the north korean nuclear issue - university of...

TheNorthKoreanNuclearIssueNorthKoreanSociety

March5,2019ClarkW.Sorensen

BeginningofNorthKorea’sNuclearAmbitionsl  NuclearambitionsgobacktoearlyDPRKhistory

l  DPRKaskedforandgotassistanceinnucleartechnologyfromtheSovietUnionstartingin1956,buttheSovietUnion(whofirstdetonatedanuclearbombin1949)wascarefultokeepweaponstechnologyoutofDPRKhands

l  SovietUnionwasalsohelpingChina,butby1959KhrushchevrenegedongivingChinaaccesstonuclearweapons,yetheneverthelessagreedtoestablishaNorthKorean(civilian)nuclearprogram

l  By1963theEastGermanswereawarethattheNorthKoreanswereinterestedinprocessingNorthKorean(lowgrade)uranium

l  In1961theSovietUnionsignedamutualdefensetreatywithDPRK,buttheywerewaryofbeingdrawnintoanunwantedwarbyDPRK(astheUSwaswithROK)l  DPRKmilitarybuildupbeginsin1962implyingtheyfelttheSovietcommitmentwaslessthaniron-

clad

Sino-SovietSplit l  AlongwithDestalinization,NikitaKhrushchevhadinauguratedin1956aforeignpolicyof

“peacefulcoexistence”withcapitalism(inlightofthepossibilityofnuclearwar)l  BeforethatLeninandtheBolsheviksadvocatedworldrevolutionthroughworkers’“internal

revolutions”withintheirownnationsl  Chinahadamixedpolicy—peacefulcoexistenceandnon-supportforlocalrevolutionsinAsia

(ZhouEnlai),butMaoZedongbelievedintheinevitableconflictofcapitalismandcommunism(asdidCuba)andfelttheKoreanWarprovedhispoint

l  TheSovietUnionrenegingonitsnuclearweaponsaidtoChinacombinedwithitssigningoftheLimitedTestBanTreatywiththeUSin1963inthewakeofthe1962Cubanmissilecrisiswasthestrawthebrokethecamel’sbackandsplittheSovietUnionandChinal  AtthispointNorthKoreawasmoresympathetictoChinasinceitneversignedontothedoctrineof

peacefulcoexistence(orDestalinization)l  DesiretoacquirenuclearweaponswasunderstoodthenasanaspectofJuchedefense

China’sNuclearPrograml  Chinarejectedthelimitedtestbantreatyandcontinuedtoworkonanucleardeterrentl  FirstweaponstextOctober16,1964

l  FirstH-bombtestJune17,1967l  LastnucleartestJuly29,1996

l  RecognizedasoneoffivenuclearstatesintheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatythatChinaratifiedin1992l  However,ChinaisthoughttohaveaidedPakistanwithitsnuclearprograminthe1980s

l  SignedComprehensiveTestBanTreatyin1996

DPRKfirstnuclearstepsl  1965gotasmallgraphitemoderatedreactorfromtheSovietUnionthatwasupandrunningfrom1967l  SovietUnionwasnotwillingtodomore,sotheDPRKmadeinquiriesaboutnucleartechnologywithothercommuniststateswithoutsuccess

l  The1970soilshocksmadetheDPRKevenmoreinterestedinnuclearpowerl  In1974Indiaexplodeditsfirstbomb(andbecameadefactonuclearstate)

l  TheSovietUnioninsistedthattheDPRKsigntheNPTbeforetheywouldgivetheDPRKmorenuclearaid

l  DPRKheldoffuntil1985,butwhentheysignedtheNPTtheydidn’tputasafeguardsprograminplacewiththeIAEAuntil1992whenIAEAinspectionsfirstbegan

PreludetoAccelerationofDPRKNuclearProgram(Armstrong’sInterpretation)l  July1986Gorbachev’sVladivostakspeech(“NewThinking”)

l  Whilereiteratingtraditionalpolicy,healsonotedeconomicgrowthinJapanandelsewhere,withdrawaloftroopsfromMongolia,expandingtieswithASEAN,peacefulrelationswithEastAsianneighborsandUS

l  1988SovietUnionrenouncedBrezhnevDoctrine(useofforcetoretainsocialisminsatellites)andbeganwithdrawingtroopsfromAfghanistanl  HadbeenreducingmilitaryaidtoNorthKoreawithlastdeliveryin1989

l  June1990,USSecretaryofStateJamesBakerarrangesforSouthKoreanPresidentRhoTaewootomeetMikhailGorbachovinSanFranciscowherehewasmeetingPresidentReaganinthelaststopofhisAmericantour

l  September1990SovietForeignMinisterEduardShevardnadzevisitedDPRKtoreassurethemafterGorbachev-Rohmeetingl  KimJongIlrefusedtoseehim,andKimYŏngnamgavehimadiatribethreateningnucleardevelopmentsincethe

SovietUnionwasnotlivinguptoitstreatyof1961(thatpromisedaidincaseofmutualattack)

