An Inspection of theNorthern Ireland Prisoner

Resettlement Strategy

June 2007

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June 2007

Presented to the Houses of Parliament by the Secretaryof State for Northern Ireland under Section 49(2) of theJustice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002.

An Inspection of theNorthern Ireland PrisonerResettlement Strategy

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List of abbreviations iv

Chief Inspector’s Foreword v

Executive Summary vii

Recommendations x

SECTION ONE: Inspection Report

Chapter 1 Background and Development 3

Chapter 2 Addressing the complex needs of prisoners 7

Chapter 3 Delivering offending behaviour programmes 13

Chapter 4 Reintegrating prisoners into the community with expert partners 17

Chapter 5 Developing a prison structure which reflects the 23“working day” outside

Chapter 6 Greater interaction between staff and prisoners 26

Chapter 7 Promoting healthier and pro-social lifestyles 31

Chapter 8 Supporting women in custody and on release 35

SECTIONTWO: Appendices

Appendix 1 Methodology 38

Appendix 2 Comparisons 39

Appendix 3 Definitions 42

Contents

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List of abbreviations

ACE Assessment, Case Management and Evaluation process

CJI Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland

CSA Central Services Agency

DEL Department of Employment and Learning

DHSSPS Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety

DSD Department for Social Development

Extern A voluntary organisation which provides services to offenders

FNP Foreign National Prisoner

HBW Hydebank Wood Prison and Young Offenders Centre

HRS Housing Rights Service

IMB Independent Monitoring Board

LSRC Life Sentence Review Commissioners

MASG Multi-Agency Steering Group

MGRO Ministerial Group on Reducing Offending

NIACRO Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders

NIHE Northern Ireland Housing Executive

NIO Northern Ireland Office

NIPS Northern Ireland Prison Service

OBP Offending Behaviour Programme

PAU Prisoner Assessment Unit (at Crumlin Rd Prison)

PBNI Probation Board for Northern Ireland

PREPS Progressive Regimes and Earned Privileges Scheme

PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland

RASU Risk Assessment Special Unit

RoI Republic of Ireland

SLA Service Level Agreement

SMT Senior Management Team

SPS Scottish Prison Service

SSA Social Security Agency

VCS Voluntary and Community Sector

YJA Youth Justice Agency

YOC Young Offenders Centre

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The Northern Ireland Resettlement Strategy is an important criminal justice initiative.Its aim is to protect the public by addressing a wide range of underpinning factors thatcontribute to offending.The concept of prisoner resettlement was elevated to a positionof priority in UK penal policy by two reports:“Through the Prison Gate” (2001) and“Reducing Reoffending by Ex-Prisoners” (2002).

The Northern Ireland Resettlement Strategy was generated by Recommendation 208 ofthe Criminal Justice Review.This inspection comes at a stage when the Strategy has beenoperational for nearly three years, a time when the lead agencies – the Northern IrelandPrison Service (NIPS) and the Probation Board for Northern Ireland (PBNI) - agreed itwould be useful to take stock before planning ahead.

Northern Ireland has a combination of factors which create a positive environment forresettlement: it is a small jurisdiction where prisoners are invariably held close to theirhomes; it has singular corrections agencies, the lowest per capita rate of imprisonment inthe UK, and spends much more per head on imprisonment; it also has high staff/prisonerratios and close liaison between prisons and community Probation.

CJI and the Prisons Inspectorate have examined the resettlement work of each NorthernIreland prison when undertaking inspections of individual establishments in 2005 and 2006.This inspection is different in that we sought to examine how well the Strategy was beingdelivered across the prison estate, and between the Prison Service and its partner agencies.

Because the Strategy focuses almost exclusively on issues relating to prisoners while incustody, and says little about targeting post release progress, this inspection’s main focus ison the custodial aspects of the Strategy. However, we also spoke with released prisoners toascertain their perspective on the value of work undertaken while they were in custody.

CJI applied the definition of resettlement that is used by the Northern Ireland Strategy,and measured progress against the performance standard that the agencies have set forthemselves.These definitions are set out in the glossary. In addition, this report’s structureis aligned to the seven main areas of the Strategy’s implementation plan.

The internal audit of resettlement undertaken by the NIPS in September 2006, partly inpreparation for this inspection - is a model of self-scrutiny. If the main recommendationsof that audit were to be fully implemented, then resettlement would progress rapidly.

There are issues for the wider criminal justice system, politicians and other governmentagencies to address in relation to resettlement.The NIPS and its partner agencies areobliged to work with everyone who is sent to them, and are presented with a majorchallenge to “resettle” people whose lives were often very unsettled before enteringprison.Attempts to promote the social inclusion of released prisoners need to be informedby a positive approach to their value as human beings, and their potential contribution as

Chief Inspector’s Foreword

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participants in society. Such attitudes and approaches are not easily cultivated in a contextof public antipathy towards some categories of offenders.A real and sustained improvementin resettlement services to prisoners will therefore require a significant degree ofpolitical will.

The inspection was undertaken in February 2007, led by CJI’s Tom McGonigle, who receivedvaluable assistance from the Prison and Probation Inspectorates.The Scottish PrisonService, the Chief Inspector of Prisons for Scotland and the Irish Prison Service provideduseful comparator information.The NIPS, PBNI and their partner agencies were entirelyopen in affording access to all requested people, documents and events.

This report contains 19 recommendations which the lead agencies and other importantstakeholders such as the Life Sentence Review Commissioners have agreed are important.

We hope there will be good progress in implementing them before we conduct a review inthree years time.

Kit ChiversChief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland.

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Executive Summary

This inspection found that the concept of resettlement has become well-established sinceits commencement in 2003.A lot of good preparation – based on frank and self-criticalanalysis – went into planning the strategy and this has been beneficial in its roll out.

There is positive commitment at strategic level within the NIPS and PBNI, the lead agencies,and they have striven to promote the principle that, apart from loss of liberty, prisonersshould retain normal citizenship rights. Several strategic reviews that were identified in theStrategy have now been completed, and their recommendations could help deliver essentialcultural changes within the NIPS. It is however a concern that the NIPS expects some keyreforms – such as a personal officer scheme and relocation of women prisoners – will notbe implemented for several years.

Most responsibility for delivering the Resettlement Strategy lies with the NIPS.They areclosely supported by the PBNI, and other partners’ investment varies depending upon howsignificantly they rate offenders in relation to their core business and available resources.This is largely a product of how the strategy was developed: as it is currently written theNIPS are solely responsible for, or lead on over two thirds of the Implementation Plan.It would now be appropriate to widen the net of responsibility. It is anticipated that theMinisterial Group on Reducing Offending will address this issue. In the interim we suggestthat all partner agencies should be engaged to explore their potential contribution to theStrategy and to develop more meaningful targets.

The NIPS model for delivering resettlement is largely appropriate for the present, eventhough absence of a personal officer scheme has meant there is little ownership ofresettlement amongst those with key daily interfaces in the NIPS.This is a fundamentalflaw, and while Inspectors recognise such a scheme is unrealistic in 2007, it must remaina target.

Each custodial establishment has created resettlement posts which are supported by aResettlement Team at NIPS HQ.All the people involved are clearly committed to theconcept of resettlement. Unfortunately the model is frequently undermined by higherpriorities, at both establishment and HQ levels. Redeployment of staff, excessive emphasison security, and frequent prisoner transfers are the main problems. Progress on a range ofNIPS human resources issues will be central to successful future delivery of theResettlement Strategy.

There are large numbers of prisoners who receive little or no resettlement input, especiallyremandees – who comprise an unusually large percentage of the Northern Ireland prisonpopulation – and short term prisoners. Many may not want or need resettlement attention,but sharper assessment and delivery processes are essential to ensure optimum delivery ofan important resource.

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Inspectors found problems with delivery of offending behaviour programmes, file recording(although this has improved), deployment of psychologists, the absence of a ResettlementTeam in Hydebank Wood, constructive use of prisoners’ time, and measurement of theStrategy’s progress.We find it necessary to reiterate the need for women prisoners to beheld in a separate facility from young men in the interests of good resettlement practice.

The Resettlement Strategy depends heavily on the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS),not just for delivery of services, but for providing meaningful links between the PrisonService and the wider community.The VCS find it difficult to plan on the basis of short termfunding, and do not always feel valued, while for its part NIPS finds it increasingly difficult tofund VCS work which only deals with a small percentage of prisoners. Such competingdemands take place against a backdrop of continuing reductions in the NIPS budget.

At operational level the Strategy has generated many tangible benefits: some excellent staffhave been appointed, premises provided, and a range of programmes which prisoners andtheir families value are being delivered. Links have been strengthened between the NIPS,PBNI and the other agencies.

The resettlement culture within prisons is innovative, and there is a refreshing willingnessto experiment.The downside of this approach is a sometimes ad hoc and localiseddevelopment of resettlement.While many of the initiatives are good things in themselves,piecemeal activity can mean that learning is not shared nor practice consolidated, andprogress is vulnerable to being overtaken by the next good idea.The NIPS recognises thatthere is an overemphasis in some places on specific initiatives at the cost of implementationof the full Strategy, and accepts that it needs to encourage a more consistent,comprehensive and all-embracing approach to implementing the Strategy.

