an interpretation of 1953 presidential election

7/30/2019 An Interpretation of 1953 Presidential Election

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An Interpretation of the Philippine Election of 1953

Author(s): Harold F. GosnellSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 1954), pp. 1128-1138Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951015 .

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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILIPPINEELECTION OF 1953*HAROLD F. GOSNELL

American UniversityConditions for the successful operation of the democratic form of govern-

ment have not been present in the Orient. Democracy requires a people whohave confidence in themselves, in their leaders, and in the democratic processes,and who have the means for operating democratic institutions. Included in thetools that make democracy work are literacy, a willingness to abide by the rulesof the game, and a rapid means of communication and transportation.' In theOrient a fatalistic view regarding government is widespread. People in thelower income groups feel that government is an institution of the few, by thefew, and for the few. Vote buying, spoils politics, favoritism, nepotism, graft-ing, the squeeze, the hold up, the percentage are all taken for granted. As oneFilipino senator put it, "Graft and corruption are inherent in human nature."2The Orient also suffers from the primitive character of means of transportationand communications. Roads are bad, newspapers have limited circulations,telephones and telegraph stations are few, radios are scarce, and travel is oftencomplicated by hazards of water, mountainous terrain, bandits, and wild ani-mals.The Philippine elections of November 10, 1953 show that the difficulties thathave hindered the growth of democracy in the Orient can be overcome.3 Beforethe elections apprehension was widespread that extensive use might be madeof fraud and terror to defeat the free expression of the popular will. The electiondemonstrated that popular sentiment could be mobilized and its expression pro-tected in a Far Eastern country with limited experience with democratic in-stitutions. The election was, therefore, an especially serious setback to commu-nism and fascism.

It should not be expected that a country governed for four hundred and fiftyyears by foreigners would develop leaders of its own overnight. In governing thePhilippines the Spaniards made little attempt to train the Filipinos for self-* The author was in the Philippines as an observer of the November, 1953 elections

for president and national legislature.1 Harold F. Gosnell, Democracy: Threshold of Freedom (New York, 1948); Richard

McKeon and Rokkan Stein, Democracy in a World of Tensions; A Symposium Preparedby UNESCO (Chicago, 1951); Robert Strausz-Hupd and Stefan T. Possony, InternationalRelations in the Age of Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship (New York, 1950).

2 Senator Jos6 Avelino, quoted by Philippines Herald, Oct. 21, 1953.3 Harold F. Gosnell, "Filipinos Hold Free Election," National Municipal Review, Vol.

43, pp. 120-22 (March, 1954); T. Durdin, "Philippines Awaits a New Deal," Reporter,Vol. 10, pp. 17-19 (Jan. 5, 1954); T. Durdin, "Filipino Emerges as a New Asian Leader,"New York Times Magazine, Nov. 22, 1953, p. 17; C. P. Romulo, "Right Man Wins,"Atlantic, Vol. 193, pp. 50-52 (Feb., 1954).

