an assessment of ballistic missile production capacity in

International Strategic and Security Studies Programme

Bangalore, India

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES

September 2007R2 - 07

NIAS Study - 2007

An Assessment of BallisticMissile Production

Capacity in Pakistan

Rajaram Nagappa

An Assessment ofBallistic Missile Production

Capacity in Pakistan

NIAS Study - 2007

Rajaram Nagappa


NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIESBangalore, India

© National Institute of Advanced Studies 2007

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National Institute of Advanced StudiesIndian Institute of Science CampusBangalore - 560 012

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Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Dr. K. Kasturirangan, Director, NIAS for his

support and encouragement for taking up this study. The author is indebted to Prof.

S. Chandrashekar, JRD Tata Visiting Professor, NIAS, Shri Arvind Kumar, Associate Fellow,

NIAS, Prof. M.C. Uttam, University of Pune and Dr. Subhananda Rao, Director, HEMRL,

Pune for reviewing the report and offering useful suggestions and comments.

Rajaram Nagappa

List of Abbreviations

AP Ammonium Perchlorate

Al Aluminum

ASFC Army Strategic Forces Command

CEP Circular Error Probable

CP Carbon Phenolic

EPDM Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer

FLSC Flexible Linear Shaped Cord

FRP Fibre Reinforced Plastic

HTPB Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Butadiene

IGMDP Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme

INCOSPAR Indian National Committee for Space Research

IRNA Islamic Republic News Agency

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NDC National Defence Complex

NDE Non Destructive Evaluation

NTI Nuclear Threat Initiative

PVC Poly Vinyl Chloride

R&D Research and Development

SP Silica Phenolic

SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission

1

Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan


Complex plant located at Fatehjang. It is estimatedthat the maximum number of propulsion units ofGhaznavi, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 adds to atotal of 12 units annually and the current productionis lower than this number. The immediateproduction emphasis will be towards a) preparationof further numbers of Shaheen 1 for handing overto the Army Strategic Force Command by 2008;and b) completion of further flight tests of Shaheen2. It is estimated that four to five years of fullcapacity production effort is required for matchingthe missile numbers to the missile borne nuclearwarheads.

Introduction

Pakistan has developed and launched ballisticmissiles with different ranges coming under theHatf 1 to Hatf 6 nomenclature. The missiles havealternate designations like Abdali, Ghaznavi,Ghauri and Shaheen. All the missiles withthe exception of Ghauri employ solid rocketpropulsion. Beginning with the launch of Hatf 1 inFeb 1989, launch of these missiles has beenreported by the Pakistani and the InternationalPress at periodic intervals. Since the year 2002,there is an increase in the launch frequencyand range of the missiles. This would indicatethat Pakistan’s capability to produce solidpropellant missile has made substantialprogress and is not to be under-estimated.An attempt is made in this paper to assessPakistan’s solid propellant missile productioncapacity.

Summary

Pakistan has an active ballistic missile programmecomprising four missiles based on solid propellantand one missile based on liquid propellant.Frequent reports are seen in the media regardingthe missile flights along with statements pertainingto completion of troop exercises and handing overto the Army Strategic Force Command. In thisreport an attempt is made to assess the solidpropellant based production capacity and gaugethe number of missiles that may be produced andthat may be in stock in Pakistan.

It is well known that the Pakistan missile efforthas drawn extensively upon French and Chineseinputs pertaining to technology, equipment andmaterials. At the same time Pakistan appears tohave developed capability to indigenously designand realise solid propulsion systems for use inballistic missiles. Using this and other inputs, anassessment of material requirements is made forthe principal subsystems. Process cycle for thepropellant and nozzle realisation and the processtime are estimated to arrive at the possiblethroughput in missile propulsion systems. Thesenumbers are compared with the actual reportedflight numbers of the missiles to arrive at thepossible numbers produced, the number in stockand the deployment status.

It is argued that the Abdali is made in the Spaceand Upper Atmosphere Research Commission(SUPARCO) propellant plant while the othermissiles are made in the National Defence

2


Dauphin1—and was limited in range andperformance. For Pakistan to narrow or annulthe technology gap in a short period of time,indigenous development was not the answer. Theanswer lay in leap-frogging through technologyacquisition to aid the indigenous capability andthis is what Pakistan set about doing.

By the early eighties, the Chinese had decided tochange over to solid propellant systems for theirmissile programme.2 By this time their avionics,control and guidance systems had also attaineda level of maturity. Adapting them to the solidpropulsion systems was fairly straightforward. TheDF 15 / M 9 and the DF 11 / M 11 are the betterknown of the shorter range solid propulsionmissiles developed by the Chinese for bothdomestic use and the export market. The M 9development started in 1984 and the missile wasdeployed in 1988. The M 11 development startedin 1985 with operational deployment of the missilein 1988. This period matches fairly well withPakistan’s attempt towards missile parity withIndia. The chronology of missile developmentin Pakistan and its comparison with the rocket /missile technology status in India is listed intable 1.

1 See S. Chandrashekar “An Assessment of Pakistan’s missile capability”, Missile Monitor, Number 3, 1993 For an update seeS Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar and Rajaram Nagappa, “An Assessment of Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Programme: Technical andStrategic Capability” NIAS Report R5-06, Oct 2006, (Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies).

