the project gutenberg ebook of the vedanta sutras with …acharya.org/bk/pb/oth/vswrc.pdf · of the...

TheProjectGutenbergEBookofTheVedantaSutraswiththeCommentaryby

Ramanuja,byTrans.GeorgeThibaut

Copyrightlawsarechangingallovertheworld.Besuretocheckthe

copyrightlawsforyourcountrybeforedownloadingorredistributing

thisoranyotherProjectGutenbergeBook.

ThisheadershouldbethefirstthingseenwhenviewingthisProject

Gutenbergfile.Pleasedonotremoveit.Donotchangeoreditthe

headerwithoutwrittenpermission.

Pleasereadthe"legalsmallprint,"andotherinformationaboutthe

eBookandProjectGutenbergatthebottomofthisfile.Includedis

importantinformationaboutyourspecificrightsandrestrictionsin

howthefilemaybeused.Youcanalsofindoutabouthowtomakea

donationtoProjectGutenberg,andhowtogetinvolved.

**WelcomeToTheWorldofFreePlainVanillaElectronicTexts**

**eBooksReadableByBothHumansandByComputers,Since1971**

*****TheseeBooksWerePreparedByThousandsofVolunteers!*****

Title:TheVedantaSutraswiththeCommentarybyRamanuja

SacredBooksoftheEast,Volume48

Author:Trans.GeorgeThibaut

ReleaseDate:January,2005[EBook#7297]

[Yes,wearemorethanoneyearaheadofschedule]

[ThisfilewasfirstpostedonApril9,2003]

Edition:10

Language:English

Charactersetencoding:ASCII

***STARTOFTHEPROJECTGUTENBERGEBOOKTHEVEDANTASUTRAS***

THE

VEDANTASUTRAS

WITHTHECOMMENTARYBY

RAMANUJA

TRANSLATEDBY

GEORGETHIBAUT

PARTIII

SacredBooksoftheEast,Volume48

[1904]

[ScannedinbySrinivasanSriram(aspartofthesripedia.orginitiative).

OCRedandproofedatDistributedProofingbyothervolunteers;Juliet

Sutherland,projectmanager.Formattingandadditionalproofreadingat

Sacredtexts.combyJ.B.Hare.Thistextisinthepublicdomainworldwide.

Thisfilemaybeusedforanynoncommercialpurposeprovidedthisnotice

isleftintact.]

CONTENTS.

VEDANTASUTRASWITHTHECOMMENTARYOFRAMANUJA.

INTRODUCTION

ADHYAYAI

PadaI

PadaII

PadaIII

PadaIV

ADHYAYAII

PadaI

PadaII

PadaIII

PadaIV

ADHYAYAIII

PadaI

PadaII

PadaIII

PadaIV

ADHYAYAIV

PadaI

PadaII

PadaIII

PadaIV

INDEXESBYDR.M.WINTERNITZ:

IndexofQuotations

IndexofSanskritWords

IndexofNamesandSubjects

Corrigenda

TransliterationofOrientalAlphabetsadoptedfortheTranslationsofthe

SacredBooksoftheEast

INTRODUCTION.

IntheIntroductiontothefirstvolumeofthetranslationofthe

'VedantaSutraswithSankara'sCommentary'(vol.xxxivofthisSeries)I

havedweltatsomelengthontheinterestwhichRamanuja'sCommentary

mayclaimasbeing,ontheonehand,thefullestexpositionofwhatmay

becalledtheTheisticVedanta,andassupplyingus,ontheother,with

meansofpenetratingtothetruemeaningofBadarayana'sAphorisms.Ido

notwishtoenterhereintoafullerdiscussionofRamanuja'sworkin

eitheroftheseaspects;anadequatetreatmentofthemwould,moreover,

requireconsiderablymorespacethanisatmydisposal.Someveryuseful

materialfortherightunderstandingofRamanuju'sworkistobefound

inthe'AnalyticalOutlineofContents'whichMessrs.M.Rangakaryaand

M.B.VaradarajaAiyangarhaveprefixedtothefirstvolumeoftheir

scholarlytranslationoftheSribhashya(Madras,1899).

ThequestionastowhattheSturasreallyteachisacritical,nota

philosophicalone.Thisdistinctionseemstohavebeenimperfectly

realisedbyseveralofthosecritics,writinginIndia,whohave

examinedtheviewsexpressedinmyIntroductiontothetranslationof

Sankara'sCommentary.Awritershouldnotbetaxedwith'philosophic

incompetency,''hopelesstheisticbiasduetoearlytraining,'andthe

like,simplybecausehe,onthebasisofapurelycriticalinvestigation,

considershimselfentitledtomaintainthatacertainancientdocument

setsforthonephilosophicalviewratherthananother.Ihavenowhere

expressedanopinionastothecomparativephilosophicalvalueofthe

systemsofSankaraandRamanuja;notbecauseIhavenodefiniteopinions

onthispoint,butbecausetointroducethemintoacriticalenquiry

wouldbepurposelessifnotobjectionable.

ThequestionastothetruemeaningoftheSutrasisnodoubtofsome

interest;althoughtheinterestofproblemsofthiskindmayeasilybe

overestimated.Amongtheremarksofcriticsonmytreatmentofthis

problemIhavefoundlittleofsolidvalue.ThemainargumentswhichI

havesetforth,notsomuchinfavouroftheadequacyofRamanuja's

interpretation,asagainstthevalidityofSankarakarya'sunderstanding

oftheSutras,appeartomenottohavebeentouched.Idonotbyany

meansconsidertheproblemahopelessone;butitssolutionwillnotbe

advanced,inanydirection,butbythosewhowillbeatthetroubleof

submittingtheentirebodyoftheSutrastoanewanddetailed

investigation,availingthemselvestothefullofthehelpthatistobe

derivedfromthestudyofalltheexistingCommentaries.

ThepresenttranslationoftheSribhashyaclaimstobefaithfulonthe

whole,althoughImustacknowledgethatIhaveaimedratheratmakingit

intelligibleand,inacertainsense,readablethanscrupulously

accurate.IfIhadtorewriteit,Ishouldfeelinclinedtogoeven

furtherinthesamedirection.IndianPhilosophywould,inmyopinion,

bemorereadilyandwidelyappreciatedthanitisatpresent,ifthe

translatorsofphilosophicalworkshadbeensomewhatmoreconcernedto

throwtheirversionsintoaformlessstrangeandrepellenttothe

westernreaderthanliteralrenderingsfromtechnicalSanskritmust

needsbeinmanypassages.Iamnotunawareofthepeculiardangersof

theplannowadvocatedamongwhichthemostobviousisthetemptation

itofferstothetranslatorofdeviatingfromthetextmorewidelythan

regardforclearnesswouldabsolutelyrequire.AndIamconsciousof

havingfailedinthisrespectinmorethanoneinstance.Inothercases

Ihavenodoubtgoneastraythroughanimperfectunderstandingofthe

author'smeaning.Thefactis,thatasyetthetimehashardlycomefor

fullyadequatetranslationsofcomprehensiveworksofthetypeofthe

Sribhashya,theauthorsofwhichwrotewithreferenceinmanycases

tacittoanimmenseandhighlytechnicalphilosophicalliteraturewhich

isonlyjustbeginningtobestudied,andcomprehendedinpart,by

Europeanscholars.

ItgivesmegreatpleasuretoacknowledgethehelpwhichIhavereceived

fromvariousquartersinpreparingthistranslation.PanditGangadhara

Sastrin,C.I.E.,oftheBenaresSanskritCollege,has,withunwearying

kindnessandpatience,suppliedmethroughoutwithcommentsofhisown

ondifficultsectionsofthetext.PanditSvaminRamaMisraSastrinhas

renderedmefrequentassistanceintheearlierportionofmytask.And

toMr.A.Venis,thelearnedPrincipaloftheBenaresSanskritCollege,

Iamindebtedformostinstructivenotesonsomepassagesofa

peculiarlytechnicalandabstrusecharacter.NorcanIconcludewithout

expressingmysenseofobligationtoColonelG.A.Jacob,whose

invaluable'ConcordancetothePrincipalUpanishads'lightenstoan

incalculabledegreethetaskofanyscholarwhoisengagedinwork

bearingontheVedanta.

VEDANTASUTRAS

WITH

RAMANUJA'SSRIBHASHYA

FIRSTADHYAYA.

FIRSTPADA.

MAYmymindbefilledwithdevotiontowardsthehighestBrahman,the

abodeofLakshmiwhoisluminouslyrevealedintheUpanishads;whoin

sportproduces,sustains,andreabsorbstheentireUniverse;whoseonly

aimistofosterthemanifoldclassesofbeingsthathumblyworshiphim.

ThenectaroftheteachingofParasara'sson(Vyasa),whichwasbrought

upfromthemiddleofthemilkoceanoftheUpanishadswhichrestores

tolifethesoulswhosevitalstrengthhaddepartedowingtotheheatof

thefireoftransmigratoryexistencewhichwaswellguardedbythe

teachersofoldwhichwasobscuredbythemutualconflictofmanifold

opinions,mayintelligentmendailyenjoythatasitisnowpresented

totheminmywords.

Thelengthyexplanation(vritti)oftheBrahmasutraswhichwascomposed

bytheReverendBodhayanahasbeenabridgedbyformerteachers;

accordingtotheirviewsthewordsoftheSutraswillbeexplainedin

thispresentwork.

1.ThenthereforetheenquiryintoBrahman.

InthisSutratheword'then'expressesimmediatesequence;theword

'therefore'intimatesthatwhathastakenplace(viz.thestudyofthe

karmakandaoftheVeda)constitutesthereason(oftheenquiryinto

Brahman).Forthefactisthattheenquiryinto(lit.'thedesireto

know')Brahmanthefruitofwhichenquiryisinfiniteinnatureand

permanentfollowsimmediatelyinthecaseofhimwho,havingreadthe

Vedatogetherwithitsauxiliarydisciplines,hasreachedtheknowledge

thatthefruitofmereworksislimitedandnonpermanent,andhencehas

conceivedthedesireoffinalrelease.

Thecompound'brahmajijnasa'istobeexplainedas'theenquiryof

Brahman,'thegenitivecase'ofBrahman'beingunderstoodtodenotethe

object;inagreementwiththespecialruleastothemeaningofthe

genitivecase,PaniniII,3,65.Itmightbesaidthatevenifwe

acceptedthegeneralmeaningofthegenitivecasewhichisthatof

connexioningeneralBrahman'sposition(intheabovecompound)asan

objectwouldbeestablishedbythecircumstancethatthe'enquiry'

demandsanobject;butinagreementwiththeprinciplethatthedirect

denotationofawordistobepreferredtoameaninginferredwetake

thegenitivecase'ofBrahman'asdenotingtheobject.

Theword'Brahman'denotesthehightestPerson(purushottama),whois

essentiallyfreefromallimperfectionsandpossessesnumberlessclasses

ofauspiciousqualitiesofunsurpassableexcellence.Theterm'Brahman'

isappliedtoanythingswhichpossessthequalityofgreatness

(brihattva,fromtheroot'brih');butprimarilydenotesthatwhich

possessesgreatness,ofessentialnatureaswellasofqualities,in

unlimitedfulness;andsuchisonlytheLordofall.Hencetheword

'Brahman'primarilydenoteshimalone,andinasecondaryderivative

senseonlythosethingswhichpossesssomesmallpartoftheLord's

qualities;foritwouldbeimpropertoassumeseveralmeaningsforthe

word(sothatitwoulddenoteprimarilyordirectlymorethanonething).

Thecaseisanalogoustothatoftheterm'bhagavat[FOOTNOTE4:1].'The

Lordonlyisenquiredinto,forthesakeofimmortality,byallthose

whoareafflictedwiththetriadofpain.HencetheLordofallisthat

Brahmanwhich,accordingtotheSutra,constitutestheobjectofenquiry.

Theword'jijnasa'isadesiderativeformationmeaning'desiretoknow.'

