analysing decision -making processes within...
TRANSCRIPT
Analysing decision-making processes
within ProRail With regard to strategic and administrative decision-making
Student: J. N. van Dulken
Student number: s2177382
Internship supervisor: F. A. Bekius, MSc
Science supervisor: D. Rodrigues Valesin, PhD
SBP supervisor: P. D. M. Weesie, PhD
Date: July 2018
Internship’s organisation:
ProRail
Innvation department
Educational institution:
University of Groningen
Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences
Mathematics + Business & Policy
Disclaimer
This report has been produced in the framework of an educational program at the University of Gronin-gen, Netherlands, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Science Business and Policy (SBP)Curriculum. No rights may be claimed based on this report, other than described in the formal intern-ship contract. Citations are only possible with explicit reference to the status of the report as a studentinternship product.
Prologue
Thanks to ProRail for the opportunity for this internship. With thanks to all the supervisors of this internshipproject. Especially to Femke Bekius, for all her effort, help and feedback on this internship project. Thanksalso to Laura van der Zalm and Vincent de Kwaasteniet, for the fine cooperation. Thanks also to all traineesfrom the department Innovation department, for all the fun and ice cream we have eaten together.
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Abstract
ProRail would like to have more validation in their complex decision-making processes. Decision-making atProRail is complex because of technical uncertainties of the system, actors have different perspectives andthe context is dynamic. By using game theory, we have contributed to this question with this internshipproject at ProRail. The research question was: To what extent can a mathematical analysis of a game(identified in a decision-making process) give ProRail insight on a complex decision making process? Withthis internship project we have looked at a specific decision-making case study at ProRail, which has alreadytaken place. This case study is about the renovation of Nijmegen station. In order to be able to run the highfrequency time table, of the program PHS, in the future, Nijmegen station must be adapted. We looked atthe decision-making process where all the actors involved had to think about how the plans for Nijmegenstation had to be designed. We have made a case description of the case study, which reflects the complexityof the decision-making process. This was done on the basis of documentation and interviews.
We formalised this decision-making process, on the basis of game theory, into a mathematical game. Thedecision-making process of case study Nijmegen can be interpreted as a committee problem. We formalisedthis committee problem by describing it through a non-cooperative bargaining game. We distinguished fourdifferent scenarios from the non-cooperative bargaining game that we have analysed and compared: theMulti-Issue bargaining game, the Issue-by-Issue bargaining game with a random order of issues, the Issue-by-Issue bargaining game with agenda setting and the bargaining game with majority voting. We analysedthe games by finding the SPEs by means of backward induction. The aim of this formalisation is to try andsee if the formalisation of the game (and the formalisation of the case study Nijmegen) is able to mathe-matically describe the real world process and outcome of the process. Do the theoretical description of theprocess match the real world process and outcome?
No clear unambiguous conclusions have emerged from this internship project. Findings that were made inone decision-making process were not always confirmed in another decision-making process. Therefore, wecan say that the mathematical formalisation and analysis does not fully capture the elements and dynam-ics of the real world decision-making process from case studies. However, the mathematical analysis cancontribute to insights into decision-making processes, but it differs per process in terms of which insights.We can conclude that it depends on the decision-making process if the order of actors is important whenmaking proposals in the Issue-by-Issue game. It also depends on the decision-making process whether theMulti-Issue game is the best game. In addition, the analysis also reveals preferences that actors theoreticallywant as the outcome of the process, but that have not been an option in the real decision-making process.These insights can help ProRail in the future with their decision-making processes.
This research was carried out at the Innovation department, they were commissioned by V&D to conductresearch into decision-making processes within ProRail. The advice will be two-part, an advice for V&D andan advice for the Innovation department. The advice to V&D would be to not (yet) use the formalisationand analysis during decision-making processes or afterwards to evaluate them. For this the formalisationmust first be further optimised and investigated. This internship project does however reveal interestinginsights, that we see possibilities for. That is why we would like to give V&D the advice to raise (more)awareness about certain aspects in decision-making processes. The advice to the Innovation department isto further explore and elaborate the obtained insights from the research. The advice is to further investigatehow actors influence, with the making of proposals, the outcome of the decision-making process and howthe preferences of actors on issues can be used to steer and design the decision-making process in order toreach good(better) outcomes for the process. This can be done, for example, by extended and improving theformalisation and analysis of this internship project.
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Contents
1 Introduction 71.1 Project challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.2 Reason behind the project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.3 Formal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81.4 research question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81.5 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.6 Outline report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Complex decision-making 112.1 Complex decision-making processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.1 The system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.1.2 Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.1.3 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Analysing complex decision-making processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Game theory 133.1 The beginning of game theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133.2 Definition of game theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133.3 Components of a game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.1 Game set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.3.2 The solution/outcome of a game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Game theoretical concepts in public administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153.5 Needed theory for the formalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Internal Analysis 184.1 ProRail as organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184.2 Reason for this project and current decision-making processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1 Reason for this project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194.2.2 Current decision-making processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194.2.3 Actors involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Method case analysis 225.1 Case description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225.2 Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225.3 Data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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6 Case description 246.1 Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246.1.2 System characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256.1.3 Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276.1.4 Formal decision-making structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306.1.5 Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326.1.6 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326.1.7 Recap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336.2.1 Short overview of the process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336.2.2 Timeline and rounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336.2.3 Round 1: determining the scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366.2.4 Round 2: the on hold situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366.2.5 Round 3: elaboration of the alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366.2.6 Round 3a: scope extension with the tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376.2.7 Round 4: choosing an alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376.2.8 Round 5: the variation study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.3 Essence of the process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7 Mathematical formalisation 407.1 Argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.1.1 Choosing the games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407.1.2 The scope of the variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2 The formal game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417.2.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417.2.2 The bargaining game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417.2.3 Analyses of the games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427.2.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8 Mathematical analysis of case study Nijmegen 488.1 The formalisation of case Nijmegen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488.2 Analyses of the different games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518.3 Overview SPEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548.4 Discussion results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.4.1 Preference order actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548.4.2 Comparison SPEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558.4.3 Comparison to the real world outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9 Results comparison three case studies 579.1 Results other case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.1.1 Case study Amsterdam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579.1.2 Case study Rotterdam-Schiedam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.2 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10 Conclusion 61
11 Discussion 6311.1 Marginalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.1.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6311.1.2 Formalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6411.1.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
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11.1.4 Generalizability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6511.2 Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6511.3 Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12 Advise 6712.1 Advise to V&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6712.2 Advise to the Innovation department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6712.3 Other recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A Template case description 71
B Interview protocol 74B.1 Interview protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74B.2 Appendix respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
C List with conducted interviews 88
D Codings scheme 89D.1 General codings scheme complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89D.2 General codings scheme process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
E Case study of the rebuilding of Amsterdam Zuid station 106E.1 Actor preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
F Case study of the four-track situation between Rotterdam and Schiedam 109F.1 Actor preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Project challenge
This internship project is a contribution to a question that ProRail would like to see answered and needshelp with. ProRail would like to have better insight and understanding in their decision-making processesand their outcomes and therefore have some validation about their decision-making processes, that they willmake the right decisions in the process. It involves the processes with regard to strategic and administrativedecision-making. Decision-making at ProRail is complex because of technical uncertainties of the system,such as increasing passenger growth and limited space for installing new infrastructure; actors have differentperspectives and the context is dynamic. For example, these complex decision-making processes can beabout infrastructural decisions, such as rebuilding of stations or the construction of a railway line.
The aim of this internship project is to deliver an contribution towards creating insight in decision-makingprocesses at ProRail with the use of game theoretical concepts. decision-making processes are complex whenthere are several actors with different interests, connected by a network structure. In this network subsys-tems exist and depend on each other, on technical and contextual difficulties. Actors can enter and leave thisnetwork, which makes the process dynamic. Game theory is the logical analysis of the interaction betweenactors and the outcomes of these interactions. It can help to get insight in processes by indicating actors,the actions of the actors, the relationships between the actors, information and payoff of actors. Analysingthese elements can create insights that would not be detected otherwise. Therefore, game theory can bean appropriate tool to analyse decision-making processes [1]. Limited research has been conducted andimplemented in the area of strategic decision-making. Therefore, it is unlikely that all the decision-makingprocesses are done in the most optimal way for ProRail and its employees.
This internship project contributes to a PhD-research on application if game theoretical concepts can createinsights in real-world complex decision-making processes in the Dutch Railway Sector. In particular, we willperform a mathematical analysis evaluating a decision that is made before.
1.2 Reason behind the project
As a result of the outcomes of a PhD research in 2014 at the TU Delft in collaboration with ProRail,ProRail would like to have better insight and understanding in their decision-making processes and theiroutcomes. This is important because their decision-making processes are complex, making it difficult nowa-days for the actors of the decision-making processes to analyse the process themselves and explain the results.
At ProRail, the existing policy is that complex decision-making processes, in particular the large projects, areanalysed after the process is finished by ProRail itself or by external organisations. Nowadays, the ‘problem’
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is that when actors are asked to reflect on their decision-making process, they only take into account thetechnical aspects of the process. They hardly take other variables into account like the different roles of theactors, their relations etc by the analysis as it is done today. From previous research we know that thesevariables have an influence on the outcome of the decision-making process as well. Currently, this is hardlytaken into account
There has been previous research at ProRail using gaming simulation and after positive reactions a newPhD research was started by the TU Deft, carried out by my daily supervisor Femke Bekius about theapplication of game theoretical concepts in decision-making processes. Game theoretical concepts for complexstrategic/administrative decision-making processes could help to analyse the decision-making processes andhence give better insight and understanding in those processes and their outcomes.
1.3 Formal framework
This internship is done in the context specialisation Science, Business & Policy track of the master’s degreeprogram Mathematics at the University of Groningen. The goal of this internship is integration of Economicand/or managerial aspects with scientific based knowledge.
The final product of this internship, this report, is an advice to ProRail. As part of the internship, the internworks on the preparation of the actual implementation (as gaining support).
The internship takes place in the period 01-02-2018 to 27-07-2018 and takes exactly 24 weeks. The supervisionof this internship is given in table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Supervision
Name Institute Function Role in supervisionF. A. Bekius, MSc TU Delft PhD student
at TU DelftDaily supervision
J. van Luipen ProRail ProgrammanagerInnovation
Formal supervision
D. Rodrigues Valesin, PhD University of Groningen,Johann Bernoulli Inst.For Math. And CompSc.
AssistantProfessor ofMathematics
Science teacher
P. D. M. Weesie, PhD University of Groningen,Professional Training ‘Sci-ence+Business & Policy’
Teacher SBP teacher
1.4 research question
The central research question of this internship project is:
To which extent can a mathematical formalisation and analysis of a (part of) a decision-making process usinggame theory give (ProRail) insight in a complex decision-making process?
This question gives rise to the following sub-questions:
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1. Which game theoretical concepts can be used to formalise (parts of) complex decision-making pro-cesses?
2. How can the formalisation be applied to the decision-making of case study Nijmegen?
3. What insights in the decision-making process are achieved by the (mathematical) analysis of the dif-ferent game forms/scenarios identified in case of station Nijmegen?
4. To which extent does the mathematical formalisation show the differences between different decision-making processes?
5. To which extent is the mathematical formalisation and analysis using game theory able to describe areal world decision-making process (in case studies such as Nijmegen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam)?
The research question and sub-questions will be explained further in de next section.
1.5 Method
This internship project was executed at the Innovation department of ProRail. As said before, the internshipproject is part of a PhD research on using game theoretical concepts in analysing decision-making processeswithin ProRail. There are two other interns, also part of the research of Femke Bekius (both masters stu-dents, from Public Administration and Brain and Cognitive Sciences), each working on a own case study.Since we all are from different studies, we can shed our light on the research from different perspectives.The other two interns did not contribute specifically to this internship project, but we have worked togethersometimes to brainstorm and to make a joint method to be able to analyse all our decision-making processesfrom our case studies in the same way.
There are several different decision-making process situations at ProRail. The situations differ for examplein number of actors, the relation between the actors or number of decisions. This internship project will onlybe about three specific decision-making process cases. With the other two interns, we all got one case each.The cases were chosen by ProRail. The case study used in this internship project was about the rebuildingof Nijmegen station and the case studies of the other two interns were about the rebuilding of AmsterdamZuid station and the four-track situation between Rotterdam and Schiedam. Each of us analysed their ownspecific case.
To answer the research question of this internship project, we did several analyses. We started with a generalanalysis of the case study, to explain the process and its complexity. Since we wanted to be able to comparethe case study of this internship project with the case studies of the other two interns, we used the samemethod. Therefore, this method was made together. We used literature about complex decision-making pro-cesses, documentation about the case studies, made a case description, conducted interviews and analysedthe interviews by transcribing and coding.
After this first general analysis, we all did our own specific analysis. For this internship project, that is themathematical analysis of a specific game that appeared in a decision-making process. First we did this forthe case study of this internship project. For the mathematical analysis, the game needed to be formalised.Therefore we translated the decision-making process into a formal mathematical game theory model. Totranslate the decision-making process to a formal mathematical game theory model, we used literature reviewand meetings with my daily supervisor. With the formalised game, in order to do the mathematical analysis,we needed the right variables and knowledge about how to translate real observations into mathematicallyvalued variables. The data for the variables we conducted through the interviews. With the mathematicalanalysis we wanted to take a look at what the mathematical values of the variables detected from the casestudies were, and what the mathematical outcome was of the case studies.
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After this mathematical analysis we did the same with the case studies of the other interns, to see what thedifferences were in the games, in the processes and in the outcomes. The results of all the three case studieswe compared with each other. Other different decision-making processes are not part of this internshipproject.
More specific information about the methods used in this internship project is described in chapter 5.
1.6 Outline report
Before we go into detail about this internship project, first some theory about complex decision-making andgame theory is needed. This is dealt with in chapter 2 and 3. In order to give a solid advise to ProRail,we should know to whom in ProRail the advise is to, how the company works and how the advise will beimplemented. This will be discussed in chapter 4. In chapter 5, I will go more into detail about the methodused for the general analyses of the cases. Part of the method is making a case description, which will bechapter 6. Chapter 7 is about the mathematical formalisation and how this is set up. The mathematicalanalysis of the case study Nijmegen on the basis of the formalisation is described in chapter 8. With theanalysis of all three case studies, the case studies can be compared. This will be done in chapter 9. Aftercomparing the results, the conclusion and discussion follow in chapter 10 and 11. The last chapter of thisreport will contain the advice that will be given to ProRail following the research of this internship project.In the appendix you can find the interview protocol, a list with all the conducted interviews, the template forthe case description, the coding schemes and the mathematical variables of the case studies of the rebuildingof Amsterdam Zuid station and the four-track situation between Rotterdam and Schiedam.