2 For a detailed documentation of this effort see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of ForceModernisation in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

Background

The development of solid rockets in India andPakistan started about the same time in the early1960’s. Both the countries obtained soundingrocket technology from Sud-Aviation of France andset up manufacturing facilities. Both programmeswere set up by civilian organisations—the IndianNational Committee for Space Research(INCOSPAR) in India and SUPARCO in Pakistan.The similarity perhaps ends there. India went onto build a strong civil space programme improvingon the solid rocket technologies and developingother launch vehicle technologies. Missiledevelopment in India started later as a totallyseparate programme and evolved on its own.

The rocket technology attempts in Pakistan on theother hand, after an initial spell of sounding rocketlaunch activity, went into a period of lull. Perhapsthe Indian Guided Missile DevelopmentProgramme (IGMDP) initiative in 1983 stirred upthe missile development activity in Pakistan asevident from the launch of Hatf 1, which more orless coincided with the initial launches of India’sPrithvi and Agni missiles. The Hatf 1 was derivedfrom the French sounding rockets—Dragon and

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It appears that the Pakistan’s Ghaznavi missile isderived from China’s M 11 and there aresimilarities in the missile configurations. Theanalysis of the missile image confirms the

1980's Major strides in civillaunch vehicleprogrammeIGMDP is launched in July1983.Agni 1 is flight tested in1989

Establishment of solidpropellant plant inSUPARCO

HATF 1 is test fired in thelate 1980's

China completes the development ofM 9 and M 11 missiles.Pakistan signs an agreement withChina for the procurement of 34-80 M11 missile systems and a smallernumber of M 9 missile systems3.

1990's Operationalisation of Agni1 and development ofvariants.

Spurt in the missiledevelopment activity.Family of Missileswith different rangesdeveloped. There is anincrease in the launchfrequency

US intelligence detects missilemanufacturing facility at Fatehjang4.The facility is reported to be built by theChinese in 1997 or 1998.

2000's Flight tests of IGMDPmissiles

22 missile launchesbetween 2002 & 2006

similarities but shows that the Ghaznavi is shorterthan M 11 in length5. The findings of the analysisare summarised in Table 2.

1970's Technology indigenisationin the Civil Spaceprogramme

No significant event Lull in SUPARCO activities from 1973

3 State Department Posting Text, n. 230, July 2, 1991 (STATE DEPARTMENT ON CHINA: M-11 MISSILE), available at the website:http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/910702-188884.htm

4 The details on this manufacturing facility can be seen on the website: http://www.nti.irg/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/3294_3327.html The facility is stated to be a copy of the M 11 plant in China’s Hubei province and is located at Fatehjang a suburbof Rawalpindi

5 n.1 , S. Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar, Rajaram Nagappa, pp. 12-13

Table 1: Pakistani Missile Development Chronology

Year Indian Event Pakistani event Remarks

1960's Launching of SoundingRocketsSounding RocketProduction under licencefrom Sud Aviation, France

Launching of SoundingRocketsSounding RocketProduction under licencefrom Sud Aviation, France

SUPARCO launched over 70 soundingrockets such as Judi-Dart, Nike family,Centaure, Dragon and Petrel.Production and assembly facilitieswould have formed part of the licenceagreement.

4


Another assessment6 shows the length anddiameter of M 11 to be 9.09 m and 1.01 mrespectively. Most sources however indicate thediameter to be 0.88 m. The estimated range ofthis missile is 280 to 350 km with 800 kg / 500 kgpayload. This violates the Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR) export restrictions andconsequently, it is possible that the Chinese mayhave sold a shorter MTCR compliant version ofthe M11 to Pakistan. The image analysis carriedout by Chandrashekar et al confirms the similaritybetween the shorter version of the M 11 warhead

(3.80 to 4 m long) and the one used on theGhaznavi. The analysis also confirms that therocket motor is shorter than the M 11 rocket motor.However its estimated range with a 1000 kg and700 kg payload is 269 km and 347 km respectively.This would suggest that this export did violateMTCR regulations.

Similar co-relationship between the Chinese M 9 andthe Shaheen 1 missile are seen. Table 3 providesdetails of the measurements made by Chandrashekaret al on the Shaheen 1 and the M 9 missiles.

6 Mark Wade, “Encyclopedia Astronautica” available at the website: www.astronautix.com/lvs/shkval.htm

Table 2: M 11 Ghaznavi Missile Characteristics

Missile Length, m Diameter, mWarhead Motor Total

M 11 N.A N.A 11.34 0.893.81 m 5.76 m 9.57 m4.09 m 6.54 m 10.65 m4.80 m 6.17 m 10.97 m

Ghaznavi 3.76 m 5.05 m 8.81 m 0.914.01 m 4.90 m 8.91 m4.31 m 5.17 m 9.48 m4.11 m 4.80 m 8.90 m

Table 3: Shaheen-1/M 9 Missile Characteristics

Image Warhead (m) Motor+nozzle (m) Length (m)Image 1 (Shaheen 1) N.A N.A 9.62 mImage 2 (Shaheen 1) 3.71 m 6.18 m 9.89 mImage 3 (Shaheen 1) 3.56 m 6.36 m 9.92 mImage 4 (Shaheen 1) 3.28 m 6.40 m 9.69 mImage 5 (Shaheen 1) 4.27 m 7.15 m 11.43 mImage 6 (Shaheen 1) 4.81 m 7.88 m 12.69 mImage 7 (Shaheen 1) 4.45 m 7.18 m 11.64 mImage 8 (Shaheen 1) 4.83 m 8 m 12.83 mImage 23 (Shaheen 1) 4.75 m 7.45 m 12.20 mImage 9 (M 9) 4.41 m 4.45 m 8.86 mImage 10 (M 9) 4.08 m 4.81 m 8.89 mImage 11 (M 9) 5.08 m 4.62 m 9.70 mImage 12 (M 9) 3.53 m 4.87 m 8.40 mImage 13 (M 9) 4.29 m 4.54 m 8.84 m