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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION OF 1953 1129government. They did not provide universal education, they kept the Filipinosdivided by their local dialects, they failed to build a modern system of com-munication and transportation, and they set the example of a highly central-ized government operated for the benefit of the few. The United States, inslightly less than half a century, made some progress in introducing universaleducation, teaching English as a common language, training leaders, and devel-oping communications.4 But democracy has to be learned through experience,and for the Filipinos the process of learning really began July 4, 1946, theirIndependence Day.The first elections for the republic were actually held before IndependenceDay. Sergio Osmefia, who became the President in exile when President Quezondied in 1944, ran for re-election in April, 1946 as the candiate of the Nacionalistaparty. Had he been given a free hand, he might have been re-elected. When hereturned from exile, he wanted to outlaw all who had collaborated with theJapanese occupation. General MacArthur prevented his doing this by directingthe calling of a session of Congress which included a number of collaborators.One of these, Senator Manuel Roxas, had been long a rival of PresidentOsmefia.Roxas led the formation of a new political party, called the Liberal party,which challenged President Osmefia's bid for re-election. The Liberals, an off-shoot from the Nacionalistas, charged the Osmefla administration with ineffi-ciency, weakness, and favoritism. Effective as a speaker and backed by a largefaction of former Nacionalistas, Roxas waged a vigorous campaign, whilePresident Osmefila refused to exert himself. Roxas won by a narrow margin.'The election proved that the administration could be changed by democraticmeans and showed that it might be possible to build up a two-party system inthe Philippines.6The Roxas administration was disappointing to many. The new presidentfailed to convince the people that he was governing primarily for their benefitrather than for that of the favored few. Spoils and graft in the disturbed postwardays were hard to eliminate. In his two years in office Roxas failed to live up tothe promises of his campaign.7Former Senator Elpidio Quirino, who had been elected vice president in 1946as a Liberal, became president in April, 1948 following the sudden death ofPresident Roxas. Before he became president, Quirino had not been regardedas an outstanding political leader. He had neither the oratorical powers of

4C. Ralston Hayden, The Philippines, A Study of National Development (New York,1942).5 The returns were: Roxas, 1,333,392; Osmefla, 1,129,996.6Bernard Seeman and Laurence Salisbury, Cross-Currents in the Philippines (AmericanCouncil, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946). This discussion has a curious blind spot on

the Communist leadership in the Huk movement. On the party system in the Philippines,see Hayden, op. cit.; Jos6 M. Aruego, Philippine Government in Action (Manila, 1953);George A. Malcolm, First Malayan Republic, The Story of the Philippines (Boston, 1951).

7 Manila Sunday Times Magazine, Oct. 25, 1953, pp. 14-16; C. F. Nivera, "PoliticalReview," in Philippine Yearbook 1950-1951 (Manila, 1951), p. 108.



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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION OF 1953 1131Quezon or Roxas, nor the organizing abilities of Senator Jos6 Avelino or SpeakerEugenio Perez. The son of a jail warden of Spanish days, Quirino acquired aneducation, including a law course, in the early days of the American regime,earning his way by government clerkships. He learned politics and administra-tion under the Americans, serving as representative, senator, Secretary ofFinance, Secretary of the Interior, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He hadmarried into a wealthy family, and had no financial need to indulge in spoilspolitics. It was charged that he had collaborated to some extent with the Jap-anese;8 to counterbalance this charge, however, his supporters could point to thekilling of his wife and two of his children by the Japanese. As Secretary ofForeign Affairs he had several diplomatic victories to his credit.President Quirino started out with plenty of goodwill, but lacked the vigor-ous health needed for a clean-up administration. His own friends betrayed hisconfidence and he found it difficult to get rid of them. Instead he used thetechniques of palace intrigue, keeping secret dossiers and using them when hefelt that his power was threatened.9The elections of 1949 were disillusioning to those who hoped to see increasingacceptance of democratic methods. President Quirino gained control of thenominating machinery by bringing graft charges against Senator Jose Avelino,who was trying to unseat him. Senator Avelino bolted the Liberal conventionand ran on a Liberal ticket of his own. The Nacionalistas put forward Jos6Laurel, an effective orator who had been president during the Japanese occu-pation and who wanted to vindicate his record. Laurel claimed that GeneralMacArthur had left him behind to do what he could for his people.President Quirino was apparently unwilling to take his chances in a free elec-tion. The temptation to bring pressure to bear upon the voters was too strong.He used the vast powers of the executive, inherited from Spanish times, to in-fluence the result. It was charged that he used the Philippine Constabulary,the provincial treasuries, the mayors, and other officials to terrorize the votersand manipulate the results. In contests following these elections several Liberalrepresentatives lost their seats. It was alleged that ghosts, monkeys, and beeswere allowed to vote in some provinces. While the official returns gave Presi-dent Quirino 1,796,446 votes, Laurel 1,303,575, and Avelino 419,890, Laurelnever admitted that he been defeated.'0

8 Malcolm, First Malayan Republic (cited in note 6), p. 185; Seeman and Salisbury,Cross-Currents in the Philippines (cited in note 6), p. 22; Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal inthe Philippines (New York, 1946).

