analysing and evaluating flood risk governance in poland · analysing and evaluating flood risk...

Strengthening and Redesigning European Flood Risk Practices

Towards Appropriate and Resilient Flood Risk Governance Arrangements

Analysing and evaluating flood risk

governance in Poland Looking for strategic planning in a country in

transition Matczak, P., Lewandowski, J., Choryński, A., Szwed, M., and Kundzewicz, Z.W.

Date: 31 March 2016

Report Number: D3.6

Milestone number: MS3

Due date for deliverable: 30 September 2015

Actual submission date: 28 September 2015

STAR-FLOOD receives funding from the EU 7th Framework programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant

agreement 308364

Document Dissemination Level

PU Public

Co-ordinator: Utrecht University

Project Contract No: 308364

Project website: www.starflood.eu

ISBN:

i

Document information Work Package 3

Responsible consortium partner IAFE

Year 2016

Document type Deliverable report

Status Final version

Date 24.08.2015

Author(s) Piotr Matczak, Jakub Lewandowski, Adam

Choryński, Małgorzata Szwed, Zbigniew W.

Kundzewicz

Document History Date Revision Prepared by Organisation Notes

16/03/2015 v1 Matczak P., et al. FHRC Discussed 30th March

15/05/2015 v2 Matczak P., et al. FHRC Discussed at Consortium

meeting in Sweden

Acknowledgement The work described in this publication was supported by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme through the grant to the budget of the Integrated Project STAR-FLOOD, Contract 308364

Disclaimer This document reflects only the authors’ views and not those of the European Union. This work may

rely on data from sources external to the STAR-FLOOD project Consortium. Members of the

Consortium do not accept liability for loss or damage suffered by any third party as a result of errors

or inaccuracies in such data. The information in this document is provided ‘as is’ and no guarantee or

warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the

information at its sole risk and neither the European Union nor any member of the STAR-FLOOD

Consortium is liable for any use that may be made of the information.

© STAR-FLOOD Consortium.

This report should be referred to as follows:

Matczak P., Lewandowski J., Choryński A., Szwed M., Kundzewicz Z.W. 2016, Flood risk governance in Poland: Looking for strategic planning in a country in transition (report D3.6), STAR-FLOOD Consortium, Utrecht, The Netherlands. ISBN: 978-94-91933-09-7

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Key words

Flood Risk Management;

Flood Risk Governance;

Flood defence;

Crisis management;

Resilience;

Flood risk discourse;

Actors;

Discourses;

Rules;

Resources;

Poland

Author details Prof. dr. habil. Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz, Professor of Earth Sciences at the Institute for Agricultural

and Forest Environment, Polish Academy of Sciences and Potsdam Institute for Impact Climate

Research.

Dr. habil. Piotr Matczak is a senior researcher at the Institute for Agricultural and Forest

Environment, Polish Academy of Sciences and Institute of Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University in

Poznań.

Dr. Malgorzata Szwed is a researcher at the Institute for Agricultural and Forest Environment, Polish

Academy of Sciences.

Adam Choryński, MSc is a junior researcher at the Institute for Agricultural and Forest Environment,

Polish Academy of Sciences.

Jakub Lewandowski, MSc is a junior researcher at the Institute for Agricultural and Forest

Environment, Polish Academy of Sciences.

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Preface This report is the third deliverable of the EU 7th Framework Project STAR-FLOOD (www.starflood.eu).

STAR-FLOOD focuses on flood risk governance. The project investigates strategies for dealing with

flood risks in 18 vulnerable urban regions in six European countries: Poland, Belgium, England in the

UK, France, The Netherlands and Sweden. The project assesses Flood Risk Governance Arrangements

from a combined public administration and legal perspective, with the aim to make European regions

more resilient to flood risks.

Work Package 1 provided an extended problem analysis related to Flood Risk Governance in Europe

and Work Package 2 focused on how Flood Risk Governance in Europe can be researched. Work

Package 3 forms the empirical core of the project, in which analysis, explanations and evaluations of

each country, including three case studies, have been performed.1 This report constitutes deliverable

D3.3 and summarises the research conducted in Poland at the national and case study level of

analysis; including the case studies of Poznań County, Słubice City and the City of Wrocław. The

national Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poland is characterised by rather stable arrangement

of actors, rules, resources and discourses delivering a hydro-technical approach to Flood Risk

Management.

This report accompanies five other reports for each partner country (D3.2 to D3.7). Alongside D3.1, a

report of workshops held in each country, these deliverables form the main input for the last two

Work Packages of STAR-FLOOD; WP4 and WP5. Whereas WP4 focuses on a systematic comparison

between the STAR-FLOOD consortium countries; WP5 identifies design principles for appropriate and

resilient Flood Risk Governance.

We trust that the current report is of interest for a broad readership with an interest in Flood Risk

Management and governance. The content of this report may inspire researchers and professionals

with an interest in social scientific and legal research into Flood Risk Management, Disaster Risk

Reduction or climate change adaptation.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Ann Crabbé Dr. habil. Piotr Matczak Prof. Peter Driessen

Leader of WP3 Lead author of D3.6 STAR-FLOOD project coordinator

1 Other deliverable reports for each country are as follows; The Netherlands (D3.2); England (3.3); Belgium

(3.4); Sweden (3.5); France (D3.7)

http://www.starflood.eu/

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Overview of key findings Floods, the biggest natural risk in Poland, cause large losses and will remain a serious hazard despite

the fact that climate change impacts on future flood risk in Poland is uncertain. The specific feature

of flood risk management reforms is their context: the radical transformation of the economic,

political and administrative system after the fall of communism in 1989/90. Significant changes in

flood risk management have been introduced in the last 25 years despite weak strategic thinking.

External shock events (big floods, the EU accession) were the main triggering factors accelerating the

reforms.

1. Main characteristics of flood risks in Poland

Flood risk in Poland is significant. Almost half of Poland’s municipalities are endangered.

Urbanisation and urban sprawl processes with increase in the amount of impermeable surface will

elevate the risk of flash floods. It will be further increased by climate change. Although the

projections for Central Europe are not clear in terms of change of mean annual precipitation,

increase in precipitation intensity is likely in the future.

2. Main characteristics of the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement

Flood risk policy in decision making in Poland stems from, on the one hand, the mix of existing legal

acts and programmes, and on the other hand, from the requirements of European Union (EU)

legislation. The EU is a provider of legitimate and long term policy making concepts, related to the

implementation of the Floods Directive requirements. Otherwise, the climate change context is

weakly present in Poland. Flood risk is framed within crisis management, water management, and

economic losses.

Between 1989/90 and 2014, the Polish case shows the domination of a technical-infrastructural

approach to Flood Risk Management. The flood defence strategy is maintained due to historical

developments and as an effect of dramatic experiences, such as catastrophic flood events of 1997

and 2010 which brought € 3 billion losses each. However, the defence strategy has been gradually

more supported by preparation and prevention strategies. Table I depicts the measures employed in

Poland.

Table I Some of the current measures employed in Polish FRM

Prevention Defence Mitigation Preparation Recovery Spatial plans; Expropriation

policy.

Retention basins outside area to be protected;

Widening, deepening, dredging;

Dikes; Weirs (used to drain

faster or for water retention outside area to be protected);

Water course maintenance.

Separate sewers;

SUDS (including green roofs, urban green);

Rain water reservoirs (hardly visible).

Sand bags; Pumps (if used to

manage a flood when it occurs);

Flood warning systems; Intervention and

evacuation plans; 24 hour monitoring and

intervention teams; Forecasting; Crisis communication.

Insurance systems;

Repair works;

Solidarity fund.

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The process of diversification of measures resulted in the evolution of three Flood Risk Governance

sub-arrangements (sub-FRGAs). These sub-arrangements overlap with strategies. The sub-FRGAs

characterised by a consistent groups of actors, rules, resources and discourses are: (a) structural

defence; (b) crisis management and (c) spatial planning. Even though some activities either to collect

rainwater where it falls (i.e. mitigation) or to recover after the floods (i.e. recovery) are present, both

strategies have a rather ad hoc approach and cannot be considered as full-fledged sub-

arrangements. The structural defence sub-arrangement, with embankments, dikes, dams and

reservoirs as typical measures, is the most pronounced one. This statement about the national level

of flood risk management is also valid for FRM on the case study level in Poznań, Słubice and

Wrocław. Other sub-arrangements, such as crisis management and spatial planning, are gaining

momentum in Poland. Although reasons behind and significance of these dynamics vary according to

the region analysed, the direction of change in all three case studies supports this conclusion. Figure I

depicts the Polish FRGA.

Figure I. Illustration of the Polish FRGA

The Polish Flood Risk Governance Arrangement (FRGA) is fragmented with rather underdeveloped

bridging mechanisms. Particular aspects of flood risk management are linked to different ministries

with their own interests. In several respects the responsibilities in Polish FRM are still not functional,

but are rather the result of a contingent evolution. Thus, both the Water Framework Directive (WFD)

and the Floods Directive (FD) are seen as a source of alternative ideas and as the basic reference

framework for reshaping the FRGA. In fact, the environmental critics of the dominant hydro-technical

approach refer often to the FD as a source of a support for environmental concerns. On the other

hand, sometimes elements of the FD and other EU documents are used instrumentally by FRM actors

to legitimise their current activities and even to justify existence of proper institutions. We conclude

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that the FD has had a significant impact on the FRM in Poland. It could be argued that very little

improvement in terms of prevention would have occurred without the FD. This improvement relates

to the obligation connected with the preparation of Flood Hazard and Flood Damage Maps together

with Flood Risk Management Plans, which enhance cooperation between three sub-arrangements.

As written before, the three distinctive sub-arrangements of structural defence, crisis management

and spatial planning, with a dominance of structural defence, have been evident at both national and

case studies level. At the same time, the crisis management sub-arrangement has been gradually

developing at the national scale after the dramatic flood of 1997. Within the arrangement the

monitoring of waters is a duty of the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management State

Research Institute, while crisis management planning and action capacities rely mostly on

municipalities and the State Fire Brigades. The spatial planning sub-arrangement is generally weak,

due to feeble development and implementation gap of spatial planning. Economic development is a

dominant priority of local governments and this leads to investments in flood prone areas. It remains

to be seen whether this would considerably change when Flood Hazard and Flood Damage Maps are

incorporated into local spatial and development plans. The flood mitigation strategy is mainly

realised in the form of small water retention programmes of moderate scale but in urban areas they

are at the pilot projects stage. The flood recovery strategy involves strong engagement of the state.

After the flood of 1997 there was a plan to establish a universal flood insurance system but the

attempt failed. The insurance system was then treated as a weakness of FRM in Poland. However, it

is considered by the insurance sector as moderately well developing. It is based on combined policies

and the penetration increases with the growth of the mortgage market. Both strategies develop

somewhat independently from the complex flood risk management strategies.

Since the 2000s, the dominant hydro-technical approach towards flood risk management in Poland

has been criticised more and more vividly. It is contested from two angles: as ineffective in terms of

flood management and as harmful for the environment. The first criticism emphasises that the

current strategy fails, and losses from floods may increase. Moreover, it is argued that the defence

strategy, based on structural protection, leads to an increase rather than decrease of flood risk. This

criticism is expressed by some - rather dissident - hydrologists, crisis management experts, and

NGOs. The second criticism is expressed mainly by environmental NGOs, and focuses on the damage

to the environment caused by the flood protection activities, while not securing flood risk decrease.

Re-naturalisation of rivers and similar ideas are proposed instead. Fragmented water and flood

management legislation is weak and subsequent amendments to the Water Act have undermined its

coherence.

3. Explanations for stability and change

The Polish FRGA can be characterised as rather stable. Although there are observed shifts in

significance and diversification of strategies, a coherent flood risk governance arrangement can

hardly be found. Instead, there are several strategies concerning: dealing with floods in terms of

crisis management; building and sustaining defence infrastructure; modelling; warning systems, etc.

The reasons for that are - inter alia - path-dependency of flood management institutions, fragmented

organisation with little integration and several administrative bodies covering areas related to flood

risk management and an unclear or rather maladjusted financial resources distribution as well as

vii

overlapping competences. There is more competition for resources than coordinated efforts to

decrease flood risk. One could argue that in the arrangement where a short-term, investment-driven

orientation thrives mainly on budget maximisation rather than on strategic planning, floods are

needed as justification of investments.

A significant dependence on structural infrastructure with related business capacities results in

stability in this respect. This dominance is strengthened by discourses and expertise. Changes in

FRGA composition were driven by external factors: the flood of 1997 (initiating the development of

the crisis management) and the EU accession (involving the FD implementation and flood risk maps

developing). It is not a zero-sum game, however, as the growing role of crisis management and

planning is not at the expenses of defence.

4. Evaluation of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy

The Polish FRGA can be characterised as having a strong capacity to buffer shock events, as shown by

the major 1997 and 2010 floods. Both stresses did not shorten financing in the defence-oriented

flood risk management. In addition, recovery and EU funds were reinvested in hydro-technical

infrastructure. Although some progress has been achieved in terms of institutional learning (new

approaches and new measures were adopted, particularly with reference to good practices in other

European countries), much inertia and reliance on the well-established approaches could also be

observed. In other words, adaptive capacity is feeble mainly due to actors’ path dependence. Lack of

innovation and little bridging mechanisms are key factors that constrain long-term investments and

more concerted actions. As a consequence, effects achieved in one sub-arrangement of flood risk

governance have been found to be diminished by actions of another. In general, the resilience of the

Polish FRGA has not changed dramatically in the analysed period (1989/90-2015), but -above all –

development was observed in terms of ability to buffer and recover. Summing up, the Polish FRGA is

more effective in terms of goal attainment within different sub-FRGAs rather than problem-solving.

Implementation of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for particular projects (with its time and resource

obligations) is a dominant mode of management, hence easier to fulfil than solving the issue meant

to be dealt with. Inadequacy and incoherency of data (absence of indicators) in the Polish FRGA

constrains possibilities to conduct comprehensive and independent efficiency evaluation. The

resource dimension rarely enhances human capacity. At the same time, rules (e.g. competences of

actors, acts, regulations) make it difficult to track the way in which and to what effect money is being

spent.

High discretion in the domain of spatial planning undermines improvements in legitimacy of Polish

governance. New construction sites on flood plain areas increase potential financial losses, thus

delegitimising and undermining principles that are meant to be obeyed. Part of society feels that

public consultation processes are organised not to identify opinions but to identify potential

opponents of an idea.

5. Good practices, options for improvement and recommendations

The crisis management system and several measures taken separately and rather independently

from FRM can be indicated as strengths of the Polish FRGA. Good practices such as the water

viii

retention programme in forests and the organisation of the crisis management system are hardly

part of a coherent strategy. An overall weakness of the Polish FRGA is the lack of coordination and

strategic planning. In Poland, this context is characterised by a problematic spatial planning and a

highly fragmented actor structure both within and between sub-arrangements. Based on both

strengths and weaknesses, this report ends with a list of recommendations:

1. Water and flood risk management have to develop around a system based on economic

incentives. Such a development in the field of water and flood management would entail

integration of the domains to economise the efforts. Incorporating more market mechanism

could help to overcome the stalemate dominated by ministries and agencies managing their

individual domains.

2. Improving efficiency is highly needed. The use of EU funds enforced implementation of clear

accountancy procedures, including the development of tools that easier enhance efficiency,

such as strategy-related cost-benefit analysis. Incorporating pricing in the FRGA and market

mechanisms could reframe the relation between the public administration and the public.

Hence, a strategy for incentivising private sector involvement would be a logical next step.

Particularly the insurance industry would be incentivised to promote resistance measures at

the property scale and to cooperate with the public administration. Risk-reflective pricing of

insurance premiums and therefore risk reduction at the property level would be incentivised to

reduce higher costs.

3. Enhancing public participation would not only mean involvement of citizens as clients. This

seems difficult (and may turn out to be a dramatic experience) but eventually it could improve

the legitimacy of decision-making. Yet, raising awareness of decision makers, politicians,

managers, private sector, and citizens at large, and fostering public participation and

community involvement on all levels, are needed.

4. Since collaborative and regional programmes and watercourse maintenance activities suffer

lack of coordination and inefficiency due to division of responsibility, unified property rights in

terms of water and flood protection infrastructure are much needed. At the same time, more

financial transparency should be brought into Polish FRM.

5. It seems that much more expertise is needed for designing an integrated flood risk governance

system. Particularly links between spatial planning and FRM are very important and concrete

instruments are needed for new and existing buildings. The spatial planning system, in order to

be a consistent and relevant means for FRM, needs to be more effectively coordinated at the

regional level; this coordination is lacking at present.

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List of abbreviations and Polish equivalents Abbreviation Expanded abbreviation Polish equivalent

CBA Cost-benefit analysis Analiza kosztów-korzyści

CBOS Public Opinion Research Center Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej

CKPŚ (LP) Centre for Coordination Environmental Projects (State Forest Holding)

Centrum Koordynacji Projektów Środowiskowych (Lasy Państwowe)

EU European Union Unia Europejska

FD Floods Directive Dyrektywa Powodziowa

FRGAs Flood Risk Governance Arrangements Sposoby organizacji zarządzania ryzykiem powodziowym

FRM Flood Risk Management Zarządzanie Ryzykiem Powodziowym

FRMPs Flood Risk Management Plans Plany Zarządzania Ryzykiem Powodziowym

FRMSs Flood Risk Management Strategies Strategie Zarządzania Ryzykiem Powodziowym

GIS Geographic Information System System Informacji Geograficznej

GUS Central Statistical Office of Poland Główny Urząd Statystyczny

IKSO International Commission for the Protection of the Odra River

Międzynarodowa Komisja Ochrony Odry przed Zanieczyszczeniem

IMGW-PIB Institute of Meteorology and Water Management -National Research Institute

Instytut Meteorologii i Gospodarki Wodnej - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy

KG PSP Headquarters of the State Fire Brigades Komenda Główna Państwowej Straży Pożarnej

KW PSP Provincial Headquarters of the State Fire Brigades

Komenda Wojewódzka Państwowej Straży Pożarnej

KZGW National Water Management Board Krajowy Zarząd Gospodarki Wodnej

MRiRW Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ministerstwo Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi

MŚ Ministry of Environment Ministerstwo Środowiska

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations Organizacje pozarządowe

NIK Supreme Audit Office Najwyższa Izba Kontroli

PAA Policy Arrangement Approach Perspektywa Organizacji Polityk

PGLP or LP State Forest Holding Państwowe Gospodarstwo Leśne Lasy Państwowe

RZGW Regional Water Management Board Regionalny Zarząd Gospodarki Wodnej

SUDS Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems Zrównoważone systemy kanalizacji deszczowej

VFB Voluntary Fire Brigades Ochotnicza Straż Pożarna

WCZK Provincial Crisis Management Centre Wojewódzkie Centrum Zarządzania Kryzysowego

WFD Water Framework Directive Ramowa Dyrektywa Wodna

NFOSiGW or WFOSiGW

National or Regional Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management

Narodowy lub Wojewódzki Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej

WW I/ WW II World War I/ World War II I wojna światowa, II wojna światowa

WWF World Wildlife Fund for Nature WWF

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Contents

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Introducing Flood Risk Governance in Poland ................................................................................ 1

1.2 Research aims and questions ......................................................................................................... 1

1.3 Research approach and methods ................................................................................................... 2

1.4 Outline of the report ....................................................................................................................... 6

2 Analysis of national Flood Risk Governance ......................................................................................... 9

2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 9

2.2 The context of Flood Risk Governance in Poland ........................................................................... 9

2.2.1 Physical context of Flood Risk Governance in Poland ............................................................ 9

2.2.2 Socio-cultural context of Poland’s Flood Risk Management ................................................ 11

2.2.3 Administrative structure ...................................................................................................... 13

2.2.4 Political and administrative culture...................................................................................... 15

2.2.5 Legal context ........................................................................................................................ 16

2.3 Flood Risk Governance in Poland: analysing the arrangement .................................................... 17

2.3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 17

2.3.2 Defence strategy -a dominant Flood Risk Management Strategy ....................................... 17

2.3.2 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poland ................................................................... 20

2.4 Explanations for stability and change in Flood Risk Governance ................................................. 26

2.4.1 Introduction: main features of Flood Risk Governance in Poland ....................................... 26

2.4.2 Explanatory factors for stability and change in the Polish national Flood Risk Governance Arrangement ................................................................................................................................. 27

2.5 Evaluations at the national level ................................................................................................... 30

2.5.1 Resilience .............................................................................................................................. 31

2.5.2 Efficiency .............................................................................................................................. 32

2.5.3 Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................. 32

2.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 33

3 Case study 1 -Poznań County ............................................................................................................. 35

3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 35

3.2 Contextual background of the Poznań case study ........................................................................ 36

3.2.1 Physical circumstances ......................................................................................................... 36

3.2.2 Historical events ................................................................................................................... 37

3.2.3 General characteristics and socio-cultural context .............................................................. 37

3.2.4 Major socio-economic developments .................................................................................. 38

3.3 Analysis of Flood Risk Governance in Poznań County .................................................................. 38

3.3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 38

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3.3.2 Analysis of Flood Risk Management Strategies .................................................................... 38

3.3.3 Flood Risk Governance sub-Arrangements in Poznań ......................................................... 41

3.4 Explaining change and stability in Flood Risk Governance in Poznań County .............................. 45

3.4.1 Drivers of stability................................................................................................................. 45

3.4.2 Drivers of change .................................................................................................................. 46

3.5 Evaluating Flood Risk Governance in the Poznań County ............................................................ 47

3.5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 47

3.5.2 Resilience .............................................................................................................................. 47

3.5.3 Efficiency .............................................................................................................................. 48

3.5.4 Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................. 48

3.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 49

4 Case study 2 -Słubice City ................................................................................................................... 51

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 51

4.2 Contextual background of the case study .................................................................................... 52





4.3 Analysis of Flood Risk Governance in Słubice ............................................................................... 54

4.3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 54

4.3.2 Analysis of FRMSs ................................................................................................................. 54

4.3.3 Flood Risk Governance sub-Arrangements in Słubice .......................................................... 56

4.4 Explaining change and stability in Flood Risk Governance in Słubice........................................... 61

4.4.1 Drivers of stability................................................................................................................. 62

4.4.2 Drivers of change .................................................................................................................. 63

4.5 Evaluating Flood Risk Governance at the case study scale ........................................................... 63

4.5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 63

4.5.2 Resilience .............................................................................................................................. 64

4.5.3 Efficiency .............................................................................................................................. 65

4.5.4 Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................. 65

4.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 66

5 Case study 3 -Wrocław City ................................................................................................................ 67

5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 67

5.2 Contextual background of the case study .................................................................................... 67





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5.3 Analysis of Flood Risk Governance in Wrocław ............................................................................ 71

5.3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 71

5.3.2 Analysis of the Flood Risk Management Strategies ............................................................. 71

5.3.3 Analysing Flood Risk Governance sub-Arrangements in Wrocław ...................................... 73

5.4 Explaining change and stability in Flood Risk Governance at the Wrocław case study scale ...... 76

5.4.1. Drivers of stability ................................................................................................................ 77

5.4.2. Drivers of change ................................................................................................................. 78

5.5 Evaluating Flood Risk Governance in Wrocław city ...................................................................... 79

5.5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 79

5.5.2 Resilience .............................................................................................................................. 80

5.5.3 Efficiency .............................................................................................................................. 81

5.5.4 Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................. 81

5.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 81

6 Explanations for stability and change in Flood Risk Governance in Poland ....................................... 83

6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 83

6.2 Factors contributing to stability .................................................................................................... 84

6.3 Factors contributing to change ..................................................................................................... 84

6.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 86

7. Evaluation of Flood Risk Governance in Poland ................................................................................ 87

7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 87

7.2 Resilience of Polish Flood Risk Governance .................................................................................. 88

7.2.1 Assessment of capacity to resist .......................................................................................... 88

7.2.2 Assessment of capacity to absorb and recover .................................................................... 89

7.2.3 Assessment of capacity to adapt and learn.......................................................................... 89

7.3 Efficiency ....................................................................................................................................... 89

7.4 Legitimacy ..................................................................................................................................... 90

7.4.1 Participation and acceptability ............................................................................................. 90

7.4.2 Procedural justice, accountability, transparency, access to information ............................ 91

7.4.3 Social equity ......................................................................................................................... 91

7.5 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 91

8 Moving forwards - suggestions for strengthening and redesigning Flood Risk Governance in Poland ............................................................................................................................................................... 93

8.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 93

8.2 Identifying the strengths and limitations of current Flood Risk Governance ............................... 93

8.3 Opportunities and barriers to moving forward ............................................................................ 96

8.3.1 Sectorial and spatial integration .......................................................................................... 97

8.3.2 Bridging mechanisms............................................................................................................ 98

8.3.3 Involvement of citizens and role of media ........................................................................... 98

xiii

8.3.4 Insurance .............................................................................................................................. 98

8.4 Recommendations for strengthening and redesigning Flood Risk Governance in Poland .......... 99

References ........................................................................................................................................... 101

Annex A: List of legal acts and key policy documents analysed for the purposes of this research .... 107

Annex B: List of interviews .................................................................................................................. 111

Annex C: List of interview guidelines .................................................................................................. 114

xiv

List of tables Table 1.1 Key characteristics of selected case studies and research motivation 4

Table 2.1 List of main events in Poland in the analysed time interval 10

Table 2.2 Main statistical features of Poland 11

Table 2.3 Opinion of the Poles on reasons for floo-related damages 12

Table 2.4 Particular measures grouped into strategies 18

Table 2.5 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Poland 22

Table 2.6 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs (country level) 26

Table 2.7 Drivers of stability and change in Polish FRGA 28

Table 2.8 Evaluation of flood risk governance 31

Table 3.1 Key characteristics of the Poznań case study 36

Table 3.2 Key events affecting FRGA in Poznań County 37

Table 3.3 Current measures employed in FRMSs in Poznań County 38

Table 3.4 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Poznań 42

Table 3.5 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs in Poznań 44

Table 3.6 Drivers of stability and change in Poznań County FRGA 45


Table 4.1 Key characteristics of the Słubice case study 52

Table 4.2 Key events affecting FRGA in Słubice 53

Table 4.3 Basic demographic characteristics of Słubice 53

Table 4.4 Current measures employed in FRMSs in Słubice 54

Table 4.5 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Słubice 57

Table 4.6 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs in Słubice 61

Table 4.7 Drivers of stability and change in Słubice FRGA 62


Table 5.1 Key characteristics of the Wrocław case study 68

Table 5.2 List of main events in Wrocław city and related responses 69

Table 5.3 Major demographic characteristics of Wrocław city 70

Table 5.4 Current measures employed in FRMSs in Wrocław city 71

Table 5.5 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Wrocław 74

Table 5.6 List of several trans-boundary initiatives taken by Czech, German and Polish actors 75

Table 5.7 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs in Wrocław 76

Table 5.8 Drivers of stability and change in Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław 77


Table 6.1 Summary of factors forming stability and change in Polish conditions 83

Table 7.1 Evaluation of flood risk governance arrangements in Poland 88

Table 8.1 Strengths and weaknesses of Polish flood risk governance 94

Table 8.2 Opportunities and barriers to strengthening flood risk governance in Poland 97

xv

List of figures Figure 1.1 Flood Risk Management Strategies identified within STAR-FLOOD 3

Figure 1.2 Research set-up of the STAR-FLOOD project 3

Figure 1.3 Three case studies in Poland (1 - Poznań County; 2 - Słubice City; 3 - Wrocław City) 5

Figure 2.1 Catastrophic floods of regional extent in Poland with year of occurrence 10

Figure 2.2 GDP per capita for STAR-FLOOD partner countries 12

Figure 2.3 The three-level administrative structure relevant for flood risk management 14

Figure 2.4 Misfit of administrational borders 15

Figure 2.5 Schematic overview of strategies in Poland 18

Figure 2.6 Three Flood Risk Governance sub-arrangements forming the FRGA in Poland 21

Figure 3.1 Area of case study 1- Poznań County 35

Figure 3.2 Division of Poznań County into municipalities 36

Figure 3.3 The Warta River basin 37

Figure 3.4 Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study Poznań 39

Figure 3.5 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poznań County 41

Figure 4.1 Area of case study 2- Słubice City 51

Figure 4.3 Flood-protection solutions for the city of Słubice (based on Kołodziejczyk, 2011) 55

Figure 4.4 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Słubice 57

Figure 4.5 Visual representation of conflict within structural defence sub-arrangement in Słubice 59

Figure 5.1 Area of case study 3 67

Figure 5.2 Assessment of flood risk in Wrocław (OderRegio, 2005) 68

Figure 5.3 The rivers of the city of Wrocław 69

Figure 5.4 Problems connected with quantity and quality of water in Wrocław (KZGW, 2012) 70

Figure 5.5 Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study Wrocław 71

Figure 5.6 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław 73

xvi

List of boxes Box 1.1 Research questions of the STAR-FLOOD project 6

Box 2.1 Facts about the Water Act 23

Box 3.1 Flood defence measures important for Poznań County 39

1

1. Introduction

1.1 Introducing Flood Risk Governance in Poland Floods are the main natural risk in Poland in terms of losses (Biedroń, 2012). Rain-caused river floods

are the predominant type. Large river floods result in significant strains for the state budget: the

most destructive floods in the last 25 years, in 1997 (mostly on the Odra river and its tributaries) and

in 2010 (on the Vistula river and on the Odra river), brought approximately € 3 billion losses each.

After 1989/90, the flood risk management policies were quite inactive, until the dramatic Millennium

flood in July 1997. This disastrous event triggered legislative and organisational reforms that got

finalised in 2001 with the Water Act and in 2007 with the Act on Crisis Management, establishing the

crisis management system. Also, several region-wide flood infrastructure programmes (for the Odra

River basin and for the Vistula River basin) were set up after 1997.

The impact of climate change on alteration of the scale and frequency of large river floods is

uncertain. Climate model simulations indicate a general increase of frequency and amplitude of

heavy precipitation, but the estimates vary for different climate models and different emission

scenarios. Increase of heavy precipitation in Poland in the future warmer climate is plausible and it

would particularly contribute to the growing problem of urban floods and flash floods (Pińskwar,

2010). The southern, mountainous part of Poland is particularly exposed to floods. Some areas in the

northern part of the country, at the Baltic Sea shore, are exposed to storm surges. Flash floods in

urban areas are frequent. Rapid urban sprawl in the last decades and growing incapacities of sewage

systems in cities increase this risk. However, there is little data on the number of flash floods and the

scale of losses.

According to the National Crisis Management Plan, more than 1000 municipalities (out of 2500) are

exposed to flood risk. It is a high-profile risk in crisis management, security discussions and policy

making in Poland. The Eurobarometer survey shows that flood risk is perceived to be the major

natural risk in the country while violent storm is the second one (Eurobarometer, 2012).