Andasinthecaseofanydesirethedesiredobjectisthechiefthing,

theSutrameanstoenjoinknowledgewhichistheobjectofthedesire

ofknowledge.ThepurportoftheentireSutrathenisasfollows:'Since

thefruitofworksknownthroughtheearlierpartoftheMimamsais

limitedandnonpermanent,andsincethefruitoftheknowledgeof

Brahmanwhichknowledgeistobereachedthroughthelatterpartofthe

Mimamsaisunlimitedandpermanent;forthisreasonBrahmanistobe

known,aftertheknowledgeofworkshaspreviouslytakenplace.'The

samemeaningisexpressedbytheVrittikarawhensaying'afterthe

comprehensionofworkshastakenplacetherefollowstheenquiryinto

Brahman.'AndthattheenquiryintoworksandthatintoBrahman

constituteonebodyofdoctrine,he(theVrittikara)willdeclarelater

on'thisSarirakadoctrineisconnectedwithJaimini'sdoctrineas

containedinsixteenadhyayas;thisprovesthetwotoconstituteone

bodyofdoctrine.'HencetheearlierandthelaterMimamsaareseparate

onlyinsofarasthereisadifferenceofmattertobetaughtbyeach;

inthesamewayasthetwohalvesofthePurvaMimamsasutras,

consistingofsixadhyayaseach,areseparate[FOOTNOTE5:1];andaseach

adhyayaisseparate.TheentireMimamsasatrawhichbeginswiththe

Sutra'Nowthereforetheenquiryintoreligiousduty'andconcludeswith

theSutra'(Fromthereis)noreturnonaccountofscripturalstatement'

has,owingtothespecialcharacterofthecontents,adefiniteorderof

internalsuccession.Thisisasfollows.Atfirsttheprecept'oneisto

learnone'sowntext(svadhyaya)'enjoinstheapprehensionofthat

aggregateofsyllableswhichiscalled'Veda,'andisherereferredto

as'svadhyaya.'Nexttherearisesthedesiretoknowofwhatnaturethe

'Learning'enjoinedistobe,andhowitistobedone.Heretherecome

incertaininjunctionssuchas'LetaBrahnmanabeinitiatedinhis

eighthyear'and'TheteacheristomakehimrecitetheVeda';and

certainrulesaboutspecialobservancesandrestrictionssuchas

'havingperformedtheupakarmanonthefullmoonofSravanaor

Praushthapadaaccordingtoprescription,heistostudythesacred

versesforfourmonthsandahalfwhichenjoinalltherequireddetails.

Fromalltheseitisunderstoodthatthestudyenjoinedhasforits

resulttheapprehensionoftheaggregateofsyllablescalledVeda,on

thepartofapupilwhohasbeeninitiatedbyateachersprungfroma

goodfamily,leadingavirtuouslife,andpossessingpurityofsoul;who

practisescertainspecialobservancesandrestrictions;andwholearns

byrepeatingwhatisrecitedbytheteacher.

AndthisstudyoftheVedaisofthenatureofasamskaraofthetext,

sincetheformoftheinjunction'theVedaistobestudied'showsthat

theVedaistheobject(oftheactionofstudying).Byasamskarais

understoodanactionwherebysomethingisfittedtoproducesomeother

effect;andthattheVedashouldbetheobjectofsuchasamskaarais

quiteappropriate,sinceitgivesrisetotheknowledgeofthefour

chiefendsofhumanactionviz.religiousduty,wealth,pleasure,and

finalreleaseandofthemeanstoeffectthem;andsinceithelpsto

effectthoseendsbyitselfalso,viz.bymeremechanicalrepetition

(apartfromanyknowledgetowhichitmaygiverise).

TheinjunctionastothestudyoftheVedathusaimsonlyatthe

apprehensionoftheaggregateofsyllables(constitutingtheVeda)

accordingtocertainrules;itisinthiswayanalogoustotherecital

ofmantras.

ItisfurtherobservedthattheVedathusapprehendedthroughreading

spontaneouslygivesrisetotheideasofcertainthingssubserving

certainpurposes.Aperson,therefore,whohasformednotionsofthose

thingsimmediately,i.e.onthemereapprehensionofthetextofthe

Vedathroughreading,thereuponnaturallyapplieshimselftothestudy

oftheMimamsa,whichconsistsinamethodicaldiscussionofthe

sentencesconstitutingthetextoftheVeda,andhasforitsresultthe

accuratedeterminationofthenatureofthosethingsandtheirdifferent

modes.Throughthisstudythestudentascertainsthecharacterofthe

injunctionsofworkwhichformpartoftheVeda,andobservesthatall

workleadsonlytononpermanentresults;andas,ontheotherhand,he

immediatelybecomesawarethattheUpanishadsectionswhichformpart

oftheVedawhichhehasapprehendedthroughreadingrefertoan

infiniteandpermanentresult,viz.immortality,heapplieshimselfto

thestudyoftheSarirakaMimamsa,whichconsistsinasystematic

discussionoftheVedantatexts,andhasforitsresulttheaccurate

determinationoftheirsense.Thatthefruitofmereworksistransitory,

whiletheresultoftheknowledgeofBrahmanissomethingpermanent,the

Vedantatextsdeclareinmanyplaces'Andasheretheworldacquiredby

workperishes,sotheretheworldacquiredbymeritperishes'(Ch.Up.

VIII,1,6);'Thatworkofhishasanend'(Bri.Up.III,8,10);'By

nonpermanentworksthePermanentisnotobtained'(Ka.Up.I,2,10);

'Frailindeedarethoseboats,thesacrifices'(Mu.Up.I,2,7);'Leta

Brahmana,afterhehasexaminedalltheseworldsthataregainedby

works,acquirefreedomfromalldesires.Whatisnotmadecannotbe

gainedbywhatismade.Tounderstandthis,letthepupil,withfuelin

hishand,gotoateacherwhoislearnedanddwellsentirelyinBrahman.

Tothatpupilwhohasapproachedhimrespectfully,whosemindis

altogethercalm,thewiseteachertrulytoldthatknowledgeofBrahman

throughwhichheknowstheimperishabletruePerson'(Mu.Up.I,2,12,

13).'Told'heremeans'heistotell.'Ontheotherhand,'Hewho

knowsBrahmanattainstheHighest'(Taitt.Up.II,1,1);'Hewhosees

thisdoesnotseedeath'(Ch.Up.VII,26,2);'Hebecomesaselfruler'

(Ch.Up.VII,25,2);'Knowinghimhebecomesimmortalhere'(Taitt.Ar.

III,12,7);'Havingknownhimhepassesoverdeath;thereisnoother

pathtogo'(Svet.Up.VI,15);'HavingknownasseparatehisSelfand

theMover,pleasedtherebyhegoestoimmortality'(Svet.Up.I,6).

ButanobjectionhereisraisedthemerelearningoftheVedawithits

auxiliarydisciplinesgivesrisetotheknowledgethattheheavenly

worldandthelikearetheresultsofworks,andthatallsuchresults

aretransitory,whileimmortalityisthefruitofmeditationonBrahman.

Possessingsuchknowledge,apersondesirousoffinalreleasemayat

onceproceedtotheenquiryintoBrahman;andwhatneedisthereofa

systematicconsiderationofreligiousduty(i.e.ofthestudyofthe

PurvaMimamsa)?Ifthisreasoningwerevalid,wereply,theperson

desirousofreleaseneednotevenapplyhimselftothestudyofthe

SarirakaMimamsa,sinceBrahmanisknownfromthemerereadingofthe

Vedawithitsauxiliarydisciplines.True.Suchknowledgearisesindeed

immediately(withoutdeeperenquiry).Butamatterapprehendedinthis

immediatewayisnotraisedabovedoubtandmistake.Henceasystematic

discussionoftheVedantatextsmustheundertakeninorderthattheir

sensemaybefullyascertainedWeagree.Butyouwillhavetoadmit

thatfortheverysamereasonwemustundertakeasystematicenquiry

intoreligiousduty!

[FOOTNOTE4:1.'Bhagavat'denotesprimarilytheLord,thedivinity;

secondarilyanyholyperson.]

[FOOTNOTE5:1.ThefirstsixbooksofthePurvaMimamsasutrasgive

rulesforthefundamentalformsofthesacrifice;whilethelastsix

booksteachhowtheserulesaretobeappliedtothesocalledmodified

forms.]

THESMALLPURVAPAKSHA.

Butafurtherobjectionisurgedasthatwhichhastoprecedethe

systematicenquiryintoBrahmanweshouldassignsomethingwhichthat

enquirynecessarilypresupposes.Theenquiryintothenatureofduty,

however,doesnotformsuchaprerequisite,sinceaconsiderationofthe

Vedantatextsmaybeundertakenbyanyonewhohasreadthosetexts,

evenifheisnotacquaintedwithworks.ButintheVedantatextsthere

areenjoinedmeditationsontheUdgithaandthelikewhicharematters

auxiliarytoworks;andsuchmeditationsarenotpossibleforhimwhois

notacquaintedwiththoseworks!Youwhoraisethisobjectionclearly

areignorantofwhatkindofknowledgetheSarirakaMimamsaisconcerned

with!Whatthatsastraaimsatistodestroycompletelythatwrong

knowledgewhichistherootofallpain,forman,liabletobirth,old

age,anddeath,andallthenumberlessotherevilsconnectedwith

transmigratoryexistenceevilsthatspringfromtheview,dueto

beginninglessNescience,thatthereispluralityofexistence;andto

thatendthesastraendeavourstoestablishtheknowledgeoftheunity

oftheSelf.Nowtothisknowledge,theknowledgeofworkswhichis

basedontheassumptionofpluralityofexistenceisnotonlyuseless

butevenopposed.TheconsiderationoftheUdgithaandthelike,which

issupplementarytoworksonly,findsaplaceintheVedantatexts,only

becauselikethemitisofthenatureofknowledge;butithasnodirect

connexionwiththetruetopicofthosetexts.Hencesomeprerequisite

mustbeindicatedwhichhasreferencetotheprincipaltopicofthe

sastra.Quiteso;andthisprerequisiteisjusttheknowledgeofworks;

forscripturedeclaresthatfinalreleaseresultsfromknowledgewith

worksadded.TheSutrawriterhimselfsaysfurtheron'Andthereisneed

ofallworks,onaccountofthescripturalstatementofsacrificesand

thelike'(Ve.Su.III,4,26).Andiftherequiredworkswerenotknown,

onecouldnotdeterminewhichworkshavetobecombinedwithknowledge

andwhichnot.Hencetheknowledgeofworksisjustthenecessary

prerequisite.Notso,wereply.ThatwhichputsanendtoNescienceis

exclusivelytheknowledgeofBrahman,whichispureintelligenceand

antagonistictoallplurality.Forfinalreleaseconsistsjustinthe

cessationofNescience;howthencanworkstowhichthereattach

endlessdifferencesconnectedwithcaste,asrama,objecttobe

accomplished,meansandmodeofaccomplishment,&c.eversupplyameans

forthecessationofignorance,whichisessentiallythecessationof

theviewthatdifferenceexists?Thatworks,theresultsofwhichare

transitory,arecontrarytofinalrelease,andthatsuchreleasecanbe

effectedthroughknowledgeonly,scripturedeclaresinmanyplaces;

compareallthepassagesquotedabove(p.7).

Astotheassertionthatknowledgerequiressacrificesandotherworks,

weremarkthatasfollowsfromtheessentialcontrarietyofknowledge

andworks,andasfurtherappearsfromanaccurateconsiderationofthe

wordsofscripturepiousworkscancontributeonlytowardstheriseof

thedesireofknowledge,insofarnamelyastheycleartheinternal

organ(ofknowledge),butcanhavenoinfluenceontheproductionofthe

fruit,i.e.knowledgeitself.Forthescripturalpassageconcernedruns

asfollowsBrahmanasdesiretoknowhimbythestudyoftheVeda,by

sacrifice,bygifts,'&c.(Bri.Up.IV,4,22).

Accordingtothispassage,thedesireonlyofknowledgespringsup

throughworks;whileanothertextteachesthatcalmness,selfrestraint,

andsoon,arethedirectmeansfortheoriginationofknowledgeitself.

(Havingbecometranquil,calm,subdued,satisfied,patient,and

collected,heistoseetheSelfwithintheSelf(Bri.Up.IV,4,23).)

Theprocessthusisasfollows.Afterthemindofamanhasbeencleaned

ofallimpuritiesthroughworksperformedinmanyprecedingstatesof

existence,withoutaviewtospecialformsofreward,therearisesin

himthedesireofknowledge,andthereuponthroughknowledgeitself

originatedbycertainscripturaltexts'Beingonly,thiswasinthe

beginning,oneonlywithoutasecond'(Ch.Up.VI,I,2);'Truth,

Knowledge,theInfinite,isBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'Withoutparts,

withoutactions,calm,withoutfault,withouttaint'(Svet.Up.VI,19);

'ThisSelfisBrahman'(Bri.Up.II,5,19);'Thouartthat'(Ch.Up.VI,

9,7),Nesciencecomestoanend.Now,'Hearing,''reflection,'and

'meditation,'arehelpfultowardscognisingthesenseoftheseVedic

texts.'Hearing'(sravana)meanstheapprehensionofthesenseof

scripture,togetherwithcollateralarguments,fromateacherwho

possessesthetrueinsight,viz.thattheVedantatextsestablishthe

doctrineoftheunityoftheSelf.'Reflection'(mananam)meansthe

confirmationwithinoneselfofthesensetaughtbytheteacher,bymeans

ofargumentsshowingitalonetobesuitable.'Meditation'

(nididhyasanam)finallymeanstheconstantholdingofthaisensebefore

one'smind,soastodispeltherebytheantagonisticbeginningless

imaginationofplurality.Inthecaseofhimwhothrough'hearing,'

'reflection,'andmeditation,'hasdisdispelledtheentireimagination

ofplurality,theknowledgeofthesenseofVedantatextsputsanendto

Nescience;andwhatwethereforerequireisastatementofthe

indispensableprerequisitesofsuch'hearing,''reflection,'andsoon.