Lankov’sInterpretationofNukesas“SurvivalDiplomacy”(chapter5)l  Seenukesasadeterrenttoattack

l  Canusenukesfordiplomaticblackmail(interpretationoftheAgreedFramework)l  USdiplomacyl  386generationinSouthKoreaàSunshinepolicy

l  By2008l  MyungbakLeeelectedinSouth(conservative)l  DisillusionwithSunshinepolicyafter2006DPRKnucleartest

l  Noticenoclearchronologyorcausalchain,normentionofDPRKinterestinnuclearenergy

By 1990s US was Concerned about the DPRK program l  1993—IAEA inspection revealed diversion of fuel from DPRK’s reactors

l  This was reported to the UN Security Council, and the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT

l  US was preparing for evacuation of US civilians and a preemptive airstrike when former President Carter personally visited Kim Il Sung in P’yŏngyang in 1994 and announced a nuclear agreement

l  Kim Il Sung was supposed to subsequently meet with the South Korean President, but he died suddenly shortly after Carter’s visit (Carter June 15th, KIS dies July 7th)

l  Agreed Framework of 1994 negotiated to keep DPRK in NPT l  DPRK fully in compliance with NPT with IAEA inspecting DPRK nuclear reactors 24-7 to make

sure no plutonium diverted—special inspections of non-declared sites l  In exchange the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation would build LWR in North

Korea (financed mostly by Japan and South Korea) l  Assumption—diversion of fuel from LWRs is more difficult than from conventional reactors and

they are more suitable for electricity generation l  US would provide fuel oil to help power generation while LWR being built

SouthKorea“SunshinePolicy”l  1998announcedbyPresidentKimDae-jung

l  NamecomesfromAesop’sfable“TheNorthWindandtheSun”l  KimDaeJungfeltconfidentthatSouthKorea’spoliticalstabilityduetodemocratizationanditseconomic

superiorityallowedittomagnanimoustoNK

l  PeaceandCooperationwiththeNorth(대북화해협력정책)l  NoarmedprovocationbytheNorthwillbetoleratedl  TheSouthwithnotattempttoabsorbtheNorthinanywayl  TheSouthactivelyseekscooperationandpromotesreconciliation

l  KimDae-jungvisitsP’yŏngyangJune13-15,2000afterwhichaNorthSouthJointDeclarationl  KimDae-jungwonNobelPeacePrizein2000for“hisworkfordemocracyandhumanrightsinSouth

KoreaandinEastAsiaingeneral,andforpeaceandreconciliationwithNorthKoreainparticular”l  Itlatercameoutthatthisvisitwas“facilitated”withpaymentsofseveralhundredmilliondollarstoNorth

Korea

NorthSouthCooperationunderSunshinel  1998MountKumgangTouristRegioninNorthKoreaopenedtoSouthKoreanandinternationaltourists

l  InitialtravelNorth/Southwasbyboat,butby2002landtravelwasarranged

l  2003tworaillines(oneinwest,oneineast)thathadbeenseveredduringtheKoreanWarwerereconnected(aspartof2000agreement)NorthSouth

l  Seriesofnorth-southfamilyreunionsinSeoul,P’yŏngyang,andKŭmgang

l  2003-4KaesŏngIndustrialParkopenedjustNorthoftheDMZontheWestCoastl  50yearlease,buildings,equipmentandpowersuppliedbySouthKoreal  ManufacturingwithNorthKoreanlaborunderSouthKoreanmanagement,with

laborpaidindollarsthroughDPRKgovernment

KaesŏngIndustrialZone

BreakdownofAgreedFrameworkl  BushAdministrationwasverysuspiciousoftheAgreedFrameworknegotiatedunderthe

Clintonadministrationl  KimDae-jungvisitedtheWhiteHouseinMarch2001andsomefeltBushslightedKim’srealismabout

NorthKoreal  SomeofClinton’snegotiatorshadassumedthatDPRKwouldcollapse,butithadn’tl  By2002UShadintelligencethatDPRKhadasecondsecretHEUprogram

l  IntelligencefoundDPRKcontactswithPakistanhadtransferrednucleartechnology1990-96l  probablyinexchangeformissiletechnology

l  (Pakistanhadexplodeditsowndevicein1998ledbyA.Q.Khanmakingan8thdefactonuclearstate)

l  AfterUSaccusedDPRKofcheatingin2002DPRKejectedIAEAinspectors,andthefollowingyearwithdrewfromtheNPTl  TheUScouldhavetreatedthesecretprogramundertheAgreedFrameworkasan“undeclarednuclear

site”andnegotiatedforinspections,buttheBushadministrationdidnotwanttosuccumbtowhatitconsidered“nuclearblackmail”

NoControlsl  WiththebreakdownoftheAgreedFrameworkandDPRK’swithdrawalfromtheNPTin2003IAEAinspectorswerekickedoutandtherewerenocontrolsontheDPRKnuclearprogramatalll  DPRK“refueled”theirreactor(whichinvolvedextractingthespentnuclearrods,andpresumablyextractingplutoniumforfurtherprocessing)

l  Bushadministrationmadestrongstatements,butnowhadlittleleveragel  ChinabecameconcernedthattheUSwouldactunilaterallyinNorthKoreal  China’ssloganatthetimewas“peacefulrise”andtheywantedstabilityinEastAsiasotheycouldconcentrateoneconomicgrowth

SixPartyTalksl  began in 2003 hosted by China

l  No progress in first three rounds (Aug 2003-June 2004 with James Kelly) l  More progress in next three rounds (July 2005-Sept 2007) l  Proliferation Security Initiative

l  bilateral Mutual Ship-boarding Pacts allowing mutual expedition of ship-boarding requests for ships under those national flags—designed to fight proliferation

l  October 18, 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act l  October 9, 2006 first DPRK nuclear test l  UNSC 1718 l  Joint Statement of goals February 2007 l  DPRK issues nuclear inventory November 2007 l  US calls inventory incomplete and suspends aid pending a complete inventory