Despite the obligation (stated in the Water Act of 2001) to prepare a national flood management

programme, it has not been completed yet. It is a particularly striking difference compared with the

water quality issue. The National Programme for Municipal Wastewater Treatment was an ambitious

programme and it has been successfully completed. The nation has devoted much effort to trying to

comply with obligations stated in the EU WFD. In terms of flood risk management such advancement

is missing. The lack of a national flood strategy is partly compensated by efforts to implement the

Floods Directive. In this report the shape and development of flood risk governance in Poland is

analysed. In the next section (1.2) research aims and questions asked are provided. Research

approach and methods used in this report follow in section 1.3.

1.2 Research aims and questions This report is a deliverable of the EU 7th Framework Project STAR-FLOOD (see: www.starflood.eu for

an outline of the project). STAR-FLOOD focuses on Flood Risk Governance. The project investigates

how current flood risk governance arrangements can be strengthened or redesigned to enhance

societal resilience to flooding. To this end, it is assessed to what extent governance arrangements

2

support or constrain the diversification of Flood Risk Management Strategies as well as the extent to

which such a diversification of strategies enhances societal resilience to flooding. Empirical research

is carried out in six European countries -England in the UK, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Poland

and Sweden -and eighteen vulnerable regions in these countries. The project is assessing Flood Risk

Governance from a combined public administration and legal perspective.

This report is deliverable D3.6 of the third Work Package of STAR-FLOOD. While the first Work

Package provided an extended problem analysis related to Flood Risk Governance in Europe and the

second Work Package focused on how Flood Risk Governance in Europe should be researched, Work

Package 3 reports the main results of the empirical research. It does so through six country-specific

reports, each of which identified the architecture of flood risk governance, analysed flood risk

governance and evaluated current arrangements of governance in terms of resilience, efficiency and

legitimacy. These findings are supported by inter-disciplinary research conducted at the national and

the case study scale.

1.3 Research approach and methods To assess stability and change in Flood Risk Governance, the STAR-FLOOD project draws on the Policy

Arrangements Approach (PAA). Policy arrangements have been defined as “a temporary stabilisation

of the content and organisation of a policy domain” (Van Tatenhove et al., 2000). By studying the

development of these policy arrangements over time, the degree of stability or change in these

arrangements can be analysed. The PAA claims to link up all relevant dimensions of a policy domain

(actors, discourses, rules and resources) and hence enables a study of the policy arrangement as a

whole. The approach has been applied in earlier studies of environmental policies, nature

conservation and water management (Van Tatenhove et al., 2000; Arts et al., 2006; Wiering and Arts,

2006). Two features make the approach particularly useful for analysing FRGAs. Firstly, the approach

combines and integrates different concepts within frameworks of policy analysis (e.g. policy network

models, discourse analysis, the advocacy coalitions framework and regime theory in international

relations) and includes both structure and agency—related elements of institutional analysis, thus

choosing a more sociological approach (Giddens, 1984). Other approaches are less comprehensive in

terms of the dimensions included. Secondly, the four dimensions of the PAA allow for the inclusion

and integration of legal factors in the analysis.

Flood Risk Governance Arrangements (FRGAs) can be defined as institutional constellations resulting

from an interplay between actors and actor coalitions involved in all policy domains relevant for

flood risk management—including water management, spatial planning and disaster management;

their dominant discourses; formal and informal rules of the game; and the power and resource base

of the actors involved (Hegger et al., 2013). FRGAs can be analysed at different scales, including local,

regional, national and international.

To help us identify FRGAs, the STAR-FLOOD project also refers to the notion of Flood Risk

Management Strategies (FRMSs), which are categorised as: prevention; defence; mitigation;

preparation and response; and recovery (Fig. 1.1). A number of Flood Risk Management measures

were grouped into these strategies.

3

Figure 1.1 Flood Risk Management Strategies identified within STAR-FLOOD

To assess what may contribute to stability and/or change, explanatory factors were divided into five

types: (i) physical circumstances; (ii) physical and social infrastructure; (iii) structural factors; (iv)

characteristics of agency and (v) influence of shock events. We have assumed that these five factors

may be found within flood-relevant policy domains but they can also be external to them.

In the last research step, evaluation of previously obtained analytical and explanatory results was

performed. Evaluations of FRGAs outcomes have been made using criteria to determine the extent to

which the desired outcomes of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy were achieved. The set-up of the

research -from analysis via explanation to evaluation - is presented in Fig. 1.2.

Figure 1.2 Research set-up of the STAR-FLOOD project

The desired outcome of resilience addressed the question of whether and to what extent: (i) a

diversified set of Flood Risk Management Strategies is actually in place at country and case study

level; (ii) the strategies have been linked together and aligned; and (iii) a proven capacity to learn and

adapt could be found.

Three case studies were conducted in order to provide insight into local applications of the national

policy and thus to give a possibility to observe various flood risk governance situations. In the

selection process we looked for locations that had experienced flood risk, but to a different degree:

the city of Wrocław was devastated by the Millennium flood of 1997; the city of Słubice experienced

a very high water level in 1997, but the city was eventually defended; the city of Poznań was

4

considered safe due to the protection by a large reservoir upstream, but in 2010 Poznań County

faced flood risk. The chosen cases are homogeneous in terms of hydrological conditions. All three

cities lie at the lowland rivers in the same river basin of the Odra. The Odra is the second largest river

in Poland and during high water levels in 2010 all three urban areas have been threatened by flood.

Basic characteristics of the cases are presented in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Key characteristics of selected case studies and research motivation

Case study 1: Poznań County

Case study 2: Słubice City

Case study 3: Wrocław City

Province/ county/ municipality

County Municipality Municipality

Population About 900,000 About 20,000 About 650,000

River basin area Warta (26 580 km2 to

Goślińska Struga). Odra (53 532 km

2 to the

gauge Młynówka/ Muhlenfliess).

Odra (22 675 km2 to

Bystrzyca and Widawa Rivers).

Types of flooding

Fluvial, pluvial, urban floods.



Elevation

About 50-155 m above sea level.

About 17.5 -60 m above sea level.

About 105 –155 m above sea level.

Research motivation (reasons for including the case studies; what should they add to the analysis at the national level?)

Not severely harmed. Border city (example of trans-boundary flood risk management), highly vulnerable to flooding (located in depression).

Severely harmed by flood of 1997; pilot project frontrunner.

The cases represent variability both in terms of flood risk and consequences thereof: the first city

(Poznań) is relatively well protected; in the second one (Słubice) flood risk is significant and the city

was seriously threatened; the third one (Wrocław) is a city where a dramatic flood occurred. All cases

are within one river basin of a large, international River Odra (Fig 1.3). Thus, our objective was to

examine directions of changes (i.e. bottom-up or top-down) between different levels of flood risk

governance by looking into flood risk governance on both the national and case study level.

The research covered the last 25 years. Years 1989/90 were set as the baseline because in these

years the collapse of communism and the fundamental change of economic, political and

administrative systems radically transformed the context of the flood risk governance in Poland.

5

Figure 1.3 Three case studies in Poland (1 - Poznań County; 2 - Słubice City; 3 - Wrocław City)

The main methods applied are desk research and in-depth semi-structured interviews. Numerous

policy documents (programmes, accessible evaluations etc.), scientific reports and publication or

commentaries were critically examined. Moreover, in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried

out. Although the analysis of documents, official reports and evaluations allowed for a general

understanding of the arrangement in each region, interviews with actors engaged in flood risk

governance were indispensable for collecting information on how flood risk governance is implicitly

interpreted by actors and how they put it into action. Fifty-four interviews, each 1.5 hour long on

average, were conducted. In Polish flood risk governance, the role of the public administrative bodies

are dominant. Therefore, most of these interviews were run with delegates of administrative bodies’,

representing policy domains relevant for flood risk management (spatial planners, water and

drainage managers, crisis management team members). However, relevant actors from beyond the

public administration domain were also interviewed (e.g. NGOs). The aim of conducting the

interviews was to search for underlying assumptions and attitudes that various actors exhibit

towards each other and towards Flood Risk Governance. Our research approach was top-down

oriented. Thus, firstly we investigated which of the five strategies were the most significant during

the research time interval and what were the reasons for this. In order to explain the importance of

strategies we used the PAA dimensions as a framework for organising our preliminary results.

We started from the national perspective, followed by examining local scale arrangements. Box 1.1

below lists the research questions that this report addresses.

6

Box 1.1 Research questions of the STAR-FLOOD project

National level research questions

1. How is the National Flood Policies and Regulations System (NFPR) structured? To what extent is there

cohesion between Flood Risk Governance sub-Arrangements?

2. To what extent are the five Flood Risk Management Strategies distinguished within STAR-FLOOD (see:

below) embedded in the NFPR? Is there evidence to suggest efforts are being made to diversify Flood Risk

Management Strategies and measures employed within these strategies?

3. In what ways is the National Flood Policies and Regulations domain linked to other relevant policy domains?

In what ways do these enable or constrain flood risk governance?

4. How has the NFPR changed over time? What explanatory factors account for periods of stability and/or

change?

5. To what extent can the current NFPR be characterised as resilient, efficient and legitimate? How has this

changed over time?

Case study research questions

6. To what extent do the governance arrangement(s) in selected case studies reflect those evident in the

NFPR?

7. To what extent are the five FRMSs embedded in the governance arrangement(s) in selected case studies?

8. How have arrangements for flood risk governance evolved over time? What are the driving forces for

stability and/or change? In what ways do these compare to those seen at the national scale?

9. To what extent can the governance arrangement(s) in selected case studies be characterised as resilient,

efficient and legitimate?

10. To what extent do the governance arrangement(s) in the NFPR enable or constrain innovative initiatives in

selected case studies?

After analysing the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poland at the country level, we were able

to examine how the national arrangement deviates or overlaps with the arrangements at the local

level. The three case studies were conducted in order to examine correspondence between the

national and local level of flood risk governance. It means that conducting our case study analysis

aimed at explaining, comparing and refining results obtained at the national level.

In order to explain Poland’s flood risk governance, we identified four critical time points that we

considered milestones in Flood Risk Management in Poland. These are: the collapse of communism;

the Millennium flood of 1997; EU accession; and the floods on the Odra and Vistula of 2010.

1.4 Outline of the report The next chapters of this report will focus on an understanding of the National Flood Policies and

Regulations Domain (NFPR) in Poland. Chapter 2 will describe this in terms of an overarching Flood

Risk Governance Arrangement (FRGA). This provides insight into the main features of flood risk

governance at the country level. Section 2.2 elaborates on relevant context-related variables. After

that, we present a review of the current Flood Risk Governance Arrangement and the extent to

which Flood Risk Management Strategies (FRMSs) are embedded in this arrangement (section 2.3).

Section 2.4 aims to provide explanations for the outlook of the current FRGA and the dynamics

through which it has been formed. These explanations include stability and change in the national

arrangement including the relevant legal context.

7

In subsequent chapters we examine to what extent sub-arrangements identified on the national level

are reflected within FRGAs on the case study level. Moreover, by explaining developments of flood

risk management in the three case studies of Poznań, Słubice and Wrocław, we draw similarities and

differences in dynamics and forces behind those dynamics for FRGAs. Together with the assessments

provided at the end of each chapter (2-5), we analyse, explain and evaluate developments both at

the national level and in the case studies. Based on chapters 2-5, chapter 6 provides overarching

explanations and chapter 7 provides evaluations of the developments studied. Chapter 8 concludes

this report by providing suggestions for strengthening and redesigning Flood Risk Governance in

Poland.

9

2 Analysis of national Flood Risk Governance

2.1 Introduction This chapter aims at understanding the national flood policies and regulations in Poland (NFPR). It

provides insight into the main features of the governance of flood risk at the country level.

Elaboration on relevant context-related variables (in section 2.2) is followed by an overview of

national flood risk governance and the main features of stability and change therein since 1989/90

(section 2.3). Explanations for this are provided (section 2.4), followed by an evaluation at the

country level (section 2.5). Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.

2.2 The context of Flood Risk Governance in Poland The following sub-sections present main characteristics relevant for the flood risk governance in

Poland: the physical (2.2.1) and socio-cultural context (2.2.2); the administrative structure (2.2.3) and

the political and administrative culture (2.2.4). Finally, 2.2.5 provides the legal context of Flood Risk

Governance in Poland.

2.2.1 Physical context of Flood Risk Governance in Poland

River flooding is the main natural risk in Poland. The River Vistula (Wisła in Polish), and the River Odra

(Odra in Polish and Czech, Oder in German) are the two biggest rivers. The River Vistula flowing

entirely on the territory of Poland is the longest Polish river and the longest (1020 km) river draining

to the Baltic Sea. The Vistula River basin is transboundary, with parts in Slovakia, Ukraine and Belarus.

Nevertheless, the international River Odra was chosen as more important for the purposes of STAR-

FLOOD. Odra has its source in the Sudetes Mountains in the Czech Republic, and it is the second

largest river in Poland, both with regard to its length (840.36 km), and the area of its drainage basin

(119.07 thousand km2, of which 106.04 thousand km2 is within the territory of Poland). A reach of the

Odra forms part of the national border between Poland and Germany over a distance of 162 km,

which creates transboundary governance issues. These were particularly important during the 1997

flood (elaborated in the Słubice case study - chapter 4). A number of large towns are located on the

River Odra, most of which are in Poland, but some also in the Czech Republic and Germany.

Although rainfall floods can occur on all rivers of the country, the highest river flood risk is found in

the headwaters of the Vistula and the Odra rivers as well as on their mountainous and Piedmont

tributaries. If a combination of intense and/or long-lasting rainfall and snowmelt occurs

simultaneously, floods can happen on large lowland rivers. From a hydro-meteorological perspective,

flood events can also be classified by their spatial extent. In this respect, one can divide floods

according to the scale on which they occur (local/regional). Summarised data of main flood events

are presented in Fig. 2.1.

10

Figure 2.1 Catastrophic floods of regional extent in Poland with year of occurrence (Kundzewicz et al., 2012)

Historical floods

Within the last 25 years, which is the analysed time interval, four milestone events can be pointed out, two of them related to socio-political development and two others to flood events (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 List of main events in Poland in the analysed time interval

Event year Event Main response(s)

1989/90 Communism collapse Systemic transformation of the country (administrative system, economy, law, political system etc.)

1997 Millennium flood of 1997

Water Act of 2001 passed Regional and nationwide flood defence infrastructure projects initiated Act on Crisis Management of 2007 passed

2004 EU accession Transposition of EU laws EU funds became accessible

2010 Flood on Odra (Oder) / Vistula

Act on Support to Entrepreneurs Affected by Flood Events of 2010

Our analysis starts in 1989/90 with the collapse of the communist system and the rebirth of the

market economy, democracy and local governments. The general reconstruction of the

administration after the collapse of communism led to substantial shifts in governance. Those

changes involved establishment of a water administration based on hydrographic borders i.e.

arranged by river basins. Flood risk management in Poland after 1989/90 was driven mainly by inertia

from the past system until a wake-up flood of 1997 occurred. It served as a shock event, whereby

about 2 percent of the area of Poland was inundated. This flood, colloquially named "flood of the

Millennium", caused financial losses estimated at 12 billion PLN (about € 2.9 billion) and 55 fatalities.

Until 1997, flood defence infrastructure, underfinanced during communist times, was continuously

11

treated as a dominant measure in dealing with flood risk in Poland. The flood of 1997 showed both

the inefficiency of the flood risk management system and the ineffectiveness of structural protection

provided only by dikes and reservoirs. Moreover, ambiguities concerning the division of

responsibilities became evident during the flood. As the result, the flood of 1997 led to substantial

reforms of the flood management (and water management) system. The Water Act of 2001 was a

legislative response driven mainly by the need to arrange flood risk management comprehensively.

The Act on Crisis Management of 2007 was another consequence of the Millennium flood of 1997,

rearranging the system of crisis management in the country. The accession to the EU in 2004 brought

both challenges related to transposition of EU legislation and opportunities of access to EU funds,

which were allocated to upgrading flood risk management, mostly for flood defence infrastructure.

The large flood of 2010 was another devastating event, and a test for the new system. In general, the

performance of the newly built flood management system was considered a success.

2.2.2 Socio-cultural context of Poland’s Flood Risk Management

With the population of 38.5 million people, Poland is the third biggest country among the STAR-

FLOOD countries in terms of the number of inhabitants, after France and England. It is not very

densely populated and variation of population density within the country is significant (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Main statistical features of Poland

Year Residents in million

Households in million

Residents per household

Population density people/km

2

Average age

Average household income (€)

2000 38,218 13,400 2.84 122 38.5 10,470

2012 38,533 13,444 2.82 123.2 39.5 12,196

Source: UN and OECD statistics

Urban population is 23.337 million (60.6% of Polish total). Despite the rapid decrease of birth rate and

increase of emigration, housing is still a significant problem in Poland. It is a result of dramatic

destruction and devastation of buildings during World War II, rapid growth of the population in 1950-

70, and ill-conceived housing policies during the communist era. Demand for housing resulted in

dynamic increase of urban sprawl after 1989/90. Although several studies of Wrocław and Poznań

regions have been conducted in Poland in relation to that matter (Szewrański et al., 2015; Graf, 2014)

no consistent conclusions about impacts of urbanisation processes to flood risk can be provided.

Although it is assessed that flood risk can increase in the future due to development and related

hydrological impact as well as climate change (MŚ, 2013), simulations of the number of houses at risk

are missing.

Amongst various risks, Poles perceive natural disasters, such as floods, as the most threatening (86%

are concerned about them), while they are the least afraid of terrorist attacks. Insufficient

preparedness for an event of a large flood is considered a main reason for flood damage (Table 2.3).

Progress in terms of equipment and organisation was noted by Poles, compared to opinions on the

1997 and the 2010 floods.

12

Table 2.3 Opinion of the Poles on: “What are the main reasons for massive damages caused by floods in your opinion?”

Reason (%)

Flood in 1997 Flood in 2010

Insufficient preparedness for an event of a large flood 36 39

Deficiency of equipment and its inadequacy for such disasters 35 14

Deficiency of good organisation in such situations 31 9

Poor performance of central authorities 17 15

Deficiency of funds 12 14

Poor performance of local authorities 11 13

Source: CBOS, 2010

Major socio-economic developments

Poland is a medium-income country, with GDP per capita being considerably lower than in the old EU

countries and in all other STAR-FLOOD partner countries. Poland comes 23rd among the 28 EU

countries.

Huge economic problems and high inflation (together with large debt inherited from the communist

times) in 1989/90 resulted in the fundamental transformation of the whole political and economic

system. Introduction of drastic economic reforms in 1989/90/91 was followed by relatively steady

economic growth also in the time of the global turbulences after 2008 (Fig. 2.2). Even in the worst

year Europe-wide, 2009, Poland noted economic growth.

Figure 2.2 GDP per capita for STAR-FLOOD partner countries - current comparison published by World Bank (2014)

The level of economic development has important implications for flood management (and water

management). In general, water management is considered to be short of funds. Underinvestment

during several recent decades cannot easily be compensated.

In line with economic development, a major milestone for Poland’s socioeconomic life was accession

to the EU on 1 May 2004. This move has had a substantial impact on the country as the EU legislation

13

had to be implemented. The Floods Directive (FD), the Water Framework Directive (WFD), and other

EU regulations (particularly referring to environmental protection) have become a clear reference

point for flood risk management and water management policies in Poland. Moreover, accession to

the EU has brought inflow of funds to the cash-thirsty sectors. In the case of flood risk management,

it resulted in a significant number of infrastructure investments.

2.2.3 Administrative structure

Poland is a unitary state with a three-level administrative structure. The central government plays the

main role in the Polish flood risk policies and regulations. It shares responsibilities with local

authorities, but according to the Polish legal arrangements the main responsibility for the country’s

security (including risk related to floods) resides in the Council of Ministers. The tasks are divided in

accordance with the administrative structure. On the provincial level, Poland consists of 16 provinces

with on average nearly 20 thousand km2 and over 2 million inhabitants each. These are further

divided into 379 counties and 2,478 municipalities/communes. The heads of the local governments (a

county and a commune) are elected in popular elections. The major reform of 1989/90 re-introduced

local governments as legally recognised bodies, and the current three-step administrative division has

been in force from 1 January 1999. This subdivision of administrative structure into central

government and self-government brings both opportunities and constraints with respect to flood risk

management in Poland. The three-level administrative structure is presented in Fig. 2.3.

Consequences of that structure have become evident more on the case study level than on the

national level (see: chapters 3 and 5).

The two main bodies with regard to flood risk management in Poland are National and Regional

Water Management Boards (KZGW and RZGWs), and Provincial Authorities of Drainage, Irrigation and

Infrastructure (WZMiUW). There are 7 RZGWs and 17 WZMiUWs (16 are in accordance with the

provincial borders, plus one specifically covering the depression area of Żuławy, Northern Poland).

These two most important bodies can be indicated within the administrative structure in Poland. At

the same time, responsibilities for river and flood management rests also with National and seven

Regional Water Management Boards (RZGWs) but their administrative borders (arranged after

hydrography, i.e. according to the borders of major river basins) do not overlap with the general

administrative structure in Poland (Fig. 2.4). This spatial misfit has been criticised in Supreme Audit

Office reports of 2011 (NIK, 2011a, b) and of 2013 (NIK, 2013), mainly due to weak coordination of

projects and financial inefficiency. The responsibility for maintenance of flood defence infrastructure

(dikes etc.) resides with the Provincial Authorities of Drainage, Irrigation and Infrastructure

(WZMiUW). Administrative areas of WZMiUW bodies cover provincial administrative borders and

these 17 bodies are practically in charge of 94% of all embankments in Poland. The remaining six

percent are managed by local administrations or Regional Water Management Boards. WZMiUWs are

supervised by the provincial governments but have close links to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural

Development.

14

Figure 2.3 The three-level administrative structure relevant for flood risk management

15

Figure 2.4 Misfit of administrational borders (red lines indicated borders of provinces) and

hydrographical divisions (river basins). RZGW cover areas represented by different colours.

The division of responsibilities in water management and flood management areas causes some

tension. One example is the devolution of responsibility for smaller streams maintenance towards the

municipalities. This shift should be considered an example of a broader phenomenon observed in

Poland and connected with simultaneous transfer of additional obligations to municipalities and

strengthening local self-government. Nevertheless, this shift in responsibilities is not supported by a

shift in adequate financial resources. Weak budget conditions of a local government can result in

weak execution of devolved tasks (Korolewska and Marchewka-Bartkowiak, 2012).

2.2.4 Political and administrative culture

A specific feature of the governmental system of Poland after 1989/90 has been an

“overparliamentarisation” of politics, with a weak and highly fragmented executive (Agh, 1995). The

fall of communism was a politically-driven change. The public administration in 1989/90 was of a top-

down, communist type, and the transformation efforts were considered to have been enforced

against a reluctant and opposed administration. As a result, several attempts to establish a politically

neutral, competent corps of administration have failed (Czaputowicz, 2008). The political culture in

Poland is influenced by the heritage of the many years under the communist rules and the

subsequent systemic transition. There is a common mistrust towards politics. The Polish political

culture is alienated in terms of attitudes towards the executive powers, Parliament and Government

(Gorbachyk and Lyzogub, 2000). Local governments are trusted by 60% of Poles, the most of all

political bodies, while only 34% trust the Parliament (CBOS, 2015).

16

On top of that, the legacy of the communist system (in terms of overlapping economic interests,

behavioural routines, claimed responsibilities of the state etc.) has penetrated political and

administrative culture rendering changes difficult. As a result, a tendency to repeat good practices

from abroad (in terms of institutional design etc.) has appeared to be a practical strategy. The

implementation of basin-based water management (implemented in 1991) and the flood risk maps

(resulting from the Floods Directive) can serve as examples.

2.2.5 Legal context

The legal system in Poland can generally be considered a continental one. In 1989/90, the time of the

communism collapse, the Polish legal system was not well-adjusted to the democratic regime and the

market economy (Rubin, 1994). The continuity of the legal system was recognised, with evolutionary

albeit substantial changes introduced after 1989/90. Concerning water issues, in 1991 the water

management administration based on river basin borders was established and subsequently changed

and updated. The next phase of legal changes took place in addition to the reforms connected with

accession to the EU (2004). No comprehensive legal framework for flood risk management had

existed until 2001, when the Water Act was enacted. At present, strong efforts of Polish legislators are

focused on adapting Polish regulations to EU law. Thus, the implementation of EU regulations in the

management and protection of water resources is essential not only due to the accession treaty, but

also due to the sustainable development principles (mentioned in the national Constitution). In

Poland, the principles are stated in documents, ruling management of water resources and in all

water and environmental regulations. Actual implementation of the principle is disputable.

Another feature of the Poland’s legal context is the lack of national strategic planning in several fields

of water and flood management, combined with high trust in regulative rule of law. Execution of the

regulatory documents is weak due to low regulations’ complementarity and cross-sectorial and cross-

level misfits in division of responsibilities (Kamiński and Stefanowicz, 2011).

One of the biggest failures of the legal framework in the area of flood risk management in Poland is

the deficit of enforcement of land use planning. Subsequent floods reveal continuation of

construction developments in flood prone areas. However, numerous amendments implemented to

the Water Act in recent years did not eliminate all the outstanding legal issues/problems. Moreover,

the amendments undermined the cohesion of the act and made it awkward and unclear in certain

parts. One of the possible causes can be attributed to the character of the legal framework

introduced after 1989/90. Good practice solutions “imported” from other countries of the EU

involved tensions in implementation as these solutions were not well-embedded in the local legal and

administrative traditions in Poland.

Access to justice improved significantly over the analysed time which is a part of a broader

development in administrative transparency in Poland. At the same time, decisions within Polish

flood risk management are objected by watchdog activities pursued by NGOs. A strategic litigation

manner of appealing flood risk administrative decisions started to be particularly effective after the

nature-conservation Rospuda case in 2007 (Szulecka and Szulecki, 2013). Actions and protests of

several environmental NGOs halted building a road crossing a protected area. This case can be

considered a turning point as it showed that NGOs could successfully contest the administration’s

decisions.

17

Summarising chapter 2.2, one could argue that flood risk in Poland is high (compared to other risks),

and that the country is struggling to reform its Flood Risk Governance Arrangement, along with the

wider economic and political transformation. A legacy of a very centralised model of political and

economic organisation of the country makes the road to a more resilient arrangement a demanding

task.

2.3 Flood Risk Governance in Poland: analysing the arrangement

2.3.1 Introduction

In the post-WW2 times until the end of the Polish People's Republic (1945-1989/90), water related

institutions and departments were entirely dependent on national government policy-making. Within

this top-down mode of water governance, the local context was rarely taken into account. At the

same time, meeting local demands gave legitimacy to centralised flood risk management. It should be

stressed that, even though economic calculations were weak and neglected, water boards operating

on smaller streams were locally well-embedded (Paczuski, 1989/90; Paluch, 2006). Their main goals

were to use rivers for navigational and energy purposes and for water supply. Much attention was

paid to creating new agricultural areas by land reclamation. This has often led to draining wetland

areas, contrary to "land reclamation" as ensuring optimal moisture conditions of cultivated soil

(Majewski, 2011). The aim of management of surface and ground waters (Wąsowicz, 1989/90) was to

meet the aggregated needs associated with water resources (to secure supply of water for inhabitants

and industrial sectors; to protect against floods and droughts). This approach considered hydro-

technical construction financed from the budgetary resources to be the way of achieving the

objectives. Therefore, many important hydro-technical and hydro-energy structures that function

until today came into existence. These investments were mainly supposed to protect the growing

demand for water of industry, energy production and population.

After the systemic change in 1989/90, the socio-economic conditions in Poland altered dramatically

and, as a result, the approach to water management has been gradually modified. Environmental

issues emerged as an important concern, which started to be accounted for in legislation, even if

enforcement of environmental law was deficient. Meanwhile, the impact of the EU WFD changed the

approach to water management and general aims, with the principal goal to achieve good quality of

all waters. It became realised that activities aimed at taming nature, consisting of technical solutions

and focusing on the "here and now" can turn out to be negative, harmful and can actually backfire in

the long run (Rotnicka, 2011).

The concepts and methods of water management formulated at the beginning of the 20th century

were questioned and new principles (following the discussion in other countries in Europe), such as

the integrated water resources management concept and sustainable development, received

attention. New ideas for counteracting floods, such as restricting development and backing out of

river valleys started to be discussed and promoted. According to environmentalists, natural, or re-

naturalized rivers, would have the capacity to fulfil their functions, be a friendly space for habitats

and decrease flood risk. These new ideas started to influence the flood management discussions and

practice.

2.3.2 Defence strategy -a dominant Flood Risk Management Strategy

Currently, several approaches to dealing with flood risk can be distinguished in Poland. They consist of

18

particular measures grouped into strategies (Table 2.4). A schematic overview of FRMSs in Poland

(the current situation) is presented in Fig. 2.5.

Figure 2.5 Schematic overview of strategies in Poland. Dark blue indicates the most dominant strategy, and medium blue establishing strategies, light blue minor strategies, grey-blue strategies do not play an important role.

Table 2.4 Particular measures grouped into strategies

Prevention Defence Mitigation Preparation Recovery Spatial plans; Expropriation

policy; Re-allotment

policy.

Retention basins outside area to be protected;


Dikes; Weirs (used to

drain faster or for water retention outside area to be protected);

Water course maintenance;

Quay walls (gaining significance);

Compartment dikes;

Winter beds.

Separate sewers; Sustainable

Urban Drainage Systems -SUDS (including green roofs, urban green);

Flood safe building (occasionally);

Permeable pavements (rarely used);

Retention basins inside area to be protected (hardly visible);

Rain water reservoirs (hardly visible).


manage a flood when it occurs);

Repair works of flood protection measures (in case of emergency, not regular maintenance);

Flood forecasting; Flood warning

systems; Intervention and

evacuation plans; 24 hour monitoring

and intervention teams;

Crisis communication;

General information about flooding (e.g. flood risk management maps, flood risk management plans).

Insurance systems;

Repair works; Solidarity fund.

Although measures related to all flood management strategies are present, not all strategies are of

equal importance. In general, the defence strategy is the main flood risk management strategy in

Poland. The dominant defence strategy is based on the hydro-technical approach, and largely on the

hydraulic mission presumed by the water sector. It is supported by a related discourse and can be

found in the technical and scientific literature. Financed mainly from the central level, the strategy

relies primarily on large-scale, structural measures. The involvement of communities into flood

management activities on the local level is limited. As large-scale defence strategy measures like e.g.

dikes and retention reservoirs are investments absorbing huge financial resources, they can be

afforded only by central institutions. The national budget for investments is radically higher than on

the local level. Therefore, municipalities are usually not involved in those investments. This does not

19

merely concern realisation, but also planning and decision-making.

The defence strategy is contested from two angles: as ineffective in terms of flood management, and

as harmful for the environment. The first criticism emphasises that the current strategy fails as losses

from floods increase. Moreover, it is argued that following the defence strategy, based on structural

protection, leads to increase rather than decrease of flood risk. This criticism is expressed by some -

rather dissenting - hydrologists, crisis management experts, and NGOs.