The Resettlement Strategy has clear objectives.Available evidence suggests the currentlevels of achievement are as follows:

• Fully Achieved – 5

• Partially Achieved – 7

• Not Achieved – 2

Because they are often non-specific and duplicatory, Inspectors found it difficult to measureachievement of the 66 actions outlined in the Strategy. Our assessment is as follows:

• Fully Achieved – 24

• Partially Achieved – 26

• Not Achieved – 16

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Northern Irelands’ resettlement work compares favourably with the Republic of Ireland.The model is similar to England,Wales and Scotland, and similar difficulties arise in thosejurisdictions.A key difference is that statutory providers deliver more services – such asbenefits advice and accommodation arrangements – directly in their prisons.Appendix 2provides more detail on these comparisons.

Good progress has been made during the first phase of the Northern Ireland ResettlementStrategy, and NIPS has initiatives in hand which should deliver further benefits. On the otherhand there are several current difficulties, and some impending threats.While the NIPS andits partners must take the lead in dealing with these, wider government and its agenciesshould also contribute to this important work.

Recommendations

• The resettlement needs of groups such as remand prisoners and short term prisonersshould be given greater priority.This process should be commenced by targeting remandand short term prisoners who are assessed as especially needy. (Para 2.7)

• The PAU file recording process should be used as a model for resettlement filerecording. (Para 2.9)

• The NIPS transfer policy should be updated.This should take account of the diversity ofthe NIPS estate, clearly notifying to prisoners the opportunities that exist, andincorporating resettlement and equity issues. (Para 2.13)

• A separate thematic inspection of the lifer management system in Northern Irelandshould be undertaken.The timing of this inspection should allow time for new practice inlifer management to bed in. (Para 2.16)

• NIPS should recommit to Resettlement Leave and involvement of prisoners’ families atResettlement Boards. (Para 2.19)

• The NIPS and PBNI should work with others to design and deliver offending behaviourprogrammes or other relevant interventions for a wider range of prisoners, including“deniers.” (Para 3.4)

• NIPS should maintain close oversight of its psychology services, and regularly reviewtheir functioning with all interested parties. (Para 3.9)

• The Implementation Plan should be updated to place greater emphasis on thecontribution of the NIPS’ partners while prisoners are inside; and on resettlementoutcomes that are achieved after release from custody.The underpinning principleshould be that prisoners have the same rights as other citizens, save for their lossof liberty. (Para 4.4)

• Pending developments by the MGRO we recommend that the MASG composition shouldbe reviewed, with a view to more appropriate participation and wider ownership bysetting more explicit objectives for all partner agencies. (Para 4.5)

• The resettlement databases should be slightly amended and standardised betweenestablishments. (Para 4.16)

• The MASG should adopt simpler and more measurable outcome monitoring againstbenchmarks in the Resettlement Action Plan. It should retain the existing seven areas/14objectives, but reduce the 66 actions to a smaller, achievable number. (Para 4.17)

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• The NIPS should reaffirm its commitment to both objectives in the area of developing aprison structure which reflects the “working day” outside, and outline tangible stepstowards their fulfilment. (Para 5.5)

• The NIPS Security Classification Review’s recommendations should be implemented witha degree of urgency. (Para 5.12)

• NIPS should recommit to establishing a personal officer scheme, or its equivalent for allprisoners, within a meaningful timescale. (Para 6.7)

• A dedicated Resettlement Team should be established promptly in HBW pending apersonal officer system being put in place. (Para 6.12)

• HBW and Maghaberry governors and their senior management teams should articulateclearly the way in which their establishment contributes to the Northern IrelandResettlement Strategy. (Para 6.13)

• HBW and Maghaberry governors should articulate the various contributions expectedfrom different groups of staff in the establishment. (Para 6.13)

• NIPS and PBNI in conjunction with appropriate agencies should redraft the healthcaresection of the Implementation Plan to ensure appropriate targets are set for the new eraof prison healthcare provision. (Para 7.3)

• We again recommend relocation of the women prisoners to a dedicated site. (Para 8.5)

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Inspection Report

Section 1

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1.1 Although the prison populationhas been rising steadily since 2001,Northern Ireland still has thelowest imprisonment rate in theUK (82/100k), and the lowestreconviction rate (43%).

1.2 On March 5th 2007:• The prison population was 1,456,

of whom 38% were on remand(only 17% of the English prisonpopulation were on remand);

• There were 73 separated Loyalistand Republican prisoners held inMaghaberry;

• 36 female prisoners were heldat Hydebank Wood;

• Numbers of foreign nationalprisoners were increasing, butstill low: 44 people representing32 nationalities;

• There were 6,145 committalsto prison during 2005-06;

• The Northern Ireland annual costper prisoner place was £86,290,more than twice the England andWales cost of £37,500.

The Prison Estate

1.3 The Northern Ireland prisonestate is small – there are threeestablishments, each applying adifferent resettlement approach.

Background and Development

CHAPTER 1:

1.4 Maghaberry – A high security prisonwith capacity for 745 adult malelong term sentenced and remandprisoners – but holding 820 in May2007 due to overcrowding. Someprisoners are held in separatedconditions, and there is a dedicatedfacility for 12 lifers in the laterstages of sentence. Maghaberry alsomanages the Prisoner AssessmentUnit which has 22 beds in Belfast forprisoners nearing the end of theirsentences.

Maghaberry provides resettlementopportunities for sentencedprisoners. Remandees comprise morethan half the population and can availof housing advice, but apart from asmall number who are offerededucation and other programmesthey are not eligible for resettlementplanning. Maghaberry has a dedicatedResettlement Team based in discreteaccommodation.

1.5 Magilligan – A medium securityprison, with capacity for 425 shorter-term prisoners, which also has lowsecurity accommodation (Foyleview)for up to 82 selected prisonersnearing the end of their sentence.

Magilligan has a dedicatedResettlement Team based in purpose-built accommodation.The physical

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presence of Foyleview supportsMagilligan’s resettlement ethos, andlocal employers and the communityhave been well-engaged over the past12 years. Resettlement is easier todeliver at Magilligan because it hasa settled population, who are allserving sentences, and the securityemphasis is less than at Maghaberry.

1.6 HydebankWood (HBW) – Amedium to low security youngoffenders centre and prison, withtotal capacity for 306 male youngoffenders and female prisoners.

HBW provides resettlement for allremand and sentenced youngoffenders and women. It does nothave a dedicated team or premises,but two managers have aresettlement brief.Working outarrangements are available for asmall number of women prisonersand young men at Hydebank Wood.

1.7 A Resettlement Project Board beganwork in July 2002, and a Head ofResettlement was appointed withinthe NIPS to coordinate activity acrossits three establishments.The ProjectBoard commissioned an AftercareAudit, which was provided in March2003.A Strategic Review ofResettlement Services was launchedin October 2003, and theResettlement Strategy was launchedin June 2004, followed almost a yearlater by an Implementation Plan forthe period April 2005 – March 2007.

1.8 Since the Strategy was launched therehave been several positive initiativesincluding designation of dedicatedstaff and premises, and staffsecondments between partner

organisations.A Multi-Agency SteeringGroup (MASG) was established andmany existing initiatives (most of theVCS activity within the prisons) werebrought under the framework of theStrategy.These developments havegenerated closer workingrelationships and promoted acoherent resettlement identity.

1.9 Several strategic reviews that wereidentified in the Strategy have nowbeen completed by the NIPS,including reviews of lifers, chaplains,security, constructive activity,progressive regimes, offendingbehaviour programmes andfacilitators. If implemented, theirrecommendations will make a majorcontribution to resettlement, as wellas helping deliver essential culturalchanges within the NIPS.

1.10 Detailed databases of resettlementactivity have been developed byMaghaberry and Magilligan, and thesignificance of resettlement isdemonstrated by the fact that boththese prisons make explicit referenceto resettlement activity in theirstatements of purpose on the NIPSwebsite.The Independent MonitoringBoards take a keen interest inresettlement issues and their latestreports have called on the NIPS toallocate more resources toresettlement.

The NIPS Resettlement Audit

1.11 The Resettlement Strategys’ Multi-Agency Steering Group (MASG)minutes indicate that by June 2006the high prison population was felt tobe impacting on resources andprogramme delivery. In September

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2006 NIPS undertook a ResettlementAudit. It made positive findingsoverall, including “performance thatclearly indicates good or excellentperformance” and found an averagecompliance level of 66% with theStandard.

1.12 The main areas requiring significantattention were inconsistentresourcing of resettlement, lowawareness among non-specialist staff,the system of prisoner transfers andinadequate pre-release processes.Anindividual report was completed foreach prison, highlighting key areas forfuture development.

1.13 In Maghaberry it found “Very limitedwork being done in the essential areaof discharge…Because staff have notbeen informed about Safer Custodyconcept, it is seen as a process that isseparate and disconnected fromresettlement…Pockets of goodinitiatives are in evidence but notfully integrated, resourced or linkedup to the resettlement process.Resettlement is thus seriouslycompromised. Resettlement staff arecompetent, enthusiastic and keen,with excellent practice in someareas…but frustrated through havingto react continuously…dependenceon so few staff is resulting in a systemthat is at best fragile…Magilligan isinevitably impacted by the lack ofinformation flowing fromMaghaberry…”

1.14 Magilligan had “excellentresettlement accommodation.” Therewere 10 dedicated NIPS staff, allwith Job Descriptions and relevanttraining, and the Resettlement Teamhad won a Criminal Justice Award in

2006 for “Outstanding contributionto working with offenders.”