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The diameter of the Shaheen-1 and the M 9 canbe independently verified to be 1 metre. In thecase of the Shaheen 1 missile the rocket motorlengths are longer than the rocket motor lengthsof the M 9. They also exhibit a trend of progressiveincrease in lengths showing that Pakistan mayhave internalised the technology they haveobtained from the Chinese and could now dothings on their own. The internalisation effort hasled to the two stage adaptation for Shaheen 2.The dimensional similarities and the fact that in ashort span of five to six years Pakistan coulddevelop, test and operationalise these missilesdefinitely points to significant technology inputsfrom China.

A complete missile system comprises thewarhead, navigation, guidance and control systemto steer the missile, onboard computer andavionics, instrumentation and telemetry system,auxiliary systems and the propulsion system. Ourconcentration in this paper will be on the propulsionsystem, which is normally referred to as the missilemotor. It is assumed that in all probability Pakistandepends on imports from China for the navigationsystems and related electronics. It is also assumedthat Pakistan has adequate design andmanufacturing capability with reference to theother missile systems.

Fig. 1: Schematic of a Solid Fuelled Missile

Propellant

Nozzle

Igniter

Motor Case

Description of the Missile Motor

The solid fuelled missile propulsor, normallyreferred to as a motor, is a system with no movingparts. The main component is the propellantgrain, which is either cast in a mould and thenassembled into the motor case or directlycast into the insulated motor case. The mainingredients of such a propellant are an oxidiserlike Ammonium Perchlorate (AP), elastomerslike Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC) or HydroxylTerminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB), for fueland a metal fuel like Aluminum (Al) powder.Small quantities of other chemical additiveslike curators, catalysts and plasticisersmake up the complete composition.

The motor case is made of alloy steel or FibreReinforced Plastic (FRP). The propellant is ignitedby a charge containing hot gas / particles.The combustion gases are accelerated througha nozzle which converts the pressure generatedby combustion into kinetic energy. For steeringthe rocket, thrust vector control deviceslike deflection of aerodynamic surfaces, jetvanes, flexible nozzle bearing systems andfluid injection in the nozzle are employed. Asstated earlier, Pakistan has benefitted fromFrench and Chinese technology inputs in its

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Thrust Vector Control None Jet vane and secondary injection system.Probably flexible bearing system.

Manufacturing Equipments and machinery forhardware fabrication, heat treatment,pressure testing, propellantprocessing and non- destructiveevaluation, grain charging, assemblyfixtures.

Equipments and machinery for hardwarefabrication, heat treatment, pressuretesting, propellant processing and nondestructive evaluation, assembly fixtures.

Testing Ground test stands andinstrumentation.

Single and 6 component test stands andinstrumentation.

Separation System Explosive cord stage separationsystem.

Flexible Linear Shaped Charge (FLSC)separation system.

Table 4: Inputs derived from French and Chinese Transfer of Technology

Motor Component French input Chinese input

Motor Case 15CdV6 steel composition,fabrication and testing.

CrMnSiA steels with different percentageof alloying elements, fabrication andtesting.

Insulation PVC tubing Nitrile and EPDM rubber

Propellant Free standing AP/PVC Plastisolpropellant grains.

Case bonded AP/Al/HTPB grains(China has expertise in other solidpropellant compositions too).

Propellant Processing Raw material preparation, sigmamixers, vacuum mixing, cast/cure,machining and non destructiveevaluation (NDE) techniques.

Raw material preparation, vertical mixers,vacuum casting, curing, machiningand non destructive evaluation (NDE)techniques.

Nozzle Liner Moulded asbestos phenolic and silicaphenolic liners and paints, graphitethroat insert.

Silica and carbon phenolic liners, tapewinding process, graphite throat insert.

Igniter Hot gas and particulate pyrotechnicignition system.

Pyrogen ignition system.

1. Missile Case Hardware

It can be safely assumed that the motor casingfor all the Pakistani missiles is made of low alloysteel. As indicated in the table above, technologyinputs for 15CdV6 steel with yield strength of 800MPa would have come as part of the soundingrocket technology transfer. Also this material is

Assessment of Pakistani Capabilities

Among the elements of the missile motordescribed in the previous section, the hardware,the propellant and the nozzle systems are thecomplex ones, requiring special facilities andmanufacturing/processing techniques. These aredescribed below:

missile development effort. Table 4 summarisesthe technology inputs Pakistan would have derived

from the French and the Chinese rocket/missiletechnology transfers.

