steven k. blackhurst, osb no. 730320
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
Page 1
STEVEN K. BLACKHURST, OSB No. 730320 E-mail: skb@aterwynne.com
ATER WYNNE LLP
1331 NW Lovejoy Street, Suite 900
Portland, OR 97209-3280
Telephone: (503) 226-1191
Facsimile: (503) 226-0079
Attorneys for Ronald F. Greenspan
in his Capacity as Receiver
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
AEQUITAS MANAGEMENT, LLC;
AEQUITAS HOLDINGS, LLC; AEQUITAS
COMMERCIAL FINANCE, INC.;
AEQUITAS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
INC.; AEQUITAS INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, LLC; ROBERT J.
JESENIK; BRIAN A. OLIVER; and SCOTT
GILLIS,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:16-cv-00438-PK
RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO
LIMITED OBJECTION FILED BY
COMVEST CAPITAL, III, L.P. AND
COMVEST FREEDOM
ADMINISTRATION
The Receiver submits this response to the Limited Objections filed by Comvest Capital,
III, L.P. and Comvest Freedom Administration, together with Comvest Capital (collectively
“Comvest”). This Court should reject Comvest’s Limited Objections.
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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I. COMVEST’S INTEREST IN THE TRUSTS AND THE TRUSTS’ ASSETS IS
STRICTLY AS A SECURED LENDER. COMVEST HAS NOT FORECLOSED
ITS SECURITY INTERESTS. IN THE ABSENCE OF FORECLOSURE, THE
RECEIVERSHIP ENTITY REMAINS THE LEGAL AND BENEFICIAL OWNER
OF THE ACC TRUSTS AND THE ACC TRUSTS’ ASSETS.
ACC Holdings 1, LLC and ACC Holdings 2, LLC (collectively, the “Subsidiary
Parents”) are the subsidiary parent companies of ACC Funding Trust 2014-1 and ACC Funding
Trust 2014-2, respectively (collectively, the “Trusts”). Each of these entities is a “Receivership
Entity” as set forth on Exhibit A of the Interim Order Appointing Receiver (Doc #30). Further,
corporate parents of these 100% owned entities are two of the five Entity Defendants (Aequitas
Commercial Finance and Aequitas Holdings, LLC) in the SEC complaint pending before this
Court. As contained in the SEC complaint, the Entity Defendants allegedly fraudulently raised
up to $331 Million from investors; Aequitas investors had more than $27 million of equity and
funds funneled into the Trusts for the purchase of consumer notes receivable – it is these
consumer note receivables (and the Trusts which own them) in which Comvest holds a security
interest.
Pursuant to various agreements entered between the parties, including a Credit
Agreement, Trust Agreement, and Collateral Agreement, the Trusts borrowed money from
Comvest. Pursuant to the terms of a Pledge Agreement, the Subsidiary Parents pledged their
interests in the Trusts (the “Trust Certificates”) as security for the Comvest loans to the Trusts.
Pursuant to the terms of a Collateral Agreement, the Trusts granted Comvest a security interest in
the Trusts’ assets.
Comvest alleges that on or about February 2, 2016, it issued a Notice of Default to the
Trusts and the Subsidiary Parents. The purported notice sets forth a number of defaults and
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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purportedly exercised a right to institute default rate of interest, 15% per annum, retroactive to
April 14, 2015, almost a year earlier than the declared default and a mere 15 days after making
the loan. The default notice states that Comvest is evaluating all of its available courses of action
relating to the alleged defaults, but provides no notice of any action taken by Comvest, other than
retroactive default interest.
The Receiver can neither confirm nor deny that the default notice was given or whether
the alleged defaults actually exist or existed. All of this being investigated pursuant to the
powers granted to the Receiver.
Without explanation, other than a general reference to “Loan Documents” (which is an
undefined term), Comvest would have this court believe it took action which transferred the
ownership and control of the Trusts, the Trusts’ assets and the Trust Certificates. Comvest
claims that it has re-registered the Trust Certificates from the Subsidiary Parents to Comvest
Admnistration; replaced the Trust administrator with Comvest Administration; and exercised
rights under deposit account control agreements.
Comvest alleges that, “[a]s a result of Comvest’s exercise of its enforcement remedies
under the Loan Documents, Comvest Administration owns the Trusts (including their assets) and
the Trust Certificates. Therefore, no Defendant to this action or any affiliate or subsidiary
thereof has any interest, legal or equitable, in the Trusts or the Trust Certificates.” See
Comvest’s Limited Objection to Stipulated Order Appointing Receiver, paragraph 12.
