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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUG LAIR; STEVE DOGIAKOS;AMERICAN TRADITION
PARTNERSHIP; AMERICAN
TRADITION PARTNERSHIP PAC;MONTANA RIGHT TO LIFE
ASSOCIATION PAC; SWEET GRASS
COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY
INTEGRITY; LAKE COUNTY
REPUBLICAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE;BEAVERHEAD COUNTY REPUBLICAN
CENTRAL COMMITTEE; JAKE OIL,LLC; JL OIL, LLC; CHAMPION
PAINTING; JOHN MILANOVICH,Plaintiffs-Appellees,
RICK HILL, Warden,Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN MOTL, in his officialcapacity as Commissioner ofPolitical Practices; TIM FOX, in hisofficial capacity as Attorney Generalof the State of Montana; LEO J.GALLAGHER, in his official capacityas Lewis and Clark County Attorney,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 16-35424
D.C. No.6:12-cv-00012-
CCL
OPINION
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LAIR V. MOTL2
Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the District of Montana
Charles C. Lovell, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 21, 2017San Francisco, California
Filed October 23, 2017
Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Carlos T. Beaand Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Fisher;Dissent by Judge Bea
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LAIR V. MOTL 3
SUMMARY*
Civil Rights
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in anaction challenging Montana’s limits on the amount of moneyindividuals, political action committees and political partiesmay contribute to candidates for state elective office.
The panel held that Montana’s limits, as set forth inMontana Code Annotated § 13-37-216, were both justifiedby and adequately tailored to the state’s interest in combatingquid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The panel heldthat Montana had shown the risk of actual or perceived quidpro quo corruption in Montana politics was more than “mereconjecture.” The state offered evidence of attempts topurchase legislative action with campaign contributions. Thepanel held that contribution limits served the state’s importantinterest in preventing this risk of corruption from becomingreality.
The panel held that Montana’s limits were also “closelydrawn” to serve the state’s anti-corruption interest. Thelimits targeted those contributions most likely to result inactual or perceived quid pro quo corruption – high-end, directcontributions with a significant impact on candidatefundraising. Moreover, the limits were tailored to avoidfavoring incumbents, not to curtail the influence of politicalparties, and to permit candidates to raise enough money tomake their voices heard. Although Montana’s limits were
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It hasbeen prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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LAIR V. MOTL4
lower than most other states’ in absolute terms, they wererelatively high when comparing each state’s limits to the costof campaigning there. Thus, Montana’s chosen limits fellwithin the realm of legislative judgments the courts could notsecond guess.
Dissenting, Judge Bea stated that the district courtproperly evaluated the evidence submitted by Montana’sofficials and found the officials had not established the onlyconstitutionally permissible and valid state interest sufficientto justify Montana’s campaign contribution limits: theprevention of corruption or its appearance.
COUNSEL
Matthew T. Cochenour (argued), Helena, Montana, forDefendants-Appellants.
James Bopp (argued), Terre Haute, Indiana, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
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LAIR V. MOTL 5
OPINION
FISHER, Circuit Judge:
Montana limits the amount of money individuals, politicalaction committees and political parties may contribute tocandidates for state elective office. The district courtinvalidated these limits as unduly restrictive of politicalspeech under the First Amendment. Because Montana’slimits are both justified by and adequately tailored to thestate’s interest in combating quid pro quo corruption or itsappearance, we reverse.
Montana has shown the risk of actual or perceived quidpro quo corruption in Montana politics is more than “mereconjecture,” the low bar it must surmount before imposingcontribution limits of any amount. The state has offeredevidence of attempts to purchase legislative action withcampaign contributions. Contribution limits serve the state’simportant interest in preventing this risk of corruption frombecoming reality.
Montana’s limits are also “closely drawn” to serve thestate’s anti-corruption interest. The limits target thosecontributions most likely to result in actual or perceived quidpro quo corruption – high-end, direct contributions with asignificant impact on candidate fundraising. Moreover, thelimits are tailored to avoid favoring incumbents, not to curtailthe influence of political parties, and to permit candidates toraise enough money to make their voices heard. AlthoughMontana’s limits are lower than most other states’ in absoluteterms, they are relatively high when comparing each state’slimits to the cost of campaigning there. Thus, Montana’s
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LAIR V. MOTL6
chosen limits fall within the realm of legislative judgmentswe may not second guess.
I. Background
A. Montana’s Contribution Limits
In 1994, Montana voters passed Initiative 118, acampaign finance reform package that included thecontribution limits at issue here. I-118’s limits replaced aregime that had been in place since 1975. That regimepermitted individuals and political parties to contribute up tothe following limits:
Table 1: Pre-Initiative 118 Limits
Governor OtherStatewideElection
PublicService
Commission
Legislature City orCounty
Individual $1500 $750 $400 $250 $200
Politicalparty
$8000 $2000 $1000 $250 $200
See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216 (1975) (enacted by No. 23-4795, 1975 Mont. Laws Ch. 481 § 1).
I-118 lowered the cap on individual contributions whileraising the cap on contributions from political parties.1
1 Montana styles its limits on political parties as “aggregate” limits,meaning that a political party is treated as a single entity for contributionpurposes, even if the party is broken down into a number of different localcommittees across the state. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(2). These
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LAIR V. MOTL 7
Although the contribution limits at issue here originate fromI-118, the limits have not remained static. Since I-118’senactment, the Montana legislature has both amended thelimits and indexed them to inflation. See id. § 13-37-216(2003) (raising the limits); Act of Apr. 27, 2007, 2007 Mont.Laws Ch. 328 § 1 (H.B. 706) (indexing the limits toinflation); Admin. R. Mont. 44.11.227. Moreover, unlike thepre-1994 limits, I-118’s limits apply per election (rather thanper cycle), so a contributor may give up to the maximumtwice if a candidate faces a contested primary (once for theprimary and once for the general election). See Mont. CodeAnn. § 13-37-216(5); Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices,Amended Office Mgmt. Policy 2.4 Reinstating Pre-Lair 2016Campaign Contribution Limits at 2 (May 18, 2016) (“Pre-1994 Limits Policy”), http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/ContributionLimitPolicy (explaining that the pre-I-118limits applied per cycle).
Table 2 shows the post I-118 contribution limits in 1994(when they were enacted), 2011 (when this lawsuit began)and today. Table 3 compares the pre-I-118 limits to the postI-118 limits as of 2017.
aggregate limits are different in kind from the ones the Supreme Courtstruck down in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). There, theaggregate limits meant that once an individual’s contributions to allcandidates added up to the aggregate limit, he could no longer give anymoney to any candidates. See id. at 1443, 1448. Montana’s aggregationof political party contributions, by contrast, permits a party to contributeup to the limit to as many candidates as the party wishes.
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Ta
ble
2:
Pos
t-In
itia
tive
118
Lim
its2
Gov
ern
orO
ther
Sta
tew
ide
Ele
ctio
nP
ub
lic
Ser
vice
Co
mm
issi
onS
tate
Sen
ate
Oth
er P
ub
lic
Off
ice
1994
2011
2017
1994
2011
2017
1994
2011
2017
1994
2011
2017
199
420
11
201
7
Ind
ivid
ual
/P
AC
$800
$100
0$1
320
$400
$500
$660
$200
$260
$340
$200
$260
$340
$20
0$2
60
$34
0
Pol
itic
alp
arty
$15,
000
$36,
000
$47,
700
$500
0$1
3,00
0$1
7,20
0$2
000
$520
0$6
900
$800
$210
0$2
800
$50
0$
13
00$1
700
See
Mon
t. C
ode
Ann
. § 1
3-37
-216
; A
dmin
. R. M
ont.
44.
11.2
27.
2 Lim
its
sho
wn
are
the
max
imum
per
cyc
le a
ssum
ing
a ca
ndid
ate
face
s a
cont
este
d pr
imar
y. P
er e
lect
ion
lim
its
are
one
half
of t
he a
mou
nt s
how
n.
LAIR V. MOTL8
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Tab
le 3
: P
re-I
nit
iati
ve 1
18 L
imit
s vs
. 201
7 L
imit
s
PR
E-I
NIT
IAT
IVE
118
2017
Per
Cycl
eP
er C
ycle
Per
Ele
ctio
n
Ind
ivid
ual
s/P
AC
Gov
erno
r$15
00
$1320
$66
0
Oth
er s
tate
wid
e$75
0$6
60
$33
0
Pub
lic
Ser
vice
Com
mis
sion
er$40
0$3
40
$17
0
Sta
te l
egis
latu
re$25
0$3
40
$17
0
Cit
y o
r co
unty
off
ice
$20
0$3
40
$17
0
Pol
itic
al P
arti
es
Gov
erno
r$8
000
$47,7
00$23,8
50
Oth
er s
tate
wid
e$2
000
$17,2
00$8
600
Pub
lic
Ser
vice
Com
mis
sion
er$10
00$6
900
$3450
Sta
te l
egis
latu
re$2
50$2
800
$1400
Cit
y or
coun
ty o
ffic
e$2
00$1
700
$850
LAIR V. MOTL 9
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LAIR V. MOTL10
B. Eddleman
We first addressed – and upheld – the constitutionality ofMontana’s contribution limits in Montana Right to Life Ass’nv. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). ApplyingBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and Nixonv. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000),we held
state campaign contribution limits will beupheld if (1) there is adequate evidence thatthe limitation furthers a sufficiently importantstate interest, and (2) if the limits are “closelydrawn” – i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on thestate’s interest, (b) leave the contributor freeto affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow thecandidate to amass sufficient resources towage an effective campaign.
Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092.
At step one, we held Montana’s limits furthered thestate’s “interest in preventing corruption or the appearance ofcorruption.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, we noted “[t]heevidence presented by . . . Montana . . . [wa]s sufficient tojustify the contribution limits imposed, and indeed carrie[d]more weight than that presented in Shrink Missouri.” Id. at1093. We defined “corruption” or its appearance to includeboth “instances of bribery of public officials” and “thebroader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishesof large contributors.” Id. at 1092 (quoting Shrink, 528 U.S.at 389).
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LAIR V. MOTL 11
At step two, we held Montana’s limits were “‘closelydrawn’ to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associationalfreedoms.” Id. at 1093. The limits were adequately tailoredto the state’s “interest in preventing corruption and theappearance of corruption” because they “affect[ed] only thetop 10% of contributions, and . . . the percentage affectedinclude[d] the largest contributions” – those most likely to beassociated with actual or perceived corruption. Id. at 1094. The limits also allowed candidates to amass sufficientresources to wage effective campaigns, as shown bytestimony from candidates and statistics demonstrating theminor effects of the limits on fundraising compared to thelow cost of campaigning in Montana. See id. at 1094–95. The limits, moreover, had caused no significant difference inthe amount challengers were able to raise compared toincumbents. See id. at 1095. We therefore upheld Montana’slimits.
C. Randall
Three years later, the Supreme Court’s decision inRandall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), left Eddleman’sholding on less stable footing. Randall invalidatedVermont’s contribution limits, and a three-justice pluralityled by Justice Breyer proposed a new two-part, multi-factor“closely drawn” test. As we subsequently explained,
[u]nder [the Randall] test, the reviewing courtfirst should identify if there are any “dangersigns” that the restrictions on contributionsprevent candidates from amassing theresources necessary to be heard or putchallengers at a disadvantage vis-a-visincumbents. [Randall, 548 U.S.] at 249–52.
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LAIR V. MOTL12
The plurality found four “danger signs” inVermont’s contribution limits: “(1) The limitsare set per election cycle, rather than dividedbetween primary and general elections; (2) thelimits apply to contributions from politicalparties; (3) the limits are the lowest in theNation; and (4) the limits are below those wehave previously upheld.” Id. at 268 (Thomas,J., concurring) (listing the plurality’s “dangersigns”). The plurality held, if such dangersigns exist, then the court must determinewhether the limits are “closely drawn.”
The plurality looked to “five sets ofconsiderations” to determine whether thestatute was closely drawn: (1) whether the“contribution limits will significantly restrictthe amount of funding available forchallengers to run competitive campaigns”;(2) whether “political parties [must] abide byexactly the same low contribution limits thatapply to other contributors”; (3) whether“volunteer services” are consideredcontributions that would count toward thelimit; (4) whether the “contribution limits are. . . adjusted for inflation”; and (5) “anyspecial justification that might warrant acontribution limit so low or so restrictive.” Id. at 253–62.
Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2015) (Lair II)(last two alterations in original) (citations omitted). Althoughthis test is in many respects similar to the tailoring inquiry at
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LAIR V. MOTL 13
step two of the Eddleman analysis, it does not map perfectlyonto Eddleman.
D. Lair
After Randall, the plaintiffs commenced this actionchallenging Montana’s limits a second time. The districtcourt concluded Randall abrogated Eddleman’s approach toevaluating contribution limits and held Montana’s limits wereinvalid under Randall. See Lair v. Murry, 903 F. Supp. 2d1077, 1093 (D. Mont. 2012). Montana appealed.
Because the district court’s decision came weeks beforea state election, Montana sought a stay pending appeal, whicha motions panel of this court granted in a published decision. See Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012)(Lair I). The motions panel held Randall had not abrogatedEddleman, because no “opinion [in Randall] can bemeaningfully regarded as narrower than another and canrepresent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.” Id. at 1205 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado,399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir.), amended by 416 F.3d 939(9th Cir. 2005)). Assuming arguendo Justice Breyer’splurality opinion was controlling, Lair I concluded Randallapplied rather than altered Buckley, the primary decision uponwhich Eddleman had relied. Id. at 1206–08. Finally, evenapplying Randall’s somewhat different “closely drawn”analysis, Lair I concluded Montana’s limits would likelysurvive scrutiny. Id. at 1208–13.
We then heard Montana’s appeal on the merits. See LairII, 798 F.3d at 744. In Lair II, we followed the motionspanel’s holding that Randall did not abrogate Eddleman’sgeneral approach to evaluating contribution limits. Id. at 747.
