amtrak thesis pdf for the lambe report
TRANSCRIPT
Lambert 1
Dylan Lambert
Mr. Grimshaw
U.S History II
21 May 2012
The Passenger Train and Amtrak
The passenger train; one of America’s longtime institutions that has proven time and time
again that it simply won’t die (unlike some Wall St. banks). This means one must wonder if the
passenger train needed some sort of salvation considering the widespread development of the
interstate highway network, and increasing popularity of the automobile. Since the inception of
the railroad as a means of transportation in the early 1800s, passenger trains were in place to
move people from point A to point B. Some of the most prestigious passenger trains were to
come about in the early 1900s. Trains like the Twentieth Century Limited, Southwest Limited,
Knickerbocker, Yankee Clipper, Empire Builder, and the Merchants Limited were all established
to provide luxurious travel to patrons for the price of a sleeping car ticket. These days were not
to last forever as by the eve of World War II automobile traffic and an improved road network
had eaten away at passenger trains, seeing smaller branch lines and lesser main line trains
canceled, curtailed, or combined with existing services. The streamlining innovation helped draw
ridership while developing more durable equipment, but it didn’t stem the decline. Simply put,
Amtrak’s formation was necessary to prevent the decline in passenger rail and increase
ridership on a national level.
It was the formation of the National Railway Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak as it is
more commonly known, that stopped the decline. One would imagine that the passenger train
would increase in popularity (and thanks to Amtrak it has) but Congress has proven to be a
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impediment for increasing Amtrak’s subsidy and developing a better passenger rail network.
Ever since its inception Amtrak has been used as a political football, usually having its funding
cut before any other government program, and this leads to a constant fear that Amtrak will be
forced to significantly curtail service. Because of funding problems, Amtrak is left to cover 85%
of its costs, and that is a system-wide scale. Individual routes that Amtrak operates, such as the
Pacific Surfliner, attract significant ridership and reach marginal levels of profitability; yet these
routes aren’t enough to cover the system-wide problem of covering maintenance costs and
purchasing new equipment to retire the oldest assets in the Amtrak fleet (some of the dining cars
and sleepers were built in the 1950s and were transferred to Amtrak at birth). Is all this political
football even worth the time and trouble when Congress should be able to agree on something so
incredibly simple so it can focus on more prudent measures, such as our military and the
economy?
Amtrak’s story is one of survival against all odds. As said by Joseph Vranich in his book
Derailed: What went wrong and what to do about America’s Passenger Trains, “on some days,
riding Amtrak can be great; on other days, a disaster” (Vranich 1). This can only serve to
highlight the problems faced by Amtrak day in and day out. Finances, mechanical failures and
politics are a constant impediment to the job that Amtrak is sent to do. But when did the motions
begin which had the seemingly inevitable outcome of the formation of Amtrak on May 1, 1971?
In hindsight, we can trace the fractures that led to Amtrak’s creation going back to the 1930s.
The nation was recovering from the Great Depression, and the automobile made serious inroads
into the passenger traffic of the railroads, both large and small. In the case of some small
shortlines, passenger service was discontinued to maintain profitability. Furthermore, although
the decline in ridership was detrimental to many of the smaller railroads and their passenger
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operations, the larger conglomerates were working to draw new ridership through innovation and
technological advancement.
But where was this ridership supposed to come from? Only a revolution in passenger
train operations would draw such ridership that the railroads envisioned. That answer came in the
form of “streamliners”. Newer, lighter materials made the heavyweight cars of the era, so called
because of how the all-steel construction contributed to the weight, were made redundant by
lighter alloys like aluminum and stainless steel. The first railroad to invest heavily in stainless
steel was the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad; “despite its initial high cost, stainless
steel has no other life expectancy than ‘long’, thus the Burlington expected that use of stainless
steel and its associated costs would be offset by lower maintenance and a carbody’s increased
longevity” (Schafer and Welsh 12). The minds at the CB&Q were correct in their assumption,
for stainless steel is the preferred material for use in Amtrak’s passenger cars because of the
lower maintenance costs (which is nearly none, as stainless steel is impervious to corrosion).
Some cars in Amtraks are nearing 60 years old, and the only reason they have been utilized for
such an extensive period of time is due in part to the carbodies being in excellent condition.
