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Democritus on appearances and perception: the early sources

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EpistemologyafterProtagoras:ResponsestoRelativisminPlato,Aristotle,andDemocritusMi-KyoungLee

Printpublicationdate:2005PrintISBN-13:9780199262229PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:October2005DOI:10.1093/0199262225.001.0001

Democritusonappearancesandperception:theearlysources

Mi-KyoungLee(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/0199262225.003.0008

AbstractandKeywords

Democritusrejectsthethesisthatallbeliefsaretrue,butacceptstheideathatthingsareforeachasone’ssensestellone.Thus,hegivessomesenseofwhatamoreandnuanceddevelopedversionofProtagoreanideasaboutperceptionwouldlooklike,onethatanticipatesEpicurus’sloganthat‘allperceptionsaretrue.’ThischapterexaminestheearlysourcesforDemocritus’epistemologicalviews,especiallyTheophrastus,whopreservesforusDemocritus’theoryofperceptionandsensibleproperties.

Keywords:sensiblequalities,perception,senses,relativity,subjective,appearances,explanation,aitiologia,vision

Theearlierphilosophersofnaturedidnotstatethematterwell,thinkingthatthereiswithoutsightnothingwhitenorblack,norflavourwithouttasting.

(Aristotle,DeAnimaIII2.426a20–3)

8.1IntroductiontoDemocritus1IftherewasaclosecontemporaryofPlato'sandAristotle'swhomostexemplifiedtheProtagoreanideastheyexamineandcriticizeintheTheaetetusandinMetaphysicsΓ5,itwouldbeDemocritus,orsoIshallargueinthisandthenextchapter.ThereareofcoursemajordifferencesbetweenProtagorasandDemocritus;Democrituswasnorelativist,andheisknowntohavearguedagainstProtagoras'Alētheia.ButheseemstohavesubscribedtoanumberofideasthatPlatoandAristotleassociatewithProtagoras.Forexample,hiswayofthinkingaboutthesensesandsensiblequalitiesisdeeplyProtagorean,andhemadeuseofProtagoras'argumentfromconflictingappearancestoarguethatnothingissweetunlessitseemssotosomeone.Healsoarguedthatthesensesmustbeviewedasakanōnor‘standard’—thatis,ameasureinProtagoras'language—withoutwhichknowledgeisnotpossible.Inthischapterandthenext,wewillexploretheseProtagoreanaspectsofDemocritus'epistemology,whichwillhelptosharpenoursenseofthediversityofideasbeingexploredbyphilosophersinlateclassical,fourth‐centuryGreece.

(p.182) DemocritusandProtagorasarenotusuallydiscussedonthesamepage.ProtagorasisaSophistandanorator;inhistoriesofancientGreekthought,heisusuallyputinthechaptersonrhetoricoronPlato'sresponsetotheSophists.DemocritusisclassifiedasoneofthelastofthePresocraticphilosophers,anatomistwhorespondedtoParmenides'argumentsconcerningbeing,butwhosemodeofphilosophyhearkensbacktotheMilesiantraditionofmonism.Theyarethoughttodifferinmethod(sophistryvs.philosophy),interests(rhetoricvs.science),andgoals(persuasionvs.truth).Butsuchneatcategoriescanbelimitingforthosewishingtounderstandtheirideasandinfluence.Aswehaveseen,Protagoras'Truthcontainedepistemologicalargumentsthatissueapowerfulchallengetorealistandobjectivistassumptionsinphilosophy;Protagoraswasalsoconcernedwithtopicsofphilosophicalsignificanceinpolitics,education,andreligion.Democrituswasnotonlyaphysiologos;healsowrotenumerousbooksonethics,politicalphilosophy,grammar,rhetoric,andmusic(DLIX46–9).Forthisreason,ithasbeensaidthatifProtagoraswasthemostphilosophicalofthesophists,DemocrituswasthemostsophisticalofthePresocratics.2

Accordingtoancienttradition,bothProtagorasandDemocrituscamefromAbderainThrace,onthenorth‐westerncoastoftheAegean.Thoughitisdifficulttoestablishtheirdateswithcertainty,giventheunreliablestateofthedoxographictraditionforpre‐Platonicphilosophers,itseemsthatProtagoraslivedfromc.492to4213andthatDemocrituslivedfromc.460to356,4whichmakesDemocritusapproximatelytwenty‐fiveyearsyoungerthanProtagoras.Thereis,however,abiographicaltraditionwhichmakesDemocritusolderthanProtagoras,andProtagorasaprotégéofDemocritus;Protagorasissaidtohaveoriginallybeenawood‐porter,whocametoDemocritus'attentionbecausehewasusingaparticularlyingeniousshoulder‐pad,τύλη,forcarryingwood.5Thesereportsareimpossible;PlatosaysintheMeno(91de=DK80A8)thatProtagoraswasfamousthroughoutGreeceforfortyyears,andthathewas70whenhedied,but

Democrituscannothavebeenteachingbetween465and455,letaloneearlier.6Butthesestoriesmaybepartofthereasonwhyancient(p.183) biographerstendtoclassifyProtagorasasamemberofthe‘schoolofDemocritus',suchaswefindinthearrangementofDiogenesLaertius’LivesoftheAncientPhilosophers,whereLeucippus7andDemocrituscomefirst,followedbyProtagoras,Pyrrho,Timon,andEpicurus.J.A.Davison(1953)arguesthatattemptstomakeDemocritusolderthanProtagorasarealsoresponsibleforthetraditionaccordingtowhichDemocrituslived104years;hethinksitismoreplausiblethatDemocritusdiedc.396attheageof64.8

WecannotbeverysureaboutProtagoras'andDemocritus'exactdates;whatisimportantforusisthatitislegitimatetoseeDemocritusasthelaterfigurereactingtoProtagoras.WeknowthatDemocritusknewofandrespondedtoProtagoras'measuredoctrine.SextusEmpiricusreports:

Onecouldnotsaythateveryappearanceistrue,sincethisleadstoself‐refutation,asDemocritusandPlatotaughtinoppositiontoProtagoras.Forifeveryappearanceistrue,thenthatnoteveryappearanceistrue,whichisitselfanappearance,willalsobetrue,andsoitwillbecomefalsethateveryappearanceistrue.(MVII.389–90=A114/T181)

Plutarchdescribesasimilarargument:

ThefirstchargeColotesmakesagainsthim[Democritus]isthatbysayingthateachthingisnomoreofonekindthananotherhehasthrownlifeintoconfusion.ButDemocrituswassofarfromthinkingthateachthingisnomoreofonekindthananotherthatheopposedthesophistProtagorasforsayingjustthatandwrotemanypersuasiveargumentsagainsthim.(AgainstColotes4,1108f=B156/T178c)

ThereisnocorrespondingevidenceortestimonythatProtagorasrespondedtoorknewofDemocritus.

BycomparisonwithProtagoras—andindeedbycomparisonwiththeotherPresocraticphilosophers—Democrituswroteinunprecedentedamounts,inall(p.184) areasofphilosophy,includingphysics,biology,epistemology,mathematics,astronomy,musicandpoetry,ethics,politics,medicine,andanthropology.WhereasmostofthePresocraticswroteonlyoneortwobooksorpoems,Democrituswroteoverseventybooks,accordingtoThrasyllus'catalogue(DLIX45–9=A33/T40)—anoutputonlymatchedintheclassicalperiodbyPlatoandAristotle.ItisusefultokeepinmindthatDemocrituswasnotreallyaPresocraticbutacontemporaryofSocrates'whomayhavelivedwellintothefourthcentury.Thevolumeofhiswritingwasaccompaniedbyacorrespondingincreaseinsophisticationandtheoreticaldetail,asAristotleandTheophrastusattest.ButhistoryhasbeenparticularlycrueltoDemocritus;onlyfragmentsofhiswritingsremain,andasaproportionofhistotaloutput,lessremainsforhimthanfortheothers.Wedonotpossessasinglecompletebookorpieceofwriting;indeed,wedonotevenhaveasignificantcontinuousexcerptfromanyofhiswritings.9Mostofwhatremainsareunconnectedone‐linersorbriefstatementsinethics,andtheseonlyhintatthelargeroutlinesofwhatever

ethicaltheoryhehad.Forotherareasofhiswork,suchashisatomistphysicsandscience,wearealmostcompletelydependentonthetestimonyofancientphilosophersanddoxographersofalatergeneration.Andtheygiveusfewcluesastotheoverallshapeandargumentativestructureofhisphilosophicaltreatises.WesimplyhavenoideahowDemocritustypicallybegan,ended,andorganizedhistreatises,orwhattheannouncedaimsandmethodsofhisbookswere.

DespitethefactthatalmostnothingremainsofDemocritus'writings,weshouldnotunderestimatehisimportanceandinfluenceinantiquity.10ReferencestoanddiscussionsofDemocritus'writingssuggestthattheywerewidelydisseminated,andthatitwasstillpossibletoreadthemintheoriginalatleastuptothefirstcenturyAD,andpossiblyaslateasthefourthcentury.11CicerorankshimaboveChrysippusandCleanthes;12Seneca,Philodemus,and(p.185) otherslavishpraiseonhim,describinghimforexampleas‘themostlearnedaboutnatureofalltheancients’.13Hewasalsoregardedasoneofthemostforemoststylistsoftheperiod,singledoutbyDionysiusofHalicarnassus,Plutarch,andCicero,fortheclarityofhisthoughtandexpression.14PlatonotoriouslyfailstomentionDemocritusinhiswritings15—afactwhichneednotbeconstruedinasinisterway.16ButAristotleregularlymentionsanddiscussesDemocritus.17Forexample,inOnGenerationandCorruption,AristotlesinglesDemocritusoutforpraise:

Ingeneral,noonehasdiscussedthesematters[i.e.,theconditionsofcomingtobeandpassingaway]otherthansuperficially,withtheexceptionofDemocritus.Heseemsnotmerelytohavethoughtaboutthemall,buttodifferfromtherestinhisapproach.(GCI2.315a34=A35/T42a)

Aristotle,Theophrastus,HeracleidesPonticus,Epicurus,hispupilMetrodorusofLampsacus(c.331–278),theStoicsCleanthes(c.331–232),andpossiblySphairosofBosphorus(mid‐tolatethirdcenturyBC),areallsaidtohavewrittenbooksonDemocritus.18Atthesametime,thereseemstohavebeenpersistentconfusioneveninantiquityconcerningbasicfactsaboutDemocritusandLeucippus,whoisthoughttohavebeenDemocritus'predecessorandperhapshisteacher.EpicurusdeniedthatLeucippusexisted,andthereisconfusionforexampleaboutwhethertheMegasDiakosmoswasbyLeucippusorDemocritus.This,andtheultimatelossoftheirbooks,wasperhapsdue,asSchmid–Stählinsuggest,tothelackofanorganizedschoolofsuccessorsinAbdera.CertainlytheEpicureansdonotseemtohavefeltanyresponsibilityfor(p.186)preservingDemocritus'writings—andinthis,theywereperhapsencouragedbyEpicurus'owndenialsthatheowedanythingtoDemocritus.19

AncienttraditionsofbiographyconnectatleasttwomajorschoolswithDemocritus:theEpicureansandthePyrrhonistsceptics.Thehistoriesoftheseschools,setoutintheformof‘successions’orintellectualgenealogiespurportingtoestablishstudent–teacherrelationships,20arethemselvesintertwinedandconvergenotonlyonDemocritusbutalsoonPyrrho(c.365to270),21thelatterofwhomwasadoptedbyAenesidemustwocenturieslaterastheforefatherofhisbrandofscepticism.Ancientintellectualgenealogiesconstructedbyphilosophicalschoolsarenotentirelyreliable,subjectastheyaretothewhimsofancientbiographers(foronething,itisneverclearwhatisrequired

foronepersontoqualifyasa‘teacher’or‘student’ofanother)aswellastoattemptsbylaterthinkerstoestablishanintellectualpedigreeforthemselves.Forthisreason,theyarelessusefulforestablishingaconnectionbetweenDemocritusandthelaterHellenisticschools,theEpicureansandthePyrrhonists.Buttheyareperhapsmorereliablewhentheyreportthattherewasagroupoflatefourth‐centuryphilosopherswhowereinfluencedbyDemocritusandexercisedsomeinfluence,inturn,onPyrrhoandEpicurus.DemocritusissaidtohavetaughtMetrodorusofChios,afourth‐centuryatomistwithscepticaltendencies.22Metrodorus,inturn,issaidtohavegivenPyrrho‘badbeginnings’;PyrrhoandAnaxarchusofAbdera,anotherfourth‐centuryatomist,aresaidtohavetravelledtogetheronAlexander'sexpeditiontoIndia.23AristoclesreportsthatPyrrhowasastudentofAnaxarchus,andlaterencounteredDemocritus'books.24PyrrhoisreportedbyhisassociatePhilotohave‘mentionedDemocritusmostoften’(DLIX67=T195).25PyrrhointurnissaidtohavebeentheteacheroftheatomistNausiphanesofTeos(b.c.360BC),whowastheteacherofEpicurus.26

Democrituswasalsotakenupbyotherschools.HewasassociatedwiththePythagoreans,27whichiswhyThrasyllus,aPythagoreanandthecourtastrologer(p.187) oftheEmperorTiberiusinthefirstcenturyAD,tooksuchaninterestinDemocritus,compilingacatalogueofDemocritus'books,organizedintetralogieslikethemorefamouscataloguehecompiledforPlato'sbooks.28ItisalsothereasonwhyIamblichusincludedinhisProtrepticusthetreatiseoftheAnonymusIamblichi,whoaswenotedearlierwasprobablyafollowerofDemocritus.Democritusalsoseemstohavebeenreadbyancientmedicaldoctors;someworksintheHippocraticcorpusmayperhapsshowsignsofhisinfluenceandideas.29IthasbeenarguedthattheCynicswerechampionsofDemocritusandresponsibleforthepreservationandstateoftheethicalfragmentsaswehavethem,onthegroundsthatthefragmentscloselyresembleinwordingandspiritsomeoftheircentraldoctrines.30Andfinally,despitethefactthatDemocritusfamouslysaid‘ForIcametoAthensandnooneknewme’(DLIX36=B116/TD1;alsoinCicero,TusculanDisputationsV.36.104),thereisevidencethathisethicalandpoliticalworkswereeventuallyreadbythelatefifthorearlyfourthcenturyinAthens:thetextoftheAnonymusIamblichi,mentionedabove,appearstobeanAtheniandocumentfromthatperiodheavilyinfluencedbyDemocritus'politicaltheory.

WemustthereforereconstructDemocritus'viewsaboutknowledgeandperceptionfromthetestimonyofsourcesbothroughlycontemporarywithDemocritusandlate.Wewillproceedbyexaminingeachpieceoftestimony,keepinginmindtheinterestthewitnesshasinDemocritus,whethercriticalorsympathetic,withthehopeofbeingabletotracelinesofconvergencefromthesetestimoniesbacktotheoriginalsource.IfwecangiveaplausibleexplanationofwhylaterthinkersemphasizedcertainaspectsofDemocritus'viewsasopposedtoothers,thiswillgiveusindirectconfirmationthatweareproceedingalongtherightlines.

ThetestimonyconcerningDemocritus'viewsaboutknowledgecanbedividedintoroughlytwogroups.First,AristotleandTheophrastusareearlysources.TheydonotaddressthesubjectofDemocritus'epistemologydirectly.Wewanttoinvestigate

Aristotle'sremarksthatDemocritusthoughtthat‘truthliesinappearing’,orthatappearancesaretrue,andhisreasonsforassociatingDemocrituswithProtagoras.TheophrastusisvaluableforhistestimonyconcerningDemocritus'theoriesofperceptionandsensiblequalities.Second,wehavetestimonyfromlaterEpicureanandscepticaltraditionswhichmakeDemocritus(p.188) intoaso‐callednegativedogmatist,someonewhothoughtthatnoappearancesaretrueandthatthetruthisimpossibleforhumanbeingstodiscover.31

Despitetheapparentdifferencesbetweenthem,onecannotfavouronesetoftestimonyovertheother,foreachsetcontainselementswithaffinitieswiththeotherset.Forexample,Aristotle,liketheEpicureans,givesevidenceofa‘sceptical’Democritus:‘AndthisiswhyDemocritus,atanyrate,saysthateitherthereisnotruthortousatleastitisnotevident’(Met.Γ5.1009b11–12).Andhistestimonyshouldnotbedismissedoutofhand,forwheninterpretedinthelightofothertestimonyandfragmentsfromDemocritus,wecandiscernthefundamentalepistemologicalprinciplesAristotlethinkscharacterizeDemocritus'thinking.32Norarethelatesources—ortheearlyones—freefromtensions.Insomepassages,SextusEmpiricuspresentsDemocritusasanegativedogmatistwhodeniesthatanythingistrue,butelsewherehedeniesthatDemocrituswasascepticofanykind,sincehemakesbothreasonandthesensessourcesofknowledgeandcriteriaofthetruth.WewillproceedontheassumptionthatAristotle,Sextus,andtheothersmaybedescribingdifferentaspectsofasinglecoherenttheory;wewilldiscussAristotleandTheophrastusinthischapter,andthelatersourcesinChapter9.