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LAIR V. MOTL14
We also held, however, that the Supreme Court’s decisions inCitizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), andMcCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), had limited theimportant state interest at Eddleman’s first step to preventing“quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance.” Lair II,798 F.3d at 746. McCutcheon defined quid pro quocorruption as “a direct exchange of an official act for money”or “dollars for political favors” and the “appearance” of quidpro quo corruption as “public awareness of the opportunitiesfor abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financialcontributions to particular candidates.” 134 S. Ct. at 1441,1450 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Eddlemanhad relied on a broader definition of corruption – embracingboth quid pro quo and a generalized “access and influence”theory – Citizens United and McCutcheon underminedEddleman’s holding that Montana’s limits were justified byan important state interest. We therefore remanded for thedistrict court to evaluate Montana’s limits under theEddleman framework, but with the important state interestlimited to preventing actual or perceived quid pro quocorruption.
On remand, the district court held the limitsunconstitutional under both prongs of Eddleman. In thedistrict court’s view, Montana did not provide adequateevidence that its contribution limits further the state’s interestin combating quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Thecourt acknowledged evidence of various attempts to obtainpolitical favors through campaign contributions butconcluded these examples were inadequate because they didnot show the attempted corruption succeeded. “The stickingpoint with respect to the evidence Defendants rely upon isthat the quids in each one of the cited instances were eitherrejected by, or were unlikely to have any behavioral effect
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LAIR V. MOTL 15
upon, the individuals toward whom they were directed.” Lairv. Motl, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1034 (D. Mont. 2016). UnderEddleman’s “closely drawn” prong, the district courtconcluded the limits both prevented candidates fromcampaigning effectively and were not narrowly focused,“because they were expressly enacted to combat theimpermissible interests of reducing influence and leveling theplaying field.” Id. at 1035. Montana again appealed. Wehave jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
II. Standard of Review
We generally review a district court’s legal conclusionsde novo and its factual findings for clear error. See Lair II,798 F.3d at 745. In the First Amendment context, however,“our review [of the district court’s fact finding] is morerigorous than other cases.” Id. at 748 n.8; see also Randall,548 U.S. at 249 (plurality opinion) (“[C]ourts, includingappellate courts, must review the record independently andcarefully with an eye toward assessing the statute’s‘tailoring,’ that is, toward assessing the proportionality of therestrictions.”). In addition, we “review the application of[the] law to those facts de novo on free speech issues.” LairII, 798 F.3d at 745.
III. Discussion
A. Important State Interest
Under Eddleman, we ask first whether “there is adequateevidence that [Montana’s] limitation[s] further[] . . . [the]important state interest” of preventing actual or perceivedquid pro quo corruption. 343 F.3d at 1092. This step of theinquiry is divorced from the actual amount of the limits – it
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LAIR V. MOTL16
is a threshold question whether any level of limitation isjustified. As we explained in Eddleman:
[The plaintiff] does not dispute that[Montana’s interest in combating corruption]is sufficient to justify campaign contributionlimits. Rather, [the plaintiff] argues that thelimits imposed are unnecessarily stringent. . . .
This, however, is not the appropriate inquiry[at step one]. The correct focus . . . is whetherthe state has presented sufficient evidence ofa valid interest, not whether it has justified aparticular dollar amount. The latter inquiry, ifever appropriate, occurs in the second part ofour analysis, in examining whether therestriction is “closely drawn.”
Id.
To satisfy its burden, Montana must show the risk ofactual or perceived quid pro quo corruption is more than“mere conjecture.” Id. (quoting Shrink, 528 U.S. at 392); seeMcCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (reiterating the “mereconjecture” standard). Montana need not show any instancesof actual quid pro quo corruption. See Thalheimer v. City ofSan Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011). It mustshow “only that the perceived threat [is] not . . . ‘illusory.’” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at27).
This evidentiary burden is lowest where, as here, thestate’s purported interest is neither “novel” nor “implausible.”
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LAIR V. MOTL 17
Because the regulations at issue in Shrinkwere similar to those in Buckley, the state’sasserted interest was neither novel norimplausible. Therefore, the Court declined toimpose, let alone articulate, a stringentevidentiary burden. Shrink dealt with directcontributions to candidates, and Buckleyestablished that a limit on the amount of suchcontributions is “only a marginal restrictionupon the contributor’s ability to engage in freecommunication” that can be justified by thegovernment’s interest in preventing “politicalquid pro quo from current and potential officeholders.” 424 U.S. at 20–21, 26.
Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1122 (citations and internal quotationmarks omitted).3
Here, the important state interest requirement is satisfied. The plaintiffs do not dispute that Montana’s interest incombating quid pro quo corruption or its appearance justifiessome level of contribution limit. Indeed, the plaintiffsconceded at oral argument that they believed Montana’s pre-1994 limits were constitutional.
Even if the plaintiffs challenged this conclusion theywould not succeed, because Montana’s evidence shows thethreat of actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption in
3 This conclusion is consistent with the Randall plurality’s decision,which did not suggest Vermont lacked a valid interest in combating quidpro quo corruption. The plurality’s analysis was focused entirely on thetailoring of Vermont’s limits. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 248–60 (pluralityopinion).
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LAIR V. MOTL18
Montana politics is not illusory. State Representative HalHarper testified groups “funnel[] more money into campaignswhen certain special interests know an issue is coming up,because it gets results.” State Senator Mike Anderson sent a“destroy after reading” letter to his party colleagues, urgingthem to vote for a bill so a PAC would continue to funnelcontributions to the party:
Dear Fellow Republicans. Please destroy thisafter reading. Why? Because the LifeUnderwriters Association in Montana is oneof the larger Political Action Committees inthe state, and I don’t want the Demo’s toknow about it! In the last election they gave$8,000 to state candidates. . . . Of this $8,000– Republicans got $7,000 – you probably gotsomething from them. This bill is importantto the underwriters and I have been able tokeep the contributions coming our way. In1983, the PAC will be $15,000. Let’s keep itin our camp.
State Senator Bruce Tutvedt stated in a declaration thatduring the 2009 legislative session the National Right toWork group promised to contribute at least $100,000 to electRepublican majorities in the next election if he and hiscolleagues introduced and voted for a right-to-work bill in the2011 legislative session. Finally, a state court found two2010 state legislature candidates violated state election lawsby accepting large contributions from a corporation that“bragged . . . that those candidates that it supported ‘rode intooffice in 100% support of [the corporation’s] . . . agenda.’” See Comm’r of Political Practices v. Prouse, DDV-2014-250
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(1st Jud. Dist. Mont. 2016); Comm’r of Political Practices v.Boniek, XADV-2014-202 (1st Jud. Dist. Mont. 2015).
In concluding this evidence failed to justify contributionlimits, the district court imposed too high an evidentiaryburden on Montana.4 The court held Montana’s evidence wasinadequate because the attempted corruption did not succeed– the “quids” did not lead to “quos.” See Lair, 189 F. Supp.3d at 1034. But Montana need not show any completed quidpro quo transactions to satisfy its burden. It simply mustshow the risk of actual or perceived quid pro quo corruptionis not illusory, a bar Montana’s evidence easily clears. Montana’s contribution limits are of the same kind as inShrink and Buckley, and they are supported by at least asmuch evidence as was present in those cases. See Shrink,528 U.S. at 393–94 (noting a statement from a legislator “thatlarge contributions have ‘the real potential to buy votes’”;“newspaper accounts of large contributions supportinginferences of impropriety”; an example of a “state
4 Like the district court, the dissent would hold Montana to a morestringent evidentiary burden than our cases or the Supreme Court’s permit. The dissent says Montana must prove the existence of actual or apparentcorruption (Dissent at 37, 38, 41, 42), whereas we – following theSupreme Court – have repeatedly held that all Montana must do is showa “threat” or “risk” of actual or apparent corruption. Eddleman, 343 F.3dat 1092; Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2012). Thedissent similarly suggests Montana must show evidence of a completed,successful exchange of dollars for political favors to meets its evidentiaryburden. Dissent at 37 n.1, 38, 40, 41–42. But Montana need only showthat the threat of actual or apparent corruption is “not . . . illusory” or ismore than “mere conjecture.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27; Shrink, 528 U.S.at 392. For example, even if the “destroy after reading” letter did notresult in the successful purchase of a block of votes in exchange forcontributions, it certainly shows that the threat of such arrangements isnon-illusory.
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LAIR V. MOTL20
representative . . . ‘accused of sponsoring legislation inexchange for kickbacks’” (but not convicted); and a scandalin which the former attorney general pled guilty to misusingstate property to benefit campaign contributors); Buckley,424 U.S. at 27 n.28 (referencing generic “abuses uncoveredafter the 1972 elections”). Montana, therefore, has offeredadequate evidence that its limits further the important stateinterest of preventing quid pro quo corruption or itsappearance.5
B. “Closely Drawn”
We next address whether “the limits are ‘closely drawn’– i.e., [whether] they (a) focus narrowly on the state’sinterest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate with acandidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficientresources to wage an effective campaign.” Eddleman,343 F.3d at 1092. This tailoring inquiry “ensures the state’scontribution limits are not lower than needed to accomplishthe state’s goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption or itsappearance.” Lair II, 798 F.3d at 740 n.4. In conducting thisinquiry, courts owe significant deference to the legislativeprocess. As Buckley explained, courts have “no scalpel toprobe” these legislative judgments, so “distinctions in degree
5 In reaching the contrary conclusion, the dissent points to no case –and we are aware of none – where the risk of actual or apparent corruptionwas inadequate to justify contribution limits of some level. The plaintiffsthemselves concede Montana’s pre-Initiative 118 limits satisfy the FirstAmendment. Under the dissent’s logic, however, Montana’s evidence isinadequate to justify any contribution limits whatsoever, no matter howhigh. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092 (explaining that the valid interestanalysis is divorced from whether the state has justified the particulardollar amount of the limits at issue). On this record, that unprecedentedconclusion is simply untenable.
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become significant only when they . . . amount to differencesin kind.” 424 U.S. at 30 (citation omitted). Thus, “the dollaramounts employed to prevent corruption should be upheldunless they are ‘so radical in effect as to render politicalassociation ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice[below] the level of notice, and render contributionspointless.’” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Shrink,528 U.S. at 397).
1. Narrow Focus
The first part of the closely drawn analysis is whether thelimits are narrowly focused on Montana’s anti-corruptioninterest. We assess the “fit between the stated governmentalobjective and the means selected to achieve that objective,”McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445, looking at whether the limitstarget “the narrow aspect of political association where theactuality and potential for corruption have been identified,”Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
Here, because Montana’s limits target the kinds ofcontributions most likely to be associated with quid pro quocorruption, they satisfy the narrow focus inquiry. First, I-118targeted only the top 10% of pre-1994 contributions inMontana – the high-end contributions most likely to result inactual or perceived corruption. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at1094. We relied on this fact in Eddleman to conclude thelimits were narrowly focused. See id. Because the I-118limits were not indexed to inflation when Eddleman wasdecided, moreover, today’s limits affect an even smallerpercentage of contributions at the top of the range than theydid at that time.
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Second, Montana places the strictest limits on directmonetary contributions to candidates – the type of largessemost likely to effect actual or perceived corruption. SeeShrink, 528 U.S. at 393–94 (focusing on direct contributionsin discussing the evidence of corruption justifying Missouri’scontribution limits). Political party contributions – i.e.,indirect contributions – are capped tens of thousands ofdollars higher. Cf. Randall, 548 U.S. at 256 (pluralityopinion) (imposing the same limits on individuals andpolitical parties cuts against upholding the limits). Moreover,Montana’s “statute in no way prevents [individuals and]PACs from affiliating with their chosen candidates in waysother than direct contributions, such as donating money to acandidate’s political party, volunteering [their] services,sending direct mail to their supporters, or taking outindependent newspaper, radio, or television ads to conveytheir support.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. This, too, showstailoring for the type of contribution most likely associatedwith dollars-for-favors exchanges, without unnecessarilycurtailing other forms of political expression.
The plaintiffs argue Montana could accomplish its goalswith higher limits, but they seek a level of constitutionalprecision the Supreme Court has never required – Montananeed not “fine tune” its limits to stay within the FirstAmendment’s boundaries. As Buckley explained,
Appellants’ first overbreadth challenge . . .rests on the proposition that most largecontributors do not seek improper influence. . . . Although the truth of that propositionmay be assumed, it does not undercut thevalidity of the $1,000 contribution limitation. Not only is it difficult to isolate suspect
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contributions, but, more importantly,Congress was justified in concluding that theinterest in safeguarding against theappearance of impropriety requires that theopportunity for abuse inherent in the processof raising large monetary contributions beeliminated.
A second, related overbreadth claim is that the$1,000 restriction is unrealistically lowbecause much more than that amount wouldstill not be enough to enable an unscrupulouscontributor to exercise improper influence. . . . While the contribution limitationprovisions might well have been [higher insome cases], Congress’ failure to engage insuch fine tuning does not invalidate thelegislation.