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freely available in sheet and forging form from anumber of steel makers in Europe. The fabricationprocess also follows conventional rolling, welding,heat treatment and machining process and canbe manufactured with the appropriate tooling.The Chinese have developed high strengthlow alloy steels for their missile and space motorapplications. Published information indicates thatfor the JL 1 they have developed a weldable qualitysteel. For space motor applications, they havedeveloped 45CrNiMoV steel, which has yieldstrength of 1470 MPa and is equivalent to D6ACsteel used in many US rocket motors. The Chinesehave developed various steel alloys with carboncontent varying from 0.25 to 0.45%. The exact typeof steel, the Chinese have used in their M9/M11programmes is not explicitly spelt out. One cansurmise that this will also be a low alloy steelof the type developed for the JL 1. The steelcomposition and fabrication process including thetooling would form part of the M 11 technologytransfer package. The People’s Steel Mills Ltd7

located near Karachi produces alloy and specialsteels. AISI 4340 produced by the Mill is ofaerospace grade and can be used for missilemotor case fabrication. The steel can be rolledinto sheets and can be forged. It is also amenablefor welding and can be heat treated to obtainstrength in the range of 1055 MPa. The Mill canproduce sheets of 3 mm or higher thickness andhammer forged components upto 2000 kg weight.Consequently, the missile case choice will be15CdV6 for the earlier missile like Abdali and AISI4340 for the later missiles like Ghaznavi, Shaheen1 and Shaheen 2. This will pose no specialproblems for the fabrication of 1 m diameter motorcases.

2. Propellant System

This is the heart of the missile motor and providesthe power for the launch and acceleration of themissile. The propellant system constitutes themajor weight of the missile powerplant andaccounts for 80-90% of the missile initial mass.Its preparation involves mixing the ingredients intoa thick slurry, casting the slurry into the insulatedmotor case, curing it in an oven and doing thefinishing operations. The process as describedhere appears quite simple, but in actuality, is quiteinvolved and a sequence of steps with due regardto quality and safety have to be taken to obtain anacceptable product.

Mention was made in Table 4 that Pakistan wouldhave obtained the technology of PVC plastisolpropellants from France. This is a low energysystem using ammonium perchlorate as oxidiserand PVC as fuel, with typical specific impulse8 inthe region of 2050 N-s/kg. The main advantage ofthe system is that the propellant is free standingand its production is independent of the availabilityof the motor hardware. Therefore the propellantgrains can be separately produced, stored andcharged into the hardware as required. Fromhandling and grain sagging considerations, themaximum size of the grain is limited to 700-1000kg. The Hatf 1, from the similarity of the finconfiguration to the French Sounding Rocketsappears to be a direct adaptation and would haveused the PVC based propellant. Pakistan hashowever, improved the performance of thesubsequent variants of this missile—the Hatf 1A/Abdali and in the process made improvements inthe propellant energetics by addition of aluminum

7 See more information on Peoples Steel Mills Ltd—Typical Grades at http://www.psmltd.com/flow.htm8 Specific impulse is defined as the thrust produced per unit mass flow of propellant and is a figure of merit for a propellant system.

8


or change of composition. They may havereplaced the free standing feature of the propellantby directly casting into the case. The productionrelated advantages of a free standing grain systemhave already been touched upon and it is thereforelikely that the free standing grain feature is stillretained.

For the larger missiles like the Ghaznavi, Shaheen1 and 2, the propellant is cast directly into thechamber using what is called the case-bondingtechnique. The ingredients of this propellant willbe ammonium perchlorate, HTPB as fuel binderand aluminum powder. Such systems can providea specific impulse in the region 2450 N-s/kg. Thebasic technology would have come to Pakistanas part of the M 11 technology transfer deal andPakistan would have extrapolated and innovatedon the technology for its larger missiles. The authorhas not been able to obtain authenticated detailsof Pakistani propellant material productioncapabilities. It is stated in the NTI’s Pakistan profileoverview9, that a propellant plant was establishedin Pakistan with Chinese help in 1997-98. As perthe overview, the Solid Propellant and ChemicalsPlant for Missiles owned by the National DefenceComplex (NDC) manufactures aluminum powder,ammonium perchlorate oxidiser, HTPB binder,curing agents and other ablative materials. In theabsence of any other corroborating evidence, theNTI statement is used as the basis for gaugingthe Pakistani production capabilities.

Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) is a major constituentin solid propellant compositions. There are reports

9 On Pakistan see the website: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/3294_3327.html10 Missile Chronology Pakistan 1947-2002. Source: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/11 DX Zhang & DY Ye “Evolution of Solid Rocket Propulsion Technology for Space Missions in China“ , The Fourth Academy of China

Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.

of ammonium perchlorate imports by Pakistanprior to 1997-98 as evidenced by impoundedshipments of AP10 by Taiwan on 12 March 1996,by Hong Kong on 29 April, 1996 and again by HongKong on 13 December 1996. The impoundedquantities were respectively 15 tons, 15 tons and10 tons. From this it would appear that the APproduction in Pakistan prior to 1996 was eithernon-existent or inadequate for the programme.With the commissioning of the NDC plant in1997-98, this shortfall could have been overcome.This could explain the absence of reportspertaining to import/impounding of AmmoniumPerchlorate beyond 1996. Alternately, importscould have continued (Hong Kong reverted toChina in 1997) through the land route from China.The other major and minor constituents are eithermanufactured in the NDC facility or procured fromthe market. The processing equipments howevermust have all come from China11.

3. Nozzle and control systems

The nozzle is made of high temperature resistantmaterials as the hot combustion gases areaccelerated through it. The critical elements hereare high temperature erosion resistant materialsand their fabrication. The materials are termed asablative materials and are essentially carbon orsilica fabric reinforced plastics. Phenolic resin isthe matrix system. Graphite is generally used asthe nozzle throat material. As part of the M 11technology transfer, the Chinese may havesupplied the processing equipments but not thetechnology for producing the raw materials.

9


This guess is made on the premise that thetechnology for the ablative reinforcements likecarbon and silica is quite different as opposed tothe propellant chemicals. Also the quantitydemand is not very high and it is not difficult toprocure these materials from China or throughtraders. The technology of making large sizedgraphite blocks indigenously is also difficult andthis requirement is also likely to be met throughimport.

