AN EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF

COMPLEX SYSTEMS THEORY TO POLICY MAKING

BY

Karen S. Wilhelm, Lt Col, USAF

For

National War College

Course 5603: The National Security Process

14 December 1998

Every quantltatlve measurement we have shows we’re wmmng the war ’

When the Mxon Admmlstratlon took over m 1969 all the data on North Vietnam and on the Umted States was fed mto a Pentagon computer - population, gross natlonal product, manufactunng capabilrty, number of tanks, ships, and amxaft, size of the armed forces, and the hke The computer was then asked, “When will we wmv” It took only a moment to gwe the answer “You won m 1964@

In a lmear world, the underdog never wms 3

Lmeanty is the unitary view, the root metaphor, of Western thmkmg It is ubiqmtous

in our vlsuahzation of the way the world works “Humans have a terrific need for stab&y and

one of the ways we serve this need is through the search for paradigms We consider reahty

tamed if we find a classification, a description for rt ‘& We have created stabihty and

understandmg through the metaphor of the world as a giant, clockwork machme governed by

linear relationships National leaders and diplomats often react to problems, crises, and

negotiations wrth a linear mmdset Thrs linear view usually mamfests itself m the unstated

assumptions underlymg courses of action chosen by pohcy makers - courses of action which

often assume there 1s a direct link between means and ends, that carefully calculated and

precisely applied actions wrll lead to equally precise pohucal outcomes, or that what worked

before will work agam Even though policy makers recognize the inherent complexities of

ther craft, they often fall back upon a linear mmdset - because they have not been given an

alternative Thrs paper will examme the possibihty of creating such an alternative mmdset -

an analytical framework based on an understandmg of nonlmeanty and complex systems

Recogmzmg the “generic” complexrty of a problem (1 e solution will be difficult

because there are many factors to consider) is not the same as understandmg the difference

between linearity and nonlmearrty, nor is it the same as understandmg complex systems

2

theory To categorrze a system or a relatronshrp as linear IS to imply two condrtrons The first

IS that changes m system mput result m pronortronal changes m system output The second IS

that of addmvrty - simply put, the whole equals the sum of Its parts These two condmons

mean that understandmg linear systems IS relatively easy. Knowledge of inputs leads to

knowledge of outputs Problems are solved by breakmg them mto mdrvrdual parts and

analyzmg the parts In order to understand and, more rmportantly, control a linear system, we

keep breakmg It down unnl we find parts that are basic enough to understand and control - at

which pomt we can understand and the control the reassembled mtermehate parts, and then

the whole ’

Regardless of the appeal of the linear metaphor, the “real world” exhrbtts srgmficant

r&m/ear&es - instances where thmgs do not operate m a clockwork manner, systems that are

open to outside influences, that are unstable, inefficient, unpredrctzble, and not controllable,

systems m whrch rt IS impossible to understand the rules of operation or behavror, m which

small changes m input may result m large changes m output, m which no amount of

knowledge of rmtral or current states wrll allow calculatron of subsequent or final states

The emergence of new, nonhnear fields of study - chaos, nonlinear dynamrcs,

complexrty, complex adaptive systems, cellular automata, artificial life, etc , has made explicit

the pervasiveness of the linear metaphor and the fundamental inadequacy of such a linear view

of the world That fundamental madequacy means the root metaphor must change The new

root trietaphor must rest on a foundation of nor&near@ The nonlmear field of study most

applic+ible in the context of thrs paper is complex systems theory

At the core of complex systems theory are complex adaptive systems Systems, m

general, often drsplay nonlinear charactenstrcs, therefore, the results of actrons often cannot be

predicted and outcomes are sometimes less or more than the sum of inputs Small mputs may

have great effect, but, similar to the economic law of dunmishmg returns, more may not result

m even greater effects Conversely, input may have little effect until some “crmcal mass” is

reached Also, an input may have no effect unless some other input or condition is present

Fmally, “m a system, the chams of consequences extend over time and many areas the effects

of action are always multiple ‘we can never do merelv one thmg’ r’6 In complex adaotive

systems, the agents formmg the system have the capacity to cope collectively with new

challenges ’

The nature of systems, then, leads to four key premises of complex systems theory I

The first is self-organization and emergent properhes The agents of complex adaptive

systems will form and re-form patterns of connections and behavior which are self-organized,