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Chapter 2
Complex decision-making
This project is about complex decision-making processes on strategic and administrative level. Meaning,decisions made at strategic level of organisations (ProRail) regarding large infrastructural projects. Beforewe dive into the project itself, first must be defined what is meant by a complex decision-making process.This chapter will give some background information on complex decisions making processes and modelsgenerally used to analyse these processes.
2.1 Complex decision-making processes
Complex decision-making processes (on strategic and administrative level) is a topic studied by PublicAdministration. We are studying decision-making on/in technical systems, such as the railway system.We call a decision-making process complex when the following three elements are present: a system withtechnical uncertainties; actors with different interests; and a dynamic context.
2.1.1 The system
The system contains the information needed in order to make a decision, information about rail infrastructure,the timetable or the trains. This information can be perceived differently by actors. Actors can have differentinterest and views on the data, the system boundaries and the methods used in the process. This can makeinformation ‘contested’ for actors. Thereby, system requirements can be changing or can be contradictory fordifferent actors. This all together makes that complex decision-making on technical systems frequently arecalled wicked or unstructured problems. A wicked problem is a problem with incomplete and contradictoryinformation, and therefore the solution is often difficult to find. The system can be divided into smallersubsystems, which are dependent on each other. This can be done in various ways. They can depend on oneor more variables, they can give each other feedback or no feedback, they can, in relation to each other, beswitched parallel or series, and the subsystems may respond to each other in a synchronous or asynchronousway. Subsystems can also be linear or nonlinear. We call the subsystems linear when all their functionsare summed together to ensure the outcome of the system. If there is no proportionate relationship here,a system is nonlinear [2], [3]. The decision-making process under study in this thesis studies non-linearsystems, since improving the subsystems (for example rail infrastructure, the timetable or the trains) doesnot lead automatically to a better system.
2.1.2 Actors
In a complex system, actors can be modelled in two ways: in a hierarchical system of actors or in a networkof interdependent actors. In a hierarchical system of actors there is one actor (or group of actors) within
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the system that takes the decisions. The other actors are subordinate and therefore the relationships be-tween actors are vertical, or pyramid shaped. In a network of interdependent actors, actors are connected‘horizontally’. No actor has the absolute power of the decision, and the actors therefore are interdependenton one another. There are different forms of dependency between actors. The dependency can be bilateralor multilateral. This means that there can be a dependency between two actors or between three or moreactors. There can be single or multidimensional dependencies. The dependency is on one dimension or onseveral dimensions. Another form of dependency between actors is synchronous or asynchronous dependen-cies. They can be dependent on each other at one specific moment, but it can also last during a certainperiod. The last dependency that is defined is if a dependency is static or dynamic [3].
In the systems we study in this project, many actors are involved. They have different interests, differentperceptions, different power positions and all dependent on each other. Therefore, the relations between theactors take the form of a, so called, network.
2.1.3 Context
Problems in the system, such as the railways, are considered complex if they are substantially unstructuredor if the problem has complex dependencies by a high amount of objectives and constraints. Another factorthat makes a system complex is the amount of subsystems and the degree of different dependencies betweenthe subsystems. If both are largely present, an overview of the system is challenging to make [2]. Complexityin the social elements is caused by many different actors with different incentives in a network setting. Thecontext can also be dynamic. Things can change during the process. The problem definition can change,actors can come or leave the process or change their interests during the process. For decision-making in arailway system examples of a dynamic context are: decisions taken by the government that directly affect aninfrastructural project, safety requirements that change during the process or change in regional operators.
2.2 Analysing complex decision-making processes
Most decision-making models, such asare quite analytic and describe the decision-making process according to a fixed schedule of successive
phases: identifying the problem, formulating an objective, collecting information, implementing a decision,implementing that decision, and evaluating the implementation. This is a linear process. However, mostdecision-making processes do not follow exactly this fixed schedule, because additional information is addedduring the process, additional requirements are imposed or interests change. In addition, these models donot offer a lot of free work space for actors, to come back to issues, to add issues, or to explore thingsfurther. Also in a network structure, such a linear model does not really work because of all dependenciesbetween actors. In addition, such a model does not say anything about the actor and context aspects of adecision-making process, which are always present at real world decision-making problems. That is a pitfallof many models. By using game theory by analysing decision-making, (part of) these actor and contextaspects will show. Think of actors, their relationships and their interests. That is why in this internshipproject decision-making processes are approached by means of game theory. More about game theory andits use in public administration is described in the next chapter [3].
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Chapter 3
Game theory
To be able to follow and understand the game theoretical parts in this report, here we will give a briefoverview of the mathematical topic of game theory. We will not go into the theory too deeply, but only dealwith the most important topics needed for this report.
3.1 The beginning of game theory
Game theory is quite a young topic in mathematics. The first appearance of game theory was in 1928, ina paper of John von Neumann. He is considered the founder of game theory, together with Oskar Morgen-stern. In 1944 they published their book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, which is considered thefoundation of the field of game theory. Game theory is not only a mathematical topic, but is also used insocial sciences [4]. Later on in this chapter, in section 3.4, we will explain the use of game theory from apublic administration point of view.
3.2 Definition of game theory
Before we can say something interesting about game theory, we first have to define what game theory isexactly. You may think that game theory is the (mathematical) theory behind games and how they workfor real games like card games, board games or chess. However, game theory is about more than that. Sincegame theory is not only a topic in mathematics, the definition of game theory should not be mathematical.Straffin (1993) describes in his book game theory in the following way [4]:
Game theory is the logical analysis of situations of conflicts and cooperation. More specifically, a game isdefined to be any situation in which:
1. There are at least two players. A player may be an individual, but it may also be a more general entitylike a company, a nation, of even a biological species.
2. Each player has a number of possible strategies, courses of actions which he or she may choose tofollow.
3. The strategy chosen by each player determines the outcome of the game.
4. Associated to each possible outcome of the game is a collection of numerical payoffs, one to each player.These payoffs represent the value of the outcome to the different players.
The desired outcome of each player is to ‘win’ the game, to end with the best possible payoff. To do so, hewill choose his actions strategically. However, the outcome also depends on the actions of the other players.
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They try to ‘win’ the game as well. The outcome of the game, depending on the chosen actions/strategiesby the players can be calculated mathematically and depends on the sort of game that is played.
3.3 Components of a game
Although there are many different game models described in game theory, there are some standard compo-nents that appear in each theoretical model of a game. In this paragraph we will treat these componentsshortly and explain some general theory.
3.3.1 Game set-up
As described in paragraph 3.2 in the definition of a game, every game consist of at least four components:the number of players, the strategies or action of each player, the outcome of the game and the payoff ofeach player. Every theoretical model starts with determining the players involved in the game. The amountof players, n, is mostly given as a set, written as: N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The choice of action for a player i, calleda strategy is given as si. The set of all possible strategies to a player is then given by Si = {s1, s2, ...., sn}.The outcome of a game is the result of the chosen strategies by each player. This result in a particular payofffor the players. Utility theory is the study of payoffs. A payoff function (or utility function) gives us thepayoffs of the players, as a function of the chosen strategies of the players. We write the payoff functionmathematically as ui(s1, ..., sn) [4, 5, 6].
Games can be roughly divided into eight categories, through three types of distributions. We keep this distri-bution because games are divided into these groups in the literature. The games per category are describedin the same way and the same solution methods per category often apply. The first division can be madein the number of players in the game. In game theory we distinguish two situations: Two-Person gamesand N-Person games. N-Person games are games with three or more players.The second division is aboutthe interest of the players. Here again, we distinguish two situations: Zero-Sum games and Non-Zero-Sumgames. In Zero-Sum games the interest of the players are strictly opposed. So the interest of one player isthe direct loss of the other player. This does not apply in Zero-Sum games. Here both players can also winor lose together. The last division is about the degree of cooperation. You can have Cooperative games andNon-Cooperative games. Cooperative games are games in which players are able to form coalitions and tryto find the best (winning) coalition [4, 5]. Non-Cooperative games are games where this is not possible. Seefigure 3.3.1 for a schematic overview of the different categories. In addition to these features, games havemore (characteristic) features that will come forward for each individual game.
A schematic overview of the different categories of the games and the forms they are in can be seen in figure3.3.1.
Figure 3.3.1: A schematic overview of the different categories of the games
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3.3.2 The solution/outcome of a game
Each player would like to ‘win’ the game to end with the best possible payoff. Hence, the player has toplay his best strategy. We have seen that strategy is a standard component of a game and its theoreticalmodel. A strategy is not only about possible actions of the actor, but takes also into account the actionsand strategies of the other players. The set of all strategies for all players in the game is called a strategycombination. The combination of the chosen strategies of the players determines the outcome of the gameand hence the payoff to each actor. The best strategy for each player can be calculated in advance of playingthe game. This is done on the basis of solution concepts. In game theory there are many different solutionconcepts. Which solution concept you use depends on the kind of game you have. Examples of solutionconcepts are Nash equlibria, the core and the Shapley Value [5, 4]. When calculating the outcomes of thegame with the solution concept, one looks for a Pareto optimal outcome. An outcome of a game is Paretooptimal if there is no other outcome which would give the players a higher/better payoff in that game. Thisis an important principle in game theory. In his book, Straffin describes why: ’to be acceptable as a solutionto a game, an outcome should be Pareto optimal” [4]. This is knows as the Pareto principle.
3.4 Game theoretical concepts in public administration
As said in the beginning of this chapter, game theory is not seen as purely a mathematical topic. In thissection we will shortly explain how game theory is used in public administration.
Concepts that are studied in mathematical game theory are actors, payoffs, strategies, solutions concepts ofgames. These are aspects that play a role in decision-making processes. Therefore, game theory can alsobe used in social sciences, to understand the behaviour of actors in a decision-making processes [5]. Thesemathematical game concepts are studied in public administration and complex decision-making processes,however, mostly in a non-formalised way. In public administration there is no numerical payoff or a calcu-lation of the best strategy. A game in public administration is more a description of a real world processbuilt from the game theoretical concepts [2, 1]. Thereby, with complex decision-making, more concepts areinvolved in the process than the one studied with game theory, such as emotions and personal characters.Therefore, game theory gives a too much simplified version of reality [3]. It is not a new concept to use gametheoretical concepts in public administration, as is described in for example: [7, 8, 9]. Although game theorygives a simplified version of reality, by studying the game theoretical concepts (actors, payoffs, strategies),insights can be created that would not be detected otherwise, as described in chapter 2. Therefore, gametheory can be an appropriate tool to analyse decision-making processes [1].
3.5 Needed theory for the formalisation
In anticipation of chapter 7, we will discuss here the necessary theory that we will use in the formalisation.For the case study of Nijmegen, we want to find a game that best represent the real situation of the process.Looking at figure 3.3.1, the project in Nijmegen can be categorised as a N-person, non-zero, cooperative game.
For a cooperative game, there are two ways to approach such a game. You can just look at it as a coopera-tive game, but also from a non-cooperative approach by reducing the cooperative game to a non-cooperativebargaining game. The last approach was founded by Nash [10, 11]. A non-cooperative bargaining gameis a game in extensive form. A game in extensive form is a step-by-step description of a game. It showsstep-by-step structure of decisions to be taken by the players. This creates a clear overview of the entiregame. This overview can be used so that a player can determine and adjust his strategy during the entirecourse of the game [5]. A definition of the extensive game with perfect information is given by Osborne inthe following way [6]:
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Definition 1. An extensive game with perfect information consists of
• a set of players
• a set of sequences (terminal histories) with the property that no sequence is a proper subhistory of anyother sequence
• a function (the player function) that assigns a player to every sequence that is a proper subhistory ofsome terminal history
• for each player, preferences over the set of terminal histories.
The set of terminal histories is the set of all sequences of actions that may occur; the player assigned by theplayer function to any history h is the player who takes an action after h.
A terminal history is a possible sequence of actions a player can play and the player function is a functionthat gives the player who moves at each point in each terminal history [6].
The bargaining game is set up in rounds. In each round, one player proposes a proposal. The other playerscan accept or reject this proposal. If a proposal is rejected, another player proposes another proposal. Ne-gotiations are held until all players have accepted the proposal and then the round is ended [5].
A non-cooperative bargaining game can occur in many forms. A first distinction that can be made is thenumber of issues that are being negotiated in the game. If more than one issue is negotiated, we call this aMulti-Issue bargaining problem. Otherwise it is called a one-issue game [12]. The players can relate to eachother in several ways. You have the kind of game where there is one seller, and multiple buyers. All thesebuyers all negotiate one-on-one with the seller. Another way is the committee problem. Here all playersjointly form one committee, and have to reach mutual consensus to reach a decision [12]. From here on, wefocus only on the committee problem. This corresponds to the situation in the Nijmegen decision-makingprocess. If you have multiple issues that need to be dealt with, this can be done per issue, but all issues canalso be dealt with simultaneously. This distinction can be made by simultaneous bargaining or by Issue-by-Issue bargaining. A distinction can also be made in the game by the way in which a new proposal is created.If a player makes a proposal, and the proposal is not accepted by the other players, a new proposal has tobe made. This can be done in two ways. A player, picked at random proposes a new offer, or the playerthat rejected the offer comes with a new proposal. Most games in game theory determine the payoff of eachplayer in the game. However, instead of looking at the absolute payoff of each actor, a game can also lookat a players’ preference over the different options in outcome of the game [12, 5, 6, 13, 4]. In the same wayas figure 3.3.1, we can make the distinction between the different categories of the Multi-Issue games visual.This is seen in figure 3.5.1.
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Figure 3.5.1: A schematic overview of the different categories of the Multi-Issue games
For the formalisation and analysis of this internship project, we will look at a Multi-Issue, committee bar-gaining problem. More specific, we will look at both the simultaneous bargaining game, with a non-randomproposer with preference and look at the Issue-by-Issue bargaining game, with a non-random proposer withpreference (see figure 3.5.1). More specifics of the games and why these games are chosen will be given inchapter 7.
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Chapter 4
Internal Analysis
In order to be able to give solid advice to ProRail, we should know how the organisations works, where thequestion for this project comes from within ProRail, what the current situation is at ProRail, and how myadvice can be implemented later. This will be discussed in this chapter.
4.1 ProRail as organisation
ProRail is responsible for the railway network in the Netherlands: construction, maintenance, managementand safety. They arrange all train traffic, build and manage stations and create new tracks. In doing so, theymaintain existing tracks, switches, signals and level crossings. They do this in cooperation with operatorsand partners. ProRail is a large company with 4,000 employees, with the government being 100% shareholder[14] .