The second criticism is expressed mainly by environmental NGOs and focuses on the damage to the

environment caused by flood protection activities, while not decreasing flood risk. Re-naturalisation

of rivers and similar ideas are proposed instead. The Directives (WFD and FD) are seen as a source of

the alternative ideas and as the basic reference framework for reshaping flood risk governance in

Poland. The FD has had a significant impact on FRM in Poland. It could be argued that without the FD

very little, if any, improvement in terms of prevention would take place. In fact, the critics of the

dominant hydro-technical approach often refer to the Floods Directive as a source of support for their

environmental concerns. The change of the discourses is an important factor contributing to change.

However, the new ideas are largely suppressed.

Despite slow advancement in communication technologies and insufficiency of forecasting measures,

the flood preparation strategy has been gradually developed at the national scale after the dramatic

flood of 1997. Centrally financed investments in forecasting infrastructure accompanied by the Act on

Crisis Management enacted in 2007 consolidated this approach in dealing with flood risk. Nowadays,

it is present within the crisis management system. The monitoring of waters and preparation of

forecasts is the duty of the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management, while crisis

management planning and action capacities rely mostly on the State Fire Brigades (Matczak and

Abgarowicz, 2013). The siren system of warning is largely abandoned, while first attempts to use

warning via mobile phones are introduced locally.

The flood prevention strategy is generally weakly present, due to poor development and

implementation of spatial planning. Local governments’ priority is economic development, and this

leads to allowing investments in flood prone areas. Local plans have been prepared with loose

consideration of the flood risk. Issuing building permit makes it possible to build in flood prone areas.

Different municipalities, especially those in dense neighbourhoods of larger towns, are developing

very quickly. Their population grows at the expense of the centres of agglomeration. Urban sprawl

becomes very intense, as it is not effectively limited by the planning activities of local authorities.

Developing communities count on gaining new taxpayers and earning immediate financial resources

through the sale of land for new developments. For the municipalities, there is little incentive to

implement spatial plans as they would limit the possibilities of profiting from investors that have

decided to build new developments in flood prone areas (regardless of whether it is done consciously

or because of the lack of knowledge about the risk). Consequences of these development-first-

policies on the local level have been denuded by flood risk maps that have to be taken into account

when new and existing spatial development plans are being amended. Objections raised by local

governments concerned about financial compensations that will have to be covered from municipal

budgets are now beginning to emerge.

20

The flood mitigation strategy is mainly realised in the form of small water retention programs of

moderate scale. Mitigation measures in urban areas (sustainable urban drainage systems, green

roofs) are at the pilot projects stage. At the same time, water engineers consider mitigation activities

insignificant compared to retention capacities possessed by large reservoirs.

The flood recovery strategy involves strong engagement of the state. After the flood of 1997, there

was a plan to establish a universal flood insurance system but the attempt failed. The insurance based

on private companies was then treated as a weakness of flood management in Poland. It relies on

combined policies and the penetration increases with the growth of the mortgage market. The

insurance system develops somehow independently from the complex flood risk management

strategies. Although there are mechanisms (e.g. a budget reserve to be kept by municipalities)

devoted to flood recovery, they hardly constitute a coherent system. Instead, big floods involve ad

hoc decisions to tackle a problem.

2.3.2 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poland

The baseline of this research is the systemic change of 1989/90. Taking into account the four main

milestones within the last 25 years it could be argued that the relative importance of the strategies

has been changing. Four milestones consist of: the collapse of communism (1989/90); the Millennium

flood of 1997; EU accession (2004); and the flood on the Odra and Vistula of 2010. They had impacts

on the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poland. In this section, three distinctive Flood Risk

Governance sub-Arrangements are introduced, institutionalised around particular aspects of Flood

Risk Governance. These are: a) the structural defence sub-arrangement, b) the crisis management

sub-arrangement, and c) the spatial planning sub-arrangement. Although all sub-arrangements have

evolved significantly throughout time, one of them existed before the systemic change of 1989/90

(the structural-defence sub-arrangement). The other two have formed after 1989/90. Figure 2.6

presents the three sub-arrangements within the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement (FRGA) in

Poland as of 2015.

21

Figure 2.6 Three Flood Risk Governance sub-arrangements forming the FRGA in Poland

In terms of power and decisions making, (i) KZGW, (ii) RZGWs and (iii) WZMiUWs, are the most

important actors for flood risk management in Poland. They report to the Ministry of Environment (i

and ii) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (iii), respectively. All three (KZGW,

RZGWs and WZMiUWs) form cooperation coalitions with a tendency to rely on internal knowledge

and expertise. Table 2.5 below presents areas of actors’ activity with regards to the three sub-

arrangements. The Table explains in which sub-arrangement a particular actor takes action. Even

though sub-arrangements are presented within one FRGA it has to be underlined that the FRGA in

Poland is recognised as not coherent. Division of competences can serve as a root for that situation. It

can be argued that the EU legislation is an important reference of the legal and institutional changes.

It is treated as an externally imposed obligation to obey, which is related to the conditions to be

fulfilled to apply for EU funds. However, it contributes to over-legislation of flood risk management

issues, and one can connect this with a high degree of trust in redemptive rule of law. It is a part of

the Poland’s legal culture (see: 2.2.5), with its focus on the transformative power of legislation,

disregarding the instruments for execution.

In consecutive parts of this section, each sub-arrangement will be elaborated. In Table 2.5 a summary

of main feature of sub-FRGAs is presented.

22

Table 2.5 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Poland

Sub-FRGA Description Key actors Key rules/ legislation

Key discourses

Resources

Structural

defence

Structural measures consisting mainly of dikes and reservoirs, with the aim to protect people against flood risk.

KZGW; RZGWs; WZMiUWs; Regional

Environment Protection Departments;

Municipalities.

Water Act Need to protect people and property.

The state budget;

The EU funds.

Crisis

management

Preparing crisis management capacities, including preparation, warning, exercises, and operational capacities.

State Fire Brigades;

Municipalities; NGOs; RZGWs; IMGW.

Act on Crisis Management

Need to provide security to citizens and to manage crisis.

The state budget.

Spatial

planning

Regulative capacity, mainly on the municipal level to manage land use.

Municipalities; RZGWs; KZGW; Private sector

(developers).

Act on Planning and Spatial Development

Planning as a tool for local development.

Municipalities’ budgets.

The structural defence sub-arrangement is the most important one within the Polish FRGA. It is

based mostly on the defence strategy with its large technical infrastructure as the main measures.

This sub-arrangement mainly involves highly institutionalised actors. Two Ministries: (i) of

Environment and (ii) of Agriculture and Rural Development play a dominant role, along with bodies

dependent on the ministries such as the National Water Management Board (KZGW) together with

Regional Water Management Boards (RZGWs), as well as Provincial Authorities of Drainage, Irrigation

and Infrastructure (WZMiUWs) (see: Figure 2.3). Politicians and pro-environmental NGOs are

significant participants too. NGOs become active mostly in opposing the dominant hydro-technical

discourse and expertise. The structural defence sub-arrangement is strongly embedded in functioning

legal acts like the Water Act of 2001, Water Framework Directive, Floods Directive, Environmental

Protection Act of 2003, and the Act on Access to Information on the Environment and its Protection

of 2008. Actors active in this sub-arrangement form different coalitions that are mostly the effect of

the supervision structure (Ministry of Environment in respect to both KZGW and RZGWs; Ministry of

Agriculture and Rural Development in respect to WZMiUWs). NGOs cooperate with policy

entrepreneurs, i.e. individual experts willing to promote certain measures.

An important context of the structural defence is the general strategy of water management. In

general, the evolution of the Polish water management system after 1989/90 has been inclining to

the Integrated Water Resources Management model, a prominent idea emphasising the complexity

of water resources (quantity and quality aspects, surface water and groundwater) and use of water

resources without compromising the sustainability of ecosystems (Kowalczak et al., 2013). The Water

23

Act of 2001 defines responsibility for water management and flood risk management in particular. It

attributes the obligations to consult land use planning and to issue building permits to the Directors

of RZGWs responsible for a given area. It also attributes the property rights of waters (with relevant

obligations and benefits) and divides responsibilities, according to preparation of flood risk maps,

preparation of flood risk management plans, hydrological services, measuring and observation

services.

The Water Act is defended by several actors as an adequate, feasible piece of legislation and a good

way of coping with water issues (Interviews: Gov#4, Gov#5). At the same time, it has been criticised

as fragmented and not functional for water management in Poland (Interviews: Senate#1, Gov#3,

Aca#1). The most common objection is that the Water Act lacks stability, there is no unified content,

and therefore it brings difficulties in use. An example of this instability is that 36 Water Act

amendments have been made since 2001. In relation to EU legislation, the Water Act version

amended in 2012 referred to 17 EU directives. The most important facts about the Water Act are

presented in Box 2.1.

Box 2.1 Facts about the Water Act

The Water Act was enacted on June 18

th, 2001. It refers to the principles of sustainable development, rational

use and an integrated approach, and the principle of shared interests of stakeholders. Its content is divided into several domains: property rights to waters; management and protection of waters; water infrastructure, administrative competences to the type of waters etc. Floods are dealt with by a separate chapter. It attributes tasks and responsibilities to various bodies, financial responsibilities, planning, restrictions of actions, duties etc. The Act has been amended 36 times since 2001. The Floods Directive has been implemented in 2011, resulting in a decrease of axiological and terminological consistency of the act, especially in the issues of floods and droughts. Several parts of the Act, e.g. on spatial planning instruments (i.e. Flood Hazard and Risk Management Maps, local spatial development plans) cause controversies and are considered unclear.

As far as formal competences in water management are concerned, the position of the National

Water Management Board (KZGW) with its regional units (Regional Water Management Boards -

RZGWs) is dominant. Regarding flood prevention, its role is mainly devoted to planning activities. It

provides advice to the Ministry of Environment. RZGWs manage larger rivers (with flow over 2m3/s)

and issue acts and decisions of local law (e.g. they can indicate the type of land cultivation, land use

and types of cultivations resulting from requirements of flood protection). Directors of RZGWs can

order actions aimed at catching water in a storage reservoir or discharging water from the reservoir

without compensation.

As national bodies, the National Water Management Board (KZGW) and Regional Water Management

Boards (RZGWs) are financed by the state. The president of KZGW and directors of RZGWs have

decision-making and control power, represent the State Treasury in water management issues, and

act as investors in water management. The funding of KZGW and RZGWs is relatively stable (Interview

Gov#5). These institutions have substantial funds sufficient to carry out their tasks (Interview Loc#1,

24

Gov#24). Nevertheless, the system of raising funds for project realisation, especially for RZGWs, is

complicated, with various sources involved. The President of the KZGW is responsible for

implementing the Floods Directive requirements in cooperation with the Ministry of Environment

(MŚ). The RZGWs have an implementation role in this respect. Both KZGW and RZGWs employed

well-trained specialists from a range of disciplines like hydrologists, environmentalists, etc. The KZGW

was envisaged as a competent body. However, it has not built a strong professional position, due to

staff instability and rotation. Since 1989/90, a decrease of supply of well-trained engineers was noted

(Interviews: Gov#4, Loc#1). The RZGWs need specialists from different disciplines. They try to give

some suggestions to technical universities regarding their curricula.

The second important actor in water management are the Regional Authorities on Drainage,

Irrigation and Infrastructure (WZMiUW) formed by the Provincial Governments. They carry out tasks

on behalf of both central government and local government administrations. The area of their

operation is limited to the provincial administration borders (see: Fig. 2.4). WZMiUWs are responsible

for the technical condition (development and maintenance) of hydro-technical devices (dikes etc.).

Most flood embankments are more than 80 year old and require substantial work (NIK, 2013).

WZMiUWs partially realise tasks of the state and they receive funds from the ministries. They also

apply for the EU structural grants for their investments. This creates tensions in a financial and

operational sense, since the EU funds are not intended for covering maintenance.

Provincial Authorities of Drainage Irrigation and Infrastructure (WZMiUWs) manage small rivers (with

flow below 2m3/s), and participate in actions during floods. In particular, they administer and assume

responsibility for the state of provincial flood protection reservoirs. Additionally, they are in charge of

maintenance of devices of basic and detailed land reclamation (tasks carried out on behalf of the

government administration). Their activity is often close to the agricultural sector. Although these

bodies are subordinated to provincial authorities, tracking the evolution of the administration they

are close to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MRiRW). The drainage and retention

authorities are supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Traditionally, this

Ministry has strong links to the Polish Peasant Party, a junior partner in several governments under

different constellations after 1989/90. Since then (until 2015), the Polish Peasant Party was not in a

ruling coalition for only seven years.

Just as in the case of RZGWs, a lack of competent experts is perceived in WZMiUWs. The reason can

be explained by the generation gap: after 1989/90, there was a discontinuity in the education of

water engineers. As a result, the retired experts are employed for some tasks, since no one else has

the appropriate skills and knowledge. Engineers specialised in hydro-engineering are a marginal part

(approx. 2%) of all engineers. Hydro-engineering certifications were abandoned 20 years ago. The lack

of professionals prepared for working with water engineering is clearly recognised by academia and

practitioners alike. However, hydro-engineering disappeared from technical universities, replaced by

environmental engineering. The later type of education obtained more funding and was recognised as

more modern.

The second sub-FRGA distinguished at the national level in Poland is the crisis management sub-

arrangement. Massive losses caused by the flood of 1997 raised the need to increase the

effectiveness of measures taken during such events. Previously (like during the flood in 1997), one of

25

the most important players was the Army, but they lacked enough specialised technical and

knowledge resources for flooding issues. After 1989/90 the State Fire Brigades took over the tasks.

Nowadays, in a case of emergency caused by a flood event, the greatest coordinative competence

resides within crisis management departments on the provincial, county and municipality levels, and

operationally by the State Fire Brigades. RZGWs and WZMiUWs are also involved. A crisis

management centre is a coordinative institution that oversees actions of different rescue forces that

take part in direct rescue operations. Its main aim is to allow flow of information, to gather

information on possible risks, and to undertake rescue actions together with other rescue forces,

such as fire brigades, the police etc. Although at the lowest, municipal, level, it is not obligatory to

establish this body, the teams are usually set up. On this local level, crisis management is focused

mostly on issues related to local problems, like fire protection. They are also responsible for early

warning systems and risks monitoring, coordination of rescue activities and evacuation actions. At the

provincial level, a provincial governor is in charge of coordination of threat prevention and assisting

lower levels of administration in case of inadequate resources. He/she represents the government

and coordinates actions. The forecasting and early warning system is developed by the Institute of

Meteorology and Water Management National Research Institute (IMGW-PIB).

Rules behind the sub-arrangement rather clearly divide the responsibilities between actors. The most

important ones are: the Act on State of Natural Disaster of 2002 (the state of natural disaster was not

announced since enacted), the Act on Crisis Management of 2007, and the Floods Directive. The

current state of crisis management has been the result of the national level evolution with little

influence of EU legislation (Brazova and Matczak, 2014). The triggering factor was the Millennium

flood of 1997. It took 10 years to complete the system as it was necessary to prepare a

comprehensive legislation and the related institutional framework for all risks (including floods). As it

was not the case before the flood of 1997, the relation between the civil bodies and the military part

of crisis management has been clarified by this Act of 2007. It addressed mismatches revealed by the

flood of 1997. This sub-arrangement faces little discourse criticising the system, and State Fire

Brigades have sufficient financial resources.

However, the role of civil protection within the crisis management system is ambiguous (NIK, 2011). It

is subordinated to the National Fire Brigades (KW PSP) but its role and operations lack a clear legal

background (Matczak and Abgarowicz, 2013). The Act on Crisis Management of 2007 does not involve

controversies, and the crisis management system based on the Act is considered to be functioning

well (Interview Gov#10). However, conflicts may occur in several respects. For instance, in case of

crisis management plans there are tensions between actors (between military and civil actors;

between the National Fire Brigades and local governments etc.). In the opinion of practitioners,

testing procedures in real life, via exercises and during an actual crisis, is necessary for correct

procedures (interviews: Aca#1, Loc#2).

The Spatial planning sub-arrangement has been identified as the third sub-FRGA at the national level

in Poland. It is supported by most of the actors of the whole FRGA in Poland, at least on the discursive

level. Nevertheless, the regulative impact on the FRGA is limited. This is partially caused by the fact

that behind the actors active here (Ministry of Infrastructure and Development, academics of

different backgrounds) there are practically no regulative competences. Even though there are some

26

formal rules (Spatial Development Act of 2003, Floods Directive), an informal rule and practice has

been established, giving the local authorities the right to decide on implementing spatial plans at the

moment that this is considered economically profitable. This explains the general weakness of the

sub-arrangement, which is strong only on the rhetorical level. Within the sub-arrangement, it is

discussed whether flood risk and flood damage maps will change the situation when they become

available eventually.

Comparing sub-arrangements from a governance perspective, some difference can be observed

despite a general centralisation (Table 2.6).

Table 2.6 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs (country level) Sub-FRGA Mode of governance Shifts in modes of governance

Structural defence

Centralised Symptoms of a shift towards decentralised governance can be observed: more active role of stakeholders and NGOs. Nevertheless, centralisation is still dominant.

Crisis management

Decentralised

Most action and resources can be found at municipal/county/provincial levels. Certain flexibility of rules close to informal ones can be observed, but at the same time voluntary fire brigades representing the non-governmental sector, are becoming more dependent on municipalities.

Spatial planning Decentralised Main role in played by municipalities, but private sector is

getting importance as a stakeholder influencing the procedures.

The systemic change and processes of democratisation that took place in Poland after 1989/90 made

room for civil society as an actor affecting important social issues and the development of the

country, including environmental matters in particular. NGOs have become particularly significant due

to the Aarhus Convention. The act on Access to Information on the Environment and its Protection,

Participation of the Society in Environment Protection, and Environmental Impact Assessments of

2008 is a transposition of the Convention. However, public consultation and participation in decision-

making processes in flood risk management in Poland is still at its infancy. There is a lack of

experience in raising public engagement in terms of more active participation in decision-making

processes. The model of top-down informing is the most common practice. Little innovative practices

can be observed. For instance collaborative planning (i.e. urban development and flood risk

management) both in vertical and horizontal terms are hardly noticeable.

In 1989/90 Poland, as all other Central and Eastern European states in the Soviet zone of influence,

was a very centralised country in all respects. Although fundamental decentralisation took place

afterward, significant centralisation can still be observed as the three sub-arrangements’ modes of

governance (Driessen et al., 2012) show. The main and radical shift in governance mode occurred in

1989/90 and later became stable, although a growing role of the civil sector is widely acknowledged.

2.4 Explanations for stability and change in Flood Risk Governance

2.4.1 Introduction: main features of Flood Risk Governance in Poland

The state of the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement (FRGA) in Poland is a result of an evolution, and

in the last 25 years it underwent noticeable changes. Although not significantly, the structural

defence sub-arrangement is gradually evolving towards a more pro-environmental approach. Other

sub-arrangements (crisis management and spatial planning) have gained more importance within the

27

Polish FRGA. At the same time, the main feature of the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement (reliance

on the defence strategy), although weakened, remains dominant.

This section presents the main characteristics of the current Flood Risk Governance Arrangement and

points out further factors explaining stability and change. Although the Polish FRGA consists of three,

rather independent sub-arrangements, the current flood risk governance arrangement in Poland can

be characterised by the following general features:

a) Reliance on the defence strategy is dominant. It is challenged, however, by a new trend –

more ephasis on prevention, and combining flood management with nature conservation.

Thus both stability and change can be observed in this respect;

b) The hydro-technical approach, discourse and expertise central in Poland’s arrangement for

a long time are challenged by a pro-environmental approach and non-structural measures.

Still, incorporating environmental concerns is proceeding slowly, but a certain trend can be

pointed out;

c) Fragmented organisation, with several administrative bodies covering areas related to FRM,

could be identified. There is competition for resources rather than coordinated efforts to

decrease flood risk. The agencies act as interest groups linked to ministries and economic

sectors. The steering power of ministries (the Ministry of Environment in particular) is

relatively weak. This stems from legislation-based fragmentation and mismatch of

competences. The fragmentation evolved as a relatively stable feature of Poland’s

arrangement, and attempts to integrate did not succeed;

d) Short-term, investment-driven orientation, which is focused more on budget maximisation

than on strategic FRM can be observed. One could argue that floods are perversely needed

as they entail justification of investments. Lack of integrated assessment of flood risk

governance outcomes is a relatively stable element of the arrangement.

2.4.2 Explanatory factors for stability and change in the Polish national Flood Risk Governance Arrangement

Factors explaining stability and change in flood risk governance arrangement in Poland are presented

in Table 2.7. Endogenous and exogenous factors are distinguished.

28

Table 2.7 Drivers of stability and change in Polish FRGA Drivers of stability Drivers of change

Factors internal to the FRGA

Administrative competences and hydrographical borders do not fit each other (incoherence);

36 Water Law amendments since 2001 -undermining legitimacy;

Divided ownership (management responsibilities) of water and infrastructure;

Institutional path dependency (recovery funds provided and spent for the same measures);

Fragmented management;

Depreciation of infrastructure (embankments etc.).

Decentralisation of management and the funding of flood management activities;

Institutional change in the water management;

Obligation to provide information about environment.

Factors from outside the FRGA

External funds (the EU) spent on customary measures;

Labour Act (institutional time); The state budget shortages; Budget maximisation principle; Lack of data about financial flows; Flood plain areas availability as a resource

for potential investments; Low public involvement in consultation

processes; Weak steering power by ministries; Focus on projects’ realisation instead of

outcomes; Voluntarily based insurance system (since

1989/90);

Urban development and urban sprawl;

Flood of 2010.

Droughts and floods in 1980s and 90s; The general state transformation after the

communism collapse in 1989/90; Accession to the EU; External funding (allocated to e.g. small

retention programmes as State Forest Holding’s own interests);

Floods Directive (obligating to prepare Flood Risk and Hazard Maps, Flood Risk Management Plans);

Water Framework Directive (emphasis on quality of the environment and nature conservation);

Obligation to apply the EU and the World Bank effectiveness and efficiency measures in projects implementation;

Increased insurance penetration due to development of mortgage market;

Flood of 1997; Crisis Management Act as a consequence of

flood of 1997; Increasing public demand for administrative

transparency; Policy entrepreneurs (mainly NGOs); Declining number of trained hydro-

technicians; Increasing diversification of technical

measures (due to technological development, technology dissemination);

Broader use of dissemination technology to communicate flood risk (SMS).

Four critical thresholds that have influenced the shape of the FRGA by modifying it in some aspects

and enhancing different features of the arrangement can be indicated in the background of the

Poland’s flood risk governance arrangement: the systemic transformation that started in 1989/90; the

floods of 1997 and of 2010 and accession to the EU in 2004. In particular:

a) The fall of the communist system in 1989/90 and related political, economic and legal

changes had a profound impact on the FRGA context and it was a fundamental factor

29

implying change. The rebirth of local government and the general reconstruction of the

administration took place after 1989/90. Subsequently, a water administration based on

the river basin level was established. Although the change involved redistribution of

property rights, tasks and responsibilities among the administration agencies and

emergence of the private sector role, the overall arrangement, based on defence and

structural protection remained initially untouched, driven by inertia. Substantial resources

were channelled into water quality (construction of water and wastewater treatment

plants and sewage systems), while flood management received less attention and was

short of money; one could argue that it was marginalised. The change of the administrative

system has played a significant role in flood risk management, as it offered a framework for

flood risk governance. The crisis management system has been built in accordance with

the local government’s administration structure, and several flood management

responsibilities were allocated to provincial governments;

b) Large floods had a double role both involving change and stability. The Millennium flood of

1997 triggered a major reform of the crisis management system. Much more attention was

put into the preparation strategy. The whole crisis management system was established

(covering all hazards, not only floods). Besides creating the crisis management

administrative structure at all levels of administration, the State Fire Brigades significantly

increased their operation capacities. Pilot projects of local communities’ involvement in

preparation were launched. The hydrological modelling and warning system were

advanced. Also, there was an attempt to create universal flood insurance system (which

failed). Nevertheless, main investments were transferred to structural defence and

reservoirs. In this respect, the main strategy remained stable. The flood of 2010 had no

changing effects, as the crisis situation was basically managed;

c) The accession to the EU in 2004 involved transposition of EU legislation (particularly the FD

and WFD). It strengthened the position of some actors emphasising environmental concern

(such as NGOs), and the new ideas in flood management (such as the re-naturalisation of

rivers). EU legislation and access to the European funds involved a new rhetoric of flood

management and undermined the vested interests in the water sector.

Taking into account particular factors, it can be argued that inertia-type factors can be pointed out

among internal factors explaining stability. These include division of competences (and related

sectorial division), the “soft” character of the Water Act with a substantial number of amendments,

and weak public engagement in decision making. Existing physical infrastructure can be considered a

stabilising factor. Embankments and other infrastructure for structural flood risk reduction were the

core element of the arrangement, with regard to human resources, investments and maintenance,

expertise etc. The necessity to maintain the infrastructure holds back changes. In terms of internal

factors explaining change, an important one is the evolution of the administrative structure and

related reshuffling of responsibilities. Increased significance of the State Fire Brigades’ role in the area

of crisis management is particularly noticeable.

Among external factors explaining stability, the general state governance can be pointed out. For

instance, the state budget shortages led to decreased money allocation for flood preparation and

infrastructure. It helped to conserve the existing FRGA, particularly in 1989/90s. The budget shortage

has led to under-investments in flood management. Several attempts to implement measures that

30

would be efficient in the long run failed, as they required investment with delayed benefits. The

immediate needs of the state budget outweigh the flood preparedness management measures. For

instance, meadows in flood plains owned by the State Treasury and managed by the Agency of

Agricultural Lands are being sold. This adversely affects the option of future use of floodplains in

flood management. Among other factors, institutional path-dependency, based on vested interests,

enhances continuation of the existing model of FRGA. New resources, e.g. from the EU funds are

allocated in accordance with the traditional pattern.

Physical conditions form an important external factor contributing to change. The floods of 1997

revealed that the flood risk governance arrangement is not prepared to cope with the risk. Other

important external factors include “imported” legislation (the EU directives) and new flood risk

governance ideas (like “re-naturalising” rivers). The new ideas are supported by a growing non-

governmental sector gaining importance as a new actor arguing for change. New technologies, for

instance those allowing for more comprehensive collection of meteorological data, building better

models and better risk communication were factors of change. Altogether, the infrastructure was

rather hampering the changes.

Summarising section 2.4, we can conclude that flood risk governance in Poland relies mostly on the

defence strategy which stems from long term development. Radical socioeconomic change of

1989/90 did not have a quick impact on the flood risk governance. Later changes slowly shifted

governance towards development of preparation strategies, a more prominent role of civil

organisations, and more emphasis put on environmental issues. These changes are incremental. Pull

factors are related to external impacts: EU legislation and penetration of new concepts and ideas.

After the beginning of 1989/90, subsequent changes have been slow and involve rather shallow

institutional change.

2.5 Evaluations at the national level The Polish FRGA has evolved significantly after 1989/90. Overall, the system relies less on the defence

strategy than 25 years ago. Despite the diversification of strategies, the evaluation of the FRGA does

not exhibit an entirely positive picture: a lack of coordination and strategic planning can be found.

Good practices include the water retention programme in forests, the organisation of the crisis

management system, and cross-border crisis management cooperation basing on bilateral

agreements. However, these examples of good practices are hardly part of a coherent strategy. Below,

the Polish FRGA is evaluated in terms of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy (Table 2.8).

31

Table 2.8 Key features of governance which support (+) or constrain (-) resilience, efficiency and legitimacy

Desired outcome of flood risk

governance

Sub-criteria + or - Feature of governance

Resilience

Capacity to resist

+ Improvements of flood warning system to increase lead time;

-

Homogeneity in FRMSs (domination of one strategy); Tensions on spatial planners during decision making process; Sectorial organisation of FRM; New investments.

Capacity to absorb and

recover

+ Partnership working during the flood.

-

Inaccurate responsibilities and path-dependences; Focus on land-use development rather than on pro-active spatial

planning (political pressure for development); Insufficient funding to support defence maintenance.

Capacity to adapt

+ Diversification of FRMSs; A catchment-based approach to water (including flood risk)

management.

-

Low public engagement in flood risk reduction; People tend to forget they are at risk; Arrangements are more effective in terms of goal attainment

rather than problem-solving.

Efficiency

+ CBA implemented more frequently.

-

Spending money in short-term manner; Delays in the project/investment schedule due to complicated

administrative proceedings; Removing legal gaps rather than reforming legislation; Orientation on the immediate rather than long-term effect Tendency to budget maximisation; Prolonged and complicated procedures for maintenance of

watercourse.

Legitimacy

+ Public consultation; Access to information.

-

Unstable law; Legislative gaps or non-accuracies; Faith in a magic legal force; Unequal access to information; Delegitimising and undermining principles e.g. when investing in

flood-prone areas; Lack of public interest in flood risk.

2.5.1 Resilience

In terms of resistance – the ability to reduce the likelihood or magnitude of flood risk, the progress

over the last 25 years has been rather small. Substantial investments were allocated into defence

structures. However, due to the long period of under-investment, a substantial reduction of flood risk

can hardly be claimed. After the floods of 1997 and 2010, financing of the defence-oriented flood risk

management persists. As new construction sites on flood plain areas increase potential financial

losses, effects achieved in one sector of flood risk governance can be diminished by weakening in

another. Moreover, awareness of flood risk is generally low among Poles. No significant changes in

the actors’ behaviour during the evaluation time (1989/90-2014) were observed.

32

The Polish Flood Risk Governance Arrangement has built a capacity to buffer shock events, as shown

by the difference between the 1997 and 2010 flood events. In the former case, capacity to cope with

the crisis, with regard to legal framework and operational resources, turned out to be acutely limited.

The latter case showed better coordination and information management in the field of flood crisis

management. Compared to the flood of 1997, the crisis action in 2010 was precisely controlled and

coordinated, instead of leaving space for improvisation and coincidence caused by the lack of clear

division of responsibilities. Moreover, recovery and the access to EU funds (e.g. EU Solidarity Fund)

made it possible to invest in hydro-technical infrastructure.

Yet, adaptive capacity is feeble mainly due to actors’ path dependence. Key factors that constrain

long-term investments and more assembled actions are: a lack of innovation in the general approach

towards flood risks, including a narrow scope of the CBAs conducted, a conservative stance of several

actors not willing to consider the usage of non-obvious solutions instead of highly standardised

measures, as well as unwillingness to cooperate with actors sometimes representing different

approaches. Thus, the inclusion of either insurance systems or spatial planning into flood risk

management is very much needed.

