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SPECIAL MEETING OFSPECIAL MEETING OFSPECIAL MEETING OFSPECIAL MEETING OF
TOWNVILLE COUNCILTOWNVILLE COUNCILTOWNVILLE COUNCILTOWNVILLE COUNCIL Date :
Monday, 22 November 2010
Venue : Council Chamber, Wyvern House, The Drumber, Winsford CW7 1AH
Time : 10.00 am
Agenda
1 Chairman's welcome 2 Apologies for absence 3 Declarations of interest 4 Public Question Time / Open Session (including presentation
of Petitions)
A period of 6 minutes is allocated for members of the public to
speak at Council meetings. Individual members of the public will be able to speak for up to 2 minutes although this may reduced depending on the number of people wishing to speak. Members of the public are invited to address the Council on any matters relevant to its work. A petition signed by 50 people can also be presented at the Question Time/Open Session at an Ordinary Meeting of the Council. An elector nominated by the signatories of the petition will be invited to present the petition at the Council meeting. The Chairman will then indicate the way in which the petition is to be dealt with in accordance with the petitions scheme adopted by the Council
5 Townville Wind Farm Debate (Pages 1 - 4) Council will debate concerns expressed by the public and
Councillors on the issues of noise, visual impact, ecology and ornithology, and planning policy.
6 Capital Programme 2009-2010 (Pages 5 - 22) Report of the Director of Resources.
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Supplementary Papers - Briefing Notes (Pages 23 - 78) For further information, please contact: Patrick Sebastian, Democratic Services 01244-975970 Date of Publication: 3 November 2010
TOWNVILLE COUNCIL WINDFARM DEBATE Proposal Description Developer Wind Farms (Townville) Limited (Developer) is seeking a Section 36 Consent for the erection of 20 wind turbines up to a height of 125 metres (blade tip) and associated infrastructure (access roads, cabling, crane pads, sub-station) on and adjacent to the Townville Ship Canal Deposit Grounds near Townville, Cheshire. Installed capacity will be up to 60MW (plan attached). Process Because the scheme has an installed capacity > 50MW it must be determined by the Secretary of State under section 36 of Electricity Act 1989. Developer’s application will therefore be submitted to Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) before the end of February 2011. Pre-application Developer has undertaken preparatory work identifying the location, discussing proposal with the relevant planning authority, statutory bodies & community bodies etc. A Scoping Document was submitted to the Council in June 2010. Responses have influenced the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Environmental Statement (ES) which is now nearing completion. Application (i) Full application package submitted to DECC by end February 2011. (ii) Copy of application will be issued to the Council as the ‘relevant planning authority’. (iii) Developer will advertise the application in national and local press (for two successive weeks). (iv) DECC will ensure documentation is circulated to other Government Departments and relevant statutory bodies. Consideration of the application (i) The Townville Council has 4 months to inform the Secretary of State if it objects to the application. (ii) The Public have 28 days from date of the last public notice to make representations. (iii) If the Council objects to the application it automatically triggers the need for a Public Inquiry
Item No. 5
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(iv) The Secretary of State can convene a Public Inquiry irrespective of whether the Council objects (v) DECC has no statutory target for determining s36 applications Consultation Developer has been in contact with the Council since early 2010 about this proposal. Developer has had several meetings with variety of officers at Scoping and pre-application stages in the run up to submission of application (e.g. to agree photomontage locations, discuss ecology, etc). Developer has engaged with both local residents and ward members prior to and since the Scoping Stage and has subsequently held a number of public exhibitions in Townville Library, Community Centre and at Community Forums. Over 500 people attended and over 180 questionnaire responses were returned. Developer organised a site visit to Scout Moor Wind Farm for members and interest groups on 6 June 2010. Developer has visited (by invitation) local High Schools. Developer has engaged and briefed local MP’s. Developer will hold further public exhibitions regarding the scheme in December 2010 following submission of the Section 36 application and will organize a further visit to its operational wind farm (Scout Moor or Port of Liverpool). The website (www.Developerenergy.co.uk/Townville) will be continually updated with details about scheme. Design Evolution The layout of the scheme has been through several iterations after consideration of numerous development constraints and input from stakeholders and other 3rd party interests. Key changes include reduction in turbine numbers, alteration in grouping of turbines (less near Townville now), increased separation between turbine clusters and decreased spacing between turbines. Summary Townville wind farm is a significant proposal for the region and would, if permitted, deliver up to 50% of Cheshire’s total 2020 target for onshore wind energy development (120MW), and 8.3% of the North West Region’s target (720MW). The scheme would be the first wind farm in the borough. Council will debate concerns expressed by the public and Councillors about issues like noise, visual impact, ecology and ornithology, as well as planning policy.
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The proposed wind farm occupies an area of land known locally as Townville Marsh. The land has been used for many years to deposit dredgings from the neighbouring Townville Ship Canal. The site extends to some 557 hectares, although only a small fraction of this land would be taken up by the development. The proposed turbines would be located on the inactive deposit grounds, avoiding the central active lagoon, thereby splitting the turbines into two distinct clusters. Developer has been considering proposals for a wind farm at Townville for several years, having completed an in-depth technical assessment of Townville believing it to be a good location for a wind farm of this scale.
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Wind speed - The site has a recorded average wind speed of 7.1 m/s at 80m height, suitable for a commercial scale wind farm. Amenity - The site allows for sufficient distance between the turbines and residential properties. The site is also on the opposite side of the M75 motorway from the majority of residential properties. Landscape - The site is located in an existing industrial landscape and outside important landscape designations but adjacent to Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, Areas of Great Landscape Value etc. Ecology - Whilst the site is adjacent to important bird habitats, the developer believes that the development can be accommodated without causing harm to animals and plants. Electrical connection - The turbines can be connected to the national grid through underground cables without needing additional overhead power lines.
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Report of the Director of Resources TOWNVILLE COUNCIL 27th OCTOBER 2010
CAPITAL PROGRAMME 2009/10
Summary of Report This report provides Council with two options for consideration under the Council’s 2009/10 Capital Programme. Further details of the schemes under review are shown at appendices A & B. Option 1 (Appendix A) – Care Home Provision Option 2 (Appendix B) – Regeneration / Redevelopment of Leisure Facilities Decision Required To consider the budget shortfall arising from the economic downturn and prioritise funding under the 2009/10 Capital Programme. Lead Member: Executive Member Finance Officer Contact: Director of Resources
1. The forecast expenditure on the programme is £10,648,260, of which £8,673,350 has
so far been spent in this financial year. 2. Appendix A to this report provides a proposal to consult on the closure the in-house
Council provided care facility ‘HAPPY REST’ residential care home.
Estimated costs: Closure: £1.5 million Rebuild: £2.5 million
3. Appendix B to this report provides details of the ‘GROT SPOT’ leisure scheme, updating members on the current status of the scheme.
Stabilising and restoring the cliff face cost: £1.5-2.5 million Private sector investment / total cost of project: £40-45 million
Item No. 6
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APPENDIX A
OPTION 1 - CARE HOME CLOSURES Following previous reports regarding the care home re-provision programme, this report advises Members on the current position regarding the identification of alternative places for residents of GONE AND FORGOTTEN care home and requests that Members formally agree the commencement of consultation on the closure of HAPPY REST care home. RECOMMENDATION(S) The Council is requested to: a) agree to the permanent closure of GONE AND FORGOTTEN care
home from 1st January 2011, subject to confirmation at the meeting that suitable alternative places have been identified for all remaining residents;
b) note that detailed consultation on the closure of HAPPY REST care home will commence in November 2010; and
c) note that a separate report will be submitted to the Finance Portfolio
Holder regarding the disposal of the GONE AND FORGOTTEN site. Corporate Policy Existing policy: In accordance with the Council’s commitment in Building a Better Townville to supporting people to live as independently as possible in the community, the proposals reflect an anticipated reduction in demand for residential home accommodation for older people. Financial Budget head - Total budget for this head £1.5million was identified in the capital programme to cover closure costs. Staff 1. Number of staff (current and additional) – 25 Staff at HAPPY REST
care home will be classed as ‘at risk’ and compulsory redundancy costs will need to be catered for in the current 2010-2011 budget.
2. GONE AND FORGOTTEN Staff re-deployment and redundancy costs
were factored into the 2009-2010 budget.
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Legal There is no specific legislation governing the closure of care homes. Section 4 of the report sets out summary guidance on care home closures. Customer Impact Following consultation with residents and families, 47 permanent residents of GONE AND FORGOTTEN have moved or will move to alternative care homes. Ward Members views The report has been sent to Ward Members and any comments received will be reported at the meeting. 1. COMMENTARY Background 1.1 In February 2007 Members of the Council’s Executive agreed to
pursue a reprovision programme for the Council’s care homes for older people. In April 2007 the Portfolio Holder for Adult and Community Services received a report on the proposed closure of the three existing Council owned care homes operated by Private Healthcare, starting in 2008. The report set out the consultation process which would be followed. It was proposed that FIRST TO GO House would be the first home to close in the spring of 2008 in accordance with the agreed programme. Consultation meetings were held with relatives and residents at all three homes in April and May 2007.
1.2 Following this initial consultation the Portfolio Holder agreed in June
2007 to commence formal consultation on the closure of the first home. The consultation process would involve detailed work with individual residents and their relatives to identify suitable alternative placements for the residents and, subject to the outcome, a further report would be made to the Executive seeking a final decision on the closure of the home. It was noted that some residents would be likely to take the opportunity to move at an early stage once a suitable alternative home had been found. Members of the Council’s care management staff were appointed to work with the residents and relatives at the homes scheduled for closure to identify alternative placements. This consultation process is being followed for all homes in the programme.
1.3 Following the closure of the first home, FIRST TO GO House, in March
2008, the consultation process was reviewed and refined by the Care Homes Reference Group, which oversees the closure programme on behalf of the Policy Development and Scrutiny Committees. The group is chaired by the Executive Member Adult Services and includes
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representatives from the Committees, Townville Council on Ageing and three relatives representing residents in the homes.
1.4 In June 2009 the Council agreed to the closure of GONE AND
FORGOTTEN care home and were advised that formal detailed consultation would start with the residents and families at GONE AND FORGOTTEN care home in September 2009. At that time there were 47 permanent residents in GONE AND FORGOTTEN. New permanent placements in GONE AND FORGOTTEN ceased in September 2009 as detailed discussions with residents and relatives started. As rooms became vacant some were utilised for people requiring respite care or who were waiting for permanent placements elsewhere.
1.5 Suitable alternative places have now been identified for all but 2 of the
remaining 9 residents of GONE AND FORGOTTEN and it is anticipated that the remaining 2 places will be finalised imminently (a verbal update will be provided at the meeting). A number of residents, including people who funded their own places in the home, chose to relocate to other homes as soon as they had found a suitable place and some Council-supported residents have moved to nursing care.
1.6 The new homes and timing of the moves have been agreed as a result
of discussions with relatives and with the proposed alternative homes to ensure that they can provide the appropriate care for the individual resident. Some residents have chosen to move to homes in other local authority areas in order to be near to relatives or to be able to live in their preferred home. It is anticipated that all permanent and temporary residents will have moved from GONE AND FORGOTTEN by the end of December.
1.7 Members are therefore requested to approve the permanent closure of
GONE AND FORGOTTEN care home from 1st January 2011. 1.8 The Care Homes Reference Group will review the closure of GONE
AND FORGOTTEN at its next meeting (to be arranged). Future programme 1.9 In accordance with the original proposals, it is also proposed that
formal detailed consultation will start with the 44 residents of HAPPY REST Care Home in November 2010.
Disposal of GONE AND FORGOTTEN site 1.10 In February 2007 the Executive agreed that the sites of the former care
homes would be earmarked for consideration for the provision of extra care housing for older people. In July 2009 the Resources Portfolio Holder agreed the sale of the GONE AND FORGOTTEN site to HOUSE Housing Association for the provision of extra care housing subject to planning permission and funding from the Homes and
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Communities Agency (HCA) being secured. The HCA has confirmed funding and the planning application is currently under consideration.
1.11 At the same time the Resources Portfolio Holder agreed to accept a bid
for the sale of the FIRST TO GO site to a care home operator for the building of a new care home which would have provided the Council with a number of care home places under contract in line with the anticipated requirements identified in its strategy for older people. Since then the care home provider has revised the bid and a separate report will be considered by the Executive and Resources Policy Development and Scrutiny Committee and Resources Portfolio Holder later this month.
1.12 It is proposed that a report on the disposal of the GONE AND
FORGOTTEN site be made to the Resources Portfolio Holder at a later date once the potential impact on the supply of care home places of the position with the FIRST TO GO site has been reviewed.
2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2.1 In accordance with the Council’s commitment in Building a Better
Townville to supporting people to live as independently as possible in the community, the proposals reflect the Council’s strategic objectives for older people. Since 2002 the Council has been developing alternatives to residential care through enhanced domiciliary care and intermediate care services and the expansion of availability of extra care housing resulting in reduced admissions to residential care.
2.2 This overall strategic direction for older people (e.g. the expansion of
re-ablement services and extra care housing for older people and the reconfiguration of intermediate care services) is reflected in the Adult and Community Portfolio Plan for 2010/11.
3. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 3.1 Members have previously been advised of the costs of the closure
programme. The report to the Executive in February 2007 identified the cost implications arising from the proposed closure of the homes, including liability for vacant beds during the period before closure and for staffing to support the programme. A sum of £1.5m was identified in the capital programme to meet these one-off costs.
3.2 Any closure costs relating to the two previous homes have been able to
be contained from within the ACS revenue budgets. In 2009/10 the ACS department was projecting an overspend and therefore any closure costs relating to GONE AND FORGOTTEN have had to be charged against the capital provision of £1.5m.
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3.3 It is estimated that the overall cost relating to the GONE AND FORGOTTEN closure will be in the region of £0.5m, with actual spend to date of £239k.
4. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 4.1 Under Sections 21 and 29 of the National Assistance Act 1948, the
Council has a statutory duty to provide care and accommodation for the elderly and infirm, where this is not otherwise available to them. Under Section 26 of the Act, this duty can be discharged by making arrangements with others. The NHS and Community Care Act of 1990 requires local authorities to provide appropriate accommodation to meet the needs of people who meet the Council’s eligibility criteria, and enables local authorities to purchase care from independent providers.
4.2 In drawing up the procedures for the closure of the care homes, due
account has been taken of the Council’s statutory duties under the Human Rights Act 1998, the Race Relations Act 1995, and the National Assistance Act (Choice of Accommodation) Directive 1992.
4.3 There is no specific legislation governing the closure of care homes.
Legal advice regarding the closure of homes elsewhere has confirmed residents’ entitlement to consultation, and has confirmed the duty of the local authority to inform and consult. Guidance issued by the Department of Health in 1993 suggests that Councils should provide information and advice to self-funding residents in the event of a care home being closed.
4.4 Section 12 (vii) c) of the Council’s Constitution requires decisions on
the closure of homes, including homes for older people, to be made by full Council.