Nowofsuchprerequisitestherearefour,viz.discriminationofwhatis

permanentandwhatisnonpermanent;thefullpossessionofcalmnessof

mind,selfrestraintandsimilarmeans;therenunciationofall

enjoymentoffruitsherebelowaswellasinthenextworld;andthe

desireoffinalrelease.

Withoutthesethedesireofknowledgecannotarise;andtheyare

thereforeknown,fromtheverynatureofthematter,tobenecessary

prerequisites.Tosumup:Therootofbondageistheunrealviewof

pluralitywhichitselfhasitsrootinNesciencethatconcealsthetrue

beingofBrahman.Bondageitselfthusisunreal,andisonthataccount

cutshort,togetherwithitsroot,bymereknowledge.Suchknowledgeis

originatedbytextssuchas'Thatartthou';andworkisofnohelp

eithertowardsitsnature,oritsorigination,oritsfruit(i.e.

release).Itisontheotherhandhelpfultowardsthedesireof

knowledge,whicharisesowingtoanincreaseoftheelementofgoodness

(sattva)inthesoul,duetothedestructionoftheelementsofpassion

(rajas)anddarkness(tamas)whicharetherootofallmoralevil.This

useisreferredtointhetextquotedabove,'Brahmanaswishtoknowhim,'

&c.As,therefore,theknowledgeofworksisofnousetowardsthe

knowledgeofBrahman,wemustacknowledgeastheprerequisiteofthe

latterknowledgethefourmeansmentionedabove.

THESMALLSIDDHANTA.

Tothisargumentationwemakethefollowingreply.Weadmitthatrelease

consistsonlyinthecessationofNescience,andthatthiscessation

resultsentirelyfromtheknowledgeofBrahman.Butadistinctionhas

heretobemaderegardingthenatureofthisknowledgewhichthe

Vedantatextsaimatenjoiningforthepurposeofputtinganendto

Nescience.Isitmerelytheknowledgeofthesenseofsentenceswhich

originatesfromthesentences?orisitknowledgeintheformof

meditation(upasana)whichhastheknowledgejustreferredtoasits

antecedent?Itcannotbeknowledgeoftheformerkind:forsuch

knowledgespringsfromthemereapprehensionofthesentence,apartfrom

anyspecialinjunction,andmoreoverwedonotobservethatthe

cessationofNescienceiseffectedbysuchknowledgemerely.Our

adversarywillperhapsattempttoexplainthingsinthefollowingway.

TheVedantatextsdonot,hewillsay,producethatknowledgewhich

makesanendofNescience,solongastheimaginationofpluralityis

notdispelled.Andthefactthatsuchknowledge,evenwhenproduced,

doesnotatonceandforeveryoneputastoptotheviewofplurality

bynomeanssubvertsmyopinion;for,tomentionananalogousinstance,

thedoubleappearanceofthemoonpresentingitselftoaperson

affectedwithacertainweaknessofvisiondoesnotcometoanendas

soonastheonenessofthemoonhasbeenapprehendedbyreason.

Moreover,evenwithouthavingcometoanend,theviewofpluralityis

powerlesstoeffectfurtherbondage,assoonastheroot,i.e.

Nescience,hasoncebeencutButthisdefenceweareunabletoadmit.It

isimpossiblethatknowledgeshouldnotarisewhenitsmeans,i.e.the

textsconveyingknowledge,areoncepresent.Andweobservethateven

whenthereexistsanantagonisticimagination(interferingwiththerise

ofknowledge),informationgivenbycompetentpersons,thepresenceof

characteristicmarks(onwhichacorrectinferencemaybebased),and

thelikegiverisetoknowledgewhichsublatestheerroneous

imagination.Norcanweadmitthatevenafterthesenseoftextshas

beenapprehended,theviewofpluralitymaycontinueowingtosomesmall

remainderofbeginninglessimagination.Forasthisimaginationwhich

constitutesthemeansfortheviewofpluralityisitselffalse,itis

necessarilyputanendtobytheriseoftrueknowledge.Ifthisdidnot

takeplace,thatimaginationwouldnevercometoanend,sincethereis

noothermeansbutknowledgetoeffectitscessation.Tosaythatthe

viewofplurality,whichistheeffectofthatimagination,continues

evenafteritsroothasbeencut,ismerenonsense.Theinstanceofsome

oneseeingthemoondoubleisnotanalogous.Forinhiscasethe

noncessationofwrongknowledgeexplainsitselffromthecircumstance

thatthecauseofwrongknowledge,viz.therealdefectoftheeyewhich

doesnotadmitofbeingsublatedbyknowledge,isnotremoved,although

thatwhichwouldsublatewrongknowledgeisnear.Ontheotherhand,

effects,suchasfearandthelike,maycometoanendbecausetheycan

besublatedbymeansofknowledgeofsuperiorforce.Moreover,ifit

weretruethatknowledgearisesthroughthedispellingofthe

imaginationofplurality,theriseofknowledgewouldreallyneverbe

broughtabout.Fortheimaginationofpluralityhasthroughgradual

growthinthecourseofbeginninglesstimeacquiredaninfinite

strength,anddoesnotthereforeadmitofbeingdispelledbythe

comparativelyweakconceptionofnonduality.Henceweconcludethatthe

knowledgewhichtheVedantatextsaimatinculcatingisaknowledge

otherthanthemereknowledgeofthesenseofsentences,anddenotedby

'dhyana,''upasana'(i.e.meditation),andsimilarterms.

Withthisagreescripturaltextssuchas'Havingknownit,lethim

practisemeditation'(Bri.Up.IV,4,21);'Hewho,havingsearchedout

theSelf,knowsit'(Ch.Up.VIII,7,1);'MeditateontheSelfasOm'

(Mu.Up.II,2,6);'Havingknownthat,heisfreedfromthejawsof

death'(Ka.Up.I,3,15);'LetamanmeditateontheSelfonlyashis

world'(Bri.Up.I,4,15);'TheSelfistobeseen,tobeheard,toher

reflectedon,tobemeditatedon'(Bri.Up.IV,5,6);'Thatwemust

searchout,thatwemusttrytounderstand'(Ch.Up.VIII,7,1).

(Accordingtotheprincipleoftheonenessofpurportofthedifferent

sakhas)allthesetextsmustbeviewedasagreeinginmeaningwiththe

injunctionofmeditationcontainedinthepassagequotedfromtheBri.

Up.;andwhattheyenjoinisthereforemeditation.Inthefirstand

secondpassagesquoted,thewords'havingknown'and'havingsearched

out'(vijnaya;anuvidya)containamerereferenceto(notinjunctionof)

theapprehensionofthemeaningoftexts,suchapprehensionsubserving

meditation;whiletheinjunctionofmeditation(whichisthetrue

purportofthepassages)isconveyedbytheclauses'lethimpractise

meditation'(prajnamkurvita)and'heknowsit.'Inthesamewaythe

clause'theSelfistobeheard'isamereanuvada,i.e.amere

referencetowhatisalreadyestablishedbyothermeans;foraperson

whohasreadtheVedaobservesthatitcontainsinstructionabout

mattersconnectedwithcertaindefinitepurposes,andthenonhisown

accountapplieshimselftomethodical'hearing,'inorderdefinitelyto

ascertainthesematters;'hearing'thusisestablishedalready.Inthe

samewaytheclause'theSelfistobereflectedupon'isamereanuvada

ofreflectionwhichisknownasameansofconfirmingwhatonehas

'heard.'Itisthereforemeditationonlywhichallthosetextsenjoin.

InagreementwiththisalaterSutraalsosays,'Repetitionmorethan

once,onaccountofinstruction'(Ve.Su.IV,I,I).Thattheknowledge

intendedtobeenjoinedasthemeansoffinalreleaseisofthenature

ofmeditation,weconcludefromthecircumstancethattheterms

'knowing'and'meditating'areseentobeusedinplaceofeachotherin

theearlierandlaterpartsofVedictexts.Comparethefollowing

passages:'LetamanmeditateonmindasBrahman,'and'hewhoknows

thisshinesandwarmsthroughhiscelebrity,fame,andgloryof

countenance'(Ch.Up.III,18,1;6).And'Hedoesnotknowhim,forhe

isnotcomplete,'and'LetmenmeditateonhimastheSelf(Bri.Up.I,

4,7).And'Hewhoknowswhatheknows,'and'Teachmethedeityon

whichyoumeditate'(Ch.Up.IV,1,6;2,2).

'Meditation'meanssteadyremembrance,i.e.acontinuityofsteady

remembrance,uninterruptedliketheflowofoil;inagreementwiththe

scripturalpassagewhichdeclaressteadyremembrancetobethemeansof

release,'ontheattainmentofremembranceallthetiesareloosened'

(Ch.Up.VII,26,2).Suchremembranceisofthesamecharacter(form)

asseeing(intuition);forthepassagequotedhasthesamepurportas

thefollowingone,'Thefetteroftheheartisbroken,alldoubtsare

solved,andalltheworksofthatmanperishwhenhehasbeenseenwho

ishighandlow'(Mu.Up.II,2,8).Andthisbeingso,weconcludethat

thepassage'theSelfistobeseen'teachesthat'Meditation'hasthe

characterof'seeing'or'intuition.'Andthatremembrancehasthe

characterof'seeing'isduetotheelementofimagination

(representation)whichprevailsinit.Allthishasbeensetforthat

lengthbytheVakyakara.'Knowledge(vedana)meansmeditation(upasana),

scriptureusingthewordinthatsense';i.e.inallUpanishadsthat

knowledgewhichisenjoinedasthemeansoffinalreleaseisMeditation.

TheVakyakarathenpropoundsapurvapaksha(primafacieview),'Oncehe

istomakethemeditation,thematterenjoinedbyscripturebeing

accomplishedthereby,asinthecaseoftheprayajasandthelike';and

thensumsupagainstthisinthewords'but(meditation)isestablished

onaccountofthetermmeditation';thatmeansknowledgerepeatedmore

thanonce(i.e.meditation)isdeterminedtobethemeansofRelease.

TheVakyakarathengoeson'Meditationissteadyremembrance,onthe

groundofobservationandstatement.'Thatmeansthisknowledge,ofthe

formofmeditation,andrepeatedmorethanonce,isofthenatureof

steadyremembrance.

Suchremembrancehasbeendeclaredtobeofthecharacterof'seeing,'

andthischaracterofseeingconsistsinitspossessingthecharacterof

immediatepresentation(pratyakshata).Withreferencetoremembrance,

whichthusacquiresthecharacterofimmediatepresentationandisthe

meansoffinalrelease,scripturemakesafurtherdetermination,viz.in

thepassageKa.Up.I,2,23,'ThatSelfcannotbegainedbythestudy

oftheVeda("reflection"),norbythought("meditation"),norbymuch

hearing.WhomtheSelfchooses,byhimitmaybegained;tohimtheSelf

revealsitsbeing.'Thistextsaysatfirstthatmerehearing,

reflection,andmeditationdonotsufficetogaintheSelf,andthen

declares,'WhomtheSelfchooses,byhimitmaybegained.'Nowa

'chosen'onemeansamostbelovedperson;therelationbeingthatheby

whomthatSelfisheldmostdearismostdeartotheSelf.ThattheLord

(bhagavan)himselfendeavoursthatthismostbelovedpersonshouldgain

theSelf,hehimselfdeclaresinthefollowingwords,'Tothosewhoare

constantlydevotedandworshipwithloveIgivethatknowledgebywhich

theyreachme'(Bha.Gi.X,10),and'TohimwhohasknowledgeIamdear

aboveallthings,andheisdeartome'(VII,17).Hence,hewho

possessesremembrance,markedbythecharacterofimmediatepresentation

(sakshatkara),andwhichitselfisdearaboveallthingssincethe

objectrememberedissuch;he,wesay,ischosenbythehighestSelf,

andbyhimthehighestSelfisgained.Steadyremembranceofthiskind

isdesignatedbytheword'devotion'(bhakti);forthistermhasthe

samemeaningasupasana(meditation).Forthisreasonscriptureand

smritiagreeinmakingthefollowingdeclarations,'Amanknowinghim

passesoverdeath'(Svet.Up.III,8);'Knowinghimthusheherebecomes

immortal'(Taitt.Ar.III,12,7);'NeitherbytheVedas,norby

austerities,norbygifts,norbysacrificecanIbesoseenasthou

hastseenme.ButbydevotionexclusiveImayinthisformbeknownand

seenintruth,OArjuna,andalsobeenteredinto'(Bha.Gi.XI,53,54);

'ThathighestPerson,OPartha,maybeobtainedbyexclusivedevotion'

(VIII,22).

