toward a naturalism of intentionality and consciousness
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Toward a Naturalism of Intentionality and Consciousness
Mark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.name
http://bickhard.ws/
Naturalism and Mind Is naturalism consistent with the
normativities of mind? If not, then mind cannot be naturalized If so, how?
What is Naturalism? Naturalism understood in terms of what
the natural sciences study carries with it a metaphysical barrier to naturalizing the mind It cannot address the ontologies of
normativity This barrier is of ancient provenance
Naturalism as a Presupposition of Inquiry It is always legitimate to ask further questions We live in one world — explanations lead to
integration of phenomena
These can be in tension Empedoclean substances integrate many
explanations, but also block further inquiry concerning those substances themselves
They are metaphysically basic, with no further explanations
Conceptual Barriers We live with a conceptual heritage that blocks
understanding of intentionality This barrier puts us in a position that is akin
to attempting to model fire with a better substance than phlogiston So long as fire was conceived of as a substance,
no satisfactory model was possible Our conceptual situation with regard to mind is
similar, but worse
The Western Substance Tradition Parmenides argued that change cannot occur
(arguing against Heraclitus) For A to change into B,
A would have to disappear into nothingness, and B emerge out of nothingness
Nothingness is not possible, it cannot exist Therefore, change cannot occur
Lest you think that this is an odd argument, consider the difficulties that contemporary thought has with representing falsehoods or non-existents
Meinong, Russell, Wittgenstein, Fodor, etc.
In Response There is an underlying substratum —
substance — that does not change Empedocles: divisible substance —
stuff: Earth, Air, Fire, Water
Democritus: indivisible substance Atoms
This Frames Our World Plato and Aristotle both took the
Parmenidean argument very seriously Aristotle’s substance model is much
more sophisticated than Empedocles Perhaps prime matter as basic unchanging
substratum, for example But descendents of substance and atom
metaphysics frame thought today
Two Dirempted Realms Substance makes change require special
explanation Substance makes emergence impossible
Substances can mix and remix, but there is no way to get a new substance
Factual substance is split off from intentional, normative, modal mind
Two fundamentally incompatible metaphysical realms are posited
Two Realms Still Dominant Some have explicitly posited two realms
Aristotle: substance and form Descartes: two kinds of substance Kant: world and subject Analytic: factual science and normative language
Some have tried to make do with just one side of the split
Green, Bradley: idealists — all is “mental” Hobbes, Hume, Quine: all is factual
This “all is factual” (scientific) world assumption is our contemporary dominant framework
Process Metaphysics Re-integrates this Split Change is default
Stability requires explanation Emergence is ubiquitous
Every new organization of process has emergent properties, though not all will be of interest or importance
Emergence of normativity and intentionality within the natural world, thus the integration of the split, becomes possible
Stability of Process Organization Energy Well Stability
E.g., Atoms Far-from-equilibrium Stability
E.g., Self-organization in a chemical bath Self-maintenant Stability
E.g., Candle Flame Recursively Self-maintenant Stability
E.g., Bacterium
Emergence of Normative Function Functional for X
Contributing to the maintenance of far from equilibrium conditions necessary for X
Function is specific to system Heart beat of parasite is functional for
parasite, dysfunctional for host Compare: Etiological Models
E.g., Millikan
Emergence of Representational Truth Value Recursive Self-maintenance
Selection of interaction, or indication of appropriateness of interaction, will be functional in some environments, but not in others
That is, the presuppositions of such selection or indication will sometimes be True and sometimes False
This is the emergence of representational normativity out of functional normativity
Content Indications of appropriateness presuppose
that this environment has the conditions in which the functionality holds
These presuppositions are representational content; they are predicated of the environment
They are implicit, not explicit
Contrast: Encodingism Encodingism: The assumption that (all)
representation is encoding Example: Morse code
“...” encodes “S” Representation constituted in some kind of
encoding correspondence causal, nomological, informational, conventional
Motivated by Substance Approach Signet Ring in Wax Transduction
Problems with Encodingism Myriads of fatal problems:
All such correspondences are logically external, thus require interpreter, which initiates a vicious regress
Too many correspondences Possibility of error Possibility of system detectable error Skepticism/ idealism Piaget’s ‘copy’ problem Incoherence Possibility of emergence
Innatism is not a solution
Internal Relations Green & Bradley:
Everything internally related to everything Including representation to represented change in representation entails change
in represented Strongly rejected by Russell Rare since Quine
Interactive Representation Interactive content is internally related
to indications of interaction appropriateness
Internally related to content, not to represented
not subject to Russell’s complaints
Mentality in the Central Nervous System Evolutionary problem of interaction selection
and guidance Requires anticipation of potential interactions
available for selection Frog
Requires timing in guidance of interaction Turing machines, and equivalents, have
sequence, but no timing
Anticipation and Timing How does the brain accomplish these? Not by way of passive threshold switch
neurons Discrete computationalism does not suffice
And, in any case, that is a false model of central nervous system microfunctioning
The Brain Doesn’t Work that Way
The functioning of the brain cannot be understood in terms of neurons as threshold switches.