ProblemswithSixPartyTalksl  China,Russia,Japan,SouthKorea,andtheUSallagreedthattheydidn’twantNorth

Koreatogonuclear,butbeyondthattherewereseriousdifferencesl  USwouldjustassoonDPRKwouldcollapseandwantedtoapplymaximumpressurel  JapaninsistedthequestionofcitizenskidnappedtotheDPRKbepartofthetalksl  Russiamostlyonthesidelinesl  SouthKoreahadleft-winggovernmentwith“SunshinePolicy”thatsoughttoreducetensions

throughcontactandaidl  Chinasoughta“softlanding”forNorthKoreathatwoulddenuclearizeitwithoutforcingcollapse,

sotheydidnotfullycooperationwithUSsanctionsdesires

l  WithintheBushadministrationtherewasconstantinfightingbetweenthehardlinersintheNSC(Cheney,Rumsfeld,Bolton),andthosewhowantedanegotiatedsettlement(mostlyintheStateDepartment)l  JamesKelly1stthreerounds,ChristopherHillnextthree

North Korean Human Rights Act l  Signed by President Bush October 18, 2004

l  Provides humanitarian assistance to North Koreans inside North Korea [mostly food and medicine]

l  Provide grants to private, non-profit organizations to promote human rights, and development of market economy in North Korea

l  Increase availability of information in North Korea (i.e. broadcasts into North Korea, providing transistor radios, etc.)

l  Provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean refugees, and allowing them to come to the US more easily

l  Controversial because the avowed aim of the law is to cause North Korea to collapse because of an outflow of refugees as in East Germany, and because many of the organizations that might be aided are religious or highly political

UNSC 1718 (10/06 following first DPRK nuclear test) l  North Korea must "not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile", "suspend all activities related

to its ballistic missile programme" and "abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner".

l  The DPRK must also "return immediately to the six-party talks without precondition".

l  Shipments of cargo going to and from North Korea may be stopped and inspected for weapons of mass destruction or associated items (however, there is no obligation placed on member states to perform such inspections).

l  A ban is placed on imports and exports of "battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems", "related materiel including spare parts" and any other items identified by the sanctions committee.

l  UN member states must freeze the overseas assets of individuals and companies involved with the DPRK's weapons programmes. An international travel ban is also placed on programme employees and their families.

l  UN members are banned from exporting luxury goods to North Korea.

February 13, 2007Joint Statement l  North Korea will shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing

facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications

l  In return, the other five parties in the six-party talks will provide emergency energy assistance to North Korea in the initial phase of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, to commence within 60 days.

l  All six parties agree to take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

l  All six parties agree on establishing five working groups - on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, normalization of North Korea-Japan relations, economy and energy cooperation, as well as a joint Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism.

February 2007 Joint Statement (2) l  TheworkinggroupswillformspecificplansforimplementingtheSeptember19statementintheir

respectiveareas.

l  Allpartiesagreethatallworkinggroupswillmeetwithinthenext30days

l  Detailsofassistancewillbedeterminedthroughconsultationsandappropriateassessmentsintheworkinggrouponeconomicandenergycooperation.

l  Oncetheinitialactionsareimplemented,thesixpartieswillpromptlyholdaministerialmeetingtoconfirmimplementationofthejointdocumentandexplorewaysandmeansforpromotingsecuritycooperationinNortheastAsia.

l  Thesixthroundofsix-partytalkswilltakeplaceonMarch19,2007.Thiswillbetohearreportsoftheworkinggroupsanddiscussactionsforthenextphase.[33]

Discontinuationoftalksl  DPRKissuesreportofinventorytoUSinNovember2007

l  DPRKsaidtheyhadcompliedwiththetalksanddemandedaresumptionoffuelaid

l  USrespondedthattheinventorywasincomplete,anduntilsuchtimeasacompleteinventorywasforwardeditwouldsuspendaid

l  AlthoughnumerousmeetingswereheldbetweenUSandDPRKinBeijingthisimpassewasneverovercome

SouthKoreanPresidentialElection2008l  July2008SouthKoreantouristParkWang-ja(53)shottodeathafterwanderingoutoftherestrictedzone,andbyAugust2008afterinconclusivenegotiationsaboutherdeathNorthKoreaexpelledSouthKoreansfromtheresortthathasnotreopenedtoSouthKoreanssincethen

l  ConservativeMyung-bakLeewonl  NorthKoreawasanissueinthiselection,asmanySouthKoreansfeltbetrayedbyNorthKorea’s2006nucleartestafterSouthKoreagavetheNorthaid

l  LeelinkedfurthercooperationwithNorthKoreatoprogressonthenuclearissue,endingtheSunshinePolicy

ContinuedDevelopmentinTransitiontoObamaAdministration

l  October 2008 DPRK orders IAEA inspectors away from site l  Note timing just before November Presidential election

l  April 5, 2009 Satellite launch (probably test of Taep’odong multi-stage rocket, though the test failed)

l  US responded with new UN Sanctions April 13th l  DPRK called sanctions “unbearable” and on April 25th announced reactivation of

their nuclear sites l  May 25, 2009 second nuclear test

l  UNSC Resolution 1874 (authorizes inspection of DPRK ships, prevents financial services)

l  November 2010 Siegfried Hecker (of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation) visits North Korea and is shown an operational HEU plant

UNSC1874 l  Authorizing member states to inspect, "in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law,"