2.5.2 Efficiency

Evaluating efficiency of the Polish FRGA is a difficult task due to lack of data. Missing sufficient

information to evaluate efficiency of Polish arrangement is driven both by inadequacy and

incoherence of data (absence of indicators). Data on financial expenses on flood management are

difficult to acquire as they are channelled via ministries, agencies, and various levels of

administration. It hampers possibilities to conduct efficiency evaluations not only by external experts

(i.e. academics) but also by actors engaged in flood risk management in Poland. What is more, in

terms of investments, external funds (e.g. EU funds) are managed in a complicated way, because of

various restrictions and regulations. As a consequence, only one third of the funds devoted to

national flood defence programmes (such as for the Programme for the Odra in 2006) could be spent

(NIK, 2011a). After the 1997 flood, € 250 million from the EU earmarked for recovery was only used

to a minimal extent.

There is competition between ministries and agencies for resources. Therefore there is little interest

in clarifying actual, objectivised needs. Instead, budgets are formed via political competitions and

coalitions built among the engaged actors. A draft reform of the water management system, including

self-financing water management proposed in 2007, would produce a mechanism of incorporating

economic efficiency into the FRGA. Yet, this attempt has not been successful to date. In terms of

resource efficiency, new technologies (maps, GIS, warning systems) are applied but it is difficult to

assess their actual efficiency and their contribution to the overall performance.

In general, project realisation purposes (with their deadlines and resources) are steering factors

outbalancing ultimate aims of projects. In terms of casualties, less people died during the 2010 flood

than in 1997. This could be seen as a measure of effectiveness of the reformed FRGA.

2.5.3 Legitimacy

The 2010 flood did not undermine the stability and thus legitimacy of the FRGA, particularly with

regard to the preparation strategy. There are tensions within the arrangement, however. One issue

33

concerns the division of responsibilities between RZGWs and the WZMiUWs. The latter, being

subordinated to the Provincial Governments, assume more responsibility regarding flood

management.

Regarding the recovery strategy, there is a common expectation of help from the government (“state

as insurer of last resort”), which involves moral hazard. The legal system in Poland cannot be

characterised as stable. Numerous Water Law amendments since 1989/90 can serve as an example.

This involves difficulties with implementation of rules. New developments are located in flood plain

areas, delegitimising and undermining principles that are meant to be obeyed. This is both due to the

consequences of development decisions made in the past (e.g. Kozanów district housing estate

located in Wrocław) and new investments. Problems with increasing flood losses due to spatial

planning decisions are particularly evident in the southern part of Poland (see: Fig. 2.1) where flood

losses are increasing in “regular” years, without extreme floods (€ 51 million in 2007, to € 77 million

in 2008, and to € 123.5 million in 2009).

Furthermore, decision-making in the area of flood management is professionalised, with little

involvement of the public. In the last 25 years, public participation has increased from non-existent to

a certain level, but mostly in a form of consultation and in water management. Moreover, the process

is organised more to detect potential opponents than to collect opinions and ideas on how to achieve

better outcomes. The public administration’s decisions are increasingly contested in Poland (not only

in the area of flood management). Particular projects (investments) realised in the areas of flood

management involve public participation procedures and often controversies and protests. They are

often of NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) type, while projects disregard actors’ interests due to the

tradition of decision undertaken by experts.

Altogether, despite the tensions, the FRGA can be considered as legitimised, with little potential for a

significant action undermining the whole FRGA discretion (see: sections 2.2.2-5).

2.6 Conclusions The complex social, political, economic and legal transition that started in 1989/90 shaped the

context for FRMS. A broad range of changes (concerning an administrative conduct, a role of the

public, a role of economic incentives, etc.) have been creating challenges for designing new rules in

flood management (and water management). Nevertheless, the legacy of the communist system has

rendered the changes difficult. The flood of 1997 revealed the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of

flood risk management. The subsequent reforms were based on the local governments as an

administrative and coordination frame, and on the State Fire Brigades as provider of operational

capacity. It took 10 years before the system was completed, and it passed the test of the flood of

2010.

The reforms moved the flood management system from the status of strong dependency on the

defence strategy. Although the infrastructural defence remained the basis of the system, other

strategies have been relatively strengthened, particularly the preparation one.

Another push to the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement came from the accession to the EU in 2004.

It involved transposition of EU legislation, which was used as a reason for shifting the emphasis from

34

defence towards the prevention and preparation strategies. Also, the EU funds provided new impetus

to flood management modernisation.

Overall, looking at Poland’s FRGA in last 25 years, we can observe more stability than change against

the dramatic break in political and economic realms caused by the fall of communism. Initially, in

1989/90 the FRGA was assembled according to the old top-down, defence-based model. It changed

later than other sectors, and the change was incremental, with the use of windows of opportunities

provided by the 1997 flood and the EU accession.

In the next three chapters, the analysis, explanation and evaluation of the Flood Risk Governance

Arrangement, presented above for the country level, will be compared with three local case studies.

The general aim is to investigate how far local structures and operations deviate from the national

scheme and how the national FRGA offers mechanisms for successful implementation of strategies at

the local level.

35

3 Case study 1 -Poznań County

3.1 Introduction This chapter provides an analysis, explanation and evaluation of flood risk governance in Poznań

County (see: Fig. 3.1). This case study is expected to be exemplary for the flood risk management at

the national level, however additionally it is possible to trace the cooperation between different

levels of administration (county - city - surrounding communes). First the main characteristics of the

case study area are provided (in section 3.2). This is followed by an analysis of dynamics (stability and

change) in the flood risk management strategies and their embeddedness in local/regional sub-

arrangements (3.3). Then explanation of the dynamics (3.4) and evaluation (3.5) follows and, finally,

conclusions for this case study are presented.

Figure 3.1 Area of case study 1- Poznań County (thick black line - border of the city of Poznań, thin black line - border of the Poznań County) MarCom-Carto – Faculty of Geosciences – Utrecht University, 2015

36

3.2 Contextual background of the Poznań case study

3.2.1 Physical circumstances

Poznań County consists of 17 municipalities, located around the city of Poznań (Fig. 3.2). Key socio-

demographic and physical characteristics of Poznań County are summarised in Table 3.1.

Figure 3.2 Division of Poznań County into municipalities

Table 3.1 Key characteristics of the Poznań case study

Region and county Wielkopolska Province, Poznań County

Poznań City population Poznań County population (without the city)

546,503 (2012) 344,752 (2012)

Population density in the city of Poznań Population density in the Poznań county (outside of city)

2086 inh./km² 181 inh./km²

Elevation About 50-155 m above sea level

River basin Warta River

Types of flooding Fluvial, pluvial and urban floods

The area of the Poznań County is a part of the Wielkopolska Lake District. The River Warta is the main

river of the county (flowing through the city of Poznań), the third longest river in Poland, and the

largest tributary to the Odra River (in fact, with greater basin area than the Odra). In the area of

Poznań County the Warta is flowing to the north through the zone of moraine hills. The middle part

of the basin has been undergoing a process of urbanisation for many centuries and is fully regulated

within Poznań city. The area of Poznań County belongs entirely to the basin of the River Warta (Fig.

3.3).

37

Figure 3.3 The Warta River basin

Forests occupy the area of about 42 thousand hectares, which is about 22% of the whole county. At

the beginning of the 19th century, the Wielkopolska region was significantly deforested as a result of

excessive and uncontrolled logging. Water balance was disturbed because of intensive river

regulation and inappropriate building development in the river valleys. The development of

agriculture and numerous land reclamations for agriculture (mostly drainage) caused lowering of the

groundwater level and water level of lakes, and finally resulted in massive drying.

The only object of the active flood control in the area of Poznań County is a water reservoir Kowalskie

on the Główna River (tributary to the Warta). The total capacity of the reservoir is only about 6

million m3. However, objects/structures located on the Warta upstream the Poznań County i.e. Konin-

Pyzdry Valley (mainly the floodplain around Golina) and Jeziorsko Reservoir constitute the potential

key element of flood control for both the city of Poznań and the Poznań County (see Fig. 3.2).

3.2.2 Historical events

Poznań County is pursuing flood policies in a way typical of the entire country. Thus, key events and

main response are parallel for Poland and for Poznań County (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Key events affecting FRGA in Poznań County

Event year Event Main response(s)

1989/90 Communism collapse Systemic transformation (administrative, economic, societal, legal);

1997 Millennium flood of 1997 Water Act of 2001; Region-wide defence infrastructure; Act on Crisis Management of 2007

2004 EU accession EU law transpositions; Access to EU funds

2010 Flood on the River Warta Manual control of storage reservoirs

3.2.3 General characteristics and socio-cultural context

The highest number of people lived in Poznań in the early 1989/90s. In 1989/90, Poznan had more

than 590,000 residents. From this moment, the number of inhabitants started to decline slowly and

38

gradually, caused by urban sprawl and the nationwide trend of low birth rate. The opposite situation

is taking place in Poznań County – within the past 17 years the population rose by 43.2% from the

level of 240,700 inhabitants in 1995 up to 344.700 in 2012.

3.2.4 Major socio-economic developments

The city of Poznań with its surrounding 17 municipalities forming Poznań County is located in the

middle of the route connecting Warsaw and Berlin. This favourable location and the fact that it is the

largest agglomeration in the region, makes it an important communication hub which increases its

investment attractiveness. Large investments after 1989/90 and restructuration of old industries

contributed to considerable economic development of the city. The GDP of Poznań is the second

highest among Polish cities (about € 19 thousand per capita in 2011). The unemployment rate is one

of the lowest in the country – in Poznań it does not exceed 5%. Poznań is often promoted as a

successful place for undertaking business activities and a place of an innovative economic approach.

Nevertheless, the number of inhabitants of Poznań is decreasing at the expense of Poznań County. It

leads to issues in the agglomeration such as an excess of cars and traffic jams.

3.3 Analysis of Flood Risk Governance in Poznań County

3.3.1 Introduction

The Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poznań County generally reflects the national FRGA. This

applies also to dominating strategies. Similarly to Poland as a whole, FRMSs in Poznań County are

primarily focused on flood defence, although rapid growth of flood preparation is being observed.

Currently, different measures are employed as part of the defence strategy (see: Table 3.3).

Nevertheless, in Poznań County flood defence is based on 3 main elements: Konin-Pyzdry Valley,

Jeziorsko Reservoir, and embankments.

Table 3.3 Current measures employed in FRMSs in Poznań County

Prevention Defence Mitigation Preparation Recovery Spatial planning

to influence location and layout of future development;

Expropriation policy to “free” flood-prone areas;

Re-allotment policy;

Building condition permission.

Retention reservoirs (upstream the area to be protected);

Embankments; Widening,

deepening, dredging;

Pumping stations;

Dikes, weirs; Water/river

course maintenance.

Rainwater reservoirs (hardly visible);

Efforts to promote use of separate sewers;

SUDS in new developments;

Small water retention;

Permeable pavements (rarely used);


Taxes of impervious cover (“rain tax”).

24/24 monitoring; Flood forecasting

and warning system; Intervention and

evacuation plans; Crisis

communication; Repair works of

flood protection measures (in case of emergency, not regular maintenance);


manage a flood when it occurs).

Insurance system;

Repair works;

Solidarity fund.

3.3.2 Analysis of Flood Risk Management Strategies

Concerning flood risk management strategies, Poznań County relies mostly on flood defence (see:

Fig. 3.4). This strategy consists of the two most significant measures: reservoirs and embankments

39

(Box 3.1) Nevertheless, there is a widespread conviction among administrators that full protection of

Poznań County is impossible (Interview Gov#5). Embankments, pumping stations, and reservoirs can

protect to a certain level, above which there is no possibility to provide protection against flooding to

everybody (Interviews: Loc#1; Gov#12). Nevertheless, due to its location, protection and physical

conditions, Poznań (including its surroundings) is regarded a flood safe city.

Figure 3.4 Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study Poznań. Dark blue indicates the most dominant strategy, and medium blue establishing strategies, light blue minor strategies, grey-blue strategies do not play a role.

Box 3.1 Flood defence measures important for Poznań County

Konin-Pyzdry Valley The area of the Konin-Pyzdry Valley is a natural dry reservoir for capacity of about 360 million m

3. At present,

total capacity of potential polder areas in the area of the Konin-Pyzdry Valley - after urbanisation processes and settling the part of the valley - is much smaller and amounts to only 165 million m

3. At present, there is no

polder which would be a hydro-technical device according to the law. So, this area is only conventionally called the "Golina Polder". Establishing the polder is supported by the Provincial Office, convinced that it is necessary to designate the land for the retention of flood flow in polders in the Golina location. This task has been recognised as "essential for increasing the retention of flood in the valley of the Warta River" (Interview Loc#1). The work is in progress, but problems like conflicts between land owners and flood managers exist and hinder the works. The Jeziorsko Reservoir The Jeziorsko Reservoir has been working for 24 years. It was evaluated and some of its functions were regarded to be non-satisfactory, compared with the plans. The flood protection function cannot be assessed completely and still requires research. According to farmers, the reservoir does not work properly and incurs losses (Interview Gov#5). However, without the reservoir, floods (and low flows) would have been more dramatic (Interview Gov#5). A popular argument is used that there will be no more flooding since the reservoir has been built. However, besides the reservoir, embankments were also constructed in the Konin Valley, cutting off the flood plains. So the flood protection deteriorated. Embankments In the area of the Poznań County there are nearly 4 km of dikes along the rivers. The embankment on the Warta River within the city of Poznań exists on its entire length. The majority of embankments were carried out between WW I and WW II with the application of “traditional” technology. Moreover, the embankments were gradually weakened during the decades of exploitation after every flooding. Another reason for the worsening state of the dikes is that the embankments are not mowed twice a year. This results in the appearance of dry grass, reeds and local shrubs. As a consequence, the lack of maintenance causes the accelerated depreciation of these devices (WBiZK WUW, 2010). In September 2007, 27% of dikes (in the entire Wielkopolska Province) were found to require modernisation, in September 2010 72%. Such a broad necessity of maintenance indicates very poor condition of this type of flood defences, worsened by the effects of the May-June flood in 2010. Nevertheless, this is the main flood measure located directly in Poznań.

40

The Flood preparation strategy includes two main parts, i.e. Monitoring, Forecasting and Flood

Warning; and Flood Crisis Management. The County Crisis Management Centre reports to the county

head (Starosta). The Centre is responsible for planning. It exercises and coordinates actions during

floods. The Centre’s capacities were tested in 2010, when a very high level of water in the River Warta

(and in smaller rivers) was successfully managed (Kowalczak et al., 2014) and in 2014.

The flood prevention strategy is weak, due to poor development and implementation of spatial

planning. The situation in the Poznań County reflects the country’s situation in general. After 1989/90,

flood maps were made on paper and the provincial office was responsible for preparing them. The

system was not sustained, and later a digital map system was started from scratch. The need for

improvement of maps is acknowledged, however. At the moment, municipal planners and water

managers have maps that are not entirely compatible. Preparing maps required by the Floods

Directive is expected to be a significant step forward.

Flood mitigation measures in the Poznań County are at the pilot project stage. The increase of urban

flooding is acknowledged (Kowalczak et al. 2014). Almost no mitigation measure can be found,

however. Investment in sewers are treated as a delivery of basic infrastructure. The so-called “rain

tax”, a charge for impermeable surfaces, is merely an additional source of income for municipalities.

Some solutions aiming at improving green areas and retaining water are often not perceived as FRM

strategy, rather as a pro-environmental activity (being in fact of a co-benefit type).

The flood recovery strategy involves strong engagement of the state. Therefore, at the local level it

has not been developed in the sense of a recognised FRM strategy. There is a popular conviction that

Poznań County is flood protected. However, the situation in 2010 clearly showed that there are

developments in flood prone areas. The insurance coverage is low, however. The general expectation

of the state’s help discourages from purchasing insurance.

41

3.3.3 Flood Risk Governance sub-Arrangements in Poznań

Figure 3.5 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Poznań County

Three major sub-arrangements can be found in Poland: structural defence, crisis management and

spatial planning. They are present in the Poznań County as well. Nevertheless, flood risk in the region

is rather low and therefore it does not generate any pressure to rearrange the FRGA or to include

innovations regarding a range of FRM measures. Figure 3.5 presents the form of FRGA in Poznań

County. Main characteristics of the sub-Flood Risk Governance Arrangements in the Poznań County

are presented in Table 3. 4.

42

Table 3.4 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Poznań

Sub-FRGA Description Key actors Key rules/ legislation

Key discourses Resources

Structural

defence

Infrastructural, hydro-technical flood protection

RZGWs; WZMiUWs.

Floods Directive;

Water Act.

Dominant hydraulic mission

The state budget;

Crisis

management

Monitoring and crisis management actions

State Fire Brigades;

Crisis management centres (municipal and county level);

IMGW.

Act on Crisis Management

Discussion on effectiveness of forecasting; securing crisis actions.

The state budget;

Local budgets

Spatial

planning

Land-use planning

Municipal spatial planning offices;

County spatial planning office.

Act on Planning and Spatial Development;

Floods Directive.

Planning as a tool for local development.

Local budgets.

The structural defence sub-arrangement is dominant in the county. The actor coalitions are similar to

those at the national level, with the exception of activity of regional branches of national institutions.

Regional Water Management Board (RZGW) and Provincial Authorities of Drainage, Irrigation and

Infrastructure (WZMiUW) form a very strong coalition that is partially supported by academia (mostly

hydro-technicians). A coalition that is considered opposite consists of nature protection actors and

sometimes local inhabitants. They are regarded as opponents to further investments envisaged by the

RZGW and WZMiUW. Within the sub-arrangement a competition between a hydro-technical

discourse and an environmental discourse exists. Environmental NGOs, although barely active in the

FRM field, are seen by hydro-technicians as disruptive agents, disturbing the procedures and

implementation of necessary investments. In general, “the old school thinking” focused on

embankments and huge water reservoirs is predominant. There is a widespread conviction that the

Jeziorsko reservoir and embankments can provide safety. Although in 2010 some counties in the

south of Wielkopolska suffered inundations, Poznań was considered protected by the Jeziorsko

Reservoir.

Despite availability of funds there have been no applications for a river restoration project submitted

to the Regional Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (WFOSiGW) in Poznań.

There is a lack of soft project applications, e.g. referring to spatial planning or reconstruction of

natural reservoirs. The water-related projects financed by WFOSiGW were mostly focused on sewage

systems and waste management, i.e. referred to the domain of the Water Framework Directive rather

than the Floods Directive.

The role of non-governmental organisations working to protect the environment and ecology is

criticised by the dominating actors in this sub-arrangement (RZGW and WZMiUW). The NGOs are

considered to disturb the procedural operations and significantly extend the implementation of

necessary investments (Interview Loc#1).

43

The transition from thinking in terms of hard infrastructure to a more environmental-friendly stance

that does not entirely depend on infrastructural solutions is slow. Often services/agencies affecting

flood risk management declare the will to apply non-structural, non-hydro-technical solutions, but

explain the lack of actual activity in this respect with legislative regulations e.g. a statutory obligation

for maintenance of watercourses. Cooperation between actors on different levels of administration

hardly exists. The evolution of the Polish water management system after 1989/90 has been inclining

to the Integrated Water Resources Management model mostly in declarations. Sectorial organisation

with little integration and several administrative bodies cover tasks related to FRM.

As the disagreement between the hydro-technical engineers and the environmentalists persists,

some innovative ideas appear. There are incidental projects concerning re-naturalisation of rivers.

One of them is a withdrawal of heavy equipment for mowing river banks and replacing it with the

pasturage of the sheep "wrzosówka” (Polish breed of ovis brachyura borealis). The flock of sheep was

purchased through the WZMiUW in the Wielkopolska region.

The main financial resource for FRM is the state budget that provides funds for the RZGWs, and for

WZMiUWs. A substantial amount of money spent on water management comes from specialised

funds – NFOSiGW and WFOSiGW. The latter finances water management and flood risk management

on a smaller scale.

Success rates in obtaining funds differs significantly among different services. The Provincial Authority

of Drainage, Irrigation and Infrastructure in Poznań has an annual budget of about €35 million. About

€7 million is spent on river maintenance and conservation. About €20 million is annually spent on

investments (including resources from the EU).

Institutions with strong positions in water management, like RZGW or WZMiUW, hire well-trained

experts. Since 1989/90, a decrease of the recruitment of well-trained engineers can be noted within

RZGWs (Interviews: Gov#4, Loc#1). On the one hand, in Poznań the WZMiUW has difficulty to hire

lawyers trained in water-related regulations. On the other hand, there are some opinions that RZGW

does not need to employ specialists in environmental law, because RZGW does not create the law, it

merely enforces it.

Competition between actors for resources rather than coordinated efforts to decrease flood risk can

be noted. Protection of vested interests and narrowing actions to own statutory duties become the

most effective approach. The agencies/services act as interest groups linked to different ministries

(Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of the Interior)

and economic sectors. For example, during a flood, pre-emptive discharges from the reservoir

realised by RGZW, aiming at flood reduction were opposed by the WZMiUW, enforcing interests of

the farmers owning farms downstream (saving water for irrigation). There is also an institutional

conflict, related to ownership structure. Several owners and managers of the river plains, lakes,

streams flowing out of the lake, etc. can be identified. Small streams are administered by the province

authority (WZMiUW) while large rivers fall under KZGW (RZGWs) administration.

The crisis management sub-arrangement is strongly embedded in the FRGA in Poznań County. There

is some cooperation within the sub-arrangement between RZGW, WZMiUW and the most important

44

actor: the State Fire Brigades and crisis management centres (on municipal and county level). This is

mostly based on the exchange of information and expertise in time of a flood threat. Those actors

form the axis of two major actor coalitions focusing on monitoring and forecasting and crisis

management. Some weaknesses of the arrangement are observed in inconsistencies of maps which

are questioned by the crisis management teams. They are blamed of being non-operational for crisis

management purposes. There is also an issue of lacking knowledge, especially in case of urban floods.

Nevertheless, the State Fire Brigades are well equipped and have sufficient funds. In municipal offices

there are highly-qualified specialists in the field of flood risk management, experienced and

knowledgeable about their area. However, they do not follow regulations, since they change so often,

but rely on their knowledge and rich experience. Although the Water Act defines responsibility of

public administration bodies for crisis management, financing crisis management, planning, and

resources allocation, it does not precisely define competences and subordination. Nevertheless, crisis

management is a distinct element of cooperation between Poznań County services. The crisis

management system worked well during the flood of 2010.

The Spatial planning sub-arrangement is realised mostly by spatial planners at the local and regional

level. All actors of the FRGA in Poznań County acknowledge and support the necessity of spatial

planning. Nonetheless, its authentic role in shaping the FRM is moderate. Although generally weak,

this sub-arrangement involves nature protection institutions as well as local inhabitants, to the

highest extent when compared with other regions of the country. Public participation processes are

mostly developed within municipal administration procedures in Poznań. Moreover, in spite of that,

formal rules are formed at the national level and local development plans exist together with a

regional spatial planning framework. Although it is acknowledged that the increase of impermeable

surfaces and suburbanisation processes take place, the spatial planners’ knowledge and expertise is

not taken into consideration when it comes to flood management.

Looking at the governance modes within the three sub-FRGAs in Poznań County, one can note a rather centralised mode with certain shift towards more decentralised governance (Table 3.5). Similarly to the situation at the national level, structural defence is centralised in terms of financing and planning. In terms of maintaining the structural infrastructure, the main responsibility lies in WZMiUW, a provincial body. Table 3.5 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs in Poznań

Sub-FRGA Mode of governance Shifts in modes of governance

Structural defence

Centralised Insignificant shift towards more decentralised governance since the reform of administration (1999)

Crisis management

Decentralised Shift towards more decentralised governance since the reform of the administration (1999) and after 2007

Spatial planning Decentralised Strong shift towards decentralised governance since 1989/90

Crisis management, as it appeared in 2007, is centralised, but the operational role of the State Fire

Brigades at the county level is decisive. In terms of coordination, the municipal level is very

important. However, the governmental administration and agencies play the most important roles.

Spatial planning is decentralised since 1989/90, with the main planning tool at the municipal level.

Higher level planning at the provincial and river basin levels has limited importance.

45

3.4 Explaining change and stability in Flood Risk Governance in Poznań

County Stability and change in flood risk governance in Poznań County in general replicates changes that

have been occurring on the national level since 1989/90. The systemic change and processes of

democratisation that took place in Poland forced the rebirth of local governments and the general

reconstruction of the administration. Subsequently, a water administration based on the river basin

was established. Although the change involved redistribution of tasks among the administrative

agencies and the emergence of the private sector role, the overall arrangement based on defence

and structural protection remained rather unchanged. The main explanatory factors of stability and

change in flood risk governance in Poznań County is presented in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6 Drivers of stability and change in Poznań County FRGA

Drivers of stability Drivers of change


Sectorial management; Past investment in flood defence

infrastructure (‘sunk costs’); Budget maximisation; Role of vested interests (fight for power

and resources, path dependency, institutionalisation of policies/ approaches).

Some innovative approach exhibited by flood defence actors;

Impact of judicial interpretation (interpretation, testing and application of rules);

Obligation to provide information about environment respected by actors.


Shock events (flood of 1997, 2010); Policy making culture, leading to

incremental change; Legislative processes; Project realisation scope as a benchmark

for doing something; EU accession; Financial state assistance to local

authorities/ other public organisations to recover emergency costs and losses;

Urban development and urban sprawl, flood plain areas as a resource for potential investments;

Decision-making on the national level.

Floods Directive; EU accession; Technological and scientific developments

and innovation e.g. in flood monitoring, forecasting and warning;

Shock event (flood of 1997).

3.4.1 Drivers of stability

In this section the focus is on the drivers of stability of the FRGA in Poznań County. Firstly, there are

factors influencing stability of the FRGA that are internal to the FRM system in Poznań County.

Although the Arrangement is constructed by three sub-arrangements, the structural defence sub-

arrangement clearly dominates in Poznań County. Nevertheless, it is not consistent, as there are

different actors coalitions with the largest role of main water management bodies (RZGW and

WZMiUW). They are supported by the institutions active in the crisis management sub-arrangement

(IMGW, crisis management centres). Such a constellation of different actors forming the FRGA in

Poznań contributes to stabilisation of the arrangement. Moreover, low public engagement

undermines changes and strengthens the existing order. Sectorial management and project

realisation scope limits the appearance of modification within the arrangement. Moreover every

actor is functioning within the arrangement independently, both in matters of budget maximisation

as well as FRM activities. This strongly impacts the stability of the FRGA. The domination of the

structural defence sub-arrangement impacts the stability also through the presence of flood defence

46

infrastructure. The available flood defence infrastructure, within the city (embankments) and outside

(reservoirs) create the conviction of flood safety of Poznań County. Path-dependency in case of

undertaken solutions paves the system. Moreover the divided ownership of flood management

infrastructure hampers change.

When looking at the external drivers that are stabilising the arrangement one have to have in mind

the flood of 1997. This shock event perpetuated the opinion that the best flood risk management

measures are flood defence solutions (embankments, reservoirs). The flood of 2010 might be

regarded as the shock event that held the conviction that the system is working well. Moreover, the

EU accession which fired up large funds for investments can also be seen in this respect as a factor

influencing stability of the arrangement, as availability of the financial resources that are in the

disposal of official FRM bodies (e.g. RZGW, WZMiUW) are directed to flood defence measures. There

is also the problem of Poznań location. The relative safety from flood risk, which was described in the

beginning of the chapter, became an impulse to leave the system of flood management in Poznań and

its neighbourhoods as it was. Therefore these physical circumstances can be assessed only as

stabilising factors. Issues of suburbanisation and urban sprawl, as well as the pursuit of different

municipalities to profit from selling parcels decreases the role of the prevention strategy and

enhances the present order of the FRGA.

3.4.2 Drivers of change

There are different aspects which impact changes in FRGA in Poznań County. Actors activity is the

most influential internal systems factors contributing to stability. Although only few, some innovative

activities are seen within the actors dominating the FRGA, especially structural defence sub-

arrangement (in this case WZMiUW) where their approach moves slightly towards more

environmentally friendly. Another issue is the case of attitude of the FRM bodies to the obligation to

provide information about the environment, which is respected by actors.

Legal transformation of the emergency issues after the flood of 1997 brought some dynamics in

terms of establishment of the crisis management sub-arrangement. Accession to the EU in 2004

involved transposition and incorporation of the EU legislation (particularly, the FD and WFD). This

legislation change can be described as deep. The EU legislation and access to the European funds

involved also the new rhetoric of flood management, and undermined the vested interests in the

water sector. In this respect, it can be regarded as an activating factor especially within the structural

defence sub-arrangement. The Floods Directive brought spatial planning into Poznań FRM agenda.

The Millennium flood of 1997 triggered a major reform of the crisis management system in that much

more attention was paid to crisis management (including flood crisis management). An all-hazards

crisis management system was established. Besides creating the crisis management administrative

structure at all levels of administration, the State Fire Brigades greatly increased their operation

capacities. Pilot projects of local communities’ involvement in preparation were launched.

Hydrological modelling, forecasting and warning systems were advanced. The Millennium flood

caused fundamental institutional change, especially within the crisis management sub-arrangement.

47

3.5 Evaluating Flood Risk Governance in the Poznań County

3.5.1 Introduction

This section evaluates societal resilience to flooding, as well as efficiency and legitimacy. The key

features of governance which support or constrain resilience, efficiency and legitimacy are shown in

Table 3.7.



governance

Sub-criteria + or - Feature of governance

Resilience

Capacity to resist

+ A catchment-based approach to water (including flood risk)

management; New investments.

-

Homogeneity in FRMSs (domination of one strategy); Insufficient funding to support defence maintenance; Prolonged and complicated procedures for maintenance of

watercourse.


recover

+ Partnership working during the flood; Diversity in FRMSs.

-

Inaccurate responsibilities and path-dependencies; People tend to forget they are at risk; Thinking about land-use development rather than spatial

planning on the local level (political pressure for local development and lack of alternative proposals);

Low public engagement in flood risk reduction.

Capacity to adapt

+ Improvements of flood warning system to increase lead time.

- Tensions on spatial planners during decision making process; Arrangements are more effective in terms of goal attainment

rather than problem-solving.

Efficiency

+ Diversity of measures as a way of using resources more efficiently.

-

Spending money in short-term manner; Delays in the project/investment schedule due to complicated

administrative proceedings; Removing legal gaps rather than reforming legislation; Sectorial organisation of FRM; Low cooperation between the different actors involved in FRM; Orientation on the immediate rather than long-term effect; Tendency to budget maximisation.

Legitimacy

+ Public consultation; Access to information.

-

Unstable law; Legislative gaps or non-accuracies; Faith in a magic legal force; Unequal access to information; Delegitimising and undermining principles e.g. when investing in

flood-prone areas.

3.5.2 Resilience

Although flood risk is not very high in Poznań County, a deep conviction about perfect safety and full

protection of Poznań County, based on presently used flood defence measures, exists. Because of

48

this, opportunities for innovation and experimentation are scarce.