In figure 4.1.1 you can see the organisation chart of ProRail. You see the board of directors with the mainbusiness units. Several departments and sub departments belong to each business unit. There are also somedepartments that do not belong to a specific business unit, and which are not shown on the organisationchart.
Figure 4.1.1: Organisation chart of ProRail [15]
As seen in figure 4.1.1, the organisation contains different colons. Business units have their own workingmethods, regulations and methods. My internship takes place in the Innovation department. They receivedthe question from V&D to investigate in how to get more validation in decision-making processes. Thisdepartment falls directly under the CEO and does not belong to a specific business unit [16].
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4.2 Reason for this project and current decision-making processes
As mentioned earlier in the introduction, ProRail would like to have better insight and understanding in theirdecision-making processes and their outcomes. To answer this question properly, it is important to knowwhat the reason for this project was, who exactly asked the question within ProRail and how decision-makingprocesses are currently being handled at ProRail.
4.2.1 Reason for this project
In the past, large, infrastructural decisions in the rail sector were made by people with knowledge of manydifferent facets that are of importance by such decisions. Nowadays, large, infrastructural decisions, andthe process to make such decisions has become much more complex. Due to the complexity of the systemand the splitting of ProRail and NS and departments, knowledge has spread and there is no one who canoversee the entire system with all its implications. The number of requirements have increased for the railsystem and safety has become increasingly important. The rail system has also become more ICT driven,and as a result it has become less tangible. In addition, the money for such large infrastructural projectsruns out, so there is less budget space. Another major issue is the availability of physical space to buildnew infrastructure etc., i.e., the boundaries of the systems are being reached, while at the same time thenumber of passengers increases. The result is that decision-makers have to make decisions in uncertaintyabout different infrastructural options in a project. They have to make decisions about these projects, butfeel that they do not have enough knowledge, information and consensus to select a certain option/alternative.
In the past, this problem did become clear at ProRail during the Vechtbrug project. Decision-makers didnot know if they had to choose a fly-over, a bridge or another solution, especially given the differences incosts. In order to find a solution for this project, they made use of simulations and visualisations [17]. Theserious gaming and simulations were received very positive for everyone in this project.
The positive results in the case of the Vechtbrug ensured that serious gaming, simulators and simulationswere used more often in complex decision projects [17]. With again, mainly positive reactions, the RailwayLab was established at ProRail. This facilitates the use of serious gaming, simulators and simulations duringdecision-making processes. However, there are still several underdeveloped areas by the use of gaming duringthese processes. That is, for example, data and knowledge management and the question of how you processthe data from all those simulations into a decision.
Despite the use of gaming and simulations, there is a need for more validation during the process. To whichextend can the certainty to make a good decision be improved? This question came from the directors of thedepartments of Transport and timetable and Traffic Control. The director of the departments of Transportand timetable is formally the client of this question. That is also the department to whom I will give myadvice about my internship project.
4.2.2 Current decision-making processes
Within ProRail there are several types of decisions and decision-making processes. This may, among others,include decisions relating to the strategy of the company, decisions regarding policy or decisions on infras-tructural projects. Because the demand for this internship project comes from the V&D department, welook at the decision-making processes that they have to deal with as a department. This then concernsdecisions regarding large infrastructural processes.
Infrastructural projects are carried out by the Projects department, in combination with other departments,and follow the structure of the het Kernproces (Core Process). This describes the different phases that adecision-making within the Projects department must go through. In figure 4.2.1 you can see the schematicrepresentation of het Kernproces with all its phases.
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Figure 4.2.1: Schematic representation of het Kernproces of ProRail [16]
How the process is carried out is described in the investment regulations (in Dutch: Investeringsregelement ofProRail. The investment regulations of ProRail is the entire process and procedures concerning investments.It describes what needs to be done and who should take which decisions and approve the decision before afinal decision can be made in the decision-making process [16].
However, this investment regulation does not say how you know/how to check that the decision you want totake is also the right one or how to tackle the process with all its complexity in the best way (apart from thefixed steps). There is no policy for that at ProRail. The actions and actions of people in a process are nowoften determined by experience or intuition. For example, in the case study that we are looking at in thisinternship project, there was no manual or advice to know whether they came to the right decision in theright way. There are mainly guidelines for the technical aspects of the process, but the actor and contextperspective on the process is underexposed. Thereby, at ProRail, the existing policy is that complex decision-making processes, in particular the large projects, are analysed after the process is finished by ProRail itselfor by external organisations. They mainly take into account the technical aspects of the process. Theyhardly take other variables into account like the different roles of the actors or their relations.
4.2.3 Actors involved
There are several stakeholders within ProRail that (can) benefit from a better understanding decision-makingprocesses . The demand from ProRail comes from the V&D department. Because the organisation is quitecolonised, it does not immediately mean that the answers that V&D will receive from its question, that theseinsights also automatically end up in other departments within ProRail. The decision-making projects thatV&D is taking part in, often involve several other departments as well. For these departments, too, it canbenefit from gaining more validation/understanding in the decision-making processes.
4.3 Implementation
To be able to give a solid advice to ProRail about this internship project, it is needed to know how theinsights from the mathematical analysis can be implemented in the company.
First, you have to bear in mind that this internship project is not about the core business of the company.It is ultimately about improving decision-making processes at ProRail, something that is separate from thebusiness that ProRail is involved in. For the core businesses (namely the maintenance and construction ofrail infrastructure) at ProRail, there are rules, guidelines, step-by-step plans how to implement and executethings. For non-core related business, however, there is not (or limited). This is because process improve-ment must be applied very ad hoc, very pragmatically.
The formalisation and analysis from this internship project will be descriptive of nature. Because of this,the results of this internship project cannot be implemented immediately. However, the obtained insights
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will be transferred to V&D, with the aim to suggest points for improvement and development, such that inthe future, the insights of this internship project can be made prescriptive. Meaning, so that the insightsfor example can be used as a tool for the decision-makers during a decision-making process. If this is thecase, then there are still some steps that have to be followed before such a tool can actually be used as atool within ProRail. Below is given an overview of how this would work globally.
In this internship project we now look at a simple model, which will be validated on three cases only (seesection 1.5). Before the insights from the mathematical analysis can be translated into a tool at all, moreresearch must first be done into my model. First, the model should be improved by, for example, incor-porating new theories. If the model is then good enough to reasonably describe reality, the model mustbe validated on many more cases than the three from this internship project. For this validation we firstlook at decision-making processes from cases that have already took place. To show that the mathematicalanalysis works for the cases and hence that is something that you really should try to implement in real lifeand show that it has added value. This validation is also important, because in practice it is more difficultto demonstrate the usefulness. You know that there may be errors in the process, but you can (almost)never substantiate that you prevented them by using your instrument. If after the validations are good andsufficient insights for all the decision-making processes emerge, this model can be described as a tool that canbe used by people during a decision-making process. This tool must then be tested to see whether people canwork with it and whether people experience this as added value. Should the results be that it works and thatpeople see the added value of it, then a start can be made to see whether the tool can be implemented or not.
As said before, the question for more validation in, and understanding of, decision-making processes comesfrom the V&D department, in particular from the the director of V&D. He is also the one that decides if atool for decision-making processes will be used in his department as an extra option/extra help in decision-making. Before he will decide whether or not the mathematical analysis will be implemented. Several stepsneed to be taken as described before. This internship project is a first step of this implementation process.
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Chapter 5
Method case analysis
Before we did the mathematical analysis, we needed to know the case and the complexity of the case. Toanalyse the complexity of the case, we made a case description. How this was done exactly is described inthe sections below.
5.1 Case description
In the case description, we wanted a factual situation sketch of the case. Since we (the three interns) wantedto compare the different cases, we had be able to compare our case descriptions. In order to compare ourcase descriptions, the descriptions had to be set up in the same way. Therefore we used the same templatefor the case description.
The case template was realised in collaboration with Hans de Bruijn. He is a professor of Public Adminis-tration/Organisation and Management at Delft University. In a joint session, talking about our case studies,we made a draft for the template. First part of the case description is describing the complexity of the case.What does the case involve and why can it be considered complex? The second part of the case descriptionis about the process. How did the decision-making go? The input for the case description was different formsof information sources. Part of the information was conducted through the interviews. Other input for thecase description came from documentation sources. This included: reports, formal correspondence, mediamessages and other documentation. The case descriptions for the different case studies used the same typesof documentation as much as possible. This in order to make the best possible comparable case description.The case description for the case study of this internship project can be found in chapter 6. The templatefor the case description can be found in appendix A.
5.2 Interviews
For both the analysis and the case description we used information gathered from interviews as input. It isimportant to collect all the relevant and needed information from the respondents. A well set-up interviewprotocol is therefore important. The interview protocol was jointly set up by us three. In various sessions,questions were formulated to gather information about the decision-making process. In addition to thesequestions, there were also questions in the protocol that relate to the different internship projects of ours.After all questions had been formulated and reformulated, the less important questions were deleted. Thiswas to ensure that conducting an interview does not last longer than one hour. This time limit was drawnup to ask not too much time of the respondents. Before the first interviews were conducted, the interviewprotocol was tested first. The person the protocol was tested on was not connected to one of the case stud-ies. When testing the protocol, we checked whether all questions were clear to the respondent and whethereverything was understood. On the basis of the feedback received, the last minor adjustments were made.
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The interview protocol with the appendix for the respondents can be found in appendix B.
For the case study of this internship project twelve people were interviewed. These were of the followingorganisations or departments within ProRail:
• ProRail
– Asset Management (AM)
– Transport and timetable (in Dutch: Vervoer en Dienstrgeling (V&D))
– Projecten
• NS Reizigers
• Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (I&W in the rest of the report)
• Municipality of Nijmegen
• Province of Gelderland
A list with persons that were interviewed for this project can be found in appendix C.
When all the interviews had been conducted, all obtained information had to be processed. This will be donein a systematic way. After the interviews had been completed they were be transcribed. These transcribedinterviews then were coded. By means of this coding we can then systematically retrieve all the correctinformation from the interviews. All interviews were transcribed and coded by the person that conductedthe interviews. To ensure that we could compare the case descriptions on content in the same way, we allused the same coding scheme. The coding schemes and a list with all the abbreviations of the codes can befound in appendix D. Since the interviews were held in Dutch, the coding scheme is also in Dutch.
An important issue that arises when conducting interviews is how confidentiality is handled. Sensitiveinformation may be obtained during the interviews. Therefore, it is important that this is handled properlyand that this is also clearly communicated to the respondents. The recordings of the interviews were removedafter these interviews had been transcribed. The transcribed interviews will be completely anonymous. Theinformation obtained from the interviews was used in such a way that it can not be traced back to a specificperson. When conducting the interviews this was also communicated to the respondents.
5.3 Data analysis
To be able to do the mathematical analysis, the variables for the analysis had to be collected. Partly this wasdone by the interviews. The other variables were collected by an online questionnaire. The questionnairewas sent to all the respondents a few weeks after the interviews were held. The same questionnaire wassent to all the respondents, also to the respondents from the other two students. In the questionnaire, therespondents were asked about their opinion on the most important issues in the process where decisions hadto be taken. These issues were adjusted per case. The most important issues were drawn up on the basis ofthe information that emerged in the interviews. Afterwards, these issues were also verified with the contactpersons from ProRail, all of whom we had received for our case.
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Chapter 6
Case description
This chapter will give the case description of the case of rebuilding station Nijmegen. This will be done bythe method described in section 5.1.
6.1 Complexity
This section will give an overview of the complexity of the case. Changes that take place during the processare described in the next section.
6.1.1 Motivation
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (in short I&W) has initiated the program PHS (Pro-gramma Hoogfrequent Spoor). This program has been created to prepare rail transport for the expectedgrowth in passengers on the Dutch tracks by increasing the number of trains per hour. The ultimate goal isto start running the high frequency timetable between 2020-2028 [18, 19].
Station Nijmegen is part of the so-called SUN-corridor, the corridor between Schiphol – Utrecht – Nijmegen.The goal of PHS on this corridor is to have a high frequency timetable that consist of:
• 6 intercity trains in a 10-minute service per hour
• One ICE (international train to Germany) per hour
• 4 to 6 sprinter trains per hour
The freight trains, that will run through station Nijmegen, are not included yet into the timetable, but theyneed to be taken into account as well. The expected number of freight trains will be less than 7 per day andthey will be processed manually in the timetable. At the moment this high frequency timetable, as describedabove, is not feasible at Nijmegen. Therefore, changes to the station and to the railway yard must be madeto create a robust design of the PHS timetable possible in a couple of years. Changes to the infrastructureat station Nijmegen have to be made before the PHS timetable can be implemented. This means, amongothers, that an extra platform has to be build and an extra switch needs to be installed [20].
Except that station Nijmegen has to execute the high frequency timetable in the coming years, Nijmegenshould also be able to process the expected growth in passengers by 2030. The prognosis for this passengergrowth is described in the Prognose LTSA 2030GE SOVH [21]. Here, they predicted the section load forthe SUN-corridor on a representative piece of trajectory. In 2011 this was 51.000 passengers on an averageworking day. In 2020 this will be between the 49.000 and 59.000 passengers, and in 2030 this will be betweenthe 50.000 and 65.000 passengers. Therefore, to handle the expected increase in passengers, the transfer
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capacity must be increased at Nijmegen station [20].
Due to the expected increase of passengers the coming years, part of the high frequency timetable is thatlonger passenger trains will run using this timetable. This, in combination with the extra trains and elec-trification of the Maaslijn (ready in 2020), asks for more holding capacity to store trains close to stationNijmegen.
6.1.2 System characteristics
Current situation
At the moment Nijmegen station consists of 1 main entrance, two platforms, two holding yards (GE (Goed-eren Emplacement) and REP (Reizigers Emlacement - also called the ‘Spoorkuil’). Since 2017 the highfrequency timetable is already running between Nijmegen and Arnhem, and NS is planning to run the highfrequency timetable between Utrecht and Arnhem from 2021-2022 [20].
Determining the scope of the project PHS Nijmegen
For this project the assignment from the ministry was: ensure that PHS can be run at Nijmegen. Followingthis assignment, it was necessary to determine the scope of the project before starting to work on a solution.What is all that is needed in Nijmegen to realise PHS?
At the beginning of the project it is determined that changes had to be made at Nijmegen station:
• An additional platform is necessary
• The station must be adapted to the expected growth of passengers (think of widening stairs, platformsmust be extended etc)
• A switch must be replaced (because now the intercity trains can only arrive at platform 3 and not atplatform 1)
• More holding yard (place to set up the trains) must be created
Because a new platform is necessary, the tunnel under the tracks must also be extended to the new platform.The station hall with station square and electrification of the Maaslijn are not included in the scope, despitethe fact that the station hall is something that a few parties would like to see addressed [20].
