AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES

Published by Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies

Studies in International Security Hedley Bull: HEDLEY BULL ON ARMS CONTROL James Cable: GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, 1919-1979 Donald C. Daniel: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND SUPERPOWER

STRATEGIC STABILITY Paul Dibb: THE SOVIET UNION: The Incomplete Superpower Lawrence Freedman: THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (editor): ARMED FORCES AND THE WELFARE

SOCIETIES: Challenges in the 1980s Hanns W. Maull: RAW MATERIALS, ENERGY AND WESTERN SECURITY Adam Roberts: NATIONS IN ARMS: The Theory and Practice of Territorial

Defence

International Institute for Strategic Studies conference papers Christoph Bertram (editor):

NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EAST-WEST SECURITY PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 1980s DEFENCE AND CONSENSUS: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security

Robert O'Neill (editor): THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE 1980s NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WESTERN SECURITY POLICY DOCTRINE, THE ALLIANCE AND ARMS CONTROL

Barry Buzan AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES: Military Technology and

International Relations Fram;ois de Rose:

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FRANCE

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An Introduction to Strategic Studies Military Technology and International Relations

Barry Buzan Senior Lecturer Department of International Studies University of Warwick

M in association with the MACMILLAN PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

PRESS

© International Institute for Strategic Studies 1987

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First published 1987

Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

Typeset by Wessex Typesetters (Division of The Eastern Press Ltd) Frome, Somerset

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Buzan, Barry An introduction to strategic studies: military technology and international relations.-(Studies in international security) 1. Security, International I. Title II. International Institute for Strategic Studies III. Series 327.1'16 JX1952 ISBN 978-0-333-36506-9 ISBN 978-1-349-18796-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18796-6

To Deborah, who wisely doesn't let the grass grow under her feet, and

whose partnership happily prevents me from letting it grow too much under mine

Contents

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations

Foreword

1 Introduction: Strategic Studies and International

xii

xiii

XV

Relations 1 1.1 Strategic Studies and International Relations 2 1.2 The Agenda of Strategic Studies and the

Organization of the Book 7

PART I MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY

2 The Revolution in Military Technology 2.1 The History of the Revolution

2.1.1 Firepower 2.1.2 Protection 2.1.3 Mobility 2.1.4 Communications 2.1.5 Intelligence

2.2 The Civil Foundations of the Revolution 2.3 The General Consequences of the Revolution 2.4 The Consequences of the Revolution for

Strategic Thinking

3 The Global Spread of Military Technology 3.1 The Interaction between Spread and Qualitative

Advance 3.2 The Mechanisms of Spread 3.3 The Historical Process of the Spread 3.4 The Current Position and the Outlook 3.5 The Arms Trade Literature and its Controversies

4 The Special Case of Nuclear Proliferation 4.1 The Process of Proliferation 4.2 Controlling Proliferation

vii

17 17 19 21 22 24 25 26 29

31

36

36 39 42 47 51

57 57 62

Vlll Contents

PART II STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY: THE ARMS DYNAMIC

5 Arms Racing and the Arms Dynamic 69 5.1 Controversies about the Term 'Arms Racing' 69 5.2 The Arms Dynamic: An Alternative Framework

for Analysis 72

6 The Action-Reaction Model 76 6.1 The Idiom of Action-Reaction 79 6.2 The Variables of Magnitude, Timing and

Awareness in the Action-Reaction Process 83 6.2.1 Magnitude 84 6.2.2 Timing 86 6.2.3 Awareness 89

6.3 Motives 90

7 The Domestic Structure Model 94 7.1 The American Case 95 7.2 How Applicable is the Domestic Structure Model

to Other Cases? 103

8 Completing the Picture 105 8.1 The Technological Imperative Model 105 8.2 Relating the Three Models 108

8.2.1 Technological Imperative 108 8.2.2 Action-Reaction 110 8.2.3 Domestic Structure 111

9 Problems in Studying the Arms Dynamic 114 9.1 Working with the Distinction Between Arms

Racing and the Maintenance of the Military Status Quo 114

9.1.1 The superpowers: Arms Race or Maintenance of the Military status quo? 116

9.1.2 Conclusion 120 9.2 Problems in Developing a Theory of Arms

Racing 121 9.3 The Level of Analysis Problem 125 9.4 Arms Production and the Arms Dynamic 128 9.5 Conclusion 130