1.15 At Hydebank Wood “In the absenceof a dedicated Resettlement Team, theInmate Activity Governor, PO andadmin post try to involve residentialstaff with varying degrees ofsuccess…There are excellent systemsin place, and if the resettlement teamwas properly resourced these couldbe utilised to the full.Arguably,resettlement should have a highpriority within a young offenders’institution, where the highest rateof recidivism occurs.”

1.16 The NIPS Management Board haveformally accepted the audit findingsand recommendations.They intendto use it along with therecommendations of this inspectionreport as the basis for the next phaseof the Resettlement Strategy.

The Future

NIPS and PBNI identify somesignificant proposed developmentsthat are likely to impact on theResettlement Strategy in the nearfuture, and for which they areplanning.

1.17 The Sentencing Framework Reviewproposes indeterminate and extendedperiods in custody, along with asupporting infrastructure of recall,parole supervision and developed useof the Custody Probation Order.These are likely to increase the sizeof the prison population, at least inthe short term, and to include agrowing population of elderlyprisoners. For the increasing numbersof prisoners who will become subject

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to community supervision by PBNIafter release from custody,resettlement is not only aboutpreparation for practicalreadjustment, but also aboutpreparation for supervision in thecommunity – which is becomingincreasingly stringent and curtailingof liberty.

1.18 Even without prison populationincreases due to the SentencingFramework Review, the prisonpopulation is rising steadily anyhow,and the NIPS has plans toaccommodate over 100 extraprisoners at Maghaberry andMagilligan.

1.19 The NIPS Efficiency Programmerequires cuts of 149 operationalstaff from April 2007 (Maghaberry =83; Magilligan = 35; HBW = 31).It has been guaranteed that theResettlement Teams will not beaffected, but given the existingpractice of redeploying resettlementstaff it seems likely that resettlementresources will be further stretched.

1.20 Devolution of criminal justice to alocal Assembly would increase thelevel of local scrutiny of the prisonsystem. It might also cause greaterpressure to reduce the cost perprisoner place, and raise resettlementexpectations.

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Addressing the complexneeds of prisoners

CHAPTER 2:

2.1 The work identified in this area of theImplementation Plan establishes thebasis for developing all resettlementactivity within the NIPS and with itspartner agencies.Two objectivesand 14 actions were identified.Both objectives – reviewing prisonerregimes and developing a resettlementframework – are deemed to beachieved.

2.2 Assessed achievement levels inrelation to the actions are as follows:• Fully Achieved – 8• Partially Achieved – 3• Not Achieved – 3

The non-achieved actions involvereviews of prison transfers, pre-release framework and extensionof working out schemes.

2.3 Resettlement policies have beendeveloped at NIPS HQ and locallevels, and the concept ofresettlement is now better acceptedand understood in the prisons than itwas three years ago.A ResettlementStandard has been developed. It wasupdated in September 2006 tobecome clearer and moremeasurable.

2.4 A document for assessing prisoners’resettlement needs – theResettlement Needs Profile – was

drawn up after considerableconsultation, and based on bestpractice elsewhere.While there havebeen some initial teething problemsduring the pilot phase, further finetuning is planned throughout 2007-08. Many prisoners may not want orneed resettlement attention, butsharp assessment and deliveryprocesses are essential to ensureoptimum delivery of an importantresource.

2.5 Interagency public protection workis generally good. Many releasedprisoners are subjected to tightmanagement in the community andprohibited from participating incertain activities, to the extent thatagencies accept there are occasionswhen the need for public protectionwill run counter to the ResettlementStandard.The Assessment, CaseManagement and Evaluation (ACE)process is used for risk assessment.However the training of PrisonOfficers to undertake ACEassessments has not been fruitfulbecause many who were trained havesubsequently been redeployed awayfrom resettlement roles. Qualitycontrol of ACE assessments is also anissue, and consideration is being givento PBNI reverting to do all theassessments.

2.6 Foreign national prisoners’ needs arebeginning to be identified andaddressed.A workshop to addresstheir specific resettlement needs wasrun by the NIPS in March 2007, andVisitors Information Books have beentranslated into Cantonese, Spanish,Lithuanian and Polish.

2.7 A major gap in this area of theResettlement Strategy is thatsignificant groups of prisoners donot receive any resettlement input.Overcrowding of the prison estate,particularly at Maghaberry, isreported by the NIPS as a keypressure on the delivery ofresettlement services. In particularadult short term prisoners, remandprisoners (who have not beenconvicted of a crime and should beentitled to a greater level of services)and separated prisoners atMaghaberry are unlikely to benefit.Magilligan caters for its short termprisoners by compining committaland discharge interviews. Remandeesconstitute the bulk of Maghaberry’spopulation, and short termers are thepeople most likely to return toprison at an early stage.Althoughthe Resettlement Standard suggeststhat “provision to reduce the riskof reoffending is inappropriate forprisoners who are remanded fortrial,” this should not precludeattention being paid to their wideranging social problems, some ofwhich arise specifically as a result oftheir remand into custody. It is toHBWs credit that remand prisonersthere receive the same level ofresettlement input as sentencedprisoners – this opportunity shouldapply equally to all remand prisoners,irrespective of their location. We

recommend that theresettlement needs of groupssuch as remand prisoners andshort term prisoners should begiven greater priority.Thisprocess should be commencedby targeting remand and shortterm prisoners who are assessedas especially needy.

Files

2.8 NIPS data suggests 94% of eligibleprisoners (99% of lifers) wereworking to a Resettlement Planduring 2005-06.A resettlement casefile system has been introduced, andthe files that Inspectors viewedrepresented an improvement onrecent inspections insofar as therewas written information on eachprisoner who had signed up to aResettlement Plan; and reviewshad taken place. However few ofthe files portrayed a meaningful andup to date picture of prisoners’resettlement activity.There wasalso evidence of insensitive andinappropriate comments in files, aswell as references which werepredominantly about institutionalbehaviour rather than aboutprisoners as individuals.

2.9 The best files seen by Inspectorswere those held on prisoners in thePrisoner Assessment Unit (PAU).They were regularly updated withrelevant information, whilemaintaining focus on key aspectsof risk and resettlement, andincorporated a daily diary completedby the prisoner.Whilst Inspectorsrecognise that the PAUs smallnumbers and lower turnover makerecording easier,we recommend

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that the PAU file recordingprocess should be used as amodel for resettlement filerecording.

Transfers

2.10 Several prisoners and staff toldInspectors that resettlement progresswas impeded by being transferredbetween prisons.The numbers aresignificant: almost a thousandprisoners transferred fromMaghaberry to Magilligan during2005-06 and the only strategicoversight of transfers appears to beat a weekly transfer board which isdesigned to offset bedspace pressuresin Maghaberry by identifying prisonerswho should transfer to Magilligan.This board comprises representativesfrom Maghaberry and Magilligan, andhas an independent chair from NIPSheadquarters. Resettlement isbeginning to feature on the agenda,but the main criteria are security andmedical fitness.The board thatInspectors observed was well-run.However it operates under aheadquarters instruction which wasissued in 2000, when the estate wasless diverse and the ResettlementStrategy did not exist.The lack ofstrategic focus on transferopportunities across the entire estateseems to be a missed opportunity,and the NIPS agrees that its transferpolicy needs to be updated.

2.11 For example, the PAU is meant toreceive lifers approaching the endof their sentence and prisoners ontransfer from Foyleview: the reality isthat only six made that transferbetween January 2006 – February2007.Therefore the PAU Senior

Officer has to undertake a weeklytrawl of Maghaberry’s nominal roll inan attempt to maximise this valuableresource which could offer prisonersa tangible incentive.The PAU doesnot feature in official transfer boardarrangements nor by way of prisonersbeing made aware of opportunities tonominate themselves and earn theright to transfer, and there is nosystem for measuring equality ofaccess to transfers.

2.12 Magilligan runs a local assessmentpanel to decide upon progression toFoyleview.This has been problematicin the past as there was evidence thataccess was not equally available to allprisoners. NIPS has undertaken toaddress this issue and an observedmeeting for this inspection foundthat diversity formed part of theconsideration. Resettlement wasprioritised, and the ethos of thediscussion was positive, trying tofind reasons to include rather thanexclude applicants.

2.13 Theoretically the ResettlementFile should transfer with prisonerswhen they move between prisons.However this does not always happen– during 2006 only 46% of prisonerswho transferred from Maghaberry toMagilligan had resettlement plans.Even when files transfer, Inspectorssaw evidence of the receiving prisonundertaking fresh assessments,sometimes out of necessity andsometimes because their localapproach to resettlement wasdifferent. We recommend thatthe NIPS transfer policy shouldbe updated.This should takeaccount of the diversity of theNIPS estate, clearly notifying to

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prisoners the opportunities thatexist, and incorporatingresettlement and equity issues.

Lifers

2.14 The number of lifers (164 on April30th 2007) and potential lifers (40)in Northern Ireland is high andincreasing steadily. It includes severalwho have been recalled after beingreleased under the 1999 earlyrelease scheme and whose previousexperience of prison was verydifferent.The NIPS has completed auseful review of its lifer management,and subsequently updated the actionplans that arose from this review inNovember 2006 and March 2007.