Fromourstudyofthesources,wewillarriveatthefollowingpictureofDemocritus'epistemology.Itwillbeusefultokeepthisinmindinthisandthenextchaptersincewewillbeexaminingthesourcesonebyone;thepiecesofthepuzzlewillnotbecomeclearuntiltheend.DemocritusrejectedProtagoras'measuredoctrine;hewasnosubjectivistorrelativist,anddidnotthinkthatallopinionsandbeliefsaretrue.AsIshallargue,thereasonwhyAristotledescribeshiminProtagoreanterms,andfindsconnectionsbetweenhisviewandProtagoras'isthatDemocrituswasindeedaProtagoreanaboutperceptionandsensiblequalities;onhisview,onecannotgowronginperception,becausewhatweperceivearetheeffectswhichatomshaveonus.Butthisimpliesthatthereisagapbetweenobjectsoutthereandwhatweperceive;whatweperceiveisnot(p.189) theobjectinitselfbuttheaffectionitproducesinus,andthisimpliesthatwecanneverknowhowthingsareinthemselves.ThisthoughtisexpressedinDemocritus'‘sceptical’fragmentsthatthelaterscepticsandEpicureanstakeaparticularinterestin.Atthesametime,Democritusthoughtthatthesensesareasinequanonforknowledgeaboutwhatisnon‐evidentoruncleartous;knowledgeaboutwhatisreal,thatis,atomsandvoid,isonlyarrivedatthroughreasoningandinferenceaboutwhatthesensestellus.Thatis,knowledgeisnotpossiblewithoutperception.IfthenDemocritusendorsedaviewofsensiblequalitiesaccordingtowhichthingsaresweetonlyiftheyseemsweettosomeone,andifhewascommittedtotheviewthatknowledgeisnotpossiblewithoutthesenses,thenheheldpositionsthatmakehimaProtagorean,atleastaccordingtoPlatoandAristotle'slights,becausehemakesperceptionameasureofthetruth.33

8.2Aristotle:DemocritusonappearancesLetusbeginwithAristotle.HisprimaryinterestisinDemocritus'atomistphysicsandhisbiology,withafewbriefcommentsaboutDemocritus'viewofthesoulandintellect.ThisdoesnotadduptoacoherentpresentationofDemocritus'viewsonknowledge.Butinanumberofplaces,AristotledoesdescribeDemocritusinawaythatechoesProtagoras.Forexample,whendiscussinghisexplanationofcomingtobe,passingaway,andalterationinDeGenerationeetCorruptione,Aristotlepraiseshimforgoingwellbeyondanyofhisotherpredecessorsinattemptingtoexplain‘theappearances’,andevendescribeshimasthinkingthat‘truthliesinappearing’.InrelatedpassagesoftheMetaphysicsandDeAnima(cf.§8.2,8.3.3),AristotleassociatesDemocrituswithProtagoras'conflictingappearancesargument,andincludesDemocrituswithotherswhosewayofthinkingcommitsthemtoProtagoras'thesisthatallappearancesaretrue.Forthisreason,anyinterpretationwhichmakesDemocritusarationalistwhorejectedthesensesasunreliablewilltendtodownplayandevendismissAristotle'stestimony;similarly,anyinterpretationwhichmakesDemocritusaproto‐empiricistwhothoughtthatsensoryperceptionisthepointofdepartureforallapprehensionofwhatishiddenwilltendtodefendthereliabilityofAristotle'stestimonyonthispoint.Asitturnsout,AristotleisnottheonlysourcewhoattributesthisepistemologicalprincipletoDemocritus,andsowecanunderstandandmakeuseofAristotle'stestimonywithouthavingtorelyuncriticallyonit.

(p.190) LetusturnfirsttotheDeGenerationeetCorruptione.ThoughAristotledoesnotdirectlyaddressDemocritus'epistemology,histestimonyisextremelyimportant,forherefers,intermsofpraise,toanobjectiveandamethodthat,inhisview,setsDemocritus(andLeucippus)apartfromtheearlierphilosophers.

Ingeneral,nooneexceptDemocritushasappliedhimselftoanyofthesematters[sc.theconditionsofcomingtobe,passingaway,alterationandgrowth]inamorethansuperficialway.Democritus,however,doesseemnotonlytohavethoughtaboutalltheproblems,butalsotobedistinguishedfromtheoutsetbyhismethod.For,aswearesaying,noneofthephilosophersmadeanydefinitestatementaboutgrowth,exceptsuchasanyamateurmighthavemade.Theysaidthatthingsgrowbytheaccessionofliketolike,buttheydidnotproceedtoexplainthemannerofthisaccession.Nordidtheygiveanyaccountofcombination;andtheyneglectedalmosteverysingleoneoftheremainingproblems,offeringnoexplanation,forexample,ofactionorpassion—howinnaturalactionsonethingactsandtheotherundergoesaction.DemocritusandLeucippus,however,postulateshapes,andmakealterationandcoming‐to‐beresultfromthem.Theyexplaincoming‐to‐beandpassing‐awaybytheirdissociationandassociation,butalterationbytheirgroupingandposition.Andsincetheythoughtthatthetruthlayintheappearance,andtheappearancesareconflictingandinfinitelymany,theymadeshapesinfiniteinnumber.Hence—owingtothechangesofthecompound—thesamethingseemsdifferenttodifferentpeople;itistransposedbyasmalladditionalingredient,andappearsutterlyotherbythetranspositionofasingleconstituent.Foratragedyandacomedyarebothcomposedofthesameletters.(GCI2.315a35–b15=A35,

DK67A9/T42a,trans.Joachimwithmodifications)

AristotledescribesDemocritusasaimingtopreserveandexplainappearances:heandLeucippus‘thoughtthatthetruthlayintheappearance,andtheappearancesareconflictingandinfinitelymany’,andtheyintroducedaninfinitenumberofshapesinordertoexplainthem.Democritustriedtoexplaintheappearancesofsubstantialandqualitativechange—thatis,whyobjectsappeartocomeintooroutofexistenceortoundergoalterationandgrowth—intermsoffundamentalatomicshapesthatcanbearrangedandrearranged.34

InGCI8,AristotleagainemphasizestheimportanceforLeucippusandDemocritusofexplainingwhythingsappeartocometobe,passaway,andundergochange.35

Themostsystematicandgeneraltheory[sc.ofthenatureofchange]wasproposedbyLeucippusandDemocritus,takingastheirstarting‐pointtheactualnatureofthings.Forsomeoftheolderphilosophersthoughtthatwhatisisnecessarilyoneandmotionless;forthevoidisnot,andtherecouldbenomotionwithoutaseparatevoid,norcouldtherebemanythingsiftherewerenothingtoseparatethem.…Asaresultoftheseargumentstheysetperceptionaside,anddisregardingitonthegroundthatonemustfollowreason(p.191) theysaythattheuniverseisoneandmotionless,and,someofthemadd,infinite;foralimitwouldbounditagainstthevoid.…Thesethingsseemtofollowlogically,butinpracticeitseemsneartomadnesstothinklikethis;fornomadmanissocrazyastothinkthatfireandiceareoneandthesame,butitisonlyinthecaseofwhatisgoodandwhatcustomarilyseemssothatsomepeoplearemadenoughtothinkthatthereisnodifferencebetweenthem.

ButLeucippusthoughtthathehadatheorywhichwouldgranttoperceptionwhatisgenerallyagreed,andwouldnotdoawaywithcomingtobeorpassingawayormotionorthepluralityofthings.Inthoserespectsheagreedwithwhatseemstobethecase,buttothosewhoproposedthetheoryoftheOneheagreedthattherecanbenomotionwithoutvoid,andsaidthatthevoidisnot,andthatnothingthatthereisisnot;forwhatreallyisisatotalplenum.(GCI8.324b35–325a29=DK67A7/T48a)

AristotledescribesLeucippusandDemocritusas‘grantingtoperceptionwhatisgenerallyagreed’,as‘agreeingwithwhatseemstobethecase’,andasthinkingthat‘truthlayinappearances’.Thisisperhapsmisleading—asHirzel(1877–83:i.113)putsit,hemakesitsoundasthoughDemocritusmadesensoryperceptionnotthepointofdepartureonthewaytotruth,butthelocusoftruthitself—butAristotleclearlydoesnotmeanthatLeucippusandDemocritusthoughtthatallopinionsorappearancesaretrue.Rather,hispointisthattheywishedtoshowhowordinarypre‐theoreticopinionsandobservations—suchastheobservationthatthingscomeintoexistence,passaway,andundergoalteration—canbeexplainedby‘theactualnatureofthings’asdescribedbytheatomisttheory.Unliketheirpredecessors,LeucippusandDemocritusdidnotdenythatthereisanytruthtohowthingsordinarilyappeartous;onthecontrary,theytook

appearancesseriouslyenoughtoofferatheorytoexplainwhythingsarethewaytheyappear.

WhatsetsLeucippus'andDemocritus'methodandaimsapart,accordingtoAristotle,isthattheythoughtthatappearancesrequireexplanation.Givensuchagoal,atheoryisonlyasgoodasitsabilitytoexplainthoseappearances.Asweshallsee,Democritus'explanationshavetheform:giventhatweobservexoccurring,whatisitabouttheworldthatcouldexplainwhyxoccurs?Forexample,giventhatweexperienceperceptionsofvariouskinds,howcanweexplainthecausaloriginsofthoseperceptions?Inotherwords,Democritus'explanationsareabductive,thatis,inferencestothebestexplanation:theymovefromthelevelofobservationtothelevelofexplanationandcause.

Democritus'searchforexplanations36—andthedirectionofexplanationfromwhatappearstowhatishidden—isattestedtobyothersources:

Δημόκριτοςγου̑ναὐτός,ὥςϕασιν,ἔλϵγϵβούλϵσθαιμίανϵὑρϵιν̑αἰτιολογίανἢτὴνΠϵρσω̑νοἱβασιλϵίανγϵνέσθαι.

Democritushimself,sotheysay,saidthathewouldratherdiscoverasingleexplanationthanacquirethekingdomofthePersians.(EusebiusPraeparatioEvangelicaXIV.27.4,citingDionysiusofAlexandria=B118/TD2)

(p.192) EusebiusinterpretsthisasanexpressionofthehopelessnessoffindingasingleexplanationandthinksitisofapiecewithwhathesupposestobeDemocritus'andEpicurus'denialofprovidence.However,thislinefromDemocritusneednotexpressanyepistemicscepticism,butratheracommitmenttothedifficultquestforrigorousexplanations:Democritusthinksthatsuchdiscoveriesarepreferabletoanyotherhumangoods,butthatitisdifficultandraretofindevenonesuchexplanation.

Democritususesanunusualwordaitiologia‘causalaccount’or‘explanation’.37Epicurusalsousesthisword,callingDemocritusandLeucippusaitiologēsantes‘investigatorsofcauses’beforeapplyingthetermtotheEpicureansthemselves.

〈οἱ〉δ’αἰτιολογήσαντϵςἐξἀρχη̑ςἱκανω̑ςκαὶοὐμόνοντω̑νπροτέρωνπολὺδιϵνέγκαντϵς,ἀλλὰκαὶτω̑νὕστϵρον,πολλαπλασίωςἔλαθονἑαυτούς,καίπϵρἐνπολλοις̑μϵγάλοι,κουϕίσαντϵςἐντω̑ιτὴνἀνάγκηνκαὶταὐτόματονπάνταδύνασθαι.

Thoseadequatelygivinganaccountofcausesfromthebeginning,farsurpassingnotonlytheirpredecessorsbuttheirsuccessorstooinmanyways,thoughtheyalleviatedmanygreatevils,failedtoseewhattheyweredoinginmakingnecessityandchancethecauseofeverything.(Epicurusfr.34.30Arrighetti=A69/T208)

AncientbiographersconsistentlyemphasizeDemocritus'pursuitofexplanations.PlutarchtellsananecdoteaboutDemocrituswishingtofindoutwhatthecauseofthesweetnessofacucumberwas;heaskedthemaidservantwhereshefoundthecucumber,andwhentolditwassweetbecauseithadbeeninajarwithhoney,hereplies:

‘You'veruinedit,’hesaid,apparentlyinanger,‘butallthesameIshallpursuetheinquiryandinvestigatethecause’(καὶοὐδὲνἡ̑ττονἐπιθήσομαιτω̑ιλόγωικαὶζητήσωτὴναἰτίαν),asifthesweetnessbelongednaturallytothecucumber.(ConvivialQuestionsI.10.2,628b–d=A17a/T24)

Similarly,inPhilodemus:

Democritus,amanwhowasnotonlythemostlearnedaboutnature(ϕυσιολογώτατος)ofalltheancientsbutnolessindustriousthananyotherinquirer,saysthatmusicismorerecent,andidentifiesitscause(τὴναἰτίανἀποδίοωσι),sayingthatitwasnotsingledoutbynecessity,butaroseasaresultofplenty.(OnMusicHerc.papyrus1497,col.XXXVI.29–39=B144/T213)

Thrasyllus'catalogueofDemocritus'bookscontainsnumerousbooksonthecauses(αἰτίαι)ofthings:CelestialCauses,CausesintheAir,TerrestrialCauses,CausesofFireandoftheThingsinFire,CausesofSounds,CausesofSeeds,Plants,(p.193) andFruits,CausesofAnimalsin3books,MiscellaneousCauses,CausesconcernedwithThingsSeasonableandUnseasonable,LegalCausesandEffects(orCausesofLaws,Νομικὰαἴτια)(DLIX45–9).38Finally,thereisampleevidenceofDemocritus'pursuitofaitiologiainwhatremainsofhisscientificresearch.Thetestimonyconcerninghisinterestsinbiology,medicine,andatmosphericphenomenaindicateawiderangeofinterests,andpreservecollectionsofhisobservationsandproposalsforexplainingthem.IntheGenerationofAnimals,AristotlegivesussomeideaofDemocritus'embryology,withreferencestohisexplanationsofsexandthedifferentiationofmaleandfemale(GA764a6–b20=A143/T138a),theformationoftheanimalintheuterus(GA740a33–b1=T136aandGA730a13–14=T137a),birthdefects(GA769b30–6=T140),andtheformationofteeth(GA788b10–28,789b2–8=T141).Guthrie'sclaimthat‘theaimsoftheatomistswerenotthoseofempiricalscientists’butratherdesignedto‘meettheEleaticchallenge’(1965:455)ishardtosquarewiththeevidenceattestingtoDemocritus'interestsinempiricalobservationandexplanation.

Tosumup,whenAristotlesaysintheDeGenerationeetCorruptionethatDemocritusandLeucippusthoughtthat‘truthlayinappearing’,orthatthey‘agreedwithwhatseemstobethecase’,hedoesnotmeantoimplythattheythoughtthatallappearancesandopinionsaretrue.Rather,thisisAristotle'sshorthandwayofsayingthattheygaveacentralplacetoempiricalobservationsandthattheaimoftheirtheorizingwastogivecausalexplanationsforthefeaturesoftheworldthatweobserve.ThisquestforaitiologiaiisalsoattestedinlatersourcesandtestimonyconcerningDemocritus'scientifictheorizing.AristotledoesnotintendtoimplythatDemocrituswasaProtagoreansubjectivist,butratherthatDemocritushadanempiricallyorientedmethodology,oneinwhichthesensesandperceptualexperiencearethestartingpointforanyfurtherinvestigationsintothetruth.

However,inrelatedpassagesintheDeAnimaandinMetaphysicsΓ5,AristotlecomesclosertosayingthatDemocritusendorsedtheProtagoreanthesisthatallappearancesaretrue.(Andinthesecontexts,heonlyreferstoDemocritus,notLeucippus.)In

MetaphysicsΓ5,hedescribestheconflictingappearancesargumentsupportingProtagoras'measuredoctrine:thingsappearFtosome,andnot‐Ftoothers,butthereseemstobenomorereasontosupposethatitisFthannot‐F.ItcomesassomethingofasurprisewhenheendshisdescriptionofProtagoras'argumentbyparaphrasingDemocritus:

Ποια̑οὐ̑ντούτωνἀληθη̑ἢψϵυδη̑,ἄδηλονοὐθὲνγὰρμα̑λλοντάδϵἢτάδϵἀληθη̑,ἀλλ’ὁμοίως.ΔιὸΔημόκριτοςγέϕησινἢτοιοὐθὲνϵἰν̑αιἀληθέςἢἡμιν̑γ’ἄδηλον.

Whichthenofthese[appearances]aretrueandwhicharefalseisnotobvious;fortheonesetisnomoretruethantheother,butbotharealike.AndthisiswhyDemocritus,atany(p.194) rate,saysthateitherthereisnotruthortousatleastitisnotevident.(MetaphysicsΓ5.1009b9–12=A112/T177,trans.Ross)

ThisconfirmsthatDemocritusmadesomeuseofProtagoras'undecidabilityargument.39Butwhatdoesitmeantosaythat‘eitherthereisnotruthortousatleastitisnotevident’?DidDemocritusmeantoendorsethefirstalternative,thatnothing,orneitherappearance,istrue,orthesecond,thatevenifoneappearanceistrueratherthantheother,itisuncleartous?NothingintheconflictingappearancesargumentAristotlehasjustdescribedwouldappeartojustifytheextremeconclusionthatnothing,orneitherappearance,istrue;whatisjustifiedistheideacontainedinthesecondclause‘wecannottell’,whichmodifiesandsoftensthefirstwith‘oratleast’(ἢ…γϵ).TheconflictingappearancesargumentconcludesthatonecannottellwhetherthingsareFornot‐F,andAristotleevidentlymeanstosaythatDemocritus,likeProtagoras,endorsedthisbysaying:whichappearanceistrue,ifany,isuncleartous.Unfortunately,AristotledoesnotexplainwhatfurthersignificancethisconclusionmayhavehadforDemocritus,orwhatitscontextinDemocritus'writingsmighthavebeen.(Asweshallsee,theargumentandDemocritus'conclusionprobablyconcernperceptualappearances—notallappearancesandopinionsingeneral.)