1 e not lrnposed from outside the system As this happens, new properties or attributes

emerge * The second premise is the existence of adaptation and co-evolution Complex

adaptive systems mamtam essential elements of structure by mamtaimng a balance between

exte II+ demands and internal needs At the same time, they change m response to their

environment, Just as the environment changes m response to the system The thnd key

premise rests on the power of small events “Small, seemingly minor events can give rise to

large outcomes, systems are sensinve at any moment m time to the conditions prevailmg at

that moment and can thus inmate processes of change that are substantial and dramatic “’ The

final premise is that of sensitivity to imtial condmons - which means “even the slightest

changes m mitral conditions can lead to very different outcomes “lo This does not mean those

different outcomes are always bad I’

4

The characteristics of complexity and complex adaptive systems are prevalent

throughout the full range of human activities - mcludmg the relauonshrps between nauon-

states ’ Any application of nonlmeanty to the pohcy making process must, therefore, be based

on the following basic lessons of complex systems theory First., there appear to be many more

nonlinear than linear systems (whether naturally occurrmg or human-created), and nonhnearrty

leads 40 complexity Second, the relationships or connections between parts of systems are

Just as rmportant as the parts themselves There is, m fact, no meanmg without the

connections The connections determme the context, and context defines the system Third,

there Is no “solution ” Complexity 1s about process and evolution, not problems and end-

states Fourth, adaptabihty is the essence of a complex system It has the ability to sense and

learn from rts environment Reactions to problems are rime-sensitive because the system

continually evolves - a grven reaction will not recur even if the problem is the same And

fifth, low-level mteractions result m high-level emergent behaviors l2

In the human world where complex adaptrve systems interact wrth each other, the

nature of complex systems msures that there are thmgs whrch are unknown and unknowable

The &fference between linear and nonlinear thmkers 1s how they cope with those unknowns

The hnear policy maker attempts to reduce the complex@ by slmphfylng and assuming, and

by looking at parts of the whole The linear cham of reasonmg is based on what is known

The nonlinear policy maker, on the other hand, understands that the complexity 1s mherent m

the system and cannot be reduced The nonlmearist who appreciates the unknowables may

arrive at the exact same decision as the linear thmker, but wrll be far better equipped to cope

with the inevitable unforeseen consequences of the decision

5

In order to examme the utility of a nonlinear mmdset and complex systems framework,

the lessons of complex systems theory ~11 be used m a comparative case study We w111

bnefly examme the decrslon makmg m the Cuban rmsslle C~LSIS, and the decision by the US to

apply $raduated pressure” durmg the Vietnam War Thts Qscusslon w111 be quite limited -

conducted solely for the purpose of tllustratmg the concepts mvolved These two cases are

mterestmg because many of the same decision makers were involved m both, and they made

exphclt compansons between the two

We had seen the gradual application of force applied m the Cuban msslle Cnsls and had seen a very successful result We believed that, if this same gradual and restramed application of force were applied m South Vietnam, that one could expect the same result l3

The seemmg trmmph of US obJectives (“eyeball to eyeball and the other p;uv blmked”)

durmg the Cuban Msslle (31s~ led to the mythology of a carefully managed outcome The

outcome of the rmsslle cnsls, representmg as it Qd a step back from the nuclear brmk, seemed

to herald the return of &plomacy to the forefront of international relations The prrmacy of

rationality, cnsls management, and the regulated application of force were the lessons taken -

especially by pohcy makers m the Umted States The combmatlon of &plomacy plus the

cred&e threat of force led to specific pohtical ends by means of hmlted coercion - or so the

myth goes Thus myth of ever-mcreasmg pressure on the Sowets conveyed m a vocabulary of

sqpak, messages, pauses, and squeezes was transferred whole cloth to Vietnam, where it

fasled miserably l4

The mythology of the mlsslle cnsls was not only an tifact of the heady relief at rts

outcome and the subsequent adulation accorded the Fclpants, it was also an arhfact of the

lmear mmdset of those part~clpants The chef lmearrst among them was Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara McNamara and his “whiz Kids” from Ford Motor Company had come to

Washmgton and turned the Defense Department on its head wrth the apphcatron of

quantrtatrve analysrs and decrsron makmg throughout the Pentagon Thrs quantrtatrve

approach extended to the pohcy arena and the use of mrlitary force When confronted wrth the

crrsrs rn Cuba, McNamara rejected the an strrkes and mvasron recommended by the mthtary

chiefs and supported the President’s delicate gamble of convertmg a blockade (an act of war)

mto a “quarantme” (somethmg less than war) He vrewed the quarantme as a commumcatron

from Kennedy to Khrushchev, not a m&ary operatron The message commumcated by the

gradual apphcatron of pressure was that of US resolve and the need for changed behavior on

the & of the adversary Is

An analysrs of the mrssrle cnsrs using a framework of complexrty theory reveals a

completely Qfferent prcture The mythology of calm, ratronal evaluatron of varrous

alternatrves IS belled by the record of long, mconclusrve meetmgs conducted by increasingly

fatrgu&i men under great stress The US dectsron makers were indeed sendnrg srgnals and

messages, but had no way of knowmg how they were truly interpreted by the Soviets l6