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APPENDIX B
OPTION 2 – REDEVLOPMENT PLAN FOR GROT SPOT The redevelopment plans
There was a growing recognition in the late 1990s that the GROTSPOT complex had outlived its usefulness. The building’s exterior was riddled with concrete cancer, with its interior being hopelessly passé and stuck in a 1970’s timewarp. In 1998, only 20 years after it re-opened after the fire, the Council announced that it was reviewing options for the future of GROT SPOT and that the building was not fit for its purpose. Council announced plans in January 2001 that the GROT SPOT site would house a civic museum and other leisure facilities, including potentially a multi-screen cinema. These plans would involve demolishing GROT SPOT and erecting new buildings on the site. It was envisaged that GROT SPOT would remain open to provide a large entertainment venue until the refurbishment of the re-branded ‘Entertainment and Arts Centre’ was completed in 2004. By the end of 2000, the Council had received approaches from several investors interested in the GROT SPOT site. Developers were asked to submit formal proposals for the site by 23rd May 2001. The Council specified that the plans must include a local heritage museum and a transport interchange. A colour brochure prepared by a London property agent, for the Council said the selected developer would be required to work with the Council to create a major leisure and commercial development for a “significant town centre site”. The brochure asked developers to provide a range of “complementary uses” for the site, but kept the remit of the precise mix of facilities deliberately vague. It suggested that the site could even be used for a hotel, a casino or even housing. Having drawn up a short-list of four developers from around 50 submitted applications, the Council announced in November 2001 that it was backing the proposals of a Manchester developer. At this stage, it was envisaged the new buildings would be completed by the end of 2006.
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The developer was given six months to draw up detailed plans for the site. The developer’s plans, which included a local heritage museum and a household chain 100-bedroom hotel but no casino, were shown to senior staff in Regeneration and Culture in April 2002. The proposal amounted to around £35 million of private sector investment for the site. The developers said the redevelopment could be completed in 18 months; the timetable for completion of the new buildings was brought forward to early 2005. The absence of a casino from the plans disappointed the Council, who argued that Townville should steal a march on the rest of the UK by using the GROT SPOT site for a resort-style Las Vegas casino once gambling regulations were de-regulated. ”The incorporation of mid-market and budget hotel accommodation into the scheme was seen positively by Exec Member Regeneration and Culture as helping to reverse the declining number of hotel bed spaces in the city. The Townville Chronicle (5th August 2002) reported that 1,261 bed spaces had been lost in the previous three years; 73% of these losses were in the City Centre, and the vast majority were in the middle and lower end of the market. A council spokesman said: “What will happen is that if we continue to lose beds in this category, we will start to lose tourism events. People who come for tourism events, this is the category of bed that they use and these are the beds that we have been losing hand over fist”. The Council was “generally supportive” of the developer’s scheme, although some councillors expressed reservations about the quality of the hotel accommodation to be provided. In August 2002, the Council gave the developer another six months to advance the scheme further before a final decision was taken. The developer expressed concerns about the commercial viability of the Local heritage museum. Accordingly, the Council had to accept that the Museum would be “on a more modest scale than was originally envisaged”. In December 2002, it was disclosed the redevelopment was likely to include an ice rink measuring approximately 40 metres (~133 feet) by 20 metres (~67 feet). More specific details of the redevelopment were announced in March 2003, with the plans including a health and fitness club, restaurants, bars, apartments and car parking, in addition to a Local Heritage Museum, a 100-bedroom hotel and an ice rink. The developer said: “We are delighted to be moving forward in conjunction with the Council to develop this exciting scheme and believe that we are together creating a development Townville will be proud of”. Work was scheduled to start in spring 2005. The Council would fund the Local heritage museum (Cost = £2.8 million). Some of the finance for this would be raised by selling off Council owned property that was surplus to requirements. In July 2003, the Executive Member Regeneration and Culture asked Council to approve spending £1,080,600 to advance the developers scheme, which was now also to include shops and office space. This finance would cover the necessary professional and legal advice, together with design and technical fees. The Executive Member said: “The vast majority of the £40-45 million funding for redevelopment of the site will come from private companies. In return for use of the site, the developer will be providing – at no cost to the
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Council taxpayer – the ice rink and [the five-a-side] football facility valued at £3.5 million. It’s vital with such large sums involved that the scheme is endorsed by Council before more money is spent.” Council approved the request. However, some councillors were concerned that elements of the scheme were not commercially viable. Referring to the ice rink, Councillor A said, “I can see a couple of large white elephants on the horizon”. Some members thought that a cinema would be more viable and benefit a larger proportion of the borough’s residents. It was intended that the final development agreement would be signed and then approved in early 2004. Before the agreement could be signed, much work remained to be done relating to the financing and operational management of the scheme. Furthermore, the landslides of October 2002 had highlighted the issue of cliff instability and the complexity of the whole demolition process. Whilst there was a “whole raft of factors” that would affect the demolition and redevelopment programme, the Director of Leisure, said it was imperative that the scheme was completed in time for the Council’s centenary celebrations in 2007. The developer pulls out In April 2004, the developer pulled out of the redevelopment of the GROT SPOT site after failing “to reach a mutually acceptable contractual position on a Development Agreement” with the Council. The developer, whom had already spent £250,000 on developing plans for the site, blamed increasing construction costs from an estimated £25 million in September 2003 to £31 million in April 2004. This meant the scheme “wasn’t capable of producing sufficient profit to provide the firm with its agreed profit margin and the Council with an ice rink at no cost” (Townville Chronicle, 15th April 2004). In the words of the developer director, the commercial elements of the scheme “just didn’t stake up”. He warned the Council that plans for the site needed to be slimmed down. “Unless the scheme is given a good look at to see if something can be omitted from it, it may be that other developers our size would have equal difficulties”, he said. The decision was a blow to the Council, whose plans for a local heritage museum ready for the 2007 centenary were now in shreds. Whilst this was “a disappointing outcome”, the Council remained committed to “a mixed use redevelopment of the GROT SPOT site anchored by public leisure facilities”. The Director of Regeneration and Culture said his department would spend the next six months investigating “the feasibility of putting together a revised development project” for the site. During this review process, the combination of leisure facilities in the redevelopment was reconsidered. In September 2004, it was reported in the Townville Chronicle that the redevelopment might include a multi-screen cinema, a facility that did not appear in the original developer’s plans. At the time, the Council was still in negotiation with major UK hotel and cinema chains in order to secure contracts without having to bring in a development company to oversee the project. An ice rink, apartments and shops still featured in the new plans. By May 2005, plans for a hotel and cinema complex seem to have been dissolving; and suggestions were put forward that the site “could be used for anything”.
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The October 2002 flood In late October 2002, four inches of rain fell in the City Centre in 36 hours. The heavy rain flooded the City nightclub, the sports hall and the squash courts; caused structural damage to the Spa Suite area; and triggered two landslides in the cliff behind GROT SPOT. More worryingly, the landslides dislodged two concrete blocks that supported the roof of the original GROT SPOT but were not removed following the fire. GROT SPOT was forced to close because there was a real risk that the blocks could fall on to the building. It was originally thought the blocks weighed up to five metric tonnes, and could either be removed or stabilised, so allowing the building to re-open quickly. However, a closer inspection revealed the blocks might weigh up to 50 tonnes. This news came as a disappointment to Harry Potter fans looking forward to a special preview of Chamber of Secrets in the GROT SPOT cinema, only for the screening to be cancelled at the last minute because of safety fears. City nightclub, the squash courts and the Spa Suite never reopened after the flooding. It would simply have been uneconomic to repair these facilities, given that GROT SPOT was due to close in 12 months’ time in any case. The sports hall and the FM radio studio re-opened by the end of 2002, but the Piazza level housing the cinema and the children’s play area remained closed. Several functions that were due to take place in the Piazza level were cancelled, resulting in the Council losing many thousands of pounds in revenue. During the closure, GROT SPOT staff were re-deployed to other Council venues such as the Gaiety Theatre. In January 2003, a geotechnical engineer arrived to determine whether the concrete blocks posed a risk to people using the Piazza level. A team used ropes to scale the cliff face and extracted cores from the blocks to determine their size and their manner of construction. The Director of Regeneration and Culture said: “To all our customers, please be patient. We cannot let them use the building until we can persuade the health and safety executive that it is safe”. The engineers found that there were ten concrete blocks in total and a concrete beam; the two troublesome blocks were adjacent to the GROT SPOT - building party wall. The blocks were left exposed because the roof of the original GROT SPOT was much higher than the re-built complex. After thorough investigation, it was found that the blocks did “not pose any imminent danger to the building”, but needed to be monitored regularly. The installation of a movement alarm in GROT SPOT to identify small movements in the blocks allowed the Piazza level to re-open in late May 2003 for the final summer season. GROT SPOT closed at the end of 2003, with an Abba-tribute band entertaining crowds on New Year’s Eve. However, with other refurbishments still not completed, the building re-opened during the February 2004 half term. That was the last week when members of the public were allowed inside GROT SPOT. Within weeks all entertainment had transferred to alternate venues and DANGER KEEP OUT signs appeared outside GROT SPOT. The demolition
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As GROT SPOT is in a conservation area, planning permission had to be obtained before the complex could be demolished. An objection was raised to the demolition by a local resident concerned about the noise from future building work. In March 2004, it was intended that the demolition would start later that year, with the redevelopment of the site beginning in mid 2005. With the collapse of the Development Agreement between the original developer and the Council in April 2004, there was now no need to demolish the complex as quickly. Moreover, recent surveys showed that asbestos, which was discovered in GROT SPOT in 1997, was more widespread than previously thought. The asbestos was removed before demolition in a process called soft strip. The removal of asbestos and other preparatory work, which started in December 2004 (e.g. removing internal fittings), cost £899,290 alone. With the final demolition costing £1,876,000, the cost of clearing the site was ironically more than the cost of building the original or indeed the re-built GROT SPOT complexes in the 1960s and 1970s. At the end of 2004, the demolition of GROT SPOT was scheduled to commence in October 2005. In July 2005, a Council spokesman said: “I am very anxious to get the site cleared. I recognise it is a very expensive exercise but the site could lie for years with the old buildings unless we get on with the job…Some people believe we should sell the site as it is to developers and I think that would be a real risk of nothing happening. We inherited this monstrosity from Townville Corporation and we should sort it out rather than trying to walk away.”
Plate 1. Contractor’s instruction for the demolition on the GROT SPOT site. Planning conditions for demolition dictated that a photographic record of the buildings be made. The demolition of GROT SPOT started in January 2006,
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and was carried out by a local contractor. Six specially imported machines each with an 85-foot grab were used to demolish the majority of the complex. A spokesman said: “We are using demolition rigs equipped with hydraulic breakers to split the concrete from the reinforced steel and then using the pulveriser to crush it up. We will recycle as much as we can”. Although the majority of the complex had been demolished by March 2006, a small section of the building that was grafted into the cliff face still remains today (October 2010). This is because engineers are uncertain whether the remains of the building are supporting the cliff face behind. To investigate this, a survey is required of the cliff face. Unfortunately, this cannot commence at present because the owners of four houses at the top of the cliff have refused access to their gardens to do a survey. Some of the residents have been in a long running dispute with the Council since the original GROT SPOT was built in the late 1960s. They objected to the height of the building’s Oroglas roof, which was lowered as a result. They also felt that grafting the building into the cliff face by means of concrete blocks was a bad idea that would ultimately compromise the cliff’s stability. A resident also objected to the demolition of GROT SPOT – citing noise, a frequent complaint that the residents made when GROT SPOT was in operation. Some residents even complained about the method of demolition and wanted the complex to be demolished from the top downwards. It is expected that stabilising and restoring the cliff face will cost £1.5-2.5 million. In 2008, the site of the worst peacetime British fire disaster for 44 years was nothing more than an empty piece of ground and the Council was no further forward at advancing plans for the redevelopment of the site. Indeed it was reported in February 2008 that the Council “no longer had a compelling need” to retain the site for public entertainment facilities, stating that plans for a private company to redevelop the site for leisure use had “sadly come to nothing”. Letter writers to the Townville Chronicle criticised the Council’s inaction over the site, and argued that it should be redeveloped for the good of the whole community as opposed to being sold off for apartments. One said: “When are they going to realise that people are binge drinking and there are no tourists because of the severe lack of entertainment in the City?” Another reader suggested: “GROT SPOT is an ideal place to build a cinema, bowling alley or ice rink”, commenting that: “We do not need more apartments or offices; we need entertainment. Council - buck your ideas up!”
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Plate 2. The demolition begins
Plate 3. The demolition of GROT SPOT. This photograph was taken in what was the Sports Hall.
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Plate 4. The demolition nears completion. The only parts of GROT SPOT left remaining in this photograph are the NE corner of the Piazza floor and part of the concrete wall fronting the Race Course. The Wave With no Council department interested in acquiring the GROT SPOT site, the Regeneration and Culture Directorate decided to readvertise the site to developers in August 2008. Interested developers were asked to come up with plans that would improve the borough’s leisure facilities. Four companies expressed an interest in the site. In March 2009, the Council announced that the Developer’s proposal, known as The Wave, had been chosen. The Developer has been granted a temporary licence on the site to allow them to undertake detailed investigations before a formal 99-year lease is agreed. It is envisaged that site surveys and necessary approvals were to be completed by 30th June 2009. These surveys have involved drilling bore holes and trial puts, and ascending the cliff face in a hydraulic lift to assess its stability. This timeframe will allow the plans to be debated by Council before the summer recess. The Developer group was founded in 1892 as a public company and has an extensive property and investment portfolio in the borough. It owns several Townville hotels and the new Express Hotel at Townville Airport. It also owns the largest building contractors, as well as the HSBC building in the city centre and some entertainment venues. The architects of The Wave are a local firm. They will be assisted by a Glasgow based architect that specialises in leisure and entertainment buildings, whose previous commissions include the cinema at the O2 arena in London.
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The Wave will have four floors. The first floor will contain a car park with 177 spaces. The developers do not intend to excavate an extensive basement area because of the abnormal foundations. The second level – which will be slightly above street level – is designed for the family. This floor will definitely contain a five-screen cinema, an 18 lane ten-pin bowling hall and a food court. It is the intention to make some of the space on this floor as flexible as possible so it could be used for exhibitions, rollerskating and possibly ice-skating. The third and fourth floors are aimed more for adults, and will contain a casino, bingo area, slot machines, conference and function facilities for 500 people, an A La Carte restaurant and champagne bar. The Wave takes its name from the shape of its roof, which may contain solar panels and a wind turbine for electricity generation. The building will be erected around 17ft from the cliff to facilitate adequate fire escapes from the building’s rear, a clear difference from the original GROT SPOT. There will not, however, be a rear service road. The Wave will have a large glass frontage overlooking the Race Course and will certainly be more aesthetically pleasing than the enclosed and bland white glassreinforced plastic (GRP) units that formed the upper floors of the re-built GROT SPOT complex. Whilst “moving beyond GROT SPOT”, the Chief Operating Officer of the Developer Group, assured me that the disaster will be commemorated in the new development. It is not known at this stage whether the memorial stone in Town Gardens, which is a few hundred yards from GROT SPOT, will be moved to a new memorial garden at the entrance to The Wave. Councillors believe that it is important that any new memorial actually states the number and the names of the people that died in the fire. These are notable omissions from the existing stone. If everything goes to plan, The Wave will open to the public in 2012 and will become the fourth building to occupy the site in the last 50 years.