Thatofsuchsteadyremembrancesacrificesandsoonaremeanswillbe

declaredlateron(Ve.Su.III,4,26).Althoughsacrificesandthelike

areenjoinedwithaviewtotheoriginationofknowledge(inaccordance

withthepassage'Theydesiretoknow,'Bri.Up.IV,4,22),itisonly

knowledgeintheformofmeditationwhichbeingdailypractised,

constantlyimprovedbyrepetition,andcontinueduptodeathisthe

meansofreachingBrahman,andhencealltheworksconnectedwiththe

differentconditionsoflifearetobeperformedthroughoutlifeonly

forthepurposeoforiginatingsuchknowledge.ThistheSutrakara

declaresinVe.Su.IV,1,12;16;III,4,33,andotherplaces.The

Vakyakaraalsodeclaresthatsteadyremembranceresultsonlyfrom

abstention,andsoon;hiswordsbeing'This(viz.steadyremembrance=

meditation)isobtainedthroughabstention(viveka),freenessofmind

(vimoka),repetition(abhyasa),works(kriya),virtuousconduct

(kalyana),freedomfromdejection(anavasada),absenceofexultation

(anuddharsha);accordingtofeasibilityandscripturalstatement.'The

Vakyakaraalsogivesdefinitionsofalltheseterms.Abstention(viveka)

meanskeepingthebodycleanfromallfood,impureeitherowingto

species(suchasthefleshofcertainanimals),orabode(suchasfood

belongingtoaKandalaorthelike),oraccidentalcause(suchasfood

intowhichahairorthelikehasfallen).Thescripturalpassage

authorisingthispointisCh.Up.VII,26,'Thefoodbeingpure,the

mindbecomespure;themindbeingpure,thereresultssteadyremembrance.'

Freenessofmind(vimoka)meansabsenceofattachmenttodesires.The

authoritativepassagehereis'Lethimmeditatewithacalmmind'(Ch.

Up.III,14,1).Repetitionmeanscontinuedpractice.Forthispointthe

BhashyakaraquotesanauthoritativetextfromSmriti,viz.:'Having

constantlybeenabsorbedinthethoughtofthatbeing'(sada

tadbhavabhavitah;Bha.Gi.VIII,6).By'works'(kriya)isunderstood

theperformance,accordingtoone'sability,ofthefivegreat

sacrifices.Theauthoritativepassageshereare'Thispersonwho

performsworksisthebestofthosewhoknowBrahman'(Mu.Up.III,1,

4);and'HimBrahmanasseektoknowbyrecitationoftheVeda,by

sacrifice,bygifts,bypenance,byfasting'(Bri.Up.IV,4,22).By

virtuousconduct(kalyanani)aremeanttruthfulness,honesty,kindness,

liberality,gentleness,absenceofcovetousness.Confirmatorytextsare

'Bytruthheistobeobtained'(Mu.Up.III,1,5)and'tothembelongs

thatpureBrahmanworld'(Pr.Up.I,16).Thatlownessofspiritor

wantofcheerfulnesswhichresultsfromunfavourableconditionsofplace

ortimeandtheremembranceofcausesofsorrow,isdenotedbytheterm

'dejection';thecontraryofthisis'freedomfromdejection.'The

relevantscripturalpassageis'ThisSelfcannotbeobtainedbyone

lackinginstrength'(Mu.Up.III,2,4).'Exultation'isthat

satisfactionofmindwhichspringsfromcircumstancesoppositetothose

justmentioned;thecontraryis'absenceofexultation.'Overgreat

satisfactionalsostandsintheway(ofmeditation).Thescriptural

passageforthisis'Calm,subdued,'&c.(Bri.Up.IV,4,23).Whatthe

Vakyakarameanstosayisthereforethatknowledgeisrealisedonly

throughtheperformanceofthedulyprescribedworks,onthepartofa

personfulfillingalltheenumeratedconditions.

Analogouslyanotherscripturalpassagesays'Hewhoknowsbothknowledge

andnonknowledgetogether,overcomingdeathbynonknowledgereaches

theImmortalthroughknowledge'(Is.Up.II).Heretheterm

'nonknowledge'denotestheworksenjoinedonthedifferentcastesand

asramas;andthemeaningofthetextisthat,havingdiscardedbysuch

worksdeath,i.e.thepreviousworksantagonistictotheoriginationof

knowledge,amanreachestheImmortal,i.e.Brahman,throughknowledge.

Thenonknowledgeofwhichthispassagespeaksasbeingthemeansof

overcomingdeathcanonlymeanthatwhichisotherthanknowledge,viz.

prescribedworks.Thewordhasthesamesenseinthefollowingpassage:

'Firmintraditionalknowledgeheofferedmanysacrifices,leaningon

theknowledgeofBrahman,soastopassbeyonddeathbynonknowledge'

(Vi.Pu.VI,6,12).Antagonistictoknowledge(assaidabove)areall

goodandevilactions,andhenceasequallygivingrisetoan

undesirableresulttheymaybothbedesignatedasevil.Theystandin

thewayoftheoriginationofknowledgeinsofarastheystrengthenthe

elementsofpassionanddarknesswhichareantagonistictotheelement

ofgoodnesswhichisthecauseoftheriseofknowledge.Thatevilworks

standinthewayofsuchorigination,thefollowingscripturaltext

declares:'Hemakeshimwhomhewishestoleaddownfromtheseworldsdo

anevildeed'(Ka.Up.III,8).Thatpassionanddarknessveilthe

knowledgeoftruthwhilegoodnessontheotherhandgivesrisetoit,

theDivineonehasdeclaredhimself,inthepassage'Fromgoodness

springsknowledge'(Bha.Gi.XIV,17).Hence,inorderthatknowledge

mayarise,evilworkshavetobegotridof,andthisiseffectedbythe

performanceofactsofreligiousdutynotaimingatsomeimmediate

result(suchastheheavenlyworldandthelike);accordingtothetext

'byworksofreligiousdutyhediscardsallevil.'Knowledgewhichis

themeansofreachingBrahman,thusrequirestheworksprescribedfor

thedifferentasramas;andhencethesystematicenquiryintoworks(i.

e.thePurvaMimamsa)fromwhichweascertainthenatureoftheworks

requiredandalsothetransitorinessandlimitationofthefruitsof

mereworksformsanecessaryantecedenttothesystematicenquiryinto

Brahman.Moreoverthediscriminationofpermanentandnonpermanent

things,&c.(i.e.thetetradof'means'mentionedabove,p.11)cannot

beaccomplishedwithoutthestudyoftheMimamsa;forunlesswe

ascertainallthedistinctionsoffruitsofworks,means,modesof

procedureandqualification(onthepartoftheagent)wecanhardly

understandthetruenatureofworks,theirfruits,thetransitorinessor

nontransitorinessofthelatter,thepermanenceoftheSelf,and

similarmatters.Thatthoseconditions(viz.nityanityavastuviveka,

sama,dama,&c.)are'means'mustbedeterminedonthebasisofviniyoga

('application'whichdeterminestherelationofprincipaland

subordinatemattersanginandanga);andthisviniyogawhichdependson

directscripturalstatement(sruti),inferentialsigns(linga),andso

on,istreatedofinthethirdbookofthePurvaMimamsasutras.And

furtherwemust,inthisconnexion,consideralsothemeditationsonthe

Udgithaandsimilarthingswhich,althoughaimingatthesuccessof

works,areofthenatureofreflectionsonBrahman(whichisviewedin

themundervariousforms)andassuchhavereferencetoknowledgeof

Brahman.Thoseworksalso(withwhichthesemeditationsareconnected)

aimatnospecialresultsoftheirown,andproduceandhelptoperfect

theknowledgeofBrahman:theyarethereforeparticularlyconnectedwith

theenquiryintoBrahman.Andthatthesemeditationspresupposean

understandingofthenatureofworksisadmittedbyeveryone.

THEGREATPURVAPAKSHA.

THEONLYREALITYISBRAHMAN.

Brahman,whichispureintelligenceandopposedtoalldifference,

constitutestheonlyreality;andeverythingelse,i.e.thepluralityof

manifoldknowingsubjects,objectsofknowledge,andactsofknowledge

dependingonthosetwo,isonlyimaginedon(or'in')thatBrahman,and

isessentiallyfalse.

'Inthebeginning,mydear,therewasthatonlywhichis,oneonly

withoutasecond'(Ch.Up.VI,2,1);'Thehigherknowledgeisthatby

whichtheIndestructibleisapprehended'(Mu.Up.I,1,5);'Thatwhich

cannotbeseennorseized,whichhasnoeyesnorears,nohandsnorfeet,

thepermanent,theallpervading,themostsubtle,theimperishable

whichthewiseregardasthesourceofallbeings'(Mu.Up.I,1,6);

'TheTrue,knowledge,theInfiniteisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'He

whoiswithoutparts,withoutactions,tranquil,withoutfault,without

taint'(Svet.Up.VI,19);'Bywhomitisnotthought,byhimitis

thought;hebywhomitisthoughtknowsitnot.Itisnotknownbythose

whoknowit,knownbythosewhodonotknowit'(Ke.Up.II,3);'Thou

mayestnotseetheseerofsight;thoumayestnotthinkthethinkerof

thought'(Bri.Up.III,4,2);'BlissisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.III,6,1);

'AllthisisthatSelf'(Bri.Up.IV,5,7);'Thereisherenodiversity

whatever'(Bri.Up.IV,4,19);'Fromdeathtodeathgoeshewhosees

anydifferencehere'(Ka.Up.II,4,10);'Forwherethereisdualityas

itwere,thereoneseestheother';'butwheretheSelfhasbecomeall

ofhim,bywhatmeans,andwhom,shouldhesee?bywhatmeans,andwhom,

shouldheknow?'(Bri.Up.IV,5,15);'theeffectisanamemerely

whichhasitsorigininspeech;thetruthisthat(thethingmadeof

clay)isclaymerely'(Ch.Up.VI,1,4);'forifhemakesbutthe

smallestdistinctioninitthereisfearforhim'(Taitt.Up.II,7);

thetwofollowingVedantasutras:III,2,11;III,2,3thefollowing

passagesfromtheVishnupurana:'Inwhichalldifferencevanishes,

whichispureBeing,whichisnottheobjectofwords,whichisknownby

theSelfonlythatknowledgeiscalledBrahman'(VI,7,53);'Himwhose

essentialnatureisknowledge,whoisstainlessinreality';'Himwho,

owingtoerroneousview,abidesintheformofthings'(I,2,6);'the

Realitythouartalone,thereisnoother,OLordoftheworld!

whatevermatterisseenbelongstotheewhosebeingisknowledge;but

owingtotheirerroneousopinionthenondevoutlookonitastheform

oftheworld.Thiswholeworldhasknowledgeforitsessentialnature,

buttheUnwiseviewingitasbeingofthenatureofmaterialthingsare

drivenroundontheoceanofdelusion.Thosehoweverwhopossesstrue

knowledgeandpuremindsseethiswholeworldashavingknowledgefor

itsSelf,asthyform,OhighestLord!'(Vi.Pu.I,4,38ff.).'Of

thatSelf,althoughitexistsinone'sownandinotherbodies,the

knowledgeisofonekind,andthatisReality;thosewhomaintain

dualityholdafalseview'(II,14,31);'Ifthereissomeotherone,

differentfromme,thenitcanbesaid,"Iamthisandthatoneis

another"'(II,13,86);'Asowingtothedifferenceoftheholesofthe

flutetheairequallypassingthroughthemalliscalledbythenamesof

thedifferentnotesofthemusicalscale;soitiswiththeuniversal

Self'(II,14,32);'HeisI;heisthou;heisall:thisUniverseis

hisform.Abandontheerrorofdifference.Thekingbeingthus

instructed,abandonedtheviewofdifference,havinggainedanintuition

ofReality'(II,16,24).'Whenthatviewwhichgivesrisetodifference

isabsolutelydestroyed,whothenwillmaketheuntruedistinction

betweentheindividualSelfandBrahman?'(VI,7,94).Thefollowing

passagesfromtheBhagavadGita:'IamtheSelfdwellingwithinall

beings'(X,20);'Knowmetobethesoulwithinallbodies'(XIII,2);

'Beingthereisnone,movableorimmovable,whichiswithoutme'(X,39).