Contents IX

PART III DETERRENCE

10 Introduction: Deterrence and Defence 135 10.1 Retaliation versus Denial in Deterrence

Strategy 135 10.2 Deterrence Theory as a Western Artifact 138

11 The Evolution of Deterrence: Theory and Policy since 1945 143

11.1 The First Wave 143 11.2 The Golden Age 144

11.2.1 The Coming of Bipolarity as the Background to the Golden Age 144

11.2.2 The Central Ideas of Golden Age Theory 147

11.2.3 The Problem of Extended Deterrence 151 11.3 After the Golden Age: a Third Wave? 155

11.3.1 The Relative Gain of Soviet Military Power 155

11.3.2 Changes in Military Technology 159 11.4 The Future of Deterrence 161

12 The Logic of Deterrence 163 12.1 Basic Logic: What Produces Inaction in

Opponents? 163 12.2 The Impact of Nuclear Weapons: Is Nuclear

Deterrence Easy or Difficult? 167 12.2.1 The 'Easy' School 168 12.2.2 The 'Difficult' School 169 12.2.3 The Policy Implications of 'Easy'

versus 'Difficult' 170 12.3 Intervening Variables in Deterrence Logic 172

12.3.1 Polarity 173 12.3.2 Technology 177 12.3.3 Geography 180 12.3.4 The Deterrer's Political Objectives:

Core versus Extended Deterrence 182 12.3.5 Political Relations 190 12.3.6 Conclusions on Intervening Variables 192

12.4 Deterrence Logic and Deterrence Policy 193

X Contents

13 The Debates about Deterrence 197 13.1 Deterrence versus Defence 197

13.1.1 The Issue of Ends and Means in Warfighting Strategies for Deterrence 199

13.1.2 Defence as Escape from Deterrence: SDI 203

13.2 The Method of Deterrence Logic: The Assumption of Rationality 204

13.3 Deterrence and Ethics 210 13.3.1 The Ethical Strengths of Deterrence 210 13.3.2 The Ethical Weaknesses of Deterrence 212

13.4 Deterrence and the Arms Dynamic 215 13.5 Conclusions: Deterrence and Foreign Policy 222

PART IV RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY MEANS

14 Military Means as a Security Problem 227 14.1 Military Means as a Problem in Themselves 227 14.2 Disagreements About the Nature and

Seriousness of the Problem 229 14.3 Military Versus Political Approaches to the

Problem 234

15 Disarmament 237 15.1 The Military Logic 238 15.2 The Economic Logic 243 15.3 The Political Logic 245

16 Arms Control 252 16.1 The Military Logic 256

16.1.1 Reasons for Rivals to Co-operate 256 16.1.2 The Impact of Strategic Doctrine on

Arms Control 261 16.1.3 Dilemmas of the Technological

Approach 262 16.2 The Economic Logic 270 16.3 The Political Logic 271

17 Non-Provocative Defence 17.1 The Military Logic 17.2 The Economic Logic 17.3 The Political Logic

276 280 284 285

Contents

18 Summary and Conclusions

Bibliography

Index

Xl

289

302

320

List of Tables

12.1 The calculation of deterrence logic 13.1 Ends and means in military policy 14.1 Opinion on military means as a problem

Xll

166 200 230

List of Abbreviations

ABM AD ASAT ASW BMD CBM CBW CTB C3I ECM ED GCD GLCM GNP IAEA ICBM IISS INF LNO LNW LoW LRTNW MAD MIRV MIT NATO NPT NTM PGM PNE Pu239 R&D RUSI SALT SD SDI

anti-ballistic missile assured destruction anti-satellite anti-submarine warfare/weapons ballistic missile defence confidence-building measures chemical and biological warfare/weapons comprehensive test ban command, control, communications and intelligence electronic countermeasures extended deterrence general and complete disarmament ground-launched cruise missile gross national product International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental ballistic missile International Institute for Strategic Studies intermediate-range nuclear forces limited nuclear options limited nuclear war launch -on-warning long-range theatre nuclear weapons mutually assured destruction multiple, independently manoeuvrable, re-entry vehicle Massachusetts Institute of Technology North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-proliferation Treaty national technical means precision-guided munitions peaceful nuclear explosion plutonium 239 research and development Royal United Services Institute Strategic Arms Limitation Talks strategic defence Strategic Defence Initiative

xiii

XIV

SDV SIPRI SLBM SSBN START TNW U235 U238

List of Abbreviations

strategic delivery vehicle Stockholm International Peace Research Institute submarine-launched ballistic missile ballistic missile-carrying nuclear submarine Strategic Arms Reduction Talks tactical or theatre nuclear weapons uranium 235 uranium 238

Foreword

This book is addressed to everyone who wants to understand the contemporary strategic debate in some depth. Many of these people will be students taking first courses in Strategic Studies. Some will be students in the related subjects of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Research. Some, I hope, will be individuals whose interest is driven not so much by the need to pass an exam as by concern about the implications of the strategic debate for the future of humankind.