424 U.S. at 29–30. Here, especially given that the plaintiffsdo not dispute the constitutionality of the pre-1994 limits,they ask us to police a “distinction[] in degree,” not a“difference[] in kind.” Id. at 30 (noting the differencebetween $1,000 and $2,000 was a distinction in degree). Thisis a legislative judgment we decline to second guess.6
6 At oral argument, the plaintiffs contended Montana must justify thechange between the pre-1994 limits and today’s limits. Everycontribution limit case of which we are aware, however, evaluates thecurrent limits, and the plaintiffs point to no authority suggestingotherwise. In Randall, for example, the Court evaluated Vermont’sexisting limits without discussing whether the change from Vermont’sprevious regime was justified. See 548 U.S. at 237, 239, 248–63 (pluralityopinion). Even if the change in limits were relevant, for the reasons wehave discussed the difference between the pre-1994 limits and today’s
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We acknowledge Montana’s chosen dollar amounts mightappear low, but they are not constitutionally suspect. First,Montana’s limits are not an outlier compared to other states’limits:
Table 4: 2015–2016 Limits on Contributions toGubernatorial Candidates7
State Limit
Montana $1320 per cycle
Alaska $1000 per cycle
Colorado $1150 per cycle
Delaware $1200 per cycle
Massachusetts $1000 per calendar year
Rhode Island $1000 per calendar year
Second, even if the limits are low in absolute terms, theyare quite reasonable compared to the low cost of campaigningin the state. Montana to the present is “one of the leastexpensive states in the nation in which to run a politicalcampaign.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. When contributionlimits are viewed in relation to the cost of campaigning for astate house seat, Montana’s limits are proportionally higher
limits is not constitutionally significant. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
7 See Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., State Limits on Contributions toCandidates 2015–2016 Election Cycle (July 31, 2015), www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/state-limits-on-contributions-to-candidates.aspx.
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than both the federal limits and those of 12 other states.8 Table 5 shows contribution limits relative to the cost ofcampaigning in the nine states within the Ninth Circuit:
Table 5: Maximum Contributions as a Percentage of
Total Fundraising in 2010 State House Races9
State Avg. Total Limit Ratio
Montana $8,231 $320 3.89%
Alaska $36,870 $1000 2.71%
Arizona $37,411 $410 1.1%
California $355,789 $7800 2.19%
Hawaii $26,956 $2000 7.42%
Idaho $17,245 $2000 11.6%
Nevada $74,634 $10,000 13.4%
Oregon $116,536 none n/a
Washington $85,039 $1600 1.88%
8 For state senate races, Montana’s limits are proportionally higherthan both the federal limits and those of 14 other states.
9 For simplicity’s sake, the term “state house” refers to the lowerchamber of the state legislature, even if a given state calls its lowerchamber something else.
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Montana’s limits are low only if we ignore the low cost ofcampaigning in the state. Once that reality is factored in,Montana’s limits fit well within the mainstream.
Third, Montana’s limits are reasonable compared to thesize of a typical contribution in Montana. In 2010 state houseraces, for example, the average individual contributed about$90, when the per cycle limit was $320. In the 2008 race forgovernor, the typical contribution was only $185, when theper cycle limit was $1200. Thus, in addition to targeting onlythe top 10% of contributions, the limits do not come close tocurtailing the average contributor’s participation incampaigns.
Fourth, Montana’s limits are reasonably keyed to theactual evidence showing a risk of corruption in Montana. Inhis “burn after reading” letter, written shortly before I-118was passed, Senator Anderson suggested a political actioncommittee could obtain political favors from an entire blockof legislators through contributions totaling just $8,000. Evenadjusted for inflation, that is only a few hundred dollars perlegislator. If such contributions can corrupt the legislativeprocess, Montana’s limits are anything but an exaggeratedresponse to the risk of actual or perceived corruption thatexists in the state.
We should not – and indeed cannot – be in the business offine tuning contribution limits for states. These judgmentsare for state lawmakers to make (including voters actingthrough the initiative process). As judges, our limited role isto ensure that a state chooses limits that are not “so radical ineffect as to render political association ineffective, drive thesound of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice, andrender contributions pointless.” Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397.
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Because Montana’s limits satisfy this standard, we hold theyare narrowly focused.
The district court concluded otherwise because, in the1994 Voter Information Pamphlet attached to I-118, theinitiative’s sponsors argued “[t]here is just way too muchmoney in Montana politics” and urged voters to pass I-118 toprevent “[m]oney from special interests and the wealthy”from “drowning out the voice of regular people,” reasonsthat are inadequate to justify contribution limits underMcCutcheon. The district court thus concluded the Montanavoters who approved I-118 acted with an impermissiblemotive, meaning the limits “could never be said to focusnarrowly on a constitutionally-permissible anti-corruptioninterest.” Lair, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1035. We disagree.
The district court incorrectly cast the narrow focus test asa motive inquiry that looks at the voters’ underlying intentwhen they enacted the limits. The narrow focus test,however, is a tailoring test, not a motive test. It measureshow effectively the limits target corruption compared to howmuch they inhibit associational freedoms – i.e., whether the
limitation focuses precisely on the problem oflarge campaign contributions – the narrowaspect of political association where theactuality and potential for corruption havebeen identified – while leaving persons free toengage in independent political expression, toassociate actively through volunteering theirservices, and to assist to a limited butnonetheless substantial extent in supportingcandidates and committees with financialresources.
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Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28; see Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094(analyzing fit without reference to underlying voter intent). We are aware of no case looking to underlying legislative orvoter intent in making this evaluation. Although there issome logic that the sponsors’ goal behind I-118 revealssomething about the limits’ fit, the actual content and effectof the limits – which, as discussed, target the contributionsmost likely to generate corruption or its appearance – bettershow their tailoring. We therefore disapprove the districtcourt’s reasoning.
2. Contributors’ Ability to Affiliate with Candidates
The closely drawn inquiry next assesses whether thecontribution limits “leave the contributor free to affiliate witha candidate.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092. Montana not onlypermits such affiliation through direct monetarycontributions, but also “in ways other than directcontributions, such as donating money to a candidate’spolitical party, volunteering . . . , sending direct mail . . . , ortaking out independent newspaper, radio, or television ads toconvey . . . support.” Id. at 1094. The plaintiffs effectivelyconcede that contributors may associate with candidates,arguing only that some contributors would like to give morethan the limits allow. Thus, Montana’s limits satisfy prongtwo of the closely drawn analysis.
3. Candidates’ Ability to Campaign Effectively
The final part of the closely drawn inquiry asks whetherMontana’s limits prevent candidates from amassing sufficientresources to campaign effectively. Eddleman held they didnot, see 343 F.3d at 1095, and we see no reason to reach adifferent conclusion.
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To begin with, the evidence from Montana candidatesshows the limits do not prevent effective campaigning. Montana Secretary of State Mark Cooney testified, “I don’tfeel that the limitations . . . have been harmful to mycandidacy at all.” Representative Harper testified the limitshad “[j]ust negligible effects” on his campaigns. Anothercandidate testified he raised more money after the limits werein place than before. Although one candidate initiallytestified the limits made it “more difficult” for him to raiseenough money, he later clarified he “didn’t mean that [hiscampaigns] were ineffective.” He explained, “I mean I didwhat I had to to win. If my opponents would have beentougher and I felt that I needed to, I would have raised moremoney, gone out and done the work that I needed to to runthat effective campaign.”
One candidate witness (Mike Miller) did suggest thelimits made his campaigns ineffective, but the facts belie hisclaim. Between 2008 and 2014, Miller’s campaigns receivedmaxed-out contributions from only seven of hisapproximately 200 contributors, and Miller won all four ofhis elections.
Statistical data confirm that the limits do not preventeffective campaigning. Plaintiffs’ expert Clark Bensenopined that “a high proportion of maxed-out donors” wouldbe an indicator that “the limits were too low.” Suppl.Excerpts R. 109 (“Bensen Report”). In Montana, however,maximum contributions are relatively rare. In 2010 statehouse and senate races, for example, 85% of individual
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contributors gave less than the statutory limit.10 Politicalparties contributed below the limit 78% of the time. Numbersfrom other years and other races are comparable. This lowproportion of maximum contributions shows the limits do notunduly inhibit candidate fundraising.
The plaintiffs argue competitive elections provide theproper context for evaluating contribution limits, and theypoint out that the percentage of maximum contributions incompetitive elections is higher, about 29%. The plaintiffs arecorrect that the plurality opinion in Randall focused oncompetitive races rather than average ones. See 548 U.S. at255–56. But this focus was based on the potential advantagecontribution limits might grant incumbents in competitiveraces. See id. Because these races tend to be moreexpensive, challengers may need to rely on largecontributions more than incumbents do, so overly strict limitscould disproportionately affect challengers. See id. at 256.
The plaintiffs, however, have not shown this problemexists in Montana. Incumbents and challengers incompetitive races have virtually the same percentage ofmaxed-out contributors. See Bensen Report at 101 (“Therewas very little difference with respect to incumbency [versuschallengers]” as to who relied on maximum or near maximumcontributions in competitive races.); cf. Randall, 548 U.S. at253–55 (citing to an expert report, also by Clark Bensen,showing Vermont’s contribution limits significantly reducedchallenger fundraising in competitive races). Indeed, wenoted in Eddleman that “the average gap between the total
10 1,402 maximum donations; 4,469 donations below the maximumbut above the $35 reporting threshold; estimated 3,768 donations belowthe $35 threshold, assuming an average contribution of $20.
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amount of money raised by incumbents and challengers forall legislative races was only $65.00 per race.” 343 F.3d at1095.
Three other circumstances underscore the tailoring ofMontana’s limits to avoid unduly favoring incumbents. First,Montana permits political parties to contribute far more thanindividuals and PACs. As the plaintiffs’ own expert testified,political parties give predominantly to challengers inMontana, whereas PACs contribute more often toincumbents. In Randall, by contrast, Vermont imposedidentical limits on parties, individuals and PACs, reflectingan incumbency bias cutting against the limits’constitutionality. See 548 U.S. at 256–57 (plurality opinion). Second, Montana’s limits apply per election, rather than percycle, meaning a contributor may give up to the limit twice ifa candidate runs in a contested primary. Because challengersgenerally face contested primaries more often thanincumbents, per election limits mitigate the incumbentfundraising advantage. This, too, distinguishes this case fromRandall, where Vermont’s per cycle limits were a “dangersign” of the limits’ unconstitutionality. See id. at 249. Third,by prohibiting “incumbents from using excess funds from onecampaign in future campaigns,” Montana “keeps incumbentsfrom building campaign war chests and gaining a fundraisinghead start over challengers.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1095. The anti-challenger bias that animated the plurality inRandall simply is not present here.
In sum, challengers and incumbents alike remain capableof running effective campaigns in Montana. Even if somecandidates might prefer to seek fewer, larger contributions tomeet their fundraising needs (rather than more numerous,smaller contributions), when “a candidate is merely required
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‘to raise funds from a greater number of persons and tocompel people who would otherwise contribute amountsgreater than the statutory limits to expend such funds ondirect political expression,’ the candidate’s freedom of speechis not impugned by limits on contributions.” Id. at 1091(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21–22). We hold Montana’slimits do not prevent candidates from amassing sufficientresources to campaign effectively.
* * *
Montana’s limits are closely drawn to further the state’simportant interest in preventing actual or perceived quid proquo corruption. Montana has shown the risk of quid pro quocorruption in Montana is not illusory. Its chosen contributionlimits are narrowly focused; they do not prevent contributorsfrom affiliating with the candidates of their choosing; andthey do not prevent candidates from raising the moneyneeded for effective campaigning, whether the candidate is anincumbent or challenger and whether the race is competitiveor average. We hold, therefore, that Montana’s limits surviveFirst Amendment scrutiny. The district court erred byholding otherwise.
C. Randall
Even if we were wrong in Lair II to hold Eddlemancontrols our evaluation of Montana’s contribution limits, wewould reach the same conclusion under the plurality’sdecision in Randall. The Randall test first looks for “dangersigns” that the limits prevent candidates from raising enoughmoney to be heard and challengers from raising enough tocompete against incumbents. See 548 U.S. at 249–52(plurality opinion). The plurality found four such “danger
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signs” in Vermont’s limits: “(1) The limits are set perelection cycle, rather than divided between primary andgeneral elections; (2) the limits apply to contributions frompolitical parties; (3) the limits are the lowest in the Nation;and (4) the limits are below those we have previouslyupheld.” Id. at 268 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)(listing the plurality’s “danger signs”).
If these “danger signs” exist, a court then assesses
“five sets of considerations” to determinewhether the statute was closely drawn:(1) whether the “contribution limits willsignificantly restrict the amount of fundingavailable for challengers to run competitivecampaigns”; (2) whether “political parties[must] abide by exactly the same lowcontribution limits that apply to othercontributors”; (3) whether “volunteerservices” are considered contributions thatwould count toward the limit; (4) whether the“contribution limits are . . . adjusted forinflation”; and (5) “any special justificationthat might warrant a contribution limit so lowor so restrictive.” [Randall, 548 U.S.] at253–62.
Lair II, 798 F.3d at 743 (first alteration in original) (citationsomitted).
The motions panel in Lair I addressed each of these“danger signs” and “considerations” at length, concludingthat Randall likely “would not have mandated a differentresult in Eddleman.” 697 F.3d at 1208; see id. at 1208–13.
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We agree. Montana’s limits apply per election, not per cycle. The lowest limits do not apply to political parties. The limitsare not the lowest in the nation; they are higher than Alaska’s($1000 per cycle for governor), Colorado’s ($1150),Delaware’s ($1200) and arguably Massachusetts’ ($1000 percalendar year) and Rhode Island’s ($1000 per calendar year). Although Montana’s limits are lower in absolute terms thanthose the Court has previously upheld, they are significantlyhigher than those the Court struck down in Randall ($400 percycle for governor). They are also higher as a percentage ofthe cost of campaigning than the federal limits Buckleyupheld.11 Montana’s limits do not favor incumbents orprevent challengers from fundraising effectively. Politicalparties may contribute far more than individuals and PACs;they also may provide campaigns with paid staffers, whosewages are not counted against the party’s contribution limits. See Mont. Admin. R. 44.11.225(3). Contributors mayvolunteer for campaigns and otherwise express their supportin ways beyond direct contributions. Finally, Montana’s
11 As discussed above, Montana’s limits are particularly modest whenthe cost of campaigning is taken into account – a useful way to measurea maximum contribution’s impact on a campaign. A maximumcontribution in Montana accounted for 3.89% of the total amount a 2010state house candidate raised. This percentage was higher than thepercentage for the federal limits (0.5% across all House of Representativesraces), the dollar amounts of which the Court approved in Buckley. Montana’s limits are also proportionally higher than those in Alaska(2.71%), Arizona (1.1%), California (2.19%), Colorado (1.1%),Connecticut (2.19%), Delaware (1.91%), Florida (0.87%), Massachusetts(2.14%), Michigan (0.94%), Tennessee (3.78%), Washington (1.88%) andWisconsin (2.98%). Thus, although Montana’s limits are on the low sidein absolute terms – but not an outlier – they are relatively high given thelow cost of campaigning in the state.