Contrary to Comvest’s unsupported allegations, the Receiver and the Receivership Estate
have not been divested of the ownership and control of the Trusts, the Trusts’ assets or the Trust
Certificates as a consequence of Comvest’s purported actions. Comvest is a secured creditor. It
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
Page 4
has a number of rights as a secured creditor against the Subsidiary Parents, the Trusts and the
Trusts’ assets – and, indeed it might have exercised a number of those rights. What Comvest has
not done is to foreclose on its collateral and, until it forecloses, Comvest cannot transfer
ownership and control of the Trusts, the Trusts’ assets or the Trust Certificates, or divest the
Receiver of the right to control and liquidate those assets. Moreover, even if Comvest had
divested the Subsidiary Parents or the Trusts of bare legal title, Comvest in its papers and
through subsequent actions, acknowledges that the Receivership Entity still owns the beneficial
economic interest in the Trusts and the Trusts’ assets. That interest alone is sufficient to permit
the appointment of a federal equitable receiver to protect and recover the over $27 million of
investor money in those entities.
ARGUMENTS:
A. UCC §9-602 provides that certain protections for the debtor set forth in
Article 9 cannot be waived or varied by agreement prior to default.
UCC §9-601(a) gives a secured party rights (after a default) to pursue remedies under:
(i) Article 6 of the UCC (which deals with bulk sales, and isn’t relevant here); (ii) Article 9 of the
UCC; and (iii) any additional processes agreed upon by the parties (except as set forth in UCC
§9-602).
An important backstop to the breadth of UCC §9-601 is UCC §9-602. UCC §9-602
contains a list of provisions of Article 9 that cannot be waived or modified by the agreement of
the parties prior to the occurrence of a default. If the parties agreed to provide Comvest the right
to re-certificate the Trust Certificates as an express remedy in the Pledge Agreement and/or the
Trust Agreement, as alleged by Comvest, UCC §9-602 would still operate to preserve certain
/ / /
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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rights, responsibilities and processes with respect to the disposition of collateral, including but
not limited to the following provisions:
9-610(b) which provides that every aspect of a disposition of collateral must be
commercially reasonable. If commercially reasonable, a secured party may
dispose of the collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more
contracts, as a whole or in parcels and at any time and place on any terms.
9-608(a) and 9-615(d) which provide that, with respect to proceeds of collection
or enforcement of collateral, a secured party must account to and pay the debtor
for any surplus, and the debtor is liable any deficiency.
9-611 which sets forth notification requirements for the disposition of collateral,
including the persons to be notified.
9-613 and 9-614 which set forth the required content and form of notification
before the disposition of collateral.
9-615(f) which provides a mechanism for calculating deficiency or surplus when
a disposition is made to the secured party or related party (e.g. in a credit bid
scenario).
9-620 which provides that a secured party may accept collateral in full or partial
satisfaction of an obligation only if the debtor consents in writing following
default.
9-621 which lists the parties to whom the secured party must send notification of
its intent to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of an obligation.
9-622 which sets forth the effect of acceptance of collateral in full or partial
satisfaction of the obligation it secures. Such effect includes the discharge of the
obligation to the extent consented to by the debtor, transferring to the secured
party all of the debtor’s rights in the collateral, discharging the security interest,
and terminating any other subordinate interest.
Official Comment 2 to UCC §9-602 explains why Article 9 contains these express
limitations:
… in the context of rights and duties after default, our legal system
traditionally has looked with suspicion on agreements that limit the
debtor’s rights and free the secured party of its duties. As stated in
former Section 9-501, Comment 4, “no mortgage clause has ever
been allowed to clog the equity of redemption.” The context of
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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default offers great opportunity for overreaching. The suspicious
attitudes of the courts have been grounded in common sense. This
section . . . codifies this long-standing and deeply rooted attitude.
The specified rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party
may not be waived or varied except as stated. Provisions that are
not specified in this section are subject to the general rules in
[Section 1-302].
B. Comvest may not acquire the Subsidiary Parents’ or the Trusts’ interests in
the collateral without complying with non-waivable requirements for
conducting either (a) a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale or (b) strict
foreclosure.