Aristotlegoesontosaythatvirtuallyallofhispredecessorswerecommittedinonewayoranothertotheideathatallperceptualappearancesaretrue.

ὅλωςδὲδιὰτὸὑπολαμβάνϵινϕρόνησινμὲντὴναἴσθησιν,ταύτηνδ’ϵἰν̑αιἀλλοίωσιν,τὸϕαινόμϵνονκατὰτὴναἴσθησινἐξἀνάγκηςἀληθὲςϵἰν̑αίϕασινἐκτούτωνγὰρκαὶΈμπϵδοκλη̑ςκαὶΔημόκριτοςκαὶτω̑νἄλλωνὡςἔποςϵἰπϵιν̑ἕκαστοςτοιαύταιςδόξαιςγϵγένηταιἔνοχοι.

Andingeneral,itisbecausethesethinkerssupposeknowledgetobesensation,andthistobeaphysicalalteration,thattheysaythatwhatappearstooursensesmustbetrue;foritisforthesereasonsthatbothEmpedoclesandDemocritusand,onemayalmostsay,alltheothershavefallenvictimtoopinionsofthissort.(Met.Γ5.1009b12–17)

AristotleincludesDemocritusinhislisthere,thoughhedoesnotgoontoquotehim.However,whenhequotesHomer,heevidentlyhasDemocritusinmind(cf.§7.3.3).Now

Democritusdoesinfactdistinguishsenseperceptionfromotherkindsofawarenessandcognition—indeed,hemayhavebeenoneoftheearliesttodoso.Thereisnoevidencethathehadtechnicaltermsforsenseperception40andthereasoningfaculty,41butsomuchhasbeenlostthatitishardtosay.ButinfragmentB11/TD22,Democritusdistinguishesbetween(p.195) gnēsiēgnōmē‘genuineknowing’andskotiēgnōmē‘darkknowing’,wheredarkknowingconsistsofseeing,hearing,smell,taste,andtouch,andgenuineknowingconcernswhatistoofineforthesensestodetect,thatis,atomsandvoid.AndinfragmentB125/TD23,Democritushasthesensesaddressϕρήν,‘mind’.Inthesepassages,whichwewilldiscussmorecloselyin§9.2.2and9.4,Democritusevidentlymarksoffthemindfromthesensesasadistinctcognitivepower.

Aristotledoesnotdenythis;hispointisnotthatDemocritussimplyequatedthefunctionsofsensationandthinking.Rather,Aristotleisthinkingaboutwhatanexplanationofthinkingoughttolooklike,and,inhisview,Democritus'explanationofhowthinkingoccurslookstoomuchlikehisexplanationofperceiving(cf.§§7.3,7.7).Let'stakealookatAristotle'sreasons.InMet.Γ5,AristotlequotesfromHomer:

ϕασὶδὲκαὶτὸν“Ομηρονταύτηνἔχονταϕαίνϵταιτὴνδόξαν,ὅτιἐποίησϵτὸν"Εκτορα,ὡςἐξέστηὑπὸτη̑ςπληγη̑ς,κϵισ̑θαιἀλλοϕρονέοντα,ὡςϕρονου̑νταςμὲνκαὶτοὺςπαραϕρονου̑νταςἀλλ’οὐταὐτά.

AndtheysaythatHomeralsoevidentlyhadthisopinion,becausehemadeHector,whenhewasunconsciousfromtheblow,lie‘thinkingotherthoughts’,—whichimpliesthateventhosewhoarebereftofthoughthavethoughts,thoughnotthesamethoughts[sc.asthosewhoarefullyconscious].(Met.Γ5.1009b28–31)

WhenAristotlereferstosome(‘Theysay’)whoattributethisbelieftoHomer,hemeansDemocritus.42WeknowthisbecausebothTheophrastusintheDeSensibusandAristotleintheDeAnimaassociateDemocrituswiththislinefromHomer.TheophrastusdescribesDemocritus'viewofthinkingasfollows:

Aboutthought(ϕρονϵιν̑),[Democritus]saidmerelythatitoccurswhentheconstituentsofthesoulareproperlybalanced(συμμέτρως);whenonegetstoohotortoocold,thenhesayschangetakesplace(μϵταλλάττϵιν).Thatiswhyitwasagoodideaoftheancientsthatonecan‘thinkotherthings’(ἀλλοϕρονϵιν̑).Itisclear,therefore,thatheexplainsthoughtbytheconstitutionofthebody,whichisperhapsconsistentonhispart,sincehemakesthesoulouttobeabody.(DS58=A135/T113)

TheophrastusreferstoDemocritus'praiseof‘theancients’andusesthesameunusualwordallophroneintodescribethinkingwhenthebodyhasbeenaltered.WecaninferthatDemocritusmusthavepraisedHomerforsayingthatwhenHector(orEuryalus)sufferedanalterationintemperatureorproportionin(p.196) thesoul,hewas‘thinkingdifferently’;for,inDemocritus'view,thiscorrectlyimpliesthatthinkingdependsonthecompositionandconditionofthebody.43Similarly,intheDeAnima,AristotletellsusthatDemocritusapprovedofthislinefromHomer.

Anaxagorastoosaysthatsoulisthecauseofmotion,andsodoesanyoneelsewhosaysthatmindsetseverythinginmotion;butthatviewisnotexactlythesameasthatofDemocritus.Forhesaysthatsoulandmindaresimplythesamething,fortruthiswhatappears,whichiswhyHomerwasrighttodescribeHectoras‘lyingthinkingotherthings’;hedoesnotthentreatthemindasacapacitytoachievethetruth,butsaysthatsoulandmindarethesamething.(DAI2.404a25–31=A101/T107a)44

‘Truthiswhatappears’and‘Soulandmindarethesame’arenotquotationsfromDemocritus,butrepresentAristotle'sowninferencesaboutDemocritus.45Inhisview,Democritus'praiseofthelinefromHomerimpliesthattheconditionofthebodyaffectsandindeeddeterminesthecontentofone'sthoughts;sounderstood,thinkingisapassiveconditioninwhichthecontentofone'sthoughtmirrorsthecause,fromwhichitfollowsthat‘truthiswhatappears’.HedescribesDemocritusasidentifyingsoulandmindonlybecauseDemocritusfailstodistinguishbetweenthetwointherightway.ForAristotlethinksthatitisnecessarytodistinguishthesoul—i.e.thatsetofcapacitiesinvirtueofwhichananimalisalive—fromthemind(nous),thecapacitybywhichalivingbeinggraspstruthandiscapableofthought.Democritusfailstodothis,andassignslifefunctionsandrationalfunctionstothesamething:

Democritus'explanationofeitherattribute[i.e.thesoul'sbeingasourceofmotionandtheseatofintelligence]ismoresubtle[i.e.thanthatofhispredecessors].Hesaysthatthesoulisthesameasthemind,andiscomposedoftheprimary,invisiblebodies,andisasourceofmotionbecauseoftheirsmallnessandshape.Hesaysthatthesphereisthemostmobileofshapes,andthatmindandfireareofthesamenature.(DAI2.405a8–13=A101/T107b)

Sphericalatoms,whoseshapemakesthemthemostmobileofallshapesandwhichareofthesamenatureastheatomsinfire,areresponsiblebothforanimatingthebody—thatis,forlife—andforactivatingthoughtin(p.197) thatbody—thatis,forintellect.ThefactthatsphericalatomshavebothfunctionsexplainswhyAristotledescribesDemocritusasidentifyingthesoulwiththemind.

AccordingtoLucretiusandSextus,Democritusthoughtthemindisscatteredthroughoutthebody.46

Somesaythatit[i.e.thought]occursthroughoutthewholebody,e.g.somepeoplewhofollowDemocritus.(SextusMVII349=A107/T110e)

OnthispointyoucouldnotacceptwhattheholyopinionofthemanDemocrituslaysdown,thattheelementsofbodyandmindaredisposedalternately,onebyone,andsobindthelimbstogether.(LucretiusIII.370–4=A108/T110f)

TaylorarguesthatLucretius'testimonyisparticularlyimportant,becauseinarguingfortheEpicureandistinctionbetweentheanimus‘intellect’inthechestandtheanimaornon‐rationalsoulwhichisdistributedthroughoutthebody,Lucretiusexpresslycriticizes

otherviews,includingDemocritus',accordingtowhichtheatomsmakinguptheanimusaredistributedthroughoutthebodyalternatelywiththosemakingupthebodilyorgansandlimbs.Thisimpliesnotonlythatthemindisnotlocatedinanyparticularpartofthebody—paceAëtius—butalsothat‘mind‐atomsarenotsomesubsetofsoul‐atoms;ratherthelivinghumanbeingiscomposedofaninterconnectedwebofmind‐atomsandbody‐atoms,matchedonetoone.Clearly,soul‐atomsandmind‐atomsarethesamesetofatoms’(Taylor1999a:202).

NowifDemocritusthoughtthatthesameatomsanimatethelivingbeingandareresponsibleforthinkingandperceiving,itwouldhelptoexplainwhyhemaintainedaccordingtosomereportsthateventhedeadmayfeelsomething.Sincelifeisdeterminedbythepresenceofsoul‐atomsinthelargermassofatomsmakingupthebody,beingaliveisnotanall‐or‐nothingaffair,asProclusexplains:

StoriesofpeoplewhoappearedtohavediedandthencamebacktolifewerecollectedbymanyoftheancientsincludingthescientistDemocritusinhiswritingsOnHades.…Deathwasnot,asitseemedtobe,theextinctionofalllifeinthebody,butitwasdrivenoutperhapsbyabloworaninjury,whilesomelinkswiththesoulwereleftstillrootedintheregionofthemarrowandtheheartretainedsomesparksoflifehiddeninits(p.198) inmostregions.Andastheseremainedintactthebodywasstilladaptedforlifeandsubsequentlyregainedthelifewhichhadbeenextinguished.(CommentaryonPlato'sRepublicII.113.6Kroll=B1/T112d)47

Afterthecessationofrespiration,partsofthesoul(thatis,sphericalatoms)maystillbeleftinthebodyandtheircontinuingpresenceallowittoberesuscitated.Thisisnotonlytrueinthecaseofthosewhoareapparentlydead,butalsoforthosewhohavesufferedablow.HencethesignificanceofthequotationfromHomer:evenmid‐swoon,itispossibletofeelandthink,althoughperhapsnotthesamefeelingsandthoughtsaswhenoneisfullyconscious.48

Furthermore,Democritusevidentlythoughtthatthinkingoccursinthesamewayasperceiving:inbothcases,imagesoreidōlastreamofffromobjectsandstrikethesensory‐ormind‐atomsinthebody.Thus,whenIthinkofsunshineinLasPalmas,Imusthaveobtainedthatthoughtbybeingdirectlyaffectedbythought‐imagesofthesunshineinLasPalmas.Thismayseemtoocrudetobetenable,butLucretiusoffersasimilarexplanation,andexplicitlymakesthepointthatthinkingandperceivingmustoccurinthesameway:

Because…[theimages']extremelightnessmakestheirtravelsomobile,itiseasyforanyonefineimagetoarouseourmindwithasingleimpact.Forthemindisitselfdelicateandextraordinarilymobile.ThatthishappensasIsayitdoesyoucaneasilytellasfollows.Insofaraswhatweseewiththemindissimilartowhatweseewiththeeyes,itmustcomeaboutinasimilarway.Well,sinceIhaveprovedthatitisbymeansofwhateverimagesstimulatemyeyesthatIsee,say,alion,youcannowtellthatthemindismovedinasimilarwaythroughimagesoflionsandequallythroughtheothersitsees,nolessthantheeyesexceptinthatwhatitdiscernsismore

delicate.(Dererumnatura4.779ff.=LS15D,trans.LongandSedley)

AccordingtothisEpicureantheoryofthought,onethinksofsomethingbymeansofeidōlaor‘spectres’thatconstantlystreamofffromobjectsandpossessthesameshapesthatthoseobjectsdo.AsLucretiusputsit,weseewiththemindinthesamewaythatweseewiththeeyes;inbothcases,themindorsense‐organismovedbyimageswhichreachitfromoutside,andconstitutetheobjectofone'sthoughtorperception.Cicerofindsthisexplanationofthinkingabsurd:

Youmustexplainit[sc.theEpicureanexplanationofthinking]tomewhenyoucomesafehome,sothatIcanhaveyourspectreinmypower,sothatitpresentsitselfassoonasIwanttothinkofyou,andnotonlyofyou,whomIhaveinmyheart,butifIbeginto(p.199) thinkoftheislandofBritain,itseidōlonwillcomeflyingintomychest.(AdfamiliaresXV.16.1=A118/T131a)

Hefindsitimplausiblethatthecontentofone'sthoughts,nolessthanthecontentofone'sperceptions,shouldbedeterminedbytheeidōlaor‘spectres’thatstrikeone'sbody,thateverymentalcontentshouldbetheeffectoftheimpactoftheseimagesonthemind.49AndheclearlylaysresponsibilityforthistheoryonDemocritus(DeNaturaDeorumI.38.105–10=notinDK/T131b).

IfCiceroiscorrect,thenithelpstoexplainwhyAristotleincludesDemocritusamongthephilosopherswhoseexplanationsofthinkingcommitthem—orsohethinks—totheimpossibilityoferror(cf.§7.7).For,onDemocritus'view,thereisaone‐to‐onecorrespondencebetweenwhatonethinks(forexample,CicerothinkingoftheislandofBritain)andwhatcausesonetothink(theeidōlaofBritainflyingtowardsandintoCicero'smind).ThiscertainlydoesnotimplythatDemocritushimselfendorsedthepositionthaterrorisimpossibleandthatallopinionsaretrue.Rather,itisacriticismofDemocritus'explanationofthinking,accordingtowhich,inattemptingtoexplainhowwecometohavecertainmentalcontentsandthinkcertainthoughts,heendsupexplainingtoomuch,andmakesitimpossibleforustothinkaboutnothing,sotospeak,thatis,aboutwhatisnotreallythecase.

ItisclearthatAristotlecanonlytakeussofarinourinvestigationintoDemocritus'epistemology,intohisviewsofknowledgeandperception;thisisnotanaspectofDemocritus'thinkingwhichoccupiedhisattention.Aswehaveseen,hedoesnotattempttocharacterizeingeneraltermsDemocritus'epistemology;furthermore,someofhisremarksaboutDemocritus(forexample,‘truthliesintheappearances’)aresocrypticastobepotentiallymisleading.ButifwekeepinmindtheparticularnatureofAristotle'sinterestsinDemocritus,wefindthatheoffersanumberofcluesaboutthenatureofDemocritus'viewsaboutappearances,perception,andknowledge.First,Aristotleconfirmsthat,inMetaphysicsΓ5,DemocritusmadeuseofProtagoras'argumentfromconflictingappearances,concludingthat‘eitherthereisnotruthortousatleastitisnotevident’.Themeaningofthisisstillnotclear;wewillhavetoturntoothersourcesinordertodeterminewhatconclusionsDemocritusdrewfromtheargumentfromconflictingappearances.Second,AristotlesometimesdescribesDemocritusasmaking

appearancestrue.Heevidentlymeansbythisdifferentthingsindifferentcontexts.(i)InOnGenerationandCorruption,AristotledescribesLeucippusandDemocritusfavourably,asdrivenbythedesiretodiscoverexplanationsforwhythingsappeartousastheydo.Othersources(p.200) besidesAristotleattesttotheimportanceforDemocritusofthesearchforaitiologiai,causalexplanationsofobservablephenomena.Aristotlesumsthisupwiththeslogan‘truthliesinappearing’,whichinfactmeans:appearancesarethestartingpointforanyinvestigationintothetruth.WewillreturntothisimportantprincipleinChapter9.(ii)IntheDeAnima,AristotlesaysthatDemocritusidentifiestheintellectwiththesoul,whichimpliesthatallappearancesaretrue.Withsomecare,wecanunpackthesecrypticstatementsbyseeingthat,fromAristotle'sperspective,Democritushasfailedtodistinguishbetweenlife‐functionsandintellectualfunctionsintherightway.Thatis,hemeanstocriticizethewayDemocritusassignslifefunctionsandrationalfunctionstothesamesoul/mind‐atoms,andthewayheexplainsthinkingonthesamemodelasperceiving.Forthisreason,Democritusclearlyexemplifies,forAristotle,theProtagoreanmodelofthinkingAristotlerejectsinMetaphysicsΓ5andDAIII3.

8.3TheophrastusonDemocritusTheophrastus,whowasAristotle'sstudentandsuccessorasheadoftheLyceum,is,nexttoSextusEmpiricus,ourmostimportantsourceforDemocritus'epistemology.HegivesusfarmoredetailsaboutDemocritus'viewsaboutperceptionandsensiblequalitiesthananyothersource,andseemstohaveconsultedDemocritus'booksfirst‐hand.Furthermore,heisapre‐EpicureanwitnesstoDemocritus'views,whichensuresthatanyresemblancebetweenDemocritus'theoriesashedescribesthemandEpicurus'isnottheresultofhishavingassimilatedtheformertothelatter.Finally,ofallthesources,hegivesusthebestsenseofthereasonsforDemocritus'attackonthesenses,anissuewhichwillbecrucialforourreconstructionofDemocritus'epistemologyinChapter9(seeespecially§9.2.1).