9 Malcolm, p. 301; "The Tenant in Malacanan," Manila Sunday Times Magazine,Oct. 25, 1953, pp. 14-16; Jos6 L. Guevara, "LP Chances in the Elections," Ibid., Oct. 25,1953, pp. 30-31; Isidro L. Tetizos, "Why the LP Is Confident of Victory," Counter-Point,Manila. Oct. 20, 1953, pp. 2-3.10Nivera, "Political Review" (cited in note 7). The 1953 presidential elections markeda high point in popular participation in the Philippines as a whole. In spite of this, the votecast in 1949 in the provinces of Negros Occidental and Lanao was far higher than it wasin 1953. In Lanao 150 per cent of the estimated number of eligible voters were registeredin 1951, according to the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL.)



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1132 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWIn the meantime, the problems facing the government were mounting. Im-

portant among these was the growing power of the Communist-led Hukguerrilla movement The Huks or Hukbalahaps were an offshoot of a wartimeguerrilla group. In central Luzon, where farm tenancy and unemployment werehighest, the Huks were making rapid inroads by promises and threats just asthe Communists were doing in other parts of Asia. The armed forces of thePhilippines were unable to cope with the situation; their morale was low andthey were not popular with the local population, because of the high-handedmethods they sometimes used."The United States made the granting of military aid contingent on the im-provement of the internal security situation. A young legislator by the name ofRamon Magsaysay was acceptable to the United States as a new Secretary ofDefense.'2 President Quirino appointed him to the post in 1950. The son of ablacksmith, lMagsaysay had earned his way through college driving a taxicab.Starting out as a mechanic, he rose before the war to the position of manager ofthe Zambales branch of a transportation company. His lorries were requisi-tioned by the Americans. After the surrender to the Japanese, he fled to the hillsand became a captain of guerrillas. Following liberation he was made militarygovernor of Zambales. No one could question his war record. He was firstelected to the House of Representatives from Zambales as a Liberal in 1946. Inthe House he stood out as a champion of the interests of the veterans and as acritic of his own party for demoralizing the army and failing to control the Hukmenace.

As Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay tackled the main problems facing theDepartment with great vigor. His rules seemed to be: promotion in the armyon the basis of merit without favoritism and nepotism, elimination of thecauses of discontent, rehabilitation of the Huks willing to surrender. Themeasures adopted improved the morale of the army, led to the arrest of prom-inent members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines, kept increasingmilitary pressure on the Huks, placed relations between soldiers and civilianson a better basis, and resettled a respectable number of Huks on farms in thepublic lands of Mindanao. His record was so outstanding that it caught theimagination of the people and as early as 1951 he was hailed as the next presi-dent of the Philippines. His prestige was enhanced by the attention that heattracted abroad, particularly in the United States, where he became the sub-ject of a number of articles in magazines of wide circulation.'3

11 Russell H. Fifield, "The Hukbalahap Today," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 20, pp. 13-18(Jan. 24, 1951).

12 Mr. Magsaysay said on October 17, 1953, in a speech; "Ask Mr. Quirino if it is nottrue that the United States refused to enter into the military assistance pact unless hefirst cleaned out the corruption and inefficiency of his armed forces. Ask him if it is nottrue that when he suggested that I be made Secretary of National Defense, the Americannegotiators promptly agreed, and only then was the pact concluded." Philippines FreePress, Oct. 31, 1953, p. 55.13Robert Shaplen, "Huks, Foe in the Philippines," Colliers, Vol. 127, pp. 11-13(April 7, 1951), and "Letter from Manila," New Yorker, Vol. 27, p. 96 (April 7, 1951);