With streamliners being the main passenger trains operating in inter-city service, we
could gain a look at what pattern that Amtrak’s long distance trains would follow far before its
birth. Original streamliners were nothing like what we see today; they were fixed consists that
required heavy equipment, like that found in a repair shop, to alter the train consists (Schafer and
Welsh 11). The name of the game quickly became a balance between flexibility and cost-
effectiveness, as by the 1950s, when the streamliner reached maturity, the automobile was
exploding in popularity. “Arguably the ultimate virtue of the auto- its flexibility- would prove
stiff competition for the passenger train, which through the 1920s remained a stalwart operation”
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(Schafer and Welsh 10), and such flexibility was indeed an issue to passenger rail. But there
was a second component; the freedom of going wherever you wanted whenever you wanted. It’s
that freedom that many Americans flock to, even to this day where we see young adults going
out of their ways to gain a car because of that very freedom it offers.
Fast forward some more, into the 1960s, and there had been a dramatic drop in passenger
train operations. In 1944, near the end of World War II, passenger trains held 74% of the
intercity trade; this would fall to 48% by 1949 and 29% by 1960 (Frailey 5). Such decline made
maintaining passenger trains at a profitable level nearly impossible. The old adage, “a snowball’s
chance in hell” easily applies here. The real reason the passenger trains survived through the
1960s was the United States Postal Service. Yes, the Post Office, which seems near to total
collapse, once relied on railroads for moving and sorting massive amounts of mail on the nation-
wide network.
Loss of that traffic normally meant the end to passenger operations on a given railroad. In
the case of the Kansas City Southern, mail revenues supported their passenger operations. To
make the operations appealing to the public, Kansas City Southern maintained a respectable
passenger network, with two trains in each way, in an area with sparse population, and all of this
under William Deramus Jr. and his notorious public-be-damned attitude (Frailey 11). But why
bother keeping the passenger trains appealing? It was simple; “Deramus gladly spent money to
make money” (Frailey 16). This “spend money to make money” attitude of the management at
Kansas City Southern is further enhanced by the purchase of 5 new coaches from American Car
and Foundry, and 4 used tavern-observation cars from the New York Central for $25,250 each
(Frailey 12). That public appeal would see itself pay off with increases in ridership, which were
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mostly supplemental to the postal traffic carried by many of the passenger trains still running by
the 1960s.
But the United States Postal Service proved to be the undoing of the passenger trains on
Kansas City Southern. “On December 4, 1967 Kansas City Southern told the ICC it had every
intention of quitting the passenger business after all. The reason was all too familiar. The Postal
Service had informed KCS it would end RPO and storage mail contracts, taking away more than
$800,000 in revenue and some $650,000 in profits that had sustained the trains” (Frailey 18).
Clearly, even with a loyal clientele, the reason the passenger trains on KCS (and on nearly every
other railroad at the time) was the profits provided by RPO and storage mail contracts. Without a
reason to justify the expenses of the passenger trains, many railroads killed them off as a cost-
saving measure. In the case of Union Pacific, it managed to maintain its passenger network by
combining all its trains at key locations and setting off cars for other routes, the managed to
focus their network while growing their train, nicknamed the “City of Everywhere”, to a
gargantuan length of 55 cars (Frailey 23). So other ways to keep the passenger trains running and
ensuring they made some money still existed. Such concepts seem foreign these days, and that is
partly due to the existence of Amtrak and its heavily simplified network.
Now, let us fit Amtrak into this formula. While it began operations on May 1, 1971, the
idea of Amtrak (or some sort of government involvement in the operations of passenger trains)
went back nearly a decade. “On May 20, 1962, Sen. Claiborne Pell (Dem. Rhode Island) gave a
speech that now, almost 50 years later, is remembered as the first effective call to arms for a
revolution in passenger rail” (Phillips 23). Clearly, Senator Pell had enough foresight to
recognize the importance that passenger rail would have in the national transportation network.