The book has a long history. I intended to write something like it in the late 1970s, but the work I began then led me instead to write the volume on the concept of security that was published in 1983. Robert O'Neill proposed this project to me in December 1982, and I am grateful to him for encouraging the direction of my writing. In many senses this book is an outgrowth of the earlier one, though it is much more specific in focus. The earlier book tried to explore a subject about which too little had been written. This one tries to make sense of a subject where some of the confusion arises because so much has been written. It will only have succeeded if it charts a clear path through the jungle of the literature as well as over the landscape of the subject.

The book posed two intellectual problems: how to cope with the enormous body of literature, and how to define Strategic Studies. Given the size of the literature, and the speed with which it grows, it was clear to me that I could not possibly read everything. In addition, there was the problem posed by the newly-emergent literatures on strategic defence and non-provocative defence. Both of these subjects occupied important sections in my intellectual scheme, and yet neither literature was fully-enough developed so that I could confidently characterise its major features. Most of what I eventually read is in the list of references. I adopted a strategy of diminishing returns, which is to say that I read in an area until I felt that I was no longer learning anything more of basic importance. This doubtless caused me to miss some worthwhile works, and perhaps some important insights. I apologise to their authors, and plead only that one has at some point to repay one's sponsors, and to unburden one's mind, by writing oneself. If some authors like

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XVI Foreword

Colin Gray and Robert Jervis seem to have been given generous treatment, that is because they write copiously and well, and represent major schools of thought clearly.

The problem of how to define Strategic Studies turned out to be much more difficult than I anticipated. One cannot write a textbook without a clear idea of the boundaries of the subject, but the more I thought about it the more it became apparent that Strategic Studies does not have clear boundaries. Since I felt strongly that the purpose of an introduction should be to offer a coherent interpretation of the field, the option of simply presenting a menu of chapters reflecting the average contents of first courses in Strategic Studies did not appeal to me. My eventual solution is explained in Chapter 1. It will probably not convince everyone, but it does allow the book a greater thematic coherence than would otherwise be possible. I do not think that there is any formulation of the subject that would escape criticism. My hope is that the approach I have taken will put the subject into a clear and interesting perspective, and provide a basic referent that others can use to sharpen their own understanding of the field. One penalty of this approach is that the book is structured around a cumulative argument, and is therefore best read in sequence. The individual Parts and Chapters are not as self­contained as would ideally be the case for a textbook, and I have tried to compensate for this by cross-referencing.

I am grateful to the many people who have given me their time and mental energy to help this work along. The fact that they did so is a tribute to the collective realities of the academic enterprise despite its often egocentric appearance. Jonathan Alford, Pamela Divinsky, Mariangela Franchetti, Richard Little, Robert O'Neill, Gerald Segal, Robert Skidelsky, and Steve Smith laboured through the whole manuscript, and by so doing saved me from some errors and much obscurantism. Lawrence Freedman and Kenneth Waltz did the same on earlier parts, and a passing remark of Ken Booth's helped me to find a way around what at the time appeared to be an impasse. All of these people deserve a share of the credit for such merit as the book possesses, and I am happy to field the brickbats for whatever errors and infelicities of judgement remain. My wife Deborah cheered me up through the deepest of the difficulties, and came to my rescue when the collapse of my old word processor required a painful midstream switch of format. My thanks also to the University of Warwick, which allowed me two terms of study leave without which I could never have found the level of

Foreword XVll

concentration necessary to pull together a first draft, and to the IISS. I am particularly grateful to the late Col. Jonathan Alford, the deputy director of the IISS, who dealt willingly with both the substantive and the administrative aspects of the project right up until his unexpected death. His contribution to this book is but one of the many ways in which he contributed to the development of Strategic Studies. The field will be the poorer for his untimely demise.

BARRY BuzAN