Page 21
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Consents for Wind Farms - Onshore
Standard Note: SN/SC/4370
Last updated: 14 July 2010
Author: Christopher Barclay
Section Science and Environment Section
Wind farms require either planning permission or consent under the Electricity Act. This
note discusses why so many applications for onshore wind farms have been rejected,
and whether the system is resulting in unacceptable delays. Closely related notes are
Wind Farms - Distance from housing (SN/SC/5221) and Wind Farm consents - offshore
(SN/SC/5088) which includes details of the provisions of the Planning Act 2008 relating to
offshore and onshore consents. Another note, Wind power-overview and update
(SN/SC/3276), deals more generally with issues relating to wind farms.
Many applications for onshore wind farms were rejected under the Labour Government.
The main reason was concern that a large wind farm would damage the landscape.
Some applications have been approved, partly because their visual impact was normally
considered to be limited and partly because of Government targets to encourage the use
of more renewable energy.
The Coalition Government plans to scrap regional planning, including regional targets for
renewable energy. Further guidance will be published, partly to encourage schemes
were the local community benefits from hosting a wind farm. As an incentive, they will be
allowed to retain the additional business rates generated.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Some reasons for rejection under the Labour Government 3
3 Some reasons for acceptance under the Labour Government 4
4 Conservative party plan to rely upon financial incentives, 2010 6
5 Coalition Government position, 2010 6
This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties
and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should
not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last
updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for
it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is
required.
This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available
online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the
content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public.
Agenda Annex
Page 23
1 Introduction
Consents for electricity generation were not until recently a particular problem. The
privatised electricity companies have been able to obtain consent for new gas-fired power
stations without particular complaint. However, increased emphasis upon renewable
sources of power has resulted in planning problems. In May 2009, there were 120
operational wind farms in England and Wales (112 onshore and 8 offshore).1 In January
2010, the Government announced that local authorities in England, Scotland and Wales had
approved 76 onshore wind energy planning applications in the previous two years.2 In April
2007 the Financial Times environment correspondent stated that the lack of renewable
energy was a planning problem, not an energy problem, because of rejections and lengthy
delays.3 John Hutton, then Secretary of State for BERR, said in September 2007 that a
dramatic escalation of renewable energy in the UK was being held back by “a snail’s pace
planning system." 4
In July 2009, the Times showed how the targets are not being met:
Of the 93 applications submitted for onshore wind farms in the past three years, only
35 were approved by local authorities. Another 14 were eventually passed after an
appeal but almost half of the original applications failed. In England, the South East,
South West, East Midlands, London and the North West regions have all set targets for
installing a combined total of 1,310 megawatts of wind turbine capacity by 2010. So
far they have installed only 340 megawatts (MW) with another 66MW under
construction.5
The Lords Select Committee on the European Union reported similar concerns in October
2008, both for energy generation and for upgrades to the national grid to allow that electricity
to be used. It also recorded concerns that the Planning Bill [now the Planning Act 2008]
would not solve the problem. 6
Not everybody would consider the delay or rejection of applications for wind farms to be a
weakness. The planning system is meant to enable contrasting interests to be taken into
account. Opponents of wind farms would say that some proposals would have damaged the
landscape to a disproportionate extent and thus needed to be rejected.
A further consideration is that a disappointed applicant has the right of appeal to the
Secretary of State, in practice to a planning inspector who will determine the application in
line with Government guidance. Local planning authorities think hard before rejecting
planning applications because they risk not only having their decision overturned on appeal
but also having costs awarded against them if their decision is considered to be
unreasonable. On the other hand there is a considerable delay before hearing an appeal, of
perhaps a year. A considerable cost can be incurred as the result of such a delay.
1 HC Deb 21 May 2009 c1518W
2 HC Deb 7 January 2010 c260
3 Fiona Harvey, “Last throw of the dice for DTI?” House Magazine, 16 April 2007
4 BERR Press Release, 'Snails pace' planning system producing millions of additional tonnes of carbon, 17
September 2007 5 “Battle of wind farms to be fought on land and sea”, Times, 13 July 2009
6 European Union Committee, The EU's Target for Renewable Energy: 20% by 2020, 24 October 2008, HL 175
2007-8
2Page 24
The Campaign to Protect Rural England has objected to the practice of developers of wind
schemes offering money to the community as good will payments. The British Wind Energy
Association stated that community benefits funds were often set up in response to requests
from communities and were on top of section 106 payments.
2 Some reasons for rejection under the Labour Government
It is sometimes suggested that local planning authorities have been at fault in rejecting too
many applications for onshore wind farms, but the issue is not so simple. Some appeals to
planning inspectors result in rejection, normally on grounds of damage to the landscape.
Wind farms tend to be in exposed open countryside and that is often landscape of great
merit. Here are some cases of refusals by inspectors or the Secretary of State:
Ten wind turbines, each with a 60m tall mast and maximum rotor diameter of 80m, in
Lincolnshire were refused consent, because they would be much taller than any other
man-made structure in the area and the nearest village would be unacceptably harmed
by the proximity of two turbines.7
A major wind farm with 24 turbines, just outside the boundary of the Lake District National
Park was refused consent because “the adverse impact on the landscape would be so
great that it should be the determining factor leading to his recommendation.8
Six wind turbines in Norfolk were rejected because the landscape setting of listed
buildings within 2.5km of the turbines would be seriously harmed by such
uncompromisingly modern structures.9
Scottish Ministers refused permission for three 3MW wind turbines in the highlands due to
their visual impact and cumulative effects. The site comprised an area of rough grazing
land near the summit of a hill in exposed open countryside. The turbines, with a height to
blade tip of 110m would have been visible over an extensive area.10
Permission was refused for a single, much smaller, turbine that had been planned to
supply electricity to an isolated listed building in Cornwall.11
A community wind farm comprising four turbines, each with a height to blade tip of 100m,
was rejected at a site in South Wales following a ruling that it was not needed and would
harm the landscape.12
A proposal to erect three wind turbines in Devon was rejected following an inspector’s
assessment of their visual impact on the setting of the Dartmoor national park.13
An inspector rejected an application for 16 wind turbines at a site in Cambridgeshire on
the grounds that they would undermine landscape quality and highway safety14
7 “Wind farm rejected on visual amenity grounds”, Planning, 3 February 2006 p19
8 “Visual harm foils wind farm despite climate fear change”, Planning, 24 March 2006
9 “Turbines deemed harmful to landscape setting”, Planning, 26 May 2006
10 “Wind turbines foiled by harmful landscape impact”, Planning, 9 June 2006
11 “Turbine judged to spoil listed setting and coastline”, Planning, 15 September 2006
12 “Wind farm blocked on need and landscape grounds”, Planning 3 November 2006
13 “Turbines rejected due to impact on national park”, Planning, 8 December 2006
14 “Wind farm proposal thwarted by amenity impact”, Planning, 19 January 2007
3 Page 25
A proposal for two wind turbines near a world heritage site in Cornwall was rejected due
to their adverse impact on the landscape and the setting of a nearby church.15
The Crow Holt scheme in Nottinghamshire would have included ten 125m turbines. It
was rejected because the inspector agreed with Bassetlaw District Council that the
environmental impact would be “severe”.16
An 80 metre wind turbine was rejected at a site at Orkney.17
A proposal for four wind turbines in the Cheshire green belt was deemed an inappropriate
development that would undermine the area’s openness and visual amenity.18
A proposal for a 10 metre wind turbine at Nidderdale was ruled out of keeping with the
landscape in an area of outstanding natural beauty.19
A proposal for nine wind turbines in South Wales was rejected because the landscape
and visual harm would not be justified by the scheme’s renewable energy benefits.20
Of particular importance was the rejection by Scottish ministers of a proposal at the Isle of
Lewis for an enormous 181-turbine wind farm to generate 651MW of electricity because of
the potential impact on wildlife. The 24,800 ha site included the Lewis peatlands special
protection area and lay near to two other protected areas. These areas were of international
importance for a range of wild birds, including golden eagles.21
Other refusals have related to air safety at an airfield22,23 and a parachute centre24. Another
ground for refusal is harming a conservation area25,26, while a more unusual one was that the
wind farm would scare horses on a nearby road.27
3 Some reasons for acceptance under the Labour Government
However, in other cases, inspectors have granted permission despite some concerns over
the effect on the landscape:
A wind turbine on the edge of the Mendip Hills area of outstanding natural beauty (AONB)
was approved because the scheme’s impact on the AONB would be localised and that its
effects on the setting of listed buildings, including a grade I listed church, would be
acceptable.28
15 “Wind turbines foiled by effect on setting”, Planning, 16 February 2007
16 “Tall turbines turned down”, Planning, 29 June 2007
17 “Turbine appearance fails landscape test”, Planning, 31 October 2008
18 “Wind scheme benefits fail to tilt balance”, Planning, 5 December 2008
19 “Turbine held to undermine natural beauty”, Planning, 8 May 2009
20 “Landscape harm trumps turbine case”, Planning, 9 January 2009
21 “Wind farm rejected on wildlife grounds”, Planning, 16 May 2008
22 “Turbine deemed to compromise air safety”, Planning, 6 March 2009
23 “Air safety and amenity block wind farm”, Planning, 17 April 2009
24 “Turbines refused near parachuting centre”, Planning, 19 September 2008
25 “Turbine judged to harm conservation area”, Planning, 3 October 2008
26 “Conservation area harm stymies turbine”, Planning, 15 August 2008
27 “Turbine considered likely to scare horses”, Planning, 24 April 2009
28 “Turbine secured on edge of protected landscape”, Planning, 16 June 2006
4Page 26
18 wind turbines on land in Perthshire were approved because the contours of the ground
and intervening tree belts would ensure that its visual impact from buildings would not be
significant.29
Three wind turbines were approved in the Lancashire green belt because the need to
tackle climate change outweighed the inappropriate nature of the scheme.30
Four wind turbines were approved near the Peak District National Park despite council
concerns that the application failed to comply with environmental assessment
regulations.31
Four 121 metre wind turbines were allowed on the Solway coast after limited landscape
and tourism harm were outweighed by the need to combat global warming and improve
energy security.32
In granting consent for a 126m high 2MW wind turbine in Lancashire, the inspector
agreed that such structures were not uncommon and could become an accepted part of
the landscape.33
The Secretary of State approved a wind farm in Northumberland because of the
landscape’s low quality.34
Two 15kw wind turbines were approved at a school in Plymouth because their visual
impact would be acceptable and there would be educational benefits.35
The Secretary of State approved 12 wind turbines in East Yorkshire, subject to a section
106 agreement, because the impact on the perception of a grade I mediaeval Minster
would not be severe and would be outweighed by renewable energy benefits.36
Five 1.3MW wind turbines in low moorland plateaux of windswept heather and rough
grass in Cumbria were approved after a bird impact check, despite significant local impact
because of the importance of the renewable energy.37
Two 3MW wind turbines were approved in Suffolk 200m outside an AONB, because of
the need for renewable energy.38
A wind farm was approved in Cornwall partly because only 3% of the region’s electricity
demand had been met from renewable sources.39
In September 2008, the largest wind farm in Britain, approved in 2005, started to operate:
29 “Wind farm overcomes landscape impact concern”, Planning, 14 July 2006
30 “Green energy benefits justify wind farm”, Planning, 17 October 2008
31 “Turbines allowed after statement passed”, Planning, 17 October 2008
32 “Turbines survive landscape objections”, Planning, 12 June 2009
33 “Turbines seen as symbol of commitment”, Planning, 5 June 2009
34 “Turbines’ visual impact held insignificant”, Planning, 6 February 2009
35 “Educational benefit of turbines allowed”, Planning, 9 January 2009
36 “Turbines backed despite landscape effect”, Planning, 12 December 2008
37 “Turbines agreed after bird impact check”, Planning, 4 July 2008
38 “Energy policy overrides landscape effect”, Planning, 30 May 2008
39 “Wind farm agreed to deliver targets”, Planning, 25 April 2008
5 Page 27
Residents objected to the 26 turbines standing more than 300ft (91m) high on Scout
Moor, between Lancashire and Greater Manchester. (…) Local councils also objected
but after a public inquiry the government decided the £50m project should go ahead. 40
On 13 June 2008, the Government published an agreement between Government and
industry, aiming to reduce objections relating to radar and aviation.41
4 Conservative party plan to rely upon financial incentives, 2010
The Conservative Party Green Paper on Planning, Open Source Planning, published in
February 2010 proposed abolishing regional planning and consequently targets for
renewable energy. However, local councils would be given a financial incentive:
Wind farms
We actively support getting more of our energy from renewable sources, including both
on-shore and off-shore wind. This will help tackle climate change, create thousands of
jobs, and help guarantee our energy security. Britain has some of the best renewable
resources in the world – not just on land, but in the wind, wave and tidal power
available off one of the longest coastlines in Europe. We should make the most of
those resources.
If we are to be successful in this task it is vital that we develop broad public support for
the process. On-shore wind farms are not appropriate in all settings: local community
consent is vital, and applications will need to be considered in the light of the possible
impact on the local environment. This means allowing communities to be active
participants in, as well as beneficiaries of, on-shore wind development.
That is why it is Conservative policy to allow communities that choose to host
wind farms to keep the business rates they generate for six years. We are also
examining how community ownership of wind turbines can be introduced, as on
the continent, and how discounted electricity can be available to communities in
the vicinity of wind farms. This is the sort of fresh thinking that will be required to
increase acceptance of wind farms.
5 Coalition Government position, 2010
The Labour Government had national targets for renewable energy, which led to regional
targets in Regional Spatial Strategies and appropriate policies in Local Development
Frameworks. Planning applications have to be determined in accordance with the
development plan “unless material considerations indicate otherwise”.42 The hierarchy of
plans, in other words, linked individual planning decisions to Government policy. The
Coalition Government has radically changed the position.
Another PQ explained the Government’s intention:
Andrea Leadsom: To ask the Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government what his policy is on local participation in planning decisions concerning
wind farms; and if he will make a statement.
40 “The biggest wind farm in England is officially opening after years of planning controversy”, BBC News Online,
25 September 2008 41
DBERR Press Release, Wind power takes off with new agreement on radar and aviation, 13 June 2008 42
Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 s.38(6)
6Page 28
Robert Neill: We will radically reform the planning system to give neighbourhoods far
more ability to determine the shape of the places in which their inhabitants live, based
on the principles set out in the Conservative Party publication Open Source Planning.