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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION OF 1953 1133As the 1951 senatorial and provinicial elections approached, PresidentQuirino gave his Secretary of Defense the job of trying to insure the honesty ofthe voting. Secretary Magsaysay performed this task so well that the elections

were generally accepted as fair and clean. The Nacionalista senatorial can-didates defeated the Liberal candidates, including the President's brother,Tony Quirino. All Nacionalista candidates were elected, polling about 59 percent of the total vote.14The growing rivalry between the President and his Secretary of NationalDefense made a break between the two men inevitable. On February 28, 1953,Secretary Magsaysay resigned from the cabinet and issued a statement in whichhe said in part: ". . . it would be useless for me to continue as Secretary of Na-tional Defense with the special duty of killing Huks as long as the administra-tion continues to foster and tolerate conditions which offer fertile soil for Com-munism and I have repeatedly and publicly said that merely killing dissidentswill not solve the Communist problem. Its solution lies in the correction ofsocial evils and injustices and in giving people a decent government free fromdishonesty and graft."'5 Magsaysay left the Liberal party and Senators Laureland Recto backed his nomination as the Nacionalista party candidate forpresident. At the Nacionalista convention, Senator Laurel and other senatorialleaders were able to persuade most of the delegates to support Magsaysay forthe nomination. A small number of delegates held out for Senator Osias andthen bolted the party to the opposition.In the Liberal convention, former Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo sought thenomination but the control of the delegates was firmly in the hands of PresidentQuirino. Vice President Fernando Lopez, who had been refused a renominationby the Liberals, joined forces with Romulo. Both men bolted the Liberal partyand formed a new Democratic party which campaigned until the middle ofAugust, at which time the two men withdrew their candidacies and formed acoalition with the Nacionalista party. Lopez became a candidate for senator onthe Nacionalista-Democratic ticket.

IIRepresenting the old order, President Quirino made a last stand. Some of hisLiberal colleagues had wisely urged him to step aside,'8 but he clung to the ideathat he might repeat his performance of 1949. He found it hard to believe that

Time, "Cleanup Man," Vol. 58, pp. 33-34 (Nov. 26, 1951); W. L. Worden, "Robin Hoodof the Islands," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 224, pp. 26-27 (Jan. 12, 1952); H. W. Fey,"Changes in the Philippines," Christian Century, Vol. 69, pp. 119-21 (Jan. 30, 1952);WV.C. Bullitt, "No Peace in the Philippines," Readers Digest, Vol. 60, pp. 95-98 (March,1952).

14 Journal of Philippine Statistics, Vol. 5, Table 5 (Nov.-Dec., 1952).1I "Philippine Elections," World Today, Chatham House Review, pp. 508-10 (Dec.,1953).16 Leon 0. Ty, "Peaceful Revolution," Philippines Free Press, Manila, Nov. 21, 1953,p. 4.



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1134 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWthis young upstart, whom he had helped to make successful, could defeat anexperienced statesman like himself.