For missile steering purposes, besides using theaerodynamic control surfaces, the Chinese haveadopted rotating nozzles and secondary injectionin their missiles of 1960/70 vintage (JL-1 forexample)12. In the later space motors, they haveused flexible bearing nozzles13. Rotating nozzleis useful only for multiple nozzle systems. As allthe Pakistan missiles have a single nozzle, themissile steering will be based on secondaryinjection, reaction control systems andaerodynamic surfaces.

It may not be difficult for Pakistan to procure allthe materials required for making nozzles andcontrol systems. The Chinese trading company

<Alibaba.com> founded in 1999 lists many of thematerials required for missile propellant and nozzlemaking.

Production Cycle

The production of the missile is governed by themajor subsystem process time. In the missilesubsystems listed in the previous section, themotor case will in all probability be supplied by afabrication industry. Steel fabricators will have thesetup for tooling, machining, welding, heattreatment, inspection and pressure testing. Therequirement of sheets and forgings can even beprocured from abroad to supplement theindigenous production. The processing ofpropellants and nozzles on the other hand will bemostly done inhouse.

The process steps and production cyclefor case bonded propellant systems is shownin figure 2. The process durations are for aShaheen class of motor. The estimated timerequirement for each step is also indicated inthe figure.

12 n.213 n.11

10


Fig 2: Propellant Process Flow Chart

The process duration, assuming the input rawmaterials and motor case hardware is available isestimated to be 22 days. Critical facilities like themixing station and cast / cure station are duplicatedfor increasing the throughput and for maintainingproduction in case of breakdown or mishap in oneof the stations. The longest occupancy is of 9 daysin the cure station which will govern the totalproduction throughput. 25 units (Ghaznavi andShaheen 1 will account for one unit each while

Shaheen 2 will account for 2 units—one unit foreach stage motor) could be produced in a year of250 working days based on this estimate. Thisassumes that the essential inputs like hardwareand raw material flow are maintained to sustainthis rate of production and that there is noqueueing in some critical facilities like non-destructive evaluation. Real life conditions are farfrom ideal and there are bound to be disruptions,equipment breakdowns, material shortfalls and

2 days

InputMaterials

2 days

PremixPreparation

1 day

CurativeAddition &Final Mixing

Mixing Station

HardwareReceipt

Hardware Insulation andLining

7 days

Inert Hardware Preparation

AssemblyGround / Flight

Test

Storage in Magazine

CastingStation(1 day)

CuringStation

(9 days)

DecoringStation

(4 days)

NDE(3 days)

11


technical glitches, which will have an impact onproduction. The actual annual production can beexpected to be lower than this number.

Figure 3 depicts the missile nozzle, which is madeup of two parts—the convergent section and acone or bell shaped divergent section. The twosections are processed separately and thenassembled together. As explained earlier thermalresistant materials like carbon phenolic (CP) andsilica phenolic (SP) are used for thermalprotection. Graphite is used for the throat section.Each of these is processed separately, machinedand then bonded to the hardware. A finalmachining of the assembly results in the requiredcontour. The process is quite involved asdimensional matching between mating parts isinvolved and the liners have to be cleared throughinspection and non-destructive evaluation atseveral points during the production process.

Figure 4 details the steps involved in the realisationof nozzle liners along with the approximate

process times. Practically all the steps are insequence and therefore the operations are serial.It should be noted that the process time indicatedis for either the convergent or the divergentsection. To realise one complete nozzle assembly,the total process time gets doubled. The processtime indicated is representative for the nozzle ofa Shaheen class of missile.

The cycle time for a sub-assembly is of the orderof 33 days and on a continuous basis a theoreticalfrequency of one sub assembly every 10 dayscould be maintained. On this basis, in a 250working day year 25 nozzle convergent ordivergent sub-assemblies, i.e. 12 full nozzleassemblies can be realised. As in the case of thepropellant system, this will assume timelyavailability of inputs like raw materials, structuralhardware, mating control system components (likesecondary injection thrust vector system) and noqueuing in any work station.

Fig 3: Missile Nozzle

Structuralbackup

CP Liner

GraphiteThroat

CP Liner

Divergent SectionConvergent Section

12


Throughput can be increased by having more workstations, but cost, quantity requirements of inputmaterials, process tooling, space and operationalrequirements pose constraints. The thermalprotection system for the re-entry vehicle requiresthe same materials and processes. It is quitepossible, the two requirements are made in thesame facility or co-located facility, sharing someof the process and inspection equipments. Thisfacility could also be under the control of thePakistan Atomic Energy Commission as part ofthe warhead preparation unit.

Though the propellant processing numbers couldbe higher, it is appropriate to peg the productionto match the nozzle production numbers. It wouldtherefore appear that 12 motor assembliesper year will suffice to match with the 12 nozzle

assemblies. This number also seems morerealistic, keeping in mind the inventories, hardwareflow, process tool sets, accessories, plant upkeep,maintenance, storage, transportation and relatedissues. An examination of the Pakistani missile launchlog is also indicative of lower order of production.

The Pakistani missile launch log shows a total of26 launches between April 1999 and December2006. (22 of these missiles have been launchedbetween May 2002 and December 2006). Out ofthese 7 are Ghauri missiles, which have a liquidpower plant. Therefore excluding these we havea total of 19 solid propellant missiles comprisingAbdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen2 launched between 1999 and 2006. The launchlog relating to the solid propellant missiles is shownin table 5.