We will abolish the unelected Infrastructure Planning Commission and replace it with
an efficient and democratically accountable system that provides a fast-track process
for major infrastructure projects. We will publish and present to Parliament a simple
and consolidated national planning framework covering all forms of development and
setting out national economic, environmental and social priorities. To be successful it is
vital to have broad public support and the consent of local communities. This includes
giving communities not only a say, but also a stake, in appropriately-sited renewable
energy projects like wind farms. We will therefore encourage community-owned
renewable energy schemes where local people benefit from the power produced. We
will also allow communities that host renewable energy projects to keep the additional
business rates they generate.43
Following the abolition of regional planning on 6 July 2010, the Government issued guidance
to planning authorities including the following FAQ:
20. What about regional policies on Renewable and Low Carbon Energy?
Through their local plans, authorities should contribute to the move to a low carbon
economy, cut greenhouse gas emissions, help secure more renewable and low carbon
energy to meet national targets, and to adapt to the impacts arising from climate
change. In doing so, planning authorities may find it useful to draw on data that was
collected by the Regional Local Authority Leaders’ Boards (which will be made
available) and more recent work, including assessments of the potential for renewable
and low carbon energy.44
Energy Minister Charles Hendry explained the Government’s intentions in a debate on 8 July
2010:
There is an issue about winning public support. We believe that renewable energy
should not be imposed on communities, but should have popular support within
communities. The previous Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Doncaster
North (Edward Miliband) ... has spoken of different techniques. First, he said that
people should have wind farms because it would be good for everybody. That did not
really win people's hearts and minds. He then said that people should have a wind
farm because it would be bad if they did not-a bit like somebody who drives across a
zebra crossing without stopping-but that did not win hearts and minds.
We think that a new approach is necessary that will actively engage communities in
ensuring that they see what the benefits will be. They will keep business rates locally.
We will find ways of encouraging community ownership. The income stream from one
of the turbines perhaps goes directly into the community, so it can see that it is hosting
something on behalf of the wider region or the national interest and that a real benefit
comes back to it for hosting the facility.45
Two PQs explained the position on specific topics. One covered wind turbines and health:
Graham Evans: To ask the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change what
recent assessment he has made of the effects of wind turbines on the health of nearby
residents.
43 HC Deb 2 June 2010 c36W
44 DCLG, Guidance for Local Planning Authorities following the revocation of Regional Strategies, July 2010
45 HC Deb 8 July 2010 c167WH
7 Page 29
8
Charles Hendry: The planning process requires developers and planners to evaluate
the likely impact of issues such as noise and shadow flicker from wind turbines on local
residents and those working in the vicinity. Planning authorities can and do refuse
planning permission for proposed wind farms where there are likely to be significant
impacts which cannot be acceptably mitigated.
A study was commissioned in 2007 into a noise phenomenon known as aerodynamic
modulation (AM), which it is was thought could be a cause of noise disturbance for
nearby residents. The study found that the incidence of AM resulting from wind farms
in the UK is low. Out of the 133 wind farms in operation at the time, there were four
cases where AM appeared to be a factor. Complaints have subsided for three out of
these four sites.46
Another PQ explained the effects on wildlife:
Graham Evans: To ask the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change what
assessment he has made of the effects of wind turbines on nearby wildlife populations.
Charles Hendry: The UK operates strict controls to protect the natural environment,
and any planning application for a wind farm which is likely to have a significant effect
on the environment by virtue of factors such as size, nature or location is subject to
environmental impact assessment. Statutory nature conservation bodies are consulted
upon the scope and outcomes of the environmental impact assessment.
Local and national planning authorities can and do refuse planning permission for
proposed wind farms where there are likely to be significant impacts on local wildlife
populations which cannot be acceptably mitigated. Where appropriate, conditions can
be placed on a wind farm to ensure that any impacts on local wildlife populations are
minimised, avoided or compensated. This may include post development monitoring of
wildlife.
The wildlife impacts of offshore windfarms are also looked at strategically as part of
DECC's offshore energy strategic environmental assessment process. The most recent
2009 report concluded that up to 33GW of offshore wind could be installed without
unacceptable environmental consequences, providing that suitable mitigation
measures are incorporated on a site by site basis.47
46 HC Deb 7 July 2010 cc340-1W
47 HC Deb 6 July 2010 c149W
Page 30
Guidelines for the
closure of care homes
for older people:
prevalence and content
of local government
protocols
Jacquetta Williams and
Ann Netten
PSSRU Discussion Paper 1861/2
October 2003
PSSRUPersonal Social Services
Research Unit
www.PSSRU.ac.uk
Downloaded publication
in Acrobat format
The PSSRU retains the
copyright in this publication.
It may be freely distributed as
an Acrobat file and on paper,
but all quotations must be
acknowledged and permission
for use of longer excerpts must
be obtained in advance.
We welcome comments about
PSSRU publications. We would
particularly appreciate being
told of any problems
experienced with electronic
versions as otherwise we may
remain unaware of them.
Email: pssru_library@kent.ac.uk
The PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH UNIT undertakes social and health care research, supported mainly by the Departmentof Health, and focusing particularly on policy research and analysis of equity and efficiency in community care, long-term care and relatedareas — including services for elderly people, people with mental health problems and children in care. Views expressed in PSSRU publications donot necessarily reflect those of funding organisations. The PSSRU was established at the University of Kent at Canterbury in 1974, and from 1996it has operated from three branches:
University of Kent at Canterbury, Cornwallis Building, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NFLondon School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AEUniversity of Manchester, Dover Street Building, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL
The PSSRU Bulletin and publication lists are available free from the librarian at the PSSRU in Canterbury (01227 827773; emailpssru_library@kent.ac.uk) and on the PSSRU website.
Email: PSSRU@kent.ac.uk Website: http://www.pssru.ac.uk
Page 31
Contents
Acknowledgements ...............................................................................................................v
Summary .............................................................................................................................vii
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................1
2. Regulatory and policy context ..........................................................................................3
2.1 Law and guidance ......................................................................................................3
2.2 Legislation in the United States and Australia...........................................................5
2.3 Councils’ responsibilities...........................................................................................6
2.4 Legal challenges and local authority reviews ............................................................7
3. Good practice literature .....................................................................................................8
4. Methods ...........................................................................................................................12
5. Findings ...........................................................................................................................12
5.1 The documents received .........................................................................................14
5.2 Aims, scope and principles of good practice ...........................................................14
5.3 Definitions of types of closure ................................................................................16
5.4 Legal issues .............................................................................................................17
5.5 The allocation of roles and responsibilities ............................................................18
5.6 Care management arrangements .............................................................................19
5.7 Recommended notice periods and timescales .........................................................20
5.8 The provision of help and information to self-funders ...........................................20
5.9 The provision of assessments of residents’ needs ...................................................21
5.10 Approaches to resident preparation and consultation ...........................................21
5.11 Sources of information about other care homes ...................................................22
5.12 The role of care staff .............................................................................................23
5.13 Approaches to temporary moves ...........................................................................24
iPage 32
5.14 Safe transfer recommendations .............................................................................24
5.15 Approaches to placement review and closure evaluation .....................................26
5.16 Local authority resources and closure costs ..........................................................26
6. Discussion .......................................................................................................................27
7. Policy and research implications ....................................................................................31
8. Conclusions .....................................................................................................................32
References ...........................................................................................................................34
ii Page 33
Index of tables and boxes
No. Title Page No.
Box 1
Table 1
Actions, issues & objectives during home closures identified in
the literature
Response from local authorities with more than 100 homes by type
11
13
iiiPage 34
Acknowledgements
This study was funded by the Department of Health as part of a wider study of the causes and
consequences of care home closures commissioned from the Personal Social Services
Research Unit (PSSRU). We should like to thank all the local authority staff, the National
Care Standards Commission, and other departments who kindly responded to our inquiry and
who sent copies of protocols. Lesley Cox provided secretarial assistance, recorded responses
and undertook most of the telephone enquiries. Responsibility for the views in this report are
the authors’ alone. It does not represent the views of the Department of Health.
v Page 35
Summary
Introduction
1. The rise in the number of care home closures in recent years has raised concerns about the
way in which residents and their relatives and carers are being affected by such relocation
and the way in which it is managed. Currently there is no statutory guidance in England
aimed specifically at the way in which care homes close.
2. This paper presents a review of local government guidelines and protocols for the closure
of care homes for older people. The objectives of the study were to identify the
prevalence of written guidelines and the nature of existing principles and
recommendations for good practice. Thirty-three documents were analysed to identify
their purpose and scope, the ways in which roles and responsibilities were defined and
allocated, and suggestions and recommendations for good practice.
Regulatory and policy context
3. Existing guidance, regulation and legislation relevant to the closure of care homes
includes:
The responsibility of local authorities to assess vulnerable people;
Advice that it is sensible for local authorities to draw up plans and protocols in the
event that a nursing home closes or a resident is evicted;
The requirement that care home providers apply to the National Care Standards
Commission to close and should do so not less than three months before the
proposed closure date. Notification to service users should be not more than
seven days after application to the Commission;
The requirement that residents should be given a written contract that includes a
period of notice, and the opportunity of trial visits to new homes.
Findings
4. In total information was collected from just over a third (55) of the 150 councils in
England. Of those departments with over 100 care homes 67 per cent (48) responded.
5. Nearly two thirds of the responding authorities reported having a closure protocol.
viiPage 36
6. Document length and scope varied. The majority covered either voluntary closures or
voluntary and emergency closures. Five were checklists. Few considered measures to
prevent closure. Most focused on actions to be taken after notification of closure.
7. Legal issues raised included: communication by inspectors to operational staff about the
financial viability of a home; required permissions, for example, for transferring
residents’ records; the payment or sending of additional care staff into a closing home.
Advice on some of these legal issues differed.
8. Recommended principles for good practice included: taking residents’ social and personal
needs into account (existing friendships with residents, preferred geographical location,
ability of family and friends to visit); maximising residents’ ability to make an informed
choice. Several comments suggested that enabling choice was likely to be difficult to
achieve in practice.
9. A quarter of the protocols referred to the length of notice proprietors should or ideally
would provide. Typically these recommended notice of around a month or as much as
possible.
10. Views and recommendations varied in relation to a number of issues:
a. Definitions of urgent and planned closures
b. Overall responsibility for the management of a care home closure
c. Responsibility for particular tasks
d. Organisational arrangements for the provision of care management
e. Which residents should be offered guidance, help and information
f. The way in which residents should be notified of a closure and the level of
council involvement
g. Whether moves should be arranged to coincide with the moving of other
residents or spread over more than a week
h. The desirability of temporary/second moves
11. Considerable importance was placed on involving care staff in the closure process,
respecting their friendships with residents, and their likely concern for residents’ future
welfare.
12. Plans for resident reviews rarely specified whether all residents or local authority funded
residents only would be reviewed.
viii Page 37
13. A minority of protocols referred to a formal debriefing of social services staff, or an
evaluation of the closure process.
Discussion
14. The range of roles, responsibilities and procedures discussed in the reviewed protocols
suggests that there is a need for such plans to ensure that practical and efficient systems
are in place.
15. The variation in approaches to providing assessments and support to self-funding
residents who have arranged their own care home place may leave these residents
vulnerable and raises issues of equity and access to social care services.
16. The variation in roles, responsibilities and procedures across local authorities raises issues
of geographical equity and access to social care services.
17. Factors that affect the way in which a closure process can be managed are likely to affect
the feasibility of introducing standard requirements: the cause of closure, the timescale,
the local availability of care home places, and local authority staffing resources.
18. Managing the process of a care home closure requires that a balance be struck between
what is desirable and what is achievable. It would be useful to establish which actions or
measures are more or less essential to the support of residents, relatives and carers, and
care staff and providers during care home closures.
Policy and research implications
19. There appears to be scope for the rationalization of roles and responsibilities within
councils during care home closures, for national guidance on legal matters and on the role
of the National Care Standards Commission.
20. Equity and welfare considerations for residents and effectiveness and efficiency
considerations for authorities suggest that there is a role for guidance and information at
three levels: nationally, at council or care trust level and for care managers directly
involved in the process of closure.
ixPage 38
21. Policy and practice might be supported by further research evidence. Ongoing qualitative
work is investigating the experience and views of residents, relatives, social services staff,
and care staff about what is important during a care home closure. Ideally evidence is
needed to establish whether positive outcomes for residents and their relatives and carers
are associated with particular processes, arrangements and practices during a care home
closure.
x Page 39
1. Introduction
The impact of care home closures for older people in England has been the subject of
considerable media coverage and campaigning by independent provider associations,
charitable organisations, campaigning groups and residents of closing homes (Carvel, 2002a;
Carvel, 2002b; Bright, 2000; Residents Action Group for the Elderly (R.A.G.E.) National;
Sapstead and Womack, 2002). The central concern is that residents’ health will not only
suffer as a result of such involuntary relocation, but that they may die. Empirical research, in
the United Kingdom, United States and Canada, examining mortality rates after care home
closures is currently ambiguous and likely to remain so given the methodological and ethical
difficulties involved (Smith and Crome, 2000). There is also a lack of evidence about
whether resident adjustment, health and emotional well-being is protected or promoted by
particular approaches to closing a care home. Few studies have linked resident health
following a home closure to specific practices, arrangements and activities during home
closure, although some have related a lack of any increase in levels of mortality after hospital
relocation to preparation and planning (McAuslane and Sperlinger, 1994; Thorson and Davis,
2000). It is likely that any effects of care home closure are influenced by the way in which a
home is closed. It is important therefore to understand current arrangements and practices
during home closures. This paper reports research into the prevalence and content of council
guidelines for care home closures. The research was part of a larger study that also aimed to
explore the process of care home closure from the viewpoint of residents and relatives and
social services care managers and managerial staff.
There have been calls for ‘closure protocols’ to safeguard residents’ welfare. Such appeals
have unfavourably compared current arrangements for closing local authority care homes
with arrangements for closing schools (which require the permission of the Secretary of
State), for council housing transfers (which require a vote among tenants). They have also
emphasised the need for consultation and possible intervention to delay or prevent closures
(Bright, 2000; Bright, 2001; Brindle, 2001).
Since 1948, under section 21 of the National Assistance Act councils with social services
responsibilities (hereafter referred to as “councils” or “local authorities”) have had a duty to
provide accommodation, including care home places, to persons aged 18 or over who are in
need of care and attention by reason of age, infirmity or other circumstances. Since 1993
councils have had a legal responsibility to assess the help and support needed by vulnerable
people and a duty to provide appropriate accommodation for those with needs that meet the
council’s eligibility criteria (NHS and Community Care Act 1990). The Act also allowed
1
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councils to purchase care services from independent providers (NHS and Community Care
Act 1990).
Nearly 70 per cent of older people living in care homes in England are publicly funded and
the majority of publicly funded places are in care homes in the independent sector (Netten et
al., 2001; Laing and Buisson, 2001). Consequently the vast majority of care home residents
live in independent homes over which authorities have little or no direct control over the
decision whether or when to close the home.
There are two main types of closure of independent homes: enforced and voluntary. When
inspectors apply to cancel registration, under the Care Standards Act of 2000, the closure is
classified as enforced. Enforced closures may be ‘emergency’ or ‘non-urgent’. An
application for an emergency cancellation must be based on grounds that pose an immediate
and serious risk to the life, health or well-being of residents or patients. When a provider
decides to close a home and notifies the National Care Standards Commission of their
intention to cancel their registration the closure is classified as voluntary. Closures due to
actions by receivers or creditors are included in this category.