Observing Sovret actrons and reactrons had to serve as a poor substrtute for defimtrve

knowledge

There were a number of other areas where US decrsron makers were smnlarly

handrcapped by lack of mformatron or understandmg Throughout the crrsrs there was the

ddlic~ty of assessing Sovret motrves. Kennedy and hrs advrsors assumed aggressive

mtentrons on then part and &d not consider the possrbrhty that the Sovrets might view then-

actions as defensive m nature, or as a response to an aggressive posture on the part of the US I

(e g puttmg mtermedrate range nuclear mrssrles m Turkey) US leaders also assumed that

leaders m the Kremlm had complete control over every actron of then subordmates durmg the

7

time of the crisis In reality, they did not For example, the offer of withdrawal of the missiles

m exchange for a promise of no mvasion conveyed by Washmgton KGB head Aleksandr

Fomm through an ABC reporter was at his own mitrative, although it paralleled Kremlm

thmkmg More seriously, the order that led to the shootmg down of a U-2 over Cuba was

given by the local air defense commander without authorrzatron from his superiors on the

island or m the Soviet Umon US leaders were also basing their decisions on incorrect

mtelhgence estimates Analysts estimated there were S-10,000 Soviet troops on the island

when in fact, there were approximately 42-44,OOO They were also unaware of the existence of

Soviet nuclear warheads for tactical missiles when there were mne of them deployed to Cuba

and when local commanders had authorization to use them on their own mmauve m the event

of a US mvasron of the island ”

The US leadership also suffered from a lack of total knowledge of and control over US

actions durmg the crisis On 22 October, the Commander m Chref of Strategrc An Command,

General Thomas Powers, forwarded the order to Increase the defense posture of his forces m

the clear - thus “signalmg” the Soviets on his own imtiative There was also a test launch of a

US ICBM from a location near that of nuclear-armed ICBMs whrch were on high alert as a

result of the crisis The launch took place wrthout the knowledge of national leaders Fmally,

previously mittated covert actions agamst Cuba contmued despite orders from both McNamara

and Robert Kennedy that they be &scontmued after the crrsis broke ‘~3

A nonlinear analysis of the missile crisis would have hq$hghted these factors and

perhaps led to far different conclusions regardmg the lessons to be learned Instead, the linear

mode of thmkmg prevailed McNamara acknowledged his rehance on the Cuban crisis as a

model for his thmkmg regardmg mrhtary action m Vietnam He viewed graduated pressure as

8

a sensible course of action between the extremes of confront&on cnth the Soviets and the

Chmese leading to potentral nuclear war and the fsulure of contamment exemplified by

withdrawal lg

In a memo to the President m March 1964, the linear nature of McNamara’s thmkmg IS

rea&ly apparent In descnbmg the US obJectWe as estabhshmg an independent, non-

Con&mst South Vietnam, he uses perhaps the most linear metaphor of the Southeast Asia

conflict - the famous “dommo theory ” He wrote that failure to keep South Vretnam free of

Commumsm would result m the probable fall of Laos and Cambodia, the ascendance of

Coyumst mfluence m Burma, the likely fall of Indonesia and Malaysia, grave pressure on

Thailand, the Phrhppmes becommg “shaky,” and threats to India, Australia, New Zealand,

Taiwan, Korea, and Japan 2o McNamara also noted that early m his tenure as Secretary of

Defense, the falling dommoes became more plausible with the strengthemng of the lmks

between the USSR and Cuba, and with the consistent provocative behavior of the Soviets with

respect to Berlin In his mmd, these actrons mduzated contmued aggressive mtent on their I

part 2’

The progressive application of ever-mcreasmg mrhtary force against North Vretnam

recommended by McNamara and a number of other advisors gave President Johnson the

rllusron of control over the situation In reality, it devolved mto a surreal exercise existing m a

nebulous realm between academic management theory and game strategy 22 Even the men “on

the ground” m Vietnam were stymied by the failure of the enemy to understand that they were

being beaten

The ability of the Viet-Cong contmuously to rebuild their umts and to make good their losses 1s one of the mysteries of this guenlla war we still find no plausible explanation of the contmued strength of the Vret- Cong if our data on losses are even approximately correct Not only

9

do the Vlet-Cong umts have the recuperative powers of the phoemx, but they have an amazmg ability to mamtam morale have we found evidence of bad morale 23