2.15 Inspectors noted some recentimprovements in lifer management.Each lifer now has an annual review,which they are invited to attend;potential lifers have a needs analysiscompleted when they arrive intocustody; all staff in Maghaberry’sErne House, which holds most of thelifer population, had updated trainingduring 2006; and new accommodationhas been developed on theMaghaberry site to provide morerelaxed regimes for lifers who are atan advanced stage in their sentence.

2.16 While there is necessarily moreresettlement activity at some pointsduring a life sentence, concerns wereexpressed to Inspectors about thesufficiency of interventions at theearly stages. In addition the LifeSentence Review Commissioners(LSRC) expressed concerns aboutrisk assessment of lifers, lack ofopportunities for them to participatein relevant offending behaviour work,

inadequacy of provision for femalelifers, failure to comprehensivelyaddress the mental health needs oflifers, and other aspects of theirmanagement.This is an importantjoint area of work for the NIPS andPBNI – who are currently establishinga detailed set of standards for theirwork with lifers. We thereforerecommend that a separatethematic inspection of thelifer management system inNorthern Ireland should beundertaken.The timing ofthis inspection should allowtime for new practice in lifermanagement to bed in.

2.17 The Resettlement Strategy recognisesthat much resettlement activity willbe meaningless unless attention ispaid to the basic deficits faced bymany prisoners, such as literacy andnumeracy. It is reported that 51% ofprisoners with literacy and numeracydeficits achieved improvements during2005-06.This exceeded the NIPStarget.The target for City and GuildsBasic Skills achievement was notreached (36% of those eligibleachieved these awards). However,these are good examples of simpletargets being set and measured.

2.18 The Strategy aspired to undertakeprisoner surveys to measure theirsatisfaction levels with resettlementwork. No dedicated surveyshave been undertaken, thoughresettlement has featured in theroutine inspection surveys of eachprison, and also in general prisonersurveys undertaken by the ScottishPrison Service in 2006.The broadfindings of these surveys, as withprisoner feedback for this inspection,

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was that prisoners’ experience ofresettlement is often haphazard, anddetermined more by what is availablethan by their assessed need.

2.19 Home leave arrangements generallyseem to work well in terms of riskassessment and safe returns tocustody. Overall 78% (2,173/2,790applications) of home leaveapplications during 2005-06 weresuccessful. However only Magilliganappeared to use resettlement leave,for a small number of prisoners.And there has been virtually noinvolvement of prisoners’ families atResettlement Boards during thelifetime of the Strategy. Home leaveand family contact are very importantelements of the Strategy, and werecommend that NIPS shouldrecommit to them.

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3.1 Two objectives and seven actionswere identified. Both objectives –to deliver and evaluate offendingbehaviour programmes (OBPs) – aredeemed to be partially achieved.

3.2 Assessed achievement levels inrelation to the actions are as follows:• Fully Achieved – 2• Partially Achieved – 5

3.3 The key objective involved deliveryof accredited offending behaviourprogrammes – enhanced thinkingskills, cognitive behaviour, sexoffending, car crime and angermanagement.The resettlementdatabases show that 245 prisonersparticipated in prison based OBPsduring 2006:• 56 in Maghaberry;• 99 in Magilligan;• 90 in HBW.

These are low numbers in relation tothe entire prison population, and interms of fulfilling the ResettlementStandard to “reduce the risk ofreoffending and risk of harm.”

3.4 Numerous difficulties – which are notunique to Northern Ireland – besetdelivery of OBPs. Eligibility criteriaare a particular problem.Thefollowing groups cannot participate in

offending behaviour programmes:• Remand prisoners;• Prisoners with insufficient time

left on sentence;• Prisoners whose risk level is

deemed too low;• “Deniers” (prisoners who maintain

their innocence despite beingconvicted) and

• Prisoners with poor literacy levels.

While these criteria are perfectlyvalid, and essential for accreditationpurposes, they result in many fewerprisoners undertaking OBPs thanwould be desirable.The challengetherefore – which is beyond theresponsibility of NIPS alone – isto develop offending behaviourprogrammes for prisoners who arecurrently ineligible.Arrangements forprogramme design and accreditationwere drawn up in 2004 but havenot been implemented. Werecommend that NIPS andPBNI should work with othersto design and deliver offendingbehaviour programmes or otherrelevant interventions for awider range of prisoners,including “deniers.”

3.5 For those prisoners who are requiredto undertake OBPs as part of acourt order, PBNI has to deliver the

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Delivering offending behaviourprogrammes

CHAPTER 3:

programmes after release if theyhave not been undertaken in prison.PBNI has developed a peripateticteam to help deliver OBPs, andInspectors were told that despitemajor logistical problems, nobodyhas failed to be offered a programmein the community.

3.6 It was clear from discussions withreleased prisoners that theyrecognise they are being managedaccording to their risk levels, andthere were several instances wherenon-compliance was appropriatelydealt with by prompt initiation ofbreach proceedings.This wasconfirmed by file reviews which alsodemonstrated that the releasedprisoners were receiving appropriatesupport in conjunction with a rangeof other appropriate agencies.

3.7 Besides prisoner eligibility issues,delivery of OBPs within prisons ishindered by shortages of facilitators.Facilitation is a challenging, time-consuming and skilled role whichrequires continuously updatedtraining, opportunities to consolidateskills learned and to deliverprogrammes on a consistent basis.This is difficult for Prison Officers’because their shift patterns do not fitneatly, especially for sex offenderprogrammes which require the inputof three staff three times a week forten months.

Psychology

3.8 Developments within prisonpsychology during the past few yearshave not helped support OBPdelivery or other aspects of theResettlement Strategy.There were

indications that because of locationand reporting arrangements theChief Psychologist had perhaps notbeen as closely involved as shemight have been in line managementand policy work.This has resultedin independent psychologyarrangements being established foreach establishment, without clearmanagement or coordination.The LSRC was recently shocked todiscover that there was no qualityassurance process in relation to liferassessments, and there had beensome recent cases where theassessments provided to them hadbeen defective.

3.9 Inspectors were told that the role ofthe Chief Psychologist has recentlybeen clarified, and a job descriptionand oversight arrangements havebeen agreed with all interestedparties in establishments. It remainsto be seen whether this will remedythe difficulties and we recommendthat the NIPS should maintainclose oversight of its psychologyservices, and regularly reviewtheir functioning with allinterested parties.

3.10 While for 07-08, the NIPS hascommitted aprox. £200k forprovision of psychology services inestablishments, it has proven difficultfor the service to recruit and retainpsychologists. For the longer termthey have initiated discussions withgovernment workforce plannerssince neither local university has anacademic route for producing forensicpsychologists.

3.11 Prisoners are well aware that arefusal to engage with psychology is

14

likely to result in downgrading oftheir regime level.Yet they alsoknow that engagement is unlikely tolead to participation in appropriateprogrammes because of insufficientfacilitators or the problemshighlighted in paragraph 3.4. Suchoutcomes lead to cynicism on theirpart, and a sense that the system isineffective.

3.12 Reviews of OBPs and facilitators havebeen undertaken. Unfortunately theOBP review could not fulfil its basicrequirement for reconviction analysisbecause of incomplete data. Norcould the review of facilitators signalany clear way forward to address thisdifficult issue.

3.13 Despite the difficulties with OBPdelivery there are a wide range ofother programmes that work well inthe prisons.They are popular withprisoners and their families, andattract high levels of participation,although delivery is still dependenton the availability of facilitators, andtherefore often patchy. Many are runby voluntary and community sectorbodies (VCS), often in conjunctionwith Prison Officers.Theseprogrammes make a significantcontribution to resettlement byenhancing prisoners’ personaldevelopment and supporting theirfamilies through a difficult time.Theyinclude alcohol and drugs awarenessprogrammes, child centred visits,yoga, parenting programmes, literacyand reading schemes, job clubs, Dukeof Edinburgh’s Endeavour Award, aGood Relations programme andhealth promotion.

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4.1 One objective and six actions wereidentified.The objective – to establishthe multi-agency steering group – isdeemed to be achieved.

4.2 Assessed achievement levels inrelation to the actions are as follows:• Fully Achieved – 2• Partially Achieved – 4

4.3 The MASG meets twice annually,alternately chaired by NIPS and PBNI.Resettlement also features regularlyat meetings between the varioussignatory agencies, and there are arange of formal agreements tounderpin the work. In addition to theNIPS and PBNI the MASGs activemembership includes representativesfrom the Department of Health,Social Services and Public Safety(DHSSPS), Northern Ireland HousingExecutive (NIHE), NIACRO, NorthernIreland Office (NIO) and SocialSecurity Agency (SSA).

4.4 Progress in engaging strategicpartners in the Resettlement Strategyhas been varied. Documentation andinterviews indicate that this dependson how significant agencies perceiveoffenders are to their core business,and on how much effort is made toengage them meaningfully.This is nothelped by the fact that the Strategy isgenerally less clear about what is

actually expected of non-criminaljustice agencies.The NIPS havevigorously pursued opportunities toengage with community partners, butat times been rebuffed because ofstructural and funding impedimentse.g. when seeking affiliation to localFurther Education Colleges foreducation provision.This isexacerbated by the fact that theImplementation Plan lays ownershipfor delivery almost exclusively at theNIPS door, and there is much lessemphasis on the consequences of thisactivity within the community afterrelease. Given that resettlement isdefined as “…work in custody and onrelease…,” and that several statutoryproviders have signed up to theStrategy,we recommend that theImplementation Plan shouldbe updated to place greateremphasis on the contributionof the NIPS’ partners whileprisoners are inside; and onresettlement outcomes thatare achieved after release fromcustody.The underpinningprinciple should be thatprisoners have the same rightsas other citizens, save for theirloss of liberty.