Design conflicts
After the scope was determined, solutions had to be devised to ensure that running the high frequencytimetable is possible in Nijmegen. With the formulation of designs and solutions for the PHS problem thereare several design conflicts in this project. This was partly due to the fact that Nijmegen is on a slope,creating a spatial limitation.
First, extra holding yard space has to be created, but the question is on which holding yard should that bedone? There is only limited space on the holding yards. The REP can not be extended, because it is veryclose to a residential area. The GE is closer to the station, which is an advantage, but on the REP is a trainwash installation and workshop. Because there is limited space on the holding yards, the amount of storagecapacity is at the expense of functionality in the holding yard. For example, there is no room for a trainwash installation.
Second, the question is also how the new platform will be located: symmetrically with the other two plat-forms (then there is no possibility of being able to go directly from rail 6 to the REP), or asymmetric withthe other platforms, then you can immediately get off track 6 to the REP (see figures 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). The
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downside of installing the platform asymmetrically is that there will be a longer walking distance with theother platforms, as a result of which the connection and transfer time with the Maaslijn will be at stake.
Third, the new platform will be build on the west side of platform 3-4, and thus becomes an island platform.For PHS only one platform is needed, but since it is already an island platform, it is possible to make twoplatforms at the same time. However, this requires extra money, but the difference in costs was quite small.
Last, there has been looked at speed increase to 80 km/h of arrival and departure speed at Nijmegen station.That is currently 40 km/h. Ideally everything will be 80 km/h, but there is also a price tag attached toit. To run the high frequency timetable in Nijmegen, it is only necessary to speed up the north side of thestation.
Alternatives
The study for the project PHS Nijmegen started with the preparation of 20 solutions concepts, to be ableto run the high frequency timetable in Nijmegen, called alternatives. These alternatives were funnelled inJune 2015 to 2 alternatives (named 10’ and 11’). Alternative 10’ is with a direct connection from track 6to the REP and a new platform symmetric with the existing platforms (see figure 6.1.1) and alternative11’ is without a direct connection from track 6 to the REP and a new platform that is asymmetric withthe existing platforms (see figure 6.1.2). These two alternatives have been studied in more detail on theirfeasibility and costs.
Figure 6.1.1: Alternative 10’ (with direct connection track 6 direction REP) [20]
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Figure 6.1.2: Alternative 11’ (without direct connection track 6 direction REP)[20]
6.1.3 Actors
Several actors are involved in the process. Each of these actors has a specific role in the process. Each actorhas his own interests, strategies and dependencies. Below, an overview is given per actor about their role,interests, general strategies and dependencies the actor has applied in the process. Behaviour of actors thatchange during the process are described in process section.
ProRail
ProRail is the manager of the railway infrastructure and stations. Thereby, ProRail is responsible for theentire railway network in the Netherlands: installation, maintenance, management and safety.Role ProRail: project managerInterest ProRail: achieving a consensus between all parties and preparing the system for PHS.Strategy: collaborativeActors are dependent on ProRail for rail expertise and for project management. Actors are also dependenton ProRail for the land they have and which is necessary for the project.
Within ProRail, several internal actors, i.e. departments, can be distinguished, which are presented below.Despite the fact that there were several actors within ProRail, they ensured that they acted as one actor inthe steering committee.
Vervoer en Dienstregeling (V&D)
Department within ProRail, with the important subsection: Transport Analysis and Capacity Development(VACO). This department does all the calculations to see what is needed and what is possible to be able torun PHS in Nijmegen.Role ProRail V&D: internal clientInterest ProRail V&D: create more capacity on the tracksStrategy: collaborativeDepartments were dependent on V&D for capacity analyses and the timetable models. All departmentsdepended on their specific knowledge.
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Asset management (AM)
Department within ProRail, deals with the construction and maintenance of the rail infrastructure.Role ProRail AM: stakeholder (a stakeholder has no real, big influence, can not decide directly, but is in-volved with the project. This holds for all the stakeholders).Interest ProRail AM: safety and more efficient maintenanceStrategy: collaborativeDepartments are dependent on AM for the requirements that are imposed on the infrastructure. All depart-ments were dependent on their specific knowledge.
Projects
Department within ProRail, realises innovations to rail and stations.Role ProRail Projects: process leaderInterest ProRail Projects: no unambiguous interest depends on who you speak to in the project group,perhaps advising the steering group as well as possibleStrategy: collaborative. The project group also exerted pressure on all parties, in a positive sense, to finisheverything on timeAll departments were dependent on their specific knowledge.
Verkeersleiding (VL)
Department within ProRail ensures that the timetable is executed as well as possible.Role ProRail VL: stakeholderInterest ProRail VL: flexibility, for control possibilities for trainsStrategy: collaborativeAll departments were dependent on their specific knowledge.
NS
NS is one of the two operators at Nijmegen station. NS consists of two parts: NS Reizigers and NS Stations.Because these parts functioned separately in the process, they were regarded as two separate actors.
NS Reizigers
Unit within NS, is about transporting the passengers and everything that comes with it.Role NS Reizigers: StakeholderInterest NS Reizigers: satisfied passengers and more capacity. Nijmegen is one of the more important PHSprojects for NSStrategy: collaborativeActors are depend on NS Reizigers for rail expertise.
NS Stations
Unit within NS, deals with all real estate of NS and its layout.Role NS Stations: stakeholderInterest NS Stations: satisfied passengers and more capacity.Strategy: collaborativeActors are dependent on NS Stations for rail expertise. Parties are dependent on NS Stations for the landthey have and which is necessary for the project.
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Ministry of I&W
The ministry responsible for the infrastructure in the Netherlands, and therefore responsible for the railway.Role I&W: client, competent authority, initiator and financierInterest I&W: to keep the costs low and make the system ready for PHSStrategy: collaborativeActors are dependent on the ministry for the assignment and the budget
Municipality of Nijmegen
Role Nijmegen: stakeholderInterest Nijmegen: a beautiful and functional station and keeping the city accessible.Strategy: collaborativeActors depend on Nijmegen for (environmental) permits and money for the tunnel. Parties are dependenton the municipality for changing the zoning plan. Parties are also dependent on the municipality that thereis support for the project among the residents of Nijmegen. Parties are also dependent on the municipalityfor the land they have and which is necessary for the project.
Province of Gelderland
Role Gelderland: stakeholderInterest Gelderland: satisfied passengers. The province also thinks it is important that public transport isincluded in total, so the province, for example, looked at the transfer with Arriva.Strategy: collaborativeNijmegen is dependent on the province for subsidy, NS is dependent on the province for budget to be ableto install the switch connection earlier.
Arriva (formerly Veolia till end 2016)
Arriva is the second operator at station Nijmegen, and is only at the station with the Maaslijn.Role Arriva: stakeholderInterest Arriva: a good connection with the NS trainsStrategy: collaborativeBecause the Maaslijn is not in the scope of the PHS project, nobody really depends on Arriva. They dohave rail expertise.
KNV
KNV is the trade association for freight operators.Role KNV: stakeholderInterest KNV: That there is enough space with PHS for freight transport at Nijmegen station.Strategy: collaborativeActors are dependent on KNV because they do have rail expertise
Arriva, Veolia and KNV were in the steering committee (see section 6.1.4), but did not play a large part inthe process.
There is a difference in the importance of the project for actors. Nijmegen thinks it’s a very importantproject, and the province too. For ProRail and NS it is only one of the many projects that they are involvedin.
All actors have put pressure on each other to get things done on time. All actors also indicate that duringthe process the complexity of the project has increased, but not intentionally to make a decision impossible,
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but just to connect things together and make the decision easier.
All actors believed it was a nice, pleasant and transparent process with good, constructive cooperation.Everyone wanted to do their best for other actors. Each actor remained committed to the end. The interestsof all actors were also not very far apart. The actors also felt that they were being listened to adequately.The non-rail actors were well helped in broadening their rail expertise. In general, they informed each otherwell. Almost everyone thought it was a fast process, only NS did not experience it that way. NS thoughtit took a long time. Nijmegen sometimes also thought that the process took a long time, but that was allthe formal steps in general that took a long time. It was not specific to this process. Actors also did notmiss any information during the process. ProRail and NS Reizigers have had a lot of discussion about thefunctionality of the station. There have been some moments in the process that the detailed details of the 10’and 11’ were not completely known at NS. That sometimes there have been times in the detailed elaborationthat they were surprised by what was there. This was immediately resolved by seeking contact with ProRailfor further explanation.
People have found it difficult that there have been many changes within the process of individuals. Thatfunctions are fulfilled by several people in the process. Collaboration also depends on trust, and that is alsoon a personal level. That is more difficult when a lot of people change. This also means that things have tobe picked up or discussed again, which in turn requires extra time or people missed information.
There was also good cooperation within ProRail. All departments mainly had to deal with projects depart-ment, or saw each other at the large internal consultation (in Dutch: groot intern projectteam overleg oflarge IPT, see next section). There was little contact between the departments other than projects. In theinternal decision for the preferred alternative, VL had a different opinion than the other departments. Theyactually wanted 10’ (because then they have more adjustment options).
During the project, the project team has followed the official steps for such a process fairly tightly. Thesteps of such an infrastructure project are laid down in the investment regulations of ProRail. This projectteam prepared all the formal steps very clearly and communicated to all actors. Everyone liked that verywell, there was a lot of clarity. Everyone knew what was needed at what time and who was responsible forit. NS thought it worked fine, but thinks that all those process steps also took some extra time. All otheractors thought the process was going very quickly (and complimented each other about it).
6.1.4 Formal decision-making structure
The project is in an alternative study phase. In this phase, it is roughly decided which changes they willmake. That is part of the core process within ProRail (see figure 6.1.3). The decision about the preferredalternative has been taken by the DO PHS.
Figure 6.1.3: Schematic representation of het Kernproces of ProRail [16]
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There is also a Directors’ Meeting PHS (in Dutch: Directeuren Overleg PHS, in short DO PHS ). The boardsof NS, ProRail, and I&W are in the DO. And there used to be KNV, but they have retired at the end of2017. The actors also depend on the DO for support.
There is a steering committee for this project, which prepares the decisions (that need to be taken in thisproject) for the DO. This steering committee was created by the DO and includes representatives from: Pro-Rail, NS Reizigers, NS stations, Arriva, I&W, the municipality of Nijmegen and the Province of Gelderland.The representatives of the actors in the steering committee are people on an strategic level. The steeringcommittee meets once every six weeks. The steering committee is not there for the formal decision-making,but for steering the process. The steering committee manages the integrality of the track portion versus therest of the environment. The preparation for the final decision from the steering committee is written downin the memorandum preferred alternative (in Dutch: Nota Voorkeursalternatief ) [20].
There is an internal project team within ProRail that includes the project manager, project coordinator,controller and plan developer. They work out all the plans of the steering group. In addition, a large in-ternal project team consultation (in Dutch: groot intern projectteam overleg of large IPT ) has also been setup, where ProRail has various representatives from departments or business units. This was to coordinateeverything internally between all departments before there was a steering committee meeting.
The decision on the preference of ProRail for the alternatives must also be approved internally within Pro-Rail by the ExCo (executive committee). The ExCo is responsible for the organisation and performance ofthe daily operation. ProRail may only publish its preference officially if this has happened. A business caseis made for this, and this must ultimately be approved by the Commissioners Council [16].
In figure 6.1.4, the formal decision-making structure is made visible. This shows which consultations areall participating in the Nijmegen project. In doing so, it shows which consultations work together, areinterdependent and what is exchanged between the various consultations.
Figure 6.1.4: Structure formal decision-making
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6.1.5 Funding
The total budget for PHS for the entire country is 2,8 billion. This amount is made available to the programby the Ministry. The program then divides it over the different projects. In 2014 a very rough estimate wasmade for the project Nijmegen, which amounted to 86 million. On these calculations, the budget for theproject was set at 86 million [20].
6.1.6 Context
Media attention
There has been limited media attention the project Nijmegen. Media that reported about station Nijmegenwas only local media. The steering committee also made sure when something was published about theproject, that they did that together, so conveyed they the same message [22, 23].
Political attention
There was great political involvement from local politics. Nijmegen wants to remain an accessible city andtherefore the municipality and province of Gelderland were very involved in the project. The project is nowalso part of the coalition negotiations in the municipality.
There is also local (residents and local politics) dissatisfaction about the current layout station of Nijmegenstation. Especially about the station hall and station square. This led, for example, to council questions, oractions of political groups. There is also a bit of jealousy involved in this project. There has always beena bit of rivalry between Arnhem and Nijmegen. Arnhem now has one of the most beautiful stations in theNetherlands, while that is a smaller city and transports fewer passengers than Nijmegen. Nijmegen believesthat it is now their turn for a new station.
Remaining
An external aspect that played a role in this project is the fact that the high frequency timetable is alreadyrunning on the A2 corridor, between Amsterdam and Eindhoven, and that this is a success. As a result, thehigh frequency timetable is now also (quickly) desired on the SUN corridor.
Nijmegen is the last project at the SUN-corridor. This means that there is time pressure in the process.Soon all other stations in the corridor will be ready for PHS, except for Nijmegen. That is why, in the nextphase of the project, they will be looking at where the process can be accelerated.
In summer 2017, a form-free environmental impact report (in Dutch: Milieu effect rapportage) assessment wascarried out. There are still some risks and issues in the next phase of the project. Especially environmentalrequirements (noise/noise barriers) are going to be an obstacle. By running more trains and shunting moretrains, more noise is produced, which probably will exceed the noise standards. Therefore, expected is that5 meters high noise barriers will probably have to be installed. In the next phase of the project, this needsto be further researched.
6.1.7 Recap
In this section we looked at the complexity of the decision-making process during the rebuilding of Nijmegenstation. The case is complex because there are many different (internal) actors and their interests are notall the same. In addition, there are several limitations with this project. There is also a spatial limitation.Station Nijmegen is located on a slope in the middle of the city. That is why it is not possible to buildextra holding site, for example. It must therefore fit within the space that is available. This ensures thatthere is not a lot of space to build all new tracks and a new platform. This had to be taken into account
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when drafting the alternatives. In addition, some design options may not be possible together, partly due tothis space constraint, but a choice must be made between the one option or the other. The difficult choicebetween multiple options in this project is that not every actor has the same priorities, so other preferenceshave which option is preferred. Because these aspects already play a role from the beginning of the process,it is interesting to see what impact this has on the process and how the process develops.
6.2 Process
This section will give a description of the process of project PHS Nijmegen, from the beginning of thealternative study phase. In this section the information is used as given in the previous section.