Only m rare cases

Yet, graduated pressure as conceived by the victors of Cuba was never intended to

defeat the enemy Rather, their intent was to engender confidence and cohesion m the South,

to apply a modest effort that would demonstrate their resolve and the lmphclt costs and nsks to

the North, and to “level the playmg field” so that an acceptable negotiated settlement could be I

reached 24

, Much later m life, McNamara unwttmgly identified the mherent weakness of the linear

mmdset when he confessed that

We failed to recogmze that m mteznational affiurs, , there may be problems for which there are no lmme&ate solutions For one whose life has been dedicated to the belief and practice of problem solving, this IS particularly hard to admit imperfect, untidy world 25

But, at tnnes, we may have to live urlth an /

Our understanding of that imperfect, untidy world 1s a bit clearer when we apply a

complex systems analysis to these two cases In Cuba, the two pnmary “systems” mvolved,

the US and USSR, were clearly both complex and adaptive, and thus nonlinear That

nonhqear@ IS evident when one examines the unknowns and “unknowables ” The US could

not know the exact motlvatlons of the Sovlets and thus was ha&capped m devlsmg a

response to their actions Soviet leaders, m turn, could not have known what the US reaction

would be as they set out to mstall mlsslles m Cuba Neither side could know what action or

coutqzr-action might trigger a nuhtary confrontation between the superpowers or what might

result m nuclear exchange The danger of nuclear war and the unknowns surrounding it, m

fact, were key contrrbutors to the ultlrnate Qplomatic solution of the conf?ontatlon

10

There are other lessons from complex systems theory wEuch shed light on the Cuba

case A focus on the connectrons wrthm and between systems might have &Wed the post-

cnsls emphasis on the supposed connection between graduated pressure and reversal of the

Soviet decision It might have h@hghted, mstead, the connection between the removal of the

nusslles and the US guarantee of no mvaslon of Cuba and removal of Jupiter mlsslles from

Turkey and Italy 26

Complex systems theory also lllghlrghts the errors made by US pohcy makers m using

the Cuban model m forming pohcy for VK%EUII The actions of complex adaptive systems are

never wholly transferable from one system to another nor from one time to another because of

the qualities of self-orgamzatlon and emergence, the processes of adaptation and co-evolution,

and the sens&v@ to initial condztlons of subsequent achons US pohcy makers obviously

knew the North Vietnamese were not the “same” as the Soviets, yet they assumed graduated

pressure would brmg about the same result m Vietnam as it had m Cuba

Ambassador Maxwell Taylor’s report (quoted above) clearly shows the qualities of

self-orgamzatlon and emergence etiblted by the Vret Cong Yet, m applying graduated

pressure to the North Vietnamese, US pohcy makers had no understanding of if or how that

pressure would mfluence the behavior of the Wet Cong m the South An understanding of the

nonhnemty etibrted m the mablhty of US leaders to totally control their own forces durmg

the Cuban cnsls might have led to better understandmg of the mablhty of the North to totally

contrdl Wet Cong actions Finally, an understandmg of complex systems might have led

decision makers to question the fundamental linear metaphor at the foundation of US

mvolvement m Southeast Asia - the fallmg dommoes

* * * * *

11

What lessons can we draw from this imtial attempt to apply complex systems theory to

an analysis of diplomacy and policy malung First, it is extremely difficult to transfer what

are essentially scientrfic and mathematical concepts to the study of the social sciences

Second, despite the ticulty of doing so, rt is a worthwhile endeavor because it can shed light

on factors often overlooked with a linear frame of reference Therefore, adding nonlmearny

and complex systems theory to the education of policy makers and then advisors would prove

equally worthwhile.

It 1s also important to recognize that understandmg nonhnearny and complexity does

non mean an end to systematic thmkmg or logical analysis It does mean recogmzmg that the

logic is probably not analogous to a straight line The linear metaphor stands m opposition to

the “rules of nature ” The natural world is a nonlinear world m which complex adaptive

systems are the primary actors Changmg our basis of understanding and analysis 1s not a

trrvral nor a short-term process, the linear metaphor has been 250 years m the makmg We

must, however, take the first steps now, by recogtnzmg the pervasively linear foundation of

our thmkmg, the weakness of the lmear metaphor when confronted wrth the reahues of how

the world works, and the alternative foundation being exposed for us through progress m the

nonlmear sciences

12

’ Robert McNamara, press conference, Fall 1962 (T), quoted m Lloyd C Gardner, Pay Any Przce Lynabn Johnson and the Warsfor Vzetnam (Chrcago Ivan R Dee, 1995) p 62