4.5 It has proven difficult to get the rightpeople involved in the MASG,particularly to blend appropriate

Reintegrating prisoners into thecommunity with expert partners

CHAPTER 4:

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strategic and operational personnelfrom the relevant agencies e.g. theCentral Services Agency andDepartment of Employment andLearning are signatories to theResettlement Strategy, but have notparticipated in the MASG for sometime; there is no health perspective;and prison governors do not attend.It is important that the lead agenciescontinue to work to widen the net ofresponsibility for offenders.The NIPSand the NIO have also initiated aMinisterial Group on ReducingOffending with the purpose ofproviding a “structured, strategic andintegrated way forward” bringingtogether ministers with interests incriminal justice, health, education andsocial development.This approach -which is similar to the communityplanning model - aims to improvecoordination of the resettlementstrategy and deal with barriers.Pending developments by theMGRO, we recommend that theMASG composition should bereviewed, with a view to moreappropriate participation andwider ownership by setting moreexplicit objectives for all partneragencies.

Three main areas were identified inthis section of the Strategy: housing,employment and benefits advice:

Housing

4.6 In relation to housing the NIHE hasfunded a Housing Rights Service(HRS) pilot project for 24 months toadvise about more complex housingmatters, and to mentor resettlementstaff, since June 2006. Despiteagreeing a clear remit there have

been different interpretations ofthis post, leading to some confusionand unmet expectations. Howeverthe acknowledged benefit of theproject has been in flagging upaccommodation issues that need tobe addressed, and getting NIHE actionon them. It is noteworthy that mostof the beneficiaries in Maghaberry areremand prisoners, who otherwisereceive little resettlementintervention.The HRS generates hardoutcome data that shows tangibleprogress, which could provide amodel for measuring wider aspectsof the Strategy.

4.7 The NIHE were described as havinghelped make a practical differencein matters such as entry to directaccess hostels, though prisoners’accommodation needs are muchgreater than can be provided forwithin current arrangements.Consequently the NIHE is planning tojointly fund a second worker withNIPS for the prisons.They are alsoengaged in a specialist interagencyaccommodation group to address thesensitive issue of sex offenders’accommodation needs.

Employment

4.8 Members of the MASG were hopefulthat the Progress to Work initiative –which was established with theDepartment of Employment andLearning (DEL) - would provideopportunities to enhance prisoners’employability and support those withspecial needs.While they reporteddisappointment with DEL’s levels ofengagement and delivery, feedbackfrom DEL indicates that they view theProgress to Work programme as

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serving a wider client group thanprisoners, and suggest more couldhave been done to engage them withthe Resettlement Strategy.This is agood example of a situation whereroles and expectations need to bemore clearly agreed for the nextphase of the Resettlement Strategy.

4.9 Nonetheless there have been relevantachievements: Foyleview hasdeveloped a wide range of voluntarywork placements and managed toobtain fulltime employment for31ex-prisoners during the past year;and NIACRO exceeded its target of“enhancing the employability” of 300prisoners during 2006-7.There arealso local successes, such as in thedelivery of Multiskills (wallpapering,tiling etc) training at Magilligan toshort term prisoners.This is usefulfor prisoners at a personal level, evenif it does not lead to paidemployment. In planning the nextphase of the Resettlement Strategyacross the prison estate it may beuseful to prioritise training whichprovides flexibility and can lead toqualifications within a short time,given the high numbers of prisonerswho only spend short periods insentenced custody.

Benefits Advice

4.10 In relation to benefits advice theSSA seeks to make a practicalcontribution to the Strategy, althoughit considers itself to be on theperiphery of the criminal justicesystem.The SSA has delivered aseries of two-day training courses forthe NIPS and NIACRO staff andresearched the experience of ex-prisoners accessing the benefits

system to simplify and speed up theprocess.This has culminated in newoperational guidance.The SSA havealso part-funded a welfare rights postat HBW, and arranged for NIACROAdvice Workers to attend theirDistrict Managers’ meetings.

The Voluntary and Community Sector

4.11 Besides contributing to the housing,employability and benefits themes,VCS organisations have acquiredfunding to deliver a range of otherservices in the prisons e.g. parentingprogrammes (Barnardos),VisitorCentres (Quakers and NIACRO),Employability and Benefits Advice(NIACRO), Bereavement Volunteers(Cruse), Drugs/Alcohol counsellors(Northlands and Dunlewey),Opportunity Youth Support Workersat HBW.These and otherprogrammes are funded by NIPS andPBNI, and have added significantly toresettlement provision across theprison estate.

4.12 Inspectors heard several examples ofoperational difficulties and tensions inpartnership working: well-intentionedbut hasty initiatives that failed to takeaccount of previous learning;communications breakdowns thatcaused duplication of effort withinthe same establishment;VCS groupsfeeling undervalued at times; feedbacknot provided; disciplines with differentpriorities working in relative isolationfrom each other; overlapping servicesbeing provided in some areas.Theseare typical, but unnecessary problemsthat arise in partnership working.They can be costly in financial termsand energy, and require ongoingattention and commitment by

everyone involved in order to achievesolutions. In planning the way aheadafter this inspection it may be usefulfor the MASG agencies to hold anevent where they clarify roles andresponsibilities in order to operatemore effectively henceforth.

4.13 The VCS contribution is significantand enriches prison life. By providingessential links for some prisoners tocommunity agencies on release, theVCS represent an important andperhaps fragile thread betweencustody and the community.Furthermore, the VCS voice isimportant to support interventionssuch as resettlement which may beperceived as marginal. Some statutorybodies choose to deliver theirservices in prisons via the VCS.Thiscan work as long as the rationale andfunding arrangements are correct, andrelationships are sufficiently mature.

4.14 Inspectors were told that governmenthas recently proposed to change thecurrent basis for funding the criminaljustice voluntary sector. Basically thismeans that significant core costs willhave to be paid to the VCS by NIPSand PBNI.At a time when the NIPSand PBNI budgets are decreasing,they fear this will be impossible,though as outlined in CJIs “AddedValue” report in November 2006,such major change will requiredetailed planning and restructuringover a period of years.

4.15 The Resettlement Strategy would beseriously impoverished if the VCSinput were lost, and it is not only theVCS which has difficulty in resourcingresettlement activity.Although CJRrecommendation 208 suggested that

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“…the (Probation) service should beadequately resourced” to deliverresettlement services, PBNI also hasunresolved funding shortages andreports that it has received nofunding for resettlemement work inthe community.

Measurement

4.16 The resettlement needs of eachprison’s population are compiled ondatabases which have been designedand are maintained by the individualinitiative of prison staff.They providemanagement information and analysisof a wide range of activity includingOBP referrals and completions, risklevels, leave applications andoutcomes.The information generatedby these databases is useful formanagerial purposes, both locally andat headquarters level. It could beeven more accurate with a fewamendments, and would enablecomparisons if standardised betweenestablishments, especially if relevantmaterial was incorporated within theNIPS database. We recommendthat the resettlement databasesshould be slightly amended andstandardised betweenestablishments.

4.17 Quantitative measurement of theStrategys’ achievements has notworked well so far.As with anycriminal justice initiative, rates ofreoffending might be considered theultimate arbiter of success, though inreality this is an impossible measure,even with good longitudinal research.However basic measurable outcomesshould be applied e.g. benefitsprocessed within 24 hours of release;secured accommodation for release;

jobs/training positions taken up;literacy and numeracy levelsimproved against benchmarks. In thiscase agencies told Inspectors that thehigher level resettlement indicatorsare aspirational rather than realistic,there are no clear reportingmechanisms, and some agencies donot have appropriate measurementsystems in place.These concerns arenow being addressed and a moremanageable, smaller-scale systemhas been drafted for consideration.We endorse this progress andrecommend that the MASGshould adopt simpler and moremeasurable outcome monitoringagainst benchmarks in theResettlement Action Plan. Itshould retain the existing sevenareas/14 objectives, but reducethe 66 actions to a smaller,achievable number.

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5.1 Two objectives and 14 actions wereidentified. One objective – developingprison vocational and educationalservices – is deemed to be partiallyachieved, and the other – prisonersto achieve at least five hours per dayin constructive resettlement activity –is deemed not to be achieved.

5.2 Assessed achievement levels inrelation to the actions are as follows:• Fully Achieved – 4• Partially Achieved – 6• Not Achieved – 4

Outstanding actions in this section ofthe Strategy include expansion ofevening activities and training peermentors to assist with resettlement.

5.3 Areas of achievement includelunchtime opening of Maghaberryworkshops since October 2006;development of local employer linksfor Foyleview and PAU prisoners; andprovision of job kiosks in each prison.

5.4 That said the aspiration of prisonworking life reflecting the workingday outside is a long way from reality.At best the working day operatesbetween 10am – 12 noon and 2pm –4pm.This four hour period isfrequently eroded by late starts andearly finishes, confirming the view ofthe 2003 Resettlement Needs Survey

that the prisons in many ways stillrun to suit the needs of staff ratherthan the needs of prisoners.At HBWthe major criticism heard fromprisoners and some members of staffwas that the rigid timetable for theworking day does not reflect lifeoutside. Many prisoners stated thatthey would prefer to have a briefworking lunch in their workshoprather than the long locked uplunchtime period at present.