The characteristics of the care home sector, the types of homes that are closing ‘voluntarily’,
and the reasons for closure raise issues about how guidelines for home closures should or
could be introduced, implemented or imposed. The nature and scale of activities during a
closure are likely to be restricted by practicalities such as timescale, particularly when a
provider faces business failure. Providers have reported closing voluntarily due to a
combination of factors related to financial viability, including the level of local authority fees,
the cost implications of the proposed National Minimum Standards, difficulties recruiting
staff, meeting staff costs, and reduced demand (Williams et al., 2001). In such
circumstances, it is difficult to see how specific guidelines to protect residents, such as a
required standard length of notice of closure, can be adhered to in practice. Traditionally the
independent residential sector has been characterised by small business providers, typically
husband and wife teams running homes in converted, rather than purpose build, premises.
Despite the increasing number of major nursing home providers, providers who own only one
or two homes supply more than fifty per cent of nursing places (Laing and Buisson, 2001).
An analysis of care home closures between 1996 and 2001 found that it is these typical
homes, smaller, single businesses in converted buildings that were closing (Darton, 2002).
The rise in the number of voluntary closures, combined with the number of openings, has
brought about a reduction in the number of places in care homes providing nursing and
residential care for older people (Netten et al., 2002). This reduction in places, in turn is
2 Page 41
likely to add a further constraint on how closures are managed, by further reducing the
number of homes with vacancies and limiting the choice available to residents and their
relatives and former carers.
The aims of this investigation were to identify:
the extent to which councils have written guidelines or protocols relating to their
involvement in the closure of independent care homes for older people;
how roles and responsibilities are assigned;
principles and objectives for good practice;
recommended approaches and procedures.
Questions we aimed to answer in part or whole included:
Is there agreement about what is a good way to close a care home?
What circumstances and issues affect the guidance about the closure process?
To what extent are recommendations, or advice, based on past experience or evidence?
The paper outlines the regulatory and policy context of home closures, including the statutory
responsibilities of local authorities. Objectives and procedures for good practice suggested in
the literature are also reviewed before the findings are presented, and their implications
discussed.
2. Regulatory and policy context
2.1 Law and guidance
There is no national law or statutory guidance in England aimed specifically at the closure of
independent residential and nursing homes. Government guidance on local authorities’
powers to make arrangements for residential accommodation states that ‘it will be sensible
for local authorities to draw up plans and protocols with health authorities in the event that a
nursing home closes or a resident is evicted (and in the event that a residential care home
closes)’ (Department of Health, 1993). The guidance also recommends that such contingency
plans should support self-funding residents as well as those receiving public financial
support: they should ‘as far as is possible, aim to ensure that all residents are helped to
identify opportunities and choices in finding alternative accommodation within a similar
timescale (irrespective of the source of financial support)’. In general guidance is not law.
This guidance, however, has the force of law insofar as it was issued under section 7 of the
Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, which states that councils are obliged to follow
guidance from the Secretary of State.
3Page 42
The most recent good practice material that discusses the relocation of residents in detail is a
Health Service Circular that offers guidance on how to relocate frail older patients following
hospital or long stay ward closure (NHS Executive, 1998). The recommendations cover
consultation, a project plan, the needs of the individual and their relatives or carers, the
process of transfer and role of the receiving setting, and arrangements for follow-up and
monitoring.
A number of the national standards and regulations, introduced under the Care Standards Act,
are relevant during the closure of a care home:
Providers are required to give residents a statement of terms and conditions, or a written
contract, that includes a period of notice (Standard 2, Department of Health, 2001a);
Prospective residents should be offered the opportunity to visit new homes and to move in
on a trial basis (Standard 5, Department of Health, 2001a);
Providers should apply to the Commission to cancel their registration and should do so
not less than three months before the proposed effective date or at ‘such shorter period (if
any) before that date as may be agreed’ (Regulation 15 (2), Department of Health,
2001b);
‘not more than seven days thereafter’ providers should give notice to terminate
accommodation to residents, their next of kin, and any local authorities that have made
provision of accommodation, nursing or personal care (Regulation 15 (3) Department of
Health, 2001b).
When a home is closed due to financial difficulties or bankruptcy it is unclear how
practicable or enforceable this provision for three months notice is.
The legal obligation on care home owners/managers to meet this requirement is further
complicated by the lesser amount of notice required for terminating accommodation:
‘reasonable’ notice must be given to the service user, their next of kin and the local authority,
if they arranged the accommodation. The requirement also allows for the possibility that
providers might find it difficult to give reasonable notice:
‘If it is impracticable for the registered person to comply with the requirement in
paragraph (1) -
(a) he shall do so as soon as it is practicable to do so; and
(b) he shall provide to the Commission a statement as to the circumstances which
made it impracticable for him to comply with the requirement.’ (Regulation 40, Care
Home Regulations, 2001)
4 Page 43
This discrepancy in requirements may allow care home owners to notify councils of their
intention to close a home by giving notice that they are terminating accommodation for each
individual resident.
The agreement between the statutory and independent sector, Building Capacity and
Partnership in Care, also calls for greater openness and collaboration to reduce instability in
the social care market. It urges providers to ‘undertake prompt and timely communication
with commissioners’ and states that councils should work with independent providers to
manage closures: ‘If services have to be withdrawn, commissioners and providers should
seek to achieve this in a planned way.’ (Department of Health, 2001c p17, p16).
2.2 Legislation in the United States and Australia
In the United States and Australia residents’ rights are also protected by legislation, including
the right to security of tenure. In the United States a resident of a nursing home, and their
family, or guardian, has the legal right to at least 30 days notice of an involuntary transfer or
discharge (Nursing Home Reform Act 1987: s. 483.12). Some state laws expand upon this.
In Washington State, for example, the licensee of a nursing home must notify the local
administration office of the Department of Social and Health Services, all residents and their
representatives in writing of voluntary closure sixty days beforehand (Washington
Administrative Code). In Australia older people in residential homes have a right to at least
14 days notice of having to leave (Aged Care Act, 1997: Part 4.2 s. 23 [5-6]). The
Accreditation Standards that services have to comply with also state that residents should be
made aware of their rights and responsibilities, including their right to security of tenure
(Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency Ltd). In addition a provider cannot make a
resident leave
‘or imply that the care recipient must leave, before suitable alternative
accommodation is available that meets the care recipient’s assessed long-term needs
and is affordable by the care recipient.’ (Aged Care Act, 1997: Part 4.2 s. 23 [6])
In both the United States and Australia the form of notification is specified. Notification
must be in writing, include the reasons for the decision, the date on which the resident is
required to leave, and their rights to appeal/complain. In America notification also has to
include where the resident is to move to and the provider is responsible for making
arrangements to transfer residents safely.
5Page 44
2.3 Councils’ responsibilities
Before services can be publicly provided or arranged a person’s needs must be assessed.
Since 1998 councils have not been able to refuse to carry out an assessment on the grounds of
a person’s financial resources (Department of Health, 1998). This entitlement to an
assessment was emphasised in recent policy and practice guidance to councils on how to
promote fair access to care services (Department of Health, 2002a). The guidance also states
that reviews, including re-assessments of individual’s needs, should be made within three
months of help first being provided or when there is a major change to the service. Thus
councils have specific responsibilities to provide community care needs assessments to
people who may be in need and/or seeking long term care and during a home closure councils
have a responsibility to re-assess the needs of publicly funded residents and to secure
alternative accommodation for them.
However, local authorities are permitted to arrange services on a temporary basis without an
assessment ‘if, in the opinion, of the authority, the condition of that person is such that he
requires those services as a matter of urgency …(and) as soon as practicable thereafter, an
assessment of his needs shall be made’ (NHS and Community Care Act, 1990: 47. paragraphs
5 and 6). This provision for the urgent arrangement of services without an assessment may
be interpreted as meaning that during urgent home closures the needs of residents need not be
assessed before ‘suitable’ alternative accommodation is found. Consequently, the extent to
which councils are obliged to re-assess the needs of publicly funded residents during a home
closure is unclear.
Once a council has agreed to fund a residential placement they are required to ensure that
they arrange for care in a person’s preferred accommodation, if they have expressed a
preference and if their choice meets certain conditions, for example that it is available and
suitable to their needs (National Assistance Act 1948 (Choice of Accommodation)
Directions, 1992). The extent to which this responsibility to ensure people are able to
exercise a genuine choice over where they live applies during a home closure is unclear.
During a home closure a re-assessment of a self-funding resident, who has arranged their own
care, might identify important changes in their circumstances or needs. They might have
become eligible for funding for example, or need a different type of care. Yet it is unclear
whether councils are obliged to do any more than offer self-funded residents information or
advice, or possibly to make arrangements if the resident or family are unable to do so
themselves. When seeking residential care people are entitled to a needs assessment,
irrespective of their financial support, but this does not appear to apply during a home
6 Page 45
closure; people may be seeking alternative provision but their eligibility for services has
already been established.
2.4 Legal challenges and local authority reviews
The European Convention of Human Rights was incorporated in the Human Rights Act 1998,
and implemented in England in October 2000. Two Articles of the Convention have been
used in court cases appealing the decision to close NHS hospitals and authority run homes:
Article 8, which gives the right to respect for private and family life, home and
confidentiality; Article 2 which gives the right to life (Human Rights Act, 1998). For
example, a judicial review of a health authority’s decision to close a nursing home found the
authority in breach of Article 8 and the decision unlawful, because patients had been told in
writing that it would be a home for life (Court of Appeal judgement R v North & East Devon
Health Authority ex parte Coughlan, 1999). Permanent residents entitlement to consultation
from local authorities before they decide to close a home has also been confirmed in judicial
review (R v Devon County Council ex parte Baker and Durham County Council ex parte
Curtis and Others, 1995). Councils have a duty to inform and consult existing residents, to
provide the reasons for the decision to close a local authority run home and to allow
reasonable time for responses, which in turn, should be considered by the authority. Recent
challenges to council’s decisions to close care homes, however, have been dropped. For
example, three legal challenges to Lancashire County Council’s decision to close 32 of its 48
care homes were withdrawn when the council agreed to include a medical assessment of the
risk of transfer in assessments of the residents’ needs, to move residents with staff to new or
refurbished homes, and to consider postponing transfers until any risk could be minimised or
managed (Lancashire County Council and Chorley Borough Council, 2003).
The Human Rights Act applies to ‘public authorities’ only. The definition of public authority
includes private bodies that are carrying out public functions. This raises the issue of whether
independent sector organisations, that provide services purchased by public authorities, are
performing a public function and are consequently required to uphold the European
Convention on Human Rights. In a case against the closure of a care home by the voluntary
sector housing association Leonard Cheshire, the court of appeal upheld the dismissal of the
application for a judicial review of the decision to close, on the grounds that Leonard
Cheshire did not constitute a public body and so did not fall within the remit of the Human
Rights Act (R v Leonard Cheshire Foundation, 2002). The British Institute of Human Rights
has called for the government to promote legislative change to remove the disparity in
protection ‘afforded to those residents placed by a local authority in a care home which it
runs itself as against that afforded to those the local authority places in privately run homes’
(The British Institute of Human Rights, 2002, p5).
7Page 46
Councils have also used local government overview and scrutiny committees, introduced
under the Local Government Act 2000, as a means with which to investigate the closure of
care homes. For example, scrutiny committees have investigated the way in which residents’
are moved between care homes, including moves brought about by home closure and the
closure of an independent nursing home (Gloucestershire County Council, 2003; Prasad,
2003). Issues identified in relation to moving residents included the lack of a requirement or
policy for “follow up” assessments, the lack of an independent advocacy service, and the lack
of understanding among the local community about the role and responsibilities of social
services departments (Gloucestershire County Council, 2003).
3. Good practice literature
While there are a number of regulations and standards relevant to the closure of care homes
for older people (although not all relate specifically to the way in which homes are closed)
there are few publications that offer guidance or report research findings about the way in
which care homes have been or should be closed. Studies about the relocation of residents or
patients in settings other than independent care homes are more numerous; historically
literature focusing on the process of moving older people or other service users has focused
on relocation resulting from hospital renovation (Brugler et al., 1993), the closure of long
stay hospital wards (Dickinson, 1996), and hospital closure (McCourt Perring, 1993; Knapp
et al., 1992; Korman and Glennerster, 1985).
Many of the circumstances and issues do not apply to independent care home closures in the
current UK and wider international context. However, some planning issues and
recommendations are relevant: the importance of ensuring services are maintained throughout
the closure period (Korman and Glennerster, 1985); recognition that the process of closure is
likely to be more complex than anticipated (Korman and Glennerster, 1985); the importance
of attending to residents’ reactions to change and loss, as well as the practicalities of finding
alternative accommodation (McCourt Perring, 1993); that patients and staff should take part
in activities that offer control, predictability and decision-making (Brugler et al., 1993).
Available practice guidance includes a professional practice handbook for social care staff
working with all user groups in residential, day, domiciliary and community care settings,
which includes a chapter on closing homes (Leonard Cheshire and Social Care Association,
undated). This emphasises: careful planning; provision for the support and involvement of
staff and residents and their relatives and carers; a charter of rights for service users to
promote informed choice and involvement; the retention, ideally, of a full complement of
8 Page 47
existing staff; a time-scale of two to six months. It warns against allowing closures to ‘slide
into unstructured winding down’ (Leonard Cheshire and Social Care Association, undated:
10). When managing a local authority home closure Lane similarly recommends that ‘All
individuals, staff and residents should be encouraged to avoid panic inspired precipitate
moves during the countdown to closure. Ideally a target of not less than three months and not
more than six months should be set at an early stage’ (Lane, 1987).
Recommended timescales for relocation differ. While Lane suggests between three and six
months for local authority home closures, others have recommended a longer timescale,
between six months and a year in the context of moving nursing home residents to a new
facility (Lane, 1987; Leonard Cheshire and Social Care Association, undated; Amenta et al.,
1984). Given the lack of evidence on which to base decisions about timescale Age Concern
has recommended that the decision be made ‘as far as possible by the older people
concerned’ and that advocates are available to residents to ensure their views are prioritised
(Age Concern, 2002: 12).
The importance of not excluding residents who have cognitive deficits when preparing
residents for relocation has been highlighted by Dickinson’s finding that, except for those
with severe impairments, residents with dementia can recall factual information, and express
appropriate emotional responses, making individual counselling and support appropriate
(Dickinson, 1996).
A recent summary of good practice in care home closures identified a limited evidence base
(Woolham, 2001). The available guidance focused on the need to minimise resident
disruption and distress, familiarise residents with their new care setting, and provide
continuity, and recommended more specifically the need to:
identify and attend to residents who are predisposed to stress and show signs of stress
after the closure announcement;
prepare residents via discussions and visits to their new home;
allow a time-scale of three months;
minimise the degree of environmental change;
ensure detailed resident information is transferred;
support the care staff;
move staff and residents together where possible, and if not, have a key worker from the
new home visit;
ensure residents are accompanied by someone familiar on the day of the move.
9Page 48
Factors that help residents to adjust in their new accommodation following a care home
closure is another area that has been under-researched. It is likely that good practice in terms
of the provision of support to newly arrived residents by care staff is applicable to residents
arriving from a home closure. One would expect Reed and Payton’s (1997)
recommendations to be relevant and hopefully to be of benefit to relocated residents as part
of routine practice. For example, the ways in which staff can help and support relationships
between residents should be included in care plans and established residents could be invited
to act as informal hosts or mentors to new residents. However, relatives and residents may
regard arrival from a home closure as something that requires different types or level of
support.