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limits are adjusted for inflation. Accordingly, Montana’scontribution limits would survive scrutiny even if Randall governed.
IV. Conclusion
Our Constitution permits contribution limits to serve thenarrow but vital purpose of preventing actual or apparent quidpro quo corruption in politics. Because the limitationsimposed by Montana Code Annotated § 13-37-216 bothfurther that interest and are adequately tailored to it, theysatisfy the First Amendment.
REVERSED.
BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Our representative government requires and relies on theready flow of ideas between elected legislators and the voters. Those ideas are mostly transmitted during election campaignsby advertisements and organized rallies, examples of freespeech, neither of which come free. Contributors to thecampaigns want their ideas made known and accepted by thecampaigning legislators. Restrictions on citizens’ campaigncontributions limit their ability to make their ideas known andto influence the legislators to accept and further those ideas. For these reasons, our First Amendment law permits limits onsuch contributions only if the restrictions are closely drawnto a valid, important state interest. Courts must carefullyscrutinize such limitations. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (“the First Amendment requires us toerr on the side of protecting political speech rather than
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suppressing it” (citation omitted)). Here, the district courtproperly evaluated the evidence submitted by Montana’sofficials and found the officials had not established the onlyconstitutionally permissible and valid state interest sufficientto justify Montana’s campaign contribution limits: theprevention of corruption or its appearance. Thus, Irespectfully dissent.
In Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085,1092 (9th Cir. 2003), we upheld Montana’s campaigncontribution limits under a two-part test: 1) the contributionlimits must respond to a valid important state interest and2) the contribution limits must be closely drawn to thatinterest. In that decision, we recognized that discouraging“undue influence” gained over legislators by contributorsthrough their contributions could be a valid important stateinterest. 343 F.3d at 1096–97. As we recognized in Lair v.Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2015), the SupremeCourt’s plurality decision in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230(2006), which held Vermont’s campaign contribution limitsunconstitutional under the First Amendment, did not alterEddleman’s framework because no opinion received thesupport of a majority of the justices.
If Citizens United had not been decided the way it was,the Montana officials’ claims here of a valid important stateinterest would make this an easy case for reversal. ButCitizens United changed all that because it narrowed what canconstitute a valid important state interest (at Eddleman’s firststep) to only the state’s interest in eliminating or reducingquid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The SupremeCourt explained in FEC v. National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee that “[t]he hallmark of corruption is thefinancial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” 470 U.S.
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480, 497 (1985). The mere prevention of influence onlegislators by contributors is now not a valid important stateinterest that could justify campaign contribution limits. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010); see alsoMcCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441. As such, only the avoidanceof corruption or the appearance of corruption remain as astate interest valid and important enough to limit the freespeech rights of contributors exercised through theircontributions to their legislators.
To establish this sole valid important state interestdefendants here must demonstrate that the existence of actualor apparent quid pro quo corruption is more than “mereconjecture” and is not “illusory.”1 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at1092. While an appellate court’s review of a district court’sfactual findings is more rigorous in the First Amendment
1 A common sense understanding of quid pro quo corruption suggeststhat it is limited to exchanges in which a politician personally pocketsmoney in exchange for an official action that violated the politician’sobligations of office. The notion that contributions to a candidate’scampaign fund, one of the key mechanisms by which constituentsinfluence their elected representatives, could ever constitute part of animproper exchange for an official act seems implausible since thecontribution of funds to a campaign to effect influence is their expectedand proper purpose. Despite this, the Supreme Court has earlierrecognized that quid pro quo corruption includes occasions when“[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations ofoffice by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions ofmoney into their campaigns.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460–61(quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at497 (emphasis added)). As such, under Supreme Court precedentcontributions made for the permissible purpose of influencing legislatorscan apparently constitute quid pro quo corruption in certain circumstances. Such influence is improper corruption when, in fact, the legislator actscontrary to his legal obligation(s). In our record, there is no evidence ofsuch an illegal act.
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context, our prior precedent has confirmed that we stillreview such factual findings with some deference. SeeNewton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 930 F.2d 662, 670 (9th Cir.1990) (“[W]e must simultaneously ensure the appropriateappellate protection of First Amendment values and still deferto the findings of the trier of fact.”); see also PlannedParenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of LifeActivists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1066–70 (9th Cir. 2002). Becausethe district court entered judgment on cross motions forsummary judgment, however, a de novo standard of reviewas to the existence of a material triable issue of fact properlyapplies here.
A close examination of relevant evidence from the recordmakes clear that the district court’s finding that defendantsfailed to carry their burden to prove the appearance orexistence of quid pro quo corruption at the first step ofEddleman, as narrowed by Citizens United, was correct evenif reviewed under a de novo standard. That is because therecord here is devoid of any evidence of exchanges of dollarsfor political favors – much less for any actions contrary tolegislators’ obligations of office – or any reason to believe theappearance of such exchanges will develop in the future.
First, consider the letter sent by Senator Mike Andersonto his party-colleagues, urging them to vote for a bill so thatmoney from certain political action committees wouldcontinue to flow to the Republican Party’s coffers. None ofthe record evidence shows that any legislator accepted thedeal articulated by Senator Anderson and, despite fiveseparate investigations, Anderson himself was never found tohave engaged in any unlawful practices. Eddleman, 343 F.3dat 1093. Rather than actual or apparent quid pro quocorruption, the event shows rejection of temptation. Next,
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consider the offer to contribute $100,000 to the RepublicanLegislative Campaign Committee in exchange for Republicanlegislators’ support for a right-to-work bill, as testified to bySenator Bruce Tutvedt. This offer also did not constitute quidpro quo corruption because the Republican legislatorsrejected it. Further, they likely would have introduced andsupported such a right-to-work bill regardless of this offer, asit was consistent with their political party’s policy position. More importantly, even had certain legislators accepted theseoffers (as Representative Hal Harper’s generalized testimonysuggests sometimes occurred), such actions would appear toconstitute nothing more than the trading of influence andaccess, which are critical mechanisms through which ourpolitical system responds to the needs of constituents. SeeCitizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (“that speakers may haveinfluence over or access to elected officials does not meanthat these officials are corrupt”).
Similarly, the Montana state court decisions referenced bydefendants do not establish actual or apparent quid pro quocorruption. These include:
• The Montana Supreme Court held in 2013 that a PublicService Commissioner unlawfully accepted financial giftsfrom power companies that “would tend to improperlyinfluence a reasonable person in [the Commissioner’s]position,” a number of which payments the Commissionerreturned to the contributor shortly after they werereceived. Molnar v. Fox, 301 P.3d 824, 832 (Mont.2013).
• Two Montana state trial court decisions found that two2010 legislative primary candidates violated statecampaign finance laws by accepting corporate
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contributions in return for promising 100 percent supportfor the corporations’ agenda and without properlyreporting such contributions. Comm’r of PoliticalPractices v. Boniek, XADV-2014-202 (1st Jud. Dist.Mont. 2015); Comm’r of Political Practices v. Prouse,DDV-2014-250 (1st Jud. Dist. Mont. 2016).
None of these cases involved bribery or the improper tradingof official acts by violating a legislator’s legal obligations formonetary contributions. Two of these cases (Boniek andProuse) were default judgments against individuals whonever even made it to a general election (each lost in theRepublican primaries), making quid pro quo corruption ineach circumstance impossible as neither candidate ever heldany office from which to grant official favors. Although theMontana court that adjudicated Boniek and Prouse labeled theconduct in both of these cases as “corruption,” the court didnot delineate which official actions taken by defendants inthese cases constituted an illegal official act, define what“corruption” meant in this context, or explain how thisfinding was related to the legal claims against defendantsbefore that court. Moreover, defendants Boniek and Prousealready held out-spoken conservative positions on issues likeright-to-work, abortion, guns, and government, meaning thatany official acts they may have taken to further the interestsof conservative contributors had they been elected wouldhave been consistent with their longstanding policy positionsand not primarily motivated as an exchange of an illegalofficial act for campaign contributions.
Finally, the declaration of Montana’s Commissioner ofPolitical Practices (Jonathan Motl) that numerous cases ofquid pro quo corruption occurred in Montana was rebutted bysworn declarations from the very politicians and political
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LAIR V. MOTL 41
candidates who, according to Motl, engaged in quid pro quocorruption. Given defendant Motl’s position asCommissioner of Political Practices, which gives him broadauthority to investigate political misdeeds, see Montana CodeAnnotated § 13-37-111, it is surprising, to say the least, thatthe only enforcement actions against purported quid pro quocorruption in Montana cited by defendants are the above-referenced, non-starter cases for violations of campaignfinance or ethics rules. One would expect that if quid pro quocorruption was as widespread as Commissioner Motl asserts,he could point at least to some actual court convictions forbribery or other forms of quid pro quo corruption.
Taken together, a detailed examination of the evidenceoffered by defendants establishes that the district courtconcluded correctly that the record evidence failed to proveany actual quid pro quo corruption. This still leaves thepossibility that the evidence in the record establishes theappearance of corruption in Montana. As Buckley v. Valeoexplained, “[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of actualquid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance ofcorruption stemming from public awareness of theopportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of largeindividual financial contributions.” 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976);see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450. In other words, theappearance of quid pro quo corruption is the “publicawareness of the opportunities for abuse.” For the veryreasons discussed above, however, none of the recordevidence establishes the existence of any opportunity for quidpro quo corruption or other abuses. Where is the evidencethat a legislator caused the re-routing of a freeway to benefita commercial landowner, who had paid the legislator’svacation travels? Where is the evidence that an airportconstruction contractor was awarded a contract, and had
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LAIR V. MOTL42
remodeled the legislator’s home at little or no cost to thelegislator? Rather, the record makes clear that Montanapoliticians often rejected even efforts by certain interests toinfluence or access legislators, that even seemingly minorviolations of campaign finance laws by unelected primarycandidates were rigorously punished, and that Montana’sCommissioner of Political Practices consistently reviewed thepropriety and legality of the actions of politicians, politicalcandidates, and various interest groups. In other words, theonly reasonable inference that may be drawn from the recordevidence is that there were few opportunities for abuse and,therefore, scant public awareness of such opportunities. Assuch, on this record the existence of actual or apparent quidpro quo corruption is, at best, “illusory” or “mere conjecture,”such that defendants have not met their burden to establish avalid important state interest to justify the contribution limitsat issue in this lawsuit. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092.
While it is admittedly difficult at times to distinguishbetween proscribed corruption and acceptable influence,given the important First Amendment interests at stake whenrestricting political speech we are obliged to scrutinizecarefully whether a valid important state interest exists beforeupholding the constitutionality of such restrictions. SeeMcCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (“The line between quid proquo corruption and general influence may seem vague attimes, but the distinction must be respected in order tosafeguard basic First Amendment rights.”). Although thereis admittedly some common sense to the notion that limitingthe amount of money citizens may contribute to politicalcandidates inherently forestalls corruption, because so doingalso restricts speech our federal constitution requires a greaterevidentiary showing than made on this record before a statemay restrict political speech through campaign contribution
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LAIR V. MOTL 43
limits. While the panel majority’s opinion pays lip service tothe changes in the Eddleman framework rendered by CitizensUnited, the contents of its analysis at Eddleman’s first stepdemonstrate it has failed to account substantively for thischange.
In footnote 5, the majority opinion notes that “[u]nder thedissent’s logic…Montana’s evidence is inadequate to justifyany contribution limit whatsoever, no matter how high.” Thisis quite correct. Absent a showing of the existence orappearance of quid pro quo corruption based on objectiveevidence, the presence of a subjective sense that there is a riskof such corruption or its appearance does not justify a limit oncampaign contributions. Restrictions on speech must bebased on fact, not conjecture.
Because I do not think defendants established theexistence of a valid important state interest at step one of theEddleman framework, I respectfully dissent.