The lack of public interest in flood risk management and passive attitude of citizens are barriers to

societal resilience. At the same time, there is a high expectation that the state should defend society

against flooding.

Spatial planning procedures at different administrative levels are incoherent. Spatial planners at local-

municipality level rarely take flood risk into account. Providing land for development is their priority.

This is both due to political pressures for local development and a lack of alternatives proposed (e.g.

because of a passive role of environmental institutions). Yet, spatial planning measures are perceived

as a promising tool for achieving the goal of flood risk reduction by improving flood resistance.

At the same time, the role of flood risk and hazard maps prepared for the purposes of FD is unclear.

Nonetheless, there are high expectations linked with Flood Hazard and Risk Maps, especially among

RZGW authorities and crisis management teams.

3.5.3 Efficiency

FRGAs should use resources in an efficient manner, based on the ratio of desired output to input (e.g.

measured by cost benefit analysis). Therefore, project realisation (with its time and resource

obligations) is regarded to be more important and more easily fulfilled than the issue that is meant to

be dealt with. This feature applies for Poznań County.

There are also some difficulties in harmonising procedural steps and money flows. The responsible

institutions have little liquidity, money arrives late and is spent in a hurry (by the end of the year). At

the same time, complicated administrative proceedings cause delays in the project/investment

schedule. This causes inefficiencies.

Consecutive amendments in the legislation do not reform law but reduce operability of decision-

making authorities. Often the Water Act does not precisely define competences and subordination of

agencies/services. In some respects, the responsibilities are not functional, but rather result from

contingent evolution.

It seems that diversity of measures for flood risk management is a way of using resources more

efficiently, but common conviction about the high flood safety in Poznań County limits applicability of

this solution.

3.5.4 Legitimacy

Actors involved in FRM should, in principle, have open and equal access to information.

Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For instance, hydrometeorological data collected by the

Polish Hydrometeorological Service, Institute of Meteorology and Water Management State Research

Institute (IMGW-PIB) are not publicly available for free. Similarly, rules of law assume extensive social

consultation when it comes to FRM. Inhabitants seldom use their right to this information. Their

approach is rather passive and they prefer to be represented by the authorities. Moreover, public

engagement in the decision-making process is low.

49

Some NGOs, like the Polish Bird Protection Society, try to improve this situation. They stimulate social

participation in decision-making process. The NGOs undertake legal action on behalf of citizens.

Therefore, opinions, remarks and possible protests of NGOs are treated seriously by bodies

submitting documents for consultative process. However, NGOs are perceived by governmental

authorities as problem-making institutions that slow down and even stop decision-making processes.

There is a common belief that the public consultation process is organised to detect potential

opponents rather than to collect opinions and ideas on how to achieve effects.

Water and environmental legislation is unstable. Nevertheless, a deep conviction of legal force exists.

Authorities stress their acting in accordance with the rules. However, processes delegitimising and

undermining principles that should be obeyed take place because of gaps in the law. For example,

hiring specialists by crisis management centres to work during the night shift is difficult, as crisis

management centres are parts of the municipal or county offices that are not allowed to hire

employees beyond the office working hours.

Non-accuracies and gaps in law, inaccurate responsibilities and path-dependences, together with

complicated procedures cause flood risk governance in Poznań County to be somewhat non-

transparent and unaccountable.

3.6 Conclusions The FRGA in Poznań reflects characteristics of the national level both in terms of the number and

features of sub-arrangements, and the dynamics thereof. The transition from a hydro-technical risk

approach towards more environmentally friendly measures is developing slowly, but gradually. At

the same time, low flood risk in Poznań County exerts little pressure on dominant flood management

actors to implement a broader range of measures. Although much has been improved in the

analysed period, little innovation and institutional learning has been observed. In fact, factors

explaining stability and change indicate high reliance on external agents and support the conclusion

of the presence of a centralised mode of governance within the Polish FRGA. In other words,

although the Millennium flood of 1997 was not a significant threat for Poznań County in particular,

aftermath actions taken on a central administrative level in Poland resulted in promoting importance

of the preparation strategy also in the Poznan county case. A legislative initiative aiming for

diversification of strategies has been supported by dominant actors in Poznań (mainly RZGW and

WZMiUW) because additional knowledge and expertise possessed by IMGW and State Fire Brigades

reasserted the key role of defence measures for Poznań FRGA.

Changes in rules dimension, mainly regulative acts (i.e. Act on Crisis Management of 2007, Floods

Directive, Act on Access to Information on the Environment of 2008) have made impact on flood risk

governance in the region. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that successful implementation of

legal acts depends on resources (financial, human etc.). The Act on Access to Information on the

Environment of 2008 is actively used by non-governmental actors, while the Floods Directive lacks

such additional resources to become fully implemented. Therefore one can argue that the shift in the

prevention strategy is basically discursive.

Thus, little can be said about inherently driven resilience in Poznań FRGA. Flood risk management

institutions exhibit high ability to buffer shock events, as was the case with the 2010 flood. Recovery

50

funds provided have been spent on the same measures. Societal interest in flood risk issues is still

underdeveloped and this results in low involvement in public participation processes. Flood risk

governance in Poznań is given little political attention with a lot of room for discretion. Shifts in

attitudes towards participation and broader inclusion of multiple actors as well as larger public

participation would change the dominant, exclusive approach to flood risk management in Poznań.

51

4 Case study 2 -Słubice City

4.1 Introduction This chapter provides an analysis, explanation and evaluation of flood risk governance in Słubice (see

Fig. 4.1). Słubice is a city located at the Polish-German border, on the bank of the River Odra. Situated

below the level of the River Odra, it is highly susceptible to flooding. Thus, as an example of trans-

boundary flood risk management this case study aims at describing similarities and differences to the

National Flood Policies and Regulations (NFPR) domain. Słubice is dominated by a defence-oriented

approach. There is a serious conflict between nature conservation NGOs and supporters of the

defence strategy. Moreover, spatial planning is poor, which reflects the NFPR. What makes the Słubice

case study unique is trans-boundary cooperation. Nevertheless, this was on the table before the flood

of 1997. It evolved over time and was tested during the flood in 2010, drawing on the experience

from the shock event. Today, the cooperation with the German side is regarded to be working well. As

one can expect, the flood of 1997 was a major event which released social capital and engagement.

In this chapter, we will first provide the main characteristics of the case study area (in section 4.2).

This will be followed by an analysis of dynamics (stability and change) in the flood risk management

strategies and their embeddedness in local/regional sub-arrangements (4.3). Then we go on to

explain the dynamics (4.4) and to evaluate them (4.5), before finally providing our conclusions for this

case study.

Figure 4.1 Area of case study 2- Słubice City MarCom-Carto – Faculty of Geosciences – Utrecht University, 2015

52

4.2 Contextual background of the case study


The town of Słubice is located in Western Poland, at the Polish-German border, at the right bank of

the River Odra, opposite of the German city of Frankfurt Oder. Słubice is the central municipality of

Słubice County and had 19,902 inhabitants in 2013 (Table 4.1). Słubice County covers an area of

999,700 km2 and consists of five municipalities. Almost 85 percent of inhabitants of the County live in

the city of Słubice. The occupation of 4/5 of all inhabitants in Słubice is linked with trade. Several

thousands of inhabitants in Słubice just come there for work or live there but do not register their

residence (so that the number of inhabitants presented in official information is lower than the

number of those actually residing in the town). This can have an impact on social cohesion and

potential eagerness towards cooperation during flood events. At the same time the city of Frankfurt

is more than three times bigger than Słubice (ca. 60,000 inhabitants). There is a strong economic

cooperation between the two cities, mostly in the fields of trade and transport.

Table 4.1 Key characteristics of the Słubice case study Region and county Słubice County, Lubuskie Province, western Poland, at

the border with Germany, neighbouring with

Frankfurt an der Oder

City population 19,902 (2013)

Population density 107 persons per km2

(municipality), town: 1036 per

km2

Elevation 17.5 -60 m above sea level

River basin The River Odra

Confluence with the Warta estuary

Types of flooding Fluvial, pluvial, urban floods

Local business Trade and transport

Due to the city location at the bank of the River Odra, and close to the estuary of the River Warta,

the municipality is highly susceptible to floods. There are embankments along the River Odra.

Nevertheless, during heavy precipitation in the upper part of the river the water discharge increases,

generating risk of flood. As the groundwater level rises there is sometimes urban flooding. There is

also a threat of floods from the northern side, as there are many lowlands cut by small water

streams.


The baseline year for the analysis of the Słubice case study is set at 1989/90, as for the national level.

The collapse of the communist system became a turning point for the flood risk management system

and for the whole water management. This was caused by administrative, political and legal changes.

Its effect was the lack of firm financial responsibility for the flood management infrastructure (mostly

flood defence at that time). The Millennium flood of 1997 became a big threat for Słubice. The town

did not suffer a lot during the flood, but it was close to disaster. It was pure coincidence that the dikes

along the Odra stood when the water broke through on the German side upstream (Interview Aca#3).

Although the flood in 2010 could have brought even heavier losses, the town was saved thanks to

mainly embankment developments in infrastructural defence and a fairly well-established crisis

management system. Summing up, one should stress that milestones which affected flood risk

management in Słubice overlap with those observed at the national level and other investigated case

53

studies. An overview of key events is presented in the table below (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Key events affecting FRGA in Słubice Event year Event Main response(s)

1989/90 Communism collapse; The baseline year for analysis

Collapse of the communist regime in Poland, the baseline year for the analysis also at the national level

1997 Largest flood, weak trans-boundary FRM system, poor state of flood defence infrastructure

A programme of flood defence infrastructure reconstruction was introduced; influence of Crisis Management Act enactment

2004 Accession to the EU EU law transpositions (Natura 2000), EU

funds

2010 Large flood threat Trans-boundary cooperation tested,

improved flood defence and introduced preparation measures


Słubice is a town strongly relying on trade because of its location near to the national border.

Although it has the largest concentration of inhabitants in the county, a trend of a decreasing number

of residents was observed until 2011. Migration in two directions, to Germany and to larger cities in

Poland, has an economic background. People are leaving Słubice to find better paying jobs. At the

same time, there is a large number of people that are not registered inhabitants of Słubice, but visit

the city everyday looking for income possibilities (especially trading at the marketplace). This and the

geographical location on the trade and transportation route between Berlin and Warsaw have

resulted in a low sense of local community. Therefore, in case of an emergency situation, low social

cohesion might be a strong impediment to an effective crisis reaction. Since 2012, the number of

Słubice inhabitants has increased (Table 4.3), due to development of new areas for residential

constructions. However, it does not help social cohesion as new inhabitants are relocating from the

whole county. At the same time, the centre of the town depopulates, strengthening urban sprawl

(Interview Loc#15). Since the administrative reform in 1999, when Słubice became a town within the

Lubuskie Province, the Province has depopulated by around 1200 every year (Smolarkiewicz, 2014).

Summarised data about basic demography of Słubice is presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Basic demographic characteristics of Słubice

Year Number of residents

Number of households

Number of residents per

household

Population density/km

2

2010 19,953 n/a n/a 108

2012 19,883 7 151 2.8 107

2013 19,902 7 262 2.7 107

Source: GUS Zielona Góra, 2014


As mentioned before, the economy of Słubice is based on transport and trade. Since 1989/90, when

the borders were opened, the town profited from its location close to Frankfurt/Oder on the German

side. This radically increased transportation and enabled trade exchange. It is estimated that more

than 11 million people and 3 million cars pass the Słubice-Frankfurt border line every year. Thus,

tourism and trade are two main sectors that have impact on the economic cooperation between the

two cities. Analyses predict that between 2013 and 2020 passengers’ traffic will grow by more than

54

150% while freight traffic will triple.

4.3 Analysis of Flood Risk Governance in Słubice

4.3.1 Introduction

Słubice is a good example of the national arrangement as far as presence of strategies is concerned.

There is a strong domination of the defence strategy with an emerging preparation strategy. Other

strategies are gaining some role, but are still only a minor part in the FRM system. The town, where

flood risk is high and which has experienced flood risk several times in the past, has a strategy of

coping with flood built on defence, while other solutions are pushed aside. This strategy, assessed as

the most effective and the most important, is realised in the space of administrative and social

stalemate (e.g. certain selection of variants for embankments reconstruction even if other variants

were considered as more real and effective). In this respect, the case of Słubice represents the

national FRGA, but the emphasis is even more strongly on the defence strategy. Figure 4.2 represents

graphically the disproportion between strategies in Słubice. As the city experienced flood events

broadly described by the media and is regarded as an example of successful protection from the flood

of 1997, the question arises: to what extent does the Słubice arrangement with strong domination of

defence strategy impact the national arrangement, supporting flood defence domination. Indeed,

flood defence and flood preparation dominate. Current measures employed in strategies identified in

Słubice case study are presented in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Current measures employed in FRMSs in Słubice

Flood prevention Flood defence Flood mitigation Flood preparation Flood recovery

Spatial plans. Dikes;

Widening,

deepening,

dredging;

Water course

maintenance;

Quay wall

(gaining

significance);

Retention basin

outside area to be

protected.

Retention

basins at

National Park

area.

Intervention and

evacuation plans;

24/24 monitoring

and intervention

teams;

Crisis

communication;

Sand bags,

pumping;

Repair works of

flood protection

measures.

Repair works.

4.3.2 Analysis of FRMSs

When analysing flood risk management strategies, one can see that FRM system is clearly dominated

by the defence strategy (Fig 4.2).

55

Figure 4.2 Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study Słubice. Dark blue indicates the most dominant strategy, and medium blue establishing strategies, light blue minor strategies, grey-blue strategies do not play a role

Two years after the great flood of 1997, it was decided to modernise embankments at the Słubice-

Górzyca section. This consisted of sealing the embankments' main body and foundation, heightening

the top (to highest ordinates agreed with the German side), and road construction. There were four

variants of the reconstruction of dikes (see: Fig. 4.3): (i) construction of the flow polder with the relief

channel; (ii) construction of the relief and district channels; (iii) modernisation of embankments

around Słubice with construction of the new circular embankment from the north-western side; (iv)

construction of polders to the north of Słubice. The authorities of Słubice city and the RZGW Szczecin

opted for variant 3. In February 2014, the Lubuskie Province governor signed the building permit

decision for the expansion of flood banks around Słubice. The decision gained a status of immediate

feasibility and the project became one of the biggest implemented in the Province. Implementation

has been widely accepted in Słubice. From the national level perspective, the defence strategy is

often recognised as the only one being fully effective, and it also received local legitimacy (Interview

Gov#14).

Figure 4.3 Flood-protection solutions for the city of Słubice (based on Kołodziejczyk, 2011)

The coalitions of actors operating in this strategy are strongly institutionalised. The Regional Water

Management Board (RZGW) represents the water management sector. The Provincial Authority of

Drainage, Irrigation and Infrastructure (WZMiUW) separately cooperates with the farmers in some

cases. There is also another coalition of the National Park “Ujście Warty” (Warta Mouth) together

with a pro-environmental NGO, but their main goal is nature conservation rather than flood risk

56

management. Thus, the Naturalists Club, an NGO, argues that more attention should be paid to

solutions that are less intrusive for nature, like mitigation.

Of second importance for flood risk management in Słubice is the preparation strategy. The Security

and Crisis Management Office of the City prepares plans, organises exercises etc. Personal contacts

have an important role in the operations. When the community of Słubice experienced significant

flood threats in 1997 and 2010, inhabitants eagerly participated in evacuations. Also the political

context matters for this strategy in Słubice. Close to elections, the preparation actions are disturbed

by political interests (Interview Loc#8). In Słubice, the cooperation between the State Fire Brigades

(Interview Gov#15), the Border Guard, the Police and the City Guard is effective in the opinion of

crisis services representatives (Interview Loc#12). Trans-boundary cooperation between the Polish

and German side in preparation is also considered productive. The decentralisation reform in Poland

initiated the creation of a network of initiatives and it works well (Interview Gov#15). The county

level administration, established in 1999, allows for effective cooperation in the area of flood

management, particularly concerning preparation.

Local authorities seem to prioritise new developments over flood risk prevention as they allow new

construction within flood prone areas. Moreover, north of Słubice there is a large economic zone

where businesses are localised directly on the Odra river bank. Nevertheless, most endangered areas

close to the river in the town’s centre are depopulating. This is not an effect of spatial planning

decisions, but rather a spontaneous move of inhabitants to new residential areas. The proposal of

constructing a channel that would cut the city off from the market faced objections from local

stakeholders (mainly traders and house owners). Housing properties that were constructed after the

Millennium flood in 1997 made it impossible to build the proposed channel (variant 1). Consequently,

spatial planning decisions were dependent on decisions made by housing owners (Interview Loc#15).

A space for a polder is occupied by housing properties as well (Interview Gov#15). Although

understanding of the purposes and role of spatial planning as a potential tool for mitigating flood risk

is widely recognised in bilateral Polish-German policy documents and strategies, the coordination of

spatial planning actions on both the Polish and German side rarely takes place. Such a sectorial

attitude is common for flood risk management and water management in Poland more generally.

Hardly any activities on flood mitigation can be observed. This is partly due to the city’s location.

There is little possibility to retain water. The mitigation strategy, although hardly present in Słubice as

an FRM strategy, can be noted as a constellation of some independent measures, often undertaken

not as anti-flood activities (instead linked to e.g. sewers). It represents the national FRGA where

mitigation is not an intentional action. However, some actors (e.g. Ujście Warty National Park) are

supporters of this strategy, though with no tangible results.

The recovery strategy is strongly dependent on resources from the Ministry of Administration and

Digitisation, an upper level of the administration. The budget reserve that the city needs to keep is of

negligible importance in a case of a big flood. The Słubice case exemplifies the centralisation of the

recovery strategy. In Słubice, insurances are voluntary in nature even in areas endangered by floods.

4.3.3 Flood Risk Governance sub-Arrangements in Słubice

The FRGA in Słubice resembles the national FRGA. This is clearly visible when looking at the division

57

of strategies. The defence strategy firmly outbalances the other strategies, except for flood

preparation. The infrastructural solutions are considered to be the most effective ones (if not the only

ones). The sub-arrangements available at the national level (structural defence, crisis management

and spatial planning) also appear in this case. Nevertheless, it can be stated that the FRGA in Słubice

is the most stable of all the analysed cases. Figure 4.4 presents the Flood Risk Governance

Arrangement in Słubice, including the three sub-arrangements identified.

Figure 4.4 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Słubice

Although each sub-arrangement differs according to the dimension of actors, rules, resources and

discourses engaged, it can be stated that the FRGA in Słubice is the most stable of all the analysed

cases. In further parts of this chapter arguments for this will be provided. For reasons of clarity, a

summary of formal sub-arrangements which constitute FRGA in Słubice is presented in table 4.5

below.

Table 4.5 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Słubice

Sub-FRGA Description Key actors Key

rules/legislation Key discources Resources

Structural defence

Hydrotechnical protection of inhabitants and properties against floods

WZMiUW; RZGW; National Park “Ujście Warty”.

Water Act of 2001; Floods Directive;

Hydraulic mission dominant; High Nature-protection-oriented developing

The state budget (e.g. Programme for the Odra River 2006)

Crisis management

Crisis management activities

State Fire Brigades; Municipal and

Crisis Management Act of 2007

Providing security to citizens;

The state budget; municipal

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district crisis management centres; Municipal police.

Highly supported by local inhabitants

budget

Spatial planning

Urban and land-use planning

Municipal spatial planning office

Act on Planning and Spatial Development of 2003; Floods Directive.

Preventing future developments in flood-prone areas secondary to providing space for local development.

Municipal budget

In the case of Słubice, there is a clearly dominant discourse of flood defence. The structural defence

sub-arrangement is the defence strategy built around two major institutions: Regional Water

Management Board (RZGW) and Provincial Authorities of Drainage, Irrigation and Infrastructure

(WZMiUW), though these bodies are represented by their local branches. Both institutions have their

representative offices located in Słubice. Nevertheless, their role is limited to administering their

sections. They are strongly embedded in existing legislation, although several amendments of the

Water Act made their functioning more difficult. Even though the WZMiUW is considered to be a

rather resourceful institution, the representative in Słubice signalled poor financial support from the

provincial office (Interview Loc#11).

The National Park “Ujście Warty” is another actor directly involved in implementation of defence

strategy actions. Additional actors involved are mainly the Regional Water Management Board

(RZGW), Provincial Authority of Drainage, Irrigation and Infrastructure (WZMiUW) and private parties

(namely: farmers). There is a struggle related to responsibilities and power among actors, in

particular related to: 1) problems with negotiating the overlapping economic and political interests;

2) behavioural routines; and 3) over-regulation and lack of consistency in terms of division of

competences and water and flood risk legislation as a whole. Some of these problems have also been

observed at the national level of the Polish flood risk governance and are described in Chapter 2 of

this report (Section 2.6). The Słubice case study provides an opportunity to investigate these

problems in practice. A visual representation of this conflict is presented in Figure 4.5. Arrows depict

conflicts between main actors. Those in red are the most visible and constitute the arrangement. The

National Park has been identified as the most active and the central actor in this strategy. Minor

actors and conflicts are in grey. The range of interest of different actors is signalled by circles. Some

areas of interest overlap; these are often conflicts of jurisdiction, responsibilities for financing river

management, as well as the conceptions of how water (and flood) management is conducted (more

infrastructural or more pro-environmental).

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Figure 4.5 Visual representation of conflict within structural defence sub-arrangement in Słubice

As stated previously, measures taken as part of the defence strategy are treated as the way of dealing

with flood risk. The main problem is located around the ownership of water facilities. Despite the fact

that the River Warta flows through the Park and has a huge impact on the Park, the Parks’ authorities

have competences limited to the territory of the Park only. Nevertheless, some parts of flood

defence infrastructure, like dikes, located within the National Park are under the management of

WZMiUW. Thus, there are conflicts of competences when it comes to realisation of statutory goals of

the park (nature and landscape conservation) with WZMiUW, with the Agency for Restructuring and

Modernisation of Agriculture (ARMA), and with farmers. In order to secure the flood defence

infrastructure, it has to be maintained by mowing the areas between the dikes (but also agricultural

areas within the Park). Often the Park cannot accept the mowing because of crane species that make

their habitat there. This involves fines from ARMA and the supervisory body of agricultural area

within the Park (Interview Gov#16). There are also some other ownership disputes. The WZMiUW

argues that the institution is not responsible for education paths in the Park, so it is not performing

any maintenance there (i.e. mowing). At the same time, the Park authorities claim that these paths

are located on dikes, meaning they are not allowed to undertake any action there.

Another conflict appears between the National Park and farmers located in the surroundings of the

Park. One of the important duties of the Park is to provide sufficient amounts of water for the birds,

and to maintain the landscape. Therefore the Park attempts to accumulate water in its territory. This

partially may serve as the flood risk management measure of water retention. Unfortunately this

leads to large conflicts with farmers, who are willing to drain water from their arable fields. In case of

the flood risk mitigation strategy, sometimes the goals of the Park of nature conservation do not go

together with the flood water retention principles. The Park is always trying to keep the level of

60

water at a specified level and in case of a flood event it needs to accept that larger amounts of water

may bring losses for the landscape. Therefore, it can be said that the Park’s role in case of flood

mitigation is limited, especially in times when there is no imminent flood event.

This creates another tension. Some parts of the Natura 2000 areas include agricultural land, and

owners should cultivate their land in compliance with the environmental guidelines. This often does

not happen, as farmers do not meet Natura 2000 recommendations. Moreover, they sometimes are

not even aware of the fact that their land lies within the Natura 2000 borders (interview Gov#16).

When it comes to the indicators’ assessment, the Regional Directorate for Environmental Protection

(body responsible for evaluation of implementation of Natura 2000 goals) expects that everything

was done exactly in accordance with the regulations (interview Gov#16). The National Park also faces

problems with the Natura 2000 areas. This programme is treated as an empty document that aims to

preserve species valuable especially in Western Europe, and not actually endangered in the Park.

Moreover, it limits the realisation of the National Parks goals. When, for instance, the Park wants to

remove some trees as a form of landscape conservation, it is obliged by the Habitat Directive to leave

them.

Simultaneously, farmers are also not interested in flood risk mitigation measures, but rather in

traditional flood defence (i.e. pumping out the water) (Interview Gov#16). Similarly to other cases

and the national level, Natura 2000 is assessed negatively by actors who assume that the area was

wrongly delineated. It does not overlap with the borders of the National Park which was established

for the same environmental reasons. As a result, the National Park is criticised as an institution that

does not solve any problems (Interview Gov#16), and seen as a unit to obtain financial resources from

the European Union (Interview Gov#16).

The crisis management sub-arrangement is structured around the cooperation between the State

Fire Brigades, administrative bodies of crisis management centres in Słubice and on higher

administrative levels, as well as the municipal police (also a local institution). The actors responsible

for evacuation have gained importance particularly since the flood of 1997. Nowadays, the State Fire

Brigades play a substantial operational role at this phase. They have equipment, infrastructure, action

schemes, and are the only mobile force in Poland dealing with floods (Interview Loc#8). Voluntary

Fire Brigades (VFB) and civil defence units are weak. This is considered a serious problem, as youth

are not engaging in VFB (Interview Gov#14). The Municipal Crisis Management Office complains that

the city de facto finances the voluntary FB (Interview Gov#15). The stronger position of crisis services

is a consequence of changes in national legislation in the form of the Act on Crisis Management

(passed in 2007).

RZGW and WZMiUW also give expertise and actively participate in actions taken during flood event. It

can be stated that the monitoring and forecasting system is weak (or rather lacking), but it is coped

with by local expertise and experience. Good cooperation between actors is an issue of a clear

division of responsibilities which results from experience from previous flood events. This is also the

case with cooperation between Słubice and Frankfurt crisis management authorities. Exchange of

valid information is considered to be effective.

During an event, the inhabitants are mostly evacuated and do not take part in supporting the crisis

61

management activities, nor help the services with monitoring of the embankments when there is no

threat.

The spatial planning sub-arrangement is weak. Although actors think that spatial planning should be

included in FRM, it is still insignificant. The main factor behind spatial planning in Słubice is local

development. Low participation of inhabitants in consultations regarding flood risk issues gives the

municipalities full power in realising their goals. This situation changes when direct interests of the

local inhabitants are at stake. The most important actors are local spatial planners under the

influence of local politicians.

Summing up, although there are actors that are willing to play the role of agents of change, such as

the National Park and an NGO, their influence on the strong advocacy coalition of infrastructural

flood defence is rather limited. Despite some tensions, both flood threats of 1997 and 2010 have

contributed to stabilising the dominant structural defence sub-arrangement and the whole FRGA.

Some dynamics appear in the crisis management sub-arrangement, however. Shifts in modes of

governance are presented in Table 4.6 below.

Table 4.6 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs in Słubice Sub-FRGA Mode of governance Shifts in modes of governance

Structural defence Centralised High dependency on financial and knowledge resources have not changed significantly.

Crisis management Decentralised Army as a main actor in crisis management replaced by municipal crisis bodies and State Fire Brigades operating rather independently from the regional and national level of governance. Establishment of transboundary emergency management supports decentralised mode.

Spatial planning Decentralised Main role played by municipal spatial planning bodies with little consideration of regional and national planning. No significant shift to other form of governance is expected in the near future.

The flood events of 1997 and 2010 brought infrastructural programmes to the region which

reinforced the centralised mode of governance in the structural defence sub-arrangement. On the

other hand, a need for cooperation improved transboundary management between Słubice and

Frankfurt significantly. Despite formalisation of rules (i.e. Crisis Management Act of 2007) informal

contacts, based on previous experiences with flood threats, remaining accurate and effective.

Changes towards either pro-active or regional planning are definitely not the case in Słubice’s spatial

planning sub-arrangement. Local development is still the dominant principle for spatial planning.

4.4 Explaining change and stability in Flood Risk Governance in Słubice In the previous section, three sub-arrangements have been identified and analysed. Though

dominated by the structural defence sub-arrangement, Flood Risk Governance in this case study

evolved throughout the analysed period. Since 1989/90, two additional sub-arrangements have been

formed. Drivers behind dynamics in the FRGA in Słubice can be grouped into drivers of stability and

change and they will be presented in this order. The most important factors in Słubice FRGA are listed

in Table 4.5.

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Table 4.7 Drivers of stability and change in Słubice FRGA Drivers of stability Drivers of change


Overlapping of economic interests; Actors coalitions and their

behavioural routines; Institutional design.

Inclusion of additional actors coalitions (e.g. in transboundary crisis management).


Shock events (flood of 1997 and 2010);

Physical location of Słubice; Existing institutional design; Political system organisation.

Shock events (flood of 1997 and 2010); New legislation (Crisis Management Act of

2007); Floods Directive; Environmentally oriented policy entrepreneurs

(NGOs).

4.4.1 Drivers of stability

This section will start with elaboration of internal factors influencing stability of FRGA in Słubice.

Although three distinctive sub-arrangements have been identified in FRGA in Słubice (see Section

4.3.3) the structural defence sub-arrangement is dominant. This flood risk governance sub-

arrangement is constructed by two advocacy coalitions. The first one is formed by actors representing

the water management sector (RZGW, WZMiUW), focused on structural flood defence. The flood

defence coalition is supported by the crisis management services, who see risk in environmentalists'

pursuit of preserving nature around flood defence infrastructure (e.g. conservation of beavers which

damage river dikes) (Interviews: Loc#8, Aca#3, NGO#2). The second advocacy coalition includes the

National Park “Ujście Warty”, and an environmental NGO trying to introduce some changes in water

management by not treating excess water as a risk, but rather as an opportunity (accumulating water

needed for the Park instead of getting rid of it). This environmental NGO tries to act as a policy

entrepreneur by preparing research material and promoting their work towards local decision

makers, but they are louder in the scientific spheres than within the local community of Słubice.

There is little willingness exhibited by dominant actors to change their mode of behaviour. Thus, flood

risk mitigation measures proposed by the National Park are not put forward as flood management,

but rather as water management. Consequently, the National Park “Ujście Warty” cannot be assessed

as an agent of change. No local NGO active within FRM sphere in Słubice is functioning as such.

Bargaining problems, being a consequence of overlapping economic interests within the structural

defence sub-arrangement, are also being assisted by remaining path dependency. Actor coalitions

and their behavioural routines are another important driver of stability in the FRGA in Słubice. There

is a large flood defence infrastructure available: a flood dike is constructed along the city, the most

important facility defending the city in 1997 and in 2010. However, in 1997 the technical state of the

dike was very poor and the city was protected only thanks to large engagement of people and

services, and by some lucky coincidence (dike break upstream on the German side). Therefore,

decisions were made to reconstruct the dike after the flood and to put even more emphasis to flood

defence. The fact that Słubice did not suffer dramatically in 1997 was seen as proof of the effective

flood defence infrastructure. Therefore, the conviction to sustain the chosen course of action

persisted again. In this respect, the two shock events, in 1997 and 2010, can be analysed as factors

that have mostly influenced stability: decision makers are not willing to abandon the chosen path.