6.2.1 Short overview of the process
In June 2014, ProRail has been commissioned by DO PHS to prepare Nijmegen for running PHS on theSUN-corridor. In addition, the DO PHS has set up a steering committee. Subsequently, the steering com-mittee, together with the ProRail project team, determined the scope for the PHS project in Nijmegen. Thiswas established in December 2014. With this scope all alternatives have been generated. When generatingthe alternatives, the budget had to be taken into account. The alternatives were then funnelled to thealternatives 10 ’and 11’ in July 2015.
Because the two alternatives 10’ and 11’ were exceeding the budget, in December 2015 the project was puton hold by the DO and a budget variant had to be worked out. That was not possible without sacrificingon functionality. Then in September 2016, the DO granted permission to continue with the project with anunchanged scope.
It was decided to build a new island platform and therefore the tunnel under the platforms must be extendedto the new platform. As a result, there is the opportunity to continue the tunnel a little further and createa western entrance. The municipality has already expressed this wish from the beginning of the project.Because Nijmegen, together with the province, could and wanted to finance this tunnel themselves, all partiesthought this was a great plan. In April 2015, the study started on the possibilities for the tunnel.
When the choice between 10’ and 11’ had to be made in the end of 2017, it seemed that all parties would gofor 11’. Only at the last moment NS indicated that they wanted 10’. This was better for stabling up andshunting the trains, and ultimately cost them less.
In the meantime, it had also become apparent that both options were not very good for transfer, and thatthere is probably a possibility of optimising 11’, called 11”. NS considers 11” also as a good alternative.11” more will be worked out in the next phase of the project, whether this is indeed a concrete option.With this optimization in mind everyone has agreed to 11’ and the DO has opted for 11’. The ministry haspromised that there will probably be sufficient budget for the project. If it turns out that 11” is not feasible,NS has stipulated that it will not be automatically 11’, but that it will go back to the table and that newnegotiations will take place.
A schematic overview of the process can be seen in figure 6.2.1. In the next section, the process is given inmore detail.
6.2.2 Timeline and rounds
The process can be divided into rounds, based on the rounds model (see D.2). The rounds model, and howthe rounds are identified, is explained in D.2. Below, we will go a little deeper into how the process went,per round. The rounds are indicated on the timeline (see figure 6.2.1).
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Figure 6.2.1: Timeline process Nijmegen
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Rounds in the process:
Round 1: June 2014 - December 2015
• Starts with the beginning of the project and ends because the project is put on hold
• The main issue of this round is determining the scope of the project
• All actors, as presented in 6.1.3, are involved
• In this round, actors were dependent on ProRail and NS for their rail expertise
Round 2: December 2015 - September 2016
• Starts with putting the project on hold and ends because the project is restarted
• The main issue of this round is the on hold situation
• All actors are involved
• In this round, actors were dependent on the DO for the budget of the project
Round 3: September 2016 - end 2017
• Starts with the restart of the project and ends because NS says they want 10’
• The main issue of this round is the further elaboration of the alternatives 10’ and 11’
• All actors are involved
• In this round, actors were dependent on ProRail and NS for their rail expertise
Round 3a: end 2016 - June 2017
• Starts with the idea of Nijmegen from the tunnel through and ends because there was assuranceon the budget for the tunnel
• The main issue of this round is the scope extension with the extension of the tunnel to an extraentrance for the station
• The actors involved were Nijmegen, Gelderland, ProRail and I&W
• In this round, Nijmegen was dependent on the DO for approval of scope extension, on the provincefor subsidy and on I&W for the management agreement
Round 4: end 2016 - January 2018
• In this round the main issue was choosing an alternative.
• The main issue of this round is determining the scope of the project.
• All actors are involved.
• In this round, actors were dependent on ProRail and NS for their rail expertise and were dependenton each other to reach consensus on the decision for the alternative
Round 5: January 2018 - Now
• Starts with the decision preference alternative (January 2018) to now
• The main issue can not yet be designated
• All actors are (so far) involved
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6.2.3 Round 1: determining the scope
On the basis of the determined scope (given in 6.1.2), 20 alternatives were drawn up as a solution to theassignment to run the high frequency timetable at Nijmegen station. Subsequently, in this round, thealternatives were funnelled to 2 alternatives. The ministry provided the budget for the project from the PHSprogram. The first estimate for the costs of the project was 110 million. This was higher than the budgetof 86 million that was available. Nijmegen was already the 3rd project within PHS that went over theirbudget. This did cause a dilemma for the DO PHS, because there is no more budget for the total PHS. ForNS, PHS Nijmegen does have more priority than other PHS projects. Because the costs would go too muchover the budget, a quick scan was done into a budget alternative. After the quick scan, the round ends withthat the project was put on hold by the DO.
6.2.4 Round 2: the on hold situation
During this on-hold phase, the budget alternative had to be worked out. During this phase there waspressure from the ministry to make a alternative that would fit within the budget, because the ministry’sinterest was to keep costs low. The results from the budget alternative showed that the project could notbe cheaper, without really compromising on functionality. The worst case scenario, which was mentionedby almost all actors, was that the project would not go ahead because it would be too expensive and thatas a result the entire SUN-corridor was not able to run the high frequency timetable. In this round therehas been acted to prevent this, the steering group lobbied and put pressure on the ministry to get moremoney. The actors have done this by talking to the ministry a lot to convince them of the usefulness ofNijmegen. In the end, the DO said that the project could continue with an unchanged scope. This becausean alteration of the scope results in new risks and extra engineering costs. In addition, no concessions couldbe made on functionality. As a result, I&W had to make concessions on their interest, because the budgetfor PHS Nijmegen has increased. For PHS it is only necessary to increase the speed to 80 km/h of arrivaland departure speed at the north side of the station, so the DO decided to do just that, and leave the southside as it is. The round ends with the restart of the alternatives study. The on hold situation has given theNijmegen project a year delay.
6.2.5 Round 3: elaboration of the alternatives
The scope of the project has been slightly modified in this round by changing the planning; in 2023 therewould be a new track connection from Den Bosch to platform 2. Platform 1 will be used again, now beforearrival from Den Bosch. This track connection is now being brought forward and will already be realisedin 2019. This was mainly a wish of NS. To bring the track connection forward does result in extra costs.ProRail and the ministry can not provide budget for this. The province has been found willing to pay theso-called non-efficient costs. The remaining costs are for the I&W. In this round, the role and responsibilityof the province changed to financier.
In this round the discussion also took place about the station hall in Nijmegen. Nijmegen has an old station,which does not function perfectly, but well enough, and Nijmegen wants an improved station and stationsquare. There is a work group for the station environment, including ProRail, NS Stations, municipality andprovince. There is only no budget for a renovation of the station, so therefore it is not in the scope of thePHS project Nijmegen. Nobody wants to pay these extra costs because the station is still functioning wellenough. In May 2016 and in July 2017 there were two administrative consultations on this. NS wants tochange the station, but according to their wishes and they do not want to pay for it. During the discussionabout the station hall, NS Stations did behave in a wait-and-see manner, in anticipation of the fact that otherparties did not come with money/responsibility. Nothing has come from these administrative consultationsyet.
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At the beginning of the generating of the alternatives (and thus during the funnelling), it was not very welllooked at whether the alternatives were feasible. Certain aspects were (too) little included in the designs.For example, timetables and transfer. The focus was on the design from the track layout. Extra knowledgewas needed and it had to be examined whether everything was feasible, in order to make a good decision.As a result, it only became clear in this round that the different alternatives 10’ and 11’ were not that goodfor transfer. When the project team looked at it once again, it turned out that one of the variants (11’) islikely to be developed into a much better variant (especially for transfer), called 11”. However, this needs tobe further researched and so no decision could be made about it. That is why the steering group still had tochoose between 10’ and 11’. Almost all actors preferred 11’ and thought that all other actors had the samepreference. Until just before the alternative choice it turned out that NS wanted 10’, which ends the round.
6.2.6 Round 3a: scope extension with the tunnel
For the project, the tunnel is being extended to the new third platform. Here the municipality saw a chancefor a western entrance to the station, by pulling the tunnel a bit further. This is a big wish of the municipalityand province, something that they have wanted for some time. After making this idea known to the steeringcommittee, all parties agreed with this plan. For NS, they showed some avoidance or wait-and-see behaviourin the discussion of the Western entrance. They did not immediately see a great importance for themselves.The DO then approved this scope change. A management agreement was signed between Nijmegen andthe Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment for the extension of the tunnel (June 2018). Here theadministrative link is made between the extension of the tunnel and PHS Nijmegen. With that, the role ofthe municipality of Nijmegen has changed. Now they also become the principal and financier of a part ofthe project. The PHS project has always had priority, that should not be delayed by the scope broadening.In combination with the scope change of the tunnel, the alternatives 10 ’and 11’ could be combined (withor without tunnel), resulting in 4 alternatives that were further elaborated and where ultimately to be chosen.
By changing the scope of the project with the new entrance, the project became more expensive. ProRailand I&W liked and agreed on the scope extension, but were not willing to pay the additional costs. Sinceit was a great wish of the municipality of Nijmegen to extent the scope with the new entrance, they werewilling to pay for the extra costs. Because it involves a large amount of additional costs, Nijmegen hasfound the province of Gelderland willing to co-finance the Western entrance through a subsidy. Both havemade 6 million available for the project. For the municipality of Nijmegen this is officially recorded in theZomernota of 2017. For the province of Gelderland this is officially recorded in the Mid Term Review of2017. By securing the budget, this round is ended.
6.2.7 Round 4: choosing an alternative
The estimate for the costs of the project is now 130 million for PHS Nijmegen. Both options (10’ and 11’)are almost equally expensive. The difference in costs with the previous estimate of costs is partly in pricelevel correction, partly in the passage of the tunnel. Passing the tunnel costs 3.8 million. That is then purelythe tunnel what ProRail builds. Costs for a staircase, elevator, square and bicycle parking are paid by themunicipality (and thus also the province). PHS Nijmegen had at the end of 2017 the promise of the ministrythat there will be sufficient budget. However, there is still no total security from I&W for the budget. Theofficial commitment to the budget will only take place in the next phase of the project, upon realisation.The only money that has now been promised is 4 million for the study. There is always a very small chancethat there will not be enough budget and the whole project will not take place. Thereby, almost all actorsthink it is peculiar, that at first there was not enough money and was discussion about every million, whileat the end the costs had risen again and it was not really an issue anymore.
As mentioned before, almost all actors preferred 11’ and in addition thought that all other actors had thesame preference. Until just before the alternative choice it turned out that NS wanted 10’. 11’ is better forpassengers (better transfer options), but NS wants 10’, because it is better for them to set up and shunt
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trains. That is a bit peculiar, because the slogan of NS is: The passengers on 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, ProRailhas put pressure on NS to get them with 11’, but without result. NS clearly had its own interest in this roundand they have also emphatically pursued this. That’s why they showed go-alone behaviour. As a result ofthis go-alone behaviour of NS, ProRail has had to make some concessions in their interest, since achievingconsensus between all parties was therefore not possible. As mentioned there is a possibility to develop 11’to 11”. Everyone, including NS, agrees with 11”, which is now going to be investigated further. Thereforeeveryone has now unanimously opted for 11”, provided that this can be developed further. If that is not thecase, if 11” turns out to be not feasible, NS stipulated in the DO that they would do not automatically fallback on 11’, but go back to the drawing board. With this, in January 2018 the round ends with the DOtaken the decision for 11’.
6.2.8 Round 5: the variation study
In this round, the project has entered a new phase and has now started the variation study (see figure 6.1.3).Here the chosen variant is further elaborated. Because this round is currently happening, the main issue cannot yet be designated. The decision will be taken on the preferred variant (11’ or 11”) and this is plannedfor July 2018.
What has already happened this round is that the municipality of Nijmegen has succeeded in getting theCEOs of NS and ProRail and the DG of I&W to Nijmegen in April 2018 to talk about the station halland station square. The tone of the conversation here was very different from the previous administrativeconsultations. Together they decided to add the station hall to the project. There is no picture yet abouthow to financing it.
6.3 Essence of the process
This is a complex process. Many different aspects make this process complex. The process started with thatthere was not a very specific question for the project, but the actors themselves first had to determine whatwas needed in Nijmegen to be able to run the high frequency timetable at Nijmegen and thus what the scopefor this project would be. From the beginning there was already not enough budget. This has also played apart in drawing up alternatives and the actions of actors. So a solution had to be made to be able to run thehigh frequency timetable and that is also affordable. In addition, there have been other limitations with thisproject. There was also a spatial limitation. Station Nijmegen is located on a slope in the middle of the city.That is why it is not possible to build up an holding site, for example. This also ensures that there is not alot of space to build new tracks and a new platform. This had to be taken into account when designing thealternatives. Because of this space limitation some design options can not be combined, but a choice had tobe made between the one option or the other. So there is a restriction on solution space.
What also played a part in the complexity was that there was some kind of external actor (the DO) thatcould impose decisions on the steering committee, which the steering group had nothing to say about (suchas putting the project on hold). They are an actor with a lot of power, but not a real actor who participatesin the process. The on hold situation made the process more complex, because the actors themselves hadno influence on this, and therefore had to convince the DO and the ministry about the benefits of the PHSproject Nijmegen. The budget survey during the on-hold situation showed that the project could not becheaper, without it being at the expense of functionality. Therefore, the Ministry had to make concessionsto his interest in solving this problem, by continuing the project with an unchanged scope, and thus enlargethe budget for the project.
During the process, the scope has been extended with the extension of the tunnel under the platforms, sothat a Western entrance at the station can occur. This was a big wish from the municipality of Nijmegen,but there was no money for this scope extension in the budget of the project. Subsequently, Nijmegen itself
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was able to raise a budget, and found the province willing to provide budget for it as well.
Many different actors are involved in the project and their interests are not all the same. For example, theMinistry wants to keep the costs low, NS wants it to be easy to stabling and maintain their trains and theother parties want the convenience of the passenger to be served as well as possible. This is reflected in thechoice of actors for the different alternatives. The difficult choice between multiple options in this project isthat not every actor has the same priorities, and so that the preferences for the different alternatives differ.Every actor except NS wants the alternative 11’ (because this is good for transfer), and NS wants the alterna-tive 10’ (this is better for setting up and handling trains). Despite the fact that the alternatives were alreadyfunnelled to only 2 alternatives, both proved not to be a very good solutions for transfer. When this waslooked at better, a sort of 3rd alternative arose: 11”. Because this has to be further researched, this was notan option in the alternatives choices. That two operators (NS and Arriva) use the same station also makes itmore complicated. Now that there will be an additional platform, the two operators have to be more coordi-nated with their timetables, in favour of the passengers, which the operator does not necessarily benefit from.