5.5 The working week picture is equallypoor.While 95% of Magilligan’sprisoners are notionally allocatedwork, much of this is neither fulltimenor meaningful: on one day duringthis inspection H1 had 87 prisonerson roll, of whom only 29 were shownas working. On another day H3A+ Bhad 42 on roll, but only 18 of thesewere actually working. Prisoners whowere engaged in work identified thatthey had very limited roles, both intime occupied and in stimulus. Even inmotivating settings such as educationor the Maghaberry Braille workshops,the system was blamed for deliveringan insubstantial experience: prisonersin Magilligan who were allocated fulltime education told Inspectors thatthey received only 1 x full day and2 x half days per week.This was noreflection on the teachers andinstructors who were reported as

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Developing a prison structure whichreflects the “working day” outside

CHAPTER 5:

being helpful and encouraging. Ratherit reflected an outdated, security-driven system that urgently needs tobe updated. We recommend theNIPS reaffirm its commitmentto both objectives in this area,and outline tangible stepstowards their fulfilment.

5.6 Each prison departments KeyPerformance Targets focus on volumerather than impact on prisoners.This has led to competition amongstactivity providers, meaning someprisoners end up in activities thatare inappropriate to their needswhile staff become frustrated byinconsistent attendance patterns.Current activity is poorly coordinatedand there is no particular priority,whereas English prisons’ purposefulactivity targets are set according tothe establishments’ securityclassification.

5.7 It is therefore inaccurate to think ofprisoners as a captive audience whoare readily available to partake inwork, therapeutic activities andoffending behaviour programmes.The reality is that, while they arecaptive, their availability is limited bylengthy and sometimes unpredictablelockup times (usually 22 hours perday for remand prisoners), othercommitments such as visits and courtappearances, gym, tuckshop, securitylockdowns and lack of cover forinstructors’ and teachers’ leave.

Security

5.8 Of all the challenges thatresettlement faces, it is thepredominant security culture thatmost impedes much of the progress

to which the NIPS aspires. High levelsof searching and shutdowns,combined with the fact that mostprisoners have to be escortedeverywhere within the prisons, have anegative impact on culture andrelationships.The November 2006review of prisoner securityclassification is illuminating. Itsuggests that 50% of NorthernIreland’s prisoners could have theirclassification downgraded.This reviewwas based on October 2005 datawhich showed that, of 1,369 prisoners:• 11% were classified as High Risk

(only 1.3% of the English prisonpopulation is high risk);

• 82% were Medium Risk;• 7% were Low Risk.

5.9 The review suggested “This situationis difficult to justify, particularlywhen there is a direct correlationbetween security classification andstaff/prisoner ratios, especially inMaghaberry…In fact the NIPS is amedium-low risk service…prisonersare held in inappropriate securityconditions for their risk level…Thisall causes problems and does notallow for the sharing of complexityof prisoner population betweenMaghaberry and Magilligan….Classification is imprecise andsubjective… As a Prison Servicewe have been risk averse ratherthan risk managers…”

5.10 Subsequently a new classificationmodel was locally-designed andtrialled, resulting in:• 9% of the population was

reclassified to High Risk;• 34% was reclassified to Medium

Risk;• 57% was reclassified to Low Risk.

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5.11 The review suggested that applicationof this model would producenumerous positive results, includingbetter role definition forestablishments; better staffdeployment; assist NIPS to shift awayfrom its “siege mentality;” and allowprisoners clear progression throughsentence.

5.12 The NIPS reports that it mustdetermine the future configurationof its estate and resolve humanresource issues before the reviewsrecommendations can beimplemented, although the 2007-2010Corporate Plan states that “A newsecurity classification model is to berolled out in 2007…” Of all thereviews recently undertaken by theNIPS, this is probably the mostimportant for resettlement purposes,and we recommend that theSecurity Classification Review’srecommendations beimplemented with a degree ofurgency.

5.13 The NIPS also undertook a PrisonerNeeds Constructive Activity Reviewin 2006, partly because skillsdelivered were not alwaysappropriate to the current jobmarket.That review is helpful inidentifying achievements by prisoners,including 396 national educationaccreditations, and over 500nationally recognised training awardsduring 2004-05. However itconcluded that there was nocoordinated strategy, large numbersof prisoners ended up in activitiesthat were inappropriate to theirneeds, and that “Non-Developmental”activity (court, wing orderly) oftentakes priority over “Developmental”

activity (work, programmes,education). It also pointed to usefullearning from other UK jurisdictionsand the RoI where education andvocational training are frequentlydelivered by external statutoryproviders. NIPS is addressing theseissues by its Progressive Regimes andEarned Privileges Scheme (PREPS)Review and by its attempts to engageexternal partners in the ResettlementStrategy.

5.14 There has been more focus on thedevelopment of charitable workthan meaningful work in each of theprisons.While some prisoners aremore willing to undertake such work,and it to some extent providesopportunities for reparation, it doesnot enable the skills developmentthat would enhance resettlementprospects.

5.15 Maghaberry managers expended alot of energy and money on securityupgrading to negotiate lunchtimeopening of their workshops inOctober 2006. It is thereforefrustrating for them to find evidenceof significant underusage of theworkshops. During the inspectionweek average official occupancy ofthe 120 places was 49%, thoughanecdotal feedback suggested theactual figure was a lot less. Therewere several reasons for this:• Automatic ineligibility of

remandees and separatedprisoners;

• Security blockages of otherprisoners

• Instructors on leave without coverfor their functions;

• Many prisoners were unwilling tocome:

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“It’s because the food is better inthe houses at lunchtime;”“The work I want (MotorMechanics) is not done there;”“There are too many drugs in theworkshops;”“The wages do not justify theeffort;”“If I go back to my cell overlunchtime I can watch TV in peace.”

• Communication breakdowns –officers simply not callingprisoners out to the workshops.

5.16 These reasons are both structuraland personal. Structural matters arewithin the control of prisonmanagers.They should be remediedto some extent by the PREPS Reviewwhich is potentially far-reaching, butwider cultural change will berequired to achieve meaningful andlasting progress.

5.17 Whilst the regime for separatedprisoners expanded in October 2006,the prisoners report it as still beingvery limited.Their separated statusmeans they cannot partake in manyof the activities that are available tothe main population. Education, gymand crafts are provided, but in eachinstance the numbers of participantsare restricted on security grounds.

5.18 At its most positive an ex-prisonerreported that he had saved asignificant sum earned from workundertaken while in Foyleview,which was very useful in assisting hisresettlement after release.

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Greater interaction betweenstaff and prisoners

CHAPTER 6:

6.1 Two objectives and five actions wereidentified. One objective – raising staffawareness – is deemed to be partiallyachieved; the other – developing therole of personal officers – is deemednot to be achieved.

6.2 Assessed achievement levels inrelation to the actions are as follows:• Fully Achieved – 0• Partially Achieved – 2• Not Achieved – 3

Apart from the personal officer role,the other outstanding actions involveresettlement training for “all prisonand probation staff.”

6.3 The actions in this area are mainlyabout meeting Prison Officers’training needs in relation toresettlement.They are importantbecause staff training has animportant role to play in achieving ahigher profile for resettlementgenerally. Magilligan has developedgood local resettlement training forprison staff, and has also begun todevelop a restorative justice policy.

6.4 Most of NIPS’ centralised trainingcontinues to emphasise the securityfeatures of the job, thoughresettlement elements now feature inthe new management training forPrincipal Officers and Senior Officers.

The NIPS training college is also at anadvanced stage of developing aworkshop focussing on resettlementfor officer grades, which is to bedelivered in autumn 2007. Eachestablishment has a tutor, and thereis also a Strategic LearningCommittee in place with governorrepresentation, which can beexpected to enhance the profile ofresettlement in time.

6.5 The NIPS Resettlement Auditcommented extensively on problemswith staffing resettlement teams:• “The staff outside Resettlement

Teams have a limitedunderstanding of how the processworks…In Maghaberry and HBWinsufficient staffing complementswere found to be critical, and iscurrently relying on the goodwillof staff to keep it on the radar.”

• “The Management Team at alllevels redeploy staff fromResettlement Teams when theyneed extra staff.This has a doublenegative effect – first it leaves theResettlement Teams unable todeliver services…Second itdelivers a message to the widerprison that resettlement is lessimportant and reinforces thenegative views towards thesechanges in practice.”

the personal officer role (mainlycontributing to safer custody, lifer andresettlement team work). It was alsoencouraging to learn that, of fortyprisoners spoken to at HBW thecomments about most staff were verypositive. In March 2007 the HydebankWood Governor received a ButlerTrust Achievement Award for hisinnovative work in breaking downbarriers and building mutual respectbetween staff and young offenders.

6.9 The HBW Inspectors commented:“Our overall impression echoed theprisoners’ comments.We found themto be very committed and generallyvery keen to develop theircontribution to the work of theprison.The fact that it is a small,informal friendly place can dilutesome of the official and formalmanagerial requirements that needto be spelled out, including aboutresettlement. Resettlement ishappening, but not stated – it couldbe done so much better if it weremore explicit.”