North Korean cargo on land, sea, and air, and to destroy any goods suspected of being connected to the DPRK's nuclear programme.[2]

l  Requiring the North Korean government to return immediately to the six-party talks and renounce its announcement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[3]

l  Preventing financial services that could contribute to the nuclear or ballistic missile related programmes.[4]

l  Instructing member states not to provide financial assistance to the DPRK nuclear programme, or enter into loans with the country, except for humanitarian or developmental reasons.[4]

l  Extending the arms embargo on North Korea by banning all weapons exports from the country and most imports, with an exception to small arms, light weapons and related material – though member states must notify the Security Council five days prior to selling the weapons.[5][6]

l  Demanding that North Korea halt its nuclear weapons program and conduct no further nuclear or missile tests.[5]

l  Asking member states to notify the Council of steps they are taking to implement the sanctions within 45 days.[7]

l  Affirming the Security Council's commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the situation.[7]

SubsequentTestsl  ThirdNuclearTestFebruary12,2013

l  2015KimJong-unannouncescapacityforH-bomb

l  FourthNuclearTestJanuary6,2016l  AnnouncedasH-bomb(butnotcorroborated,andconsideredunlikelybecauseofthesmallsizeoftheexplosion)

l  DPRKhasmadeprogressinweapanization,thoughre-entrymechanismsarenotyetthoughttobedeveloped

l  FifthNuclearTestSeptember9,2016(claimedtestofnuclearwarhead)

NorthKoreaMissilePrograml  Early1990s—NorthKoreareverseengineeredScud-BdesignedfromEgyptand/orChina

l  NodongMissilewithrangeof1000-1500miles(canreachSouthKoreaandJapan)l  Difficulttocounter

l  T’aepongdong1&2l  T’aep’odong1—3stagerockettested1998tolaunchKwangmyŏngsŏngsatellite(failed)l  T’aep’ogdong2—2/3stages,tested2006andfailed

l  Ŭnharocketl  2009testfailed,butin2012abletolaunchasatellite,2016successfullaunch

l  Hwasŏng(intercontinental)l  August&September2017multistagerocketpassingoverHokkaido

InViolationofUNSC1718?l  UNSC1718prohibitsballisticmissiletests

l  DPRKclaimsŬnhatestsaresatellitelaunchesthatareallowed

l  ProblemforUS,Japan,andSouthKoreaisthatthisis“dualuse”technologyl  PossiblesubmarinelaunchofmissileinApril2016

What’stheProblem?l  “SurgicalStrike”notfullypossible,andwouldlikelyleadtofull-scalewarwithcasualtiescomparabletotheKoreanWarl  Seoul—25millionpeople—withinrangeofNorthKoreanartilleryandmissilessoDPRK

couldkilltensofthousandsinminutes(alsochemicalweapons)

l  USleverageislimitedbecauseDPRKhaslimitedcontactswiththerestoftheworldl  SanctionshurttheDPRK,buttheyarehardtoadministeroverthelongrunbecause

DPRKisalwayscomingupwithnewwaystogetaroundthem,andbecausemaintaininginternationalcoalitionsoverthelonghaulisdifficult

l  ForgingaforeignpolicyconsensusovertheDPRKhasbeendifficultintheUSl  Nonegotiationhasconsideredconcludingatreatybecausepassingatreatythrough

theUSSenateisconsideredimpossible

NorthKoreanMissileRangesl  Red=Nodong

l  Blue=Musudan

l  Green=T’aep’odong

l  Brown=Hwasŏng

LatestSanctionsl  UNSCR2270&2321

l  2016after4thand5thnucleartestsbannedDPRKexportofpreciousmetals,coalandiron(exceptforsubsistence)

l  UNSCR2371&2375l  2017aftermissiletestsand20176thnucleartestbannedallexportofcoal,iron,leadandseafood,jointventures,textileexports,andNorthKoreannationalsworkingoverseas

l  USPresidentialExecutiveOrders2017l  CutsDPRKfromUSfinancialsystem,aswellasanyfirmsthattradewithNorthKoreafromthissystem

WillSanctionswork?l  Quidproquosanctions—Igiveyouthisandyougivemethat(AgreedFramework)

l  Positivesanctions—aimedatinducingbroadchangesinsocietythatempowerthoseforceswithinthecountrywhowanttradeandpeace(SunshinePolicy)

l  Threatsanctions—I’mgoingtomakeyouhurtunlessyoudowhatIwant(present?)willonlyworkundercertainconditions

l  Iftherulingclassisdirectlyhurtbythesanctions,theymightchangepolicyl  Or,ifthepeoplewhoarehurtbysanctionscanpressurethegovernmentto

respondl  Or,ifthepoliticalordertrulycollapses

OttoWarmbierJune2017l  CollegestudentfromOhiowhovisitedNorthKoreaonapackagetourinwasarrestedonJanuary2,2016l  Madeapublicconfessionofattemptingtostealapropagandaposterl  BillRichardsonmetwiththeNorthKoreansinNewYorktonegotiateWarmbier’s

release,butthenextdayhewasconvictedof“anti-stateactivity”andsentencedto15yearshardlabor

l  DiplomaticattemptstofreeWarmbierundertheObamaadministrationwerenotsuccessful

l  OnJune2,2017SecretaryofStateRexTillersonannouncedWarmbier’sreleasenegotiatedbytheStateDepartmentatPresidentTrump’sbehestl  WarmbierarrivedintheUSinacoma(thatNorthKoreaclaimedhehadbeeninfor17