Alltheseandothertexts,thepurportofwhichclearlyisinstruction

astotheessentialnatureofthings,declarethatBrahmanonly,i.e.

nondifferencedpureintelligenceisreal,whileeverythingelseis

false.

Theappearanceofpluralityisduetoavidya.

'Falsehood'(mithyatva)belongstowhatadmitsofbeingterminatedby

thecognitionoftherealthingsuchcognitionbeingprecededby

consciousactivity(notbymereabsenceofconsciousnessorknowledge).

Thesnake,e.g.whichhasforitssubstratearopeorthelikeisfalse;

foritisduetoanimperfection(dosha)thatthesnakeisimaginedin

(or'on')therope.Inthesamewaythisentireworld,withits

distinctionsofgods,men,animals,inanimatematter,andsoon,is,

owingtoanimperfection,wronglyimaginedinthehighestBrahmanwhose

substanceismereintelligence,andthereforeisfalseinsofarasit

maybesublatedbythecognitionofthenatureoftherealBrahman.What

constitutesthatimperfectionisbeginninglessNescience(avidya),which,

hidingthetruthofthings,givesrisetomanifoldillusions,andcannot

bedefinedeitherassomethingthatisorassomethingthatisnot.'By

theUntruetheyarehidden;ofthemwhicharetruetheUntrueisthe

covering'(Ch,Up.VIII,3,1);'KnowMayatobePrakriti,andthegreat

LordhimwhoisassociatedwithMaya'(Svet.Up.IV,10);'Indraappears

manifoldthroughtheMayas'(Bri.Up.II,5,19);'MyMayaishardto

overcome'(Bha.Gi.VII,14);'Whenthesoulslumberinginbeginningless

Mayaawakes'(Gau.Ka.I,16).Theseandsimilartextsteachthatitis

throughbeginninglessMayathattoBrahmanwhichtrulyispure

nondifferencedintelligenceitsownnaturehidesitself,andthatit

seesdiversitywithinitself.Ashasbeensaid,'BecausetheHolyOneis

essentiallyofthenatureofintelligence,theformofall,butnot

material;thereforeknowthatallparticularthingslikerocks,oceans,

hillsandsoon,haveproceededfromintelligence[FOOTNOTE22:1]But

when,onthecessationofallwork,everythingisonlypureintelligence

initsownproperform,withoutanyimperfections;thennodifferences

thefruitofthetreeofwishesanylongerexistbetweenthings.

Thereforenothingwhatever,atanyplaceoranytime,existsapartfrom

intelligence:intelligence,whichisoneonly,isviewedasmanifoldby

thosewhosemindsaredistractedbytheeffectsoftheirownworks.

Intelligencepure,freefromstain,freefromgrief,freefromall

contactwithdesireandotheraffections,everlastinglyoneisthe

highestLordVasudevaapartfromwhomnothingexists.Ihavethus

declaredtoyouthelastingtruthofthingsthatintelligenceonlyis

trueandeverythingelseuntrue.Andthatalsowhichisthecauseof

ordinaryworldlyexistencehasbeendeclaredtoyou'(Vi.Pu.II,12,

39,40,4345).

AvidyaisputanendtobytrueKnowledge.

OthertextsdeclarethatthisNesciencecomestoanendthroughthe

cognitionoftheessentialunityoftheSelfwithBrahmanwhichis

nothingbutnondifferencedintelligence.'Hedoesnotagaingotodeath;'

'Heseesthisasone;''Hewhoseesthisdoesnotseedeath'(Ch.Up.

VI,27);'Whenhefindsfreedomfromfearandrestinthatwhichis

invisible,incorporeal,undefined,unsupported,thenhehasobtainedthe

fearless'(Taitt.Up.II,7);'Thefetteroftheheartisbroken,all

doubtsaresolvedandallhisworksperishwhenhehasbeenbeheldwho

ishighandlow'(Mu.Up.II,2,8);'HeknowsBrahman,hebecomes

Brahmanonly'(Mu.Up.III,2,9);'Knowinghimonlyamanpassesover

death;thereisnootherpathtogo'(Svet.Up.III,8).Intheseand

similarpassages,theterm'death'denotesNescience;analogouslytothe

useoftheterminthefollowingwordsofSanatsujata,'DelusionIcall

death;andfreedomfromdelusionIcallimmortality'(Sanatsuj.II,5).

TheknowledgeagainoftheessentialunityandnondifferenceofBrahman

whichisascertainedfromdecisivetextssuchas'TheTrue,knowledge,

theInfiniteisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'Knowledge,blissis

Brahman'(Bri.Up.III,9,28)isconfirmedbyotherpassages,suchas

'Nowifamanmeditatesonanotherdeity,thinkingthedeityisoneand

heanother,hedoesnotknow'(Bri.Up.I,4,10);'Letmenmeditate

uponhimastheSelf(Bri.Up.I,4,7);'Thouartthat'(Ch.Up.VI,8,

7);'AmIthou,Oholydeity?andartthoume,Oholydeity?';'WhatI

amthatishe;whatheisthatamI.'ThistheSutrakarahimselfwill

declare'ButastheSelf(scripturaltexts)acknowledgeandmakeus

apprehend(theLord)'(Ve.Su.IV,1,3).ThustheVakyakaraalso,'It

istheSelfthusoneshouldapprehend(everything),foreverythingis

effectedbythat.'Andtoholdthatbysuchcognitionoftheonenessof

Brahmanessentiallyfalsebondage,togetherwithitscause,comestoan

end,isonlyreasonable.

ScriptureisofgreaterforcethanPerception

But,anobjectionisraisedhowcanknowledge,springingfromthe

sacredtexts,bringaboutacessationoftheviewofdifference,in

manifestoppositiontotheevidenceofPerception?Howthen,werejoin,

cantheknowledgethatthisthingisaropeandnotasnakebringabout,

inoppositiontoactualperception,thecessationofthe(ideaofthe)

snake?Youwillperhapsreplythatinthislattercasethereisa

conflictbetweentwoformsofperception,whileinthecaseunder

discussiontheconflictisbetweendirectperceptionandScripturewhich

isbasedonperception.Butagainstthiswewouldaskthequestionhow,

inthecaseofaconflictbetweentwoequalcognitions,wedecideasto

whichofthetwoisrefuted(sublated)bytheother.Ifasistobe

expectedyoureplythatwhatmakesthedifferencebetweenthetwois

thatoneofthemisduetoadefectivecausewhiletheotherisnot:we

pointoutthatthisdistinctionholdsgoodalsointhecaseofScripture

andperceptionbeinginconflict.Itisnotconsiderationsastothe

equalityofconflictingcognitions,astotheirbeingdependentor

independent,andsoon,thatdeterminewhichofthetwosublatesthe

other;ifthatwerethecase,theperceptionwhichpresentstousthe

flameofthelampasoneonlywouldnotbesublatedbythecognition

arrivedatbyinferencethatthereisasuccessionofdifferentflames.

Whereverthereisaconflictbetweencognitionsbasedontwodifferent

meansofknowledgeweassignthepositionofthe'sublatedone'tothat

whichadmitsofbeingaccountedforinsomeotherway;whilethat

cognitionwhichaffordsnoopeningforbeingheldunauthoritativeand

cannotbeaccountedforinanotherway,isthe'sublatingone[FOOTNOTE

25:1].'Thisistheprincipleonwhichtherelationbetween'what

sublates'and'whatissublated'isdecidedeverywhere.Nowapprehension

ofBrahmanwhichismereintelligence,eternal,pure,free,

selfluminousiseffectedbyScripturewhichrestsonendlessunbroken

tradition,cannotthereforebesuspectedofany,eventheleast,

imperfection,andhencecannotbenonauthoritative;thestateof

bondage,ontheotherhand,withitsmanifolddistinctionsisprovedby

Perception,Inference,andsoon,whicharecapableofimperfectionsand

thereforemaybenonauthoritative.Itisthereforereasonableto

concludethatthestateofbondageisputanendtobytheapprehension

ofBrahman.AndthatimperfectionofwhichPerceptionthroughwhichwe

apprehendaworldofmanifolddistinctionsmaybeassumedtobe

capable,issocalledNescience,whichconsistsinthebeginningless

wrongimaginationofdifference.Wellthenafurtherobjectionis

raisedletusadmitthatScriptureisperfectbecauserestingonan

endlessunbrokentradition;butmustwethennotadmitthattexts

evidentlypresupposingtheviewofduality,ase.g.'Lethimwhodesires

theheavenlyworldoffertheJyotishtomasacrifice'areliableto

refutation?True,wereply.AsinthecaseoftheUdgatriand

Pratihartribreakingthechain(notatthesametime,but)in

succession[FOOTNOTE26:1],soherealsotheearliertexts(whichrefer

todualityandtransitoryrewards)aresublatedbythelatertextswhich

teachfinalrelease,andarenotthemselvessublatedbyanythingelse.

ThetextswhichrepresentBrahmanasdevoidofqualitieshavegreater

force

ThesamereasoningappliestothosepassagesintheVedantatextswhich

inculcatemeditationonthequalifiedBrahman,sincethehighestBrahman

iswithoutanyqualities.Butconsidersuchpassagesas'Hewho

cognisesall,whoknowsall'(Mu.Up.I,1,9);'Hishighpoweris

revealedasmanifold,asessential,actingasforceandknowledge'(Svet.

Up.VI,8);'Hewhosewishesaretrue,whosepurposesaretrue'(Ch.Up.

VIII,1,5);howcanthesepassages,whichclearlyaimatdefiningthe

natureofBrahman,beliabletorefutation?Owingtothegreaterweight,

wereply,ofthosetextswhichsetforthBrahmanasdevoidofqualities.

'Itisnotcoarse,notfine,notshort,notlong'(Bri.Up.III,8,8);

'TheTrue,knowledge,infiniteisBrahman'(Taitt.Up.II,1);'That

whichisfreefromqualities,''thatwhichisfreefromstain'these

andsimilartextsconveythenotionofBrahmanbeingchangeless,eternal

intelligencedevoidofalldifference;whiletheothertextsquoted

beforeteachthequalifiedBrahman.Andtherebeingaconflictbetween

thetwosetsofpassages,weaccordingtotheMimamsaprinciple

referredtoabovedecidethatthetextsreferringtoBrahmanasdevoid

ofqualitiesareofgreaterforce,becausetheyarelaterinorder

[FOOTNOTE27:1]thanthosewhichspeakofBrahmanashavingqualities.

Thuseverythingissettled.ThetextTaitt.Up.II,1referstoBrahman

asdevoidofqualities.

Butanobjectionisraisedeventhepassage'TheTrue,knowledge,

infiniteisBrahman'intimatescertainqualitiesofBrahman,viz.true

being,knowledge,infinity!Notso,wereply.Fromthecircumstance

thatallthetermsofthesentencestandincoordination,itfollows

thattheyconveytheideaofonematter(sense)only.Ifagainstthis

youurgethatthesentencemayconveytheideaofonematteronly,even

ifdirectlyexpressingathingdistinguishedbyseveralqualities;we

mustremarkthatyoudisplayanignoranceofthemeaningoflanguage

whichappearstopointtosomeweakmindednessonyourpart.Asentence

conveystheideaofonematter(sense)onlywhenallitsconstitutive

wordsdenoteoneandthesamething;if,ontheotherhand,itexpresses

athingpossessingseveralattributes,thedifferenceofthese

attributesnecessarilyleadstoadifferenceinmeaningonthepartof

theindividualwords,andthentheonenessofmeaningofthesentenceis

lost.Butfromyourviewofthepassageitwouldfollowthatthe

severalwordsaremeresynonyms!Giveusyourattention,wereply,and

learnthatseveralwordsmayconveyonemeaningwithoutbeingidle

synonyms.Fromthedeterminationoftheunityofpurportofthewhole

sentence[FOOTNOTE27:2]weconcludethattheseveralwords,appliedto

onething,aimatexpressingwhatisoppositeinnaturetowhateveris

contrarytothemeaningsoftheseveralwords,andthatthustheyhave

meaningandunityofmeaningandyetarenotmeresynonyms.Thedetails

areasfollows.Brahmanistobedefinedaswhatiscontraryinnature

toallotherthings.NowwhateverisopposedtoBrahmanisvirtuallyset

asidebythethreewords(constitutingthedefinitionofBrahmaninthe

Taittiriyatext).Theword'true'(or'trulybeing')hasthepurportof

distinguishingBrahmanfromwhateverthingshavenotruth,asbeingthe

abodesofchange;theword'knowledge'distinguishesBrahmanfromall

nonsentientthingswhoselightdependsonsomethingelse(whicharenot

selfluminous);andtheword'infinite'distinguishesitfromwhatever

islimitedintimeorspaceornature.Noristhis'distinction'some

positiveornegativeattributeofBrahman,itratherisjustBrahman

itselfasopposedtoeverythingelse;justasthedistinctionofwhite

colourfromblackandothercoloursisjustthetruenatureofwhite,

notanattributeofit.Thethreewordsconstitutingthetextthus_have_

ameaning,have_one_meaning,andarenonsynonymous,insofarasthey

conveytheessentialdistinctionofonething,viz.Brahmanfrom

everythingelse.ThetextthusdeclarestheoneBrahmanwhichis

selfluminousandfreefromalldifference.Onthisinterpretationof

thetextwediscernitsonenessinpurportwithothertexts,suchas

'Beingonlythiswasinthebeginning,oneonly,withoutasecond.'