Included among these UCC sections that can’t be “contracted around” are provisions
relating to the commercially reasonable sale process, which are designed to maximize the value
of the collateral and to provide for the return of any surplus to the debtor after the proceeds of the
sale are used to satisfy the debtor’s obligations to the secured party.1
Comvest does not contend that it conducted a foreclosure sale of its collateral. Instead,
Comvest relies upon provisions of the Pledge Agreement and the Trust Agreement that allegedly
permit Comvest to re-register the certificates in the name of Comvest Administration upon the
occurrence of and during the pendency of a default. See Comvest’s Limited Objection To
Stipulated Order Appointing Receiver, at paragraphs 4, 5, and 12.
The Receiver disagrees with Comvest’s interpretation of the Pledge Agreement and the
Trust Agreements. The Receiver reads the relevant provisions merely as providing a mechanism
to transfer the Trust Certificates to the new owner thereof after a commercially reasonable
disposition of the Trust Certificates. The Receiver does not read the provisions (nor could they
1 Under Article 9, the debtor is entitled to any surplus proceeds resulting from a disposition of the
collateral. UCC §9-615(d)(1); see also Bill Fits Auto Sales, Inc. v. Daniels, 922 S.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Ark. 1996) (affirming the trial court’s judgment awarding surplus proceeds to debtor). This duty to account for surplus proceeds is among the duties that cannot be waived or varied by agreement of the parties. UCC §9-602(5)
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
Page 7
be enforced under the law) as authorizing Comvest to seize ownership of collateral without a
foreclosure sale, debtor’s consent to strict foreclosure or judicial intervention in violation of the
non-waivable requirements of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Comvest contends that, by re-registering the Trust Certificates in the name of Comvest
Administration and by replacing the administrator of the Trusts with Comvest Administration,
Comvest Administration has acquired all legal and equitable title to the Trusts, the Trusts’ assets
and the Trust Certificates.
At the outset, it should be noted that this contention makes no sense whatever when
applied to the Trust assets. Comvest does not explain why re-registration of the Trust
Certificates or by the replacement of the Trust administrator would affect the Trusts’ ownership
of the Trust assets.
Moreover, Comvest’s contention that Comvest (through its affiliate, Comvest
Administration) acquired ownership of the Trusts, the Trust assets and the Trust Certificates
without a foreclosure sale is tantamount to the claim that Comvest has accepted the collateral in
strict foreclosure.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code includes strict foreclosure among the
enforcement remedies available to a secured party upon the default of a secured obligation.
Strict foreclosure – referred to as an “acceptance of the collateral” in Article 9 – provides a post-
default mechanism for the secured party to acquire the debtor’s interest in the collateral without a
foreclosure sale or judicial intervention. UCC §9-620, Comment 1.
The procedures for strict foreclosure and the protection inherent in those procedures are
set out in UCC §§ 9–620, 9-621 and 9-622. The rights granted to the debtor or and the duties
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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imposed upon the enforcing secured party in these sections are non-waivable. UCC §§ 9-
602(10) and 9-624(b). In addition, Article 9 does not eliminate any non-UCC requirements that
an enforcing secured party may have to satisfy to become the owner of the collateral it accepts.
UCC §9-620, Comment 9.
Under Article 9, an acceptance of collateral by the enforcing secured party in full or
partial satisfaction of the secured obligation requires:
(1) the secured party’s consent to the acceptance in an authenticated (i.e., signed) record
(UCC § 9-620(b)(1)); and
(2) the debtor’s post-default consent to the acceptance (UCC § 9-620(a)(1)); and
(3) good faith on the part of the enforcing secured party (UCC §9-620, Comment 11).
Under element (2) above, “the remedy [of strict foreclosure] is only available if the
debtor consents to strict foreclosure after it has defaulted. Thus, for example, the debtor cannot
consent to strict foreclosure in anticipation of a future default at the time it enters into the
transaction that creates the debt and security interest.” In re CBGB Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R.
551, 555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The form of the debtor’s consent depends on whether the strict
foreclosure is partial or full. In the case of partial strict foreclosure,
the debtor must expressly consent “to the terms of the acceptance
in a record authenticated after default.” UCC § 9-620(c)(1). In
contrast, the debtor may consent to full strict foreclosure – the
complete satisfaction of its debt – either expressly or by
implication. As with partial strict foreclosure, it can expressly
consent “to the terms of the acceptance in a record authenticated
after default.” UCC § 9-620(c)(2). Alternatively, after default, the
secured party can send a “proposal”2 to the debtor “that is
2 "'Proposal' means a record authenticated by a secured party which includes the terms on which the
secured party is willing to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures pursuant to Sections 9-620, 9-621, and 9-622." UCC § 9-102(a)(66).