months),andhediedshortlyafterarrivingintheUS

NorthKoreaTestsin2017l  July4,2017testofHwasŏng14missile

l  Two-stagemobileintercontinentalmissile2,800mileswithRussian-styleengine

l  July28,2017testofHwasŏng14missilel  2341milerangebutdifferenttrajectorymightgo10,000milesputtingmostofUSin

range

l  September3,2017SixthNuclearTestl  4to16timesmorepowerfulthanprevioustestsl  USwarnsof“massivemilitaryresponse”

l  November28,2017Hwasŏng15capableofreachingallofUS

Fall2017TalkonNorthKoreaOptionsl  McMaster

l  Mattis

l  Tillerson

KimJongUn’s2018NewYear’sAddressl  “LastyearthemovesoftheUnitedStatesanditsvassalforcestoisolateandstifleourcountrywenttoextremes,andourrevolutionfacedtheharshesteverchallenges.”

l  “Byalsoconductingtestsofvariousmeansofnucleardeliveryofsuper-intensethermonuclearweapons,weattainedourgeneralorientationandstrategicgoalwithsuccess...Outcountry’snuclearforcesarecapableofthwartingandcounteringanynuclearthreatfromtheUnitedStates,andtheyconstituteapowerfulandreliablewardeterrent,whichnoforcecanreverse...Thewholeofits[US]mainlandiswithintherangeofournuclearstrike,andthenuclearbuttonisonmyofficedeskatalltimes”

PresidentTrumpJanuary2Tweetl  “NorthKoreanLeaderKimJongUnjuststatedthatthe“NuclearButtonisonhisdeskatalltimes.WillsomeonefromhisdepletedandfoodstarvedregimepleaseinformhimthatItoohaveaNuclearButton,butitisamuchbiggerandmorepowerfulonethanhis,andmyButtonworks!”

2ndPartofKimJungUn’sNewYearSpeechl  AfterblamingthepreviousSouthKoreaPresidentforbeingfascistvassalforcesoftheUS

desperatetoignitewarthatcollapsed“thankstothemassiveresistanceoftheenragedpeople”henotedthatnothinghaschangedinNorth-Southrelations

l  “Thisyearissignificantbothforthenorthandsouthasinthenorththepeoplewillgreetthe70thfoundinganniversaryoftheirRepublicasagreat,auspiciouseventandinthesouththeWinterOlympicgameswilltakeplace...Weshouldimprovethefrozeninter-Koreanrelationsandglorifytheirmeaningfulyearasaneventulonenoteworthyinthehistoryofthenation.

l  TheOlympics“willserveasagoodoccasionfordemonstratingournation’sprestigeandweearnestlywishtheOlympicgamesasuccess.Fromthispointofviewwearewillingtodispatchourdelegationandadoptothernecessarymeasures;withregardtothismatter,theauthoritiesofthenorthandthesouthmaymeettogethersoon.”

SouthKoreanreactionl  SouthKoreanPresidentMunJaeIn(electedMay10th2017afterimpeachmentofformerPresidentParkKeunhye)iscenterleftandwishedfornegotiationswiththeNorth,butin2017hadbeenrebuffedbytheNorth

l  ChinahadboycottedKoreanculturalexportsinretaliationforSouthKoreainstallationofTHAADmissilebatteriesinApril2017(beforeelectionofMun)

l  THAADbatteriesexistinHawaii,WakeandGuambutChinaobjectedtothesel  MunnegotiatedwithChinabypromisingnottoinstallanymoreTHAAD

l  MunneededNorthKoreancooperationforsuccessfulOlympicsl  HethuswelcomedNorthKoreasinitiative,NorthKoreareopenedhotlinewith

Seoul,andtalksforNorthKoreanparticipationintheOlympicswerecompleted

StateoftheUnionSpeechJanuary20,2018l  “NoregimehasoppresseditsowncitizensmoretotallyorbrutallythatthecrueldictatorshipinNorthKorea.NorthKorea’srecklesspursuitofnuclearmissilescouldverysoonthreatenourhomeland.

l  “Pastexperiencehastaughtusthatcomplacencyandconcessionsonlyinviteaggressionandprovocation.

l  InvokingOttoWambierTrumprecognizedWambier’sparentsintheaudienceaswellasNorthKoreanrefugeeJiSeong-ho,andthenendedthespeechinvokingfreedomasanAmericanvalue.

SouthKoreanAmbassadorshipl  OneyearintotheTrumpadministrationtherewasstillnoambassadorappointedforSouthKorea

l  January30VictorChaOp-edinWashingtonPost“GivingNorthKoreaa‘bloodynose’carriesahugerisktoAmericans”outlinedrisksl  VictorCha,aProfessoratGeorgetown,wasformerlyDirectorforAsianAffairsintheBushAdministrationNational

SecurityCouncill  HadbeenclosetoappointmentbytheTrumpAdministrationforSouthKoreanAmbassadorbutreportedinlate

Januarytohavebeennixedbecauseheadvisedagainstapreemtivestrikel  If“Kimisundeterrablewithoutsuchastrike,howcanwealsobelievethatastrikewilldeterhimfrom

respondinginkind?AndifKimisunpredictable,impulsiveandborderingonirrational,howcanwecontroltheescalationladder,whichispremisedonanadversary’srationalunderstandingofsignalsanddeterrence.”