Textssuchas'Thatfromwhencethesebeingsareborn'(Taitt.Up.III,

1);'Beingonlythiswasinthebeginning'(Ch.Up.VI,2,1);'Self

alonewasthisinthebeginning'(Bri.Up.I,4,1),&c.,describe

Brahmanasthecauseoftheworld;andofthisBrahmantheTaittiriya

passage'TheTrue,knowledge,infiniteisBrahman'givesthestrict

definition.

Inagreementwiththeprinciplethatallsakhasteachthesamedoctrine

wehavetounderstandthat,inallthetextswhichspeakofBrahmanas

cause,Brahmanmustbetakenasbeing'withoutasecond',i.e.without

anyotherbeingofthesameoradifferentkind;andthetextwhichaims

atdefiningBrahmanhasthentobeinterpretedinaccordancewiththis

characteristicofBrahman,viz.itsbeingwithoutasecond.The

statementoftheChandogyaastoBrahmanbeingwithoutasecondmust

alsobetakentoimplythatBrahmanisnondualasfarasqualitiesare

concerned;otherwiseitwouldconflictwiththosepassageswhichspeak

ofBrahmanasbeingwithoutqualitiesandwithoutstain.Wetherefore

concludethatthedefiningTaittiriyatextteachesBrahmantobean

absolutelyhomogeneoussubstance.

But,theaboveexplanationofthepassagebeingaccepted,itfollows

thatthewords'truebeing,''knowledge,'&c.,havetobeviewedas

abandoningtheirdirectsense,andmerelysuggestingathingdistinctin

naturefromallthatisopposite(towhatthethreewordsdirectly

denote),andthismeansthatweresorttosocalledimplication(implied

meaning,lakshana)!Whatobjectionistheretosuchaproceeding?we

reply.Theforceofthegeneralpurportofasentenceisgreaterthan

thatofthedirectdenotativepowerofthesimpleterms,anditis

generallyadmittedthatthepurportofgrammaticalcoordinationis

oneness(ofthematterdenotedbythetermscoordinated).Butwenever

observethatallwordsofasentencearetobeunderstoodinanimplied

sense!Isitthennotobserved,wereply,that_one_wordistobe

takeninitsimpliedmeaningifotherwiseitwouldcontradictthe

purportofthewholesentence?Andifthepurportofthesentence,which

isnothingbutanaggregateofwordsemployedtogether,hasoncebeen

ascertained,whyshouldwenottaketwoorthreeorallwordsinan

impliedsensejustaswehadtakenoneandthusmakethemfitinwith

thegeneralpurport?Inagreementherewiththosescholarswhoexplainto

usthesenseofimperativesentences,teachthatinimperativesentences

belongingtoordinaryspeechallwordshaveanimpliedmeaningonly(not

theirdirectlydenotativemeaning).For,theymaintain,imperativeforms

havetheirprimarymeaningonlyin(Vedic)sentenceswhichenjoin

somethingnotestablishedbyothermeans;andhenceinordinaryspeech

theeffectoftheactionisconveyedbyimplicationonly.Theother

wordsalso,whichformpartofthoseimperativesentencesanddenote

mattersconnectedwiththeaction,havetheirprimarymeaningonlyif

connectedwithanactionnotestablishedbyothermeans;whileif

connectedwithanordinaryactiontheyhaveasecondary,implied,

meaningonly[FOOTNOTE30:1].Perceptionrevealstousnondifferenced

substanceonly

WehavesofarshownthatinthecaseofaconflictbetweenScripture

andPerceptionandtheotherinstrumentsofknowledge,Scriptureisof

greaterforce.Thefact,however,isthatnosuchconflictisobserved

toexist,sincePerceptionitselfgivesrisetotheapprehensionofa

nondifferencedBrahmanwhosenatureispureBeing.Buthowcanitbe

saidthatPerception,whichhasforitsobjectthingsofvariouskinds

andaccordinglyexpressesitselfinjudgmentssuchas'Hereisajar,'

'Thereisapieceofcloth'causestheapprehensionofmereBeing?If

therewerenoapprehensionofdifference,allcognitionswouldhaveone

andthesameobject,andthereforewouldgiverisetoonejudgmentonly

astakesplacewhenoneunbrokenperceptionalcognitioniscontinuedfor

sometime.True.Wethereforehavetoenquireinwhatway,inthe

judgment'hereisajar,'anassertionismadeaboutbeingaswellas

somespecialformofbeing.Theseimpliedjudgmentscannotbothbe

foundedonperception,fortheyaretheresultsofactsofcognition

occupyingdifferentmomentsoftime,whiletheperceptionalcognition

takesplaceinonemoment(isinstantaneous).Wethereforemustdecide

whetheritistheessentialnatureofthejar,oritsdifferencefrom

otherthings,thatistheobjectofperception.Andwemustadoptthe

formeralternative,becausetheapprehensionofdifferencepresupposes

theapprehensionoftheessentialnatureofthething,and,inaddition,

theremembranceofitscounterentities(i.e.thethingsfromwhichthe

giventhingdiffers).HencedifferenceisnotapprehendedbyPerception;

andalljudgmentsandpropositionsrelativetodifferencearefoundedon

erroronly.

Differencebhedadoesnotadmitoflogicaldefinition

TheLogicians,moreover,areunabletogiveadefinitionofsuchathing

as'difference.'Differencecannotinthefirstplacebetheessential

nature(ofthatwhichdiffers);forfromthatitwouldfollowthaton

theapprehensionoftheessentialnatureofathingtherewouldatonce

arisenotonlythejudgmentastothatessentialnaturebutalso

judgmentsastoitsdifferencefromeverythingelse.But,itmaybe

objectedtothis,evenwhentheessentialnatureofathingis

apprehended,thejudgment'thisthingisdifferentfromotherthings'

dependsontheremembranceofitscounterentities,andaslongasthis

remembrancedoesnottakeplacesolongthejudgmentofdifferenceis

notformed!Suchreasoning,wereply,isinadmissible.Hewhomaintains

that'difference'isnothingbut'essentialnature'hasnorightto

assumeadependenceoncounterentitiessince,accordingtohim,

essentialnatureanddifferencearethesame,i.e.nothingbutessential

nature:thejudgmentofdifferencecan,onhisview,dependon

counterentitiesnomorethanthejudgmentofessentialnaturedoes.His

viewreallyimpliesthatthetwowords'thejar'and'different'(inthe

judgment'thejarisdifferent')aresynonymous,justasthewords

'hasta'and'kara'are(bothofwhichmean'hand').

Nor,inthesecondplace,can'difference'beheldtobeanattribute

(dharma).Forifitwerethat,weshouldhavetoassumethat

'difference'possessesdifference(i.e.isdifferent)fromessential

nature;forotherwiseitwouldbethesameasthelatter.Andthis

latterdifferencewouldhavetobeviewedasanattributeofthefirst

difference,andthiswouldleadusontoathirddifference,andsoin

infinitum.Andtheviewof'difference'beinganattributewouldfurther

implythatdifferenceisapprehendedontheapprehensionofathing

distinguishedbyattributessuchasgenericcharacterandsoon,andat

thesametimethatthethingthusdistinguishedisapprehendedonthe

apprehensionofdifference;andthiswouldconstitutealogicalseesaw.

'Difference'thusshowingitselfincapableoflogicaldefinition,weare

confirmedinourviewthatperceptionrevealsmere'Being'only.

Moreover,itappearsthatinstatesofconsciousnesssuchas'Hereisa

jar,''Thereisapieceofcloth,''Thejarisperceived,''Thepieceof

clothisperceived,'thatwhichconstitutesthethingsisBeing

(existence;satta)andperception(or'consciousness';anubhuti).Andwe

observethatitispureBeingonlywhichpersistsinallstatesof

cognition:thispureBeingalone,therefore,is_real_.Thedifferences,

ontheotherhand,whichdonotpersist,areunreal.Thecaseis

analogoustothatofthesnakerope.Theropewhichpersistsasa

substrateisreal,whilethenoncontinuousthings(whichbywrong

imaginationaresuperimposedontherope)suchasasnake,acleftin

theground,awatercourse,andsoon,areunreal.

Butouradversaryobjectstheinstanceisnottrulyanalogous.Inthe

caseofthesnakeropethenonrealityofthesnakeresultsfromthe

snake'sbeingsublated(badhita)bythecognitionofthetruenatureof

thesubstrate'Thisisarope,notasnake';itdoesnotresultfromthe

noncontinuousnessofthesnake.Inthesamewaytherealityoftherope

doesnotfollowfromitspersistence,butfromthefactofitsbeingnot

sublated(byanothercognition).Butwhat,weask,establishesthe

nonrealityofjarsandpiecesofcloth?Allareagreed,wereply,that

weobserve,injarsandsimilarthings,individualdifference

(vyavritti,literally'separation,''distinction').Thepointtodecide

isofwhatnaturesuchdifferenceis.Doesitnotmeanthatthejudgment

'Thisisajar'impliesthenegationofpiecesofclothandother

things?Butthismeansthatbythisjudgmentpiecesofclothandother

thingsaresublated(badhita).Individualdifference(vyavritti)thus

meansthecessation(orabsence),duetosublation,ofcertainobjects

ofcognition,anditprovesthenonrealityofwhateverhas

noncontinuousexistence;whileontheotherhand,pureBeing,likethe

rope,persistsnonsublated.Henceeverythingthatisadditionaltopure

Beingisnonreal.Thisadmitsofbeingexpressedintechnicalform.

'Being'isrealbecauseitpersists,asprovedbythecaseoftherope

inthesnakerope;jarsandsimilarthingsarenonrealbecausetheyare

noncontinuous,asprovedbythecaseofthesnakethathastheropefor

itssubstrate.

Fromallthisitfollowsthatpersistingconsciousnessonlyhasreal

being;italoneis.

Beingandconsciousnessareone.Consciousnessissvayamprakasa.

But,ouradversaryobjects,asmereBeingistheobjectofconsciousness,

itisdifferenttherefrom(andthusthereexistsafterall'difference'

or'plurality').Notso,wereply.Thatthereisnosuchthingas

'difference,'wehavealreadyshownaboveonthegroundsthatitisnot

theobjectofperception,andmoreoverincapableofdefinition.It

cannotthereforebeprovedthat'Being'istheobjectofconsciousness.