Fig 4: Nozzle Process Sequence

Reinforcement

Resin

Mandrel Extraction1 day

Debulking / Curing7 days

Layup / Winding7 days

Ply/Type Cutting4 days

Impregnation4 days

Cold Storage

Machining / Bonding7 days

Inspection / NDE5 days

Assembly2 days

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Table 5: Pakistan Solid Propellant Missile Launch Log

Date Missile Type Launch SummaryApril 15, 1999 SHAHEEN 1 Year No. of launchesFebruary 7, 2000 HATF 1 1998 0May 26, 2002 GHAZNAVI 1999 1May 28, 2002 ABDALI 2000 1October 4, 2002 SHAHEEN 1 2001 0October 8, 2002 SHAHEEN 1 2002 4March 26, 2003 ABDALI 2003 4October 3, 2003 GHAZNAVI 2004 3October 8, 2003 SHAHEEN 1 2005 2October 14, 2003 SHAHEEN 1 2006 4March 9, 2004 SHAHEEN 2 Total 19December 8, 2004 SHAHEEN 1November 29, 2004 GHAZNAVI Missile Type No. of launchesMarch 19,2005 SHAHEEN 2 Abdali 5March 31,2005 ABDALI Ghaznavi 4February 19 2006 ABDALI Shaheen 1 7April 29th 2006 SHAHEEN 2 Shaheen 2 3November 29th 2006 SHAHEEN 1 Total 19December 9th 2006 GHAZNAVI

In the case of Shaheen 1, there is a long gap ofthree and a half years between the first and secondflight. The 1999 flight of Shaheen 1 was the firstone after the NDC plant came up in 1997/98. Inspite of the M 9 pedigree, there could have beenproblems in the first flight. The identification of theissue, its correction and confirmatory testsmay account for the time between the flights.Subsequent numbers and frequency is indicative

of a satisfactory solution to the problem.

The propellant mass in these missiles is estimatedbased on the missile powerplant dimensionsdetermined from the images14 and is used tocompute the propellant mass in the missiles. Datafrom the year 2002 is taken for computing the totalannual propellant quantity used for the missileflights. The details are shown in table 6.

14 n. 1

14


Table 6: Missile Propellant Estimates

Missile Flown Estimated Total propellant producedYear Propellant Mass, for flight tests in a particular

Name Nos. tonnes year, tonnes

2002 Ghaznavi 1 3.78Abdali 1 1.03Shaheen 1 2 6.3 x 2 17.41

2003 Abdali 1 1.03Ghaznavi 1 3.78Shaheen 1 2 6.3 x 2 17.41

2004 Shaheen 2 1 4.0 + 1.54*Ghaznavi 1 3.78Shaheen 1 1 6.3 15.62

2005 Shaheen 2 1 4 + 1.54*Abdali 1 1.03 6.57

2006 Abdali 1 1.03Shaheen 2 1 4.0 + 1.54*Shaheen 1 1 6.3Ghaznavi 1 3.78 16.65

*Shaheen 2 has two stages and the propellant mass of each stage is indicated

One can conclude from the table that Pakistanhas approximately used 17.5 tonnes of finishedpropellant quantity per annum for flight purposes.It may not be right to peg the production at thisrate as some of the units could be used for groundqualification requirements and for stockpiling. Asthe missiles could be transported and stored underdifferent terrain and weather conditions, they aresubjected environmental conditioning to simulatesuch conditions followed by proving tests. Also aminimum number of flight tests are required toconfirm the system performance and firm up theCEP. Some numbers are also earmarked for crewtraining purposes. Each country follows its own

guidelines with regard to the number of provingflights required before declaring a systemoperational. The US services employ a verycomprehensive test programme for theirmissiles15. The R&D tests number about 24 eachfor the Minuteman, the Peacekeeper and theTrident missiles. It is unlikely that Pakistan wouldplan such an extensive test programme for itsmissiles. From time and cost considerations, it willopt for deriving the maximum inputs from minimaltests through extensive instrumentation and fromthe inputs drawn from the exposure to the ChineseM 9/M 11 programmes. An assessment of theminimum complement of tests is shown in table 7.

15 Staff Working Paper, “The MX Missile Test Program“, The Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, January1986

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Table 7: No. of Tests for Operationalisation

Test Objective Ground tests Flight Tests RemarksMotor Development 2Motor Qualification 3Development Flights — 2Qualification Flights — 3Training Flights 5 2 tests by development crew with the service

crews.1 tests by service crews with development crewsupport.2 tests by service crews with development crewsupervision.

Surveillance Tests 1 — This requirement is infrequent and is used forchecking the aging criteria of the propulsionsystem.

Total 6 10

A total of 16 motors will have to be ground andflight tested for declaring the system operational.The number can be pruned to some extent. Thesurveillance test is an infrequent requirement withthe objective of ensuring the soundness of themotor with storage time. The motor will be drawnfrom the production batch as the need arises andhence it need not be counted as a prerequisite foroperationalisation. Part of the crew training testscan be combined with the qualification tests. Thiswould mean a complement of 5 ground and 7 flighttests would be required to declare the missilesystem operational. Based on this assessment,the following inferences are drawn:

Abdali: Published reports as well as the fin shapeof Hatf 1 confirm the Sud Aviation sounding rocketancestry of this missile. Abdali is a modifiedversion of this and uses the acquired Frenchtechnology for PVC based propellants. It ispossible that Pakistan has improved on thecomposition by adding a certain percentage of

aluminum to improve its energy. Abdali is a shortrange tactical missile and intended to be producedin numbers. Pakistan has long experience in themanufacture of this type of propellant and rocketsystem and consequently would have requiredvery little development and qualification effort. Themodifications may not significantly alter theprimary parameters and therefore add to the testnumbers. Therefore the earlier Hatf 1 flightsalong with 5 Abdali missile launches till December2006 may meet the criteria for operationalisation.Based on this argument, it is concluded thata) the propellant is produced in the SUPARCOplant, using a modified PVC composition andretaining the free standing feature of the propellantgrain; and b) the missile is in production andinducted into the services.