During the process it was also an issue that Nijmegen and the province liked to see that the station halland station square would also be tackled. The Ministry and the NS did not want to add this to the scopeof the project, because of the costs. NS also made it clear that they did not want to pay for the renovationof the station, but wanted to determine what would happen to the station. This did not always benefit therelationship between the actors.
In the future there will still be some issues to tackle. For example, it is still not 100% sure that there will besufficient budget for the project. This will only be determined in the next phase of the project. In addition,the alternative 11” has to be investigated whether this is a feasible alternative. If this is not the case, thenthere must be negotiations between all actors if they will choose 10’ or 11’ as final choice.
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Chapter 7
Mathematical formalisation
In this chapter the mathematical formalisation of a game concept from public administration, applied tothe case Nijmegen, will be given. As mentioned in chapter 3, we will formalise the Multi-Issue game andthe Issue-by-Issue game. First, we will explain the argumentation for my formalisation. Then, we will givethe theoretical model with some examples. The chapter finishes with the formalisation of the case studyNijmegen.
The goal of this formalisation of the games is to try and see if the formalisation of the game (and theformalisation of the case study Nijmegen) is able to mathematically describe the real world process andoutcome of the process. Do the theoretical description of the process match the real world process andoutcome? And if so (or if not so), can that help to say something about the process or create insight in theprocess? Also, since we take two perspectives: the Multi-Issue game and the Issue-by-Issue game, what isthe difference between the two and can give the comparison of the two games more insights in the process?
7.1 Argumentation
7.1.1 Choosing the games
The reason why we choose two perspectives, the Multi-Issue game and the Issue-by-Issue game, is thatin complex administrative decision-making processes it is very likely that a committee problem appears,as it did in the case of rebuilding station Nijmegen. You can look at a committee problem that has totackle several issues from two perspectives, from a Multi-Issue game perspective and from a Issue-by-Issueperspective (see section 3.5). Both are games of multiple actors where a decision on multiple issues has to bemade through consensus with all the actors. Since both games describes the same committee problem, wecan compare these games (and their outcomes) with each other. The committee problem that appears in theproject of Nijmegen has non-transferable utility. There is no exchange of payments between actors to supporteach other or to represent their interests. Therefore, we chose to formalise the game as a non cooperativecoalitional bargaining game. In such games, you have two forms. Bargaining games with random proposers,and games where the player that reject the proposal becomes the new proposer. For the formalisation, wechose the latter, since it is more realistic in such processes.
7.1.2 The scope of the variables
Each game consist of several variables that make up the game. Variables that (try to) capture and describethe reality. A real world decision-making process or game appearing in real time is made up of a lot of differentvariables that can describe the complexity of a decision-making process. All those variables contribute tothe final payoff of a player in the game. Examples of these variables are actors, relations, history, interest,power and information. Formalised games in game theory mostly only include a few of these variables in
40
their payoff function. The more variables you include, the better you can describe a real world situation.However, the more variables you include, the more complex the game becomes.
Used variables in the formalisation
The idea with this formalisation was to keep it simple. This fits with the idea that it should be a readablereport and advice for non-mathematicians and that (perhaps in the future) non-mathematicians understandand can use this formalisation with regards to decision-making. Therefore, we decided not to create a modelwith a payoff function, but with a preference order of alternatives.
The case study of station Nijmegen is in the so-called alternatives study phase. The design variables thatgenerate the different alternatives and the opinions of the actors about these design variables and theirimportance are of great influence in this process. These are the variables we are going to look at in theformalisation. The specific design variables for this case study can be found in section 8.1.
7.2 The formal game
This section will describe the formal game we are going to use for the formalisation of the process. We willend the section with some examples to show how the formalisation works. In the next sections the frameworkfor the analysis of the case study Nijmegen is given.
7.2.1 The model
Both the Multi-Issue game and the Issue-by-Issue game are committee problems that can be described by abargaining game. The differences between the two games is the order of bargaining. Therefore, both gamescan be described by the same model.
The game consist of n players (actors) and is given as set N = {1, 2, .., n}. The players have to make decisionsabout m issues. Each issue has a finite set Ij (1 ≤ j ≤ m) of options to choose from and I =
∏j Ij . The
preferences of the actors regarding the issues is given by a linear binary relation. This is denoted as a >i b,where a is preferred over b by player i, for {a, b} ∈ Ij and i ∈ N . The preference order of each actor isthe set given by (>i). W will give the set of actors that is the winning coalition and in our case the grandcoalition. With these variables the game can be described as:
Γ = (N, I, (>i)i∈N ,W ) (7.2.1)
7.2.2 The bargaining game
The bargaining game consists of several subgames, or rounds. Each round consist of bargaining about adecision that has to be made. The round starts with one player i, i ∈ N , making a proposal a about an issueI, where a ∈ I, to a certain coalition. The other players in the coalition can one-by-one, in clockwise order,accept or reject the offer. If a player rejects the proposal, he is the one that comes up with a new proposaland again the other players in the coalition can accept or reject the offer. The round ends if all the playersin the coalition accept the proposal. Then a new round with a new issue starts. The kind of processes thatis looked at (mostly) require unanimity of all the players on the decisions being made. This has as a resultthat the winning coalition of this kind of game is the grand coalition.
The set I of all possible alternatives can be divided per actor into a set with acceptable alternatives and aset with alternatives an actor will reject. This is called the acceptance set (Ai, i ∈ N) and the rejection set(Ri, i ∈ N). In order for an actor to accept a proposal, the alternatives should be in his acceptance set.
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As mentioned before, the difference in the Multi-Issue game and the Issue-by-Issue game is the order ofbargaining. By the Issue-by-Issue game, a decision is made separately on each issue. Bargaining about anew issue only starts when a decision has been made about the previous issue. In the Multi-Issue game, allthe issues are discussed simultaneously. Here, players do not make a proposal on a single issue, but makea proposal on an issue combination from their preference order. As a result, the Multi-Issue game behaveslike a single-issue bargaining game with multiple issues at the same time.
7.2.3 Analyses of the games
Now that we have described the model and the bargaining procedure, we want to know what the best strategycombination is for each player and how to determine the best strategy combination. For each player, theaim of the bargaining game is to get the most favourable preference combination as outcome of the game.However, the players all have different preference orders and therefore disagree about what the best outcomeis. Since consensus is needed on the outcome, there must be searched for a equilibrium that result in anoutcome that is acceptable for all players.
Subgame perfect equilibrium
One way of finding such an equilibrium in the different preference orders is to look at the subgame perfectequilibrium (SPE). Our committee bargaining game is a game in extensive form (see chapter 3). We call thisgame in extensive form Γ(P ). A game in extensive form can be divided into decision points and subgames. Asubgame is a part of the game that starts with decision point x. The strategy combination for the subgamestarting with decision point x and following from the strategy combination (si)i∈N , is given as sx = (sxi )i∈N .A definition of a SPE is given by [12]:
Definition 2. b is a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ(P ) if for each i ∈ N and for each decision point xwe have: sx >i (sx−i, d
xi ) for every strategy combination dxi in the subgame starting with x, where (sx−i =
(sxj )j∈N i.
In short, an SPE is looking for a solution, where there is no better solution that is supported by all actors.We have chosen for the SPE because it is a solution concept can also be used well in a game where thepreferences of actors are asked instead of that a real payoff is calculated.
Backward induction
A SPE can be found by backwards induction. According to the name, backward induction starts at theend of the game and when reasoning back to the beginning of the game, finds the best strategy combina-tion and hence the SPE. Backward induction works in the following way: it first considers only the lastsubgame. Here is considered what ensures the best outcome with the choice that is available. After de-termining the best choice in the last subgame, with this information, the best choice can be made for thesecond-last subgame. This will be done till the beginning of the game is reached. The strategy combinationthat has been created by this backward induction leads us to the SPE outcome of the game. A conditionfor backward induction is that no player is indifferent about the choice between two different options [13, 12].
To see how this works, let us consider a very simple example of a 2-player extensive game. Player 1 startsthe game by making its choice between A and B. Next, player 2 makes its choice, depending on the choiceof player 1. Player 1 end the game with the last choice. A game in extensive form with perfect informationcan be displayed visually by means of a game tree, as seen in figure 7.2.1. As can be seen, this game consistsof seven subgames.
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1
2
1
a
G
b
H
C
1
c
I
d
J
D
A
2
1
e
K
f
L
E
1
g
M
h
N
F
B
Figure 7.2.1: Game tree
The order of the preference combinations of the players are given as:
Player 1 : a > b > c > d > e > f > g > h
Player 2 : d > h > a > g > b > f > c > e
Let us start at the end of the game. Here we have four different subgames. We look at each game separately.In the subgame on the left (for actions G and H) the outcomes are a or b. Player 1 prefers a over b and hencewill choose action G. In the same way we look at the next subgame (for actions I and J). Here the outcomesare c or d. Player 1 prefers c over d and hence will choose action I. For the other two subgames on this levelplayer 1 will choose respectively action K and M . With the choices of player 1 at the last subgames, wetake a look at the second last subgames. In the subgame on the left (for actions C and D) the outcomes area or c, as a result of the choices of player 1. Since player 2 prefers a over c, he will choose action C. For thesubgame on the right player 2 will choose action F for the best possible outcome. Depending on the choicesof player 2, player 1 has to choose between actions A and B to determine his best outcome. The outcomeswhere he can choose between are a and g. Since player 1 prefers a over g, he will choose action A and henceoutcome a is the SPE of this game. In the next paragraph some examples are given for finding a SPE in abargaining game.
7.2.4 Examples
Example 1
In this example we show you an Issue-by-Issue game with a random agenda. For the game, N = {1, 2, 3}and consist of two issues. I1 = {a1, a2} and I2 = {b1, b2}. The order of the preference combinations aregiven as:
Player 1 : (a1, b2) > (a2, b2) > (a1, b1) > (a2, b1)
Player 2 : (a2, b2) > (a2, b1) > (a1, b2) > (a1, b1)
Player 3 : (a1, b1) > (a1, b2) > (a2, b1) > (a2, b2)
In this game, player 1 starts with the proposal a1. Player 2 has to accept or reject the proposal. If player 2accepts the offer, then player 3 has to accept or reject the proposal. If player 2 does not accept the offer, hehas to come up with a new proposal. Since I1 consists only of a1 and a2, player 2 has therefore to proposea2. If player 3 reject the new proposal of player 2, the game ends in a deadlock and hence will go back tothe beginning of the game. Before the game can start over, the players have to negotiate and one of theplayers has to make concessions to accept a proposal he reject in the previous round. If a consensus has beenreached about the first issue among the players, the game moves on to the next issue I2. In this subgame,
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player 2 starts proposing b1. Here follows the same bargaining procedure as in the previous subgame. Agame tree of this game example is given in figure 7.2.2.
1 : a1
2
3
32 : b1
1
a1, b1
Y es
2 1 : b2
a1, b2
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
13 : b2
2
a1, b2
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
1
3
1
a2, b1
Y es
2
a2, b2
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
1
2
a2, b2
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
3
1
1
3
a2, b1
Y es
2
a2, b2
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
3
2
a2, b2
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Figure 7.2.2: Game tree example 1
Now that we have described the game, we want to find the SPE of the game by backward induction. Weassume that a preference combination is always preferred over a deadlock position. To find the SPE, weuse the way explained in the previous paragraph and start at the last subgame of the game. For each ofthese subgames, player 2 has to make a choice between accepting or rejecting the offer. Since a preferencecombination is always preferred over a deadlock position, in each case, player 2 accepts the offer. From thereone, we work upwards. By the backwards induction, when the subgame on bargaining about issue I2 starts,we are left with the preference combinations a1, b2 (left part), a2, b2 (middle part) and a2, b1 (right part). Ifwe continue the backward induction further up, we find a2, b1 as SPE for this game.
Example 2
Here we have the same game as in example 1, only consisting of four issues instead of two. We haveI1 = {a1, a2}, I2 = {b1, b2}, I3 = {c1, c2}, I4 = {d1, d2}. The order of the preference combinations are givenas:
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Player 1 : (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) >
(a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) >
(a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) >
(a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d2)
Player 2 : (a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) >
(a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) >
(a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) >
(a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d1)
Player 3 : (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) >
(a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) >
(a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) >
(a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d2)
Player 1 proposes a proposal for the first issue. The subgame on the second issue is started by player two.After consensus has been reached on the second issue, player 1 makes the first proposal on the third issue.For the last issue player 2 will make the first proposal. The game tree can be drawn up in the same wayas the previous example. This complete tree is not given here, due to its size, but it continues in the sameway. As you might have seen in the game tree of the previous example, there is a pattern in the game tree.The layout of the tree for only the first issue (see figure 7.2.3) is a pattern that repeats itself. The same treeoccurs below each feasible outcome after bargaining about an issue Ii, i ∈ I, as is seen in figure 7.2.4. Usingthis insight by finding the SPE, the SPE of this game is (a2, b2, c1, d2).
1 : a1
2
3
a1
Y es
1
a2
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
3
1
a2
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Figure 7.2.3: Game tree of only the first issue
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1 : a1
2
3
Repeated tree
Y es
1
Repeated tree
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
3
1
Repeated tree
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Figure 7.2.4: Game tree first issue
Example 3
In both the Multi-Issue game and in the Issue-by-Issue game, we assume that consensus is needed for adecision. However, a committee can also decide that consensus is not needed for a decision, but that amajority of the votes is decisive. Here we show an example of such a game. For the game, we look at anIssue-by-Issue game were we have N = {1, 2, 3} and consist of three issues. I1 = {a1, a2}, I2 = {b1, b2} andI3 = {c1, c2}. The order of the preference combinations of the players are given as:
Player 1 : (a1, b2, c1) > (a1, b2, c2) > (a2, b2, c1) > (a2, b2, c2) >
(a1, b1, c1) > (a1, b1, c2) > (a2, b1, c1) > (a2, b1, c2)
Player 2 : (a2, b1, c1) > (a2, b1, c2) > (a2, b2, c1) > (a2, b2, c2) >
(a1, b1, c1) > (a1, b1, c2) > (a1, b2, c1) > (a1, b2, c2)
Player 3 : (a1, b2, c2) > (a2, b2, c2) > (a1, b1, c2) > (a2, b1, c2) >
(a1, b2, c1) > (a2, b2, c1) > (a1, b1, c1) > (a2, b1, c1)
Again, for this game we can draw up a game tree, as is seen in figure 7.2.5.
a1, b1, c1
c1
a1, b1, c2
c2
b1
a1, b2, c1
c1
a1, b2, c2
c2
b2
a1
a2, b1, c1
c1
a2, b1, c2
c2
b1
a2, b2, c1
c1
a2, b2, c2
c2
b2
a2
Figure 7.2.5: Game tree
The game three looks a bit different than in the previous examples. In this game the players do not have toaccept or reject the proposal one by one, but must have a majority per issue and then proceed to the next
46
issue. The SPE for this game is still determined in the same way. We start determining the SPE by lookingat the subgame of the third issue. Two of the three players prefer c1 over c2, and therefore in each subgamewill choose the left option. Then we continue upwards to the subgame of the second issue. The majorityprefers b2 over b1, so we are left with the options a1, b2, c1 and a2, b2, c1. After looking at the subgame onthe first issue, we see that a1, b2, c1 is the SPE of this game.