TheophrastusdiscussesDemocritus'theoryofperceptioninhisDeSensibus‘OntheSenses’whichisareviewandcritiqueofpre‐Aristoteliantheoriesofthesensesandofsensiblequalities.TheDeSensibuswasthoughtbyDielstobeafragmentofalarger,nowlostworkPhysikōndoxai‘OpinionsofthePhysicists’,whichapparentlysetouttheviewsofearlierthinkersonvarioustopicsinphysicsandnaturalphilosophy;50morerecently,ithasbeensuggestedthatitwaspartofasystematicworkofTheophrastus'onsenseperception,orthatitmayhavebeenastand‐alonework,acriticalexerciseandprolegomenaforfutureworkonthetopic.51Inanycase,theDeSensibusbearsthestampoftheauthor'steacher.(p.201) Itsbasicthemes—suchastheideathattheoriesofperceptionareeitherlike‐by‐likeorbyalteration—arefamiliarfromAristotle'sDeAnima,asaremanyofitscriticisms.ItalsomakesexemplaryuseofAristotle'sdialecticalmethod.Foritisnotorganizedchronologically,butsystematically,todisplaythesharpestcontrastbetweenthethinkersdiscussed;theintentisnotsimplytorecordvariousthinkers'viewsonasubject,buttolearnsomethingfromexaminingthemcritically,determiningwhattheygotwrongandwhattheygotright,andtodiscernthetrajectoryofintellectualprogressinthem.52IntheDeSensibus,Theophrastusisnotcuratinga

museumexhibitofphilosophicalopinionsorcompilingahandbook;heseemstoassumethatthetextsheconsultsarealreadyknownandavailabletohisreaders.Thus,forexample,hedoesnotrefertobooksortheirtitles,andhemakesnoattempttogiveanexhaustiveaccountofaperson'sviews.

TheDeSensibus'strengthsandfailingsfromapurelydoxographicalpointofviewcanbepartlymeasuredbecausewehappentopossessPlato'sownpresentationofhistheoryofsensiblequalitiesintheTimaeus.IfTheophrastusdoesagoodjobindescribingPlato'stheoryintheDS,wehavesomereasontoexpectthatheisequallyconscientiousinhisaccountsoftheotherswherenosuchcontrolexists.Asithappens,TheophrastusfollowstheTimaeusfairlyclosely,andsometimesquotesalmostverbatimfromit.Granted,thereareenoughdiscrepanciesbetweenhisdescriptionofPlato'sviewsandtheTimaeustosuggestthathisreportsofotherphilosophersarenotalwayscomprehensiveandmaysometimesbemisleading.53Butagainthisispartlybecauseheisnotadoxographerorhistorianinthestrictsense—heisnotwritingahandbookforthosewholacktheoriginaltextorasummaryofopinions,butseemstobemotivatedbythedesiretoascertaintheoriginalandderivativeaspectsofeachtheory,andtodeterminewhichphilosophersmadethebestprogressinunderstandingthenatureofperceptionandthesensiblequalities.TheophrastusisundoubtedlysuperiortomostothersourcesforthePresocratics,andisgenerallymorecarefulthanAristotle:hequotesmorethanAristotledoes;hetakesgreaterpainstodescribeaviewobjectivelyandindetail;heclearly(p.202) separateswhatapersonsaysfromhisownhermeneuticalparaphrasesandcriticisms.54InallthisheisunlikeAristotlewhosecriticisms,aswesawearlier,aresometimessocompressedthatitishardtodistinguishwhatathinker'sviewwasfromAristotle'sdescriptionofwhathebelievesaretheattendantproblemsordifficultiesforthatview.

8.3.1TheophrastusonDemocritus'theoryofperception

WewillbeginbyexaminingTheophrastus'accountofDemocritus'theoryofvisioninordertogetsomesenseofDemocritus'wayofexplainingperceptioningeneral.TheophrastusoffersthefollowingdetailedaccountofDemocritus'theoryofvision.

Hemakessightoccurbymeansoftheimage;hisaccountofthisisoriginal,forhesaysthattheimageisnotimmediatelyproducedintheeyeball,buttheairbetweenthesightandthethingseeniscompactedbytheseerandthethingseenandanimpressionismadeonit,aseverythingisalwaysgivingoffaneffluence.Thismassofair,whichissolidandofadifferentcolour,isthenimagedintheeyes,whicharemoist;adensebodydoesnottaketheimage,butamoistoneletsitpassthrough.Thatiswhymoisteyesarebetteratseeingthanhardones,providedthattheoutercoatingisasfineaspossible,andtheinsideasporousaspossiblewithoutanydense,strongfleshorthick,greasyliquid,andtheveinsintheregionoftheeyesarestraightandfreeofmoisture,sothattheymatchtheshapeoftheimpressions;foreverythingmostreadilyrecognizesthingsofthesamekindasitself.(DS50=A135/T113)55

AccordingtoTheophrastus,visionoccurs,forDemocritus,bymeansofanemphasisin

theeye.56Emphainesthaimeans‘appearorbevisiblein’,andanemphasisis,literally,an‘appearingin’;itusuallyreferstothephenomenonofsomethingappearinginreflectivesurfaceslikemirrorsorwater(e.g.Plato,Ti.46b1).Forthisreason,thetermissometimestranslatedas‘reflection’(Guthrie1965:442)or‘mirroring’(Aristotle,DeSensu438a6,trans.ROT).However,thisimpliessomethingmorethanwhatDemocritushasinmind,57forreflectionsappearinsmoothsurfacestoviewerslookingatthesurface,butDemocritusevidentlymeanstosaythatapersonseeswhenanemphasisappearsinherowneye,whichitselfhasasmoothsurfacefortakingthoseimages.(p.203) Thus,itissafertotranslateemphasismoreliterallyas‘appearance’(Burkert1977)or‘image’(Taylor1999a).

TojudgefromTheophrastus'account,Democrituspositedatleastthreestagesintheproductionofanemphasisintheeye.First,thereisaconstantstreamofeffluencesconsistingofthinlayersofatomsemanatingfromeveryobject.58Second,effluencesmakeanimageorimpressionontheairbetweentheobjectandtheeye.Airisthefinestofallpossiblemedia,andcanreceiveimpressionsofallkinds;here,weshouldthink,asWalterBurkert(1977:98)suggests,ofsandincomparisonwithgravel.Air,likesand,mustsomehowbecompactedandcompressedbetweentheobjectandtheeyebeforeitcantakeanimpression:

Thethingonwhichtheimpressionismademustbedense,andmustnotbescattered,ashehimselfsaysincomparingthemakingofthissortofimpressiontopressingsomethingintowax.(DS51=A135/T113)

Oncethemassofairhasbeencompactedandtheeffluencemakesanimageorimpressiononit,thatinturnis‘imaged’orappearsintheeye.Theeye,whichismadeoutofwater,canonlytaketheimageundercertainconditions:ideally,theeyeshouldhaveafineexternalcoatingandnotbetoodense.AsfaraswecantellfromTheophrastus'description—andnoothersourcetellsusasmuchasTheophrastus—Democritushadnothingmoretosayaboutwhathappensoncetheemphasisisproducedintheeye,thatis,abouthowanimage's‘appearing’intheeyeproducesvisualawarenessintheperceiver.59

AccordingtoTheophrastus,theair‐impressionswereaninnovationofDemocritus',andinhiscriticalcomments,heconcentratesonthisaspectofthetheory.60WhydidDemocritusintroducethisintermediatestage,insteadofsimplyhavingeffluviafromtheobjectentertheeyedirectly?Theophrastuswondersaboutthishimself(DS51).Thereasonwillturnouttobethat(p.204) Democritusthoughtthat,asamatteroffact,airfunctionsasanobstaclebetweentheeyeandtheobjectsofvision.

Letusbeginwithhisexplanationthat‘theairbetweenthesightandthethingseeniscompacted(συστϵλλóμϵνον)bytheseerandthethingseenandanimpressionismadeonit,(τυπου̑σθαι),aseverythingisalwaysgivingoffaneffluence.’61Thissuggeststhatairplaysanintermediateroleinvision—asitdoesinthemodernunderstandingofsound.SowhydoesAristotlecriticizeDemocritus(amongothers)forfailingtorecognizetheneedforamediuminvision,suchas‘thetransparent’playsinhisowntheory?

[Invision]colourbringsaboutachangeinthetransparentmedium,e.g.air,andthesense‐organischangedbytheactivityofthiscontinuousmedium.ForDemocrituswasnotcorrecttothinkthatiftheinterveningspacewasemptyonewouldseeacutelyenoughtoseeevenanantintheheavens;thatisimpossible.(DeAnimaII7.419a13–17=A122/T118)

Isn'tDemocritus'air‐impressionjustsuchatransparentmediumforvision?TheanswermustbethatAristotleisawareofthefunctionofairinDemocritus'theory,butdoesnotbelievethatairplaystheroleofamediumintherequiredsense.Aristotlewants(1)atransparentmedium,notamedium‐as‐obstacle,(2)asense‐organactivatedbytheactivityofthattransparentmedium,and(3)atheoryofvisionwhichdoesnotmakeitakindofsensingbycontact.Theactivationofthemediumrequiresthepresenceoflight;thismakesvisionpossible.Bycontrast,onDemocritus'view,visionoccurspurelythroughtheimpactofexternalatomsontheatomsthatconstitutethesenseorgan.Thisiswhy,fromAristotle'sperspective,Democritusmakesallthesensesaformoftouch(DeSensu442a29–b1=A119/T116).If,onDemocritus'view,theairismoreofanobstaclethanamediumforvision,ithelpstoexplainAristotle'sreportthat,accordingtoDemocritus,iftheinterveningspacewereempty,onewouldbeabletoseeanantintheheavens.Aristotlehimselfthinkstheconditionalisfalsebecausevisionisimpossiblewithoutamediumandhenceimpossibleinemptyspace.Doesn'tAristotle'sreportconflictwithTheophrastus'reportabouttheroleofair‐imprintsinDemocritus'theory?62(p.205) Itdoesnot,if,followingZeller,wetaketheconditionalasacounterfactual:63ifspacewereempty,wewouldbeabletoseeanantintheheavens,butasitis,weobviouslycannotseethatfar,thoughwearecertainlycapableofseeing.Therefore,spacemustnotbeempty,butmustcontainsomethingwhichinterfereswithlong‐distancevision,namely,air.AirdoesnotplaytheroleofanAristotelianmediuminDemocritus'theoryofvision,butisratheranobstacle;thechallengeforDemocrituswastoexplainhowwecanseeinspiteofthepresenceofair.Theexplanationheofferedwasthatevenifvisionwouldbebetterinavoid,itcanstilloccurinair,aslongastheairiscompactedsothatitcanfunctionasavehiclefortheimage.DemocritusisthuscorrectlydescribedasmakingnouseofamediuminAristotle'ssenseoftheword.Presumablyhethoughtairisthecauseofanumberofdifferentkindsofinterferenceinvision,asisapparentwhenoneattemptstoseethingsfaraway,infog,orinextremeheatwhichgivesrisetomirages.

NowanimportantconsequenceofDemocritus'theoryisthatwearenotdirectlyaffectedbytheobjectorevenbyeffluencesofatomsoriginatingfromtheobject.Rather,asTheophrastusputsit,sightoccursbymeansofan‘image’,andthisimageisformedinamassofcompactedairthatintervenesbetweentheobjectandeye,actsasavehiclefortheimage,andisitselfshapedbytheobjectandtheeye.ThisontologicaldistancebetweenperceiverandobjectofperceptioncanalsobefoundinDemocritus'accountofhearing(Theophr.DS55–6=A135/T113).Hearingisakindofinternalaffectionwhichoccursbycontactbetweencondensedairandvoidinthebody,especiallyintheears,whenthoseareasaredryand‘well‐bored’.Whatstrictlyspeakingaffectsusarethemotionsofcondensedairwhichreachandpenetratetheinneremptyareasofthebody,especiallybutnotonlytheear.

Butifobjectsliketablesandchairsdonotaffectoursense‐organsdirectly,andonlyservetoinitiatethecausalchainofeventsthatultimatelygivesrisetotheaffectionofthesenses,wecanask:whatexactlydoweperceivewhenweseeandhear?Doweseethemountainandhearthecreek?Ordoweonly,strictlyspeaking,seetheatomsfromtheair‐impressionsthatwereformedfromeffluencesfromthemountains,andheartheair‐movementsthatweresetinmotionbythecreekandeventuallyreachtheinnerareasoftheear?64Asweshallseeinthenextsection,Democritus'answerisevenmoresurprising:strictlyspeaking,whatweperceiveistheeffectwhichthingshaveonoursense‐organs.Whatwelearnaboutthroughthesensesishowthesensesareaffected,notanythingaboutwhattheworldislikeorhowthingsareinthemselves.Thus,perceptionprovestobeadisappointinglylimitedsourceofinformationabouthowthingsreallyare.

(p.206) 8.3.2TheophrastusonDemocritus'theoryofsensiblequalitiesWeshallnowturntoTheophrastus'descriptionofDemocritus'theoryofsensiblequalities.TheophrastusdevoteshisdiscussionofancienttheoriesofsensiblequalitiesentirelytoDemocritusandPlato.ThereasonisthatDemocritusandPlatowere,accordingtohim,thefirstandonlyphilosopherstodeveloparealtheoryofsensiblequalities.65Theophrastus'aimisbothtoascertainhoworiginaleachviewwas,andalsotoevaluatethemcritically.Ashepresentstheirviews,PlatoandDemocrituseachhaveathesisaboutwhatsensiblequalitiesare,theoneoppositetotheother,andeachthenproceedstocontradicthimself.WewillfocusonthispartofTheophrastus'report—notsimplyontheallegedinconsistency,sinceitwillbecomeclearthatthecontradictionTheophrastusseesisonlyapparent,anartefactofhiscloseandperhapsoverlyliteralreadingofthetexts—butalsoonthevaluablecluesTheophrastusgivesaboutDemocritus'viewsconcerningthecognitivevalueandepistemicpowerofthesenses.

ForTheophrastus,thecentralquestionwemustconsiderinthinkingaboutsensiblequalitiesiswhethertheyaregenuinepropertiesoftheobjectstowhichtheybelong,ormerelyaffectionsofthesense,producedbytheinteractionofanobjectonasenseorgan.HefindsanswersinPlatoandDemocritus,whichhepresentsashypotheseis‘assumptions’(DS60).Platothinksthatsensiblequalitieshavetheirownnature,and‘makesthemouttobethingsintheirownright’(καθ’αὑτὰποιω̑νταὶςοὐσίαις,DS61).Bycontrast,Democritusdeniesthatsensiblequalitieshavetheirownnature;theyaremerely‘affectionsofthesense’(πάθητη̑ςαἰσθήσϵως,DS61).However,eachcontradictshisownhypothesis:‘Democritusmakesthemouttobeaffectionsofthesensebutdistinguishesthemwithrespecttotheirownnature,whilePlatomakesthemouttobethingsintheirownrightbutascribesthemtoaffectionsofthesense’(DS60–1,trans.Taylormodified).Thatis,eachsayssomethinggeneralaboutthenatureofsensiblequalities,butcontradictsitintheparticularwayhedefinesindividualsensiblequalities.

NowTheophrastus'termhypothesishastobetakenwithagrainofsalt.IntheTimaeus,Platodoesnotusethistermtointroducehisviewofsensiblequalities,nordoesheexplicitlyofferageneraldefinitionofsensiblequalities.WhatTheophrastuscallsPlato'shypothesisrepresentsTheophrastus'consideredjudgementaboutwhatPlatothinks:

becausePlatodiscussessensiblequalities(Ti.61c–69a)rightafterhediscussesprimarybodies(whichbelongstothesectionatTi.47–69onwhatcomesaboutofNecessity),TheophrastusunderstandsPlatotomeanthatsensiblequalitiesarebasicpropertiesoftheprimarybodies.Now,Theophrastus'consideredjudgementiseminentlyworthlisteningto,(p.207) butitisaninterpretation,notareport.Indeed,hisverydistinctionbetweenatheoryofsensiblequalitiesandatheoryofperceptionwasprobablynotmadebyPlatoorDemocritus.Platoforonethinksitisnotpossibletodiscussonewithouttheother(Ti.61cd);thisisthereasonwhyheisforcedtodiscusssenseperceptionprematurely,inthesectiononNecessity,wherehecandiscusssensiblequalities,althoughhehasnotyetintroducedthesoul–bodycomplex,whichcomeslaterinthesectiononwhatisproducedthroughthecooperationofReasonandNecessity(Ti.69–92).Likewise,whatTheophrastusdescribesasDemocritus'hypothesisaboutsensiblequalitieswasIbelievepartofadiscussionofthesenses,whichwasperhapsseparatefromthebookinwhichDemocritusdescribestheparticularsensiblequalitieslikeflavoursandcolours.66

WewilleventuallyexaminethispurportedhypothesisofDemocritus.Butfirstitwillbeusefultotrytounderstandhowhewentaboutgivingaccountsoftheparticularsensiblequalities.Thereseemtobeatleastfivefactorsheappealedtoinexplainingsensiblequalities.TheophrastusintroducesDemocritus'accountsofparticularsensiblequalitiesbynotingthatDemocritus‘differentiatessomebysize,somebyshape,andsomebyorderandarrangement’(DS60).ThisisconsistentwithAristotle'sreportthatDemocrituspostulatedalimitlessvarietyinshapesofatomsinordertoaccountforthelimitlessvarietyinappearances(GCI2.315b6–15=DK67A9/T42a;cf.§8.2).Thus,Democritusintroduced(1)aninfinitevarietyofshapesandsizesinordertoexplaintheinfinitevarietyofappearances.67Theophrastustellsusthatheassignedresponsibilityforeachtypeofflavourorcolourtoaparticularshapeofatom(flavoursatDS65–7andOntheCausesofPlantsVI1.6=A129/T125,coloursatDS73–8).Forexample,Democritusdefinessharpflavourasfollows:

Sharpflavourconsistsofsmall,fine‐grainedatomsofanangular,zigzagshape.Becausethesearepungenttheypenetrateeverywhere,andbecausetheyareroughandangulartheycompressandcontract,thuscreatingemptyspacesinthebodyandheatingit.(DS65)

Similarly,Democritusidentifiedsourflavourwith‘large,many‐angledatomswiththeminimumofroundness’(DS66),sweetflavourwith‘roundatomswhicharenottoosmall’(DS65),andsoon.