HenceConsciousnessitselfis'Being'thatwhichis.This

consciousnessisselfproved,justbecauseitisconsciousness.Wereit

provedthroughsomethingelse,itwouldfollowthatlikejarsand

similarthingsitisnotconsciousness.Norcantherebeassumed,for

consciousness,theneedofanotheractofconsciousness(throughwhich

itsknowledgewouldbeestablished);foritshinesforth(prakasate)

throughitsownbeing.Whileitexists,consciousnessdifferingtherein

fromjarsandthelikeisneverobservednottoshineforth,andit

cannotthereforebeheldtodepend,initsshiningforth,onsomething

else.You(whoobjecttotheabovereasoning)perhapsholdthe

followingview:evenwhenconsciousnesshasarisen,itistheobject

onlywhichshinesforthafactexpressedinsentencessuchas:thejar

isperceived.Whenapersonformsthejudgment'Thisisajar,'heis

notatthetimeconsciousofaconsciousnesswhichisnotanobjectand

isnotofadefinitecharacter.Hencetheexistenceofconsciousnessis

thereasonwhichbringsaboutthe'shiningforth'ofjarsandother

objects,andthushasasimilarofficeastheapproximationofthe

objecttotheeyeortheotherorgansofsense(whichisanother

conditionofperceptiveconsciousness).Afterthistheexistenceof

consciousnessisinferredonthegroundthattheshiningforthofthe

objectis(notpermanent,but)occasionalonly[FOOTNOTE34:1].And

shouldthisargumentationbeobjectedtoonthegroundofitsimplying

thatconsciousnesswhichisessentiallyofthenatureofintelligence

issomethingnonintelligentlikematerialthings,weaskyoutodefine

thisnegationofnonintelligence(whichyoudeclaretobe

characteristicofconsciousness).Havewe,perhaps,tounderstandbyit

theinvariableconcomitanceofexistenceandshiningforth?Ifso,we

pointoutthatthisinvariableconcomitanceisalsofoundinthecaseof

pleasureandsimilaraffections;forwhenpleasureandsoonexistat

all,theyneverarenonperceived(i.e.theyexistinsofaronlyaswe

areconsciousofthem).Itisthusclearthatwehavenoconsciousness

ofconsciousnessitselfjustasthetipofafinger,althoughtouching

otherthings,isincapableoftouchingitself.

Allthisreasoning,wereply,isentirelyspunoutofyourownfancy,

withoutanydueconsiderationofthepowerofconsciousness.Thefactis,

thatinperceivingcolourandotherqualitiesofthings,wearenot

awareofa'shiningforth'asanattributeofthosethings,andas

somethingdifferentfromconsciousness;norcantheassumptionofan

attributeofthingscalled'light,'or'shiningforth,'beprovedinany

way,sincetheentireempiricalworlditselfcanbeprovedonlythrough

consciousness,theexistenceofwhichwebothadmit.Consciousness,

therefore,isnotsomethingwhichisinferredorprovedthroughsome

otheractofknowledge;butwhileprovingeverythingelseitisproved

byitself.Thismaybeexpressedintechnicalformasfollows

Consciousnessis,withregardtoitsattributesandtotheempirical

judgmentsconcerningit,independentofanyotherthing,becausethrough

itsconnexionwithotherthingsitisthecauseoftheirattributesand

theempiricaljudgmentsconcerningthem.Foritisageneralprinciple

thatoftwothingsthatwhichthroughitsconnexionwiththeotheris

thecauseoftheattributesofandtheempiricaljudgmentsaboutthe

latter,isitselfindependentofthatotherastothosetwopoints.We

seee.g.thatcolour,throughitsconjunctionwithearthandthelike,

producesinthemthequalityofvisibility,butdoesnotitselfdepend

foritsvisibilityonconjunctionwithcolour.Henceconsciousnessis

itselfthecauseofitsown'shiningforth,'aswellasofthe

empiricallyobservedshiningforthofobjectssuchasjarsandthelike.

Consciousnessiseternalandincapableofchange.

Thisselfluminousconsciousness,further,iseternal,foritisnot

capableofanyformofnonexistencewhethersocalledantecedent

nonexistenceoranyotherform.Thisfollowsfromitsbeing

selfestablished.Fortheantecedentnonexistenceofselfestablished

consciousnesscannotbeapprehendedeitherthroughconsciousnessor

anythingelse.Ifconsciousnessitselfgaverisetotheapprehensionof

itsownnonexistence,itcouldnotdosoinsofaras'being,'forthat

wouldcontradictitsbeing;ifitis,i.e.ifitsnonexistenceisnot,

howcanitgiverisetotheideaofitsnonexistence?Norcanitdoso

ifnotbeing;forifconsciousnessitselfisnot,howcanitfurnisha

proofforitsownnonexistence?Norcanthenonexistenceof

consciousnessbeapprehendedthroughanythingelse;forconsciousness

cannotbetheobjectofanythingelse.Anyinstrumentofknowledge

provingthenonexistenceofconsciousness,coulddosoonlybymaking

consciousnessitsobject'thisisconsciousness';butconsciousness,as

beingselfestablished,doesnotadmitofthatobjectivationwhichis

impliedintheword'this,'andhenceitspreviousnonexistencecannot

beprovedbyanythinglyingoutsideitself.

Asconsciousnessthusdoesnotadmitofantecedentnonexistence,it

furthercannotbeheldtooriginate,andhencealsoallthoseother

statesofbeingwhichdependonoriginationcannotbepredicatedofit.

Asconsciousnessisbeginningless,itfurtherdoesnotadmitofany

pluralitywithinitself;forweobserveinthiscasethepresenceof

somethingwhichiscontrarytowhatinvariablyaccompaniesplurality

(thissomethingbeing'beginninglessness'whichiscontrarytothe

qualityofhavingabeginningwhichqualityinvariablyaccompanies

plurality).Forweneverobserveathingcharacterisedbypluralityto

bewithoutabeginning.Andmoreoverdifference,origination,&c.,are

objectsofconsciousness,likecolourandotherqualities,andhence

cannotbeattributesofconsciousness.Therefore,consciousnessbeing

essentiallyconsciousnessonly,nothingelsethatisanobjectof

consciousnesscanbeitsattribute.Theconclusionisthatconsciousness

isfreefromdifferenceofanykind.

TheapparentdifferencebetweenConsciousnessandtheconscioussubject

isduetotheunrealahamkara.

Fromthisitfurtherfollowsthatthereisnosubstrateof

consciousnessdifferentfromconsciousnessitselfsuchaspeople

ordinarilymeanwhenspeakingofa'knower.'Itisselfluminous

consciousnessitselfwhichconstitutesthesocalled'knower.'This

followstherefromalsothatconsciousnessisnotnonintelligent(jada);

fornonintelligenceinvariablyaccompaniesabsenceofSelfhood

(anatmatva);hence,nonintelligencebeingabsentinconsciousness,

consciousnessisnotnonSelf,thatmeans,itistheSelf.

But,ouradversaryagainobjects,theconsciousnesswhichexpresses

itselfinthejudgment'Iknow,'provesthatthequalityofbeinga

'knower'belongstoconsciousness!Bynomeans,wereply.The

attributiontoconsciousnessofthisqualityrestsonerror,noless

thantheattribution,totheshell,ofthequalityofbeingsilver.

Consciousnesscannotstandintherelationofanagenttowarditself:

theattributeofbeingaknowingagentiserroneouslyimputedtoitan

erroranalogoustothatexpressedinthejudgment'Iamaman,'which

identifiestheSelfofapersonwiththeoutwardaggregateofmatter

thatbearstheexternalcharacteristicsofhumanity.Tobea'knower'

meanstobetheagentintheactionofknowing;andthisissomething

essentiallychangefulandnonintelligent(jada),havingitsabodein

theahamkara,whichisitselfathingsubjecttochange.How,onthe

otherhand,couldsuchagencypossiblybelongtothechangeless

'witness'(ofallchange,i.e.consciousness)whosenatureispureBeing?

ThatagencycannotbeanattributeoftheSelffollowstherefromalso

that,likecolourandotherqualities,agencydepends,foritsownproof,

onseeing,i.e.consciousness.

ThattheSelfdoesnotfallwithinthesphere(isnotanobjectof),the

ideaof'I'isprovedtherebyalsothatindeepsleep,swoon,and

similarstates,theideaofthe'I'isabsent,whiletheconsciousness

oftheSelfpersists.Moreover,iftheSelfwereadmittedtobeanagent

andanobjectoftheideaof'I,'itwouldbedifficulttoavoidthe

conclusionthatlikethebodyitisnonintelligent,somethingmerely

outward('beingforothersonly,notforitself')anddestituteof

Selfhood.Thatfromthebody,whichistheobjectoftheideaof'I,'

andknowntobeanagent,thereisdifferentthatSelfwhichenjoysthe

resultsofthebody'sactions,viz.theheavenlyword,andsoon,is

acknowledgedbyallwhoadmitthevalidityoftheinstrumentsof

knowledge;analogously,therefore,wemustadmitthatdifferentfromthe

knowerwhomweunderstandbytheterm'I,'isthe'witnessing'inward

Self.Thenonintelligentahamkarathusmerelyservestomanifestthe

natureofnonchangingconsciousness,anditeffectsthisbybeingits

abode;foritistheproperqualityofmanifestingagentstomanifest

theobjectsmanifested,insofarasthelatterabideinthem.Amirror,

e.g.,orasheetofwater,oracertainmassofmatter,manifestsaface

orthediscofthemoon(reflectedinthemirrororwater)orthe

genericcharacterofacow(impressedonthemassofmatter)insofar

asallthosethingsabideinthem.Inthisway,then,therearisesthe

erroneousviewthatfindsexpressioninthejudgment'Iknow.'Normust

you,inthewayofobjection,raisethequestionhowselfluminous

consciousnessistobemanifestedbythenonintelligentahamkara,which

ratherisitselfmanifestedbyconsciousness;forweobservethatthe

surfaceofthehand,whichitselfismanifestedbytheraysofsunlight

fallingonit,atthesametimemanifeststhoserays.Thisisclearly

seeninthecaseofrayspassingthroughtheintersticesofnetwork;the

lightofthoseraysisintensifiedbythehandonwhichtheyfall,and

whichatthesametimeisitselfmanifestedbytherays.

Itthusappearsthatthe'knowingagent,'whoisdenotedbythe'I,'in

thejudgment'Iknow,'constitutesnorealattributeoftheSelf,the

natureofwhichispureintelligence.Thisisalsothereasonwhythe

consciousnessofEgoitydoesnotpersistinthestatesofdeepsleepand

finalrelease:inthosestatesthisspecialformofconsciousnesspasses

away,andtheSelfappearsinitstruenature,i.e.aspure

consciousness.Henceapersonwhohasrisenfromdeep,dreamlesssleep

reflects,'JustnowIwasunconsciousofmyself.'

Summingupofthepurvapakshaview.

Astheoutcomeofallthis,wesumupourviewasfollows.Eternal,

absolutelynonchangingconsciousness,whosenatureispure

nondifferencedintelligence,freefromalldistinctionwhatever,owing

toerrorillusorilymanifestsitself(vivarttate)asbrokenupinto

manifolddistinctionsknowingsubjects,objectsofknowledge,actsof

knowledge.Andthepurposeforwhichweenterontheconsiderationof

theVedantatextsisutterlytodestroywhatistherootofthaterror,

i.e.Nescience,andthustoobtainafirmknowledgeoftheonenessof

Brahman,whosenatureismereintelligencefree,pure,eternal.

[FOOTNOTE22:1.Inagreementwiththeusemadeofthispassagebythe

Purvapakshin,vijnanamustherebeunderstoodinthesenseofavidya.

Vijnanasabdenavividhamjnayatenenetikaranavyutpattyavidyabhidhiyate.

Sru.Pra.]

[FOOTNOTE25:1.Thedistinctionisillustratedbythedifferentviews

PerceptionandInferencecauseustotakeofthenatureoftheflameof

thelamp.ToPerceptiontheflame,aslongasitburns,seemsoneand

thesame:butonthegroundoftheobservationthatthedifferent

particlesofthewickandtheoilareconsumedinsuccession,weinfer

thattherearemanydistinctflamessucceedingoneanother.Andwe

accepttheInferenceasvalid,andassublatingorrefutingthe

immediateperception,becausetheperceivedonenessoftheflameadmits

ofbeingaccountedfor'otherwise,'viz.onthegroundofthemany

distinctflamesoriginatinginsuchrapidsuccessionthattheeye

mistakesthemforone.Theinferenceontheotherhanddoesnotadmitof

beingexplainedinanotherway.]

[FOOTNOTE26:1.ThereferenceistothepointdiscussedPu.Mi.Su.VI,

5,54(Jaim.Nya.MalaVistara,p.285).]

[FOOTNOTE27:1.ThetextswhichdenyallqualitiesofBrahmanarelater

inorderthanthetextswhichrefertoBrahmanasqualified,because

denialpresupposesthatwhichistobedenied.]

[FOOTNOTE27:2.Theunityofpurportofthesentenceisinferredfrom

itsconstituentwordshavingthesamecaseending.]