Ghaznavi: This missile is derived from theChinese M 11 missile. Pakistan is also reportedto have procured 34-80 of these missiles includingthe manufacturing know-how. The Chinese

16


connection would have provided adequatetechnology inputs to Pakistan and enabled it tomake the design transition to Ghaznavi. The M 11pedigree would have also enabled Pakistan toderive confidence with the minimum number ofqualification tests. The first test16 of this missilewas reported on May 26, 2002 and the fourth onDecember 9, 2006. According to the IslamicRepublic News Agency—IRNA17 dated April 26,2007 “the solid fuel Ghaznavi Ballistic MissileSystem was successfully fired as part of a trainingexercise in December last year by troops.” Toquote the main story carried by the news agency18

“Pakistan on Thursday handed over a batch ofnuclear capable ballistic missiles to the army at aceremony attended by Prime Minister ShaukatAziz, state media reported. The final productionbatch of Hatf III ‘Ghaznavi’ missiles was handedover to the Army Strategic Force Command(ASFC), Radio Pakistan reported”. Based on thisreport, it is safe to conclude the missile is inproduction and inducted into the army. It is safeto assume that the service crews already aretrained in the preparation and launch of M 11 andas such will require very little training andadaptation to the Ghaznavi. Also the productionof Ghaznavis may be pegged at a lower numberkeeping in mind the existing inventory of M 11missiles. The production batch of Ghaznavishanded over to the ASFC may number 6-8.

Shaheen 1: There is a gap of three and a halfyears between the first and second flight tests of

Shaheen-1. This could be due to technicalproblems/failure19 encountered in the first flight.Between 2002 and 2006, the missile has beenflight tested 6 times with two missile tests each in2002 and 2003.

The test of November 29, 2006 is reported to becarried out by the troops of the ASFC as per pressreports20. The report also stated “the event markedthe culmination phase of the training exercise andvalidated the operational readiness of the strategicmissile group equipped with Shaheen 1 Missiles”.This statement confirms the development phaseof the missile is complete and the missile is readyfor production and operational deployment. Alsothe numbers flight tested is in conformity with thenumbers shown in table 7. It is certain thatPakistan would accord production priority to handover the first batch of missiles to the ASFC at anearly date.

Shaheen 2: Four flight tests—one each in2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007—of this missile havebeen reported so far. Being a two stage system, itis more complex and will have higher reliabilityissues. In tune with table 7 figures, further 3flights of this missile are required for completelyqualifying the system. In this case also a higherpriority for completion of the remaining tests isobvious.

The scenario discussed above is summarised inTable 8.

16 “Pak test-fires another missile”, Tribune (Chandigarh), 27 May 2002, Available at the website: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020527/main2.htm

17 For details see the website: http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-16/0704268066191425.htm18 Ibid;19 See the website: http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/shaheen1.htm

20 See “Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile” Space Wars, November 29, 2006, Available at the website: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Pakistan_Test_Fires_Nuclear_Capable_Missile_999.html

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Table 8: Status Summary

Missile StatusAbdali ❀ Development complete

❀ Troop exercise complete❀ The missile is under batch

production and handed over toASFC

Ghaznavi ❀ Development complete❀ Troop exercise complete❀ Production batch (6-8 missiles)

handed over to ASFC❀ Production priority may shift to

Shaheen 1 & Shaheen 2

Shaheen 1 ❀ Development complete❀ Troop exercise complete❀ Production batch being readied

for handing over to ASFC

Shaheen 221 ❀ Development flight tests inprogress

❀ 3 more tests including troopexercise needed fordevelopment completion.

Production Summary

Based on the production cycle, it has been arguedin the previous sections that the missile motorgrain and nozzle production will be 12 units peryear. This excludes Abdali which is probably beingproduced in the SUPARCO plant. The NDC plantat Fatehjang is reported to be operational during1997-9822. It can be safely assumed that it mayhave taken some years for the plant to attain fullrated capacity. Further, the realisation of the fullrated capacity is dependent upon a number ofexternal parameters like timely availability ofhardware, input materials, resolution of technologyglitches and quality issues and this hampers therated capacity realization. The fact that Pakistanhas flown only 14 Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 andShaheen 2 missiles in the 7 year period between1999 and 2006 is a pointer to this. A likely missilepropulsion system production scenario is inferredfrom these pointers and is shown in Table 9.

21 It is not clear why Shaheen 2 does not use Shaheen 1 powerplant for the booster stage. Besides obvious improvement in the range,it will add to the standardization of hardware and reduction in the number of qualifying tests and reduction in the number of processand handling tools. It will also provide flexibility of interchange. It is possible that they are designed and produced by two differentgroups. The similarity of the stage 1 dimensions to the Chinese M – 9 may have some bearing.