Anyone who drives knows that at peak times, stretches of highway in urban areas are essentially
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paralyzed because of lacking capacity. There have also been realizations that some Amtrak
services don’t offer enough capacity for the growing ridership. Take the Capital Limited for
example; with through coaches and sleepers (through in this case means cars that are removed
from one train at certain predetermined points and connected to other trains, which means
passengers wouldn’t have to switch trains) connecting with the Pennsylvanian, Amtrak estimates
that it could attract a further 20,000 new riders to the Capital Limited (Johnston 8). While that
kind of ridership increase in the course of a year is seemingly small, that is 20,000 more riders
who support Amtrak by using its passenger services. Considering Congress doesn’t look to make
up its mind anytime soon regarding Amtrak, those new riders would be a needed asset.
“Amtrak deserves credit for keeping passenger trains around long enough for a renewed
debate on their existence” (Craghead 4). Surviving against sometimes formidable government
pressure is no accomplishment to be taken lightly. But within that opposition lays a question
about reliability. Reliability encompasses a one simple factor; on-time performance. So, how
does Amtrak stack up in the on-time performance categories? Let’s look at some of Amtrak’s
best and worst preformers;
Route On-time percentage
Capitol Corridor 93.2%
Missouri River Runner 91.1%
San Joauquin 90.7%
Pennsylvanian 90.1%
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Coast Starlight 89.9%
Hiawatha Service 89.5%
Sunset Limited 87.8%
(Johnston 18)
These trains range from corridors (smaller intercity routes, like Boston-Portland, ME) to
long distance services (overnight trains like the Sunset Limited and Coast Starlight). While we
may wish that all of Amtrak’s routes operated with this kind of efficiency, we must remember
that these trains use infrastructure owned by private concerns, so freight traffic can prove a
difficult obstacle in maintaining on-time performance.
Route On-time percentage
Carolinian 48.9%
Cardinal 51.4%
California Zephyr 52.6%
Michigan Trains (all Michigan services) 61.2%
Palmetto 64.3%
Capital Limited 68.4%
Texas Eagle 69.7%
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(Johnston 18)
Even though these are Amtrak’s worst performers, none of the routes served fall below
45% on-time performance. But what is the determining factor of Amtrak’s on-time performance?
The formula is simple; Trains traveling fewer than 250 miles have a 10 minute window on the
scheduled time, trains traveling between 251-350 miles have 15 minutes, trains traveling 351-
450 miles have 20 minutes, trains traveling between 451-550 miles have 50 minutes, and trains
traveling more than 551 miles have a 30 minute cushion (Johnston 19). To better compare these
statistics, there is a bar graph on page 13 of this paper that illustrates the percentages illustrated
in the two tables, along with a key designating which number on the lower half of the chart
represents a given train.
So, generally Amtrak has a mixed bag of routes with different performances. But on-time
performance isn’t just a result of scheduling issues and congested railways. One needs to account
the equipment that is being used. Riders have and will be drawn to rail by the amenities it offers
(Solomon 7). So the coaches that they ride in can be looked at as the main face of those
amenities, and then to draw even more ridership, the product must be of good quality (Solomon
36). Therein lays the greatest reason for service improvements, increased dependability (Nice
21). As a result, Amtrak has in recent years placed orders for new sleeping cars, coaches, dining
cars and baggage cars so service can be expanded on some routes to a daily offering, but that
won’t be a possibility until 2012, when those new cars are delivered (Johnston 8). That improved
service can be used to increase timings for many of the trains in Amtrak’s eastern region of
operations. Better timings and service quality translates into ridership increase and consistent
patronage which further develops into more income that is vastly needed by Amtrak. However,
trains that are oft on-time are doomed to be trapped in a cycle of decline, as delay is murderous
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to public support (Frailey 13). Some believe this is a sign of the worst; “Amtrak’s on-time
performance has never been, nor will it ever be, at the point where passengers can expect
European-like dependability” (Vranich 8). In some cases this may hold true, but I go back to the
fact that, for the most part, Amtrak runs its individual routes between 45% and 95% at schedule.
One must also note that only one of Amtrak’s trains, the Carolinian, runs on-time less than 50%
of the time. That can be considered both a problem and an accomplishment; trains not running to
schedule tend to perform below expectations, while managing an on-time rating of 48.9% is no
easy feat, and improvement to the timings should be much easier considering how close the
Carolinian runs to the upper half of the rating scale.