An American study which attributes a successful transfer of nursing home residents to a
larger facility to careful preparation, emphasises early notification, choice and continuity:
‘Six months to a year is not too long for many residents to be able to retain the information’
(Amenta et al., 1984: 360). Staff retention, communication and timescale have also been
identified as central issues in a study which compares four models of temporary relocation
due to refurbishment (Wyld et al., 2002). The least problematic alternatives were found to be
to let residents stay put during a refurbishment, or to move every resident to a newly built
home. The objectives of increasing residents’ familiarity with a new facility, minimising the
stress experienced by residents, and staff preparation were also pursued in a Canadian study,
which recommended that planning and outcomes benefit from conducting an implementation
evaluation (Grant, 1997). The benefits of such an evaluation are said to include:
accountability information;
specific and measurable goals, objectives and activities;
practical information that could be drawn on by others.
If implemented routinely, evaluation information about resident outcomes might also be
compared across home closures, by resident characteristics, and closure procedures and
processes.
Box 1 summarises the issues, activities and objectives highlighted in the guidance literature.
The relocation of service users is not a new focus of research enquiry. However,
comparatively little empirical research has focused on the closures of independent care homes
for older people. A better understanding of the processes involved, residents’ and relatives’
views and feelings, the resources required, the comparative advantages of different
organisational approaches, influences on process and outcome, and the consequences and
costs is needed to support any future debate, guidance, regulation or training aimed
10 Page 49
specifically at the closure of care homes for older people. The closure of care homes for
older people is not going to disappear in the immediate future. The purpose of this research
was to establish the prevalence of local authority written guidelines and the nature of
recommendations for practice. 1
Box.1: Actions, issues & objectives during home closures identified in the literature
Actions and issues Objectives
ConsultationMay need definition
Can the closure decision itself be informed by consultation?
Comply with residents’ rights
Promote resident and relative
involvement
Notification of decision
Can the timescale be too long as well as too short?
Prepare residents
Retention of existing staff Maintain ongoing care
Provide continuity of care
Preparation of residentsOngoing discussions
Counselling
Visits to new home
Charter of Rights
How might residents’ with dementia be supported?
Minimise resident stress and distress
Promote understanding and minimise
distress
Promote predictability and support choice
Protect choice and decision making
Support and involvement of staff Promote sense of control and decision
making and minimise stress
Assessment of residents’ needs Ensure new accommodation is suitable
Finding of alternative accommodation
Involve residents
Consider protecting friendship groups
Promote sense of control and decision-
making
Respect personal and social needs
Organisation of actual move and move itself
Residents to be accompanied
Timing
Transfer of information
Continuity and respect of individuals
Avoid problematic days/times of day
Provide continuity of care
Settling in periodCan staff visit or move with residents?
Provide continuity of care
Monitoring and follow-up Ensure suitability of placement
1This investigation was part of a wider study focusing on the process and consequences of care home closures.
The experiences and views of local authority staff, residents, relatives and carers, providers and care staff are
currently being identified through case study work around particular home closures.
11Page 50
4. Methods
All local authorities in England were contacted in March 2002 and asked whether they had a
protocol for the closure of independent care homes for older people, and if so, to provide a
copy. Since authorities with a considerable number of homes are more likely to have
experienced closures, and as a consequence might be more likely than other authorities to
have guidelines, a follow-up letter was sent to authorities with 100 or more independent
residential or dual registered care homes, as at March 2001(Department of Health, 2001c).
Twenty seven of these were also telephoned.
The home closure guidelines and protocols were analysed using a combination of quantitative
and qualitative approaches to content analysis. Protocols were reviewed to identify the
format, length and scope before the number in each category was quantified. Similarly, the
content of the documents was reviewed to identify the nature of recommendations before
quantifying the prevalence of particular subject matter and suggestions. Issues and
recommendations were then compared in more detail to identify common views of best
practice and any variation or agreement.
Our request for guidelines from councils was made before the implementation of the Care
Standards Act and the replacement of local authority and health authority registration and
inspection units by the National Care Standards Commission (NCSC or the Commission) in
April 2002. In reporting the findings the terminology used reflects that used in the council
guidelines and so includes reference to registration and inspection units rather than the
Commission, and nursing homes and residential homes, rather than care homes.
5. Findings
In total information was collected from just over a third (55) of the 150 councils in England.
Of those councils with over 100 independent care homes 68 per cent (48) responded. The
highest response rate among the larger councils was from Shire County Authorities (80 per
cent).
Of the local authorities who responded with over 100 independent residential or dual
registered care homes, in March 2001, 62 per cent (30) reported having a protocol, and 37 per
cent (18) said that they did not. A further seven authorities that had fewer homes also
provided examples of their protocols.
12 Page 51
Table 1 shows the response from local authorities with more than 100 care homes by type of
authority. Almost two thirds of the shire county authorities reported having a protocol. None
of the councils in Inner London volunteered a protocol. Almost half of the protocols received
were from the Northern and Yorkshire region and from the North West. None of the councils
that reported not having a protocol were in the Northern and Yorkshire region. Of the larger
authorities who reported no protocol a third were in the South East.
Table 1: Response from local authorities with more than 100 homes by type
Number ofCouncils
No. of responding
Councils
No. thatreported having
a protocol
No. that sent anexample
protocol
Shire County 31 25 17 16
Shire Unitary Authority 18 10 5 3
Metropolitan District 15 10 7 6
London 6 3 1 1
Total 70 48 30 26
Several local authority staff stated that they did not have a protocol, or had not finalised their
protocol because of the imminent replacement of the registration and inspection units by the
National Care Standards Commission. One added that they had destroyed their existing
guidelines. Four said that they were expecting the Commission to provide advice about
closures or to develop a national protocol. One protocol, published in 1994, noted that
guidance or a national protocol was likely to be issued in due course.
A couple of comments made by local authority staff suggest that views of the usefulness of
closure guidelines differ, perhaps reflecting the regional variation in the number of care
homes; one department, with a draft protocol, described the need for a protocol as urgent,
while another reported not having had an occasion when they had to use their protocol.
There may be more protocols in use than reported. Different council departments responded,
and telephone enquiries as to the existence of protocols also typically involved being put
through to more than one department. Obtaining a definite no as to the existence of a
protocol was consequently difficult; knowing which department should be contacted was far
from straightforward and deciding when all relevant departments had been contacted more
13Page 52
so. Sources of protocols or information included: Adult Services, Contracts, Commissioning,
the Directors Office, Communication, and the Policy department within councils, and the
National Care Standards Commission. Moreover many of the protocols received were formal
policy level agreements, outlining responsibilities and resource allocation. Initial analysis of
our cases study work suggests that guidelines may be developed by front-line social services
staff, based on their experience and for use by their teams. Such guidelines may not be
known about at higher levels of the organisation.
5.1 The documents received
Thirty three protocols or guidelines were received and analysed. Twenty seven of the larger
authorities and a further seven councils with fewer than 100 homes provided protocols. The
nature of the documents varied. Just under a third of the protocols were temporary in so far
as six were drafts and a further four were being updated. One inspector sent notes based on
guidelines that could not be located. A date of ‘publication’ was shown on just over half of
the documents and ranged from 1994 to 2002. Of these about half had been produced in the
last three years (2000-2002) and two thirds in the last four years (1999-2002)2. Three dated
back to 1994. Document length varied considerably, ranging from one to 71 pages. Only
three were over 20 pages. A third were between two and six pages.
Just under a third (10) of the protocols stated that they were developed or agreed jointly by
health and social services. The author(s) of the documents, however, were not always
specified, and neither were intended audiences. This possibly reflects the internal and/or
working nature of some of the documents. To a degree, intended audiences could be inferred
from the departments or agencies whose roles and responsibilities were outlined. Some
protocols appeared to be intended for multiple audiences (such as local and county
councillors, advocacy services, GP practices, the Benefits agency, Ambulance Service, Fire
Service, Health and Safety Executive and Environmental Health), while others appeared to be
written for one main audience, such as the care management team, or care home providers.
In two instances very similar protocols were provided from adjacent local authorities that had
previously been the same local authority.
5.2 Aims, scope and principles of good practice
Less than a third of the documents outlined aims and objectives. Of those that did, the
majority identified their aim as protecting and supporting residents, carers and relatives, their
rights and interests, and safe transfer to appropriate care.
2As most of the protocols were written before the introduction of the National Care Standards Commission,
where reference is made to Registration and Inspection Units this reflects the wording in the documents.
14 Page 53
The majority (27) of the protocols covered voluntary closures (13), or voluntary and
emergency closures (14), and it is these that are the focus of this analysis. Two protocols
related to the closure of council run homes, and four covered emergency closures only, of
which one was reportedly used for planned/voluntary closures. A few documents were said
to also apply to temporary emergency closures, such as those due to structural damage to the
premises, catastrophic failure of a utility service, fire, or flood. A couple of protocols also
covered the eviction of a single resident. A few applied to the closure of residential care
homes for adults only, and one emergency protocol related to children in residential care as
well as adults.
The scope of the documents also varied in the extent to which they set out to cover ‘all
aspects which may occur or require addressing’, to outline key issues, or to list actions to be
taken. Five protocols were checklists and a further 14 included a checklist or checklists.
Over half of the checklists within protocols consisted of a list of step-by-step actions to be
taken from notification to post closure. As well as checklists of actions, appendices included
the paperwork needed for a cancellation of registration order, a resident master sheet, a
resident identification sheet, a resident property sheet, a permission to remove property form,
information on Preserved Rights, and standard letters to relatives, general practitioners, and
pharmacists. One protocol included a copy of the Health Service Circular (NHS Executive
1998). Another included a leaflet for residents, relatives and friends, and another a nine-point
list of residents’ rights.
The majority of documents focused on actions to be taken after the closure decision but four
protocols referred to measures to prevent a closure, or measures to keep a home open to allow
a longer closure period. Of these, two noted that ‘The most effective way of dealing with
home closures is to prevent them happening and, in many instances, closures can be avoided
if there is co-operation and negotiation between interested parties’. Recommended measures
for extending the closure period, or for preventing an emergency closure included: faster
payment of any outstanding invoices; advance payments; the registration of the receiver.
Views differed about the legality of some of the options, for example, sending additional care
staff into a home (this is discussed in greater detail below). Several authorities reported
trying to be in a position to identify when a home is having financial difficulties in advance,
so that they might be able to prevent an emergency closure, or assist a planned closure. The
monthly monitoring of occupancy levels, and regular communication with proprietors was
recommended and high staff turnover and disinvestments highlighted as warning signs.
Just under half of the protocols summarised or advocated principles to be adhered to during a
closure, some of which reflected wider goals. For example, the protection of service users’
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welfare, rights and interests. During the closure of a care home such principles centre on
minimising disruption, stress and distress, while promoting independence, choice, privacy,
dignity and respect. One protocol referred to protecting residents’ human rights. Six
protocols recommended that advocacy services should be made available to residents and
relatives to ensure that they can make an informed choice about alternative accommodation.
The need for care managers to ensure that alternative accommodation was appropriate and
met residents’ needs was emphasised frequently.
The social and personal needs of residents, and relatives or carers highlighted as
considerations that should be taken into account included existing friendships between
residents, the preferred location of a new home, and the ability of relatives and friends to
visit. Only one protocol highlighted the importance of taking the needs of minority ethnic
communities into account when moving residents to a new care home. Six protocols referred
to the desirability of finding accommodation that friends within the closing home could move
to together if they wished. One of these cited the Health Service Circular recommendation,
made in the context of transferring NHS patients to other long stay settings, that friends
should be moved together (NHS Executive 1998). One protocol highlighted issues that
should be considered by social services staff trying to identify friendships between residents:
‘Sometimes relationships are observed to be positive by outsiders, but one of the
partners could be experiencing some form of abuse. It should not be assumed that
relationships between confused people or people with a learning disability are less
important to them than between others.’
The need to maximise residents’ ability to make an informed choice was highlighted in six
protocols. In some cases this choice was referred to as a right. Comments in two protocols
implied that offering choice might be impossible or difficult to achieve during a home
closure: ‘choice …[is] likely in fact to be minimal’; ‘the right of the resident to choose …
should be upheld as far as possible’. One protocol suggested offering residents two or more
choices where possible.
5.3 Definitions of types of closure
The protocols distinguished between emergency and voluntary closures, and between planned
and unplanned voluntary closures. Definitions varied, although they were often classified in
terms of timescale and/or reason for closure. One protocol referred to urgent or sudden
closures (presumably ‘unplanned’) as those with less than six weeks’ notice, and defined
planned closures as those with a minimum of six to eight weeks’ notice. In contrast, one of
the emergency closure protocols defined urgent closures as those that occur within a few
16 Page 55
hours, and added that experience had shown that one week’s notice was sufficient for
residents and relatives to be involved in choosing new homes. Another protocol defined
unplanned voluntary closures in terms of examples, citing financial failure, staffing issues,
and change of category of registration. Yet some of these reasons for closure could meet the
criteria given for an emergency closure: ‘any event in a residential or nursing home which
necessitates the urgent removal of residents from the home in questions’, for example fire,
flood, failure of power supply, structural problems with the building, staffing crisis. As
another protocol noted, financial problems may lead to a home closing within a few hours,
‘because the proprietor could no longer purchase food, or was relying on nursing agencies
who gave short notice that because they were not being paid they would not supply staff for
the next shift.’
5.4 Legal issues
Just under half of the protocols highlighted particular legal issues, over and above the general
legal framework described earlier. Four protocols noted that local authorities are not
empowered to move residents against their will, and that a general practitioner may need to
apply for a court order in order to do so. Another restriction related to communication
between the registration and inspection unit and local authority operational staff: the
registration and inspection unit could not inform operational staff of concerns about a home’s
financial viability as ‘to do so would render them liable to legal action in connection with
restraint of trade.’ However, as mentioned earlier, two protocols recommended that local
authorities monitor vacancy information, so as to be better placed to gain the co-operation of
a proprietor if a closure cannot be avoided.
Another legal issue related to the transfer of residents’ documents to their new care home.
Permission should be sought from the registered person at a closing home to remove
documents, and the receiving home should agree to return records at a later date for retention
by the proprietor of the closed home. One protocol included a permission form to be
completed for each resident. Another suggested that files from the closing home should be
photocopied.
In an appendix on legal issues one protocol advised care managers to restrict any advice that
they give to residents, and relatives and carers, about finding alternative homes to the
immediate care needs of the residents. The same protocol also stated that ‘meddling in any
way’ with the running of the home was ‘ultra vires and should not be undertaken’. Social
services staff were also advised to avoid being the last out of the premises.