22 See, n.10

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Table 9: Production & Utilisation Summary

Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Stock inventory inMissile 2007

GhaznaviProduction 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 6 missiles handed

to ASFCGround Test 1 2 2 - - - - - -Flight Test - - - - 1 1 1 - 1Shaheen 1Production 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 missilesGround Test 1 2 2Flight Test 1 2 2 1 1Shaheen 2Production 1 1 1 1 1 1 NilGround Test 1 1 1Flight Test 1 1 1Total 3 3 4 5 5 6 5 6 6Production units units units units units units units units units

Notes: 1. There is a lag between the production and utilisation.2. One unit comprises the motor hardware, propellant grain, nozzle, ignition and control systems

(excluding reaction control system)3. Each stage of Shaheen 2 is considered as one unit4. The number of Shaheen 2 ground tests could be less based on Shaheen 1 experience

Observations and Inferences

1. Immediately after the readiness of the plantin 1997-98, one flight of Shaheen 1 has takenplace in 1999. Thereafter no flights ofGhaznavi, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 arereported till 2002.

2. Two flights of Shaheen 1 in October 2002 areclosely spaced.

3. Two further closely spaced flights of Shaheen1 have taken place in October 2003—almostexactly a year later.

4. The long gap between the flight of 1999 andthe flights of 2002 is indicative of a major

problem in the 1999 flight and which havetaken time to resolve and qualify the correcteddesign.

5. Preparing two articles for testing is acommonly accepted practice. The second unitcan be tested to re-confirm the articleperformance. At the same time furthermodifications, if required can be quicklycarried out on the second article.

6. It also shows that two Shaheen 1’s per yearcould be the current capacity, based on inputmaterials and plant constraints.

7. It is unlikely that the Shaheen 2 preparationswould have started till confidence in the

19


Shaheen 1 performance is gained. Shaheen2 is a new design, derives from the pedigreeof Shaheen 1 and therefore its ground testscould have started after confirmation of theShaheen 1 corrections and proving groundtests—ie., in 2001.

8. No flights of the strategic missiles have takenplace in 2005. Two Abdali flights perhaps aregap fillers. The reasons for this could be:

a) Some technical issues with the othermissile systems

b) Some problem with the plant equipmentor shortage of raw materials.

c) Some technical issues with the Shaheen2 flight

d) Deliberate scheduling

Out of these, the problem with the plantequipment or shortage of critical raw materiallike Ammonium Perchlorate appears as themore plausible reason.

Production Forecast

On the basis of the assessment done in this study,one can make a modest attempt in forecastingPakistan’s solid propellant missiles productioncapacity. The forecast is elaborated below:

Ghaznavi

The production numbers of this missile are notlikely to be high until the M 11 stocks are liquidated.M 11 import numbers vary between 34 to 80. Inthe absence of any conflict situations, theapplication of these missiles will be restricted forregular crew training drills and flight tests of new

or improved missile systems. The M 11 missilesare 8 to 10 years old and maybe near the end oftheir life. Though it may be possible to extend theirlife, Pakistan will consider phasing them out in twoto three years time and replace them with thehigher capability Ghaznavi. This exercise hasbegun with the handing over of the first batch ofGhaznavis to ASFC in April 2007.

Shaheen 1.With completion of seven flight tests, thequalification and training of the ASFC personnelcan be treated as complete and the first productionbatch is being readied for handing over to theASFC. It should be possible to hand the first batchof six motors to ASFC in 2008. Readiness offurther batch numbers will be based on priorityaccorded to the missile types. Assuming Ghaznaviand Shaheen 1 are accorded equal priority, a batchof six flight units can be readied once every twoyears.

Shaheen 2

Four flight tests have been completed. Threemore tests are to be completed for qualificationand training purposes. Even if some level ofpriority is accorded, the readiness of the firstproduction batch is minimum five to six yearsaway.

The development time of Shaheen 2 could havebeen shortened if Shaheen 1 stage had been usedin the missile. The reason for not adapting thisis not clear. In future developments, it is mostlikely that Pakistan will change booster stagedimension to that of Shaheen 1 with the attendantadvantages. Possibility of incorporating a thirdstage cannot be completely ruled out.

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Conclusion

A study of the Pakistan strategic missile productionscenario is presented. The conclusions on themaximum number of missiles that can beproduced have been derived based on the processtime. The theoretical numbers have beencompared with the actual known flight informationand it is concluded that Pakistan currently has notexploited the full production potential. This maybe due to material constraints, input hardwareconstraints, number of toolings availability,transportation and storage constraints. It does notappear to be due to any technology shortcomings.

Ghaznavi and Shaheen 1 are in production, whileShaheen 2 needs to undergo further flight trialsbefore it can be declared operational.

Present production appears to be six units per yearconsisting of two units each of Ghaznavi and

Shaheen 1 and 1 stage each of Shaheen 2.The typical product mix for the production oftwelve units per year could consist of threenumbers of each of the missiles. However,the number can be altered to a different mixbased on the existing priority needs. Estimatesof Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are put at sixtyas per the 2007 assessment prepared byNatural Resources Defence Council23. Assumingtwo thirds of these will use missiles as carriers(the rest could use aircraft delivery), it wouldtake about four year’s production effort atthe full rated capacity of 12 units per year tomatch the missile and warhead numbers.This would mean that only by 2011-2012, Pakistanwould be able to provide the missile carriersystem for all these warheads. The time periodmay be even slightly stretched to accountfor design modifications and requirements oftraining/surveillance tests.

23 NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (Chicago: USA), V. 63, no. 3, May/June 2007, pp. 71-73.

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