l  Advocatesenhancedandsustainedregionalandglobalpressure

l  June29,2018HarryB.HarrisformerCommander,USPacificFleet,appointedAmbassadortoSouthKorea

2018WinterOlympicsl  KimJungUnNewYearSpeechexpresseddesiretoparticipateinWinterOlympicsandtalkwithSouthKorea

l  Hotlinereestablished,talkscommenced,andNorthKoreaagreedtocomel  USagreedtopostponeannualUS-SouthKoreajointmilitaryexercisesuntilaftertheOlympicsandParalympics

l  Delegationof10athletesandtwohundredcheerleadingbeautiesdispatchedtoP’yŏngch’angl  Didn’twinanymedals

CharmOffensive?l  KimJongUn’syoungersisterKimYojong(PartyCentralCommitteeViceChair)sentalongwithKimYŏngnam

(ChairofPresidium)toopeningceremonyl  HaddinnerwithSouthKoreanPresidentMunJaeInanddeliveredletterinvitingMuntoP’yŏngyang

l  VicePresidentMikePencerepresentedtheUSl  VisitedPrimeMinisterAbeinJapanandannouncedtoughnewsanctionswhiledenouncingNorthKoreal  InSouthKoreaPencemettheSouthKoreanpresidentbutrefusedtoacknowledgeKimYojong,andwas

accompaniedbyOttoWarmbier’sfather

l  IninterviewontheflighthomewithJoshRoginofTheWashingtonPostPenceclarifiedthattheUSwillcontinuesanctions,butiswillingtotalkwithNorthKoreaaboutdenuclearizationl  SubsequentlyitwasreportedthattheNorthKoreanscancelledaplannedmeetingwiththeUS(thatwas

supposedtobeunpublicized)becauseofPence’sannouncedplantodemandthattheNorthKoreansdenuclearizel  ReiteratedsupportfortheBusherapolicyofCVID(Complete,Verifiable,andIrreversibleDenuclearization)and

thatsanctionswouldcontinueduringtalksuntilresultsareobtained

CharmOffensiveII?l  IvankaTrumpattendedtheclosingceremonyoftheOlympicgames

l  NorthKoreanssentGeneralKimYŏngch’ŏl(CentralCommitteeViceChair,andsince2016ChairofCentralCommittee’sUnitedFrontDepartment)andRiSonGwonChairmanoftheCommitteeforthePeacefulUnificationoftheFatherlandl  MetwithSouthKoreanPresidentMun,andconveyeddesirefortalkswiththeUS,andagreedtheinter-KoreanrelationsshouldbedevelopedalongwithrelationswiththeUS

l  AsheadoftheReconnaissanceGeneralBureau총찰총국,thebureauresponsibleforoperationsagainstSouthKoreaandJapan,KimYŏngch’ŏlisthoughttoberesponsibleforthesinkingoftheCh’ŏnanandshellingofYŏnp’yŏngIslandin2010

RecentDevelopmentsl  PresidentTrumptoldgovernorsonFebruary26,2018heiswillingtotalk“onlyundertherightconditions.Otherwise,we’renottalking.”l  However,onthesamedaythesenior-mostexpertintheStateDepartmentonNorthKorea,PeterYun,announcedhisretirementbytheendoftheweekl  HehadnegotiatedthereleaseofOttoWarmbrierl  HefavorsnegotiationssayingthatwhileCVIDistheultimategoal,talksmightbeginwithafreezeonnuclearandmissiletesting

l  MeanwhileSarahHuckabeeSanders,WhiteHousePressSecretary,said,“DenuclearizationmustbetheresultofanydialoguewithNorthKorea.”

KimJungUnBreaksoutl  SouthKoreanNationalSecurityAdvisorChungEui-young(국가안보실장 정의용鄭義溶)andDirectorof

NationalIntelligenceSuhHoon(국가정보원 서훈徐薫)visitedP’yŏngyangonMarch3,2018l  FirstSouthKoreanenvoysince2007(thelasttimetherewasaKoreanDemocraticPartyPresident)l  MetwithKimJongUninKWPheadquarters,andKimalsohostedadinnerfortheml  LatervisitWhiteHousecarryinginvitationfromKimJungUnthatPresidentTrumpaccepts

l  March26,2018—KimJungUnmeetsXiJinpinginBeijing(aftersixyearsoffrostySino-NorthKoreanrelations)

l  April1,2018—SecretaryofStateMikePompeovisitsP’yŏngyangandmeetsKimJungUn

l  April27,2018—SouthKoreanPresidentMunJae-inandKimJungUnmeetatP’anmunjŏm

l  April/May,2018—ChinesePartyInternationalLiaisonandForeignMinistermakeseparatevisitstoNorthKorea

P’anmunjŏmDeclarationl  PromotecommonprosperityandreunificationofKoreathroughdramaticimprovementanddevelopmentofinter-Koreanrelationsl  JointLiaisonOfficeinKaesŏngbetweennorthandsouthKoreal  Familyreunificationl  Connectroadsandrail(TonghaeandKyŏngŭilines)

l  Eliminationofmilitarytensionandsubstantialeliminationofwarrisk

l  EstablishapermanentandpeacefulKoreanpeninsulal  Stepwisedisarmamentl  PeacetreatytoendKoreanWarl  FinalizecompletedenuclearizationoftheKoreanPeninsula