[FOOTNOTE30:1.Thetheoryherereferredtoisheldbysomeofthe

Mimamsakas.Theimperativeformsoftheverbhavetheirprimarymeaning,

i.e.thepoweroforiginatingaction,onlyinVedicsentenceswhich

enjointheperformanceofcertainactionsforthebringingaboutof

certainends:noothermeansofknowledgebuttheVedainformingusthat

suchendscanbeaccomplishedbysuchactions.Nobody,e.g.wouldoffer

asomasacrificeinordertoobtaintheheavenlyworld,werehenottold

bytheVedatodoso.Inordinarylife,ontheotherhand,noimperative

possessesthisentirelyuniqueoriginativeforce,sinceanyactionwhich

maybeperformedinconsequenceofacommandmaybepromptedbyother

motivesaswell:itis,intechnicalIndianlanguage,established

already,apartfromthecommand,byothermeansofknowledge.Theman

who,e.g.istoldtomilkacowmighthaveproceededtodoso,apart

fromthecommand,forreasonsofhisown.Imperativesinordinaryspeech

arethereforeheldnottohavetheirprimarymeaning,andthis

conclusionisextended,somewhatunwarrantablyoneshouldsay,toall

thewordsenteringintoanimperativeclause.]

[FOOTNOTE34:1.Beingnotpermanentbutoccasional,itisaneffectonly,

andassuchmusthaveacause.]

THEGREATSIDDHANTA.

Thisentiretheoryrestsonafictitiousfoundationofaltogetherhollow

andviciousarguments,incapableofbeingstatedindefinitelogical

alternatives,anddevisedbymenwhoaredestituteofthoseparticular

qualitieswhichcauseindividualstobechosenbytheSupremePerson

revealedintheUpanishads;whoseintellectsaredarkenedbythe

impressionofbeginninglessevil;andwhothushavenoinsightintothe

natureofwordsandsentences,intotherealpurportconveyedbythem,

andintotheprocedureofsoundargumentation,withallitsmethods

dependingonperceptionandtheotherinstrumentsofrightknowledge.

Thetheorythereforemustneedsberejectedbyallthosewho,through

texts,perceptionandtheothermeansofknowledgeassistedbysound

reasoninghaveaninsightintothetruenatureofthings.

Thereisnoproofofnondifferencedsubstance.

Toenterintodetails.Thosewhomaintainthedoctrineofasubstance

devoidofalldifferencehavenorighttoassertthatthisorthatisa

proofofsuchasubstance;forallmeansofrightknowledgehavefor

theirobjectthingsaffectedwithdifference.Shouldanyonetakinghis

standonthereceivedviewsofhissect,assertthatthetheoryofa

substancefreefromalldifference(doesnotrequireanyfurthermeans

ofproofbut)isimmediatelyestablishedbyone'sownconsciousness;we

replythathealsoisrefutedbythefact,warrantedbythewitnessof

theSelf,thatallconsciousnessimpliesdifference:allstatesof

consciousnesshavefortheirobjectsomethingthatismarkedbysome

difference,asappearsinthecaseofjudgmentslike'Isawthis.'And

shouldastateofconsciousnessalthoughdirectlyapprehendedas

implyingdifferencebedeterminedbysomefallaciousreasoningtobe

devoidofdifference,thisdeterminationcouldbeeffectedonlybymeans

ofsomespecialattributesadditionaltothequalityofmereBeing;and

owingtothesespecialqualitiesonwhichthedeterminationdepends,

thatstateofconsciousnesswouldclearlyagainbecharacterisedby

difference.Themeaningofthementioneddeterminationcouldthusonly

bethatofathingaffectedwithcertaindifferencessomeother

differencesaredenied;butmanifestlythiswouldnotprovethe

existenceofathingfreefromalldifference.Tothoughtthereatany

ratebelongsthequalityofbeingthoughtandselfilluminatedness,for

theknowingprincipleisobservedtohaveforitsessentialnaturethe

illumining(makingtoshineforth)ofobjects.Andthatalsointhe

statesofdeepsleep,swoon,&c.,consciousnessisaffectedwith

differenceweshallprove,initsproperplace,ingreaterdetail.

Moreoveryouyourselfadmitthattoconsciousnessthereactuallybelong

differentattributessuchaspermanency(oneness,selfluminousness,&c.

),andoftheseitcannotbeshownthattheyareonlyBeingingeneral.

Andevenifthelatterpointwereadmitted,weobservethattheretakes

placeadiscussionofdifferentviews,andyouyourselfattempttoprove

yourtheorybymeansofthedifferencesbetweenthoseviewsandyourown.

Itthereforemustbeadmittedthatrealityisaffectedwithdifference

wellestablishedbyvalidmeansofproof.

Sabdaprovesdifference.

Astosound(speech;sabda)itisspeciallyapparentthatitpossesses

thepowerofdenotingonlysuchthingsasareaffectedwithdifference.

Speechoperateswithwordsandsentences.Nowaword(pada)originates

fromthecombinationofaradicalelementandasuffix,andasthesetwo

elementshavedifferentmeaningsitnecessarilyfollowsthattheword

itselfcanconveyonlyasenseaffectedwithdifference.Andfurther,

thepluralityofwordsisbasedonpluralityofmeanings;thesentence

thereforewhichisanaggregateofwordsexpressessomespecial

combinationofthings(meaningsofwords),andhencehasnopowerto

denoteathingdevoidofalldifference.Theconclusionisthatsound

cannotbeameansofknowledgeforathingdevoidofalldifference.

Pratyakshaevenofthenirvikalpakakindprovesdifference.

Perceptioninthenextplacewithitstwosubdivisionsof

nondeterminate(nirvikalpaka)anddeterminate(savikalpaka)

perceptionalsocannotbeameansofknowledgeforthingsdevoidof

difference.Determinateperceptionclearlyhasforitsobjectthings

affectedwithdifference;foritrelatestothatwhichisdistinguished

bygenericdifferenceandsoon.Butalsonondeterminateperceptionhas

foritsobjectonlywhatismarkedwithdifference;foritisonthe

basisofnondeterminateperceptionthattheobjectdistinguishedby

genericcharacterandsoonisrecognisedintheactofdeterminate

perception.Nondeterminateperceptionistheapprehensionoftheobject

insofarasdestituteofsomedifferencesbutnotofalldifference.

Apprehensionofthelatterkindisinthefirstplacenotobservedever

totakeplace,andisinthesecondplaceimpossible:forall

apprehensionbyconsciousnesstakesplacebymeansofsomedistinction

'Thisissuchandsuch.'Nothingcanbeapprehendedapartfromsome

specialfeatureofmakeorstructure,ase.g.thetriangularlyshaped

dewlapinthecaseofcows.Thetruedistinctionbetweennondeterminate

anddeterminateperceptionisthattheformeristheapprehensionofthe

firstindividualamonganumberofthingsbelongingtothesameclass,

whilethelatteristheapprehensionofthesecond,third,andsoon,

individuals.Ontheapprehensionofthefirstindividualcowthe

perceivingpersonisnotconsciousofthefactthatthespecialshape

whichconstitutesthegenericcharacteroftheclass'cows'extendsto

thepresentindividualalso;whilethisspecialconsciousnessarisesin

thecaseoftheperceptionofthesecondandthirdcow.Theperception

ofthesecondindividualthusis'determinate'insofarasitis

determinedbyaspecialattribute,viz.theextension,tothe

perception,ofthegenericcharacterofaclassmanifestedinacertain

outwardshapewhichconnectsthisactofperceptionwiththeearlier

perception(ofthefirstindividual);suchdeterminationbeing

ascertainedonlyontheapprehensionofthesecondindividual.Such

extensionorcontinuanceofacertaingenericcharacteris,ontheother

hand,notapprehendedontheapprehensionofthefirstindividual,and

perceptionofthelatterkindthenceis'nondeterminate.'Thatitis

suchisnotduetononapprehensionofstructure,colour,generic

characterandsoon,foralltheseattributesareequallyobjectsof

sensuousperception(andhenceperceivedasbelongingtothefirst

individualalso).Moreoverthatwhichpossessesstructurecannotbe

perceivedapartfromthestructure,andhenceinthecaseofthe

apprehensionofthefirstindividualthereisalreadyperceptionof

structure,givingrisetothejudgment'Thethingissuchandsuch.'In

thecaseofthesecond,third,&c.,individuals,ontheotherhand,we

apprehend,inadditiontothethingpossessingstructureandtothe

structureitself,thespecialattributeofthepersistenceofthe

genericcharacter,andhencetheperceptionis'determinate.'Fromall

thisitfollowsthatperceptionneverhasforitsobjectthatwhichis

devoidofalldifference.

Thebhedabhedaviewisuntenable.

Thesameargumentstendtorefutetheviewthatthereisdifferenceand

absenceofdifferenceatthesametime(thesocalledbhedabhedaview).

Takethejudgment'Thisissuchandsuch';howcanwerealiseherethe

nondifferenceof'beingthis'and'beingsuchandsuch'?The'suchand

such'denotesapeculiarmakecharacterised,e.g.byadewlap,the

'this'denotesthethingdistinguishedbythatpeculiarmake;the

nondifferenceofthesetwoisthuscontradictedbyimmediate

consciousness.Attheoutsetthethingperceivedisperceivedas

separatefromallotherthings,andthisseparationisfoundedonthe

factthatthethingisdistinguishedbyaspecialconstitution,letus

saythegenericcharacteristicsofacow,expressedbytheterm'such

andsuch.'Ingeneral,whereverwecognisetherelationof

distinguishingattributeandthingdistinguishedthereby,thetwo

clearlypresentthemselvestoourmindasabsolutelydifferent.

Somethingse.g.staffsandbraceletsappearsometimesashavinga

separate,independentexistenceoftheirown;atothertimesthey

presentthemselvesasdistinguishingattributesofotherthingsor

beings(i.e.ofthepersonscarryingstaffsorwearingbracelets).Other

entitiese.g.thegenericcharacterofcowshaveabeingonlyinso

farastheyconstitutetheformofsubstances,andthusalwayspresent

themselvesasdistinguishingattributesofthosesubstances.Inboth

casesthereisthesamerelationofdistinguishingattributeandthing

distinguishedthereby,andthesetwoareapprehendedasabsolutely

different.Thedifferencebetweenthetwoclassesofentitiesisonly

thatstaffs,bracelets,andsimilarthingsarecapableofbeing

apprehendedinseparationfromotherthings,whilethegeneric

characteristicsofaspeciesareabsolutelyincapablethereof.The

assertion,therefore,thatthedifferenceofthingsisrefutedby

immediateconsciousness,isbasedontheplaindenialofacertainform

ofconsciousness,theonenamelyadmittedbyeveryonewhichis

expressedinthejudgment'Thisthingissuchandsuch.'Thissame

pointisclearlyexpoundedbytheSutrakarainII,2,33.

Inferencealsoteachesdifference.

Perceptionthushavingforitsobjectonlywhatismarkedbydifference,

inferencealsoisinthesamecase;foritsobjectisonlywhatis

distinguishedbyconnexionwiththingsknownthroughperceptionand

othermeansofknowledge.Andthus,eveninthecaseofdisagreementas

tothenumberofthedifferentinstrumentsofknowledge,athingdevoid

ofdifferencecouldnotbeestablishedbyanyofthemsincethe

instrumentsofknowledgeacknowledgedbyallhaveonlyoneandthesame

object,viz.whatismarkedbydifference.Andapersonwhomaintains

theexistenceofathingdevoidofdifferenceonthegroundof

differencesaffectingthatverythingsimplycontradictshimselfwithout

knowingwhathedoes;heisinfactnobetterthanamanwhoasserts

thathisownmotherneverhadanychildren.

Perceptiondoesnotrevealmerebeing.

Inreplytotheassertionthatperceptioncausestheapprehensionof

pureBeingonly,andthereforecannothavedifferenceforitsobject;

andthat'difference'cannotbedefinedbecauseitdoesnotadmitof

beingsetforthindefinitealternatives;wepointoutthatthese

chargesarecompletelyrefutedbythefactthattheonlyobjectsof

perceptionarethingsdistinguishedbygenericcharacterandsoon,and

thatgenericcharacterandsoonasbeingrelativethingsgiveatonce

risetothejudgmentastothedistinctionbetweenthemselvesandthe

thingsinwhichtheyinhere.Youyourselfadmitthatinthecaseof

knowledgeandinthatofcolourandotherqualitiesthisrelationholds

good,viz.thatsomethingwhichgivesrisetoajudgmentaboutanother

thingatthesametimegivesrisetoajudgmentaboutitself;thesame

maythereforebeadmittedwithregardtodifference[FOOTNOTE44:1].

Forthisreasonthechargeofaregressusininfinitumandalogical

seesaw(seeabove,p.32)cannotbeupheld.Forevenifperceptive

cognitiontakesplacewithinonemoment,weapprehendwithinthatmoment

thegenericcharacterwhichconstitutesontheonehandthedifference

ofthethingfromothers,andontheotherhandthepeculiarcharacter

ofthethingitself;andthusthereremainsnothingtobeapprehendedin

asecondmoment.

Moreover,ifperceptionmadeusapprehendonlypureBeingjudgments

cle