Example 4
So far, in the examples we only have looked at Issue-by-Issue games. The Multi-Issue game is in fact thesame game as the Issue-by-Issue game. Just because all issues are dealt with simultaneously, it works likean Issue-by-Issue game with only one issue. Calculating a SPE for this game takes a bit more work. Inorder to know for a player which offers to accept and which to reject during the bargaining, the acceptanceand rejection set of each player must be known. In committee problems it is very likely that players have tocompromise on some of their issues. Therefore, we define the acceptance set of each player as the set of thefour most preferred preference combinations. So let us take the same game as in example 3 with the samepreference order. The acceptance set and rejection set of the player then are:
A1 = {(a1, b2, c1), (a1, b2, c2), (a2, b2, c1), (a2, b2, c2)}R1 = {(a1, b1, c1), (a1, b1, c2), (a2, b1, c1), (a2, b1, c2)}A2 = {(a2, b1, c1), (a2, b1, c2), (a2, b2, c1), (a2, b2, c2)}R2 = {(a1, b1, c1), (a1, b1, c2), (a1, b2, c1), (a1, b2, c2)}A3 = {(a1, b2, c2), (a2, b2, c2), (a1, b1, c2), (a2, b1, c2)}R3 = {(a1, b2, c1), (a2, b2, c1), (a1, b1, c1), (a2, b1, c1)}
The bargaining in the game goes as follows: a player proposes a proposal. He will proposes his best prefer-ence combination. Then the other players have to respond to the offer. They only accept the proposal if theproposal is in their own acceptance set.
Player 1 starts the bargaining by proposing (a1, b2, c1). Player 2 has to respond. Since this preferencecombination is in the rejection set of player 2, he rejects the proposal. As a response, he proposes his bestcombination: (a2, b1, c1). Then player 3 has to respond. Again, this preference combination is in the rejec-tion set of player 3, he rejects the proposal. As a new offer he proposes (a1, b2, c2). Now player 1 has torespond to this offer. Since the offer is in the acceptance set of player 1, he will accept the proposal. Player2 however does not accept the offer, since it is in his rejection set. Since he already proposed (a2, b1, c1),player 2 will now propose (a2, b1, c2). Player 3 will accept this offer, as it is in his acceptance set. Sincethe proposal in not in the acceptance set of player 1, he does not accept the proposal and he proposes(a2, b2, c1). Player 2 accepts his proposal but players 3 can not accept this proposal of player 1. Nowplayer 3 is on again, and he proposes (a2, b2, c2). The proposal is in the acceptance set of player 1 and player2, so both players accept the proposal and the game is finished. Therefore, (a2, b2, c2) is the SPE of this game.
It is also possible that there is no SPE found in the Multi-Issue game. That the players do not have over-lapping preference combinations in their acceptance set. The game then comes into a deadlock. In order toensure that the game leads to a solution, players will have to negotiate to ensure that players will enlargetheir acceptance set. The acceptance set must then be enlarged until an SPE is found.
In this chapter we have now described the general theory for the formalisation in this internship project. Inthe next chapter we will apply this formalisation to the case study Nijmegen. The formalisation describedin this chapter fits in well with the case study Nijmegen because it involves a decision-making process withseveral actors who all together try to make a decision about one final decision. This decision consists ofseveral issues where decisions have to be taken during the process.
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Chapter 8
Mathematical analysis of case studyNijmegen
In the previous chapter we presented a framework for a formalisation and mathematical analyses of decision-making processes. In this chapter we will give the formalisation of the decision-making process of the caseNijmegen, perform the mathematical analysis and discuss the results of the analysis.
With the information of the actors involved in the decision regarding the case of Nijmegen, the mathematicalanalyses can be done. For the mathematical analysis, we will compare four different scenarios: the Multi-Issue bargaining game, the Issue-by-Issue bargaining game with a random order of issues, the Issue-by-Issuebargaining game with agenda setting and the bargaining game with majority voting. All scenarios are formsof a committee problem, but they are played slightly differently. We do the analyses with different scenariosto see if there is a difference in the course and outcome of the different games. Moreover, we will comparethese different outcomes and draw conclusions from it. By comparing the different scenarios we can also seewhich game is best able to describe the real-world situation.
8.1 The formalisation of case Nijmegen
The game in the process of Nijmegen can be formalised as the committee problem and is described by:
P = (N, I, (>i)i∈N ,W ) (8.1.1)
We only consider the most important actors. This will be ProRail, NS, Ministry of Infrastructure and WaterManagement and the Municipality of Nijmegen. Therefore, we have the set of all actors N= {ProRail, NS,Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, Municipality of Nijmegen}. We can also distinguishvarious actors within ProRail. However, to the other actors ProRail always acted as one player, with oneopinion. For simplicity reason, that is why we see ProRail as one player. The same holds for NS.
The issues (design variables) we are going to look at in this formalisation are the sets given in table 8.1. Werestrict ourselves to only four issues with two options each for simplicity reasons. The more issues, the morecomplex the game becomes. All these issues were points of discussion during the process and mentionedas important during the interviews. There were also other design variables which we will not consider asan issue in the game. We will not consider these issues because they were less important than the four weconsider now, or the preference order of all the actors were the same regarding these issues.
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Table 8.1: The design variables used for the formalisationI1 = {Whether or not to increase the speed to 80 km/h at the south side station}I2 = {Location holding yard}I3 = {Location new island platform}I4 = {Accessibility REP }
For each issue, we consider two options:
I1 = {a1, a2}I2 = {b1, b2}I3 = {c1, c2}I4 = {d1, d2}
Wherea1 : Increasing the speed to 80 km/h at the south side station
a2 : Not increasing the speed to 80 km/h at the south side station
b1 : REP location
b2 : GE location
c1 : Symmetric new island platform
c2 : Asymmetric new island platform
d1 : Indirect connection to REP
d2 : Direct connection to REP
The preference order of the issues and their options were asked to all the interview respondents. Thepreference order for each actor is given below:
ProRail : (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) >
(a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) >
(a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) >
(a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1)
NS : (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) >
(a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) >
(a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) >
(a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d1)
IenW : (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) >
(a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) >
(a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) >
(a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d1)
Nijmegen : (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) >
(a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) >
(a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) >
(a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d2)
These are the preference combinations with their ordering. However, in the real world, not all the prefer-ence combinations are feasible. The process has to deal with constraints. For example, budget or physicalconstraints. That the ideal preference combination is for example a1, b1, but there is only budget for one of
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the two options. Or that due to a physical limitation there is only room for either option a1 or option b1.Preference combinations that are not feasible are therefore not included in the game.
As said before, we strive to make a link with reality with this analysis. Therefore we couple the differentpreferences combinations of the actors to the different possible outcomes of the process. Since the tunnel isnot in the scope of the design variables, we have two possible outcomes: 10’ and 11’. We can categorise eachpreference in one of these outcome groups, or in a group that represents neither of the two outcomes. Thereis also a possibility that a preference combination is not feasible, due to the constraints. The distribution ofthese preferences combinations over the outcome groups is given below:
10’ : {(a2, b2, c2, d2)}11’ : {(a2, b2, c1, d1)}Not feasible : {(a1, b1, c1, d2),(a1, b2, c1, d2), (a2, b1, c1, d2),(a2, b2, c1, d2)}Remaining : {(a1, b1, c1, d1),(a1b1, c2, d1), (a1, b2, c2, d2),(a1, b1, c2, d2), (a1, b2, c1, d1),
(a1, b2, c2, d1),(a2, b1, c1, d1), (a2, b1, c2, d1),(a2, b1, c2, d2), (a2, b2, c2, d1)}
When doing the mathematical analysis of the preferences over alternatives, only the feasible preference com-binations are taken into account.
After omitting the non-feasible options, there is a set of 12 preference combinations per actor left. Thisset must be divided into a acceptance set and a rejection set per actor. We define the acceptance set ofeach player as the set of the six most preferred preference combinations. With this we have a nice balancebetween acceptable combinations and not acceptable combinations and the acceptance set is big enough tofind an SPE. The acceptance set Ai and rejection set Ri (i ∈ N) of the players in this game are:
AProRail = {(a1, b2, c1, d1), (a1, b1, c1, d1), (a2, b2, c1, d1),
(a2, b1, c1, d1), (a1, b2, c2, d2), (a1, b2, c2, d1)}RProRail = {(a1, b1, c2, d2), (a1, b1, c2, d1), (a2, b2, c2, d2),
(a2, b2, c2, d1), (a2, b1, c2, d2), (a2, b1, c2, d1)}ANS = {(a1, b1, c2, d2), (a2, b1, c2, d2), (a1, b2, c2, d2),
(a2, b2, c2, d2), (a1, b1, c1, d1), (a2, b1, c1, d1)}RNS = {(a1, b2, c1, d1), (a2, b2, c1, d1), (a1, b1, c2, d1),
(a2, b1, c2, d1), (a1, b2, c2, d1), (a2, b2, c2, d1)}AIenW = {(a1, b2, c1, d1), (a2, b2, c1, d1), (a1, b1, c1, d1),
(a2, b1, c1, d1), (a1, b2, c2, d2), (a2, b2, c2, d2)}RIenW = {(a1, b2, c2, d1), (a2, b2, c2, d1), (a1, b1, c2, d2),
(a2, b1, c2, d2), (a1, b1, c2, d1), (a2, b1, c2, d1)}ANijmegen = {(a1, b1, c1, d1), (a2, b1, c1, d1), (a1, b2, c1, d1),
(a2, b2, c1, d1), (a1, b1, c2, d1), (a2, b1, c2, d1)}RNijmegen = {(a1, b1, c2, d2), (a2, b1, c2, d2), (a1, b2, c2, d1),
(a2, b2, c2, d1), (a1, b2, c2, d2), (a2, b2, c2, d2)}
We also know from interviews the preference order of each actor regarding the outcome of the process. Thepreference in outcome of the process according to the actors:
(>ProRail) : {11′ > 10′}(>NS) : {10′ > 11′}(>IenW ) : {11′ > 10′}(>Nijmegen) : {11′ > 10′}
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8.2 Analyses of the different games
Given the information from the previous section, we have the ingredients needed to do the analysis of thegames. Below are the analyses for the four different scenarios.
Issue-by-Issue game
With this analysis we consider the case as an Issue-by-Issue game. The issues that arise in the case arehandled one by one during the course of time. The issues are dealt with in the order in which they werediscussed during the case. Since we have four issues, there are four subgames in the game. We considerProRail as the first proposer in the game. This is a realistic assumption, since ProRail is the one thatdesigns the different alternatives. For the next subgame, we assume that NS starts proposing. For the thirdround it is ProRail again and for the last round we have NS again. We consider only ProRail and NS asproposers to this game, because they have the railway expertise and because they are managers and usersof the infrastructure and therefore have the most influence. We make these assumptions because we cannotsay with certainty which actor has always made a proposal for a design option.
In figure 8.2.1 you can see the game tree for the first subgame. This is slightly different from the examplesgiven earlier, now that four actors are participating in the game. The game tree works in the same way asgiven in example 2 in section 7.2.4. By backward induction, we find a1, b2, c2, d2 as an SPE for this game.To achieve this result, Nijmegen has had to make concessions and increase its acceptance set.
1 : a1
2
3
4
a1
Y es
1
4 : a2
2
3
a2
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
4
3 : a2
1
2
a2
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Y es
3
2 : a2
4
1
a2
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
Y es
X
No
No
Figure 8.2.1: Game tree first subgame
By analysing the Issue-by-Issue game, we have made an assumption about which of the actors is the first tomake a proposal for a design variable. We can also view the game from the point of view that we reverse the
51
order and NS is the first to make a design proposal. The order of proposing is then NS-ProRail-NS-ProRail.For this game, we find a1, b2, c1, d1 as SPE. To achieve this result, NS has had to make concessions andincrease its acceptance set.
Issue-by-Issue game with agenda setting
Another way to look at the Issue-by-Issue game, is by changing the bargaining order of the issues. In thisgame, we rearrange the order of the issues on the basis of their importance. The first step is to determine therelative importance of the issues among the players. On average, among the players, the order of importanceof the issues is shown below:
I3 > I1 > I2 > I4.
Issue 3 will thus be discussed first. The same as in the analysis of the regular Issue-by-Issue game, we dothis analysis with the order of proposers ProRail-NS-ProRail-NS and NS-ProRail-NS-ProRail. Since onlythe order of the issues changed compared to the regular Issue-by-Issue game, the analysis is done in exactthe same way. As a result, for the bargaining order ProRail-NS-ProRail-NS we get the SPE a1, b2, c2, d2 andfor the bargaining order NS-ProRail-NS-ProRail we get the SPE a1, b2, c1, d1.
Issue-by-Issue game with majority voting
As explained in example 3 of the previous chapter, instead of the bargaining game and trying to reachconsensus, you can also look at the game from a perspective of majority voting. The majority preferenceper issue can be seen below:
a1 > a2
b2 > b1
c1 > c2
d2 > d1
Again, for this game we can draw up a game tree, as is seen in figure 8.2.2.
52
a1,b1,c1,d1
d1
a1,b1,c1,d2
d2
c1
a1,b1,c2,d1
d1
a1,b1,c2,d2
d2
c2
b1
a1,b2,c1,d1
d1
a1,b2,c1,d2
d2
c1
a1,b2,c2,d1
d1
a1,b2,c2,d2
d2
c2
b2
a1
a2,b1,c1,d1
d1
a2,b1,c1,d2
d2
c1
a2,b1,c2,d1
d1
a2,b1,c2,d2
d2
c2
b1
a2,b2,c1,d1
d1
a2,b2,c1,d2
d2
c1
a2,b2,c2,d1
d1
a2,b2,c2,d2
d2
c2
b2
a2
Fig
ure
8.2
.2:
Gam
etr
eew
ith
majo
rity
voti
ng
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We start determining the SPE by looking at the subgame of the last issue. the majority prefers d2 overd1, and therefore in each subgame will choose the left option. Then we continue upwards to the subgame ofthe third issue. The majority prefers c1 over c2, and also here in each subgame will choose the left option.Then we continue upwards to the subgame of the second issue. The majority prefers b2 over b1, so we areleft with the options a1, b2, c1, d2 and a2, b2, c1, d2. After looking at the subgame on the first issue, we seethat a1, b2, c1, d2 is the SPE of this game. Unfortunately, this outcome is not feasible.