Butnooneshapeisfoundunmixedandpure;oneshapeisalwaysmixedwithothers.

Noneof[theatomicshapes]isfoundpureandunmixedwithothers,butineverythingtherearemany,andthesamethingcontainssmooth,rough,round,sharp,andtherest.Theshapewhichoccursmostfrequentlyamongtheconstituentsistheonewhichdetermineshowthethingisperceivedandwhatpropertiesithas.…(DS67)68

(p.208) Thus,anexplanationofwhatcausesdifferentsortsofperceptionsalsohastoreferto(2)therelativepredominanceofthedifferenttypesofatomicshapesinamixture.Ifgood‐sizedroundatomspredominateinanobject,thenitwillgiverisetothetasteofsomethingsweet;anobjectcontainingmostlylargemany‐angledatomswillproduceadifferent,sour,sensation.

Furthermore,anymixtureofdifferentshapesofatomswillpossess(3)someorderandarrangement,withrespecttowhichrearrangementandtranspositionarepossible,69andsuchtranspositionwillproducedifferencesinappearances.AsAristotleputsit,atextoftragedyandatextofcomedyaremadeupoutofthesameletters,butdifferintheirarrangementsandtranspositionsofthoseletters;sotoo,differentrearrangementsandtranspositionsofshapesinacompoundwillgiverisetodifferencesinappearances.Forexample,acompoundinwhichalltheatomsthatproduceblackappearancesarethoroughlymixedwiththeatomsthatproducewhiteappearanceswilllookdifferentifthelatterbecomeseparatedofffromtherest.Thus,thesamethingcanlookdifferenttodifferentpeoplebecauseitsconstituentatomshavebeenrearrangedovertime,sothateachpersonperceives(correctly)adifferentarrangementofatomsandvoid.

Sofar,Democritusseemstohaveappealedtothreedifferentfactorstoexplaindifferencesinappearance:(1)thesizeandshapeoftheatoms,(2)theirrelativepredominanceinamixture,and(3)theirarrangementsandrearrangementsinthatmixture.Didheacknowledgetheimportanceofenvironmentalconditionsandthephysicalconditionoftheperceiverandthesense‐organasfactorsinwhatcausesthingstoappeardifferentlytodifferentperceivers?70Suchdifferencesinappearancesincludenotonlythefactthatasunflowerlooksdifferentfromadaffodilbutalsothefactthatasunflowermaylookdifferenttodifferentpeople.AccordingtoTheophrastus,Democritusshouldhavetakenthisintoaccount,butdoesnot.

(2.1)These[sc.shapes]wouldperhapsappear,assaidabove,tobepositedforthesakeofthose[sc.flavours];hethinksthatbythisaccounthecanexplaintheireffects,whyonecontracts,driesandcongeals,anothersmooths,settlesandmakesregular,anotherseparatesandpermeates,andsoon.Exceptthatperhapssomeonemightalsoaskthosetheoriststosaywhatthesubjectislike(τòὑποκϵίμϵνονἀποδιδόναιποιό̑ντι).Foronehastoknownotonlywhatisactive(τòποιου̑ν),butalsowhatisactedon(τòπάσχον),especiallyifthesameflavourdoesnotappearaliketoeveryone,ashesays;forthereisnothingtostopwhatissweettousfrombeingbittertosomeotheranimals,andsimilarlyfortherest.(2.2)Foritisclearthatthereisadifferentconstitutionofthesense‐organ;fortheshapeunderlyingtheflavouristhesame,anditseemsthatthatcannotalwayshavethesameeffectonadifferentsubject.Andifthatistrue,itisclearthatonemusttakeintoaccountthedissimilarityofsubjects.Sooneshoulddiscussthem.Atthesametimethistooisclear,(p.209) thatthesameshapedoesnothaveasingleeffect,ifitcanactinoppositewaysondifferentsubjects.Thatnoteverythingshouldbesubjecttotheeffectofitisnotsoabsurd,(2.3)forinstancefiredoesnotburneverything;butifsomethingsareaffectedinoppositeways,thatneedsfurther

discussion.Yetonehastostatesomecauseofthosecases;inthecaseofthosethingswhichfirecannotburnorwatermoisten,thereissomecauseandexplanation;andiftheydidtheopposite,onewouldneedyetmore.(OntheCausesofPlantsVI.2.1–3=partlyA130/T125)

AsTheophrastuspointsout,firehasthepowertoheat,butwhetheritwillsuccessfullyheatanobjectdependsonthedispositionandconditionofthatobject.Alogthoroughlydousedincoldwaterwillnotlightuplikedrykindling;similarly,whethersomethingisgoodatcuttingdependsonthetypeofmaterialbeingcut,say,sheetsofpapervs.sheetsofmetal.Democritusshouldhavediscussedtheimportanceoftheconditionoftheperceiver—notbecausethisisTheophrastus'ownviewofthematter,butbecauseitisDemocritus'goaltoexplainthecausaleffectsthatatomshaveintheworld,andthusheisobligedtosaysomethingaboutthecontributoryroleofthephysicalconditionofthesubjectsinwhichthoseeffectsareproduced.

Despitewhathesays,Theophrastus'pointcannotbethatDemocritusnowherediscussestheroleoftheperceiver'sconditioninperceptionanywhere,butrather,thatwhilehedoessoincertainwritings,hedoesnotinhisaccountsofindividualsensiblequalities.71ForTheophrastushimselfmentioned(4)theroleoftheenvironmentand(5)theconditionoftheperceiverinhisreportofDemocritus'theoriesofthesenses.Aswesawin§8.3.1,Democritusdiscussestheroleoftheenvironmentwhenheintroducesair‐impressionsandtalksabouttheroleofthesuninvision.Andheemphasizestheimportanceoftheconditionoftheperceiverasanecessaryconditionforvisiontooccur:aneyemustbeproperlymoist,andnottoodense,andporousinsidewithoutanydense,strongfleshorthick,greasyliquid,andtheveinsaroundtheeyemustbestraightandfreeofmoisture(DS50).Iftheporesinthesense‐organarenotproperlymoist,oriftheyaretoohard,thiswillblockthereceptionoftheimage,andonewillfailtosee.Similarly,forhearingtooccur,theexternalcoatingofthebodymustbedense,withemptyveins,dry,andwell‐boredthroughout(DS56).ThisshowsthatDemocritusthinksthatperceptionoccurswhenobjectsaffectthesenseorgansincertainways,andthattheconditionofthesense‐organmakesanimportantcontributiontowhattheeffectwillbe.Moreover,TheophrastusconcludeshisdescriptionofDemocritus'definitionsofflavourswiththefollowingremark:

Theshapewhichoccursmostfrequentlyamongtheconstituentsistheonewhichdetermineshowthethingisperceivedandwhatpropertiesithas,thoughthatalso(p.210) dependsonthedispositionofwhateverobserveritcomesintocontactwith;forthereareconsiderabledifferencestheretoo,sincesometimesthesamefeatureproducesoppositeeffects,andsometimesoppositefeaturesproducethesameeffect.Thatishisaccountofflavours.(DS67)

ThisindicatesthatDemocritusdidacknowledgetheimportanceofenvironmentalconditionsandtheconditionoftheperceiver.Ifso,thenTheophrastus'pointmustbethathefailstodosowhenheidentifiesindividualsensiblequalities,likesweetnessorthecolourwhite,withspecificatomicshapes.

WecannowcharacterizeingeneraltermsthewayDemocrituswentaboutexplainingtheperceptionofsensiblequalities.Heapparentlyreferredtoatleastfivecausalfactorsintheproductionofdifferentperceptions:(1)thesizeandshapeofatoms,(2)quantityandpreponderanceinacompound,(3)arrangement,(4)environmentalconditions,and(5)theconditionoftheperceiver.Hisexplanationsmakeexcellentsenseifhewastryingtoidentifythecausalfactorsattheatomiclevelwhichcanexplaindifferencesinappearances,thatis,whythingslookdifferentfromoneanother,andwhytwopeoplecandifferintheirperceptualexperiencesofthesamethings.IfDemocritusisabletoexplainhowperceptionoccurs,andwhichfeaturesofatomsandvoidinobjectsareresponsiblefortheaffectionstheycauseinsense‐organs,therewillbetwopayoffsforhim.First,hewillbeabletogivecausalexplanationsforwhythingsappearthewaytheydotous,anddemonstratewhatbasisourperceptionshaveinthematerialworld.Discoveringthecausalbasesforperceptualappearancesislikefiguringouthowathermometerworks,whatitsreadingscorrelatewithandwhy.AccordingtoAristotle,Democritus'achievementistoshowthatcontratheEleatics,‘thereistruthinappearances’(GCI2.315b9=DK67A9);insodoing,heconfirmstheabilityofthesensestodetectanddiscriminateamongthedifferentfeaturesoftheworldaroundus.Second,beingabletoexplainhowthesensesworkindirectlyreinforcestheatomisttheoryitself,asademonstrationofitssuperiorexplanatorypower.Aristotlesuggeststhatthemotivationforpostulatinganinfinitevarietyofshapesandsizeswastoexplainthevarietyofappearancesinthevisibleworldaseffectswhichtheatomsgiveriseto;thisisconsistentwithourearliersuggestionthatDemocritus'methodwastostartfromobservedfeaturesoftheworldandtomovebymeansofabductiveinferencetoconclusionsaboutthenatureandpropertiesofatomsandvoid.JustasthehypothesisoftheexistenceofGodinthedesignargumentissupposedtoexplainotherwiseinexplicablefeaturesoftheobservableuniverseand,ifsuccessful,isconfirmedasthebestavailableexplanationofthosefeatures,sotootheatomisttheoryissupposedtoexplainthenatureandoriginofperceptualappearances,and,ifsuccessful,isitselfconfirmedinsofarasitoffersthebestexplanationofappearancesavailable.

However,itislessclearwhatkindoftheoryofsensiblequalitiesthiscommitsDemocritusto.TheophrastussuggeststhatDemocritusdeniedthatsensiblequalitieshaveanynatureoftheirown,thathethoughtthatwhenperceptualappearancesconflict,oneisnomoretruethantheother.Itisworthsettingoutthisimportantpassageinfull.(p.211)

τώνϛέάλλωναισθητώνονδϵνοςϵΐναιφύσιν,άλλαπάνταπάθητηςαισθήσ€ωςάλλοιουμένης,ϵ᾽ξη̑ςγίν€σθαιτηνφαντασίαν.ονξ�έγάρτονφνχροΰκαιτονθΐρμοϋφύσινύπάρχϵΐν,άλλατοσχήμαμεταπΐπτονΙργάζϵσθαικαιτηνημΐτίρανάλλοίωσινοτιγαράνάθρουνᾑ̑,τβύτ᾽ένισχύζινίκά,στψ-,τοδϵΐςμακράδιανςνεμημςνονάναίσθητονςΐναι.σημϵΪονδώςουκϵΐ.σιφύσϵΐτομηταύταπάσιφαίνϵσθαιτοιςζώοις,«λλ᾽δημΐνγλυκύ,τοΰτ᾽άλλοιςπικρονκαιίτέροιςοζύκαιάλλοιςοριμύτοΐς§6ατρυφνονκαιταάλλαδωσαύτως,έτιδ᾽αυτούςμ€το,βάλλ€ΐντηκρίσζι72κατάταπάθηκαιτάςηλικίας·ᾑκαιφανϵρόν,ώςήδιάθίσιςαιτίατηςφαντασίας,απλώςμζνούνπϵρϊτώναισθητώνούτωδϵΐνύττολαμβάνειν,ουμηνάλλ'ώσπίρκαιτάάλλακαιταύταάνατίθησιτοις

σχημασί'πληνονχαπάντωνάποδίδωσιτάςμορφας,άλλαμάλλοντώνχυλώνκαιτώνχρωμάτωνκαιτούτωνακριβίστϵρονδιόριζαταπ€ριτουςχυλούςαναφερώντηνφαντασίανπροςάνθραηταν.

Noneoftheothersensiblequalities[besidesheavy,light,hard,soft]hasanynatureofitsown,butallareaffectionsofthesensewhenitisalteredsoastogiverisetoanappearance.73Forthereisnonaturebelongingtohotorcold,butchangeinshape[sc.ofthethingperceived]bringsaboutalterationinus;aconcentratedeffectdominateseachindividual,whereasaneffectwhichisspreadoutovertimeisnotnoticed.Theevidenceforthisisthatthingsdonotnaturallyseemthesametoallcreatures,butwhatissweettousisbittertoothercreatures,sharp-tastingtoothers,pungenttoothers,sourtoothersagain,andthesameforothercases.(64)Further,they[i.e.observers]varyintheirjudgementsaccordingtotheirdifferentstatesandtotheirages;whichmakesitclearthattheirdispositionisthecauseofhowthingsseemtothem.That,omittingqualifications,ishowoneshouldregardtheobjectsofsense.However,these[sc.theobjectsofsense]74are,likeeverythingelse,ascribedtotheshapes[sc.oftheatoms].Thoughhedoesnotsetouttheshapesunderlyingthemall,butratherthoseunderlyingflavoursandcolours,andoftheseflavourisgiventhemorepreciseaccount,inwhichtheappearanceisreferredto[thestateof]theindividual.(DS63–4,trans.Taylormodified)

Sensiblequalitieslacktheirownnaturenotbecausetheyhavenoexternalreality,75butbecausetheyare‘affectionsofthesensewhenitisalteredsoastogiverisetoanappearance’.ThissuggeststhatifFhasitsownnature,thenthe(p.212) questionofwhetherornotanobjecthasFdependssolelyonfactsaboutthatobject,andadefinitionofFwillreferonlytointrinsicpropertiesofanobject.Bycontrast,ifFdoesnothaveitsownnature,thenitcannotbedefinedwithoutreferencetosomethingelsetowhichitstandsinsomerelation.InDemocritus'theory,asensiblequalitycannotbedefinedwithoutreferencetothefactthatobjectswhichhaveitproduceacertainalterationoreffect.Moreover,itisnotenoughtoproduceanalterationoreffect;thealterationhastobenoticedbytheperceiver(‘aconcentratedeffectdominateseachindividual,whereasaneffectwhichisspreadoutovertimeisnotnoticed’).Thatis,whetheranobjectissweetdependsnotonlyonwhetheritproducesacertaineffectonthetongue;itdependsonwhetheritproducestheimpressionofsweetnessintheperceiver.Thus,whenTheophrastussaysthatDemocritusdeprivessensiblequalitiesoftheirownnature,wecouldalsoputthisbysayingthatDemocritusmakessensiblequalitiessubjective,perceiver-dependentpropertiesofobjects.76

Thereasonwhysensiblequalitiesmustbeaffectionsofthesensesisthatthingsdonotseemthesametoallcreatures;whatappearssweettohumanbeingsmayseembittertootheranimals.Furthermore,thingsdonotappearthesametoallhumanperceivers,becauseoftheirconditionandages;theconditionoftheperceivercanexplainwhydifferentperceiversmaysimultaneouslyperceivethesameobjectdifferently,asTheophrastusreports:

Further,they[sc.observers]varyintheirjudgementsaccordingtotheirdifferentstatesandtotheirages;whichmakesitclearthattheirdisposition((ήδιάθϵσις)isthecauseofhowthingsseemtothem(αίτιαττίζφαντασίας)(DS64)

[Howathingisperceivedandwhatpropertiesithas]alsodependsonthedispositionofwhateverobserveritcomesintocontactwith.Forthismakesnosmalldifference.Thus,thesamethingsometimescausesoppositeeffects,andoppositethingsthesameeffect.(DS67)

Hehaspreviouslysaidthatthingsappeardifferentlytothosewhohavedifferentdispositions(τοτοιςάνομοίωςδιακειμίνοιςανόμοιαφαίνεσθαι),andagainthatnonehasmoretruththananyother(τομηθερμάλλορςτςρονέτερουτυγχά,νει,ντηςαληθείας).(DS69)

RecallthatAristotlealsoreportsthatDemocritusmadeuseoftheconflictingappearanceargument(MetaphysicsΓ5.1009b7–12=A112/T177).Evidently,(p.213) Democritustakesthefactthatthesamethingappearsdifferenttodifferentperceiversasasignthatwhatoneperceivesdependsonhowoneisaffected,whichinturndependsonone'sparticularphysicalcondition.Butnoone'sappearanceismoretruethananother's.