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A minority of protocols referred to the possibility of existing care staff being paid by the local
authority, or to council or health authority care staff being put into a home to allow a longer
closure period. Local authorities had received different advice on this matter. One protocol
indicated that according to legal advice statutory agencies could not pay staff in homes that
were closing because ‘this would require an individual being registered as a fit person to run
the home and … there is no such thing as temporary registration … the person so registered
could… only be removed from that role if the statutory agency had grounds for de-
registration.’ In addition if the statutory agency were to pay staff it would become
responsible ‘if something went wrong in the home’. Yet, both the temporary payment of
staff, and the possibility of providing additional staff were identified as an option in two
protocols.
5.5 The allocation of roles and responsibilities
The principal actors with responsibilities during a care home closure are the residents and
their relatives or former carers, the owner of the home and the home staff, the local authority,
NHS/health authority, and the registration and inspection unit/NCSC. The allocation of roles
and responsibilities varied between councils. It varied in terms of the level of organisation
and co-ordination described, and in terms of who was responsible for particular tasks. Three
of the council protocols referred to the central government recommendation that councils
draw up plans in the event of a care home closure (Department of Health, 1993).
The degree to which the protocols outlined levels of management structure varied, as the
audience and coverage varied. Formal and comprehensive agreements tended to outline
arrangements for a co-ordinating task group, which would include representatives from the
council and the NCSC. In other documents overall responsibility ‘for ensuring that all the
parties involved work together’ was placed within one agency, such as the registration and
inspection unit, or more commonly a district manager, or above, in the local authority. In one
case the registration and inspection unit was allocated overall responsibility only when a
closure was enforced, although in another case they were said to always take overall
responsibility. In another protocol responsibility varied according to the type of home; social
services team managers were responsible for residential home closures and the registration
and inspection unit was responsible for nursing home closures.
Responsibility for particular tasks varied across the protocols. Obtaining a current list of
residents, along with details of funding arrangements, and the names of GPs and next of kin
was said to be the responsibility of the social services department in six protocols, the
registration and inspection unit in five protocols, and the proprietor or manager of the home
in another five protocols. The majority of protocols that outlined roles and responsibilities
18 Page 57
for finding alternative placements identified social services staff. In one protocol, however,
the registration and inspection unit was responsible for advising residents, carers, relatives
and purchasing authorities about vacancies and their appropriateness. Another four protocols
identified the proprietor of the home as responsible for ‘making satisfactory alternative
arrangements’. In one of these this applied to non-enforcement closures only. In two cases,
however, the proprietor or person in charge of the home was said, ‘in the first instance’ to be
responsible for making adequate arrangements ‘for the future well being of residents – even
when closure is sought by local authority or health authority registration and inspection unit’.
Another protocol recommended that proprietors be encouraged to collaborate closely:
‘Although the relevant guidance may imply that the proprietor is responsible for
making arrangements to relocate all residents, it is better that the proprietor works
with the relevant people/organisations … since the Local Authority has power to
advise and assist all groups.’
Proprietor involvement in the matching of vacancies to residents was another issue covered in
varying degrees of detail in only a few protocols. That proprietors should be involved in
discussions was recommended. Yet one protocol advised that any such involvement by
proprietors be based clearly on the understanding that they do ‘not enter any arrangements
with other proprietors about transferring residents, including self-funders, and benefits only
and preserved rights residents.’ Three protocols emphasised that the proprietor, or any
organisation acting on their behalf, has continued responsibility for the safety and care of
residents, and the National Care Standards Commission was responsible for advising the
registered person or person in charge of this.
5.6 Care management arrangements
Organisational arrangements for care management during home closures differed across the
documents. Approaches to allocating staff to carry out assessments of residents’ needs and
identify new placements included: re-allocating residents to the care manager who carried out
their initial assessment before admission; identifying a temporary team of care managers to
work on the closure; allocating residents to a specialist team responsible for annual reviews.
One document described flexible arrangements for assessment where assessments could be
carried out by a team identified by the Co-ordinating Group, or the residents’ own social
worker, district nurse or GP, depending on the timescale of the home closure. This variation
reflects findings of a national study of care management, which found that the same
practitioner was usually responsible for assessment, care planning, monitoring and review for
older people in 44 per cent of authorities, and that such continuity in involvement occurred
sometimes in 48 per cent of authorities (Weiner et al., 2002).
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Just under a third of the protocols discussed the possibility of residents having been placed in
homes in their area by other local authorities. The extent to which this issue was discussed
ranged from a page to a sentence. For example, a page long appendix recommended that
formal reassessment and placement arrangements should be completed by the placing
authority, or, if necessary, by a social worker in the lead authority (where the home is
located) on their behalf. In the latter case care mangers would have to make sure that they
adhered to the other authorities’ documentation, eligibility criteria and payment levels.
Notifying other councils about a planned closure was said to be the responsibility of the
proprietor in one document. Another suggested that when relatives lived in another authority,
their local authority should be contacted to provide liaison.
5.7 Recommended notice periods and timescales
A quarter of the protocols discussed the length of notice of voluntary closure that providers
should give of their intention to close, either to councils or to registration and inspection
units/NCSC. While the likely timescales and notice periods identified ranged considerably,
the typical recommendation was that notice should be around a month or as long as possible.
Some of the notice periods were said to be requirements, while others were described as
desirable. Contract stipulations for written notice of closure to councils for local authority
funded clients, or to the registration and inspection unit included: four weeks’ notice for local
authority funded clients; four weeks’ notice to the registration and inspection unit; 90 days
notice to the council of withdrawal from contractual obligations. The 90 days notice was
described as technical. Three guidelines recommended that as much notice or warning
should be given as possible. That timescales should be agreed between the local authority
and the owner was also noted by three protocols. Two protocols adopted a pragmatic
approach to timescales: one recommended that a month was ‘probably realistic’ to carry out
reassessments, identify new placements and move residents. Another suggested that a
timescale of between two and six weeks should be agreed, depending on the number of
residents in the care home.
5.8 The provision of help and information to self-funders
Recommendations concerning the provision of guidance, help and information to self-
funding residents varied. One protocol referred to, and another quoted from the central
government recommendation that local authorities should help all residents:
‘Contingency plans and arrangements should as far as possible aim to ensure that all
residents are helped to identify opportunities in finding alternative accommodation
within a similar time scale (irrespective of the source of financial support).’
(Department of Health, 1993)
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Two further protocols also said that every assistance should be offered to all residents. Five
protocols, however, recommended that care managers should only offer information and help
to self-funding residents without relatives, or to those incapable of finding new
accommodation for themselves. In such circumstances, one protocol noted that self-funding
residents should be allocated a care manager. In other cases the criteria for offering help to a
self-funding resident was more general: when they require help. Another protocol, however,
noted that information and advice on choosing a new home should only be offered to a self-
funding resident if they request it.
5.9 The provision of assessments of residents’ needs
Approaches to the assessment of residents’ needs by care managers and/or nurse assessors
before relocation varied considerably across the guidelines in terms of whether all, or only
publicly funded residents should be assessed, and whether publicly funded residents would be
assessed in all closure situations. Six protocols noted that councils have a statutory duty to
reassess residents that they fund. That assessments should be offered to all residents,
irrespective of funding, was noted in eight protocols, one of which added that self-funding
residents could refuse the offer. Another protocol emphasised that assessments of self-
funding residents should include a review of finances, since residents’ savings might have
reduced to the extent that they have become eligible for support. In protocols that covered
both voluntary and enforced closures the issue of whether assessments of residents’ needs
should be carried out in both situations was often unclear. In some of the protocols the
situations were not addressed separately. Recommendations in two protocols, however,
suggested that during an emergency closure residents’ needs would not always be assessed;
assessments of need would be carried out ‘where it is clear that a resident’s needs have
changed since placement’, or ‘where appropriate’. One protocol referred to the need for care
plans to be updated and recommended that updating include the ‘resident’s response to and
understanding of the current changes’.
5.10 Approaches to resident preparation and consultation
Recommendations about how to prepare residents during a care home closure related to a
range of activities: the provision of information so that residents would know what was
happening; resident consultation and involvement in decisions; the provision of emotional
support; visits to new homes to allow residents to make an informed choice and become
familiar with new surroundings.
Recommendations about who should be involved in deciding how residents, and/or relatives
and carers should be notified about a closure differed by authority, and type of closure. One
protocol recommended that social services staff should discuss the form of notification with
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the proprietor, and that the proprietor, a care manager and a representative from the
registration and inspection unit, should give notification jointly. In contrast, another protocol,
apparently intended for the registration and inspection unit, appeared to suggest that social
workers may have to inform residents of the closure when they are carrying out assessments:
‘If homes have not informed clients and relatives, though this is rarely the case, they will in
any event, be notified by social work staff in due course.’ Three protocols stated that
notification and consultation with residents and relatives was the responsibility of the
proprietor, registered person or responsible party. In the context of an emergency closure
another protocol said that the inspecting unit, the social services duty unit, or the Community
Care Division should contact relatives.
Some of the protocols recommended a collective meeting of relatives, residents, or both, and
the merit of this form of notification appeared to be taken as self-evident. One obvious
advantage of a collective meeting would be that everyone was notified simultaneously. Other
protocols, however, suggested that the form of resident notification should be decided
flexibly and on an individual basis. These discussions of resident notification either assumed
or ascribed a degree of involvement by social services staff: ‘There is little benefit in
delaying matters to hold what could be a traumatic meeting’; ‘Social Services do need to be
clear … that any discussions meet agreed standards and are seen to be made in what is
believed to be the best interests of the person concerned’.
A further recommendation related to the nature of notification: residents and staff should be
given information in written form as well as being told verbally. An earlier version of this
protocol, published by the same registration and inspection unit, included evidence for this
recommendation, although the source was not cited: ‘Research shows that in times of extreme
stress people will only retain about 20 per cent of what they are told verbally.’
Four protocols recommended that residents should be given the opportunity to visit potential
homes, although responsibility for such arrangements varied. One protocol stated that the
Care Management Review team should make arrangements, and another that the registered
person should make arrangements, which the Assessment and Care Management Team
should facilitate. The potential value of visits, both in terms of supporting informed choice,
and reducing the uncertainty and unpredictability of the situation, which in turn may make
relocation less stressful, was rarely discussed.
5.11 Sources of information about other care homes
During a home closure social services staff and/or relatives and carers need to be able to
identify homes with a vacant place and to decide whether any of these homes are suitable in
22 Page 61
terms of meeting the resident’s needs. Little was written in the guidelines about the nature
and quality of any information to be made available to residents, and relatives or carers to
help them find or choose a new care home. Written information provided to residents and
relatives by councils or registration and inspection units included lists of care homes, an
accredited provider list, home brochures, and inspection reports. One protocol reminded care
managers that they are obliged to restrict the verbal information that they give to residents
and relatives when looking for a new home, to residents’ immediate care needs. Advice
about how social services staff should go about identifying vacancies was more frequent.
Seven protocols referred to how social services staff should go about identifying vacant
places. A couple of protocols referred to a council vacancy list. The remaining protocols
advised social services staff to establish the availability of care places themselves, for
example ‘by phoning round’, and possibly liaising with the Contract Unit. One protocol
highlighted the potential need to identify hospice beds for terminally ill residents. In
response to the possibility of an insufficient local supply of nursing places, one protocol
suggested that registration rules be relaxed, in order to ‘allow a nursing home to take
residents in excess of the number it is registered for.’ However, this was said to be an
undesirable option since ‘it would undoubtedly result in an inappropriate environment (camp
beds, overcrowding, a feeling of chaos) and undue stress’. Staff were advised instead to look
for vacancies in adjacent districts.
Another protocol suggested that a list of the information provided by social services staff to
residents and their relatives or carers, and their responses, be recorded for the purpose of
accountability:
‘Experience … suggests that some providers, with vacancies, may feel
aggrieved if they do not receive residents from the home that is closing.
Therefore it is important not only to provide residents with lists of homes
with vacancies but also to document which homes have been visited by
residents and the reasons why a particular home has been chosen.’
5.12 The role of care staff
There was more consensus in the guidelines about the role of care staff during a home
closure. Where care staff were mentioned the majority of the recommendations were in
agreement; seven protocols recommended that care staff should be consulted, asked to help,
and encouraged to be involved in the closure process. Considerable importance was placed
on securing the help of staff: ‘Strenuous efforts should be made to involve the staff
throughout’. Five protocols highlighted the potential role of care staff in transfer
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arrangements. One of these recommended asking existing care staff to produce ‘pen pictures’
of residents’ routines, and their likes and dislikes, for staff at their new homes.
One protocol recommended that friendships between staff and residents should be respected
and another noted that staff might want to be present during transfers to say goodbye to
residents, and so should be kept up-to-date about moving arrangements. Three protocols
recognised that care staff might be concerned about residents after a closure. Suggested
responses included: asking staff to go with residents to their new homes, which would also
provide continuity (and staff could be paid to do); informing staff of how residents have
settled in. An emergency closure protocol suggested the provision of emotional support and
counselling for care staff.
Typically protocols that referred to the importance of involving care staff also stated who was
responsible for notifying them about the closure, the reasons and the timescale. Allocation of
responsibility for notifying care staff differed across the protocols. In three cases the
proprietor, or manager of the home, was said to be responsible. Council staff were said to be
were responsible for keeping care staff informed of arrangements and progress. One protocol
noted that the council might need to take the lead to avoid confusion in the home. In contrast,
four protocols indicated that social services staff were responsible for ensuring that care staff
had been told of the situation. In another protocol the registration and inspection unit was
said to be responsible for telling care staff, if the proprietor was unwilling or unable to do so.
5.13 Approaches to temporary moves
Few guidelines discussed the issue of whether temporary or second moves should be
discouraged or facilitated. Those that did offered different advice. One protocol suggested
that temporary moves might be arranged when there was a lack of places available in a
resident’s preferred home. In such circumstances accepting a temporary place would allow a
resident to move again to the home of their choice as soon as a place was available. Another
protocol, however, advised against second moves, recommending instead that moves be
permanent. One protocol identified temporary moves as an option during emergency
closures, when time might be insufficient to find more permanent placements.
5.14 Safe transfer recommendations
Two protocols offered different advice about how resident moves should ideally be
organised. One advised against moving large groups of residents on the same day, and
included the Health Service Circular as an appendix (NHS Executive, 1998). In the context
of transferring older NHS patients the circular states that ‘experience suggests that no more
than three or four patients should be transferred in any one week.’ In contrast, another
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protocol recommended that social workers should move all residents on the same day.
Avoidance of evening and weekend moves was also recommended.
Just over a quarter of the protocols discussed the kinds of practical arrangements and
activities involved when moving residents. Several protocols suggested the use of wrist-
bands to ensure identification of residents. A pre-packed box of emergency equipment was
mentioned in five protocols. Proposed contents included secure plastic bags for medication,
large envelopes for records, parking cones, and copies of property sheets. Several protocols
suggested that mobile phones should be made available to inspectors, care managers and key
care home staff. The need to be able to identify and equip a reception centre in the event of a
closure caused by a disaster, such as a fire or flood was identified in only one protocol.