DualingUS/ChinaVisitsl  May7-8XiJinpingandKimJongUnholdtalksinDalian

l  KimYŏngch’ŏl,RiSuYong,KimYŏjŏng,andCh’oeSŏnhŭialsopresent

l  4pointXinhuastatement

l  Traditionalfriendshipofthecountriesatreasurel  Bilateralrelationsareofmajorstrategicsignificance

l  Bothsideshouldmaintainfrequentexchanges

l  People-to-peoplefriendshipisimportant

l  XinhuareportedKim’shopethat“theDPRKandUSwouldbuildmutualtrustthroughdialogueandtherelevantsideswouldtakephasedandsynchronousmeasuresinaresponsiblemanner”

l  May9,MikePompeovisitsP’yŏngyangl  MetbyKimYŏngch’ŏl,RiSuYong,andlatermetKimJongUn

l  ThreedetaineesamnestiedbyKimandfreedasagoodwillgesture

l  KoreanAmericanKimDong-chul,Yanji-basedtraderl  TonyKim(KimSangDuk)teachingatPUST

l  KimHak-song,Chinese-bornKoreanAmericanteachingatPUST

l  Pompeooffered,“alltheopportunitiesyourpeoplesorichlydeserve”inexchangefortheDPRKshuttingdownitsnuclearprogram

l  AccompaniedbyAndrewKim,HeadoftheCIAKoreaMissionCenterl  KimhasschooltieswithSouthKoreanIntelligenceHead

SŏHunandSouthKoreanSecurityAdvisorChŏngŬi-yong(whoishismother’suncle)

l  Saidtobehawkish

l  AlsoaccompaniedbyRandalSchriver,AssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAsianandPacificSecurityAffairs

July12,Tump-KimSummitl  PresidentTrumpandSecretaryKimmet,shookhands,andhada45minutetalkwithonlyinterpreters

l  Laterhadlunchl  PresidentTrump,SecretaryPompeo,Chief-of-StaffKellyandNationalSecurityAdvisorJohnBoltonl  StateAffairsCommissionChairKimJongUn,ForeignSecretaryRiYŏngho,ViceChairKimYŏngch’ŏl

l  Signedjointstatementl  ConfirmsP’anmunjŏmdeclarationandaimof”completedenuclearizationoftheKoreanPeninsula”

l  CommitstorecoveringPOW/MIAremainsfromtheKoreanWar

l  OptimisticNewsConferencel  [NorthKorea]“hasthepotentialtobecomeanincredibleplace”

l  “IstandbeforeyouasanemissaryoftheAmericanpeopletodeliveramessageofhopeandvisionandamessageofpeace”l  Thankedhosts,PresidentMun,PrimeMinisterAbe

l  AnnouncedKim“isalreadydestroyingamajormissileenginetestingsite”

l  Inanswertoquestiononsecurityassurances,“Wewillbestoppingthewargameswhichwillsaveusatremendousamountofmoney,unlessanduntilweseethefuturenegotiationisnotgoingalonglikeitshould.

SingaporeSummit

Conferencepersonnell  RiSuyong,formerForeignMinister

l  Interpreter

l  KimJongUn,StateAffairsCommissionChair

l  KimYŏngch’ŏl,KWPCentralCommitteeViceChairandUnificationBureau

l  RiYongho,ForeignMinister

l  JohnKelly,ChiefofStaff

l  Interpreter

l  PresidentTrump

l  MikePompeo,SecretaryofState

l  JohnR.Bolton,NationalSecurityAdvisor

WhatWarGamesStopped?l  KeyResolve

l  Descendantof“TeamSpirit”heldbetweenFebruaryandAprilbytheUnitedStatesPacificCommand

l  JointexerciseswithSouthKoreainwhichextraUSforcesarebroughtintoKoreafortheexercise

l  FoalEaglel  JointexerciseswiththeRepublicofKoreaandUSunderauspicesofCombinedForcesCommandl  OneofthelargestmilitaryexercisesintheworldmonitoredbytheNeutralNationsSupervisory

CommissionundertheKoreanArmisticeAgreementl  CombinedwithKeyResolve,andinvolvedotheralliedforces(Britain),aswelll  EndedinJune2018,butresumedonsmallerscaleinNovember

l  Replacedwith“Tongmaeng”(alliance)trainingonsmallerscale

MikePompeo’sVisitstoP’yŏngyangl  July7,2018delegationledbyMikePompeo

l  PompeodidnotmeetKJUbutKimYongCholl  Pompeosaidtalkswere“productive”l  NorthsaidPompeomade“one-sidedrobber-like”demandsforCVIDratherthanconstructivemeasuresthatwouldbuildtrust

l  August24,2018—PresidentTrumpcallsoffPompeovisittoP’yŏngyangforlackofprogress

February28,2019TrumpKimSummitl  TrumpandKimmeet

l  February27privatedinneratMetropoleHotell  February28meetingwithaides

l  NoagreementandFebruary28thmeetingbrokeoffearly

l  Endamicablyl  Whilebothsidesnotednoagreement,therewerenoangrywords,eachsidesaidtalkswouldcontinue

HanoiSummitFebruary28,2019l  NickMulvaney(ActingChief-of-Staff)

l  YunHyangLee(Interpreter)

l  PresidentTrump

l  MikePompeo(SecretaryofState)

l  JohnBolton(NationalSecurityAdvisor)

l  RiYongho(ForeignMinister)

l  StateAffairsCommissionChairKimJongUn

l  SinHye-yong(Interpreter)

l  KimYŏng-ch’ŏl(KWPCentralCommitteeViceChairandUnificationBureau)