Neurons don't work that way, and, in addition, neurons are not the only functional units in the brain.
Microgenesis When we look at how the brain actually
functions, we find strong support for an alternative - microgenetic - model of central nervous system functioning.
Microgenesis, in turn, has strong implications for the nature of representation and cognition. It forces an interactive, pragmatic model of representation.
Functional Processes in the Brain Neurons as:
Threshold switches Connectionist nodes Frequency encoders
All have in common the assumption that neurons are input processors
And that neurons are the only functional units
Both Are Wrong Neurons are endogenously active
In multiple ways They do not just process inputs
And neurons are not the only functional units Glia, for example, are also functional, not
just supportive
Neurons Oscillators
Resonators Modulations of endogenous activity, not
switches of otherwise inert units Turing machine power Timing
Neurons II Silent neurons Volume transmitters
L-Dopa Graded release of transmitters Gap junctions Why multiple transmitters if all synapses are
classical? Transmitters evolved from hormones Classical synapses evolved from volume transmitters
Astrocytes (Glia) Receive transmitters Emit transmitters Form functional “bubbles” Gap junction connections Calcium waves Modulate synaptogenesis Modulate synaptic functioning
Release, uptake, degree of volume diffusion, …
Multiple Scales These are all modulatory influences at
multiple scales Large and small spatial scales Slow and fast temporal scales
There are also variations in delay times
Evolution has created a large tool box of multiple kinds and scales of modulatory influences
Microgenesis II Larger and slower processes set the context
for smaller and faster processes They set the parameters for the faster and
smaller processes Ion and transmitter concentrations Modes of synaptic functioning
They generate vast concurrent micro-modes of processing across the brain: Microgenesis
Dynamic Programming Parameter setting for dynamic
processes is the dynamic equivalent of programming in a discrete system
Microgenesis sets and changes the programs across the brain
Microgenesis is ongoing and occurs in real time
Functional Anticipation Microgenetic set-up may or may not be
appropriate to the actual flow of interactive processing that occurs in the organism
Microgenesis is functionally anticipatory The anticipation is that the microgenetic
set-up will be appropriate
Anticipation and Timing Thus, microgenetic set up is anticipatory
Generating emergent truth value and content
Modulation of oscillatory processes has inherent timing Controlling interaction in a real temporal
world
Interactive Flow Contentful Situated Embodied From a Point of View Experiential Flow
Primary Consciousness
Anticipative Visual Interaction Visual experiencing
Gibson Piaget: small object Straight line Red
O’Regan
Reflective Consciousness Second Level Interaction
Age 3.5 Some Macro-Functional Circuitry
Properties of Experiencing Experienced in Reflection Qualities of Experiencing - Qualia
Qualia
Constitutive of Experiencing And Properties of Experiencing
Ontological Circularity Very hard problem
Dissolve the Hard Problems of Consciousness
Zombies Inverted and other disordered qualia
Assume externally related properties of experiencing
Qualia problem is hard because of assumptions that entail an ontological circularity
Both are dissolved by this model
Conclusions — Representation Interactive model of representation Accounts for Emergence of
Representation Accounts for System Detectable Error Internally related content
Avoids Interpreter
Conclusions — Consciousness Captures properties of experiencing
Contentful, situated, point of view, … Renders zombies and disordered qualia
impossible Accounts for Qualia
Dissolves ontological circularity in standard assumptions
Makes consciousness as a part of the natural world much less mysterious
Conclusions — Naturalism Intentionality and consciousness are
natural phenomena But can be understood so only within a
process metaphysics That makes change the default That makes emergence possible And that makes normative, intentional
emergence (thermodynamically) natural
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