own denomination. For each denomination this presumably should
be lOO%, but non-response causes percentages to drop. This may be due to respondents think-
ing it was not necessary to complete the question for their own particular denomination.
6. Conversely when it comes to marrying across the divides, the main Protestant denominations
are less prepared to welcome marriage with Free Presbyterians and Pentecostalists than with
other denominations.
7. The 20% remaining suggest other solutions to the Northern Ireland problem, such as Independ-
ence (4%12%), a European Solution (around lo/u), Devolution (around 1%) and Majority Rule
(1%,-2X). Figures advocating a United Ireland range from 0% to 7%. These variations reflect
denominational differences.
8. It is worth noting that in our 1983 survey a slightly larger proportion of Protestant churchgoers
made the same prediction.
9. The validity of this assertion was confirmed in our earlier 1983 investigation of Protestant
churchgoers in Belfast.
10.
Conseruutives are
those who indicated that Only a conversion experience ofJesus Christ as personal
Saviour makes you a Christian and that What is written in the Bible is the Word of God and is
completely without error.
Liberals
disagreed with both of these propositions. In other words liber-
als are neither conversionist nor inerrantist in any sense. The
Liberal/Conseruutiues
can be
either
conversionist or inerrantist and are therefore intermediate between the first two groups.
11. In addition, positioning on the theological spectrum differentiates individual congregations
within some-mainly the larger-denominations. That is, some congregations display a highly
conservative pattern, others more liberal, with yet others somewhere between these poles.
12.Thc nine church teachings were: The Resurrection of Christ; The Bible is the Word of God;
People can sin; The Assumption of the Blessed Virgin; The Immaculate Conception; Papal Infal-
libility; Sins are forgiven in Confession; Transubstantiation; The Catholic Church is the One True
Church. Those who firmly believe in all nine doctrines constitute the High Orthodox category;
those who firmly believe in 4-B are considered IModerate Orthodox; those firmly believing in
less than 4 were considered Low Orthodox.
13. We need to record, however, that there is no
emct
equivalence between Protestant and Catholic
positions on these scales, namely, Protestant conservatives can not be considered simply as the cor-
relates of Catholic high orthodox because of the differing criteria used to construct the scales.
14.Further investigation of such scenarios would need to take seriously the potentially different
meanings of church attendance for different denominational groups,
15. The reader should be reminded, however, of two features; firstly that the majority of Protestant
conservatives are middle class, and secondly that while a small majority of low orthodoxy
Catholics are indeed middle class, an almost equal number are of working class background. In
other words our interpretations of the neighbourhood milieux need to be interpreted very
much in terms of
tendencies.
16.ln both cases there are 20% more conservatives than liberals who strongly agree with the
propositions.
17. It should also be noted that some such groups, for example, the Brethren, Baptist and Pentecostal
denominations, historically maintained an apolitical stance refusing to exercise their voting rights.
Our survey has only ascertained which political party comest closest to their outlook and does not
indicate whether or not such groups exercise the franchise. Having said that, we suspect that there
is now a greater willingness among such groups to vote than was the case in the past.
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