’ Harry G Summers, Jr , On Strategy A Crztzcal AnaIyszs of the J’iezrzarn War (Novato CA Presrdro Press, 1984), P IS

3 Paraphrased from Alan D Beyerchen, “Clausewrtz, Nonhnearrty, and the Importance of Imagery,” m Complexzty, Global Polztzcs, andN&onanal Securr& ed Davrd S Alberts and Thomas J Czerwmskr (Washmgton DC Natronal Defense Umversrty, 1997), p 167

4 Steven R Mann, “The Reactron to Chaos,” m Compkxzty, Global Po~ztzcs, and Natronal Searzty, ed Davrd S AIberts and Thomas J Czerwmskr (Washmgton DC Natronal Defense Umversrty, 1997), p 138

5 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewrtz, Nonhnearrty, and the Unpredmtabrhty of War,” IntematzonaZ Securzty, Vol 17, No 3 (Winter 1992/93), p 62, John F Schrmtt, “Chaos, Complexity, & War What the New No&near Dynam cal Sciences May Tell Us About Armed Confhct,” (draft) (Quantmo VA Concepts and Doctrme Drvtsro x Marme Corps Combat Development Command, 4 September 1995), pp 13-14

6 Robert Jervrs, “From Complex Systems The Role of Interactrons,” m Copzng Wzth the Bounds SpecuIatzons on Nonlzne,urzg zn h4ilztazy Amzrs, ed Thomas J Czerwmskr (Washmgton DC National Defense Umversrty, 1998) pp 260,264,261

’ James N Rosenau, “my Damn Thmgs Srmultaneously Complexrty Theory and World Affairs,” m Compkxzty, Global Polztzcs, and Natzonal Securzty, ed Davrd S Alberts and Thomas J Czerwmskr (Washmgton DC Nqronal Defense Umversrty, 1997), p 83

* Perhaps the smgle best example of self&gamzatron and emergence IS the burldmg of the human bram and the emergence of intelligence There 1s no property of any single element of the bram whrch accounts for human mtelhgence, yet when all the mdrvrdual components are connected, intelltgence exrsts Addmonaliy, as an mdmrdual grows and matures, the bram stores mformatron and experrence m new and ever-changmg patterns (1 e self-orgamzatron) such that the nature of the intelligence exhibited changes over time

’ Rosenau, p 86

lo Ibrd, p 57

” Ibrd, pp 83, 84-5,S6

l2 Andrew Ilachmskr, “Land Warfare and Complexrty, Part II An Assessment of the Apphcabrlrty of Nonlmear Dynamjc and Complex Systems Theory to the Study of Land Warfare, (U)” (Alexandna VA Center for Naval Analysts, July 1996), pp 139-40

l3 Cyrus Vance, quoted m H R McMaster, Derelzctzon offi2y (New York Harper Collins Publtshers, 1997), p 62 1

l4 James A Nathan, “The Heyday of the New Strategy The Cuban Mrssrle C&IS and the Confirmatron of Coerctve Drplomacy,” m 131e Cuban Misszle Cnszs Revzszted, ed James A Nathan (New York St Martm’s Press, 1992), pp l-2,25-6

l5 McMaster, pp 30,62

I

13 l

l6 Nathan, pp 20-1,25-6

” Lawrence Chang, “The View from Washmgton and the View from Nowhere Cuban Msnle Cnsls tistonography and the Eplstemoiogy of De&on Makmg,” m Ike Cuban Mmde Cmzs Revrszted, ed James A Xathan (New York St Martm’sPress, 1992), pp 137-9, 143-6, 149

” Ibid, pp 146-9

lg McMaster, pp 73,75

2o “SecDef Memo for the President,” 16 March 1964 m 7?ze Pentagon Papers, Vol III, by Senator tike Gravel, chaxm$ (Boston Beacon Press, 1971), pp 499-500

21 Robert S McNamara, It1 Retrospect i%e Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York Random House, 1995), p 32

” Anthbny Short, The Orzgms of the Vietnam War (New York Longman, Inc , 1989), p 307

23 Maxwell Taylor, “The Current Sltumon m South Vietnam, November 1964,” NSF files, Johnson Library, quoted m Short, p 305

24 Pentagon Papers, p 269

25 McNamara, p 323

26 Nathan, pp 20-2

14

Bibliography

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Chang, Laurence “The Vrew from Washmgton and the Vrew from Nowhere Cuban Mrssrle Cnsrs Hrstonography and the Eprstemology of Dectsron Makmg ” In JJre Cuban M.&e Crws Revwted, ed James A Nathan pp 13 l-60 New York St Martm’s Press, 1992

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