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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unconditional or subject only to a condition that collateral not in
the possession of the secured party be preserved or maintained,”
UCC § 9-620(c)(2)(A), and “proposes to accept collateral in full
satisfaction of the obligation it secures.” UCC § 9-620(c)(2)(B).
The debtor then has twenty days to object to the proposal. UCC §
9-620(c)(2)(C). If it does not object, it is deemed to have accepted
the proposal. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS § 324-10, at 394 (“[T]he
debtor’s silence for 20 days seals the deal.”) The requirements of §
9-620(c) may not be waived. UCC § 9-602(j); 4 WHITE &
SUMMERS § 34-10, at 396 (“Section 9-602(j) explicitly prohibits
waiver of the ‘rules’ stated in 9-620 . . . .”).3
In re CBGB Holdings, LLC, supra, 439 B.R. at 555-56.
Comvest has not obtained an agreement signed by the Subsidiary Parents or the Trusts
consenting to strict foreclosure after default. Nor has Comvest sent a proposal to anyone
proposing to accept any collateral in full satisfaction of the secured obligations. Thus an essential
element of strict foreclosure (i.e., debtor’s post-default consent) has not been satisfied, and any
purported or apparent acceptance of collateral by Comvest or its affiliate is ineffective. UCC §9-
620(b).
If the provisions of the Pledge Agreement or the Trust Agreement were interpreted as
apparently alleged by Comvest, to permit Comvest to re-register the Trust Certificates in the
name of Comvest Administration without conducting a foreclosure sale, such a provision would
violate the non-waivable statutory requirements under UCC § 9-620 or its predecessor,
UCC §9-505(2). In re CBGB Holdings, LLC, supra, 439 B.R. at 556-57, citing Forbes v. Four
Queens Enters., Inc., 210 B.R. 905, 910 (D.R.I. 1997) (“The original contract signed by Forbes
3 UCC § 9-621 also requires the secured party to provide notice of the proposed strict foreclosure to any
third parties who assert an interest in the collateral. In the case of partial strict foreclosure, the secured party must also provide notice to any secondary obligor. The secured party may not strictly foreclose if it receives a timely objection from one of the noticed parties or any other party holding a subordinate interest in the collateral. UCC § 9-620(a)(2). However, the failure to notify these parties does not invalidate the foreclosure. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS § 34-10, at 394.
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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[which authorized the secured creditor to retain the collateral] was not signed after default, and
does not satisfy the written notice requirement of N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-505(2).”), aff’g in part and
rev’g in part, 191 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); In re Cadiz Props., Inc., 278 B.R. 744, 749
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (“The record does not contain evidence that [the debtor] agreed to the
terms of the stock transfer ‘after default.’ Nor does the record contain evidence that [the secured
party] sent a proposal to [the debtor] ‘after default’ thereby triggering the twenty day objection
time.”); Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan of Dr. Donald H. Bohne, DDS, P.A., 216 Ga. App. 878, 456
S.E.2d 237, 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he condition in the ‘ADDENDUM’ providing for full
and complete assignment and transfer of the collateral upon default by Chen amounted to
nothing more than an unenforceable attempt at predefault waiver of the debtor’s rights under
Article 9 of Georgia’s Uniform Commercial Code.”); Emmons v. Lemaster, Inc., 27 Kan. App.
2d 940, 10 P.3d 33, 36 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (“LeMaster has produced no other evidence
indicating that he gave notice of strict foreclosure to Emmons or that she renounced after default
her right to receive notice.”).
In re Schwalb, 347 N.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006), involved the unsuccessful attempt of
a pawnbroker to take two cars in strict foreclosure under UCC §9-620. The pawn broker left the
cars in possession of the debtor but took possession of the certificates of title. The pawnbroker
claimed to be the “owner” of the cars by re-registering the certificates of title in its name. The
court found that the pawn slip sufficed as a security agreement and that the pawnbroker had
perfected a security interest in the cars by eventually getting himself listed as the lien holder on
the certificates of title. However, the court held that the pawnbroker was a secured creditor but
not an owner. It noted that the anti-waiver provisions of UCC §9-602 rendered the debtor’s
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
2483861/1/SKB/000800-0004
ATER WYNNE LLP 1331 NW LOVEJOY STREET, SUITE 900
PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
Page 11
waiver of various provisions of Article 9 ineffective. The court also held that the pawnbroker
was not proceeding in a commercially reasonable manner when he attempted to get the title to
the cars as the sole owner without having gone through an appropriate strict foreclosure.