In order to explain stability of FRGA in Słubice it is also important to look at the location. A significant

part of the town lies in a 2 metre depression with respect to the River Odra (Kołodziejczyk, 2011). This

63

fact is an important argument for those opting for measures of traditional flood defence

infrastructure. Moreover, due to the level of water in the river, it is impossible for Słubice to give up

embankments (Interviews: Aca#3, Loc#8). Those physical circumstances, together with the location of

the city in areas that have been flood prone for ages, stabilise the strong emphasis on flood defence

and reinforce the arrangement around flood defence measures.

The physical location of Słubice and the institutional design, being a part of administrative culture in

Poland, are supported via the stabilising role of legislation, being a competence of the national

government. The situation with the Water Act plays a multi-faceted role. Because of the fact that it

was changed several times, one can say that it destabilises water management in Słubice.

Nevertheless, due to its destabilisation, the arrangement is left unchanged. The effects of

implementing new regulations gives an impression that these will be substituted with new ones

sometime in the future and therefore old, proven methods in governing FRM are practiced.

4.4.2 Drivers of change

At the same time, shock events brought several changes to FRGA in Słubice. An establishment of the

crisis management system, formed as a consequence of the Crisis Management Act of 2007, gave rise

to the constitution of the crisis management sub-arrangement, being the second of importance in

Słubice´s FRGA. This change in legislation gave the State Fire Brigades a stronger position in FRM.

Although their activity during the flood of 1997 should not be underestimated, they were functioning

without proper regulations which led to several legislative complications (Interview Loc#15). Their

division of responsibilities got clearer, and they improved their resources (Interview Gov#15). This is

important in transboundary cooperation between the cities of Słubice and Frankfurt/O, which is now

assessed by local actors as effective and fruitful.

Also, implementation of the Floods Directive brought some minor, and mainly discursive, changes to

the FRGA in Słubice. Spatial planning measures have been given legal framework for being included

into FRM. Even though development of residential areas away from the flood prone zones might be a

basis for some dynamics in the arrangement of Słubice, it progresses independently from intentional

planning decisions. It is rather an effect of municipal policy to secure profits from selling parcels.

Nonetheless, it is not a subject of discussion within the arrangement

Summing up, one can state that on the one hand, the construction of the water administration and

political system in Poland enforces schemes of actions, because of a strong basis within regulations of

water management institutions and the tenure of political actors. This mainly gives benefits to

institutions opting for flood defence, and favours making safe decisions as seen by voters, who prefer

tangible measures (Interview Loc#15). Moreober, close relations between different actors

representing the flood defence sector in Słubice constrain undertaking different water management

options. On the other hand, the processes of including additional actors (i.e. NGOs, German crisis

management bodies) do bring some incremental changes to the overall Flood Risk Governance

Arrangement in Słubice.

4.5 Evaluating Flood Risk Governance at the case study scale

4.5.1 Introduction

In this evaluation section, answers to the question about the extent to which the Słubice FRGA can be

64

characterised as resilient, efficient and legitimate are offered. Thus, this section starts with a list of

features of governance that either enhance or block societal resilience to floods. These are provided

in Table 4.6., the content of which will be discussed further in subsequent sections.



governance

Sub-criteria

+ or -

Feature of governance

Resilience

Capacity to resist

+ Partnership working during the flood; Improvements of flood warning system to increase lead time.

- Homogeneity in FRMSs (domination of one strategy); Low cooperation between the different actors involved in

FRM.

Capacity to absorb

and recover

+

-

Inaccurate responsibilities and path-dependences; Thinking about land-use development rather than pro-active

spatial planning at the local level (political pressure for local development and lack of alternative proposals);

Insufficient funding to support defence maintenance.

Capacity to adapt

+ Tensions on spatial planners during decision making process; High risk awareness among inhabitants.

-

Dominant structural defence sub-arrangement is more effective in terms of goal attainment rather than problem-solving;

New investments in previously taken measures (low innovation).

Efficiency

+ High willingness of local inhabitants to participate in crisis management actions (particularly during flood threats);

-

Spending money in short-term manner; Sectorial organisation of FRM; Orientation on the immediate rather than long-term effect; Tendency to budget maximisation.

Legitimacy

+ Access to information about environment.

-

Unstable law; Legislative gaps or non-accuracies; Faith in a magic legal force; Unequal access to information; Delegitimizing and undermining principles e.g. when

investing in flood-prone areas.

4.5.2 Resilience

After the shock event in 1997, when Słubice was under threat of a catastrophic flood, and having in

mind the drastic events that took place some days earlier in Wrocław (see: Chapter 5), one can

conclude that the flood risk governance arrangement in Słubice has a strong capacity to resist. When

looking at the capabilities of reducing the flood hazard, it seems that the organisation of

embankments and planned investments in this field give some sense of security. The flood of 2010

can be considered a test of the effectiveness of the flood risk management system. The FRM system

was supported by the crisis management sector and improved by more formalised trans-boundary

cooperation. As there were no major losses in 2010, one can state that the FRGA passed its test in

resisting the threat of damages. Nevertheless, what needs to be emphasised is that the capacity to

resist is mostly based on the flood defence strategy, as the FRGA in Słubice is based strongly around

65

infrastructural measures. Since the flood in 1997 the flood risk governance arrangement in Słubice

has gained some potential for enabling quicker recovery. The functioning FRM system has been

supplemented by far more structured crisis management. Another issue is the influence of a factor

from outside the FRGA, but still linked to the improvement of crisis management on the national

level. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Recovery and Crisis Management that analyses

losses and is in disposal of financial resources is seen by municipalities as a potential relief agency in

time of a catastrophe. The role of local crisis management centres (the municipal and the County one,

also located in Słubice) is significant in terms of capacity to absorb and recover. They prepare crisis

management plans that increase the effectiveness of evacuation and decrease losses.

The capacity to adapt and to learn on the case study level should be assessed as poor. This is mostly

because of the embankments modernisation after the flood in 1997. The chosen variant of the

modernisation resulted in low resilience. Variant 3 (cf. Fig 4.3), i.e. modernisation of embankments

around Słubice with construction of the new circular dike from the north-western side, is assessed as

not meeting the safety criteria due to disadvantageous geological construction of the foundation.

Other solutions were more effective in terms of meeting safety standards. Their high costs and

objections from the inhabitants, especially those working at the marketplace that would be relocated,

resulted in abandoning other solutions and focussing on variant 3. The situation differs when taking

into account some improvement in trans-boundary cooperation. Before the flood of 1997, the

contacts between crisis services on the Polish and the German side were not systematic which caused

problems with coordination of crisis management during an event. Now, there are agreements of

sharing special units (cars with proper equipment). Another issue evidencing some capacity to adapt

is the acceptance of the Crisis Management Act in 2007 as an effect of the 1997 flood. This is mostly

on the national level, but it affects the arrangement in Słubice.

4.5.3 Efficiency

Evaluating the flood risk governance arrangement in Słubice, one must say that its economic

efficiency is rather low. The focus on the flood defence strategy, which is costly, at the expense of

other strategies (with the exception of some activity within the flood preparedness strategy) is the

first reason to assess the efficiency as rather poor. Another is the previously-mentioned selected

solution of dikes reconstruction after the flood in 1997, as it was the most costly option. Looking at

the flood risk governance arrangement in Słubice, it is clear that the arrangement is not efficient in

the sense of resource management. Again, the chosen variant of reconstruction of flood dikes is an

example of not using the resource of natural topography. Another issue is the poor usage of social

capital that has formed naturally after the flood in 1997.

4.5.4 Legitimacy

The assessment of legitimacy of the flood risk governance arrangement in Słubice is ambiguous. This

is because of the fact that managing the flood risk with dominance of flood defence measures

receives acceptance within Słubice inhabitants. Other strategies are not seen as a guarantee of flood

safety. Moreover, the selection of the embankment reconstruction variant took into account people’s

opposition for relocation of the marketplace. On the other hand, in Słubice, there is a low culture of

participation. Flood risk management is left to institutions that are responsible for embankments.

What is more, the possibility to challenge the FRM system is mostly restricted to institutional actors,

but even these, like the National Park “Ujście Warty” or NGOs, have a low impact (which is further

66

decreased by the reluctance of residents towards flood risk reduction solutions other than flood

defence).

4.6 Conclusions Within the FRGA in Słubice, there is a strong emphasis on the flood defence strategy. After the flood

of 1997, another strategy, flood preparedness, has gained some attention. Nevertheless, the

arrangement is still strongly dominated by the defence measures. In a flood prone area such as

Słubice, there is an unquestionable trust in defence measures. It is hard to talk about ‘infrastructural

path dependency’ in a situation when embankments protecting a city highly vulnerable to floods

seem to be the only way to deal with flood risk. The flood of 1997 denuded ineffectiveness of crisis

actions on both Polish and German banks. Massive improvement and cooperation have led to ‘model

cooperation’ between two cities during the second flood in 2010. Improvement of the preparation

strategy can be observed. The spatial planning strategy is weak and of secondary role in local

development. The flood of 1997 convinced inhabitants to build their houses farther from the Odra

River, and spatial planners were just reactive to local demands. This is likely to persist in the future

due to high pressure of local authorities to attract potential investors. In fact, proactive spatial

planning is not taking place due to a lack of risk awareness among local inhabitants.

The FRGA in Słubice is strongly influenced by physical circumstances and by existing social and

physical infrastructure. These factors result in stability of the arrangement. Structural factors,

although also influencing the dynamics to some extent, are not internal to the FRGA (changes of

legislation on the national scale). Even though there are actors that are willing to play the role of

agents of change, their influence on the strong advocacy coalition of the infrastructural flood defence

is rather limited. Both described shock events have contributed to stabilising the system with some

dynamics in the sense of development of the preparation strategy.

The FRGA in Słubice cannot be considered fully resilient. Although it has some capacity to resist a

flood event and it has some recovery potential, mostly due to improvements in the flood preparation

strategy, the capacity to adapt and to learn is poor. That is visible only within the developing strategy

of flood preparation. This can be regarded as improved institutional embedding of crisis management

as well as improved cooperation with the German side. Similarly, the FRGA cannot be considered

efficient. The legitimacy of FRGA in Słubice is not obvious. There are some issues that indicate that

the FRGA is legitimate, like the social acceptance of focusing on flood defence, as well as inclusion of

people’s protests for marketplace relocation. Despite some tensions with structural defence sub-

arrangement no change agents that could re-shape the FRGA in some way have been identified in the

case study.

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5 Case study 3 -Wrocław City

5.1 Introduction This chapter provides an analysis, explanation and evaluation of flood risk governance in Wrocław

City (Fig. 5.1). This case study aims to answer the question of how the local Flood Risk Governance

Arrangement differs from that observed at the national level and which factors (external or internal)

are reasons for dynamics in FRGA. First, the main characteristics of the case study area are provided

(in section 5.2). This is followed by an analysis of dynamics (stability and change) in the flood risk

management strategies and their embeddedness in the local FRGA (5.3). Further, explanation of the

dynamics (5.4) and their evaluation (5.5) are presented and finally conclusions are offered for Flood

Risk Governance in Wrocław.

Figure 5.1 Area of case study 3 - Wrocław City. Source: MarCom-Carto – Faculty of Geosciences – Utrecht University, 2015

5.2 Contextual background of the case study


Wrocław is one of the biggest cities in Poland. It is endangered by floods, and exposed to a risk of

losses worth more than € 700 million in case of 100-year flood (see: Fig. 5.2). Essential characteristics

of the city of Wrocław are assembled in Table 5.1.

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Table 5.1 Key characteristics of the Wrocław case study Region and city Dolnośląskie Province, Wrocław City

Wrocław City population 634,487 (2014)

Population density in the city of Wrocław 2167 inh./km² (2014)

Elevation About 105-155 m above sea level

River basin River Odra

Types of flooding Fluvial, pluvial and urban floods

Number of residents in endangered areas in Wrocław (with threshold of 100-year flood)

282,300

The area of the city of Wrocław belongs to a drainage area of the River Odra, which is the largest river

flowing through Wrocław. Lowland location of the city on the River Odra and its tributaries has always

caused floods of different intensity, disrupting the life of residents, many of whom live in endangered

areas (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2 Assessment of flood risk in Wrocław (OderRegio, 2005)

Even though flood control has become increasingly effective over time, water disasters caused huge

damages and required more efforts from the city’s authorities. The city is situated on the channelised

section of the Odra, which means that along the entire length of the Odra in Wrocław, the water level

remains in the range of influence determined for a given segment of the barrage. Other rivers flowing

through Wrocław or into the Odra River are: Oława, Ślęza, Bystrzyca and Widawa with its tributary -

the River Dobra (Fig. 5.3). The length of all rivers within the city borders, including the River Odra, is

ca. 100 km.

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1- the River Odra

2- the navigational and flood canals

3- the River South Odra

4- the River Old Odra

5- the municipal moat

6- the River Oława 7- the River Ślęza

8- the River Bystrzyca

9- the River Widawa

Figure 5.3 The rivers of the city of Wrocław


Wrocław has experienced two significant flood events since 1989/90: the Millennium flood of 1997

and the 2010 flood. The Millennium flood of July 1997 brought losses in exceedance of € 700 million

(IKSO, 1999). Moreover, 30 percent of the city was inundated with water at the time. Due to these

two shock events, significant changes in flood risk management can be observed. Besides flood

events, accession to the EU (with its policy, legislative and economic consequences) has become an

important milestone. The Programme for the Odra River 2006 makes this case study different from

the other cases. It was launched in 2001 and it is focused on protection of Wrocław. It was both a

window of opportunity for local flood risk management actors (i.e. it brought external funds from the

World Bank) and a chance to improve cooperation and bargaining mechanisms dominant in the city.

The flood of 2010 consolidated the flood risk governance arrangement worked out on the local scale.

Table 5.2 presents a list of key events and responses influencing the FRGA in Wrocław.

Table 5.2 List of main events in Wrocław city and related responses Event year Event Main response(s)

1989/90 Communism collapse Systemic transformation (administrative,

economic, societal, legal).

1997 Millennium flood of 1997 Water Act of 2001; Region-wide defence infrastructure; Act on Crisis Management of 2007.

2001 Programme for the Odra 2006 Comprehensive project including prevention,

defence and mitigation measures.

2004 EU accession EU law transpositions; Access to EU funds.

2010 Flood on the Odra Investment in defence measures.


For most part of its history, Wrocław was a German city. It became Polish in 1945 and many of its

post-war residents were resettled from Eastern parts of Poland that were annexed to the Soviet Union

during WW II. Table 5.3 shows major demographic characteristic of Wrocław in the last years. Due to

this historical legacy, Wrocław has been struggling with building up its sense of identity and

community. The flood of 1997 was an important cornerstone in this respect. High involvement in

crisis and recovery actions united local inhabitants and brought a change in the way of thinking

towards viewing Wroclaw as their city (Kubicki, 2010). Also, a spectacular leadership of the mayor of

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the city during the flood added to a sense of pride and community spirit (Sitek 1997).

Table 5.3 Major demographic characteristics of Wrocław city

Year Residents Households Residents per

household Population

density/km2

2002 639,150 239,324 2.7 2,183

2010 630,691 272,527 2.3 2,154

2014 634,487 296,047 2.1 2,167

Source: GUS, 2012 Change in water and flood management after the 1997 flood concerning ecological/nature

conservation and hydro-technical aspects were tied with several prevention and defence projects. It

brought flood risk management into the urban development agenda. From the point of view of

inhabitants, the most significant problems are related to water quality and quantity (Fig. 5.4.). The

issue of floods is noticed by Wrocław inhabitants, however, it is not the major concern.

Figure 5.4 Most significant problems connected with quantity and quality of water in Wrocław (KZGW, 2012)


The systemic transformation in 1989/90 accelerated the city development. It was accompanied by

significant housing estate development and urban sprawl, similarly to the Poznań case (and other

bigger cities in Poland). The Millennium flood of 1997 triggered several flood risk management-

related actions. Wrocław, which was severely affected by this event, needed to revise its flood

protection schedules. The Programme for the Odra 2006 – that started in 1999 – was a collaborative

regional scale plan aimed at coordinating flood defence, investments in inland waterways, mitigation

activities (i.e. afforestation initiatives), spatial planning and incentives for insurance. Although the

Programme eventually evolved into a hard-defence and infrastructure-oriented action plan, it also

provided experience in raising external funds. The experience gained during its implementation was

very useful on the eve of Poland’s accession to the EU, when additional funds from the European

Union became available. The flood of 2010 resulted in new legislation related to flood risk

management. The Act of 8 July 2010 about particular rules of preparing for the implementation of an

investment project in flood defence structures had its impact on flood risk management in Wrocław.

The Act was modelled on the provisions facilitating the realisation of other actions crucial for the

development of the country for Euro 2012 (the European Football Championships), such as roads,

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airports, gas pipelines etc. So far, protecting estates in the western part of the city by building dikes

has been suspended by expropriation difficulties. Yet, the Act of July 2010 facilitated dike

investment. Also, being a host city of Euro 2012, Wrocław took the opportunity to improve its

municipal crisis management centre.

5.3 Analysis of Flood Risk Governance in Wrocław

5.3.1 Introduction

Analysis of the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław city is twofold and begins with the

systemic transformation in 1989/90. Through the lens of the Millennium flood of 1997, we will

elaborate on how the defence strategy has been re-established and how the preparation strategy

became the second most important pillar in flood risk governance. In Table 5.4, flood risk

management strategies and respective measures that have been applied in Wrocław are presented.

Table 5.4 Current measures employed in FRMSs in Wrocław city

Prevention Defence Mitigation Preparation and

Response Recovery

Spatial plans;

Building condition permission;

Expropriation policy.

Retention reservoirs (upstream the area to be protected);

Dikes, weirs;


Pumping stations;

Water course;

Retention basin outside area to be protected;

Quay walls (gaining significance).

Forest small water retention;

Rainwater reservoirs (hardly visible);

Taxes of impervious cover (“rain tax”);


Permeable pavements (rarely used).

Flood forecasting and warning system;

Intervention and evacuation plans;

Crisis communication;

Sand bags; Community

awareness raising activities;

Pumps (used to manage a flood when it occurs);

Repair works of flood protection measures (in case of crisis, not regular maintenance).

Reparation works;

Insurance system (not significant).

5.3.2 Analysis of the Flood Risk Management Strategies

Figure 5.5 gives an overview of the relative importance of each of the five flood risk management

strategies distinguished within STAR-FLOOD.

Figure 5.5 Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study Wrocław. Dark blue indicates the most dominant strategy, and medium blue emergent strategies, light blue minor strategies, grey-blue strategies do not play a role.

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For centuries, flood defence in Wrocław was based on hydro-technical constructions. Floods from the

turn of the 19th and 20th century, especially the flood of 1903, sped up the investments and works

on improving the flood safety which resulted in the creation of the Wrocław Water Junction.

Nowadays, this system of watercourses and hydro-technical constructions located in the area of

urban agglomeration is the biggest in Poland and one of the biggest in Europe. When built in the

years of 1916-1922 the capacity of the Water Junction reached a value of about 2,200 m3/s, the

amount of water that had to be dealt with in 1903. Since then, the arrangement of the river troughs

in the area of the Wrocław Water Junction has not been changed (Winter, 2004).

After 1989/90, the budget shortages caused by large needs of the transforming economy resulted in

impairment of investment and maintenance of flood risk management structures. Due to this reason,

policies in Wrocław between 1989/90 and 1997 were mainly focused on social and economic issues,

not flood risk management. The Millennium flood brought the flood issue back into the centre of the

city’s agenda. Severely affected by the events of 1997, Wrocław needed to improve its flood risk

management. Decapitalisation of dikes and drainage systems in Poland in general, and in the

Wrocław region in particular, provided reasons for applying versatile measures against flooding. A

Programme for the Odra 2006, the combination of plans and projects from different sectors and

financed from national and international funds (mainly the World Bank), lasted for 14 years. It was

decided to discontinue the Programme by the end of 2014, due to its inconsistence with WFD. The

focus of the Programme content became dominated by hard infrastructure measures. The

Programme consisted of two basic components: 1. Structure of a dry flood-control reservoir Racibórz;

and 2. Modernisation of the Wrocław Water Junction. As a response to the flood of 2010 it was

modified, by construction of an additional dike. Thus, the defence strategy was consolidated as the

dominant approach in both the region and the city of Wrocław.

Besides the investments in infrastructure, there was another response to the flood of 1997.

Insufficiency of hard infrastructure during the Millennium flood was accompanied by lack of valuable

forecasting and a crisis in communication and plans. As the result, the preparation strategy has been

gradually improved at the national scale since that time and flood risk management in Wrocław

benefited from that considerably.

Flood risk management in Wrocław can also be analysed from the point of view of relations between

technical and nature-conservation approaches. The statutory dredging and stream regulations were

sometimes suspended due to conservation of rare species of flora and fauna. Similar constraints are

put on the State Forest Holding which undertakes flood mitigation activities, but cannot achieve its

goals as it operates in environmentally protected areas. Also, the Inland Waterway representatives

face the problem of postponing their interests because of environmentally driven restrictions

(Interview Gov#23). Nevertheless, potential solutions to break this environmental stalemate are

under discussion. One of them is to use environmental methods for achieving traditional goals such

as dredging. The conflict between the actors responsible for flood risk management and

nongovernmental organisations is clearly visible within this strategy. At the same time, a shift in

significance of mitigation measures can be questioned. The mitigation activities undertaken by some

actors are not regarded as flood risk management strategy. Measures such as retention do not reduce

flood risk substantially because water capacities of small water retention are low compared to bigger

reservoirs. The prevention strategy and spatial planning can still be regarded as reactive rather than

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proactive. In other words, attracting investors and urban sprawl mechanisms drive spatial plans for

Wrocław more significantly than flood risk management considerations. Therefore one can argue that

spatial planning activities are undertaken, but are not implemented in reference to flood risk

management and generally do not include flood security issues.

5.3.3 Analysing Flood Risk Governance sub-Arrangements in Wrocław

In terms of significance, the FRGA in Wrocław demonstrates the same sub-arrangements as those at

the national level. It is the most vital FRGA among the case studies analysed. There are three sub-

arrangements: structural defence, crisis management and spatial planning. A visual representation of

the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław is presented in Fig 5.6.

Figure 5.6 Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław

The following sections present each sub-arrangement in detail. In order to explain them clearly, in

Table 5.5 they are summarised along the dimensions of the Policy Arrangement Approach.

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Table 5.5 Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in Wrocław

Sub-FRGA Description Key actors Key rules / legislation

Key discourses Resources

Structural defence

Hydro-technical and infrastructural protection from flood risk.

RZGW, WZMiUW, environmentalists, NGOs.

Water Act of 2001; Floods Directive.

Domination of hydraulic mission; Nature conservation, public involvement.

The state budget (e.g. Programme for the Odra River 2006).

Crisis management

Crisis management with monitoring activities.

State Fire Brigades; Municipal and district crisis management centres; IMGW.

Act on Crisis Management of 2007.

Providing security to inhabitants; Involvement of local inhabitants.

State budget; municipal budget.

Spatial planning

Urban and land-use planning.

Municipal spatial planning office.

Act on Planning and Spatial Development of 2003; Floods Directive.

Declarative: preventing future developments in flood-prone areas; Actual: providing space for local development.

Municipal budget.

The structural defence sub-arrangement, dominant in Wrocław (and other case studies), is

challenged effectively by environmentalists. This criticism is noticeable. On the one hand there are

actor coalitions typical for the sub-arrangement, including RZGW, WZMiUW with researchers on one

hand, and on the other hand there is a coalition comprising environmental actors like NGOs, policy

entrepreneurs, and some scientists. Cooperation between the two exists but is rare. One reason is

related to resources. Water management bodies see their funds as insufficient and they need to

prioritise their actions according to most urgent needs. Strategic investments are cut because of the

lack of proper funds. There are some minor projects implemented in cooperation with the opposing

coalition of environmentalists. It is an effect of personal competences of the environmental actors.

Policy entrepreneurs are very active and open space for other discourses.

The scale and the size of losses caused by the flood in 1997 forced the Polish government to develop

a comprehensive strategy of modernisation of the flood protection system for the Odra River basin.

The project of flood control of the Odra River basin supports implementation of tasks described in the

Programme for the Odra 2006. Two basic components mentioned earlier are carried out by RZGW in

Gliwice and Wrocław and WZMiUW. RZGW as an administrative body employing highly-trained

technicians is involved in a second component of the Programme, the Wrocław Water Junction.

RZGW can be considered the most important actor for flood risk management in Wrocław city,

responsible for maintenance of the infrastructure on bigger water courses with discharge of more

than 2 m3/s. Another important organisation is WZMiUW, with the statutory duty to provide water for

agricultural lands. WZMiUW is responsible for dredging smaller water courses with discharge of less

than 2 m3/s and maintenance of dikes along these courses.

In terms of financial resources, both actors are constrained by limited funds. Although WZMiUW

possesses significant resources, only around 70 percent of all infrastructure can be properly

maintained by WZMiUW and 30 percent of all streams can be managed. At the same time, due to

annual budget account obligations, RZGW in Wrocław needs to focus its resources on new

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investments rather than on maintenance purposes; projects are prioritised according to their urgency.

Wrocław is located on the transboundary River Odra and its location provides reasons for discussion

of water issues with both German and Czech partners. As a consequence of the flood of 1997, the

International Commission for the Protection of the Odra River (IKSO) was established. The Working

Group (G2) that works within IKSO is dedicated to dealing with trans-boundary flood risk on the River

Odra. A list of initiatives taken by Czech, German and Polish provinces is presented in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 List of several trans-boundary initiatives taken by Czech, German and Polish actors Initiator Programme Enactment year

Berlin and Brandenburg Lands

ODERREGIO -International Flood Management Project (through spatial development and land use planning measures)

1997 and consecutive amendments

Regional Water Management Board - Wrocław (RZGW Wrocław)

General Strategy of Upper and Middle Odra basin

1999

Czech Republic Flood defence action plan 2000

IKSO Collaborative strategy and action principles in the Odra basin

2001

Republic of Poland Programme for the Odra 2006 2001

European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for

Environment and Sustainability

Oder−Lisflood. Final Report. EUR 20276 EN

2002

Source: IKSO, 2004

The crisis management sub-arrangement is based on the cooperation between the State Fire

Brigades and crisis management authorities in Wrocław, assisted by the municipal and state police. It

is regarded as very effective. A novelty in the field of the national FRGA is the involvement of social

networks created during the flood of 1997. Cooperation between water managers (RZGW, WZMiUW),

monitoring and forecasting (IMGW) and crisis actors exists, but there is still room for improvement.

Two coalitions are recognised here: (1) around the monitoring and forecasting system; and (2) around

crisis management. The cooperation between them is effective. The sub-arrangement is not

challenged by any counter-discourses. Fire brigades have funds, their equipment is at medium level,

but considered sufficient. Good management of human resources is mostly a consequence of

competent municipal crisis management. Clear legal procedures and a good division of

responsibilities are the factors behind the successful cooperation within the sub-arrangement.

The main actors functioning within the spatial planning sub-arrangement are municipal and regional

spatial planners. Nature protection institutions are involved in this sub-arrangement. Although there

are national-level regulations that impact the local provisions, several acts constructing the work

within the sub-arrangement also exist. These are mostly local development plans and a regional

spatial planning framework. Nevertheless, the impact of spatial planners on the FRGA in Wrocław is

minor. They exploit existing procedures aiming at proactive spatial planning actions, but a lack of

competences brings no effects to these efforts. Spatial planners have extensive knowledge and this

sub-arrangement is, in addition, rhetorically supported by actors in the whole FRGA in Wrocław.

As different sub-arrangements form the FRGA in Wrocław, presentation of their modes of governance

clarify the overview of the functioning system. Table 5.7 depicts existing modes of governance and

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shifts within them.

Table 5.7 Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs in Wrocław Sub-FRGA Mode of governance Shifts in modes of governance

Structural defence Centralised Large flood of 1997 brought regional level programmes.

Crisis management Decentralised Crisis management centres received more responsibilities after the administration reform (1999) and the Act on Crisis Management (2007)

Spatial planning Decentralised Decentralisation in 1989/90; municipal spatial planners undertake activities with low involvement of regional planning institutions.

Generally speaking, flood risk management in Poland is centralised. The case of Wrocław reflects this

feature. However, after 1989/90 the whole system underwent a shift towards decentralisation. All

three sub-FRGA are highly dependent on funding from the central government. In terms of actors,

the administrative bodies play a decisive role but stakeholders are also involved. Non-governmental

and civic organisations have limited impact. This applies also to crisis management, as in Wrocław

(similarly to other big cities) voluntary fire brigades are very weakly present. Involvement of the

private (market) sector is minor. In terms of institutions, the formal rules (derived from the acts) are

essential. This is particularly visible in crisis management (although there is a space for local

adjustments in this respect). Spatial planning relies on the act but implementation is very local. There

are some informal rules and covenants featuring a more decentralised (public-private) mode of

governance, but it is often treated with suspicion as a clique-type form of informal influence.

5.4 Explaining change and stability in Flood Risk Governance at the

Wrocław case study scale Since 1989/90, the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław has been transformed from

defence-oriented to more balanced, with an arrangement oriented at least at two strategies. This

section gives explanations for that transition. The table below (Table 5.8) presents factors impacting

stability and change of the FRGA in Wrocław.

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Table 5.8 Drivers of stability and change in Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław Drivers of stability Drivers of change

Factors internal to the FRGA Path dependency (i.e. Programme for the Odra River 2006);

Actor coalitions bargaining processes.

Actor coalitions; Policy entrepreneurs.

Factors from outside the FRGA Shock events (flood of 1997 and 2010);

Physical location (e.g. flood control paradox).

New legislation (Crisis Management Act, Floods Directive);

Transpositions of EU legislation (Aarhus Convention);

Social capital and cohesion in the city.

5.4.1. Drivers of stability

This section starts with internal factors influencing the FRGA’s stability. It must be stressed that each

driver which impacts stability of the FRGA in Wrocław, even though it belongs to various FRM realms,

has either a direct or indirect connection to the shock events of 1997 and 2010. In this respect,

several actions were taken as a consequence of the Millennium flood of 1997. The Programme for the

Odra River 2006, started in 2001, was a joint-venture action plan developed for coordination of

defence, mitigation and spatial planning. Due to a vital and effective lobbying by local policy

entrepreneurs, the Programme received political attention on the national level and its

implementation was enforced by a special legal act. A total of 56 institutions of different kind

(including seven ministries) participated in the Programme. Even though developments showed both

a potential for consensus between institutions previously focused on their own interests and a lack of

experience in cooperating on such multi-sectorial issues, the Programme was criticised for its

incoherence and changed several times in terms of its scope and division of responsibilities, and

eventually terminated at the beginning of 2015. As a consequence, Wrocław Water Junction, with a

capacity of 2,200 m3/s, was scaled up to that of the 1997 flood, 3,600 m3/s, which can serve as an

example of path dependency of the arrangement in Wrocław focused significantly on defence

measures.