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Commissioner of Political Practices Policies and Procedures
Amended Office Management Policy 2.4 Reinstating Pre-Lair 2016 Campaign Contribution limits Adopted: May 17, 2016; First amended on May 18, 2016; Second amended on May 26, 2016 Introduction The Federal District Court, in the Matter of Lair v. COPP No. 6:12-cv-00012-CCL, issued its Order on May 17, 2016 declaring that the limits imposed by Montana law on contributions to candidates for Montana public office are unconstitutional. The Federal Court’s Order has voided the limits on contributions. The contribution limits voided by the Federal Court were set by a November 1994 vote of Montana voters approving Initiative 118. The new limits set by I-118 amended limits were then set out at §13-37-216 MCA. In response to the Federal Court’s Order the Commissioner adopts the following amended policy. Policy The Commissioner hereby recognizes that Montana law reinstates the larger contribution limits in place under §13-37-216 MCA before those limits were amended by the now voided portion of I-118. The Commissioner notes that the Policy is adopted under the reasoning, authority and direction set by the Montana Supreme Court in State ex. rel. Woodahl v. District Court, 162 Mont. 283, 290, 511 P.2d 318, 322 (1972): '[a]n unconstitutional amendment to a law leaves the section intact as it had been before the attempted amendment." This issue is further addressed by AG Opinion Vol. 51, No. 2. I. Individual Contribution Limits The Court’s Order struck 13-37-216(1) MCA (2011) applying limits to individuals. The amounts for individual contributions set by §13-37-216 MCA before the now voided amendment by I-118 are as follows:
$1,500 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $750 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $400 limit for candidates for PSC, District Court Judge, and State Senator
cited in Lair v. Motl, No. 16-35424 archived on October 18, 2017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 1 of 22(44 of 70)
$250 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative)
Subsection (4) of §13-37-216 MCA (2011) sets an inflation factor based on the consumer price index in place in the year of 2002. The inflation factor was set by the Montana legislature independent of changes made by I-118. The Commissioner applies the inflation factor for the reason that it was not challenged by the Lair litigation and appears to be unaffected by the Court’s Order. Applying a 1.326 Inflation Factor to the reinstated pre-I-118 limits sets the following limits on individual contributions to a candidate for election in 2016:
$1,990 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $990 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $530 limit for candidates for PSC, District Court Judge, and State Senator $330 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative)
It is noted that the limits set by §13-37-216 MCA prior to amendment by I-118 were single limits covering both the primary and general election. Accordingly, the Commissioner adopts the above as a single limit for contributions to a 2016 Montana candidate for public office. II. Political Committee Contribution Limits, Other than Political Parties. The Court’s Order struck 13-37-216(1) MCA (2011), the subsection of law applying limits to political committees other than political party committees. The amounts for political committee contributions set by §13-37-216 MCA before the now voided amendment by I-118 are as follows:
$8,000 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $2,000 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $1,000 limit for candidates for PSC $600 limit for a candidate for the state senate $300 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative and District Court Judge)
Applying the inflation factor discussed above, the reinstated limits for political committees other than political party committees are:
$10,610 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $2,650 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $1,330 limit for candidates for PSC $800 limit for a candidate for the state senate
cited in Lair v. Motl, No. 16-35424 archived on October 18, 2017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 2 of 22(45 of 70)
$400 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative and District Court Judge)
It is noted that the limits set by §13-37-216 MCA prior to amendment by I-118 were single limits covering both the primary and general election. Accordingly, the Commissioner adopts the above as a single limit for contributions to a 2016 Montana candidate for public office. III. Political Party Contribution Limits The Court’s Order of May 17, 2016 struck 13-37-216(3) MCA (2011), the subsection of law applying limits to political party committees. On May 25, 2016 the Court issued its further Order staying the effect of this part of the Order as to Montana’s 2016 elections. Accordingly, political party contribution limits for 2016 elections were and are those set by 44.11.227 ARM: Office Contribution Limit – Per
Election Governor/Lieutenant Governor $23,850
Other Statewide offices $8,600
PSC $3,450
State Senate $1,400
All other Elected Offices $850
This Policy, with any amendments, is in effect barring further legislative or judicial action that might affect the contribution limits, including the completion of litigation in the matter of Lair v. COPP No. 6:12-CV-00012-CCL. Failure to adhere to these contribution limits will be treated as a violation of Montana’s campaign practice laws.
cited in Lair v. Motl, No. 16-35424 archived on October 18, 2017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 3 of 22(46 of 70)
cited in Lair v. Motl, No. 16-35424 archived on October 18, 2017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 4 of 22(47 of 70)
cited in Lair v. Motl, No. 16-35424 archived on October 18, 2017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 5 of 22(48 of 70)
Stat
e Li
mits
on
Cont
ribut
ions
to C
andi
date
s 20
15-2
016
Elec
tion
Cycle
Indi
vidu
al
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
St
ate
Part
y C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
PAC
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Co
rpor
ate
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Un
ion
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Al
abam
a Al
a. C
ode
§ 17
-5-1
et s
eq.
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Alas
ka
§ 15
.13.
070
and
15.1
3.07
4(f)
$ 500
/can
dida
te/y
ear
Aggr
egat
e am
ount
s ca
ndid
ates
may
acc
ept f
rom
no
n -re
siden
ts:
$20,
000/
year
/gub
cand
idat
e $5
,000
/yea
r/Se
nate
ca
ndid
ate
$3,0
00/y
ear/
Hous
e ca
ndid
ate
$100
,000
/yea
r/gu
b ca
ndid
ate
$15,
000/
year
/ Sen
ate
cand
idat
e $1
0,00
0/ye
ar/H
ouse
ca
ndid
ate
$5,0
00 m
unici
pal
$ 1,0
00/o
ffice
/yea
r
Cont
ribut
ions
from
out
-of-
stat
e PA
Cs p
rohi
bite
d
Proh
ibite
dd Pr
ohib
itedd
Arizo
nab,
e, 1
A.
R.S.
§ 1
6-90
5 an
d 16
-91
9
$5,0
00/s
tate
wid
e or
le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e
Aggr
egat
e co
ntrib
utio
ns
acce
pted
from
all
polit
ical
part
ies a
nd o
rgan
izatio
ns
cann
ot e
xcee
d:
$80,
000
– st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e $8
,000
– le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e
“Sup
er”
PACs
2 :$10
,000
/sta
tew
ide
or
l egi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate/
year
Re
gula
r PAC
s:
$5,0
00/s
tate
wid
e or
le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e/ye
ar
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
ion cy
cle
Proh
ibite
dd Pr
ohib
itedd
Arka
nsas
A.
C.A.
§ 7
-6-2
03
$2,7
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
na $2
,700
/can
dida
te/e
lect
iona
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
1 The
Ariz
ona
Citiz
ens C
lean
Ele
ctio
ns C
omm
issio
n ha
s file
d su
it in
Mar
icopa
Cou
nty
Supe
rior C
ourt
to b
lock
the
incr
ease
d lim
its, c
laim
ing
that
the
legi
slatio
n es
tabl
ishin
g th
em (H
B 25
93, 2
013)
vi
olat
ed th
e Vo
ter P
rote
ctio
n Ac
t, w
hich
bar
s the
legi
slatu
re fr
om m
akin
g ch
ange
s to
any
vote
r-ap
prov
ed la
ws w
ithou
t a se
cond
pop
ular
vot
e or
a 3
/4th
s vot
e o
f the
legi
slatu
re. T
his l
itiga
tion
coul
d re
sult
in a
n in
junc
tion
that
pre
vent
s the
new
lim
its fr
om g
oing
into
effe
ct. C
andi
date
s are
resp
onsib
le fo
r acc
eptin
g on
ly u
p to
the
lega
l max
imum
pur
suan
t to
law
and
cand
idat
es sh
ould
ch
eck
with
thei
r ele
ctio
n of
ficia
l as t
o th
e la
w’s
stat
us. T
he p
re-H
B 25
93 li
mits
wou
ld b
e $9
12/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
and
$440
/legi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate
per e
lect
ion
cycle
. 2 I
n Ar
izona
, a P
AC th
at h
as re
ceiv
ed co
ntrib
utio
ns fr
om 5
00 o
r mor
e in
divi
dual
s in
amou
nts o
f $10
or m
ore
in a
one
-yea
r per
iod
may
qua
lify
as a
“Sup
er P
AC.”
Qua
lifica
tion
is va
lid fo
r tw
o ye
ars.
(Ariz
. Rev
. Sta
t. §1
6-90
5(I))
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 6 of 22(49 of 70)
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Calif
orni
ae
Gov.
Cod
e §
8530
0 et
seq.
For e
lect
ions
hel
d on
or a
fter
Jan .
1, 2
013:
$2
8,20
0/gu
bern
ator
ial
cand
idat
e
$7,0
00/o
ther
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$
4,20
0/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
Unlim
ited
For e
lect
ions
hel
d on
or a
fter
Jan .
1, 2
013:
“S
mal
l Con
trib
utor
” Cm
tes3 :
$28,
200/
gube
rnat
oria
l ca
ndid
ate
$1
4,10
0/st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e
$8,5
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e
Regu
lar P
ACs:
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Colo
rado
e
Cons
titut
ion
Art.
XXVI
II
Effe
ctiv
e 3/
15/1
1 - 2
015:
$5
75/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$200
/legi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate
Limits
dou
ble
for a
cand
idat
e w
ho a
ccep
ts v
olun
tary
sp
endi
ng li
mits
if h
is/he
r op
pone
nt h
as n
ot a
ccep
ted
the
limits
and
has
raise
d m
ore
than
10%
of t
he li
mit.
Am
ount
s per
ele
ctio
na
Effe
ctiv
e 3/
15/1
1 - 2
015:
$6
15,0
75/g
ub. c
andi
date
$1
23,0
00/o
ther
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$22,
125/
Sena
te ca
ndid
ate
$15,
975/
Hous
e ca
ndid
ate
Note
: Co
ntrib
utio
ns b
y a
cand
idat
e to
his/
her o
wn
cam
paig
n , a
nd u
nexp
ende
d co
ntrib
utio
ns ca
rrie
d fo
rwar
d to
a su
bseq
uent
ele
ctio
n cy
cle, a
re tr
eate
d as
co
ntrib
utio
ns fr
om a
pol
itica
l pa
rty
and
are
subj
ect t
o th
e po
litica
l par
ty li
mits
. Par
ty
limits
cann
ot b
e do
uble
d fo
r ca
ndid
ates
who
acc
ept
volu
ntar
y lim
its.
Amou
nts a
re p
er a
pplic
able
el
ectio
n cy
cle.
Limits
effe
ctiv
e 3/
15/1
1 -
2015
: “S
mal
l Don
or” C
omm
ittee
s:4
$6,1
25/g
ub &
stat
ewid
e ca
nd
$2, 4
25/le
gis.
cand
idat
e Re
gula
r PAC
s and
Fed
eral
PA
Cs:
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Proh
ibite
d5 Ca
n co
ntrib
ute
thro
ugh
PAC’
s es
tabl
ished
by
the
orga
niza
tion
3 In
Calif
orni
a, a
“sm
all c
ontr
ibut
or co
mm
ittee
” is a
com
mitt
ee w
hich
has
bee
n in
exis
tenc
e fo
r at l
east
six m
onth
s, re
ceiv
es c
ontr
ibut
ions
from
100
or m
ore
pers
ons i
n am
ount
s of n
ot m
ore
than
$2
00 p
er p
erso
n, a
nd m
akes
cont
ribut
ions
to fi
ve o
r mor
e ca
ndid
ates
. (Ca
l. Go
vt. C
ode
§852
03)
4 In
Colo
rado
, a “s
mal
l don
or co
mm
ittee
” mea
ns a
ny p
oliti
cal c
omm
ittee
that
has
acc
epte
d co
ntrib
utio
ns o
nly
from
nat
ural
per
sons
who
eac
h co
ntrib
uted
no
mor
e th
an $
50 in
the
aggr
egat
e pe
r ye
ar.
5 Cor
pora
tions
are
pro
hibi
ted
from
don
atin
g m
oney
from
thei
r tre
asur
y, b
ut a
re p
erm
itted
to e
stab
lish
inde
pend
ent e
xpen
ditu
re co
mm
ittee
s or p
oliti
cal c
omm
ittee
s with
the
sam
e co
ntrib
utio
n lim
its a
s PAC
s
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 7 of 22(50 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Conn
ectic
utb
Ct.G
en.S
tat.
§ 9-
611,
9-
613
and
9-61
5 Up
date
July
201
3
$3,5
00/g
uber
nato
rial
cand
idat
e $2
,000
/oth
er st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e $1
,000
/Sen
ate
cand
idat
e $2
50/H
ouse
cand
idat
e $3
0,00
0 ag
greg
ate/
indi
vidu
al
to a
ll ca
ndid
ates
and
co
mm
ittee
s per
Ct.
Gen.
Sta
t. §
9-61
1(d)
. Al
l am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na
$50,
000/
gube
rnat
oria
l ca
ndid
ate
$35,
000/
othe
r sta
tew
ide
cand
idat
e $1
0,00
0/Se
nate
cand
idat
e $5
,000
/Hou
se ca
ndid
ate
All a
mou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
$5,0
00/g
uber
nato
rial
cand
idat
e $3
,000
/oth
er st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e $1
,500
/Sen
ate
cand
idat
e $7
50/H
ouse
cand
idat
e Ag
greg
ate
limits
on
cont
ribut
ions
by
PACs
to
cand
idat
es:
$100
,000
/ele
ctio
n by
a P
AC
esta
blish
ed b
y a
busin
ess
entit
y
$50,
000/
elec
tion
by a
PAC
es
tabl
ished
by
an
orga
niza
tion
All a
mou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
Proh
ibite
dd
Proh
ibite
dd
Dela
war
e 15
Del
. Cod
e §8
010
to
8013
$1,2
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$600
/oth
er ca
ndid
ate
All a
mou
nts p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
$75,
000/
gub e
rnat
oria
l ca
ndid
ate
$25,
000/
othe
r sta
tew
ide
cand
idat
e $5
,000
/Sen
ate
cand
idat
e $3
,000
/Hou
se ca
ndid
ate
All a
mou
nts p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
eci
ted
in L
air v
. Mot
l, N
o. 1
6-35
424
arch
ived
on
Oct
ober
18,
201
7
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 8 of 22(51 of 70)
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Fl
orid
a Fl
a. S
tat.
§ 10
6.08
$3,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/le
gisla
tive
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
(Effe
ctiv
e 11
/1/2
013)
A ca
ndid
ate
for s
tate
wid
e of
fice
may
not
acc
ept
cont
ribut
ions
from
par
ties
whi
ch in
the
aggr
egat
e ex
ceed
$25
0,00
0, a
nd n
o m
ore
than
$12
5,00
0 of
that
am
ount
may
be
rece
ived
du
ring
the
28 d
ays p
rece
ding
an
ele
ctio
n.
A le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e ca
n ac
cept
up
to $
50,0
00 e
ach
from
the
natio
nal o
r sta
te
exec
utiv
e co
mm
ittee
of a
pa
rty,
or u
p to
$50
,000
from
th
e co
unty
exe
cutiv
e co
mm
ittee
of a
par
ty.