ItissignificantthatTheophrastusraisesthesameobjectionstothisargumentinDemocritusthatAristotleraisesagainstProtagoras.Forexample,heargues:

Itisreasonablethatthebettershouldhavemoretruththantheworseandthehealthymorethanthesick,fortheyaremoreinaccordancewithnature.(DS70)

ThisechoesAristotle'sargumentthatnoteveryoneisequallyauthoritativeandinanequallygoodpositiontojudge(Met.Γ5.1010b3–11,cf.§7.8).Hecontinues:

Further,ifthereisnonatureoftheobjectsofsensebecausetheydonotappearthesametoeveryone,itisclearthattherewillbenonatureofanimalsorotherbodies;forthereisnot[universal]agreementinjudgementonthoseeither.(DS70)

Theophrastus'pointisthatDemocritus'inferencefromthefactofconflictingappearancesthatsweet,bitter,etc.aresimplyamatterofperceivingsomethingtobesuchassumes,mistakenly,thatuniversalagreementisanecessaryconditionforsomething'sbeingthecasebynature.Ifthefactthatsensiblequalitiesdonotappearthesametoeveryoneshowsthatthereisnoobjectivenatureofsensiblequalities,thenthesameargumentcouldbeusedtoshowthatthereisnonatureofanythingatall,sinceitispresumablypossibletofinddisagreementonanymatter.Theophrastus'nextobjectionalsoechoesAristotle:

Andagain,evenifsweetandbitterarenottastedbyeveryoneinthesamecircumstances,allthesamethenatureofsweetandbitterappearsthesametoeveryone,ashehimselfwouldappeartotestify.Forhowcouldwhatissweettousbebitterorsourtootherperceiversiftherewerenodeterminatenatureofthese

qualities?(DS70)

Aristotlearguedthatevenifthingsappearsweetandbittertodifferentpeople,thereisnodisagreementaboutsweetandbitterthemselves(Met.Γ5.1010b19–30,cf.§7.8).Here,TheophrastussaysthatDemocritushimselfmustagreethatthereisanatureofsweetandbitter,whichisuniversallyapparenttoall,sinceotherwisewecouldnoteventalkofsweetnessandbitterness.77Thisobjection,liketheprevioustwo,attackstheideathatthefactofconflictingappearancesconcerningsensiblequalitiesshowsthattheydonothavetheirownnature,andthattheyarenothingotherthanstatesofthesense.

IfDemocritusespousedaProtagoreantheoryofsensiblequalities,accordingtowhichnothingisreallysweetorbitter,butissoonlyifitappearssotosomeone,thenwecanmakesenseofTheophrastus'argumentthatDemocritus'viewofthenatureofsensiblequalitiesconflictswithhisowndefinitionsofindividualsensiblequalitiesintermsofobjectivepropertiesofatomsandvoid.(p.214) ὃλωςδέμέγιστονέναντιωμακαικοινονέττι-πάντων,άμαμένπείθηποιεΐντηςαιαθησϵως,άμαδϵτοιςσχήμασιδιορίζειν,καιτοαυτόφαίν€σθαιτοιςμένπικρόν,τοιςδέγλυκύ,τοιςδ᾽άλλως.οντ€γαροΐόν〈τϵ〉τοσχήμαπόβοςΐΐναιοΰτ€ταύτοντοιςμένσφαιροειοές,τοίςδ'άλλως.ανάγκηδ’[ίίπερ]ίσως,ϵἴτκρτοιςμένγλυκύ,τοιςδέπικρόν,ονοέκατάτάςημετέραςεζειςμεταβάλλειντάςμορφάς.άπλώςςέτομένσχήμακα,θ'αότόεστί,τοδϵγλυκύκαιόλωςτὀαίσθητονπροςάλλοκαιένάλλοις,ώςφησιν.άτοπονδέκαιτοπάσινάζιοΰνταύτόφαίνεσθαιτω̑ναυτω̑ναἰισθανομενοιςκαἰτούτωντηνάλήθειανέλέγχϵιν,καιταύταειρηκόταπροτεροντοτοιςάνομοιωςδιακειμένοιςανόμοιαφαίνεσθαικαιπάλιντομηθένμάλλονέτερονἑτέρουτυγχάνειντηςαληθείας.

Butingeneralthegreatestcontradiction,whichpervadesthewholetheory[ofsensiblequalities],ishisbothmakingthemstatesofperceptionandatthesametimedistinguishingthembytheirshapes,andsayingthatthesamethingappearsbittertosome,sweettoothers,anddifferenttoyetothers.Foritisimpossiblefortheshapetobeastate,orforthesamethingtobesphericaltosomeanddifferentlyshapedtoothers(yetperhapsthatishowithastobe,ifitissweettosomeandbittertoothers),orfortheshapestochangeaccordingtoourdispositions.Itissimplythecasethatshapeisintrinsic,butsweetandsensiblequalitiesingeneralarerelativeanddependentonotherthings,ashesays.Anditisabsurdtorequirethatthesameappearanceshouldbepresentedtoeveryonewhoperceivesthesamething,andshouldbethetestoftheirtruth,whenhehaspreviouslysaidthatthingsappeardifferentlytothosewhohavedifferentdispositions,andagainthatnonehasmoretruththananyother.(DS69–70)

Theophrastus'basicpointhere(andalsoatdecaus.plant.VI.2.1=A130/T125)isthatitisinconsistent(A)toidentifyindividualsensiblequalitieswithintrinsicqualitiesoftheatoms(e.g.bysayingthatsweetisroundgood-sizedatoms),butatthesametime(B)todefinesensiblequalitiesgenerallyasaffectionsofthesenses(DS61,63,72)and(C)tomaintainthatthesamethingmaybesweetforonepersonandbitterforanother(whereoneisnomorecorrectthantheother).Thesecanbecombinedinvariouswaystoproduceabsurdity.Forexample,(B)saysthatasensiblequalityisidenticalwithastateofthesense,and(A)saysthatasensiblequalityisidenticalwithakindofshapeofatoms;but,as

Theophrastussays,‘itisimpossiblefortheshapetobeastate[sc.ofthesense].’Itisalsoimpossible‘forthesamethingtobesphericaltosomeanddifferentlyshapedtoothers(yetperhapsthatishowithastobe,ifitissweettosomeandbittertoothers)’,butthisfollowsagainfrom(A)and(C),whichsaysthatthesamethingmaybesweetforsomeandbitterforothers.If(A)sweetnesscanbeidentifiedwithatomsofacertainsphericalshape,and(C)somethingsaresweetforsomeandnotforothers,theneithertheatomsofthatobjectmustbesphericalforsomeandnotforothers,oratomscanchangewithrespecttotheirshapes.AlloftheseconsequenceswouldpresumablybeunwelcomeforDemocritus.

ButwecannowseethatDemocritusprobablydoesnotintend(A):or,atleast,whenheidentifiesanindividualsensiblequalitywithaspecificshapeofatom,thisisnotsupposedtoconstituteadefinition.Whenheidentifiessweetnesswithroundgood-sizedatoms,hepresumablythinksthereareconsistentcausalcorrelationsbetweenround,good-sizedatomsandthesensationofsweetness(p.215) theyproduceonthetongue.Hemayeventhinkthatitisimpossibleforaroundatom,whichnormallyproducesasweettaste,toproducetheflavourofbitterness,eveninsomeoneill.78Ifsomeoneperceivestheflavourofsweetness,someroundatomsmusthaveproducedthatflavour;thatis,thepresenceandactivityofroundatomsonthetongueisanecessaryconditionfortheproductionofthesensationofsweetness.Thisconditionisquitestrong,andmayhaveledTheophrastustosupposethatDemocritusintendedtodefineindividualsensiblequalitiesintermsofatomicshapes.

ButifDemocritusdidnotthinkitpossibleforroundatomstoproduceasensationofbitterness,thenhowcouldhehaveheld,asTheophrastusrepeatedlysayshedoes,that(C)differentperceiversperceivethesameobjectindifferentways?Theanswermustbethatshapeisnecessarybutnotsufficientforproducingacertaineffectinaperceiver,becauseperceptualeffectsareproducednotbysingleatomsbutbycomposites.Thus,differentperceiverscantastedifferentpartsofamixtureorcanbeaffectedbydifferentsetsofeffluencescomingfromasingleobject,whichmightbesimilar,butaredistinctinnumber.Oncethoseatomsreachtheperceivers,theywillencounterperceiversindifferentphysicalconditions,withsenseorgansthatadmitatomsofsomekindsbutnotothers.Forexample,internalearcavitiesmustbesufficientlydrytobeaffectedbyairmovements;otherwise,moisturewillclogupthecavities.Aglassofwineinwhichasmallquantityofpointyatomsisfloatinginaseaofroundatomswilltastesweettothenormalperson.Buttosomeonewhoisillandwhosetongue-poresarethereforeclosedofftoallbutthesmallspikyatomsthatproducetheflavourofbitterness,itwilltastebitter.

Ifwesupposethatsentenceslike‘Sharpflavourconsistsofsharp-angledatoms(τὀνμένού̑νϵίν̑αιτώσχήματιγφνοϵιδη)constitutenotdefinitionsofsweetnessbutnecessaryconditionsfortheperceptionofsharpflavour—andthusthatTheophrastusiswrongtoregard(A)asadefinition—thenDemocritus'positioncanbemadeconsistent:hethinksthat(B)sensiblequalitiesareaffectionsofthesenseorganandthat(C)oneappearanceisnomoretruethananother.AccordingtoDemocritus,thereisnoindependentfactofthematteraboutwhethersomethingissweet,bitter,red,orwhite.Thishasnothingtodo

withtheatoms'beingmicroscopicandthereforeindividuallybeyondthescopeofoursenseorgans.Thatissueseemstomearedherring;wecannotperceivetheshapesofatoms,butthatdoesn'tpreventshapefrombeinganintrinsicpropertyofatoms.AsTaylorargues,thereasonwhyatomslacktheso-calledsecondaryqualitieslikesmells,colours,andflavoursisnotbecausetheyaretoosmalltobedetected,butbecauseDemocritushasanobserver-dependentconceptionofsecondaryqualities,accordingtowhich‘foranobjecttobered…is…forittoemitfilmsofatomsofsuchanaturethat,whenthosefilmscollidewithanappropriatelysituatedperceiver,theobjectwilllookredtothatperceiver’(p.216) (1999a:177).Thus,bydefinition,singleatomscannothavecoloursandsmellsbecauseonlyaggregatescansendofffilmsofatoms.

IthinkTaylorisontherighttrack,butthatDemocritus'viewisevenmoreradicalthantheonehedescribes.AccordingtoTaylor,Democritushasadispositionalistaccountofsensiblequalities;thereisafactofthematteraboutwhichobjectshavewhichqualities,thoughitisaperceiver-dependentfact,relativetoastandardizedperceiver.Somethingisblueifitemitsfilmsofatomsofsuchanaturethatitwilllookbluetoaperceiverintherightcondition,undertherightlightingconditions,etc.Ofcourse,ifitisdarkortheperceiverisill,itmayfailtoappearblue;itisbluenonetheless,foritstillhasthedispositiontoproducesuchappearancesundernormalconditions.However,thisisnotDemocritus'view,forhemaintainsthatoneappearanceisnomoretruethananother.Ifso,thereisnosuchthingasbeingblueorbeingsweetsimpliciter;ifsomethingwereblueorsweetsimpliciter,thenthosewhofailtoperceivebluenessorsweetnesswouldbewrong.ButDemocritusdeniesthatanysensoryimpressionsaretrueratherthanothers.Thus,hemustthinkthatbeingsweetisamatterofappearingsweettosomeone;thereisnootherfactofthematterinvolved.Thatis,Democritusheldaradicallysubjectivistaccountofsensiblequalities:athinghasasensiblequalityifandonlyifitappearstosotoaperceiver.

Democritusmayhavebeennudgedinthedirectionofsayingthatnoappearanceisanymoretruethananotherinpartbyhisowntheoryofperception(cf.§8.3.1).Democritus'theoryofperceptionfocusesontheeffectonperceiversofeffluences,orfilmsofatomscomingofftheobject,whichareinturnaffectedbytheinterveningmediumbetweenobjectandperceiver.Macroscopicobjectsproduceeffluencesand(invision)havearoleincompressingair.Butitisnotclearwhethertherepresentedobjectofperceptionisthesameasthecauseoftheperception.Whenoneislookingatamountaincreek,one'scontactwiththecollectionofatomsconstitutingthatcreekisminimalatbest,onDemocritus'view,forstrictlyspeakingoneisaffectedonlybyatinysubsetofthoseatomsthathappentoreachone'ssensesintheperceptualprocess.Butifwethereforesaythatperceptionisofsomethingproducedintheperceptualepisode,andnotoftheobjectitself,thenwearenotstrictlyspeakingperceivingorbeingaffectedbythesamethingsinperception,butsomethinguniquetoeachperceptualencounter,andthecolourorimageproducedinoneperson'sencounterwithastoneisnotthesameasthatproducedinanyother.Thus,whatwesee—sensiblequalities—istobeidentifiedwiththeeffectproduced,notsomethingoutsidetheperceiver.

Thisattitudetowardsensiblequalitieshasprofoundepistemologicalimplicationsforthesensesasacognitivecapacityandsourceofknowledge.Ifthesensestellusaboutsensiblequalities,butthesearereallynothingotherthantheeffectthatatomicbombardmentshaveonoursenses,thenwhatexactlyisthevalueofwhatthesensesteachusabouttheworld?Democrituswasevidentlyworriedaboutthisaspectofperception,asweshallseewhenweturnnexttoSextusEmpiricus,whodescribesjustsuchanattackonthesensesandtheirprospectsaspotentialsourcesofknowledge.

Notes:

(1)Inthischapter,referencestotestimonyorfragmentsofDemocritusaregiventoDiels‐Kranz'sDieFragmentederVorsokratiker(6thedn.,1952),andtoTaylor,TheAtomists:LeucippusandDemocritus(1999a).Referencesoftheform‘A114’or‘B9’areabbreviationsof‘DK68A114’and‘DK68B9’;theyrefertothetestimoniaandfragments,respectively,inDiels–Kranzch.68onDemocritus.Referencesprecededbytheletter‘T’aretoTaylor'sedition;‘T1’referstoTaylortestimonyno.1,and‘TD1’referstoTaylorfragment‘D1’.AlltranslationsoftheDemocriteanfragmentsortestimonyareTaylor's,unlessotherwiseindicated.

(2)Mejer1968:58–9.OneexceptiontotherulethatProtagorasandDemocritusarestudiedseparatelyisintheareaofethicsandpolitics,wheresomescholarshavedetectedsimilaritiesbetweentheirtheories;cf.Nestle1908,Segal1961,Cole1961,Nill1985,Farrar1988.

(3)Davison1953:33–8;seealsoMorrison1941:2–7,Ferguson1965:19–20.

(4)ThesedatescomefromApollodorus'testimonyinDLIX41andII7,accordingtowhichDemocritussaidintheMikrosDiakosmosthathewasfortyyearsyoungerthanAnaxagoras(=B5/T6),forwhomDavison(1953:39)givesabirthdateofabout500;theyaregenerallyaccepted(cf.Ferguson1965).Thrasyllus'testimony(DLIX41=A1/T6),whichgivesDemocritusabirthdateof470/69,isalsoplausible(cf.O'Brien(1994:655–77),whoarguesforadateofdeathin380/79),butDiodorusSiculus'testimony(XIV11,5=A5/T10),withdatesof494–404,isnot.SeealsoDavison1953,Mansfeld1983b;Salem(1996a:23–8)givesausefulsummaryoftheevidenceandissues.

(5)DLIX50,53=DK80A1,citingAristotle's‘OnEducation’andEpicurusasauthorities;repeatedalsobyAthenaeus,DeipnosophistesVIII354C=A9,andbyPhilostratus,V.soph.10=A9;Hesych.(?)ap.Sch.Plat.Rep.600C=DK80A3.(TheevidenceiscollectedatT14.)

(6)Cf.Davison1953:38–9,Ferguson1965:20.Theτύληmayhavebeenametaphorforsomekindofgrammaticalorrhetoricalinvention,orhavesomeconnectionwiththereportofProtagoras'dividingspeechintofourkinds,whichfollowsimmediatelyafterinDiogenesLaertius.ThetestimonywhichmakesProtagorasaprotégéofDemocrituscitesEpicurusasanauthorityandmayderivefromEpicureaneffortstodownplayhisinfluenceonDemocritus.Anotherpossibilityisthatitderivesfrommisunderstandingsofcomicreferencestohim.Dover(1976)notesthatanincidentorbitofslanderretailedonthe

comicstageisoftenreportedahundredyearslaterastruthbyhistoriansoranecdotalists;wedo,infact,knowoftheexistenceofcomediesinwhichProtagoraswasacharacter(Eupolis,Kolakes146–78Kock).

(7)AristotleattributestheatomisttheorytoLeucippusand‘hisassociate’Democritus(Metaphysics985b4=DK67A6/T46a;cf.GCA8.324b35–326b6=DK67A7/T48a),asdoesSimplicius(CommentaryonPhysics28.4–27=DK67A8/T45).Almostnothingisknownabouthislife,birthplace,anddates,exceptthathewasolderthanDemocritus,andthuslivedsometimeinthefifthcentury(Taylor1999a:157–8).