6.10 They suggested that there is anurgent need for some kind ofpersonal officer scheme for everyprisoner in HBW:“There is currentlyno sense in the minds of prisonersthat their personal sentences arebeing managed with a structuredbeginning, middle and end, or that aresettlement plan exists.

6.11 “We gained the impression that manypieces of the resettlement jigsawalready exist in HBW, and thesepieces are often of high quality withdedicated staff…What is so obviouslymissing at present is a systematic wayof putting the pieces together so that

6.6 Inspectors were told that NIPS has“too many staff in the wrong places”i.e. fulfilling security duties.This hasimpeded attempts to introduce apersonal officer scheme throughoutthe NIPS estate since 2000.Thehistorical lack of engagementbetween Prison Officers andprisoners has caused these efforts tofalter, while current shift patterns alsoinhibit continuity of staff-prisonercontact.

6.7 NIPS is aware of these problems, andis working to address them throughthe “Blueprint” human resourcestrategy. Inspectors were told thatthis strategy suggests a personalofficer scheme is unworkable for theNIPS for a variety of reasons,particularly because it might allowother staff to disengage fromprisoners. NIPS does not dispute thevalue of each individual prisonerhaving a named member of staff whowould take a special interest in theircase, and to whom they could turnfor advice or support, and aims tointroduce a “case management”system whereby every member ofstaff will be provided with relevantskills and training for all prisoners.Inspectors do not know the detailsof the case management system, butare concerned that it might not befully introduced for several years.We therefore recommend thatNIPS recommit to establishing apersonal officer scheme or itsequivalent for all prisoners,within a meaningful timescale.

6.8 While no formal personal officerscheme operates in anyestablishment, Inspectors observedseveral NIPS staff effectively fulfilling

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they make up a specific resettlementbig picture for each prisoner.Although there are weeklyresettlement meetings, prisoners donot attend, and the meetings tend toconfuse management processes withdelivery processes.” We thereforerecommend that a dedicatedResettlementTeam should beestablished promptly in HBWpending a personal officersystem being put in place.

6.12 We make two further relatedrecommendations that apply toboth HBW and Maghaberry:(i)The governors and theirsenior management teamsshould articulate clearly the wayin which their establishmentcontributes to the NorthernIreland Resettlement Strategy;(ii)They should also articulatethe various contributionsexpected from different groupsof staff in the establishment.

6.13 Unlike HBW, most prisoners in theadult estate were less positive abouttheir interaction with staff.Relationships were reported asgenerally respectful, but distant andreactive.The prisoners were lessinclined to focus on resettlementissues than on their court case orthe grind and trivia of daily prisonlife. Ex-prisoners however were morepositive on reflection about theirtime in custody.Two of themcommented:• “The Personal Officer system was

meaningless but there were someyou could call a friend.”(Maghaberry prisoner).

• “My Personal Officer (inFoyleview) was dead-on.”

6.14 Whilst several lifers told Inspectorsthat the Personal Officer Scheme isnominal, the lifer reviews that wereobserved had good input fromuniformed staff in attendance. Eventhough not designated as “PersonalOfficers” they clearly knew theprisoners by first name, and wereaware of relevant current issues.

6.15 The proposed restorative justiceprogramme has not yet beenimplemented at each establishment.However, Magilligan has undertaken apilot project with nine victims so farmeeting the prisoners who hadoffended against them.The projecthas been carefully managed, withselection of appropriate cases.The experience is described aspowerful and rewarding for allvictims, prisoners and staff involved.Everyone benefits from this type ofinnovation and it should be replicatedmore widely in the next phase of theResettlement Strategy.

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7.1 Three objectives and twelve actionswere identified. One objective –maintenance of family links – isdeemed to be achieved, the othertwo – encourage healthy lifestyles,and provide support for personalitydisordered offenders – are deemedto be partially achieved.

7.2 Assessed achievement levels inrelation to the actions are as follows:• Fully Achieved – 6• Partially Achieved – 4• Not Achieved – 2

The most obvious non-achievedaction involved enabling family visitsto take place at the family home.

7.3 Transfer of lead responsibility forprison healthcare to the HealthService took place in April 2007,when the Eastern Health and SocialServices Board began to commissionservices from local Health and SocialServices Trusts on behalf of all threeprisons.This is a significantachievement which should improvehealthcare for prisoners, though it isexpected to take a long time to fullyimplement, since there are issuessuch as clinical governance and thestatus of current healthcare staff tobe resolved. We recommend thatNIPS and PBNI in conjunctionwith appropriate agencies shouldredraft the healthcare section of

the Implementation Plan toensure appropriate targets areset for the new era of prisonhealthcare provision.

7.4 There have been severalachievements in terms of promotinghealthier and prosocial lifestyles(most of which were not targeted inthe Resettlement ImplementationPlan).These include:• Seven Alcohol and Drugs

Management Programmes weredelivered to 77 prisoners during2006;

• The absence of any suicide inHBW during the past 7 years wasrightly seen by staff as a goodachievement;

• Wellman Clinics have beenestablished at Magilligan;

• NIPS has appointed an AddictionServices Manager – this isparticularly important given theproblems of drugs abuse withinprisons;

• A three year project has beenestablished with the University ofUlster to improve mental healthscreening upon committal toMaghaberry;

• Three Cognitive BehaviourTherapists provide weekly sessionsat HBW;

• Smoking cessation programmeshave been established in eachprison, complemented by nicotine

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Promoting healthier andpro-social lifestyles

CHAPTER 7:

replacement therapy;• Workshops have been delivered by

the Dunlewey and NorthlandsCentres on drugs, stress and anger,coping skills and suicide/self harmand

• In September 2006, NorthernIreland Prison Service and HealthPromotion Agency for NorthernIreland hosted a conference onPromoting Healthy Prisons.

7.5 Several prisoners told Inspectorsthat they experienced difficulty withchanges to their medication afterentering prison.They reportedparticular difficulties in this respectupon transfer to Magilligan becausethe Magilligan doctors prescribingpractices were not consistent withthose at Maghaberry. Several wereappreciative of the healthcare thatthey received, reflecting high levels ofalcohol and drug abuse when living inthe community:“I got sorted out physically while injail.”“Jail probably saved my life.”“I got a lot out of jail…it settled myhead and removed me from the oldcompany…”“Being remanded was probably thebest thing that ever happened me.”“Jail did me good…it got me off thecannabis.”

7.6 Maghaberry has taken significantlocal action in relation to the targetto develop vulnerable prisonerprogrammes. Its multidisciplinarySafer Custody Group was found tobe providing good case managementof prisoners who were at high risk ofharm or difficult to manage becauseof personality disordered behaviour.Maghaberry’s Risk Assessment and

Social Unit (RASU) scheme hashelped poor copers, thoughInspectors’ observations of RASUagain demonstrated the problems ofsecurity dominance: during theinspection week there were eightprisoners in the RASU; three of themwere barred by Security fromworking in the Gardens, yet Gardenscomprised 60% of the RASU“working week”! On the other handindividual feedback from a releasedprisoner who had spent his time inthe RASU showed how it could workwell:“I did gardening, yoga, art, craft,English and Maths tests, and the IMB(Independent Monitoring Board)visited regularly to see that I wasOK.”

7.7 More recently the Reach unit hasbeen under development: 24prisoners (both remanded andsentenced) will live on a dedicatedlanding from April 2007, while up toforty others are managed by Reachwithin the general population. Reachaims to stabilise unsettled ordisruptive prisoners before graduallyreintegrating them with the mainpopulation. It incorporates anIsolated Visitor Scheme and isdeveloping a Family Strategy – whichshould relate to relevant areas of theResettlement Strategy - that isintended to be applied across theprison estate.

7.8 As with so many initiatives thatsupport resettlement, this is a localdevelopment in one establishmentrather than an initiative which has arecognised place within the prisonestate. Such schemes are at risk iflocal champions take on other

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priorities or are moved elsewhere.Good practice is less likely to extendacross the NIPS estate, and there isno strategy for ensuring that eligibleprisoners who are held in otherprisons (and Inspectors heard fromthe IMB of such prisoners, sometimesheld in the Segregation Units) can bemoved to the Reach unit.

Prisoners’ Families

7.9 This section of the ResettlementStrategy also targets work withprisoners’ families.There has beenmuch good work undertaken in thisarea by each prison, particularly inrelation to delivery of parentingprogrammes and expansion of childcentred visits.The MaghaberryInspectors noted that “We shouldpraise the work of the FamilyOfficers and the role they play insupporting family relationships.” Theyhad 1069 family contacts during 2006,providing a range of practical andemotional support: birthday cakes,opportunities for fathers to recordstories for their children and familyphotos, staffing child centred visits,making referrals to parenting andother classes.As reported in previousinspections, there were again manypositive comments from prisonersand their families about the NIPSFamily Officers.They and othersengaged in resettlement show thatcapacity and willingness are availablewithin the Prison Service.Theseattributes can be harnessed byawareness raising and training, but arefrustrated by redeployment to otherduties.

7.10 The former Prison Link project hasnow been transferred entirely toNIACRO and renamed Family Links. Itprovides a range of practical support(e.g. transport, childminding, benefitsadvice) for prisoners’ families. It isdeveloping well, and has benefitedfrom the secondment of a fulltimePrison Discipline Manager. FamilyLinks is jointly funded by PBNI andthe YJA, and is also seeking SocialServices support in relation topreventative intervention with thechildren of prisoners. NIACROconvenes an interagency children ofprisoners group to address theirunique needs.