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Geor
giae
O.C
.G.A
. § 2
1-5-
41 to
43
Limits
last
adj
uste
d 12
/201
0 Re
gula
r prim
ary
or g
ener
al:
$6,3
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$2,5
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e Ru
n -of
f: $3
,700
/sta
tew
ide
cand
idat
e $1
,300
/legi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Haw
aii
H.R.
S. §
2: 1
1-35
7, 1
1-35
9
$6,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$4,0
00/S
enat
e ca
ndid
ate
$2,0
00/H
ouse
cand
idat
e Co
ntrib
utio
ns fr
om a
ca
ndid
ate'
s im
med
iate
fam
ily
are
limite
d to
$50
,000
in a
n el
ectio
n cy
cle, i
nclu
ding
loan
s.
All a
mou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 9 of 22(52 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Idah
o §
67-6
610A
$5,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/le
g ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
$10,
000/
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$2,0
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Illin
oise
10 IL
CS 5
/9-8
.5
$5,4
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
n cy
cle
Any
cand
idat
e w
ho re
ceiv
es
bene
fit o
r det
rimen
t fro
m
inde
pend
ent e
xpen
ditu
res i
n ex
cess
of t
he a
mou
nts b
elow
is
exem
pted
from
all
cont
ribut
ion
limits
: $2
50,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$100
,000
/can
dida
te fo
r any
ot
her o
ffice
A
cand
idat
e an
d th
eir
imm
edia
te fa
mily
mem
bers
(s
pous
e, p
aren
t, or
child
) can
m
ake
unlim
ited
cont
ribut
ions
to
that
cand
idat
e’s c
ampa
ign.
An
y ca
ndid
ate
who
se
oppo
nent
is se
lf-fu
nded
is
exem
pted
from
cont
ribut
ion
limits
. A se
lf-fu
nded
ca
ndid
ate
is an
indi
vidu
al w
ho
cont
ribut
es $
250,
000
to h
is or
he
r ow
n st
atew
ide
cam
paig
n in
an
elec
tion
cycle
, or
$100
,000
for a
ll ot
her e
lect
ive
offic
es. C
ontr
ibut
ions
mad
e to
a
cand
idat
e by
imm
edia
te
fam
ily m
embe
rs a
re a
lso
cons
ider
ed “s
elf-f
undi
ng.”
Unlim
ited
if ca
ndid
ate
is no
t se
ekin
g no
min
atio
n in
a
prim
ary
elec
tion.
Fo
r can
dida
tes r
unni
ng in
a
prim
ary:
$2
15,8
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1
34,9
00/S
enat
e ca
ndid
ate
134,
900
$80,
900/
Hous
e ca
ndid
ate
Un
limite
d fro
m a
pol
itica
l pa
rty
durin
g Ge
nera
l or
Cons
olid
ated
Ele
ctio
n Un
limite
d du
ring
Prim
ary
Elec
tion
Cycle
whe
n ca
ndid
ate
is no
t see
king
no
min
atio
n Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
n cy
cle.
$53,
900
per e
lect
ion
cycle
Sa
me
limit
appl
ies t
o a
cont
ribut
ion
from
one
ca
ndid
ate
com
mitt
ee to
an
othe
r
$10,
800p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
$10,
800
per e
lect
ion
cycle
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 10 of 22(53 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Indi
ana
Ind.
Cod
e §
3-9-
2-4
et se
q.
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
$5,0
00 in
the
aggr
egat
e to
st
atew
ide
cand
idat
es
$2,0
00 in
the
aggr
egat
e to
Se
nate
cand
idat
es
$2,0
00 in
the
aggr
egat
e to
Ho
use
cand
idat
es
All a
mou
nts a
re p
er y
ear
Sam
e as
corp
orat
e lim
its
Iow
a Io
wa
Code
§ 6
8A.5
03
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Proh
ibite
dd Un
limite
d
Kans
as
K.S.
A. §
25-
4153
$2,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/S
enat
e ca
ndid
ate
$500
/Hou
se ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
For a
cont
este
d pr
imar
y el
ectio
n, sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its.
Unlim
ited
in u
ncon
test
ed
prim
arie
s and
gen
eral
el
ectio
ns
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Kent
ucky
K.
R.S.
§ 1
21.0
25, 1
21.0
35,
and
121.
150
$1,0
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
na Un
limite
d Ag
greg
ate
Limits
: No
cand
idat
e ca
n re
tain
par
ty
cont
ribut
ions
whi
ch in
the
aggr
egat
e ex
ceed
50%
of t
otal
co
ntrib
utio
ns o
r $10
,000
(w
hich
ever
is g
reat
er) i
n an
el
ectio
n cy
cle.
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Ag
greg
ate
Limits
: No
cand
idat
e ca
n re
tain
PAC
co
ntrib
utio
ns w
hich
in th
e ag
greg
ate
exce
ed 5
0% o
f tot
al
cont
ribut
ions
or $
10,0
00
(whi
chev
er is
gre
ater
) in
an
elec
tion
cycle
. 121
.150
(23)
(a)
Proh
ibite
dd
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 11 of 22(54 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Loui
siana
La
. R.S
. § 1
8:15
05.2
$5,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$2,5
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na
Unlim
ited
Regu
lar P
ACs:
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
“Big
” PAC
s6 : Do
uble
the
amou
nt o
f in
divi
dual
lim
its
Cand
idat
es su
bjec
t to
follo
win
g ag
greg
ate
limits
on
all P
AC co
ntrib
utio
ns
acce
pted
for t
he p
rimar
y an
d ge
nera
l ele
ctio
ns co
mbi
ned:
$8
0,00
0/st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e $6
0,00
0/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Mai
neb,
e 21
-A M
.R.S
.A. §
1015
$1,5
75/g
uber
nato
rial
cand
idat
e
$375
/legi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate7
Indi
vidu
al co
ntrib
utio
n lim
its
do n
ot a
pply
to co
ntrib
utio
ns
in su
ppor
t of a
cand
idat
e by
th
at ca
ndid
ate,
or t
hat
cand
idat
e’s s
pous
e or
do
mes
tic p
artn
er.
Indi
vidu
als l
imite
d to
$25
,000
ag
greg
ate
cont
ribut
ions
to a
ll ca
mpa
ign
finan
ce e
ntiti
es p
er
cale
ndar
yea
r. Th
is lim
itatio
n do
es n
ot a
pply
to
cont
ribut
ions
in su
ppor
t of a
ca
ndid
ate
by th
at ca
ndid
a te
or th
at ca
ndid
ate’
s spo
use
or
dom
estic
par
tner
.
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
6 In
Loui
siana
, a “B
ig P
AC” i
s a P
AC w
ith o
ver 2
50 m
embe
rs w
ho co
ntrib
uted
ove
r $50
to th
e PA
C du
ring
the
prec
edin
g ca
lend
ar y
ear a
nd h
as b
een
cert
ified
as m
eetin
g th
at m
embe
rshi
p re
quire
men
t. 7 I
n M
aine
, can
dida
tes w
ho a
re e
nrol
led
in a
pol
itica
l par
ty m
ay co
ntrib
utio
ns o
f up
to $
375
from
an
indi
vidu
al. I
ndiv
idua
l con
trib
utio
ns to
une
nrol
led
cand
idat
es a
re u
nlim
ited
for p
rimar
y el
ectio
ns.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 12 of 22(55 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
Indi
vidu
al
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
St
ate
Part
y C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
PAC
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Co
rpor
ate
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Un
ion
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
M
aryl
and
Md.
Cod
e §
13-2
26 a
nd
13-2
27
Effe
ctiv
e Ja
n. 1
, 201
5 $6
,000
/can
dida
te
$24,
000
aggr
egat
e to
all
cand
idat
es
Amou
nts a
re p
er 4
-yea
r el
ectio
n cy
cle
Tran
sfer
lim
it:
$6,0
00/4
-yea
r ele
ctio
n cy
cle
In-K
ind
Cont
ribut
ions
: Lim
ited
to a
n am
ount
equ
al
to $
1 fo
r eve
ry tw
o re
gist
ered
vo
ters
in th
e st
ate,
rega
rdle
ss
of p
oliti
cal a
ffilia
tion,
to a
sin
gle
cand
idat
e. L
imit
is pe
r 4-
year
ele
ctio
n cy
cle.
$6,0
00/c
andi
date
/4-y
ear
elec
tion
cycle
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Mas
sach
uset
ts
G.L.
Ch.
55,
§ 6
, 6A,
7A
and
8
$100
0/ca
ndid
ate
$12,
500/
indi
vidu
al a
ggre
gate
lim
it on
cont
ribut
ions
to a
ll ca
ndid
ates
Re
gist
ered
lobb
yist
s may
onl
y co
ntrib
ute
up to
$2
00/c
andi
date
Am
ount
s are
per
cale
ndar
ye
ar.
$3,0
00/c
andi
date
/yea
r No
lim
it on
in-k
ind
cont
ribut
ions
Regu
lar P
AC o
r Peo
ple'
s Co
mm
ittee
:8
$500
/can
dida
te
Cand
idat
es ca
nnot
acc
ept
aggr
egat
e co
ntrib
utio
ns fr
om
regu
lar P
ACs t
hat e
xcee
d th
e fo
llow
ing
amou
nts (
Peop
le’s
Com
mitt
ees a
re e
xem
pt fr
om
the
aggr
egat
e lim
its):
$150
,000
/gub
erna
toria
l ca
ndid
ate
$18,
750/
Sena
te ca
ndid
ate
$7,5
00/H
ouse
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s per
cale
ndar
yea
r.
Proh
ibite
dd Sa
me
as P
AC li
mits
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
8 In
Mas
sach
uset
ts, a
"Peo
ple'
s Com
mitt
ee” i
s a P
AC th
at h
as b
een
in e
xiste
nce
for s
ix m
onth
s, ha
s rec
eive
d co
ntrib
utio
ns fr
om in
divi
dual
s of $
156
(adj
uste
d bi
enni
ally
; thi
s am
ount
is fo
r 201
3-20
14) o
r les
s per
yea
r, an
d ha
s con
trib
uted
to fi
ve ca
ndid
ates
.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 13 of 22(56 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Mich
igan
M
.C.L
. § 1
69.2
46, 1
69.2
52
and
169.
254
$6,8
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$2,0
00/S
enat
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/H
ouse
cand
idat
e Al
l am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
n cy
cle
$750
,000
/gov
erno
r or
lieut
enan
t gov
erno
r sla
te w
ith
publ
ic fu
ndin
g $1
36,0
00/g
over
nor o
r lie
uten
ant g
over
nor s
late
w
ithou
t pub
lic fu
ndin
g $1
36,0
00/o
ther
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$20,
000/
Sena
te ca
ndid
ate
$10,
000/
Hous
e ca
ndid
ate
All a
mou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
Polit
ical C
omm
ittee
s:
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
. In
depe
nden
t PAC
s9 : $6
8,00
0/st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e $2
0,00
0/Se
nate
cand
idat
e $1
0,00
0/Ho
use
cand
idat
e Al
l am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
n cy
cle
Proh
ibite
dd
Proh
ibite
dd
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
9 In
Mich
igan
, an
“inde
pend
ent c
omm
ittee
” mus
t hav
e fil
ed a
stat
emen
t of o
rgan
izatio
n at
leas
t 6 m
onth
s bef
ore
the
elec
tion
in w
hich
the
com
mitt
ee w
ishes
to m
ake
cont
ribut
ions
; mus
t hav
e su
ppor
ted
or o
ppos
ed 3
or m
ore
cand
idat
es fo
r nom
inat
ion
or e
lect
ion;
and
mus
t hav
e re
ceiv
ed co
ntrib
utio
ns fr
om a
t lea
st 2
5 pe
rson
s.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 14 of 22(57 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
Indi
vidu
al
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
St
ate
Part
y C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
PAC
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Co
rpor
ate
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Un
ion
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
M
inne
sota
M
inn.
Sta
t. §
10A.
27 a
nd
211B
.15
Elec
tion
segm
ent l
imits
:10
$4,0
00/g
over
nor –
lieu
tena
nt
gove
rnor
slat
e $2
,500
/AG
cand
idat
e $2
,000
/SO
S or
aud
itor
cand
idat
e $1
,000
/legi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate
Non-
elec
tion
segm
ent l
imits
: $2
,000
/gov
erno
r-lie
uten
ant
gove
rnor
slat
e $1
,500
/Att
orne
y Ge
nera
l ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/S
ecre
tary
of S
tate
or
Audi
tor c
andi
date
$1
,000
/Sen
ate
cand
idat
e n/
a fo
r Hou
se ca
ndid
ates
Ca
ndid
ates
who
hav
e sig
ned
a pu
blic
subs
idy
agre
emen
t are
al
so su
bjec
t to
a lim
it (e
qual
to
five
tim
es th
e el
ectio
n se
gmen
t lim
its a
bove
) on
the
amou
nt o
f per
sona
l fun
ds
they
can
cont
ribut
e to
thei
r ow
n ca
mpa
ign.
Am
ount
s are
per
2-y
ear
elec
tion
segm
ent.
Part
y co
mm
ittee
s may
co
ntrib
ute
up to
10
times
the
limits
impo
sed
on in
divi
dual
s Ca
ndid
ates
are
subj
ect t
o th
e fo
llow
ing
aggr
egat
e lim
its o
n co
ntrib
utio
ns re
ceiv
ed in
the
2013
-14
elec
tion
cycle
from
pa
rty
com
mitt
ees a
nd
term
inat
ing
prin
cipa
l ca
mpa
ign
com
mitt
ees:
$4
0,00
0/go
vern
or-li
eute
nant
go
vern
or sl
ate
$25,
000/
Atto
rney
Gen
eral
ca
ndid
ate
$20,
000/
Secr
etar
y of
Sta
te o
r Au
dito
r can
dida
te
$10,
000/
legi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Ag
greg
ate
cont
ribut
ions
from
po
litica
l com
mitt
ees o
r po
litica
l fun
ds, l
obby
ists,
and
indi
vidu
als w
ho co
ntrib
ute
or
loan
mor
e th
an ½
the
year
ly
cont
ribut
ion
limit
cann
ot
exce
ed th
e fo
llow
ing
amou
nts:
$7
00,0
00/g
over
nor-
lieut
enan
t gov
erno
r sla
te
$120
,000
/Att
orne
y Ge
nera
l ca
ndid
ate
$80,
000/
Secr
etar
y of
Sta
te o
r A u
dito
r can
dida
te
$6,0
00/S
enat
e ca
ndid
ate
$12,
000/
Hous
e ca
ndid
ate
Proh
ibite
dd Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Miss
issip
pi
Miss
. Cod
e §
97-1
3-15
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
$1,0
00/c
andi
date
/yea
r Un
limite
d
Miss
ouri
Mo.