A declining number of hydro-technicians, a consequence of a shift in focus from hydro-technically

oriented water management towards a more environmental one, caused a need for RZGW and

WZMiUW to attract external expertise. Academics and NGO activists began to be seen as valuable

actors. Bargaining connected with cooperation is one of the reasons why hydro-technicians and

environmentalists remain in a constant struggle. In terms of resources exploited by those two

advocacy coalitions, hydro-technicians base their power mainly on legal authority and financial funds

while environmentalists employ their actions on social networks and public opinion. Hence, various

interests presented by citizens are seen by RZGW representatives as lacking hydro-technical

knowledge.

Concerning external factors which have an impact on stability of the FRGA in Wrocław, it should be

stressed that FRM in Wrocław, similarly to FRM in Słubice, is strongly influenced by the physical

circumstances and by existing physical infrastructure. The lowland location of the city on the River

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Odra and its tributaries has often caused floods of different severity, disrupting the life of residents..

The Millennium flood of 1997 prompted flood defence investments in several cities along the river

Odra, e.g. in Racibórz and Opole. Thus, besides improved protection, the improvements in physical

infrastructure bring also paradoxical results. In Opole, a town with more than 120,000 inhabitants

located at an upper point on the Odra, defence measures were improved significantly after 1997. For

Wrocław authorities (crisis management representatives in particular) it brings a higher level of risk,

as higher levels of water in the River Odra, with the enhanced protection of the upstream city of

Opole, endanger Wrocław on a bigger scale. The transfer of risk is exacerbated by investments taken

on the River Odra that shortened the river length by 50 km since the 1920s (Rotnicka, 2011).

Therefore the sense of the need to act by crisis managers in Wrocław is somewhat triggered by the

decisions made elsewhere.

5.4.2. Drivers of change

Similarly to the previous section, drivers of stability have either a direct or indirect connection with

two shock events which the FRGA in Wrocław experienced in the analysed time. Thus, as a

consequence of the 1997 flood, innovative solutions and developed social networks have been

brought into the FRGA in Wrocław. This was possible both due to technological improvement in the

preparation measures and a more significant role of NGOs in the city. In addition, individual policy

entrepreneurs recruited from academia, politics and administrative authorities started to propose

alternative measures to FRM. Concerning the second shock event of 2010, spatial planners on both

the municipal and regional level started to exploit window of opportunity through their knowledge

and expertise and can be a potentially valuable actor coalition for change in the future. It can be said

that the Floods Directive provides a legal framework that can support further changes in FRGA in

Wrocław.

Several factors outside the FRGA are also of importance. The sense of community in Wrocław is a

visible outcome of the 1997 flood. Several studies show that the flood of July 1997 increased social

capital with potential for cooperation. Flood leaders recruited from the most charismatic inhabitants

passed the test and significantly contributed to the effectiveness of the preparation strategy. The

flood of 2010 showed that both improved flood defence measures and crisis plans and actions are

effective in mitigating flood risk.

Dynamics in the FRGA in Wrocław have also been driven by both international and national legal

initiatives. Poland’s accession to the EU required transposition of European laws into Polish

legislation. The Act on Access to Information on the Environment and its Protection, Participation of

the Society in Environment Protection, and Environmental Impact Assessments of 2008 increased

transparency in water and flood risk management in Wrocław, and since its enactment it is a basis for

watchdog activities especially on the part of NGOs active in nature protection; they monitor

investments on rivers taken by both RZGW and WZMiUW.

At the same time, the Floods Directive that came into force in 2007 has been implemented with delay

in Wrocław. This can be explained by the lack of a political agenda on the national level. Similar

projects had been conducted before (e.g. dissemination of maps indicating flood-prone areas

initiated by WWF Poland). However, preparation of Flood Hazard and Risk Maps to meet FD

obligations did enhance cooperation between the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management,

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RZGW in Wrocław, spatial planners and the Municipal Crisis Management Centre in Wrocław.

While EU legislation was a changing factor for the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement in Wrocław,

Polish impact on FRGA dynamics is ambiguous. Several acts, such as the Act on Crisis Management of

2007 and the Act of 8 July 2010 about particular rules of preparing for the implementation of an

investment project in flood defence structures triggered dynamics concerning significance of flood

risk management strategies and sped up defence investments in Wrocław. The latter simplified and

shortened the building procedures, making investments more feasible.

Summing up, FRGA in Wrocław is most vital among all case studies analysed. Severely affected by the

floods of 1997 and 2010, the arrangement has been able to establish and institutionalise both good

practices and effectively implemented strategies. FRGA in Wrocław shows potential for future

improvements, especially in the field of spatial planning. These can be accomplished with further

diversification of strategies, supported by effective transposition of EU legislation.

5.5 Evaluating Flood Risk Governance in Wrocław city

5.5.1 Introduction

This section evaluates whether flood risk governance in Wroclaw can be seen as resilient, efficient

and legitimate. The following sub-sections present the evaluation criteria in detail. In order to clarify

the key features of governance that support or constrain resilience, efficiency and legitimacy, Table

5.9 is presented below.

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Table 5.9 Key features of governance which support (+) or constrain (-)resilience, efficiency and legitimacy

Desired outcome of flood risk governance

Sub-criteria

+ or - Feature of governance

Resilience

Capacity to resist

+ Large infrastructural investments; Improvements of flood warning system to increase lead time.

- Low cooperation between the different actors involved in FRM; Lack of spatial planning involvement in FRM; Insufficient funding to support defence maintenance.


recover

+ Large city (large potential to receive attention helps recovery).

- Inaccurate responsibilities and path-dependences; Thinking about land-use development rather than pro-active

spatial planning at the local level.

Capacity to adapt

+

High risk awareness among FRM actors and inhabitants; public involvement in the crisis management sub-arrangement (Flood Leaders);

Previous shock events.

- Dominance of structural defence sub-arrangement; New investments in previously taken measures (low

innovation).

Efficiency

+ High willingness of local inhabitants to participate in crisis management actions (particularly during flood threats).

- Sectorial organisation of FRM; Tendency towards budget maximisation.

Legitimacy

+ Access to information about the environment.

-

Unstable law; Legislative gaps or non-accuracies; Faith in a magic legal force; Unequal access to information; Delegitimizing and undermining principles e.g. when investing

in flood-prone areas.

5.5.2 Resilience

The flood of 1997 showed that there is almost no resilience in matter of capacity to resist. The flood

wave was extremely high, and the city was devastated. The next shock event of 2010 showed that

the city was able to resist large flood waves. The city was better prepared, although the water level

was also lower. Certain progress in resilience can be noted in this respect.

In case of capacity to recover Wrocław might be seen as an example of a highly resilient city. Even

though large losses we incurred, the city returned to its previous state. However, this would not be

possible without aid of the state. It has to be mentioned that Wrocław was widely presented in the

media and gained broad attention, which surely helped in recovery by enhancing the stream of

financial resources. The activity of the crisis management centre of the municipal office enacted the

institution of Flood Leaders, who were recruited from the most charismatic inhabitants. This activity

passed the test and significantly contributed to the effectiveness of the preparation strategy. The

flood of 2010 revealed that both improved flood defence measures and crisis plans and actions are

effective in mitigating flood risk. These measures and increased activity of the crisis management

sub-arrangement might evidence resilience as capacity to adapt and learning from previous dramatic

events. It should be stressed that the FRGA in Wrocław is still relatively closed in terms of knowledge

and risk-sharing processes. The arrangement’s capacity to buffer and recover in terms of re-

establishment of previously taken measures should be assessed as good. Moreover, the direction of

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change towards broadening of strategies puts Wrocław as a forerunner in innovation among the

Polish cases.

5.5.3 Efficiency

The economic efficiency of the FRGA is questionable. Huge losses as a result of the flood of 1997 and

large investments in reconstructing the embankments absorbed large amounts of financial resources.

Nevertheless, flood infrastructure (embankments, reservoir capacity, sluices) has improved since

1997. It became a serious flood risk mitigation factor and consolidated a dominant discourse about

effectiveness of a defence approach. Seen in this light, although at high costs, the goal to reconstruct

ruined infrastructure has been reached.

5.5.4 Legitimacy

The lack of flood management on the political and policy agendas after 1989/90, on both the national

and the local (Wrocław) levels, led to decapitalisation of flood defence infrastructure. At the same

time, highest water flow estimations and crisis plans for flood events were prepared on the basis of

experience gained from the flood of 1903 (with a water flow of 2,200 m3/s). Both estimations and

crisis plans did not take into consideration that a higher water flow would be possible. The previous

events brought high legitimisation for undertaken activities within the FRGA. Currently, the structural

defence sub-arrangement and the crisis management sub-arrangement are receiving high social

acceptance. Noticeable public involvement in the crisis activities also prove that the FRGA in Wrocław

might be assessed as legitimate.

5.6 Conclusions Physical circumstances of Wrocław City seem to have had a large impact on the shape of flood risk

governance at the local scale. Depreciation of defence infrastructure and ad-hoc rescue actions taken

during the Millennium flood have subsequently lead to both modernisation of Wrocław Water

Junction and establishment of the crisis management strategy. Massive effort has been made as a

consequence of the 1997 flood. However, this would not have been possible without political and

financial support from the central level, which gave an argument for a top-down mode of flood risk

governance in Poland. The Programme for the Odra 2006, the first such complex scheme in Poland

and realised on unprecedented scale, privileged defence measures and showed implementation gaps

in the field of spatial planning. Prolonged decision-making processes and poor coordination stand for

inefficient spending in flood risk management in Wrocław. Such activity schemes and the way of

processing in FRM is rather characteristic for the whole Polish FRGA at this time. Thus, the Wrocław

case with all its specifics is to be seen as representative of national level characteristics.

The exclusive and highly professionalised technical expertise that prevails in Wrocław is gaining

valuable partners from NGOs and academia. Although they are emerging rather independently from

official and well-grounded flood risk management in the city, three opportunities for diversification

of strategies were identified. Firstly, municipal and provincial spatial planners can offer added value

to flood risk management, though there is much room for improvement concerning planners´

involvement in FRM. Secondly, mitigation measures (i.e. SUDS, separate sewers) being operated by

Wrocław Municipal Enterprise of Water Supplies and Sewerage in a cost-efficient way can contribute

to the process. Thirdly, NGOs that are very active in Wrocław, with well-established international

social networks, can bring their experience into flood risk management.

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6 Explanations for stability and change in Flood Risk Governance in

Poland

6.1 Introduction The previous chapters presented the flood risk governance arrangements in Poland on both the

national and the case study level. Three sub-arrangements were distinguished for the period

1989/90-2015, namely structural defence, crisis management and spatial planning. Based on this

description, stability and change of the overall Polish Flood Risk Governance Arrangement (FRGA) are

analysed and explained in this chapter. In this respect, explanatory factors are presented. We

distinguish between drivers of stability and drivers of change which can be internal and external to

the FRGA. The relative importance of the factors is assessed and the issue of which insights the case

studies contribute to explaining the overall dynamics is also discussed. In Table 6.1 below a general

overview of factors shaping the dynamics in Polish flood risk governance is presented.

Table 6.1 Summary of factors forming stability and change in Polish conditions. Most important factors are set in bold Drivers of stability Drivers of change


Role of vested interests (competition for power and resources, path dependency, institutionalisation of policies / approaches);

Sectorial management; Past investment in flood defence

infrastructure (‘sunk costs’); 36 Water Act amendments since 2001

cause undermining legitimacy; Incoherence of administrative

competences; Implementation gap in spatial

planning.

Crisis Management Act of 2007.

Factors external to the FRGA

Legislative processes; Budget shortages; Low interest of administration in

changes (budget maximization).

The systemic change of 1989/90 (growing role of private sector);

The EU accession of 2004; Extreme flood occurrence (1997); Floods Directive, Aarhus Convention; Decrease in the number of hydro-technicians

(civil engineering departments at technical universities have been replaced by departments of environmental protection);

Increasing public demand for administrative transparency;

Normative shifts in attitudes towards public participation and inclusion of multiple actors;

Advent of environmentally-oriented NGOs.

Elements of both stability and change can be observed in the Polish FRGA. However, the flood of

1997 can be considered the main factor triggering change in the FRGA in Poland. At the same time,

this dramatic event did not decisively undermine the dominance of the defence strategy, as was

particularly evident in the Słubice case. There are a number of drivers of stability and change and

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they partially balance each other. In some cases, the factors were Janus-faced, contributing both to

stability and change. In short, the mix of Poland’s flood risk management strategies has become

more balanced within the analysed period. In fact, some relative progress could be observed in terms

of the preparation strategy. In sections 6.2 and 6.3 more elaborate explanations of factors

contributing to stability and change will be provided.

6.2 Factors contributing to stability It is evident that most stabilising influences come from within the Polish FRGA. Financial and power

factors exert a stabilising role. Polish flood risk management relies mostly on defence, and it entails

substantial public spending for investments and maintenance, involvement of several public bodies,

procurement procedures etc. It is also linked with business capacities built to perform the tasks. The

fact that interests are intertwined has a stabilising effect, as development of other strategies could

undermine the vested interests. Conflict within the dominant structural defence sub-arrangement

observed in Słubice and elaborated in chapter 4 is an example observed in practice.

At the same time, stability of the FRGA is strengthened by the division of competences between

actors. Fragmented management enhances exclusiveness and constrains collaborative initiatives. In

addition a piecemeal mode of creating legislation related to flood management constrains more

collaborative actions in the field. There have been 36 Water Act amendments since 2001, many of

which were more ad-hoc than comprehensive.

In Poland, where population density is relatively low compared to several Western European

countries, there is an opportunity for developing prevention measures („keeping people and property

away from water”). However, few changes have been observed in this respect, at both national and

local level. Due to the demand for housing development flood plain areas are attractive locations, and

local authorities are under pressure to allow building. Thus, economic development has a

conservative impact for the mix of strategies. The presence of dikes, dams, and reservoirs, identified

in the national level study and in all case studies, reinforces the reliance on defence in Poland. There

is an established belief that structural protection measures offer safety. Taking defence measures in

the upstream river is the dominant approach in Poland. As structural protection consists of long-

lasting measures, they conserve the existing solutions. This is supported by several other elements,

such as education of flood risk experts. Due to its uncertainty (absence of a ubiquitous increasing

trend in observed maximum river discharge and high model-based and scenario-based uncertainties

in projections for the future), climate change is not a driving force of dynamics in the Flood Risk

Governance Arrangement in Poland.

6.3 Factors contributing to change Assessment of the national and case study level provided in chapters 2-5 offered insights into the

dynamics of flood risk governance in Poland. Although the list of factors behind the dynamics and

their relative significance differed according to the level of governance and a case study examined,

three main changes have been observed both on national and local level:

(1) a slight relative reduction of importance of the flood defence strategy (although flood defence has

remained a dominant strategy in the analysed period) and the development of flood preparation and

flood prevention strategies (see: sections 2.3, 3.3, 4.3);

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(2) increased importance of environmental concerns, noticeable particularly within discourse and in

the administrative conduct (see: sections 2.4, 3.3, 4.3);

(3) increased role of non-governmental actors, gaining attention in the discussions and present in

decision making via administrative procedures (see: sections 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, 3.5, 4.3, 4.4). Hence, this

section explains which factors contributed to these changes in Polish FRGA.

The national-level analysis has shown that floods do influence governance changes. The most

important triggering factor lies outside the arrangement and it is the destructive 1997 flood. This

flood can be clearly pointed out as a cornerstone. It launched discussions about the weaknesses of

the existing flood risk management system and led to stepwise decisions and legal changes towards a

modification of the system. The impulse coming from the 1997 flood was strengthened by two other

factors: the beginning of systemic change since 1989/90, involving a fundamental transformation of

the socio-economic and political system, and accession to the EU in 2004, involving significant legal

transpositions. A water management administration organised in river basins was created in Poland

after the systemic change of 1989/90. Regional Water Management Boards (RZGWs) obtained formal

and legal authority and financial resources. They were delineated hydrographically in accordance to

water basins, and they have become a structure fitting the ideas of linking flood management with

natural processes.

Moreover, the change of the highly centralised economic and political system in 1989/90 created a

completely new environment for flood risk governance (democratically elected local government,

market based economy etc.). The flood in 1997 showed that the flood risk governance system was not

adjusted to the altered conditions, which created a momentum for change. The most tangible effect

was the Act on Crisis Management passed in 2007 (i.e. ten years after the 1997 flood), which

established a completely new crisis management system within the preparation strategy.

There were other drivers of change outside the system. The next important one was joining the EU

and adopting its legislation, such as the WFD, Floods Directive and other directives. The EU funds

spent for investments in the area of flood risk management involved obligatory procedures of

assessment of the environmental impact of investments, and public participation in planning. Certain

progress in these two aspects of flood risk management can be explained by the impact of the

conditions of spending EU funding.

In addition, the Aarhus Convention has influenced the administrative operations and introduced

public participation procedures to the administrative conduct. The drivers of change coming from the

legislation (particularly regarding the environmental issues and the role of the public) were

strengthened by the development of environmental NGOs. They used new legal opportunities and

started to advocate the new ideas related to flood risk management (towards incorporating the

solutions that would be in accordance with natural environmental processes) and to criticise the

dominant focus on structural protection (flood defence). As these issues gained strong media

coverage, a certain diversification of discourse emerged, towards focus on the adverse environmental

consequences of structural protection. In Poland, NGOs and individual policy entrepreneurs (from

academia and the administration) can be considered as agents of change. They use public opinion

and skilful leadership to bring change into the FRGA. Bottom-up initiatives base their success on local

networks and increased social capital. Among all cases, the city of Wrocław can serve as a frontrunner

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in this respect, while the FRGA in Słubice lacks such vitality. This is due to the fact that in Poland non-

governmental activities (particularly environmental ones) are more developed in bigger cities.

At the same time, the environmental shift coincided with the change in university education. The

shift from a focus on the engineering aspects of the education of water managers towards bigger

emphasis on environmental issues and on sustainability may be treated as superficial and as a mere

linguistic change; however, it exemplifies the discursive change at least. Thus the drivers of changes

were multiplied and mutually strengthen the effects.

6.4 Conclusions In general, the Flood Risk governance Arrangement in Poland can be considered relatively stable.

However, a certain progress in the diversification of flood risk management strategies is noticeable:

the relative dominance of defence slightly decreased, while some relative progress could be

observed in the preparation strategy. The systemic change started in 1989/90, followed by the great

flood of 1997, and then joining the EU in 2004 affected the arrangement, though the changes were

gradual and rather slow.

Undoubtedly, major changes in the Polish FRGA were largely driven by external shocks. Particularly

the catastrophic flood of July 1997 was a driving force for dynamics in the whole Polish FRGA. At the

same time, the legacy of past investments in the flood defence measures has rendered changes

incremental, sustaining the dominant role of the defence strategy. Strong political support for flood

defence measures together with a legislative framework for crisis management legitimised top-down

driven changes in the Polish FRGA. This explains why similar dynamics in terms of changes in

strategies has been observed in all three analysed case studies. Dynamics both within strategies and

Flood Risk Governance Arrangements (FRGAs) has also been supported by changes in the scope of

academic courses from technocratic and hydro-technically oriented towards more pro-environmental

ones. They create a tension between the still defence-oriented arrangements and the graduates with

limited technical expertise; this was most evident in the FRGAs of Poznań and Wrocław.

All three case studies, however, prove a continued reliance on flood defence, with gradual inclusion of

other flood risk management strategies (mainly preparation and to some extent prevention). There is

a strong ‘path dependency’ syndrome evident in the national as well as local case studies. The city of

Wrocław can be positioned as a frontrunner among the three cases analysed in terms of pressure

from environmental actors. These actions are visible and influential in the planning process,

advocating environment-friendly solutions (e.g. room for the rivers). This is due to the strength of the

environmental NGO sector in the city. The visibility of environmental NGOs in the two other cases and

on the national level is much weaker.

The last element that has been very influential in the Polish FRGA (for both stability and change) was the EU accession in 2004, involving transposition of EU legislation and opening possibilities to get additional funds. The development of risk prevention, growing role of environmental concern and public participation can be attributed partially to the impact of the EU accession.

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7. Evaluation of Flood Risk Governance in Poland

7.1 Introduction In the previous chapters the dynamics of the Arrangements both on national and local level of flood

risk governance has been presented. These research findings relied on in-depth qualitative analysis of

policy and legal documents, and stakeholders interviews. This chapter presents the evaluation of the

overall FRGA in Poland in terms of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy. In order to develop

governance design principles and make recommendations for strengthening and redesigning Flood

Risk Governance Arrangements (FRGAs) to enhance societal resilience, the current Polish FRGA needs

to be assessed.

Thus, resilience is a central criterion and is understood as the capacity to resist, capacity to respond

and recover from a flood event (“buffer capacity”) and the capacity to learn, innovate and improve

responses to flood risk (“adaptive capacity”). However, it cannot be assessed separately and

considerations of legitimacy and efficiency are also required. In turn, each criterion must meet the

condition of accuracy and be assessed within the normative, cultural and socio-political context of a

place at a given point in time. The evaluation presented in this chapter will help to identify the

strengths and limitations of the current approach to flood risk management and flood risk

governance. For this reason this chapter starts with a list of features of flood risk governance that

either advantage or disadvantage a resilient, efficient and legitimate flood risk management. These

considerations are presented in Table 7.1. In subsequent sections each evaluation criteria will be

elaborated.

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Table 7.1 Evaluation of flood risk governance arrangements in Poland. Advantages are marked as (+) and disadvantages are marked as (-).


governance

Sub-criteria

(+) or (-) Feature of governance

Resilience

Capacity to resist

+

Diversification of FRMSs; A catchment-based approach to water (including flood risk)

management; Improvements of flood warning system to increase lead time; New infrastructural investments.

- Homogeneity of FRMSs (domination of one traditional strategy,

i.e. defence).

Capacity to absorb

and recover

+ Prolonged and complicated procedures for maintenance of

watercourse.

- Inconsistent or overlapping responsibilities (fragmentation) and

strong path-dependences.

Capacity to adapt

+ Broadening of measures.

-

Low cooperation between the different actors involved in FRM; FRGAs are more effective in terms of goal attainment than

problem-solving; Investments in flood defence infrastructure (‘low degree of

innovation’).

Efficiency (financial and non-

financial)

+ Implementation of CBA at the level of particular investments.

-

Preference for quick money spending (time pressure) and orientation on the immediate rather than long-term effects.

Legitimacy

+ Public consultation procedures; Access to information (including information about the

environment).

-

The law has been changed many times in the last 25 years; Legislative gaps or ambiguities; Belief in the regulative and performative rule of law; Zoning implementation gap with weak enforcement of ban on

development in flood-prone areas.

7.2 Resilience of Polish Flood Risk Governance There are three aspects through which resilience can be assessed: (i) the capacity to resist, (ii) the

capacity to absorb and recover from a flood event and (iii) the capacity to adapt (including the

capacity to learn, innovate and improve). Results of the resilience analysis at the national and case

study levels are summarised below.

7.2.1 Assessment of capacity to resist

The capacity to resist implies that the FRGA demonstrates the ability to reduce the likelihood or

magnitude of flood hazard. Several large-scale floods took place in Poland within the analysed period,

with the most destructive events in 1997 and 2010, causing fatalities and serious material damage.

The floods have led to the implementation of new protection infrastructure within the country.

Słubice and Wrocław benefited from such programmes. At the same time, the dominant structural

defence sub-arrangements gained momentum for action. FRGAs in both cities have been

consolidated.

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In general, the capacity to resist has increased through the installation of local dikes and flood control

areas. Apart from that, there were attempts to prevent additional flood damage by limiting

development of floodplains via spatial planning regulation (flood prevention), but in practice this

rarely prevented construction in flood-prone areas. In most cases local development remains

dominant over preserving flood-prone areas from further development (see: sections 2.2, 3.3, 4.3,

5.3). Urbanisation and extensive surface sealing over increasing areas takes place and this weakens

capacity to resist. Thus, although investments in defence enhanced resistance locally, overall progress

is doubtful in this respect. This applies particularly to urban areas, where inundation caused by flash

floods is a growing problem.

7.2.2 Assessment of capacity to absorb and recover

The ability to absorb and recover relates to the capacity of the FRGA to reduce the consequences of

floods, so that the social-environmental system can buffer/absorb the disturbance caused by a flood

event and/or quickly recover from a flood event.

The degree of diversification of strategies is an indicator of capacity to absorb and to recover. Within

the Polish FRGA, one can observe an increasing role of the preparation strategy. This statement has

been validated through assessments made in all three case studies (see sections: 3.3, 4.3, 5.3).

Development of the preparation strategy and crisis management sub-arrangements is significant,

after the flood of 1997 showed the lack of sufficient preparedness of flood risk management. The

new crisis management system, completed in 2007, was tested during the flood of 2010 and can be

considered operational. Thus, certain progress can be noted in terms of capacity to absorb and

recover. The crisis management system established as the national policy is implemented successfully

on the local level as well, as confirmed by the case studies.

7.2.3 Assessment of capacity to adapt and learn

The capacity to adapt refers to opportunities for and a scope of learning. As mentioned above, the

legal and policy frameworks for FRM have been subject to repeated evaluation, especially following

dramatic flood events (see: sections 3.5, 4.5, 5.5). On the level of the whole system, substantial

reconstruction of the crisis management system after the failure during the flood of 1997 can be

considered evidence of learning. The system has been modified during its introduction, proving its

adaptability. On the local level novel measures have been introduced, for instance linking flood risk

management with environment protection or innovations in the area of preparation and warning.

However, the dissemination of these novel ideas is limited. Some proactive spatial planning measures

are being taken in Wrocław, although their impact on the FRGA is rather limited (see: section 5.2.4).

Knowledge capacities and support from local administrations enhance the capacity to learn. In sum,

learning capacities cannot be considered to be well-developed.

7.3 Efficiency Flood risk management in Poland had been underinvested for a long time and this resulted in

degradation of flood infrastructure, so that the flood risk governance authorities required resources

to secure adequate protection. As the organisation of flood risk management in Poland is

fragmented, there is a competition for resources. Dominant actors, including ministries and regional

flood management organisations, exhibited strong commitment to their statutory duties. Funds from

the EU appeared after 2004 as a new source of money, leading to a substantial increase in flood risk

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governance infrastructure investments after 2007. However, it is difficult to judge how efficient the

investments are. Although standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA) procedures are applied to particular

projects, and both investments and funds spent for flood risk governance by the authorities are

fragmented. This makes an analysis of efficiency very difficult. Vested interests of administration and

business groups play an important role in resource allocation.

Resource efficiency

Despite significant changes in flood risk governance in Poland after the 1997 flood, the next large

flood of 2010 brought high losses as well. This may indicate a lacking effectiveness of the reforms. Yet,

the level of losses cannot be treated as an ultimate criterion. During the flood of 2010 the authorities

had much better control over the situation than during the previous large inundation.

Taking into account the efficiency of resources, there is not enough data available for evaluation.

Despite overall positive opinions on the improvement of the flood risk governance in Poland, it has

occasionally been noted that the resources were allocated inefficiently. For instance, the State Fire

Brigades are considered by some interviewees to be relatively overinvested compared to other

services.

7.4 Legitimacy After the flood of 1997, public pressure regarding improvement of flood risk management grew.

Improved flood risk management enhanced accountability. One can state that this effect was caused

either by activities of nature conservation actors or that it was a part of broader transparency

expectations expressed by public opinion. The Aarhus Convention transposed into the Polish

legislation became a benchmark for public participation in designing measures, such as small water

storage and polders. Public inquiries are widely used to challenge future flood infrastructure

investments. Thus, existing legislation is being used as an instrument for watchdog activities, mainly

by environmental NGOs. As a result, arrangements in all case studies indicated tensions and even

conflicts between environmentalists and hydro-technicians. Although this causes controversies, it

could eventually lead to a more consensus-based cooperation.

Reviews of significant flood events, such as the 1997 flood, on the national and local levels started to

include not only an overview of the causes of flooding and performance of defence and drainage

infrastructure, but also performance of actors involved in flood incident response. It can be seen as

an indication of growing legitimacy.

7.4.1 Participation and acceptability

In accordance with EU legislation, water managers in Poland are obliged to pay attention to certain

forms of public participation, e.g. civil society is consulted on the Flood Risk Management Plans

(FRMPs). However, in most cases participation of the public has been limited to a formal inquiry

process and to dissemination of information. Moreover, traditionally FRM in Poland was considered

an exclusive government responsibility. Consequently, the interest of citizens to participate in the

decision-making process is limited. Although public participation procedures get little attention, there

are many NIMBY2-like protests concerning particular investment decisions.

2 NIMBY = Not In My BackYard

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7.4.2 Procedural justice, accountability, transparency, access to information

In principle, all citizens have equal access to justice. Yet, due to backlog, judicial proceedings are time

consuming. During communist times, expropriations without fair compensations were common. The

distrust towards the state remains high and contributes to difficulties in smooth execution of

investments. Introduction of transparency procedures, access to information, etc. have gradually

changed the situation but this process is slow. It frustrates the hydro-technicians, because in many

cases investment procedures have become prolonged while public dissatisfaction and protests appear

anyway. At the same time, fire brigades and rescue services, the core part of the crisis management

sub-arrangement, enjoy public trust and have a good reputation.

7.4.3 Social equity

In general, the Polish FRM is based on solidarity: preventing flood damage is considered a

government responsibility and is financed from the general tax income. Solidarity is built into the

flood insurance coverage and all citizens contribute to it, regardless of where their buildings are

situated (i.e. those living in flood-safe places subsidize those living in flood-prone areas).

An important issue related to equity is the moral hazard problem. The state is expected to provide aid

for flood victims. This situation has been strengthened by media and actual actions of politicians. As a

result, there is a mechanism that discourages people living in risky areas from undertaking

preparatory and preventive measures, which puts a burden on taxpayers.

7.5 Conclusions In previous sections, features of Polish Flood Risk Governance Arrangement (FRGA) have been

assessed according to the criteria of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy. In general, the resilience of

the Polish FRGA has not changed dramatically in the analysed period (1989/90-2015), but

development was observed in terms of the ability to reduce the likelihood of flood hazard and to

recover. In this respect, introducing the crisis management system has contributed to societal

resilience. This system operates well (it was tested during the large flood of 2010) and the State Fire

Brigades, constituting the core of this system’s capacity, is trusted by the public. Moreover, the

forecasting and warning system has been improved. The development of the crisis management sub-

arrangement contributes to a more balanced mix of the Flood Risk Management Strategies and can

be considered as valuable addition to the structural defence sub-arrangement. Although the

structural defence sub-arrangement is still dominating, progress in the diversification of strategies is

noticeable.