He had delusions that he was popular. His sycophants did not tell him that,as one Filipino put it, the people were mad.'7 He attempted to whip up the oldfear of American imperialism in order to win the nationalist vote. In reply toSenator Laurel's statement that American help might be needed to get an honestvote, President Quirino exclaimed that he would resist American interventionwith the last drop of his blood. He failed to note that the old issue no longer heldthe interest that it once did. There was little danger of American intervention,as indeed he admitted, but this did not stop his beating the dead horse.'8 Thereal issue was not American intervention but American aid.He also appealed, somewhat plaintively, to the record of his accomplish-ments, insisting that the war damage had been repaired more rapidly in thePhilippines than in any other country and that Philippine production had goneforward. On paper the record was impressive. But the opposition questionedhow much credit Quirino could claim for it. With American aid and with pri-vate capital and initiative, the economic well-being of the country had indeedbeen going forward, they conceded. What they wanted to know, however, waswhether it was going forward as fast as it could and who was reaping the benefit.The President was confident of winning. He had a well-oiled, well-fueled, andwell-financed machine, operated by the shrewd Speaker of the House, EugenioPerez. This machine had defeated the experienced Laurel in 1949. PresidentQuirino had also the Philippine constabulary, which could bring pressure tobear on the voters; he had the provincial treasurers, who had charge of the elec-tion returns; he had appointed members of the Commission on Election; he hadlocal officials; he had means of reaching the remote villages; he had control overthe schools. He did not think that the people would be swept off their feet byan ex-mechanic, who shook hands with the barrio folk as though he were run-ning for mayor.President Quirino was a polished speaker and waged as active a campaign asthe delicate state of his health permitted. Because of a serious operation, hedid not begin his campaign until late in the summer. By conserving his strengthhe was able to appear in the principal parts of the Philippines. In the northernprovinces he spoke in Ilocano, but in other provinces he spoke in English, some-times using an interpreter. In some localities various pressures were used upongovernment employees and school children to see that a crowd was assembled.The audiences were respectful but cool. The relative size and enthusiasm of thecrowds at Liberal and Nacionalista-Democratic meetings indicated clearlythat the tide was running against the Liberals.

IIIShortly after his nomination in April, 1953, Magsaysay began the most stren-uous campaign ever waged by a candidate for president in the Philippines.

17 Ibid., p. 65. 18 Philippines Free Press, Manila, Oct. 31, 1953, p. 11.



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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION OF 1953 1135By plane, by bus, by car, by boat, and on foot he covered nearly every sectionof the archipelago. At the end of seven months of such campaigning he was stillgoing as strong as ever. The irregular meals and sleeping arrangements requiredan iron constitution, an excellent digestion, and an even temperament. Hisgenuine liking for people was such that he did not hesitate to go into the barriosand shake hands with the common folk. In previous campaigns the barrioshad been neglected. While Magsaysay was not an eloquent speaker and didnot strain for oratorical effects, he was a persuasive talker, knew how to con-serve his voice, and impressed his listeners with his sincerity, his humor, and hisinterest in their welfare. He spoke English with a pronounced Philippine accent.With most of his listeners this was an asset. He could also address audiences in atleast two of the main dialects, Ilocano and Tagalog. No special preparationswere needed in order to collect an audience for one of his appearances. Thepeople wanted to hear and see the new leader and they would travel for miles,and wait hours in the rain or sun or darkness, when it was announced that hewould be speaking in the vicinity. Magsaysay gave the poor people in thebarriosthe idea that they were important in national politics.Liberal party attempts to belittle and ridicule Magsaysay as vulgar and un-educated backfired. When he heard that a prominent Liberal had said that hewas "fit only to be a basurero" (garbage collector), he answered at the nextpolitical meeting: "Yes, I am only fit to be a basurero, but if you will elect me,my friends, I will play the role of a good, a very efficient basurero. I will cleanup all the garbage of graft and corruption that the Liberals have piled up inour government! Just give me a chance and I'll show the Liberals what a goodgarbage collector I'll turn out to be."'9Magsaysay's supporters endeavored to win votes for their candidate bybuilding him up as a man of courage, energy, integrity, and action in contrastto President Quirino who was pictured as aging, sick, haughty, tired, and inef-fective. They pointed out that under President Quirino unemployment had in-creased, the deficit in the national budget had become larger, and the govern-ment had acquired a reputation for graft and corruption. The Nacionalistaplatform included among its planks statements on balancing the budget, in-creasing industrialization as a means of reducing unemployment, effecting landreforms so as to improve the tenant situation, improving educational standards,and securing freedom of action in the field of foreign relations. Magsaysay didnot spell out in detail how these objectives would be secured. In a campaign tobring about a change in administration, it is wise for opposition candidates not tobe too specific. Magsaysay did, however, place special emphasis upon buildingartesian wells for barrios, on improving the health services of the government,and on building up friendly relations with the United States government. Inanswering the claims of President Quirino that his administration had broughtmany economic improvements, Magsaysay accused the administration of