Comvest cannot reasonably claim outright ownership of the Trusts, the Trusts’ assets or
the Trust Certificates at this point. Comvest has not provided any evidence that it has taken steps
to have the Trust Certificates re-registered. In the event that Comvest has affected the re-
registration without a commercially reasonable sale or a proper strict foreclosure, such re-
registration was improper. Lastly, even if the validity of the re-registration is confirmed,
Comvest’s rights with respect to the Trust Certificates do not give Comvest the ability to
circumvent the foreclosure and commercially reasonable sale provisions of the UCC and claim
outright ownership of the Trusts, the Trusts’ assets or the Trust Certificates without complying
with the non-waivable provisions of the UCC.
II. COMVEST’S POSITION IS NOT IMPROVED BY ITS JOINDER IN WELLS
FARGO’S LIMITED OBJECTION
Comvest’s joinder in the Limited Objection filed by Wells Fargo is to no avail. First, the
financial agreements under which the Wells Fargo and Comvest loaned funds to the
Receivership Entities are different and each creditor’s financial terms need to be evaluated
separately.
Second, in its Limited Objection, Comvest admits that it has not foreclosed the Trust
Certificates under Article 9 and that the Receiver is entitled to the proceeds from a foreclosure
sale if they exceed the amounts owed. (Comvest Limited Objection at p.7). This admission of
the Receiver’s continuing interest in the assets is sufficient by itself to allow the Trusts to be
included in the Receivership Entity. The Aequitas investors, including investors in the Entity
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
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PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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Defendants, have over $27 million of equity and funds invested in these entities, which assets the
SEC and Receiver are seeking to preserve.
Third, Comvest fails to recognize the broad scope of the federal court’s equitable powers
in an SEC enforcement action. As then Circuit Judge Kennedy said in SEC v. Wencke, 622 F2d
1363, 1371 (9th
Cir. 1980) “The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the broad equitable
powers of the federal courts to shape equitable remedies to the necessities of particular cases,
especially where a federal agency seeks enforcement in the public interest.” Judge Kennedy
articulated the basis for this authority: “The federal courts have inherent equitable authority to
issue a variety of “ancillary relief” measures in actions brought by the SEC to enforce the federal
securities laws. … The power of a district court to impose a receivership or grant other forms of
ancillary relief does not in the first instance depend on a statutory grant of power from the
securities laws. Rather, the authority derives from the inherent power of a court of equity to
fashion effective relief.” Id. at 1369.
Creditors cannot defeat the inherent power of a federal court to fashion appropriate
equitable remedies by creating unique private financial agreements under state law, even if their
terms purport to deprive borrowers of any rights or interests in their assets. As the SEC points
out in its opposition to Comvest’s Limited Objection, if a provision in an organizational
document were all that was required to circumvent the equitable powers of a federal court, then
creditors could routinely include such provisions in their documents thus undermining the utility
of federal receiverships. SEC Response to Limited Objections at 11-12.
The Court’s broad equitable authority is especially important at the beginning of a
receivership. The Receiver needs time to investigate and understand complex financial
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RECEIVER’S RESPONSE TO LIMITED OBJECTION
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PORTLAND, OR 97209-3280 (503) 226-1191
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transactions involving substantial assets of potential significance to the investors whose interests
the Receiver is to protect. Again, as Judge Kennedy said in Wencke, “The time at which the
motion for relief from the stay is made also bears on the exercise of the district court’s discretion.
Where the motion for relief from the stay is made soon after the receiver has assumed control
over the estate, the receiver’s need to organize and understand the entities under his control may
weigh more heavily than the merits of the party’s claim.” Id. at 1373-74. We already know that
the books and records of the Receivership Entity show investor capital of over $27 million in the
subject entities – the details of which need to be investigated by the Receiver. Here Comvest, by
filing its Limited Objection, seeks to deprive the Receiver of an opportunity to investigate fully
Comvest’s transactions with the Receivership Entities. The Receiver should be provided with
the time he needs to do this investigation. (See Declaration of Receiver Ronald F. Greenspan).
III. CONCLUSION
This Court should reject Comvest’s Limited Objection.
DATED this 25th
day of March, 2016.
ATER WYNNE LLP
By: s/Steven K. Blackhurst
Steven K. Blackhurst, OSB No. 730320
Email: skb@aterwynne.com
Telephone: (503) 226-1191
Facsimile: (503) 226-0079
Attorneys for Ronald F. Greenspan
in his Capacity as Receiver
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