The fragmentation of responsibilities remains a problematic issue. The activities and investments

related to the structural defence sub-arrangement is organised in accordance with hydrography, i.e.

river basin borders, while the crisis management sub-arrangement is organised along the general

administration borders. Weaknesses related to the competition between the agencies and

administrations engaged within each sub-arrangements result in problems with societal resilience

which are related to the capacity to adapt and learn. Agencies compete for resources and power

while coordination is weak. The reliance on goal attainment is more important than problem-solving.

This also creates barriers for transferring innovative solutions.

The separation of the sub-arrangements constitutes a barrier to resistance. It seems that

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implementation of the Floods Directive can play an integrative role, as flood risk maps and flood risk

management plans can help to co-ordinate spatial planning, crisis management (e.g. warning

systems) and also structural defence maintenance and planning.

A lack of efficiency is particularly noticeable within the structural defence sub-arrangement. Years of

under-investment resulted in spending money on infrastructure objects, driven largely by budget

maximisation of particular actors rather than by a clear strategy. It is a lack of strategic thinking that is

behind weak implementation of spatial planning (and continuous developments in the flood prone

areas). Political and social pressure for development is strong but it hampers efficiency in the long run

as it can increase flood risk.

A significant problem of the Polish FRGA is legitimacy. Although significant progress can be observed

regarding implementation procedures of public participation, access to information etc., the legacy of

distrust towards the state is still significant. Moreover, the state is expected to take all the

responsibility for dealing with flood risk. One could argue that moral hazard has been

institutionalised. Building in flood prone areas, disregarding the risk of potential losses, is based on

the assumption that the state will eventually help as an “insurer of last resort”. However, this

assumption is not based on the procedures but rather on the belief that the government will lose

much if help is not provided. The negative reception of flood management in 1997 is believed to have

contributed to the defeat of the ruling party in the elections held a few months after the flood. It

leads to a tension undermining the resilience of the arrangement in the long run. Another aspect of

the legitimacy issue is a more general uncertainty of law and weak enforcement, while there is strong

belief in the performative status of the regulations on the legislative side.

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8 Moving forwards - suggestions for strengthening and redesigning

Flood Risk Governance in Poland

8.1 Introduction This chapter is based on the results of the analyses, explanations and evaluations of the Polish FRGA.

It points at the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of Flood Risk Governance in Poland.

Possible improvements discovered in analyses of the national and case study level are proposed. This

chapter starts with identifying weaknesses and strengths of Polish flood risk governance (8.2). Based

on that, section 8.3 presents both barriers and opportunities. This report ends withsection 8.4, where

a list of recommendations is proposed.

8.2 Identifying the strengths and limitations of current Flood Risk

Governance The Polish FRGA has gone through substantial changes since 1989/90. The development at the

national and the local levels has mainly taken place through the interplay between the different

government levels (EU, regional, municipal) and has been triggered by the flood of 1997 and the

accession to the EU in 2004. We found that important steps to increase resilience have been made

and it can be expected that further improvements will follow in the future.

In this section several strengths and weaknesses of Polish FRM are indicated. Even though

fragmented and implemented rather separately from each other, good practices identified during the

research can serve as benchmarks for future improvement of the whole FRGA in Poland.

Characteristics of strengths and weaknesses of Polish flood risk governance are listed in Table 8.1

below.

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Table 8.1 Strengths and weaknesses of Polish flood risk governance Strengths of Polish flood risk governance

Strength Relevant

sub-arrangement Reason

Crisis management system Crisis management Sufficient funding; Institutional embeddedness; Regulative rule of law.

Crisis management at the local (municipality) level

Crisis management Municipal self-governance allowing for flexibility.

Obligatory local governments’ budget reserve for disaster compensations

Independent Measure

Flood recovery measure.

Special Act on expropriation Independent measure

Regulative rule of law.

Small water retention measures - the State Forest Holding

Independent measure

Effective environmentally friendly measure (particularly for small to medium floods).

Establishing local social networks working on flood preparation

Crisis management Improvement in social capital.

Weaknesses of Polish flood risk governance

Weakness Relevant sub-arrangement

Reason

Fragmentation of competences -between and within sub-arrangements

Structural defence, spatial planning, crisis management

Competition for resources ; Little coordination and strategic

planning.

Weak institutional learning Structural defence Inertia of the practices; Insufficient bridging mechanisms.

Weak enforcement of spatial planning and mitigation measures

Spatial planning Predominant principle of promoting economic development;

Weak regulative role of regional spatial planning (with predominance of local one).

Infeasible property rights in terms of water and flood protection infrastructure

Structural defence Dikes owned and maintained by the regional government, while rivers fall under Regional Water Management Boards.

Low-degree inclusion of both insurance industry and spatial planning as a parts of flood risk governance

Spatial planning Premiums are adjusted to risk.

All five strategies identified in STAR-FLOOD are implemented in Poland, albeit to various degrees.

Flood risk governance, assessed on both the national level and that of the case studies of Poznań,

Słubice and Wrocław, shows that a clear broadening of strategies has already taken place (see:

chapters 2, 3, 4, 5). Despite their weak position at the beginning of the analysed period, the

establishment of crisis management and spatial planning sub-arrangements contributed to the

development of flood preparation and prevention strategies. The basis of the crisis management sub-

arrangement was developed within 10 years after the flood of 1997 and is now recognised as

functioning relatively well. This can be attributed to operational capacities and sufficient knowledge

and financial resources possessed by the State Fire Brigades on all administrative levels, supported by

the Crisis Management Act of 2007. In the reform of Poland’s FRGA inertia prevailed, but the shock of

the 1997 flood triggered decisions that strengthened the crisis management component. It is

impossible to judge how deliberate this choice was, but it seems that enlarging the scope of

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responsibility of the State Fire Brigades led to a better balance in flood risk management. The

continuation of investments in defence was a customary solution. The control sustained during the

flood of 2010 was achieved by the development of the various elements of crisis management. New

solutions appeared within these fields. Capabilities in flood forecasting and warning are among

recognised strengths of FRM. The system is regarded as efficient and effective in terms of delivering

accurate and targeted flood warnings to those who are at risk of flooding. Moreover, public

confidence in forecasting and warming is growing. However, challenges are still there related to

clarifying the regulation in terms of cooperation with volunteers and with the private sector. Some

actions have been taken to overcome this ambiguity. In Wrocław, the municipality helps to sustain

social networks that have been established during floods and are still active in pre-flood times in

terms of flood preparation.

There have been promising attempts to strengthen the mix of strategies. Although these are more a

list of measures taken independently rather than an outcome of specific Polish flood risk governance

policy, three attempts have to be pointed out.

Firstly, legal solutions which support diversification of strategies on the local level include the

obligation to keep a budget reserve for disaster compensation. Although implemented more as a

separate instrument by the local governments, it is a legal and universal measure for local

governments.

Secondly, the small water retention programme, carried out by the State Forest Holding, is an

example of a flood defence strategy. Again, although effective, the programme is being realised as an

independent measure. Lack of strategic coordination is missing in this respect, as flood protection

services provided by forests are somehow hidden, while technical aspect are more exhibited.

Third, an attempt to overcome weak spatial planning resistance to building in flood prone areas is

combined with difficulties related to building infrastructure because of complicated building

procedures that are relatively easy to stop (due to NIMBY-like protests). A special act on expropriation

was passed before the European Football Championships in 2012. This temporary law designed some

legal and financial solutions feasible for investments.

A principal weakness in the Polish FRGA is the fragmentation of competences. Coordination between

the sub-arrangements is still in its infancy and information and knowledge exchange takes place via

ad hoc, mainly personal rather than institutionalised, contacts between actors and stakeholders.

Structural defence and crisis management sub-arrangements operate together quite effectively, while

prevention, mitigation and recovery measures are taken rather separately. Although some progress

has been achieved in terms of institutional learning (new approaches and new measures were

adopted, particularly with reference to good practices in other European countries), much inertia and

reliance on well-established approaches could also be observed. Moreover, there is a weak

mechanism of dissemination of good practices. Instead, new projects are induced by resource

availability, with little concern of their long term viability. This could be attributed to fragmentation of

governance and insufficient bridging mechanisms.

Many local actors lack the necessary financial and knowledge resources to pursue integrated flood

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risk management. Path dependency stemming from physical infrastructure and routines is related to

uncertainty of legislation. For instance, it seems difficult for local authorities to impose strict building

regulations in flood prone areas. In fact, pressure to promote economic development makes

restrictions on building politically infeasible. Starting with the systemic transformation of 1989/90,

local governments have been given regulative power in the field of spatial planning, with weakened

planning on higher (regional) level. Multi-level coordination in this sub-arrangement is lacking.

Although some developments have been made in the field of spatial planning, for instance in terms of

public participation processes, legal ambiguities, lack of hierarchy and undeveloped horizontal

cooperation mechanisms between municipalities prevent the spatial planning sub-arrangement from

contributing to further diversification of measures in Polish flood risk management. The insignificance

of the spatial planning sub-arrangement for flood risk governance identified on the national level has

been validated by the case studies of Poznań, Słubice and Wrocław.

Economic arguments predominate also in the field of mitigation measures. “Rain tax”, as a means for

financing and improving urban rainwater systems, became a source for additional funds and used for

improving local budgets (as is the case in Poznań and the adjacent municipalities). Due to the reasons

presented above, the possibility for the development of the mitigation sub-arrangement and the

spatial planning sub-arrangement are constrained.

Catchment-based approaches to assessing and planning for flooding are adopted, e.g. within the

Flood Hazard and Risk Maps and Flood Risk Management Plans prepared in the framework of

implementing the Floods Directive. However, there are some tensions between all three sub-

arrangements identified (i.e. structural defence, crisis management and spatial planning). Dikes are

owned and maintained by the regional governments, an administrative body not organised in terms

of river basins, while local spatial planning and crisis management sub-arrangements operate

according to administrative borders. A clarification in this matter is much needed. However, this is

going to be difficult, as there are vested interests between ministries and other bodies of public

administration. A low degree of inclusion of both the insurance industry and spatial planning as part

of flood risk governance is another weakness, demonstrated by all three case studies.

Poland’s position as a country undergoing a radical transformation makes a direct transfer of its

practices to other country difficult. It could serve as an example of an attempt to adjust flood risk

management in very unstable political, economic, social and legal conditions. It is a case of

overcoming a very centralised administrative model with limited resources and a situation of flood

risk management treated as a problem secondary to other issues.

8.3 Opportunities and barriers to moving forward Possible improvement of Polish FRM faces both barriers and opportunities. Several barriers can be

pointed out. In fact, in most of the cases, barriers are linked with opportunities. This section starts

with Table 8.2, presenting opportunities and barriers to strengthening Polish flood risk governance.

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Table 8.2 Opportunities and barriers to strengthening flood risk governance in Poland

Opportunities Barriers

Sectorial integration Aligning FRM to other policy agendas such as economic growth could be advantageous. If a catchment-based approach is adopted in decision-making, it could encourage the diversification of funding sources and potentially open up private sector investment. The inclusion of private sector investment is an opportunity, but strategies for incentivising this remain underdeveloped.

Sectorial integration Integration between flood risk and spatial planning is not sufficiently close. Flooding continues to be treated as a discrete problem. Methods for integrating cross-sectorial CBA need to be developed. The benefits of catchment-based decision-making and evidence based policies are not sufficiently reaped.

Spatial integration The expansion of fully-integrated catchment-based decision making (i.e. crossing policy domains) could minimise activities that aggravate flood risk (such as development of flood prone areas, and increasing impermeable areas), support resource efficiency, and enable multiple goals to be addressed.

Spatial integration Vested interests of ministries and administrative units make integration of FRM within the catchments difficult.

Bridging mechanisms A range of bridging mechanisms and processes exist, and can serve as examples of integrated and partnership working approaches.

Bridging mechanisms The complexity of the actor arrangement in FRM is currently a barrier, although the mechanisms and processes for bridging different actor groups (and their differences in priorities, responsibilities and modes of governance) are essential.

Involvement of citizens Continued efforts to promote citizen involvement in FRM could facilitate ownership of responsibility at the household and community scale; thus reducing reliance on State intervention.

Involvement of citizens The long-lasting legacy of centralisation in FRM has created and enforced societal expectation that the State should provide protection against flooding. The State is also perceived as the insurer of last resort. It is difficult to attract and sustain interest in flood issues amongst local communities. This is compounded by a tendency to address flooding as a single issue, rather than in the context of other local concerns.

Role of media The media provide an opportunity to improve flood resilience and help with risk communication. The power of the media was demonstrated during the flood of 1997, when the fall of the Polish national government could be seen as a consequence of the non-satisfactory performance and miscommunication of the government.

Role of media The floods of 1997 demonstrated the profound role the media can play in fuelling blame, politicising flooding and enforcing societal expectations that are at odds with reality. The number of self-proclaimed “flood experts” grew high. Alternative opinions and even forecasts were published, much less realistic than the official ones.

Insurance The insurance industry can provide an opportunity to promote sustainable adaptation and introduction of resilience/resistance measures in properties at risk of flooding. The industry develops well, enhancing recovery to some extent.

Insurance Although the insurance industry has been proactive with regards to the strategies for defence and spatial planning, it seems to lack proactivity in terms of promoting property-level adaptation and continues to promote a ‘return to normal’ model of resilience (e.g. reconstruction of a house destroyed in a flood in the same, flood prone, location).

8.3.1 Sectorial and spatial integration

When it comes to barriers, the biggest problems are the deficit of coordination, and the spatial

planning legacy. Integration between flood risk and spatial planning is not sufficiently close. Flooding

continues to be treated as a discrete problem for governmental agencies and ministries. Instruments

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for integrating cross-sectorial cooperation are needed. Benefits of catchment-based decision-making

and its evidence base should be strengthened. The inclusion of private sector investment is an

opportunity, but strategies for incentivising this remain underdeveloped. Having said that, the

development of an integrated catchment-based decision-making system that crosses policy domains

could minimise activities that aggravate flood risk (such as development of flood prone areas,

increasing impermeable areas, deforestation), support resource efficiency, and enable multiple goals

to be addressed. Yet, vested interests of ministries and other administrative units make integration of

FRM within the catchments difficult. Further development of risk prevention inevitably requires

setting standards of protection. However, a very strong tradition of solidarity and an increasing role of

the public renders discussion on standards of flood protection politically sensitive. Climate change

seems not to be recognised as a significant factor influencing fluvial flood risk. However, heavy

precipitation combined with increasing areas of impermeable surfaces in cities is likely to increase the

risk of flash floods and inundations. In this respect, developing regulations discouraging sealing

surfaces is needed. In addition, without a regulatory and economic encouragement SUDS, which are

much needed for the inundated urban areas, will not develop.

8.3.2 Bridging mechanisms

A barrier hampering the progress of FRM is the complexity of decision-making process. It has taken a

lot of time and effort to harmonise Polish legislation, as needed for implementation of the EU Floods

Directive. The realisation of infrastructural measures is cumbersome and time-consuming because of

a lack of bridging mechanisms. Furthermore, there are little systematic funding mechanisms for flood

management. As this is partially a security task it is the responsibility of the state and is financed by

the state budget from taxpayers' money. Currently, some investments are partially financed with EU

funds. However, the maintenance costs need to be covered by the authorities. It distorts the

financing and creates tensions. On top of that, in order to further develop the flood risk management

system, more resources and contributions from the private sector will be needed. There is little

discussion on this issue.

8.3.3 Involvement of citizens and role of media

Another important issue is the role of citizens. The foundations for public participation in the flood

risk governance have been established, but in practice it offers little advantage. The interest of the

public is low, while the level of distrust towards public authorities is high. Innovative, well-tailored

methods are needed to increase the potential of public engagement. New information technologies

can help in terms of warning, preparation etc. Taking into account the development of new

information technologies and new possibilities, flood forecasting and warning need integration to be

fully realised. Nonetheless, translating warnings into appropriate actions by those at risk remains a

challenge. Moreover, improvement of public participation also improves legitimacy. Although the

impact of the media on Polish FRM was particularly evident during and after the flood of 1997, it is

also a significant change in the media coverage about flood risk issues in terms of proposing

alternative solutions to this matter. At the same time, flood risk governance appears to be at odds

with societal expectations about FRM. It seems that society expects that, when in need, the state will

always intervene. Apparently, social acceptance and tolerance of risk appears to be declining. Refined

public participation methods could help manage the social expectations.

8.3.4 Insurance

In terms of flood insurance, after the flood of 1997 there was an attempt to introduce a national

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flood insurance system. This attempt failed because it had little political support. Currently,

penetration of flood insurance in Poland is low, but increases with the development of the housing

estate and mortgage markets. The State is seen as the insurer of last resort and widespread

expectation of aid from the state undermines the increase of insurance coverage. As a result, the

insurance system can hardly be regarded as a deliberate part of flood risk management; it is rather

spontaneously growing. The potential of flood risk insurance needs to be more included into flood

risk governance.

Compared with most EU countries, there is a much bigger presence of natural rivers (not yet heavily

regulated) and natural retention. This is an opportunity for the Polish FRGA. Unfortunately, this

opportunity is quickly vanishing due to development, changes in property rights, etc.

8.4 Recommendations for strengthening and redesigning Flood Risk

Governance in Poland In order to evaluate the degree to which Poland can be considered more ‘flood proof’ in the future,

one has to make projections and acknowledge the existence of strong uncertainties such as: (i) the

impacts of increasing area of sealed surfaces (progressing urbanisation) and climate change; (ii)

changes in resources (including finance, knowledge and technology); (iii) shifts in socio-economic

conditions (e.g. social acceptance of risk). Taking these uncertainties into account, the following

recommendations are proposed in this section.

1. Water and flood risk management have to develop around a system based on economic

incentives. Concerning public goods the pricing and payments system could be developed and, in

fact, this is in accordance with the guidelines of the EU FD and WFD. Some work in this respect

were already proposed, such as the successful model of the State Forest Holding. Such a

development in the field of water and flood management would entail integration of the

domains to economise the efforts. Incorporating more market mechanisms could help to

overcome stalemates dominated by ministries and agencies managing their individual domains.

2. Improving efficiency is highly needed. The use of the EU funds enforced implementation of clear

accountancy procedures, stimulating developing tools that enhance efficiency, such as strategy-

related cost-benefit analysis. Incorporating pricing and market mechanisms in the FRGA could

reframe the relation between the public administration and the public. As citizens would bear

some costs of FRM, the moral hazard problem would be decreased. Thus, one possible

instrument could be related to new developments in flood prone areas. Owners of new property

could disclaim rights to be recovered from state funds in case of flood. At the same time,

inclusion of the private sector to fund and support FRM measures becomes a fundamental

element. Hence, a strategy for incentivising private sector involvement would follow. In

particular, the insurance industry would be incentivised to promote resistance measures at the

property scale and to cooperate with the public administration. Risk-reflective pricing of

insurance premiums and therefore risk reduction at the property level would be incentivised, to

reduce higher costs.

3. Enhancing public participation would not only mean involvement of citizens as clients. This

seems difficult (and may turn out to be a dramatic experience) but eventually it could improve

the legitimacy of decision-making. Yet raising awareness of decision makers, politicians,

managers, private sector, and citizens at large, and fostering public participation and community

100

involvement on all levels are needed, but ultimate results could be strengthened and, in fact,

radically repositioned by giving the citizens a clear role of paying and demanding agents.

4. Since collaborative and regional programmes and watercourse maintenance activities suffer a

lack of coordination, and inefficiency due to division of responsibility, unified property rights in

terms of water and flood protection infrastructure is much needed. Simultaneously, more

financial transparency will be brought into Polish FRM.

5. The flood policy and regulation domain (NFPR) in Poland is currently linked to several other

policy domains, e.g. environmental management, spatial planning, crisis planning, insurance

policy. At the same time, there is pressure for modernisation of flood risk governance. This

pressure comes mostly from scientists and NGO activists with a certain impact on the discourse

(i.e. towards taking more environment-friendly measures). However, the basis for integration (i.e.

river basin boundaries) is already in place. Expertise is currently spread over many stakeholders,

but integration of expertise and data on the basis of which FRM measures are being decided

upon is key. Catchment-based decision-making already exists to some extent and together with

the allocation of funding (i.e. through CBA) should encourage the development of an integrated

strategy.

6. It seems that much more expertise is needed for designing an integrated flood risk governance

system. Particularly, links between spatial planning and FRM are very important and concrete

instruments are needed for new and existing buildings. The spatial planning system, in order to

be a consistent and relevant means for FRM, needs to be more effectively coordinated from the

regional level, a coordination lacking at present.

7. Further diversification of strategies is possible when tax money stays where it has been

collected. In other words, money collected via “rain tax” has been transferred directly to local

budgets. One of the possible reasons why mitigation measures (i.e. Sustainable Urban Drainage

Systems) have not been implemented in practice is the possibility to transfer tax money directly

to budgets.

The list of recommendations presented above shows possible paths of reforms to overcome

weaknesses of the current Flood Risk Management in Poland, as identified in the framework of the

STAR-FLOOD Project. Sooner or later, another big flood will occur somewhere in the country. We are

confident that the next big flood will be managed better than the destructive deluge of July 1997 that

unveiled multiple weaknesses in every segment of the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement at the

time. However, occurrence of a truly extreme event in the future will also offer a window of

opportunity for further improvements. A strengthened and consolidated programme for the Flood

Risk Governance Arrangement, allowing for the strategic integration of components, needs to be

developed in Poland by that time.

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Annex A: List of legal acts and key policy documents analysed for the

purposes of this research

Legal acts:

Name of the Act Year of enactment Polish name

Labour Act 1974 Prawo Pracy

Aarhus Convention 1998 Konwencja z Aarhus

Water Framework Directive 2000 Ramowa Dyrektywa Wodna

Environment Protection Act 2001 Prawo ochrony Środowiska

Water Act 2001 Prawo Wodne

Act on the State of Natural Disaster 2002 Ustawa o stanie klęski żywiołowej

Act on Planning and Spatial Development 2003 Ustawa o planowaniu i zagospodarowaniu przestrzennym

Act on National Emergency Medical Services 2006 Ustawa o państwowym ratownictwie medycznym

Act on Crisis Management 2007 Ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym

Floods Directive 2007 Dyrektywa Powodziowa

Act on Access to Information on the Environment and its Protection, Participation of the Society in Environment Protection, and Environmental Impact Assessments

2008 Ustawa o udostępnianiu informacji o środowisku i jego ochronie, udziale społeczeństwa w ochronie środowiska oraz o ocenach oddziaływania na środowisko

Act on particular rules of preparing for the implementation of an investment project in flood defence structures

2010 Ustawa o szczególnych zasadach przygotowania do realizacji inwestycji w zakresie budowli przeciwpowodziowych

Act on Support to Entrepreneurs Affected by Flood Events of 2010

2010 Ustawa o wspieraniu przedsiębiorców dotkniętych skutkami powodzi z 2010 r.

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Policy documents:

English name Adequate institution Dissemination year Polish name

National Policy on Forests State Forest Holding 1997 Polityka Leśna Państwa

Collaborative Strategy and Action Principles in Odra River Basin

International Commisssion for the

Protection of the Odra river Basin

2001 Wspólna strategia i zasady działań przeciwpowodziowych w Dorzeczu Odry

Study of Conditions and Directions for Spatial Development in Słubice Municipality

The City of Słubice 2001 Studium uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gminy Słubice

Programme for the Odra River 2006

Government plenipotentiary for the

Programme 2001 Program dla Odry -2006

Oder-Lisflood. Final Report. European Commission 2002

Ocena wpływu gospodarki wodnej, użytkowania terenu i scenariuszy zmian klimatycznych na ryzyko powodzi w zlewni Odry. Raport końcowy.

National Afforestation Programme

Ministry of Environment 2003

Krajowy Program Zwiększania Lesistości

Flood protection programme for Odra River basin

International Commisssion for the

Protection of the Odra river Basin

2004 Program działań przeciwpowodziowych w dorzeczu Odry

National Development Plan 2007-2013

Ministry of Development and Employment 2005

Projekt Narodowego Planu Rozwoju 2007-2013

Water Management Strategy Ministry of Environment 2005 Strategia Gospodarki Wodnej

Programme for Strategic Development of Wielkopolskie Province

Wielkopolskie Provincial Parliament 2005

Strategia Rozwoju Województwa Wielkopolskiego do 2020 roku

Small water retention programme for Regional Directorate of State Forest Holding in Poznań

Regional Directorate of National Forest Holding

in Poznań 2006

Program małej retencji wodnej na terenie działania Regionalnej Dyrekcji Lasów Państwowych w Poznaniu

Programme for preventive flood protection in the Odra River basin with special attention to the Warta river basin and the Szczecin lagoon

Government plenipotentiary for the

Programme 2006

Program prewencyjnego zapobiegania powodzi w dorzeczu Odry ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem dorzecza Warty i Zalewu Szczecińskiego - OdraRegion

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Cross-border Cooperation Operational Programme between Poland (Lubuskie) and Germany (Brandenburg) for the period 2007-2013

Lubuskie Province 2008

Program Operacyjny Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska (Województwo Lubuskie) - Brandenburgia 2007-2013 w ramach "Europejskiej Wspólnoty Terytorialnej".

Strategy for improving the capacity of small water retention measures in forest and lowlands environment

CKPŚ 2009

Zwiększanie możliwości retencyjnych oraz przeciwdziałanie powodzi i suszy w ekosystemach leśnych na terenach nizinnych

National Programme for Municipal Wastewater Treatment

Ministry of Environment 2010 Krajowy Plan Gospodarki Odpadami Komunalnymi

National Water-Environment Programme

KZGW 2010 Program Wodno-środowiskowy kraju

National Strategy on Waste Water Management 2030

KZGW 2010 Narodowa Strategia Gospodarowania Wodami 2030

Poznań Agglomeration's Green Book

Centrum Badań Metropolitalnych

2010 Zielona Księga Aglomeracji Poznańskiej

National Water Management Policy 2030 (including threshold of 2016) KZGW 2011

Projekt polityki wodnej Państwa do roku 2030 (z uwzględnieniem etapu 2016)

National Spatial Development Policy 2030 Ministry of Infrastructure

and Development 2011

Koncepcja Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju 2030

General Strategy for protection of Upper Wisla River basin Prime Minister 2012

Program bezpieczeństwa powodziowego w regionie wodnym środkowej Wisły

Programme for Warta River development 2012-2030 The City of Poznań 2012

Strategia rozwoju rzeki Warty 2012-2030

Operational strategy of WFOŚiGW Poznań for the period of 2013-2016 (with 2020 perspective)

WFOŚiGW Poznań 2012

Strategia działania Wojewódzkiego Funduszu Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej w Poznaniu na lata 2013-2016 z perspektywą do 2020r.

Methodics for flood risk management plans preparation

KZGW 2013

Metodyka opracowania planów zarządzania ryzykiem powodziowym dla obszarów dorzeczy i regionów wodnych

Polish National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change (NAS 2020) with the perspective by 2030

Ministry of Environment 2013 Narodowa Strategia Adaptacji do Zmian Klimatu z perspektywą do roku 2030

Study on conditions of Warta River basin RZGW Poznań 2014

Warunki korzystania z wód regionu wodnego Warty

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MasterPlan for Odra River basin KZGW 2014 MasterPlan dla obszaru dorzecza Odry

MasterPlan for Wisła River basin KZGW 2014

MasterPlan dla obszaru dorzecza Wisły

111

Annex B: List of interviews

Acknowledgements The authors of this report gratefully acknowledge advice of Dr. habil.

Piotr Kowalczak and all the many experts who generously share their experience and expertise in course of many long-lasting interviews. During research scheme, 54 interviews with employees from all relevant government levels and departments, as well as with government and non-government organisations have been conducted. Due to confidentiality reasons, we present only expertise’s affiliation of those who were interviewed. Abbreviations are provided in brackets and only in this form used in the report. The interviews have been collected between February 2014 and March 2015.

Experts’ affiliation Relevant flood risk governance level

Date Interviewers

Academics (Aca#1) National level 15/07/2014 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski

NGO (NGO#1) National level 8/07/2014 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski

Government administration (Gov#1)

National level 8/07/2014 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski



Senate representative (Senate#1)

National level 28/07/2014 A. Choryński,

J. Lewandowski & M. Szwed



Academics (Aca#2) National level 12/02/2014 A. Choryński,

P. Matczak & M. Szwed

Local government administration (Loc#1)

National level 4/02/2014 A. Choryński,



National level 27/02/2014 A. Choryński & M. Szwed


Poznań case study 25/04/2014 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski


Poznań case study 30/05/2014 A. Choryński,

J. Lewandowski & M. Szwed



J. Lewandowski & P. Matczak


Poznań case study 7/05/2014 J. Lewandowski,











112














Poznań case study 9/09/2014 J. Lewandowski

& P. Matczak


Poznań case study 12/05/2014 J. Lewandowski

& M. Szwed








Słubice case study 29/07/2014 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski












Słubice case study 29/07/2014 A. Choryński &

J. Lewandowski

NGO (NGO#2) Słubice case study 16/09/2014 A. Choryński







Academics (Aca#3) Słubice case study 4/09/2014 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski



Private business (Priv#1) Słubice case study 15/09/2014 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski


Wrocław case study 4/02/2015 A. Choryński & J. Lewandowski


Wrocław case study 11/03/2015 J. Lewandowski

& M. Szwed

113


Wrocław case study 20/11/2014 J. Lewandowski,






& M. Szwed



& M. Szwed


Wrocław case study 3/10/2014 A. Choryński &

J. Lewandowski



J. Lewandowski





J. Lewandowski



J. Lewandowski







& M. Szwed





NGO (NGO#3) Wrocław case study 27/02/2015 A. Choryński &

J. Lewandowski

114

Annex C: List of interview guidelines

1. Issues of institutions active in flood risk management;

- The division of responsibilities;

o Is this division working well or any modifications are needed?

o What is the role of particular institution?

o What kind of changes in the system have occurred?

o What are the factors impacting changes in the division of responsibilities?

- Preparation of flood risk and flood hazard maps;

- Determining the strategy of FRM;

- Realisation of the strategy;

2. Issues of available financial and other resources;

- What are the resources flows in FRM?

- Availability of financial resources;

o Is the FRM sector underfinanced?

- What are the investment directions?

- What kind of changes occurred in financing of the FRM?

- The issue of other resources;

o Social;

o Technological;

o Their impact on FRM;

3. Issues referring to flood risk management legislation;

- Does the actual legislation helps or constrains effective FRM?

- Are there any improvements needed?

- The issue of law execution;

- Are there any conflicts of competence?

4. Issues of insurances and compensations related to flood events;

- What is the role of insurances in FRM?

- Does the insurance system is effective, what kind of changes are needed?

- What is the impact of insurance costs?

- What are the chances and barriers for developing the insurance sector in relation to

FRM?

STAR-FLOOD project report

analysing and evaluating flood risk governance in poland · analysing and evaluating flood risk...

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