19 L. 0. Ty, "Day of Reckoning," Philippines Free Press, Manila, Nov. 14, 1953, p. 5.



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1136 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWfavoritism and laxity in collecting taxes and of failure to utilize all the Americanaid that was available.20Instead of relying on the regular Nacionalista and Democratic parties tocarry on the campaign and making arrangements for safeguarding the vote, agroup of active Magsaysay volunteers set up their own organization which in-cluded the Magsaysay-for-President Movement (MPM), the Women's Mag-saysay-for-President Movement (WMPM), and the Student Magsaysay-for-President Movement. The leaders of these organizations were recruited fromthe Veterans organizations, the Jaycees, the Rotary clubs, the Lions, the Lea-gue of Women Voters, the National Students' Movement for Democracy, andother special groups. The Coordinator of MPM said that the idea for the organi-zation came from the Eisenhower-Nixon clubs which functioned so well in theAmerican presidential election of 1952. Out of some 18,000 barriosin the Philip-pines, MPM clubs were established in 15,600. Club members checked registra-tion lists, canvassed the voters, supplied information for exclusion proceedingsheld to revise the lists of voters, educated the voters, arranged for politicalmeetings, organized watchers, couriers, and reserves for safeguarding the cast-ing and counting of the ballots, organized their own system of communicationsfor reporting on the returns, and took other measures to combat fraud andterrorism during the elections.4' MPM carried on all of these operations usingonly candidates' watchers credentials. Before this election, candidates had sup-posed that they had to have the naming of election inspectors to protect theirvote. MPM showed that an election could be watched without naming theelection inspectors.Both parties tried to attract and to avoid offending voters who might be in-fluenced by religious considerations. Over four-fifths of the Filipinos are RomanCatholics, but the Constitution provides for separation of church and state.During the campaign certain religious questions were brought in indirectly.Some members of the Church hierarchy signed a pastoral letter which deploredattempts to use fraud and terrorism to win votes. This letter pointed mainly tothe Liberal party. The Quirino administration was also under fire on account ofa position taken by Catholic clergy on the question of religious instruction inthe public schools.

IVThe Nacionalista candidate, Ramon Magsaysay, won a resounding victory,

receiving over two-thirds of the total vote cast. In Manila he won four-fifths ofthe votes and in the other cities over seven-tenths. Such an overwhelming votemeant that all elements of the population supported him. He received strongbacking from the Catholics, from other religious elements, from the city dwell-

20 Summaries of his speeches are to be found in Philippines Free Press, Manila Times,Daily Mirror, Daily Record, Evening News, Manila Chronicle, Manila Daily Bulletin, andPhilippines Herald.