Rev
. Sta
t. §
130.
031
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
10
Min
neso
ta’s
SF 9
91 (2
013)
div
ided
ele
ctio
n cy
cles i
nto
two-
year
per
iods
, and
mad
e lim
its a
pplic
able
to a
two-
year
per
iod
rath
er th
an a
sing
le y
ear.
The
limit
is hi
gher
for t
he tw
o-ye
ar p
erio
d du
ring
whi
ch a
n el
ectio
n is
held
for t
he o
ffice
, and
low
er d
urin
g a
non-
elec
tion
two-
year
per
iod
for c
andi
date
s tha
t ser
ve a
four
- or s
ix-y
ear t
erm
.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 15 of 22(58 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
Indi
vidu
al
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
St
ate
Part
y C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
PAC
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Co
rpor
ate
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
Un
ion
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
M
onta
na e
, 11
M.C
.A. §
13-3
5-22
7 an
d §1
3-37
-216
$1,9
90/g
uber
nato
rial s
late
$9
90/o
ther
stat
ewid
e ca
nd.
$530
/sen
ate
cand
idat
e $3
30/h
ouse
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
n cy
cle
$23,
850/
gube
rnat
oria
l sla
te
$8,6
00/o
ther
stat
ewid
e ca
nd.
$1,4
00/s
enat
e ca
ndid
ate
$850
/hou
se ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
ion
$10,
610/
gube
rnat
oria
l sla
te
$2,6
50/o
ther
stat
ewid
e ca
nd.
$800
/sen
ate
cand
idat
e $4
00/h
ouse
cand
idat
e Ca
ndid
ates
lim
ited
to to
tal
cont
ribut
ions
from
all
PACs
: $2
,800
sena
te ca
ndid
ates
$1
,700
hou
se ca
ndid
ates
Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
n cy
cle
Proh
ibite
d Pr
ohib
ited
Nebr
aska
N.
R.S.
§ 32
-160
4 an
d 32
-16
08
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Neva
da
§ 29
4A.1
00 a
nd C
onst
. Ar
t. 2
§10
$5,0
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
na Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
New
Ham
pshi
re
R.S.
A. §
664
:4
To ca
ndid
ates
not
agr
eein
g to
ab
ide
by sp
endi
ng li
mits
: $1
,000
/ele
ctio
na To
cand
idat
es a
gree
ing
to
abid
e by
spen
ding
lim
its:
$5,0
00/e
lect
iona
To ca
ndid
ates
not
agr
eein
g to
ab
ide
by sp
endi
ng li
mits
: $1
,000
/ele
ctio
na
Unlim
ited
to ca
ndid
ates
who
ag
ree
to e
xpen
ditu
re li
mits
Sam
e as
par
ty li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its12
Pr
ohib
itedd
New
Jers
eye
N.J.S
.A. §
19:
44A-
11.3
$3,8
00/g
uber
nato
rial
cand
idat
e $2
,600
/legi
slativ
e ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
No li
mit
on co
ntrib
utio
ns b
y st
ate,
coun
ty, m
unici
pal a
nd
legi
slativ
e le
ader
ship
co
mm
ittee
s Na
tiona
l par
ty co
mm
ittee
: $8
,200
/ele
ctio
na
$8,2
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
na Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
11M
onta
na’s
cont
ribut
ion
limits
hav
e be
en th
e su
bjec
t of o
ngoi
ng li
tigat
ion
over
the
last
seve
ral y
ears
. See
the
Mon
tana
Com
miss
ione
r of P
oliti
cal P
ract
ices w
ebpa
ge fo
r lat
est i
nfor
mat
ion.
12 C
orpo
ratio
ns a
re n
o lo
nger
pro
hibi
ted
from
mak
ing
polit
ical c
ontr
ibut
ions
und
er N
ew H
amps
hire
law
des
pite
the
lang
uage
of N
H RS
A 66
4:4.
Tha
t ban
was
dec
lare
d un
cons
titut
iona
l by
a fe
dera
l di
stric
t cou
rt in
199
9. A
June
6, 2
000
lett
er fr
om D
eput
y At
torn
ey G
ener
al S
teve
n M
. Hou
ran
indi
cate
s tha
t the
lim
its o
n in
divi
dual
con
trib
utio
ns n
ow a
pply
to co
rpor
ate
cont
ribut
ions
as w
ell.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 16 of 22(59 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
New
Mex
icoe
N.M
.S.A
. § 1
-19-
34.7
$5,4
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$2
,500
/non
-sta
tew
ide
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na
$5,4
00/e
lect
iona
Sam
e as
par
ty li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
New
Yor
ke El
ectio
n La
w, §
14-
114
and
14-1
16
Regu
lar L
imits
, Prim
ary:
$6
,500
-$19
,700
/sta
tew
ide13
$6
,500
/Sen
ate
cand
idat
e $4
,100
/Ass
embl
y ca
ndid
ate
Fam
ily Li
mits
, Prim
ary14
: $5
23-$
137,
978/
stat
ewid
e $2
0,00
0-$4
1,57
7/Se
nate
ca
ndid
ate
$12,
500-
$17,
061/
Asse
mbl
y Re
gula
r Lim
its, G
ener
al:
$41,
100/
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$10,
300/
Sena
te ca
ndid
ate
$4,1
00/A
ssem
bly
cand
idat
e Fa
mily
Lim
its, G
ener
al:
$278
,609
/sta
tew
ide
cand
idat
e $3
0,07
9-$5
7,30
4/Se
nate
ca
ndid
ate
$12,
500-
$24,
871/
Asse
mbl
y Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
n cy
cle.
Max
imum
cont
ribut
ions
by
an
indi
vidu
al li
mite
d to
$15
0,00
0 in
th
e ag
greg
ate
per c
alen
dar y
ear.
Proh
ibite
d in
prim
ary
elec
tion
Unlim
ited
in g
ener
al e
lect
ion
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its, w
ith
exce
ptio
ns (s
ee b
elow
) Co
rpor
atio
ns a
re li
mite
d to
$5
,000
per
yea
r in
aggr
egat
e co
ntrib
utio
ns to
NY
stat
e ca
ndid
ates
and
com
mitt
ees.
Ca
ndid
ates
may
acc
ept
corp
orat
e co
ntrib
utio
ns o
f up
to $
5,00
0 an
nual
ly d
urin
g ea
ch y
ear o
f an
elec
tion
cycle
, so
long
as t
he to
tal
cont
ribut
ions
from
the
corp
orat
ion
do n
ot e
xcee
d th
e el
ectio
n cy
cle’s
regu
lar
limits
on
indi
vidu
al
cont
ribut
ions
, and
the
corp
orat
ion
does
not
exc
eed
its a
ggre
gate
lim
it of
$5,
000/
ye
ar to
all
cand
idat
es a
nd
com
mitt
ees.
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
13 Li
mit
is ba
sed
on a
form
ula:
pro
duct
of n
umbe
r of e
nrol
led
vote
rs in
cand
idat
e’s p
arty
in st
ate
(exc
ludi
ng v
oter
s on
inac
tive
stat
us) x
$.0
05, b
ut n
ot le
ss th
an $
6,50
0 or
mor
e th
an $
19,7
00
14 S
epar
ate
limits
app
ly fo
r con
trib
utio
ns fr
om a
ll fa
mily
mem
bers
in th
e ag
greg
ate.
Lim
it is
base
d on
a fo
rmul
a: t
otal
# o
f enr
olle
d vo
ters
on
activ
e st
atus
in ca
ndid
ate’
s par
ty in
the
stat
e/di
stric
t x
$0.0
25.
“Fam
ily” i
s def
ined
as a
chi
ld, p
aren
t, gr
andp
aren
t, br
othe
r, sis
ter,
and
the
spou
ses o
f tho
se p
erso
ns. C
ontr
ibut
ions
from
the
cand
idat
e an
d th
e ca
ndid
ate’
s spo
use
are
not l
imite
d.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 17 of 22(60 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Nort
h Ca
rolin
ae N.
C.G.
S. §
163
-278
.13,
16
3-27
8.15
and
163
-27
8.19
$5,0
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
na Un
limite
d Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Proh
ibite
dd Pr
ohib
itedd
Nort
h Da
kota
§
16.1
-08.
1
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Proh
ibite
dd Pr
ohib
itedd
Ohi
oe O
.R.C
. § 3
517.
102,
35
17.1
04 a
nd 3
599.
03
$12,
532.
52/c
andi
date
/ el
ectio
na
$706
,823
.95/
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$140
,988
.82/
Sena
te
cand
idat
e $7
0,18
1.10
/Hou
se ca
ndid
ate
In-k
ind
cont
ribut
ions
un
limite
d Al
l am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Pr
ohib
itedd
Proh
ibite
dd
Okl
ahom
ae 21
OS
§ 18
7.1
et se
q. a
nd
Ethi
cs C
omm
issio
n Ru
les
§2.2
3, §
2.31
, §2.
33, §
2.37
,
$2,7
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
n $2
5,00
0/st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e
$10,
000/
othe
r sta
te e
lect
ive
offic
e Am
ount
s are
prio
r to
gene
ral
elec
tion
$5,0
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
n A
PAC
that
has
bee
n re
gist
ered
for l
ess t
han
a ye
ar
prio
r to
a pr
imar
y O
R ha
s fe
wer
than
25
cont
ribut
ors:
$2
,500
per
ele
ctio
n
Proh
ibite
dd
Proh
ibite
dd
Ore
gon
O.R
.S. §
260
.160
to 1
74
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Penn
sylv
ania
25
Pa.
Sta
t. §3
253
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Proh
ibite
dd
Proh
ibite
dd
Rhod
e Is
land
R.
I.G.L
. § 1
7-25
-10.
1
$1,0
00/c
andi
date
/ yea
r In
divi
dual
s lim
ited
to $
10,0
00
in a
ggre
gate
cont
ribut
ions
to
cand
idat
es, P
ACs a
nd p
arty
co
mm
ittee
s per
yea
r
$25,
000/
cand
idat
e/ye
ar
In-k
ind
cont
ribut
ions
un
limite
d
$1,0
00/c
andi
date
/ yea
r An
nual
agg
rega
te li
mit
of
$25,
000
to a
ll re
cipie
nts
Proh
ibite
d Pr
ohib
ited
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 18 of 22(61 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Sout
h Ca
rolin
a S.
C. C
ode
§ 8-
13-1
300(
10),
8 -13
-131
4 an
d 8-
13-1
316
$3,5
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na in
ea
ch p
rimar
y, ru
noff,
or
spec
ial e
lect
ion
in w
hich
a
cand
idat
e ha
s opp
ositi
on a
nd
for e
ach
gene
ral e
lect
ion;
if a
ca
ndid
ate
rem
ains
uno
ppos
ed
durin
g an
ele
ctio
n cy
cle, o
ne
cont
ribut
ion
limit
shal
l app
ly.
$50,
000/
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$5,0
00/o
ther
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na
subj
ect t
o th
e sa
me
exce
ptio
ns d
escr
ibed
at l
eft.
$11,
500/
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$7,6
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sout
h Da
kota
S.
D.C.
L. §
12-
27-7
$4,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
cale
ndar
ye
ar
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Proh
ibite
dd Pr
ohib
itedd
Tenn
esse
ee
Tenn
. Cod
e §
2-10
-302
$3,8
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,5
00/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e Bo
th a
mou
nts a
re p
er
elec
tiona
Cand
idat
es li
mite
d to
ag
greg
ate
amou
nt fr
om a
ll po
litica
l par
ty co
mm
ittee
s:
$374
,300
/sta
tew
ide
cand
idat
e $5
9,90
0/Se
nate
cand
idat
e $3
0,00
0/Ho
use
cand
idat
e Al
l am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na
$11,
200/
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$ 11,
200/
Sena
te ca
ndid
ate
$7,4
00/o
ther
cand
idat
es
No m
ore
than
50%
of a
st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e’s o
r $1
12,3
00 o
f a le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e’s t
otal
co
ntrib
utio
ns m
ay co
me
from
PA
Cs
All a
mou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
Sam
e as
PAC
lim
its
If a
corp
orat
ion
give
s mor
e th
an $
250
in th
e ag
greg
ate
to
cand
idat
es, i
t mus
t reg
ister
as
a P A
C an
d m
ake
all f
urth
er
cont
ribut
ions
thro
ugh
the
PAC.
It m
ay tr
ansf
er u
nlim
ited
amou
nts f
rom
its c
orpo
rate
tr
easu
ry to
the
PAC.
Sam
e as
PAC
lim
its
A un
ion
mus
t reg
ister
as a
PA
C be
fore
mak
ing
cont
ribut
ions
to ca
ndid
ates
.
Texa
s El
ectio
n Co
de, §
253
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Proh
ibite
dd Pr
ohib
itedd
Utah
Ut
ah C
ode
§ 20
A-11
-101
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 19 of 22(62 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Verm
ontb
17 V
SA §
2805
$4,0
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,5
00/S
tate
Sen
ate
$1,0
00/S
tate
Hou
se
Unlim
ited
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Virg
inia
Va
. Cod
e §
24.2
-945
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Unlim
ited
Was
hing
tone
RCW
§ 4
2.17
.610
et s
eq.