Advice offered about the way in which residents’ possessions should be moved focused on
ensuring that suitable bags were used, particularly when suitcases were unavailable. Bags
suggested as suitable included plastic property bags or boxes from the emergency provision
stores. Ensuring that residents’ belongings could be identified, through labelling, was also
highlighted as important. Two protocols stated that black bin liners should not be used. Yet,
another two protocols referred to ensuring adequate supplies of black plastic bags. The
possibility that property belonging to a resident might be left at a closed home was also
identified as something that might need to be addressed. One protocol noted that although
this was legally the responsibility of the resident, their legal representative or next of kin,
assistance might be required from the new home. Some of the example property sheets
record the destination of property. Two protocols noted that care managers might have to
liaise with a pharmacist and/or inspection unit to ensure that no medication was left on the
premises. Another protocol suggested that social services staff ask for advice about the
relocation of individual residents from GP’s.
Other practical considerations identified in the protocols included: the arrangement of
appropriate transport; whether wheelchairs would be needed and the number of escorts
required; the transfer of residents’ care records; the need to ensure that medication supplies
would be sufficient for one or two weeks after the closure; the potential transfer of residents
to new general practitioners; the notification of relevant pharmacists. The allocation of
responsibility for such tasks varied across the protocols. Responsibility for checking and or
packing medication, for example, could be allocated to social services staff, the owner, or the
member of care staff normally responsible for administering medication.
Advice about ensuring that residents do not feel like they have been ‘dumped’ included:
encouraging relatives to arrange or be present during moves; ensuring that social services
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staff used their own cars and only used taxis when there was no alternative. Checking the
readiness of the new homes was also highlighted in one protocol as the responsibility of the
closure task group.
5.15 Approaches to placement review and closure evaluation
A number of approaches to resident and/or closure follow-up by social services staff were
described in the protocols. These included checking how residents were settling in during the
first few days, a formal review of the placement, debriefing of social services staff and/or
some form of evaluation. Five protocols recommended that social services department staff
continue to monitor resident welfare immediately after a closure. Advice included: ongoing
liaison between social services staff and staff at the new home; social worker visits to see
residents on the day after relocation, or during the first week; ongoing social worker liaison
with relatives. One protocol suggested that a record be kept of any complaints, or comments
made by residents, or relatives, about the closure at this time.
The majority of the protocols that referred to care manager placement reviews were in
agreement. Seven protocols stated that residents and their placements would be reviewed
within four to six weeks of relocation due to a care home closure. One protocol suggested
that residents be reviewed sooner, within 2 weeks. Plans for reviews rarely specified whether
all, or some, residents would be reviewed. One protocol, however, noted that reviews should
take place ‘for residents for whom we are responsible’.
Five protocols specified some sort of formal team debriefing, longer-term review of residents,
or evaluation of the closure and the procedures used. Debriefings would aim to identify what
went well, what went wrong, the lessons learnt and any changes that might improve future
planning and implementation. The aim of a review meeting or evaluation would be to
consider the impact of the closure on residents, and to examine procedures, either on an
annual basis or some months after the closure.
5.16 Local authority resources and closure costs
Resource and cost issues were rarely discussed in the protocols. Issues that were identified
related to staffing: the number of care managers that would be needed; how sufficient care
managers could be designated to a closure; the allocation of existing and ongoing work. Four
of the documents offered advice about the number of care management staff that would be
needed during a care home closure. One recommended that: ‘depending on the time
available, it is probably better that as few care managers as possible are involved’. Three
protocols suggested the number of residents one care manager could be expected to take
responsibility for. One protocol suggested one social worker to three to five placements, with
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one social worker to five ‘other placements’ (presumably self-funding placements), and
another two protocols recommended a minimum of one care manager to four residents.
Designating care management staff and allocating ongoing work was another resource issue
addressed in several protocols. Two stated that home closure activities should take priority
over routine work. Of these, one added that team managers should take responsibility for
existing work. Four protocols noted that finding sufficient staff or staff shortages could be a
problem. A suggestion in response to this was that the wider department might have to
support the district involved. Another protocol noted that extra staff or volunteers might be
needed. Another noted that in exceptional circumstances additional internal resources might
be available on a temporary basis. ‘Capacity problems obtaining’ nursing assessors and
mental health assessors were also anticipated in another protocol.
Few resource issues, other than staffing, were highlighted in the protocols. Those that were
related to costs that might be recovered or met by the home owner, such as transportation
costs, or recovered from other councils, such as the cost of helping residents placed by other
councils.
6. Discussion
Much of the available literature on the process of care home closures describes broad
objectives and types of activity related to minimising the distress experienced by residents
(Lane, 1987; Leonard Cheshire and Social Care Association, undated; Woolham, 2001).
There is little research evidence linking specific approaches or measures during home
closures to residents’ successful adjustment, or to their health and quality of life. Where
particular approaches or issues are discussed recommendations tend to be ‘ideal’ and many
relate to aspects of a care home closure that are likely to be outside the control of councils
(for example, length of notice, retention of existing care staff and staffing levels within a
closing home). Control of these aspects of care home closures is also likely to be affected, or
determined in part, by the circumstances and causes of closure, further limiting the extent to
which the process might be managed or made to comply with standard procedures. Yet local
authorities have a responsibility to protect and support service users and vulnerable people.
Their role during a home closure is at once very important and restricted.
This study aimed to identify the prevalence and nature of local authority guidance on the
closure of care homes for older people. We selected authorities with more homes on the
basis that those with relatively few homes would be less likely to invest resources in
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developing protocols for relatively rare events. Just under two thirds of the larger authorities
reported having a protocol for the closure of care homes for older people in 2002. This
suggests that nationally a substantial proportion of authorities do not have protocols in place.
Some of our respondents clearly felt that guidance was going to be forthcoming from the
Commission although there is no indication of this to date. Although the existence of
protocols does not guarantee their use in practice, their absence does suggest that within such
authorities there is likely to be considerable variation in practice, particularly given the
numbers of people involved and crisis that a home closure can often represent.
In the examples provided there was consensus about the main aim of local authority
involvement in care home closures: the protection and support of residents and their relatives
and carers. It is likely that any absence of a statement of this aim reflected the ‘checklist’
nature of some of the documents rather than an absence of the intention. Other areas of
agreement in the protocols included: the goal of promoting resident involvement and choice;
the importance of involving care home staff in the closure process.
However, what was most striking was the variation in scope, definitions, arrangements and
advice provided. Many recommendations differed. Although in some cases this simply
reflected alternative but comparable means of achieving similar objectives, in other instances,
the variation was likely to have implications for residents. For example, the different actors
variously identified in different protocols as responsible for finding alternative placements
might be, more or less, willing and/or able to find new placements that are appropriate to
residents’ needs.
The apparent inconsistency in the responsibilities of the registration and inspection units is
likely to reflect the lack of a national regulatory system at the time the protocols were drawn
up. However, clarification of the role and responsibilities of the National Care Standards
Commission, and it’s successor organisation, would be useful.
Clarification of the responsibilities of local authorities would also be helpful, given the likely
importance of council involvement to residents and families and the need to be accountable to
the public. In particular, clarification of councils’ assessment and reviewing responsibilities
during care home closures would be useful since the variation in councils’ plans raises policy
issues of geographical equity and fair access to social care services. Recent policy guidance
aimed at promoting fair access to adult social care services asks councils to base eligibility
criteria on a national framework to ensure that factors such as location ‘play no part in
deciding an adult’s eligibility to care services’ (Department of Health, 2002a: 6). The
guidance notes that an individual’s ‘financial circumstances should have no bearing on
28 Page 67
whether a council carries out a community care assessment or not.’ (Department of Health,
2002b:14). However it is unclear whether those already funding services themselves should
be re-assessed at a time of crisis, such as a care home closure, to ensure identification of any
changes in their circumstances that might make them eligible for services. It is also unclear
whether the recommendation that ‘There should be an initial review within three months of
help first being provided or major changes made to current services’ should apply to the
relocation of self-funded residents due to home closure (Department of Health, 2002b:12).
The variation in approaches to providing support to self-funding residents may leave these
residents, who have been estimated to make up nearly a third of independent care home
residents, vulnerable in a number of ways (Laing and Buisson, 2001). The responsibility for
finding alternative accommodation suitable to their needs, which may have changed since
admission, may be left to the resident and their next of kin, who may themselves live at a
distance or be unaware of the residents’ needs. Given the likely pressures on resources, even
when self-funding residents are offered help from care managers their needs may be of
relatively low priority compared to those of publicly funded service users. Self-funding
residents may also be relatively isolated once they have moved to a new home, possibly not
receiving any follow up support, even from advocacy services, unless on their request.
Different approaches, arrangements and recommendations were also described in relation to:
definitions of what time period constitutes an urgent or sudden closure; notice periods; views
of the measures available to local authorities to try to extend a closure period; care
management arrangements; the identification of vacant places in other care homes; whether it
is better to move residents within a short time or more gradually; whether temporary moves
should be facilitated or discouraged.
One protocol reminded care managers that they are obliged to restrict the information that
they give to residents and relatives when looking for a new home to residents’ immediate
care needs. Yet care managers are themselves important sources of information about
potential new homes since they have a professional and personal knowledge of the quality of
the care provided, as well as of the facilities and services available in local care homes. Since
care managers are restricted from offering advice relatives may have to rely on other sources
of information. Little was said in the protocols about these beyond what they were:
lists/books of providers, inspection reports and provider brochures. Lists of providers are
likely to be produced on an annual basis and to contain brief entries on individual homes,
their services and facilities. While they are available to the public, inspection reports are not
written specifically for a public audience. Making available information that has been written
29Page 68
specifically for them may better support resident choice, and that of their relatives and
friends.
The protocols highlighted a number of circumstances and issues that may constrain or limit
the way in which an independent care home closure is managed. The cause of closure may
determine the timescale for closure. When a home closes due to business failure the timing
of the closure date and the degree of flexibility or scope for extension are likely to be
affected. The timescale may in turn limit the amount of time local authorities have to prepare
and organise, limit the forms of resident preparation possible, influence whether needs
assessments can be carried out before alternative accommodation is found, and limit the
extent to which a range of care homes can be viewed by residents and their relatives. The
extent to which care staff in a closing home could be involved in the closure process was also
recognised as dependent in part on the timescale of the closure, and whether the proprietor
was willing and able to support care staff in doing so. Generally the level of co-operation
established between local authorities and the proprietor may affect negotiations and the
options available. The availability of vacant places in suitable alternative care homes may
restrict or prohibit choice and bring about a reduction or an extension of the closure
timescale. The availability of care management staff and health assessors may affect the
provision of assessments and help offered to residents, relatives and carers.
The tensions between the objectives specified in the guidelines and their practicability, and
between recommendations for ‘ideal’ practice and plans for ‘worst case’ scenarios may
reflect local authorities’ attempts to combine their practical experience, which would have
varied, with existing guidance, which relates to other settings and circumstances, and explain
some of the variation across the protocols. It also suggests that managing the process of a
care home closure requires that a balance be struck between what is desirable and what is
achievable.
Despite the variation it is clear that protocols can serve many useful purposes: support joint
working between health and social services and independent providers; provide owners, and
residents and relatives with information about what is likely to happen and about their rights
and responsibilities; ensure that systems are in place, responsibilities are allocated, resources,
tasks and activities are identified; support social services staff and ensure that they have
access to information and documentation.
30 Page 69
7. Policy and research implications
Equity and welfare considerations for residents and effectiveness and efficiency
considerations for authorities suggest that there is a role for guidance and information at three
levels: nationally, at council or care trust level and for care managers directly involved in the
process.
Nationally there is need for guidance to clarify the legal responsibilities and restrictions on
councils during independent care home closures. Are they permitted to staff closing homes
on a temporary basis to delay closure and facilitate the support of residents and their relatives
during the process? If not, is there an argument that perhaps legislation should be amended
to allow this? What are councils’ responsibilities to self-funding residents during a care
home closure? What is the role of the NCSC or its successor during closures?
There is also a need for guidance about best practice for safeguarding residents’ health,
welfare and rights. Recommendations would need to be flexible enough for social services
staff to react to individual circumstances and closure situations locally whilst equipping front-
line staff with the information and knowledge they need to make decisions. The development
of examples that relate to the issues staff might face and the considerations they should take
into account might be useful.
Councils or care trusts need to have in place clear guidance about who is responsible for what
in the event of a closure and how they translate national recommendations and/or
requirements into practice.
Care managers need to have information about vacancies that is easily accessible and reliable,
sources of advice and guidance to help them make decisions and to inform and support
residents and relatives and providers, and checklists of procedures based on national
recommendations and/or requirements.
Developers of future or revised guidelines for care home closures might want to consider:
The sort of document(s) that would be most useful to each of the principal parties
involved (in terms of form and scope, advice and/or requirements, specific procedures
and/or approaches and principles);
What actions or measures, if any, are essential to safeguarding residents’ health and well-
being during a care home closure?
Is there a need for national recommendations or standards for care home closures?
Should such national recommendations or standards be made obligatory?
31Page 70
Would such recommendations or standards for care home closures be enforceable and, if
not, how might good practice be promoted?
Some of the local authority protocols drew on past experience of home closures or general
principles of good practice in care management. Unsurprisingly the majority of the local
authority recommendations were not linked to evidence, based on academic or practitioner
led research. There is little research evidence on which to base recommendations for good
practice. Our ongoing qualitative case study work focuses on the process and consequences
of care home closures from the perspective of residents, relatives and carers, care staff and
local authorities. It aims to develop a better understanding of what happens in practice and of
the views and experiences of those involved. Their views of what is important for residents’
well-being, views of the advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action, and
suggestions for good practice should be valuable to and included in any development of good
practice recommendations or guidance.
Ideally policy and practice would be supported by further research that established whether
positive outcomes for residents, and their relatives and carers, are associated with particular
processes, arrangements and practices during a care home closure. Establishing such causal
links is likely to be far from straightforward. However, more focused work might be able to
address other unknowns: Are existing closure protocols used in practice, and if not, why not?
Who uses them and in what ways? At what level of the organisation or during which aspect
of the process is guidance most useful? What sort of consequences would guidance for care
home closures have for council’s resources? Is the Commission’s notification requirement
having an impact on the timescale of independent care home closures? Other issues where
research might support a better understanding of the process and consequences of care home
closures include: the incidence of second transfers after care home closure and the reason for
and outcome of such transfers; how care staff might best be supported throughout a home
closure.
8. Conclusions
The local authority protocols provided advice and recommendations that were often practical,
sensible and considered, and attended to the co-ordination of roles and practicalities in a level
of detail unavailable in much of the published literature. The range of roles and
responsibilities, and organisations and departments discussed in some of the longer protocols
suggests that some form of local authority plan, protocol or agreement is clearly justifiable, in
terms of practicality and efficiency at the very least. While there is no one good way to close
32 Page 71
a care home based on this evidence, there is scope for research evidence about some of the
issues, procedures and measures that might be considered to support good practice.
The rise in home closures has been of particular concern in recent years. But even if the
market stabilises closures will continue. The closure of care homes in order to safeguard
residents’ health and safety is part of the regulatory process. The market mechanism means
that ‘voluntary’ closures will also continue. The closure of a home will always be a time of
stress for residents and their relatives. It will also put strain on those responsible for their
care both directly and indirectly. It is important that there are evidence-based consistent
arrangements in place to support all those involved wherever they live and whatever their
role.
33Page 72
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