(8)Democritus'deathdateisusuallycalculatedonthebasisofthetestimonyofPseudo-Lucian,Macrob.18(=A6/T11a;cf.Censor.15,3=A6/T11b),accordingtowhomDemocrituslived104years,butDavison(1953:39)arguesthatthisnumberprobablycomesfromEpicureanattemptstomakeDemocritusolderthanProtagoras;sincethereisevidenceinPlatothatProtagoraswasoldenoughtobeSocrates'father,theirsolutionwastomakeDemocritusthirtyyearsolderthanSocrates,withabirthdateof499.Ifso,thenPseudo-Lucian'stestimonyimpliesthatDemocritus'deathdatewasinfact396;ifweassumehewasbornaround460,thenhelivedtotheageof64.ItisalsopossibletousethetestimonyofDiodorusSiculus,accordingtowhichDemocrituslivedto90(cf.O'Brien1994:674–7).

(9)IthasbeenarguedthattheauthorofthetextoftheAnonymusIamblichi(DK89)wasDemocritus;itcontainscloseparallelswiththefragmentsofProtagorasandDemocritus(Cataudella1932,Cataudella1937).ButA.T.Cole(1961)arguesthatAnonymuswasprobablynotDemocritusbutanAthenianfollowerofDemocrituswhowasinfluencedbylatefifth-centuryrhetoric;heconcludes:‘thetreatiseis,however,afaithfulreproductionofthecontents,ifnotthestyle,ofitsmodel’(Cole1961:155),Democritus'PeriAndragathiasePeriaretes‘OntheGoodnessofManorOnExcellence’,nowlost(DLIX46).

(10)ForasurveyofDemocritusandhisinfluenceinantiquity,seeSchmid–Stählin1948:I.5.236–349;onthefateofhiswritingsinantiquity,seepp.243–53.

(11)Plutarch'sAgainstColotesandQuaest.Conu.inthe1stc.ADseemtoindicateapersonalacquaintancewithDemocritus'writings.R.Löbl(1987:58)arguesthatDemocrituswasreaduptothefourthcenturyAD,butSchmidandStählin(1948:247)thinkhewasnotwidelyreadafterthethirdcenturyBC.O'Brien(1981:279–81)notesthat,unlikewithParmenides,Anaxagoras,Empedocles,andDiogenesofApollonia,SimpliciusdoesnotattempttosayanythingaboutwhatDemocritusreallythought,basedonhisownperusaloftheevidence;thisstronglysuggeststhathedidnotpossessthetextsofDemocritus.Atthesametime,asO'Briennotes,‘itdoesnotshowthat[Simplicius]considershimselftobelackingininformationaboutwhatImayperhapscallthefactsofDemocritus'theory.’Thatis,SimpliciusseemstohavefoundAristotle'streatiseonDemocritusandsomeversionofTheophrastus'PhysicorumOpinionessufficientfordeterminingthebasiccharacterofearlyatomisttheory.

(12)Cicero,Acad.II,23,73=partlyinB165/TD5cit.

(13)Philodemus,OnMusicHerculaneumpapyrus1497,col.XXXVI.29–39=B144/T213;seealsoSeneca,NaturalQuestionsVII.3.2=A92,DLIX40=A1/T6.

(14)DionysiusofHalicarnassusDeComp.Verb.24=A34/T41d,CiceroOrator20.67=A34/T41b,DeOratoreI.11.49=A34/T41a,DeDivinationeII.64.133=A34/T41c,PlutarchQuaest.Conu.5.7.6,683A(=A77/T133b).

(15)PossibleallusionstoDemocritusatTimaeus48bcandatSophist246ab(cf.Cornford1935:231).Thrasyllusthoughtthattheunnamed‘pentathlete’intheRivalsinLove,ifbyPlato,mightbeDemocritus(DLIX37),butthedialogueisgenerallyheldtobespurious.

(16)Cf.Natorp1890a,Hammer-Jensen1910,Bollack1967,Ferwerda1972.BollackarguesthatPlatowasnothostiletoDemocritus;Ferwerdasuggeststheproblemmaynothavebeenprofessionaljealousy(paceDLX40=A1/T6),butpoliticaldifferenceswithDemocritus'pro-democraticinclinations(onwhichseeFarrar1988).

(17)AristotledoesnotmentionDemocritus'ethics;asC.H.Kahn(1985:2)suggests,hemayhavethoughttheywereoutmodedincomparisonwithPlato's(cf.PartsofAnimalsI1.642a24–31=A36/T43a,quotedin§9.2.3).

(18)AlloftheevidenceiscollectedinDKii.92–3.Aristotledevotedtwoworkstohim,ΠϵρὶΔημοκρίτου‘OnDemocritus’(Simpl.decaelo294.33=A37/T44a)andΠροβλήματαἐκτω̑νΔημοκρίτουβ’‘ProblemsfromDemocritus’(DLV26).Theophrastus:ΠϵρὶΔημοκρίτουᾱ(DLV49),Πϵρὶτη̑ςΔημοκρίτουἀστρολογίαςᾱ(DLV43).HeracleidesPonticus,astudentofSpeusippus'whoattendedAristotle'slectures:Πϵρὶψυχη̑ςκαὶπϵρὶϕύσϵωςκαὶπϵρὶϵἰδώλωνπρὸςΔημόκριτον(DLV87),ΠρὸςτὸνΔημόκριτονἐξηγήσϵις(DLV88).Epicurus:ΠρὸςΔημόκριτον(schol.Zenon.delib.dic.VH1v2fr.20=UsenerEpic.p.97,10).MetrodorusofLampsacus:ΠρὸςΔημόκριτον(DLX24).Cleanthes:ΠρὸςΔημόκριτον(DLVII174).SphairosofBosphoruswroteΠϵρὶἐλαχίστων,Πρὸςτὰςἀτόμουςκαὶτὰϵἴδωλα(DLVII178),butitisnotentirelycleartomethatthesebooksareaboutDemocritus.

(19)Forreferencesanddiscussion,seeHuby1978;shedefendsEpicurusfromthechargethathehadapathologicalunwillingnesstoadmitthathewasindebtedtoanyteacherorpredecessor,notevenDemocritus.Sedley(1992b:22)suggeststhattheveryideaofatomismasconstitutingasingleschoolinantiquityisamoderndoxographicalfiction.

(20)OnthesuccessionsliteraturefromthesecondcenturyADon,seevonKienle1961.

(21)Cf.Brunschwig1999,Bett2000a:152–60.

(22)Cf.ClementStrom.I64(=DK70A1),SEMVII87–8(=DK70A25),CiceroAc.pr.II23.73andEusebiusPEXIV19.8=DK70B1.

(23)DLIX61;cf.Bett2000a:1–2.

(24)AristoclesinEusebius,PEXIV.18.27;seealsoNumeniusinEusebius,PEXIV.6.4.

(25)DeclevaCaizzi(1984)suggeststhatPyrrhomayhavebeeninterestedinDemocritus'atomismnotasascientifictheoryofcosmology,butmoreasamythormetaphorforthevanityofhumanlife,andthuschieflyinterestedinatomism'sethicalimplications.Bycontrast,Bett(2000a:152–60,187–8)arguesthatPyrrhowasinterestednotinDemocritus'atomismoranykindofphysicaltheorizing,butinhisepistemology.

(26)DLI15(=T198a),ClementMiscellaniesI.64(=T198a),DLIX64,69;SEM1.2;EusebiusPEXIV.20.14.

(27)SeeDLIX38(=A1/T6),DLIX46(=T40),ProclusCommentaryonPlato'sRepublicII113.6Kroll(=B1/T112d).Democritus'connectionwiththePythagoreansisdiscussedbyCataudella(1932,1937)inthecontextoftheAnonymusIamblichi(referencefromCole1961:155).Somedismissthesepurportedconnections,butnotBurkert(1972).

(28)Cf.Tarrant1993:85–9.AccordingtoThrasyllus,‘He[sc.Democritus]seemstohavebeenanadherentofthePythagoreandoctrines;andindeedhereferstoPythagorashimself,expressingadmirationofhiminhisbookofthesametitle.Heappearstotakeallhisviewsfromhim,andwouldevenappeartohavebeenhispupil,didnotchronologymakethatimpossible’(DLIX38=A1/T6).ThrasyllusaccordinglygaveprideofplacetoDemocritus'‘Pythagorean’booksinthefirsttetralogyinhiscatalogue(DLIX46=A33/T40).

(29)OntheinfluenceofDemocritusonHippocraticmedicine,seeWellmann1929,Diller1934,LopezFerez1974;onhisinfluenceonthedevelopmentofHippocraticandHellenisticmedicine,seetherecentseriesofstudiesbyStückelberger1979,1984,1992(referencesfromSalem1996:ch.5).Suchinfluenceishardtoprove;Jouanna(1992:386–7)expressesdoubts.AnoverviewoftheevidenceandliteraturecanbefoundinSalem1996a:ch.5.

(30)Cf.Stewart1958.

(31)InterpretationsofDemocritus'epistemologyfallroughlyintofourcategories:(1)SomerejectAristotle'stestimonyasgrossmisinterpretationsofDemocritus,mistakenlyascribingtoDemocritustheviewthatallperceptionsandperceptualappearancesaretrue,andacceptSextusascorrectlydescribingDemocritusasascientistandarationalist,notasceptic(Zeller1920:I.ii.1135–9,Natorp1884:ch.4,esp.173–8,Rodier1900:51,Ross1924:i.275,Guthrie1965,KRS1983,Curd2001).(2)Aristotle'stestimonycannotbeentirelyrejectedbecauseSextusalsosaysvariousthingsinlinewithit;hencetheymustbereconciled(Hirzel1877:i.110–17,Weiss1938,Asmis1984,Morel1998,Taylor1999a,1999b).Taylor(1999a:216–22)hasaparticularlyclearandcogentaccountofhowthe‘sceptical’fragmentsfittogetherwithDemocritus'theoreticalaspirations.(3)Democrituswasultimatelyascepticofsomekind(Dyroff1899,Barnes

1982,DeclevaCaizzi1984,Asmis1984).(4)Democritus'epistemologycontainedinternaltensions,whichheneverentirelyfacedorresolved(Morel1998,O'Keefe1997),or,alternatively,hedidnotreallyhaveanepistemologyproperlyspeaking(Sedley1992b:24n.7).

(32)SeeespeciallyR.Hirzel(1877–83:i.110–17),whoarguesthatAristotlerecognizesDemocritus'fundamentalepistemologicalprinciple,namely,thatinordertoarriveatknowledgeofwhatishiddenonemustproceedfromwhatisgiventhroughthesenses,andthatsensoryperceptionandexperienceisthepointofdepartureonthewaytotruth,butthatAristotleputsthissomewhatmisleadinglyastheprinciplethat‘truthliesinwhatappears’.

(33)McKim(1984)isoneofthefewrecentscholarstotakeseriouslythepossibilitythatDemocritusconceivedofthetruthofperceptualappearancesasanaxiomorexplanandumforanadequateaccountofreality.ButmorerecentlyTaylor(1999b)hasendorsedMcKim'shypothesisthatDemocritusshareswithProtagorasthepositionthatallperceptualappearancesareequipollent,andequallytrue.Onehastolooktothenineteenthcenturytofindearlierversionsofthisproto-EpicureaninterpretationofDemocritus(Hirzel1877–83:i.110–17,Brieger1902:56ff.,Dyroff1899:74,88).MyinterpretationhasmuchincommonwiththatofHirzel,whoemphasizestheimportanceforDemocritusoftheepistemologicalprinciple—attestedtobothbySextusandAristotle—thatthesearchfortruthmustbeginwiththesenses,eveniftheycannottellthewholetruthbythemselves.

(34)SeealsoPhiloponus(CommentaryonAristotleGC315b9,23.1–8=notinDK/T42b),whosuggeststhatDemocritususedthetheoryofshapesinordertoexplaindifferencesinperceptualappearancesbetweenobservers,andto‘preservethetruthofthoseappearancesofthesamething’.

(35)Aristotle'scommentshereareimportantforreconstructingtheconnectionsbetweentheearlyatomistsandParmenides.Thereisahugeliteratureonthissubject;foraclearstatementoftheorthodoxview,seeTaylor1999a:160–4,andforfullerdiscussionwithreferences,seeCurd1998:180–216.

(36)Democritus'searchforcausesisthemainthemeofMorel1996,animpressivelycarefulanddetailedstudyofDemocritus'aitiologiaiacrossarangeoftopics.Morelmakesapersuasivecaseforthinkingthat,ifwetakeintoaccountthefullscopeofDemocritus'scientificambitions,insteadoffocusingexclusivelyonafewfragmentsfromSextusMVII,wewouldbelessinclinedtosupposethattheonlycausesinDemocritus'universewereatomsandvoid,orthathewasnecessarilycommittedtoaprogrammeofreductiveeliminativism,thepositionthatnothingelseexistsorcanhavecausalforcebesidesatomsandvoid.

(37)Thiswordisrare,andmostlyattestedinconnectionwithDemocritusorEpicurus;cf.Morel1996:25–30.

(38)Ofcourse,thesetitlesmaynotbeDemocritus'own;evenso,ancienttitlestendtobelabelsdescribingthesubjectmatterofthebooks.SeeSchmalzriedt1970onhowancientbooksgottheirtitles.

(39)Democritususedtheοὐμα̑λλονformulainavarietyofcontexts;cf.Graeser1970.

(40)Langerbeck1935:114,Kahn1985:19.

(41)SeeKahn1985:9–10,19–24onwhyDemocritususesgnomewherewemightexpectpsyche,andhislackofaconsistentterminologyforpsychicfunctionsquitegenerally.KahnsuggeststhatDemocritushadnotfullyconceptualizedhisnotionsofthesoul'spsychicandrationalfunctionsintoatheoryofthepsyche,suchaswefindPlatoattemptingtoworkoutintheGorgiasandintheRepublic.SeealsoClaus1981:ch.2.

(42)Mansfeld(1996:168)arguesthatwhenAristotlesays‘Homeristhusrighttosay“Hectorlaythinkingsomethingelse”’,‘ilfautajouter,mentalement,un“commeonprétend”’,andthinksthathereasinMet.Γ5,thereferencetoHomerisduetoananonymousthirdparty,inparticular,thatitmaybeHippiaswho‘seraitlasourcedelamajoritédespassagesparallèlescitésparAristote’(1996:164n.20;seealso1986:18/40inreprint).ThisispartofMansfeld'sargument(1986:18ff.,1983a:43ff.)thatAristotle'sdoxographies—e.g.MetaphysicsBookA,PhysicsI,andDeAnimaI2—maynothavebeencompiledbyAristotlehimself,butcamefromdoxographiescompiledbyothers,inparticularHippias,whoisknowntohavemadecollectionsofsayings.HippiascouldbeDemocritus'sourceforthisquotation,butϕάσιprobablyreferstoDemocritus,asAristotlemakesclearinDAI2.

(43)Bailey(1928:173)saysthatDemocrituspraisesHomerforthetermἀλλοϕρονέων(‘outofhismind’),‘awordwhichDemocritusthoughtanexactexpressionoftheeffectofanger,whichmakesthesoultoohotandincapableoftruethought’.ThereisnoparticularreasontothinkthatDemocritusorHomerusedthistermtorefertotheeffectofanger,but,aswewillseefromAristotle'stestimony,temperaturedoesindeedaffectmentalfunctionsbecausesoul-atomsandfire-atomsare,accordingtoDemocritus,thesameinnature.

(44)404a25–31:ὁμοίωςδὲκαὶΑναξαγόρα‘ςψυχὴνϵἰν̑αιλέγϵιτὴνκινου̑σαν,καὶϵἴτιςἄλλοςϵἴρηκϵνὡςτὸπα̑νἐκίνησϵνου̑ς·οὐμὴνπαντϵλω̑ςγ’ὥσπϵρΔημόκριτος.ἐκϵιν̑οςμὲνγὰρἁπλω̑ςταὐτὸνψνχὴνκαὶνου̑ντὸγἀρἀληθὲςϵἰν̑αιτὸϕαινόμϵνον,διὸκαλω̑ςποιη̑οαιτὸν"Ομηρονὡς“Ἕκτωρκϵιτ̑’ἀλλοϕρονέων”.οὐδὴχρη̑ταιτῳ̑νῳ̑ὡςδυνάμϵιτινὶπϵρὶτὴνἀλήθϵιαν,ἀλλὰταὐτολέγϵιψυχὴνκαὶνου̑ν.

(45)Cf.Langerbeck1935:80,Guthrie1965:457.AsC.H.Kahn(1985:10)notes,itwouldhavebeenmoreaccurateforAristotletosaythatDemocritusdidnotclearlydistinguishbetweenpsycheandnous.