21 Mimeographed publications of the organizations and articles in Philippines FreePress.



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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION OF 1953 1137ers, from the farmers, from the literate and semi-literate, from those living innipa huts, and from those living in the most expensive houses.22Magsaysay carried 25 of the 28 cities and 48 of the 52 provinces.23 He re-ceived his highest percentage in his home province of Zambales. He also ranextremely well in the adjoining provinces of Bataan and Pampanga. Thesehigh votes reflect the influence of local loyalties in Philippine politics. Traditionalparty influences were shown in the overwhelming vote which he received in theNacionalista strongholds of Batangas, Laguna, Quezon, and Marinduque, whichwere carried overwhelmingly by Laurel in 1949.The four provinces which Magsaysay lost were President Quirino's home prov-ince of Ilocos Sur and the three adjoining provinces in northern Luzon. Inthese provinces Magsaysay ran ahead of the Nacionalista percentage obtainedin 1949, except in La Union where the difference was slight. The loyalty of theIlocos region to President Quirino is another illustration of the favorite soninfluence in Philippine politics. It was striking that Magsaysay carried theother provinces that were once part of the Liberal stronghold in the north.A comparison of the provincial percentages obtained by the Nacionalista can-didates in 1949 and 1953 shows that on the average Magsaysay received 20 percent more of the total votes recorded than did Laurel. The Nacionalista partymade its greatest gains in those provinces where there had been charges ofelection corruption in 1949, in those where there were concentrations of Mo-hammedans, in Magsaysay's home provinces, and in the most populous prov-inces of the Visayas.The greatest absolute gain was made in the province of Negros Occidental inthe Visayas, where Magsaysay won over 70 per cent of the vote as comparedwith less than 10 per cent received by Laurel in 1949. Serious charges of electionmanipulation were made in this province following the 1949 elections. It wasalleged that the registration lists in 1949 had been padded by nearly 100,000names.24This province is the principal sugar-producing area of the Philippinesand on election day the trucks of some of the larger sugar plantations were seentransporting persons who were attempting to be "flying voters." Vigilance onthe part of the Magsaysay workers, the National Movement for Free Elections(NAMFREL), the Philippine Constabulary, the Commission on Elections, andthe local officials prevented the repetition of the 1949 tactics of the Liberals.25A striking feature of the election was the large increase in the Nacionalistavote in the Mindanao provinces containing large numbers of Mohammedans,who in the Philippines are called Moros. In Cotobato and Lanao, which had

22 A scatter diagram of the percentage of the total vote for Magsaysay and the per-centage of families living in dwellings of light materials shows a slight negative relation-ship between these two variables, but the high Magsaysay provinces spread over thewhole range. In other words, Magsaysay got a high vote in both prosperous and poorprovinces.

23 See map.24 Philippines Free Press, Manila, Vol. 44, pp. 1-3 (Oct. 24, 1953).26 Gosnell, "Filipinos Hold Free Election" (cited in note 3).



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1138 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWthe largest proportion of Moros, and in the two Misamis provinces there was anincrease of over 30 per cent in the Nacionalista vote. There were serious chargesof election frauds in Lanao in 1949, and it was claimed that fake voters andfalse returns swelled the Liberal vote. The number of voters in Lanao was twicethe number of literate adults given later by the census. In 1953 Magsaysay'spopularity and splits in the local Liberal ranks reduced the Liberal vote whileprecautions taken by the Nacionalista candidates, non-partisan organizations,and the Commission on Elections prevented extensive frauds. The Commissionon Elections attorneys, with representatives of both parties, canvassed theMoro areas in order to forestall efforts to pad the registration lists. Specialmeasures to safeguard the ballot were also taken by the Commission immedi-ately preceding and during the election itself. Magsaysay's speeches in Min-danao were well received and he seemed to attract the Moros as well as otherelements of the population.

Magsaysay won the election because he inspired faith in his ability to es-tablish a government for the people. His success story helped the Filipinos buildup faith in themselves. Here was ode of them, of Malayan stock, who hadgained worldwide fame in a short time by reason of his courage, his integrity,his altruism, and his appeal as a fighting leader of the people who was willingto face threats to democracy coming either from the extreme Right or the ex-treme Left. He met the danger of the Huks by action on some of the grievancesof the downtrodden peasants.The Filipinos have demonstrated that in an oriental country confidence indemocratic institutions can be established in spite of the many influences push-ing toward a dictatorial system either of the Right or the Left. Both fascist andcommunist trends have been reversed and a change in power has been broughtabout by the methods of persuasion, fair election administration, and free or-ganization of citizens.While caution should be used in interpreting the elections, it is quite clearthat they mark a significant achievement in the progress of democratic govern-ment in the Far East. The elections demonstrated that given the right kind ofleadership, Far Eastern peoples can be stirred to faith in the ideal-funda-mental to democratic government-of government as the instrument of thepeople. They also showed that volunteers can be organized in these countriesto safeguard the election process against fraud and terror. The formidable ob-stacles to the effective operation of democratic processes in the Far East canbe overcome.

an interpretation of 1953 presidential election

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