7.11 Each prison has a Visitor Centre, runby the Quakers or NIACRO.TheVisitor Centres and transport arelargely funded by NIPS.They providean excellent service (food and drink,childcare, transport, advice) and havegood working relationships withfamilies and with prison staff.Thereare high levels of annual usage, and aVisitors Centre Forum helps ensuregood communication between serviceproviders and the NIPS.

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8.1 Two objectives and seven actionswere identified. Both objectives –develop a female resettlement policy,and develop a constructive femaleregime - are deemed to be partiallyachieved.

8.2 Assessed achievement levels inrelation to the actions are as follows:• Fully Achieved – 3• Partially Achieved – 3• Not Achieved – 1

The outstanding action involvesdevelopment of video linking tosupport retention of family links.

8.3 NIPS and its partners have workedhard to develop the regime forwomen within HBW.A new, self-regulating wing was opened inApril 2007 and there are plans for anew reception wing and separateworkshops. NIPS has aspirations tobuild a separate women’s facility buthave no idea when they will be ableto do so. So the position remainsthat the women are likely to haveto stay in a basically unsatisfactorylocation for the indefinite future.The existence of a womens’ prisonwithin the perimeter of a maleYoung Offenders Centre continues topresent major challenges for the dayto day operation of HBW.Women

prisoners expressed concern that theestablishment was dominated by theneeds of the young men, and thosesmall number who had previouslybeen imprisoned in Mourne Housetold Inspectors that it provided apreferable environment.

8.4 Basic aspects of daily prison life suchas the womens diet at HBW werecriticised.The diet was generallyreported as geared towards thetastes of twenty year old males andunsuitable for them. Managers withresponsibility for the womenprisoners expressed frustration at themale-dominated culture of HBW andfelt powerless to achieve even basicchanges to issues such as the diet.

8.5 There were other gender-relatedgrievances, such as the women notbeing allowed to wear shorts or teeshirts in the warmer weather becauseit led to the young men shouting atthem inappropriately. Unlike maleprisoners, women cannot work inthe central kitchen, nor deliver foodwithin the establishment.Whilerecognising that much has been doneto improve the conditions for womenprisoners in HBW, it is fundamentallyinappropriate that they continue toshare a location with young maleprisoners and we again

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Supporting women in custodyand on release

CHAPTER 8:

recommend relocation of thewomen prisoners to a dedicatedsite.

8.6 Inspectors spoke with two womenex-prisoners. One woman said she“…relied on other prisoners forsupport, though…had goodrelationships with some staff…gymstaff were best of all…I got my jobback after release…was helped tocontinue my foundation course viathe library in Hydebank.”Another said that “Mourne Housewas better than Hydebank becausethe young boys’ misbehaviour affectedus. I was helped by Probation, Cruseand Womens Aid.”

8.7 The major ongoing issue from thispart of the Implementation Plan is forNIPS to develop community-baseddiversionary programmes inconjunction with PBNI.A substantialamount of work has already beenundertaken in this respect, resulting ina detailed Business Plan for a centrethat would provide residentialaccommodation as an alternative toremand in custody, as well as a DayCentre for female offenders.TheBusiness Plan has now been acceptedby the NIHE, though this is a majorproposal involving several agencies,which is likely to take some time toreach fruition.

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Appendices

Section 2

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Appendix 1 Methodology

Six inspectors (2 per prison) spent a week in each of the prisons, and met releasedprisoners in local Probation facilities and hostels.

A total of 112 serving prisoners and 26 released prisoners were interviewed;

Interviews were conducted with NIPS and PBNI managers and staff, plus key staff frompartner agencies;

Resettlement files and Probation files were reviewed;

A range of meetings were observed;

Detailed background reading was undertaken, including review of statistical and policydocumentation that was provided by the NIPS and PBNI;

The Prison Inspectorate’s “Expectations” document provided the basis for interviews.Expectations requires that resettlement is managed strategically and that all prisonersshould have a sentence plan based upon an individual assessment of risk and need, whichthey are involved in designing and which is regularly reviewed.

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Appendix 2 Comparisons

England and Wales

Two recent publications provide useful comparison with the resettlement position inEngland and Wales:

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons Annual Report for 2005 – 2006 suggests thatresettlement work is not good:“Prisoners continued to undergo a large number of assessments and interviews, but theirresults were rarely coordinated and followed through consistently during sentence. Planswere drawn up (though not always for those serving short sentences) but no individual wasresponsible for ensuring that they were followed, or for monitoring progress against targetsset.Targets were often not shared with key personnel and sentence plans were notroutinely used to inform key decisions about how the prisoner would spend time incustody…Personal Officers were rarely involved in sentence management, and entries inprisoners’ history sheets reflected this…Too often, responsibility for meeting plannedtargets effectively remained with the prisoner.” [P60]

“…Access to relevant and timely interventions and programmes…has been adverselyaffected by prisoner numbers: some prisons had hundreds of prisoners queuing up forcourses they would be unable to take before release…There was underuse of release ontemporary licence for resettlement purposes.” [P62]

The report also says that the role of voluntary and community organisations inresettlement was “patchy and long term funding uncertain…nor were these services alwayswell coordinated.” [P61]

Fewer than a quarter of prisoners surveyed felt that they were gaining useful employmentskills or drug treatment, and only around one third felt that their education would be usefulon release;

Only 30% of men in local prisons felt that they had done anything during their sentencewhich would make them less likely to reoffend. However two thirds of those in trainingprisons, and over half of young adults, did believe that they had done something that wouldmake them less likely to offend in the future.

There were more negative than positive assessments in women’s prisons, although womenprisoners’ relationships with staff were good, and women were also more likely to say thatthey knew where to go for help with resettlement issues even if, in practice that help wasassessed as insufficient.

The group of adult prisons with the most positive balance of assessments wereopen/resettlement prisons, where 95% of prisoners believed that they had done somethingthere which would make them less likely to reoffend.

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“What works in Resettlement – Findings from seven Pathfinders for short term prisoners inEngland and Wales” (Lewis et al in Criminology and Criminal Justice Vol 7 No 1 Feb 2007).

This is an evaluation of Phase One of seven projects focussing on the needs of adultssentenced to prison for 12 months or less, who were currently not subject to post-releasesupervision.This evaluation also shows that it has been difficult to make progress inresettlement:

“The programmes were hampered by implementation problems particularly in relation todevelopment, staffing and management…Staffing problems were an ongoing hindrance…”[P38]

Some teams “…regularly lost actual and potential participants who were transferred toother prisons because of overcrowding…some projects encountered a culture of resistanceand obstruction among prison staff…project participants were often unable to accessprison-based provisions due to long waiting lists and the limited time that they spent incustody…gaps in provision and long waiting lists existed.” [P39]

“All the projects struggled to meet their target number of participants…due to staffshortages, a lack of eligible prisoners, and the transfer of short term prisoners…The gapbetween the total of prisoners with case records opened (1,081) and the original targetnumbers (2,500) gives some indication of the extent of the problem.” [P39]

Scotland

The Scottish Prison Service (SPS) operates in the context of a burgeoning population (7,324

on 13th March 2007) and high levels of investment in capital build, which includes someprivate contract provision. It manages its 14 public sector prisons by internal contracts.These contracts require measurement of resettlement activity including risk and needsassessments undertaken, programme completions, vocational and employment-relatedqualifications achieved and accommodation secured for release.The SPS are able to showclear progress in resettlement since the internal contractual process commenced in 2003.Aparticularly useful target is completion of an annual survey of prisoner perceptions whichcovers a wide range of issues.

The SPS reports that the routine presence of external statutory agencies in mostestablishments is of key importance in delivering their resettlement targets. Benefits andhousing providers visit most prisons each week.This ensures that prisoners and theirfamilies maintain connection with essential services. It also helps to avoid benefit fraud andensure that families’ claims are quickly processed to deal with their new circumstances.

The capital build process underway within the SPS incorporates Links Centres which aresimilar to Magilligans PDU.These are jointly-staffed by Prison Officers, statutory housingand advice workers and VCS partners, where offending behaviour and personal developmentprogrammes are delivered.There is a fledgling restorative practices approach in some

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establishments, and as in Northern Ireland the range of programmes delivered reflects amixture of prisoner need, available funding and staff committment.

Republic of Ireland

Feedback from the Irish Prison Service suggests that “There is no current strategic focus onresettlement. Prison Officers are not directly involved in resettlement work, though they domake referrals to the Probation Service and other agencies.Whilst some prisoners arereferred onto accommodation, training and education programmes, it is very much hit andmiss.A lot of work and resources would need to be put in place to develop a proper andadequate service.”

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Appendix 3 Definitions

Resettlement: “A systematic and evidence based process by which actions are taken towork with the prisoner in custody and on release…It encompasses the totality of workwith prisoners, their families and significant others in partnership with statutory andvoluntary organisations.”

Resettlement Performance Standard: “All prisoners will have the opportunity to maintainand develop appropriate community ties and to prepare for their release. Provision by thePrison Service in collaboration with the PBNI will be targeted on the basis of anassessment of risks and needs and directed towards reducing the risk of reoffending andrisk of harm.”

There are two exceptions to the Standard: civil prisoners and prisoners subject to a wholelife tariff (there is only one such prisoner in Northern Ireland).

“Short Term Prisoner” A prisoner who is serving less than four years

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