Over the years, Amtrak’s finances have varied over such a wide spectrum that one must
note what the changing climate entails. By 1995, Amtrak’s funding had varied from anywhere
between $1 Billion to $20 Million in 1986 during the Regan Administration (Nice 27).
Essentially, Amtrak has been the kickball of Congress. The politics of begging for money each
year, facing the consequent backlash when members of both the House and Senate try to initiate
sever cuts to Amtrak’s operating subsidies. This hasn’t really been an effective strategy since the
Reagan years for the following rationale – “One political force that might affect the distribution
of service is interparty competition. In a competitive political environment, votes are valuable.
Consequently, members of Congress may feel greater pressure to support programs that may
earn the gratitude of voters” (Nice 34). One can only surmise that if Amtrak is important to the
voters, then if a candidate wants to gain (or maintain) his/her public office, it would be best to
follow the will of his constituents and support such popular programs, which could include
anything from Social Security, FEMA, and most importantly, Amtrak.
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State support should also be touched on, considering some of the great successes
experienced by those partnerships. “When the Amtrak system was created, the states were given
an additional opportunity to participate in transportation policymaking. The law creating Amtrak
provided that states could obtain additional passenger rail service if officials in those states were
willing to help pay the costs of the additional service” (Nice 47). Those state subsidies are
known to vary widely, depending on if the state is willing to support a higher degree of service.
“In 1985, for example, the largest state subsidy was less than $4 Million; in 1996, three states
spent less than $200,000 on their subsidy programs. In an era of multibillion dollar state budgets,
even less affluent states may be able to afford modest subsidies of rail passenger service” (Nice
48). But the state demographics are also known to play a role as well. “Rural States tend to be
more oriented towards highway building and to spend more on road and highway programs. As a
result, fewer dollars are likely to remain for nonhighway transportation programs” (Nice 49). So,
then if rural states spend less on Amtrak subsidies, then more developed states must spend more
on their subsidy for Amtrak, right? Case in point – Amtrak California. Funded in part by the
State of California, Amtrak California is more than just a brand name; the equipment is all
owned by the state, and staffed by Amtrak employees (Lawrence 33). The service has been
incredibly successful, as between February 2010 and January 2011, the Capitol Corridor (one of
three routes operated by Amtrak California) saw 1.62 Million riders, with 130,860 using the
service in January alone (Lawrence 33). Then there is the Pacific Surfliner, yet another service
(but having a completely separate image); in 2010 it saw 2.6 Million riders, giving it the second
largest ridership rate for any Amtrak route (Lawrence 34).
The kind of ridership the Pacific Surfliner sees is indicative of Amtrak’s cemented status
in the national transportation agenda. The same statute is proven through some of Amtrak’s
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largest passenger facilities, most prudently shown through the 30th Street Station in Philadelphia.
30th Street Station was originally built in the 1920s for the Pennsylvania Railroad, and took 5
years and cost $60 Million to build (Keefe 47). There are three companies that call at 30th Street;
Amtrak, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (or SEPTA) and NJ Transit
(Keefe 50). The original designers even took into account the commuter traffic, and to make sure
that the long distance trains weren’t impeded two levels were constructed for the different trains;
the lower serving long distance trains that called in Philadelphia and the upper level serving the
many commuter trains that operated out of 30th Street (Keefe 47). That foresightedness has
proven most valuable, as 580 trains call at 30th Street serving (on average) 20,000 each day
(Keefe 46). If one was to do the math that would be 7.3 Million passengers and 211,700 trains
each year. If that many people are accessing Amtrak service through one location each year, then
clearly the demand for Amtrak and passenger rail in general is large enough to justify the
primary mission behind Amtrak’s creation; preventing decline in the passenger rail sector and
grow ridership. In accordance with those increases, Amtrak increases train miles by adding more
service to existing services on a given route or forming new services entirely on completely
different routes (Nice 73).
Now the paper comes back to the question; Amtrak’s formation necessary to prevent
the decline in passenger rail and increase ridership on a national level. Amtrak was only
meant to last for 20 years, and looking now it becomes clear that Amtrak has lasted twice as long
as intended at its formation (Katz 6). Existing for 40 years instead of the originally expected 20
indicates that Amtrak managed to develop a loyal following in Congress and develop a repertoire
with the American people. The verdict of many Americans is clear; we needed, and still need
Amtrak to preserve and develop passenger rail in the United States. Has Amtrak’s job been easy?