(46)SomesourcessaythatDemocritusdidlocatethemindinaparticularareaofthebody:inthechest(Ps.-PlutarchEpitomeinAëtiusIV.4.6=A105/T110a)orinthehead

(Ps.-PlutarchEpitomeinAëtiusIV.5.1=A105/T110b;Theodoretus,CurefortheIllsoftheGreeksV.22=notinDK/T110c).Guthrie(1965:433)acceptsLucretius'testimonythatsoul-atomsaredispersedwithbody-atomsthroughoutthebody,butthinksthatthePlacitashowsthatthemind,orthinkingportionofthesoul,is‘aconcentrationofsoulinaparticularpartofthebody’;hefavoursAëtiusIV.5.1(whichputsthemindinthehead)overAëtiusIV.4.6(whichputsitinthechest),onthegroundsthatanysourcethatlinksDemocrituswithEpicurus(asAëtiusIV.4.6does)islikelytobeincorrect.Mansfeld(1990a:3088n.120)howeverconcludesthatAëtius'testimonydoesnotallowustodetermine‘whetherDemocritusspokeofadominantpartofthesoul,letalonewhereheputit’.Taylor(1999a:200–8)argues,convincinglyinmyview,thatLucretiusistheauthorityhere,andthatAëtiusshouldberejectedaltogether;LucretiusisclearthatDemocritusdidnotlocateitanywhere.

(47)H.B.Gottschalk(1986)arguesthattheparticularexplanationgivenhereforapparentcasesofcorpsescomingbacktolifemaynotbeDemocritus',butProclus'explanationbasedonPlato'smythofEr.Evenso,itisclearthatDemocritusgavesomeexplanationforthephenomenon;cf.CelsusII.6(A160/T112cit.),PlinyNaturalHistoryVII.55.189–90(notinDK/T112cit.),VarroSatiresfr.81(A161/T112cit.),Ps.-Plutarch,EpitomeinAëtiusIV.4.7(A117/T112b),Tertullian,DeAnima51.2(A160/T112c).

(48)Indeed,somelatesourcesreportthatDemocritusthoughtthatanimalsandplantscanthink,whichmayexplain,orbeevidenceof,ancientPythagoreaninterestinDemocritus.Onplants,seePs.-AristotleOnPlants815b14–16(=DK31A70,DK59A117/T155a)andPlutarchNaturalCausesI,911e(=DK59A116/T155b).Onanimals,seePlutarch,OntheRationalityofAnimals20,974a(=B154/T187a)andPorphyry,OnAbstentionfromAnimalFoodIII.6(=notinDK/T187b).

(49)Taylor(1999a:204–5)suggestsquiteplausiblythatthedifferencebetweensensationandthinking,forDemocritus,isthatsensationoccurswheneidolafitthechannelsofasense-modalityandgothroughthemtothewebofmind-atomspermeatingthebody,whereasthinkingoccurswhenmorefinelystructuredeidolapenetratethebodyandaffectthemind-webdirectly,withoutgoingthroughsensorychannels.Suchanexplanationforthecausaloriginsofthoughtswouldhavebeenusefulforexplainingtheoriginsofdreams,forexample,beliefsaboutthegods,andsuccessfulprophecy.Cf.Taylor1999a:207–8,211–16.

(50)Diels,DoxographiGraeci(1879).Onthequestionofwhatthisworkwaslikeandwhatitsinfluenceonsubsequentdoxographywas,seeMansfeld1990a,Mansfeld1992,MansfeldandRunia1997.W.Leszl(2002)discussesthisinconnectionwiththequestionofTheophrastusasasourceforDemocritus.

(51)HanBaltussenarguesthattheDSis‘notjustalistorcollectionofdoxai(Usener,Diels),norexclusivelyacriticalhistory(Regenbogen),norameredialecticalexercise(Mansfeld)’,that‘inessence,itlacksaclearpurposealtogether,oratleastonesinglepurpose’(1998:196),andthinksthattheDeSensibusistoolargetohavebeenonebookofthePhysics.OnthepurposeandmethodoftheDeSensibus,seealsoBaltussen2000

andMansfeld1996.

(52)Mansfeld(1986:24)notes:‘ThereisnodoxographyinthepropersenseofthewordinAristotleorPlato,oreveninTheophrastus,becausethedoxaiatissuearepresentedfromasystematicalpointofviewinordertofurtherthediscussionofproblemsofasystematicalnature.’

(53)Seetheline-by-linecomparisonsbetweentheDSandtheTimaeusinLong1996,McDiarmid1959,andBaltussen2000:95–139.LongandMcDiarmiddelivernegativeassessmentsofTheophrastus'reliabilityandaccuracy;LongdescribesTheophrastus'accountasregularlycarelessandmisleading,withinexplicableomissionsandinaccuracies.McDiarmid(1953,1959)attributesthesedefectstoTheophrastus'Aristotelianbias;Sedley(1992a)arrivesatsimilarconclusionsinhisstudyofTheophrastus'presentationofEmpedocles'theoryofvision.GenerallypositiveassessmentscanbefoundinStratton1917,Kahn1960:21,Furley1993:74–5,Laks1999:256–9,Baltussen2000:95–139;thesescholarshaveinmindTheophrastus'superioritybothasasourceandasanintelligentinterpretertothelatersourcesforthePresocratics.Baltussen(2000:137–8)defendsTheophrastus,arguing,withrespecttoTheophrastus'reportonPlato,that‘accuracyinreportingandaccuracyininterpretingPlato…areseparateissues’,andthatinTheophrastus‘thelevelofaccuracybecomesadjustedtotherequirementsofthecontext.’

(54)ThisisalsonotedbyBaltussen(1998:173–4).

(55)DS50:ὁρα̑νμὲνοὐ̑νποιϵι̑τῃ̑ἐμϕάσϵιταύτηνδὲἰδίωςλέγϵιτὴνγὰρἔμϕασινοὐκϵὐθὺςἐντῃ̑κόρῃγίνϵσθαι,ἀλλὰτὸνἀέρατὸνμϵταξὺτη̑ςὄψϵωςκαὶτου̑ὁρωμένουτυπου̑σθαισυστϵλλόμϵνονὑπὸτου̑ὁρωμένουκαὶτου̑ὁρω̑ντοςἅπαντοςγὰρἀϵὶγίνϵσθαίτιναἀπορροήνἔπϵιτατου̑τονστϵρϵὸνὄντακαὶἀλλόχρωνἐμϕαίνϵσθαιτοις̑ὄμμασινὑγροις̑.καὶτὸμὲνπυκνὸνοὐδέχϵσθαι,τὸδὲὑγρὸνδιιέναι.διὸκαὶτοὺςὑγροὺςτω̑νσκληρω̑νὀϕθαλμω̑νἀμϵίνουςϵἰν̑αιπρὸςτὸὁρα̑ν,ϵἰὁμὲνἔξωχιτὼνὡςλϵπτότατος[καὶπυκνότατος]ϵἴη,τὰδ’ἐντὸςὡςμάλιστασομϕὰκαὶκϵνὰπυκνη̑ςκαὶστιϕρα̑ςσαρκός,ἔτιδὲἰκμάδοςπαχϵίαςτϵκαὶλιπαρα̑ς,καὶαἱϕλέβϵς�αἱ�κατὰτοὺςὀϕθαλμοὺςϵὐθϵια̑ικαὶἄνικμοι,ὡς“ὁμοιοσχημονϵιν̑”τοις̑ἀποτυπουμένοις.τὰγὰρὁμόϕυλαμάλισταἕκαστονγνωρίζϵιν.

(56)AccordingtoTheophrastus,‘AboutAnaxagoras’doctrineoftheemphasis,itisonewidelyheld;fornearlyeveryoneassumesthatseeingcomesaboutbymeansoftheappearance(emphasis)producedintheeyes'(DS36,seealsoDS27).

(57)SeealsoBurkert1977:98.

(58)ThisisprobablynotoriginaltoDemocritus;Burkert(1977:99)notesthatἄπαντοςγὰρἀϵὶγίνϵσθαίτιναἀπορροήν(DS50)isanalmostverbatimquotationfromEmpedoclesfragmentB89γνοὺςὃτιπάντωνϵἰσὶνἀπορροαί,ὅσσ̕ἐγένοντο.

(59)AristotlemakesthiscomplaintatDeSensu2.438a5–12=A121/T117;similarly,

Theophrastusasks,concerningAnaxagoras'accountofemphasis,whyvisionoccurswhensomething‘appearsin’theeye,whileitdoesnotoccurwhensomething‘appearsin’lifelessthings,suchaswaterorbronze(DS36).

(60)BecauseothersourcesforDemocritus'theoryofvision(T115–22)makenomentionofair-impressions,C.Bailey(1928:167)dismissesTheophrastus'testimonyas‘unsupported’.ButTheophrastus'testimonyisdetailedandshouldbegivengreaterweightthanAristotle'scursorydescriptions(DeSensu438a5–12=A121/T117),whichmakenomentionofair-impressions,nodoubtbecausehehasrenderedinextremelyabbreviatedfashionthesametheoryTheophrastusdescribesabove.Forexample,AristotlesimplysaysthatDemocritusmadewaterthatbywhichwesee,whereasTheophrastusgivesmoredetailedexplanationsofwhytheeyemustbesufficientlymoist,notdenseordry,toadmitimages(DS50,51,54);Aristotle's‘seeingisemphasis(mirroring)’isobviouslyamorecompressedversionofTheophrastus'‘hemakesseeingoccurbymeansofemphasis(reflectedimageormirroring)’.Aristotle'sonlyremarkaboutemphasisisthatDemocritus'explanationofitisunsatisfactory;hedoesnotmentiontheroleofair-impressionsprobablybecauseitdoesnotinteresthim.LaterauthorslikeAlexandermaybefollowingAristotle'sdescriptionwithoutconsultingtheoriginaltext—unlikeTheophrastus.Itisalsopossiblethatlatersourcesmakenomentionofair-impressionsbecausetheyhaveassimilatedDemocrituswithEpicurus(cf.Burkert1977).Epicurusmentionstheideaofair-impressionsonlyinordertorejectit(LettertoHerodotusinDLX49,53).

(61)Howtheeyecontributestothecompactingofairisnotclear.Eithervisionoccurswheneidolafromtheobjectmeetavisualraycomingfromtheeye,likelightcomingfromalantern(asinPlatoTi.45b,67c–d,EmpedoclesDK31B84;cf.Guthrie1965:443,vonFritz1971:612–13,Burkert1977:99–100)orhethoughtairiscompactedsimplybythepressureexertedfromthesurfaceoftheeyeandthesurfaceoftheobject(cf.Baldes1975,Barnes1982:ch.22n.9,O'Brien1984:n.60).Thesunorlightemitsfire-atomsthatalsoplayaroleincompactingtheair,asTheophrastussuggestsinhiscriticismofDemocritus(DS54).Hence,lightseemstohavethedoubleroleofcompressingtheairtoprepareitforimprintingandoftransportingtheimagebacktotheeye.

(62)Forafullerdiscussionoftheinterpretativeoptions,seeBurkert1977:102.O'Brien(1984)hasmorerecentlyarguedthatDemocritusintroducedair-impressionsinordertoexplaintheperceptionofthedistanceoftheperceivedobject.HecitesLucretiusIV.244–53andAlexanderonDeSensu,57.28–58.1insupportoftheideathattheatomiststhoughtthatthequantityofairblowingthroughtheeyeallowsustoperceivedistance.However,Taylor(1999a:209n.41)pointsoutthatTheophrastus,atleast,doesnotconnectair-impressionswiththeissueofdistance-perception(seeDS50ontheformer,DS54onthelatter),andsinceheexplicitlywondersaboutthepurposeofair-impressions,hepresumablywouldhavemadethisconnectionifDemocritushad.

(63)Zeller1920:i.2.1126–8,Beare1906:27,Morel1996:194–5.

(64)ThesamequestionsariseconcerningEpicurus'effluence-basedtheoryof

perception;cf.Striker1977,Taylor1980,Everson1990.

(65)ItisworthnotingthatTheophrastusincludesundertherubricofsensiblequalitiesnotonlyAristotle'slistofpropersensibles(colours,sounds,smells,flavours,andtactilequalities)butqualitiessuchaslight,heavy,hard,andsoft(DS61–2)whicharenotobviouslysecondaryqualitiesinthemodernsense.Thisraisesdifficultquestionsaboutthecanonicallistofsensiblequalities,includingthevexedquestionofwhetherDemocritusthoughtatomshaveweight,buttheseissueslieoutsideourconcerns;fordiscussionandreferences,seeTaylor1999a:179–84.

(66)ThefactthatTheophrastusmayhaveextractedaDemocriteantheoryaboutsensiblequalitiesfromwhatwasadiscussionofthesenseswillbecomeimportanttousin§9.2.1.

(67)ItisnotclearwhetherDemocritusmeanttosaythatthereareinfinitegradationsinsizeaswell;fordiscussionandreferences,seeTaylor1999a:173–5.

(68)DS67ἁπάντωνδὲτω̑νσχημάτωνοὐδὲνἀκέραιονϵἰν̑αικαὶἀμιγὲςτοις̑ἄλλοις,ἀλλ’ἐνἑκάστῳπολλὰ,ϵἰν̑αικαὶτὸναὐτὸνἔχϵινλϵίουκαὶτραχέοςκαὶπϵριϕϵρου̑ςκαὶὀξέοςκαὶτω̑νλοιπω̑ν.οὑ̑δ’ἂνἐνῃ̑πλϵισ̑τον,του̑τομάλισταἐνισχύϵινπρόςτϵτὴναἴσθησινκαὶτὴνδύναμιν..

(69)AristotleGCI2.315b6–15=DK67A9/T42a,Theophrastus,decausisplant.VI.7.2=A132/T126,Aristotle,Met.985b13–22=DK67A6/T46a;Simplicius,CommentaryonPhysics28.15–27=A38/T45.

(70)ThiswasanimportantpartoftheEpicureanexplanationofconflictingappearances(Plutarch,adv.Col.1109C–E=LS16I).

(71)TheophrastushasprobablytakenthedescriptionsofDemocritus'accountsoftheindividualflavoursandcoloursfromDemocritus'booksonflavoursandcolourslistedinThrasyllus'catalogue(DLIX46=A33/T40);Democritus'accountofperception,wherehedoesdiscusstheimportanceoftheperceiver'sconditioninperception,probablybelongedtoadifferentbook,perhapsOntheSenses.

(72)Thisisthemanuscriptreading.Schneider,followedbyDiels,preferredκράσϵι;Mullach,withPapencordt,preferredτὴνκρίσιν.

(73)Here,TheophrastusseemstobecloselyparaphrasingDemocritus;hereturnstospeakinginhisownvoicewiththesentence‘That,omittingqualifications,ishowoneshouldregardtheobjectsofsense.’

(74)Taylortranslatesthissentence(p.517.18–19Diels)asfollows:‘Ofcourse,thesetoo[i.e.statesofobservers]are,likeeverythingelse,ascribedtotheshapes[sc.oftheatoms].’Buttaταν】ταtareferstotτώναισθητώνintheprevioussentence,andoουμηναλλ’ώσπςρsetsupanoppositionwithwhatcamebefore.Theprevioussentencenotestheimportanceofthedispositionoftheperceivertohowthingsappeartothem;thissentencesaysthatDemocritusinfactexplainseverything,includingtaaisthetainterms

oftheshapes,notintermsofthestatesofperceivers,say,ashishypothesiswouldleadustoexpect.

(75)AccordingtoG.M.Stratton(1917),thesensiblequalitieslackanyexternalreality,butTheophrastusneversuggeststhatthingswithoutanaturedonotexistatall.T.S.Ganson(1999:207–8)alsopointsoutthat,accordingtoTheophrastus,Plato'saccountofastringencyaswhatcontractstheporesfailstogetattheφύαιϛoftheflavour;asGansonexplains,‘accountsofthissortfailtorevealwhattheessence(τηνονσίαν)ofeachflavorisandwhytheflavorshavetheeffectstheydo(διάτίταύταδρώσιν).Ingeneralanaccountoftheφύσιςofasensiblequalitywilltelluswhatthatqualityissuchthatithastheeffectsthatitdoes.Soφύσιςin[sc.DS]60shouldbeunderstoodasnatureorexplanatoryessence,notasexternalreality.’ThisisclosertowhatTheophrastushasinmind,althoughitsuggests—mistakenlyinmyview—thattosaythatatheory‘deprivessensiblequalitiesoftheirnature’issimplyawayofsayingthatitisabadexplanationofsensiblequalitiesandfailstorevealtheiressence.OnmyreadingofTheophrastus,atheoryofxdeprivesxofitsnaturewhenitmakesxasubjectiveorrelationalproperty.

(76)O'Keefe1997andGanson1999cometoasimilarconclusion.O'Keefe(1997:124–6)arguesagainstearlierinterpretersaccordingtowhomDemocritusdeniesthatsensiblequalitiesarerealbecausesensiblequalitiesarechangeable(Furley1993:93),becauseallmacrosopicobjectsareunreal(Wardy1988,Purinton1991),orbecausesensationsandaffectionsarereducibletophysicalstates(Sedley1998:298–9);rather,Democritusdeniesthatsensiblequalitiesarerealbecauserelativityimpliesunreality.Ganson(1999:212)objectstothislastargumentonthegroundsthatpropertieslikebeingheavierthanironarerelationalaccordingtoDemocritusbutnolessreal.Thelargerquestionofwhatitisforsomethingtobereal,accordingtoDemocritus,andwhetherhewouldadmitanyrelationalpropertiesasbeing‘real’isnotoneIwilltrytoaddresshere;foronething,onemustdecidewhetherspatialrelations,arrangements,andconfigurationsare‘real’propertiesofatomsornot.

(77)HowDemocritusmighthaverepliedwedon'tknow;itisnotclearthathethoughtintermsofdefinitions,essences,oruniversals.ButseenowMourelatos2003.

(78)Furley(1993:80)says:‘ThereisnohintinDeSens.thatthesameshapesproducedifferentpatheindifferentpeople.’

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