AnalysisofPersonnell  NickMulvaney,MikePompeo,and

JohnBoltonhavealladvocatedeliminatedsanctionsonlyforCVID,butotherwisebelieveinforcingNorthKoreatocomplyviasanctionsratherthanincentives(InJune2018meetingJohnF.KellywasChief-of-Staff)

l  StephenBiegunissaidtobelievethatpositiveincentivescanreduceNorthKoreanbelligerence

l  NoticethatStephenBiegunwasnotatthetable

l  ForeignMinisterRiYonghovisitedVietnamandChinainlate2018,andin2017gavespeechinUNinsultingTrump

l  KWPCentralCommitteeViceChairandUnificationDepartmentChairKimYŏngch’ŏlcomesfromtheReconnaissanceBureau(specialintelligenceoperations),andisthoughttohavearrangedthesinkingoftheCh’ŏnanin2010

USAssessmentofTalksl  PresidentTrump—”Theywantedustoliftallthesanctions,andwecouldn’tdothat.”

l  MikePompeonotedthattheNorthKoreanproposalwouldleavealready-producednuclearweaponsandmissilesinplace,aswellasproductionfacilitiesoutsideoftheYŏngbyŏncomplexthattheUSknowsabout

l  MikePompeobriefedtheforeignministersofChina,SouthKorea,andJapanontheHanoisummit(byphone)l  ChinaYangJiechil  SouthKoreaKangKyun—hwal  JapanKonoTarō

NorthKoreanAssessmentsofTalksl  RiYongho(ForeignMinister)March11:00amnewsconference:

l  “Whatwecallforisnotcompleteremovalofsanctions,butpartialremoval,concretely,firstremovaloffiveoftheelevenitemsinUNsanctionsresolutionsthatwereadoptedin2016and2017,amongthemthosethatblockthecivilianeconomyandpeople’slivelihood.ConsideringthecurrentlevelofNorthKorean-Americantrust,thesearethebroadestdenuclearizationmeasureswecantakeinstrideinthecurrentstage.

l  “Forussecurityguaranteesareamoreimportantquestionthanadoptingdenuclearizationmeasures,butweconsideritburdensomethatAmericastilladoptsmilitarymeasuresandsohaveproposedcorrespondingmeasuresofpartiallyliftingsanctions.

l  “Inthisroundoftalkswehaveclarifiedourreadinesstopermanentlystopnucleartestsandlong-rangemissileteststhroughpromisesanddocumentsinordertoreduceAmerica’sconcerns“

l  “Inthefutureifwereachthestageofbuildingtrustthedenuclearizationprocesswillbeabletoproceedfaster.HoweverasthetalksprogressedAmericainsisteduntiltheendthatwehadtodootherthingsinadditiontomeasurestoclosetheYŏngbyŏndistrictnuclearfacilities,anditaccordinglybecameclearthatAmericawasnotpreparedtoacceptourproposal.

l  Ch’oeSŏnhŭi(ViceForeignMinister)—”IgotthefeelingthatgoingforwardourComradeStateAffairsCommissionChairmighthavelostthewillforexchangebetweenChosŏnandAmerica.”(March1,20191:00AMnewsconference)

UNSecurityCouncilSanctionsfrom2016l  UNSC22703/2/2016—responseto4thnucleartest1/6/2016

l  ProhibitedweaponstradingandcalledforinspectionofDPRKcargos,andbannedexportofgold,vanadium,titanium,rareearths

l  UNSC232111/2016—responseto5thnucleartest9/9/2016l  Bannedcoalexportsandexportsofcopper,nickel,zinc,andsilver

l  UNSC23718/5/17—inresponseto142017missiletestsl  Banonexportofcoal,ironandironore,seafoodexports,andleadexportsl  Financialsanctions

l  UNSC23759/11/2017—inresponseto9/3/20176thnucleartestl  BanonsellingnaturalgastoDPRK,strictquotaonoilimports,limitedvisasforoverseasNorthKoreanlaborer,banonjointventures,

textileexports,shipinspections

l  UNSC239712/22/2017—inresponsetolaunchingofHwasŏngmissilel  Limitsimportsofpetroleum,andexportsoffood,machinery,electricalequipment,earthandstones,woodandvessels,alsoasset

freezesonNorthKoreamilitaryaccountsabroad

StrategicConsiderationsl  NorthKoreaproposalwouldliftsanctionsonmostimportsandexportsexceptforweapons

l  Pompeoknewworkingleveltalkshadn’treachedanagreementbutgambledthatKimJongUncouldmakeconcessionsl  LocationinHanoidesignedtotellNorthKoreans“youcouldbelikethisifyoudenuclearizedandreformed”(Vietnamhasgrowthrate

secondonlytoChina,andPPPpercapitaincometwiceNorthKorea’s)

l  TheNorthKoreansknewPompeowouldn’tcompromiseonsanctionsbutgambledthatTrumpcouldmakeconcessions(likeendinglargescalemilitaryexercisesinSingapore)

l  KimHyŏkch’ŏl/KimYŏngch’ŏllinel  KimHyŏkch’ŏl—SpecialRepresentativeonAmericaoftheStateAffairsCommissionl  MoreworkingleveldiscussionswithMikePompeoandSteveBiegun

l  RiYongho/Ch’oeSŏnhŭilinel  MorepublicdiplomacytofitthestyleofTrumpl  InsituationsinwhichtheUShastoberebutteditisbestforspecialists(intheForeignMinistry)todoit