WAC
§ 3
90-0
5-40
0
$1, 9
00/g
uber
nato
rial
cand
idat
e $9
50/le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e Am
ount
s are
per
ele
ctio
na Du
ring
the
21 d
ays b
efor
e th
e ge
nera
l ele
ctio
n, n
o co
ntrib
utor
may
don
ate
mor
e th
an $
50,0
00 in
the
aggr
egat
e to
a st
atew
ide
cand
idat
e or
$5
,000
in th
e ag
greg
ate
to
any
othe
r can
dida
te o
r a
polit
ical c
omm
ittee
, inc
ludi
ng
polit
ical p
arty
com
mitt
ees.
Th
is in
clude
s a ca
ndid
ate'
s pe
rson
al co
ntrib
utio
ns to
hi
s/he
r cam
paig
n. T
he st
ate
com
mitt
ees o
f pol
itica
l pa
rtie
s are
exe
mpt
ed fr
om
this
limit.
Aggr
egat
e co
ntrib
utio
ns fr
om
a st
ate
part
y ce
ntra
l co
mm
ittee
to a
stat
ewid
e or
le
gisla
tive
cand
idat
e m
ay n
ot
exce
ed $
.80
x num
ber o
f re
gist
ered
vot
ers i
n ca
ndid
ate’
s dist
rict.
Thi
s lim
it ap
plie
s to
the
entir
e el
ectio
n cy
cle.
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
A
PAC
that
has
not
rece
ived
co
ntrib
utio
ns o
f $10
or m
ore
from
10
or m
ore
WA
regi
ster
ed v
oter
s dur
ing
the
past
180
day
s is p
rohi
bite
d fro
m m
akin
g co
ntrib
utio
ns.
Proh
ibite
d fo
r cor
pora
tions
no
t doi
ng b
usin
ess i
n W
ashi
ngto
n st
ate.
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its fo
r W
ashi
ngto
n co
rpor
atio
ns.
Proh
ibite
d fo
r uni
ons t
hat
have
few
er th
an 1
0 m
embe
rs
who
resid
e in
Was
hing
ton.
Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its fo
r W
ashi
ngto
n un
ions
.
Wes
t Virg
inia
§
3-8-
8 to
12
$1,0
00/c
andi
date
/ele
ctio
na Sa
me
as in
divi
dual
lim
its
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Pr
ohib
itedd
Sam
e as
indi
vidu
al li
mits
Cont
inue
d on
nex
t pag
e
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 20 of 22(63 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
In
divi
dual
C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Stat
e Pa
rty
Can
dida
te
Cont
ribut
ions
PA
C C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Corp
orat
e C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Unio
n C
andi
date
Co
ntrib
utio
ns
Wisc
onsin
§ 11
.01
et se
q.
$10,
000/
stat
ewid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1,0
00/S
enat
e ca
ndid
ate
$500
/Ass
embl
y ca
ndid
ate
A mou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
An
indi
vidu
al m
ay n
ot
cont
ribut
e m
ore
than
$10
,000
in
a ca
lend
ar y
ear t
o an
y co
mbi
natio
n of
Wisc
onsin
ca
ndid
ates
or p
oliti
cal
com
mitt
ees.
Aggr
egat
e lim
it on
am
ount
ca
ndid
ates
may
acc
ept f
rom
al
l pol
itica
l par
ty co
mm
ittee
s, in
cludi
ng le
gisla
tive
cam
paig
n co
mm
ittee
s, in
an
elec
tion
cam
paig
n :
$700
,830
/gub
. can
dida
te
$22,
425/
Sena
te ca
ndid
ate
$11,
213/
Hous
e ca
ndid
ate
Addi
tiona
lly, t
he m
axim
um
amou
nt a
legi
slativ
e ca
mpa
ign
com
mitt
ee ca
n gi
ve w
ithou
t re
duci
ng co
mm
itte e
co
ntrib
utio
ns is
: $6
,900
/Sen
ate
cand
idat
e $3
,450
/Ass
embl
y ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
$43,
128/
gub.
cand
idat
e $1
,000
/Sen
ate
cand
idat
e $5
00/A
ssem
bly
cand
idat
e Ag
greg
ate
limit
on a
mou
nt
cand
idat
es m
ay a
ccep
t fro
m
PACs
and
cand
idat
e co
mm
ittee
s (gr
ants
from
the
Wisc
onsin
Ele
ctio
n Ca
mpa
ign
Fund
also
coun
t aga
inst
this
limit)
: $4
85,1
90/g
ub. c
andi
date
$1
5,52
5/Se
nate
cand
idat
e $7
,763
/Hou
se ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
ion
cycle
Proh
ibite
d Pr
ohib
ited
Wyo
min
g W
yo. S
tat.
§ 22
-25-
102
Effe
ctiv
e 20
13-2
014:
$1
,000
/can
dida
te/e
lect
iona
Effe
ctiv
e Ja
n. 1
, 201
5:
$2,5
00/s
tate
wid
e ca
ndid
ate
$1
,500
/oth
er ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
No in
divi
dual
may
mak
e m
ore
than
$25
,000
(inc
reas
es to
$5
0,00
0 ef
f. Ja
n. 1
, 201
5) in
to
tal c
ontr
ibut
ions
dur
ing
a tw
o-ye
ar e
lect
ion
cycle
.
Unlim
ited
Effe
ctiv
e 20
13-2
014:
Un
limite
d Ef
fect
ive
Jan.
1, 2
015:
$7
,500
/sta
tew
ide
cand
idat
e $3
,000
/oth
er ca
ndid
ate
Amou
nts a
re p
er e
lect
iona
Proh
ibite
dd Pr
ohib
itedd
(a)
Prim
ary
and
gene
ral a
re co
nsid
ered
sepa
rate
ele
ctio
ns; s
tate
d am
ount
may
be
cont
ribut
ed in
eac
h el
ectio
n.
(b)
Cand
idat
es p
artic
ipat
ing
in th
e pu
blic
finan
cing
may
not
acc
ept c
ontr
ibut
ions
afte
r qua
lifyi
ng fo
r pub
lic fu
nds.
Lim
its li
sted
are
for c
andi
date
s not
par
ticip
atin
g in
pub
lic fi
nanc
ing
prog
ram
. (d
) Di
rect
corp
orat
e an
d/or
uni
on co
ntrib
utio
ns a
re p
rohi
bite
d an
d/or
use
of t
reas
ury
fund
s and
/or d
ues i
s pro
hibi
ted.
In
thes
e st
ates
, the
law
spec
ifica
lly sa
ys th
at n
othi
ng p
reve
nts t
he
empl
oyee
s or o
ffice
rs o
f a co
rpor
atio
n fro
m m
akin
g po
litica
l con
trib
utio
ns th
roug
h a
PAC,
usin
g fu
nds f
rom
an
acco
unt t
hat i
s sep
arat
e an
d se
greg
ated
from
corp
orat
e ac
coun
ts.
Such
cont
ribut
ions
ar
e su
bjec
t to
the
sam
e lim
itatio
ns p
lace
d on
oth
er P
ACs.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 21 of 22(64 of 70)
Sour
ce:
Natio
nal C
onfe
renc
e of
Sta
te Le
gisla
ture
s La
st u
pdat
ed O
ctob
er 2
015
Okl
ahom
a an
d M
onta
na u
pdat
ed M
ay 2
016
This
data
is p
rese
nted
for i
nfor
mat
ion
purp
oses
onl
y an
d sh
ould
not
be
cons
ider
ed le
gal a
dvice
.
(e)
Cont
ribut
ion
limits
are
adj
uste
d fo
r inf
latio
n at
the
begi
nnin
g of
eac
h ca
mpa
ign
cycle
.
cite
d in
Lai
r v. M
otl,
No.
16-
3542
4 ar
chiv
ed o
n O
ctob
er 1
8, 2
017
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 22 of 22(65 of 70)
1 Post Judgment Form - Rev. 08/2013
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Office of the Clerk 95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, CA 94103
Information Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings
Judgment • This Court has filed and entered the attached judgment in your case.
Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please note the filed date on the attached decision because all of the dates described below run from that date, not from the date you receive this notice.
Mandate (Fed. R. App. P. 41; 9th Cir. R. 41-1 & -2)
• The mandate will issue 7 days after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing or 7 days from the denial of a petition for rehearing, unless the Court directs otherwise. To file a motion to stay the mandate, file it electronically via the appellate ECF system or, if you are a pro se litigant or an attorney with an exemption from using appellate ECF, file one original motion on paper.
Petition for Panel Rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40; 9th Cir. R. 40-1) Petition for Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-1 to -3)
(1) A. Purpose (Panel Rehearing):
• A party should seek panel rehearing only if one or more of the following grounds exist: ► A material point of fact or law was overlooked in the decision; ► A change in the law occurred after the case was submitted which
appears to have been overlooked by the panel; or ► An apparent conflict with another decision of the Court was not
addressed in the opinion. • Do not file a petition for panel rehearing merely to reargue the case.
B. Purpose (Rehearing En Banc) • A party should seek en banc rehearing only if one or more of the following
grounds exist:
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-3, Page 1 of 5(66 of 70)
2 Post Judgment Form - Rev. 08/2013
► Consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions; or
► The proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance; or ► The opinion directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another
court of appeals or the Supreme Court and substantially affects a rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for national uniformity.
(2) Deadlines for Filing:
• A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
• If the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party in a civil case, the time for filing a petition for rehearing is 45 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
• If the mandate has issued, the petition for rehearing should be accompanied by a motion to recall the mandate.
• See Advisory Note to 9th Cir. R. 40-1 (petitions must be received on the due date).
• An order to publish a previously unpublished memorandum disposition extends the time to file a petition for rehearing to 14 days after the date of the order of publication or, in all civil cases in which the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party, 45 days after the date of the order of publication. 9th Cir. R. 40-2.
(3) Statement of Counsel
• A petition should contain an introduction stating that, in counsel’s judgment, one or more of the situations described in the “purpose” section above exist. The points to be raised must be stated clearly.
(4) Form & Number of Copies (9th Cir. R. 40-1; Fed. R. App. P. 32(c)(2))
• The petition shall not exceed 15 pages unless it complies with the alternative length limitations of 4,200 words or 390 lines of text.
• The petition must be accompanied by a copy of the panel’s decision being challenged.
• An answer, when ordered by the Court, shall comply with the same length limitations as the petition.
• If a pro se litigant elects to file a form brief pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-1, a petition for panel rehearing or for rehearing en banc need not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 32.
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-3, Page 2 of 5(67 of 70)
3 Post Judgment Form - Rev. 08/2013
• The petition or answer must be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance found at Form 11, available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms.
• You may file a petition electronically via the appellate ECF system. No paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise. If you are a pro se litigant or an attorney exempted from using the appellate ECF system, file one original petition on paper. No additional paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise.
Bill of Costs (Fed. R. App. P. 39, 9th Cir. R. 39-1)
• The Bill of Costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. • See Form 10 for additional information, available on our website at
www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms. Attorneys Fees
• Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1 describes the content and due dates for attorneys fees applications.
• All relevant forms are available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms or by telephoning (415) 355-7806.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
• Please refer to the Rules of the United States Supreme Court at www.supremecourt.gov
Counsel Listing in Published Opinions
• Please check counsel listing on the attached decision. • If there are any errors in a published opinion, please send a letter in writing
within 10 days to: ► Thomson Reuters; 610 Opperman Drive; PO Box 64526; Eagan, MN 55123
(Attn: Jean Green, Senior Publications Coordinator); ► and electronically file a copy of the letter via the appellate ECF system by using
“File Correspondence to Court,” or if you are an attorney exempted from using the appellate ECF system, mail the Court one copy of the letter.
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-3, Page 3 of 5(68 of 70)
Form 10. Bill of Costs ................................................................................................................................(Rev. 12-1-09)
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BILL OF COSTS
This form is available as a fillable version at: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/forms/Form%2010%20-%20Bill%20of%20Costs.pdf.
Note: If you wish to file a bill of costs, it MUST be submitted on this form and filed, with the clerk, with proof of service, within 14 days of the date of entry of judgment, and in accordance with 9th Circuit Rule 39-1. A late bill of costs must be accompanied by a motion showing good cause. Please refer to FRAP 39, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and 9th Circuit Rule 39-1 when preparing your bill of costs.
v. 9th Cir. No.
The Clerk is requested to tax the following costs against:
Cost Taxable under FRAP 39,
28 U.S.C. § 1920, 9th Cir. R. 39-1
REQUESTED
(Each Column Must Be Completed)
ALLOWED
(To Be Completed by the Clerk)
No. of Docs.
Pages per Doc.
Cost per Page*
TOTAL COST
No. of Docs.
Pages per Doc.
Cost per Page*
TOTAL COST
Excerpt of Record
$ $
$
$
Opening Brief $
$
$
$
Answering Brief $
$
$
$
Reply Brief $
$
$
$
Other** $ $ $ $
TOTAL: $ TOTAL: $
* Costs per page: May not exceed .10 or actual cost, whichever is less. 9th Circuit Rule 39-1.
** Other: Any other requests must be accompanied by a statement explaining why the item(s) should be taxed pursuant to 9th Circuit Rule 39-1. Additional items without such supporting statements will not be considered.
Attorneys' fees cannot be requested on this form. Continue to next page
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-3, Page 4 of 5(69 of 70)
Form 10. Bill of Costs - Continued
I, , swear under penalty of perjury that the services for which costs are taxed were actually and necessarily performed, and that the requested costs were actually expended as listed.
Signature
("s/" plus attorney's name if submitted electronically)
Date
Name of Counsel:
Attorney for:
(To Be Completed by the Clerk)
Date Costs are taxed in the amount of $
Clerk of Court
By: , Deputy Clerk
Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-3, Page 5 of 5(70 of 70)
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