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Not at all! Supporters like Senator Pell had to fight for Amtrak’s creation. Those in the public
who wanted to save the passenger train said so when they participated in the largest mass mailing
to Congressional representatives in US history (Phillips 28). Even attempts to kill Amtrak before
it could start operations on May 1, 1971 failed when a flurry of bills and legislation was
introduced and failed to pass through either house (Phillips 31). Even today Amtrak has people
like Brian Solomon who speak up and educate the public on the importance of passenger rail.
The faith that Solomon has in Amtrak, and all forms of rail transport, is fueled by the history his
family has with passenger trains (Solomon 7). The regular funding crisis hasn’t stopped Amtrak;
shortly after beginning operation Amtrak needed an increased government subsidy, and this
served to prove that Amtrak was underfunded from the start (Solomon 40). “Its periodic funding
crisis’s are like professional wrestling – they are predictable fights with predictable results, but
spectators find it interesting anyway” (Solomon 43). To visualize how successful Amtrak has
been in attracting riders, one only needs to walk to a station served by it to see anywhere
between one person to a small mob. If those souls were drawn to Amtrak because of things like
the amenities, lower costs or even the novelty of traveling by train, Amtrak has clearly succeeded
and proven its existence necessary to the American people.
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Key to Amtrak Route Percentages:
1- Capitol Corridor
2- Missouri River Runner
3- San Joaquin
4- Pennsylvanian
5- Coast Starlight
6- Hiawatha Service
7- Sunset Limited
8- Carolinian
9- Cardinal
10- California Zephyr
11- Michigan Trans (all Michigan services)
12- Palmetto
13- Capitol Limited
14- Texas Eagle
(Johnston 8).
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
On Time Preformance, measured on a scale of 0 to 100 Percent
Amtrak Route Preformance
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Works Cited
Barringer IV, John W. “Disbanding the Tribe” Classic Trains
Summer 2011 60-63.
Craghead, Alexander “Amtrak: Against All Odds” Railfan and Railroad Magazine
May 2011 4.
Frailey, Fred W. “Twilight of the Great Trains”
Waukesha: Kalmbach Publishing Company, 1998
Goldberg, Bruce “Growing up with Amtrak” Classic Trains
Summer 2011 50-59
Ingles, J. David “Ride ‘em while you can” Classic Trains
Summer 2011 32-43.
Johnston, Bob “Amtrak’s New On-Time Report Card” Trains Magazine
March 2011 18-19.
Johnston, Bob “Amtrak’s Improvement Wish List” Trains Magazine
January 2011 20-21.
Katz, Curtis L. “Amtrak turns 40” Railfan and Railroad Magazine
May 2011 6.
Keefe, Kevin P. “America’s Finest Railroad Station” Trains Magazine
March 2011 45-53.
Lawrence, Elrond “Amtrak California” Railfan and Railroad magazine
May 2011 33-35.
McCommons, James “Waiting on a Train” The Embattled Future of Passenger Rail Service
White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2009
Nice, David C. “Amtrak” The History and Politics of a National Railroad
Boulder: Lynne River Publishers Inc, 1998
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Phillips, Don “Will someone get serious about passenger rail?” Trains Magazine
September 2011 11.
Phillips, Don “The Road to Rescue” Classic Trains
Summer 2011 23-31
Porterfield, James D. “Happy 40th, My Friend” Railfan and Railroad Magazine
May 2011 7-8.
Schafer, Mike and Joe Welsh “Streamliners” History of a Railroad Icon
St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company, 2002
Solomon, Brian “Amtrak” MBI Railroad Color History
St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company, 2004
Solomon, Brian “The Northeast Corridor” Railfan and Railroad Magazine
May 2011 36-41.
Vernon, Wes “Amtrak – Volpe’s Warning to Reistrup” Railfan and Railroad Magazine
May 2011 16-18.
Vranich, Joeseph “Derailed” What went wrong and what to do about America’s Passenger Trains
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997
Wilner, Frank N. “The Amtrak Story”
Omaha: Simmons-Boardman Books Inc, 1994