Multi-Issue game
The acceptance set and rejection set of each of the actors is given in section 8.1. We let ProRail start thegame by making the first proposal. This is the most realistic, since ProRail is the one that designs thedifferent alternatives. The actors all respond one-by-one to the proposal in a fixed order. The order is givenas follows: First ProRail, second NS, third I&W and last Nijmegen. Again, this is the most realistic scenario.ProRail and NS have the infrastructural knowledge and are the users/owners of the infrastructure. I&W hasinfluence since they provide the budget, and Nijmegen is a stakeholder.
The game starts and ProRail proposes (a1, b2, c1, d1). NS does not accept the proposal and hence proposes(a1, b1, c2, d2). This proposal is rejected by I&W. Instead, they propose (a2, b2, c2, d1). The offer can not beaccepted by Nijmegen and therefore they propose (a1, b1, c1, d1). This proposal is in the acceptance set ofProRail and they accept. The same holds for NS. Since the offer is also in the acceptance set of I&W, theyaccept the offer and (a1, b1, c1, d1) is the SPE of this game.
8.3 Overview SPEs
In the previous section, we calculated an SPE for every type of game. In table 9.1 an overview of the SPEsfor each scenario can be found.
Table 8.2: SPE of the different analysesGame Specification SPE
Issue-by-Issue gameRandom agenda P-N-P-N a1, b2, c2, d2Random agenda N-P-N-P a1, b2, c1, d1With agenda setting P-N-P-N a1, b2, c2, d2With agenda setting N-P-N-P a1, b2, c1, d1Majority voting Not feasible
Multi-Issue game a1, b1, c1, d1
8.4 Discussion results
The result of the mathematical analyses is a set of SPEs. Below we will further discuss what the SPEsactually means, compare the SPEs with each other and compare the SPEs and preference order of the actorswith the real outcomes.
8.4.1 Preference order actors
In section 8.1 the preference order per actor was presented. The preference order was asked to the actors byasking their opinion on separate issues. Similarly, the preference order for the possible outcomes of the realworld process were requested. From the preference combination we were able to detect the actors preference
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over the possible outcomes 10’ and 11’. This corresponded to the indicated preference. However, the options10’ and 11’ were not the most favourable theoretical preference combinations for the actors. All the actorshad other theoretical preference combinations that they prefer over 10’ and 11’.
In the case of Nijmegen, the actors had to choose between 10’ and 11’. Although the preference combi-nations and the preference over 10’ and 11’ differed per actor, there were some options from the prefer-ence combinations that were more favourable by all actors than the options 10’ and 11’. For the option10’=(a2, b2, c2, d2), all the actors preferred the combinations (a1, b1, c2, d2) and (a1, b2, c2, d2) over 10’. Forthe option 11’=(a2, b2, c1, d1), all the actors preferred the combinations (a1, b2, c1, d1) over 11’. However,these combinations have not been options in the process for the actors to choose from.
All actors would rather have option a1 than a2. This means that they prefer to increase the speed to 80km/h on the south side of the station than that the speed remains 40 km/h. A remarkable result, becauseit was decided early on in the process that there would be no speed increase. Increasing the speed is notnecessary for the high frequency timetable and does involves considerable costs. Especially regarding thecosts, it is remarkable that I&W is also in favour the speed increase. Note that this issue is considered lessimportant by the actors than other issues.
8.4.2 Comparison SPEs
Various SPEs are a result of the analysis of the different games. The SPE of a game gives the best equilibriumin that particular game and how it is played. We can also compare the different SPEs. From the analysis wehave the following SPEs: a1, b2, c2, d2, a1, b2, c1, d1, and a1, b1, c1, d1. With a1, b2, c2, d2 as SPE, on average,the actors get their 6th preference. We calculated this by taking the average of the position per actor of thispreference combination. With a1, b2, c1, d1 as SPE, this is their 3th preference. With a1, b1, c1, d1 as SPEon average, the actors get their 2,75 preference. So you could say that of all SPEs found, a1, b1, c1, d1 is thebest theoretical SPE, on average for all actors.
The differences in the SPE between the different games result from how the game is played. In the Issue-by-Issue game, every issue is negotiated separately. One does not proceed until a decision about an issue hasbeen taken. This means that there cannot be negotiated about other issues at the same time. So no pointscan be exchanged, in which you give in to a certain issue, but because of that you win on another issue. Thisis possible with the Multi-Issue game. Because all issues are dealt with simultaneously, actors can exchangefavours. In the case of Nijmegen, this leads to the best theoretical result.
We have seen with the analysis that changing the agenda setting does not change the SPE of the game. Inthis case study, there is no consensus among the actors about the importance of the issues. We determinedthe order of importance of the issues by taking the average order of importance among the actors. Asdescribed in the literature, the agenda setting matters (i.e. you get better results when the most importantissues are negotiated first) if there is consensus among the actors about the importance of the issues [12, 24].This is not the case in our case.
8.4.3 Comparison to the real world outcomes
The above two sections deal with the theoretical results of the analyses and preferences of actors. Now wewant to compare this with what really happened in the process. As described earlier, it is indeed possiblewith the preference combination order to describe the preferences of the actors in the possible outcomes ofthe process. With the analysis of the games we arrive at different outcomes than the possible outcomesand the actual outcome of the decision-making process in Nijmegen. This is because the variants 10’ and11’ are not a SPE and hence not the best theoretical possible outcomes of the the decision-making process.Because in the real world decisions have already been taken during the design process about certain designvariables and during the process certain design variables have already fallen away, alternatives 10’ and 11’
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were ultimately left as best options.
The Multi-Issue game is the game that most closely resembles the real world process. In the decision-makingprocess in Nijmegen, the issues were not treated one by one, but often with several at the same time.Therefore, this game describes the process most in terms of process. In terms of process, this game describesthe actual process in the best way.
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Chapter 9
Results comparison three case studies
In the previous chapter we have given the results of the mathematical analysis of the decision-making processof case study Nijmegen. As described in section 1.5, we will also perform a mathematical analysis of thecase studies of the other decision-making processes, namely of the case study Amsterdam and the case studyRotterdam. In this chapter, the results of these analyses are given and the results are compared.
We will compare the results to see if the other cases have the same sort of results as in the case study ofNijmegen. We will see whether the order of actors in the bargaining process in the other cases also yieldsa difference, whether the Multi-Issue game also gives them the best outcome and whether the real worldpreferences of actors can be described with the preference combinations. By comparing the results of thedifferent cases, we can see whether the findings we have made in the Nijmegen case also apply in the othercases. When the findings are comparable, this strengthens our conclusions. Moreover, it provides directionsfor future work.
9.1 Results other case studies
The case studies of Amsterdam and Rotterdam-Schiedam are examples of decision-making processes thathave the same sort of actors, same sort of problem and same sort complexity as the decision-making processof the case study Nijmegen. Therefore, we can perform the same formalisation and analysis as in the casestudy of Nijmegen. The case descriptions of case studies of Amsterdam and Rotterdam-Schiedam are notgiven in this report, but are available on request. The case variables of these decision-making processes canbe found in appendix E and F. Because these case studies are not the main interest of this internship project,the mathematical analyses will not be described here. The preferences orders of the actors are given in theappendices as well. Below is an overview of the results of the analyses of the two other cases.
9.1.1 Case study Amsterdam
In table 9.1 an overview of all the SPEs of this case study can be found.
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Table 9.1: SPE of the different analyses case study AmsterdamGame Specification SPE
Issue-by-Issue gameRandom agenda P-N-P-N a2, b2, c2, d2Random agenda N-P-N-P a2, b2, c2, d2With agenda setting P-N-P-N a2, b2, c2, d2With agenda setting N-P-N-P a2, b2, c2, d2Majority voting There is no real majority here
Multi-Issue game a2, b2, c2, d2
Comparison SPEs
With the found SPE a2, b2, c2, d2, the actors get on average their 3.25th preference. In this case study, theiris no difference in the theoretical outcomes of the Issue-by-Issue game an the Multi-Issue game.
Preference order actors
The actors’ preference order for the possible outcomes of the process (the alternatives) does not fully cor-respond to the preference combinations of the actors (see appendix E for both). In the real world, theactors had to choose between the alternatives called: A, B, C and D (again, see appendix E). Although thepreference combinations and the preference over the alternatives differed per actor, for the option A, all theactors preferred option C and for the option B, all the actors preferred option D. This is not in line withwhat the actors had indicated when asked about their preferences for the alternatives. Though, their firstpreference does correspond to the preference combinations.
Comparison to the real world outcomes
For the option C, all the actors preferred the combinations (a2, b2, c2, d1) and (a2, b2, c2, d2) over option C.However, these combinations have not been options in the real world process for the actors to choose from.With the analysis of the different scenarios we arrive at a different outcome than the possible outcomes andthe actual outcome of the real world decision-making process. This is because the variant C is on averagethe actors’ 5.75th preference and variant D is on average the actors’ 6.75th preference. Hence, these are notthe best possible theoretical outcomes of the the decision-making process.
9.1.2 Case study Rotterdam-Schiedam
In table 9.2 an overview of all the SPE’s of this case study can be found.
Table 9.2: SPE of the different analyses case study Rotterdam-SchiedamGame Specification SPE
Issue-by-Issue gameRandom agenda P-I-P-I a2, b2, c1, d1Random agenda I-P-I-P a2, b2, c1, d1With agenda setting P-I-P-I a2, b2, c1, d1With agenda setting I-P-I-P a2, b2, c1, d1Majority voting a1, b1, c1, d2
Multi-Issue game a1, b1, c1, d1
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Comparison SPEs
With the found SPE a1, b1, c1, d1, on average, the actors get their 6.5th preference, with a2, b2, c1, d1, onaverage, the actors get their 8.5th preference and with a1b1, c1, d2, on average, the actors get their 6.75thpreference. In this case study, therefore you could say that of all SPEs found, a1, b1, c1, d1 is the besttheoretical SPE, on average for all actors. Therefore, the Multi-Issue game gives the best theoretical outcomeof this case study.
Preference order actors
The actors’ preference order for the possible outcomes of the process (the alternatives) does not fully corre-spond to the preference combinations of the actors (see appendix F for both). In the real world, the actorshad to choose between the alternatives called: B and D (again, see appendix F).
Comparison to the real world outcomes
In analysis of this case study, there are no preference combinations that all actors prefer more than the realworld alternatives B and D. In addition, the best theoretical SPE a1, b1, c1, d1 corresponds to real worldalternative B. The real world alternatives are therefore also the best theoretical alternatives.
9.2 Comparison
If we compare the results of the analysis of the three case studies, we see that the results are different, andthe findings in one case do not completely resemble the findings of the other case studies.
By comparing the results we see that the preference combinations resulting from the online questionnaire arenot always able to accurately reflect the real world preferences over alternatives asked during the interviews.This difference is due to the way in which the preferences are asked to the actors. When determining thepreference combinations, the actors were asked to give their opinion per issue. Based on this, the preferencecombinations have been determined. The fact that actors are asked individually about each issue instead ofevaluating the total sum of issues (which corresponds to an alternative) could explain the different outcomes.
We had seen that in the analysis of the case study Nijmegen the Multi-Issue game gave the best theoreticalresult. In the analysis of the case study Amsterdam, there was no difference between the Multi-Issue gameand the Issue-by-Issue game. It therefore depends on the decision-making process which game gives the bestresults in theory. We do see that the Issue-by-Issue gives in non of the case studies the best theoretical result.
We had also seen that in the analysis of the case study Nijmegen that in the Issue-by-Issue game it matterswhich order of actors is used for making proposals. By the the analyses of the other case studies, the orderof actors did not matter, the outcome was the same. It therefore depends on the situation if the order ofactors matters for making proposals.
We have also seen in the analyses that in some cases the preference combinations sometimes have morefavourable options to the actors than the real world options, but that are not real world alternatives. Thiscan also be related to the way in which the preference combination has been drawn up. Here too, this doesnot apply to every decision-making process.
By comparing the results we see that in the case study of Amsterdam, all the results for the Issue-by-Issuegame are the same, regardless of who starts proposing. Our first thought was that this may have somethingto do with the extent to which the preferences of actors are different. That is why, for the case study Ni-jmegen and the case study Amsterdam, we looked at how far the preferences of the actors corresponded orwere different. Each time we have compared two actors, in which we looked at each preference combination
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how far apart the preference combination were for the two actors (so the distance for a preference combina-tion between two actors). Then we calculated the average distance between all the preference combinationsbetween two actors, so that we could calculate the extent to which the two actors correspond in their order ofpreference combinations. Unfortunately, the average distance of the preference combinations between actorsfor the case study Nijmegen was the same as for the case study Amsterdam. Therefore, the extent to whichthe preferences of actors are different was not the reason that the results for the Issue-by-Issue were the samein the case study of Amsterdam. In the future, the reason why the results for the Issue-by-Issue were thesame in the case study of Amsterdam could be further researched.
Clarifications can be made with the mathematical analyses. These will be described in the discussion chapter.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
In this internship project, we mathematically formalised three decision-making processes within ProRail bymeans of game theory and analysed these decision-making processes. We did this to see to which extenta mathematical formalisation and analysis of a (part of) a decision-making process using game theory give(ProRail) insight in a complex decision-making process.
No clear unambiguous conclusions have emerged from this internship project. Findings that were made in onedecision-making process were not always confirmed in another decision-making process. The mathematicalanalysis can contribute to insights into decision-making processes, but it differs per process in terms of whichinsights. Examples of gained insights are: having a clear view of all the actors involved and important issuesin the process is important and the order of proposers can have influence in the outcome of decision-makingprocess.
The main focus of this internship project was on the decision-making process of rebuilding Nijmegen sta-tion. The decision-making process of case study Nijmegen can be interpreted as a committee problem. Weformalised this committee problem by describing it through a non-cooperative bargaining game. We dis-tinguished four different scenarios from the non-cooperative bargaining game that we have analysed andcompared: the Multi-Issue bargaining game, the Issue-by-Issue bargaining game with a random order of is-sues, the Issue-by-Issue bargaining game with agenda setting and the bargaining game with majority voting.
To be able to do the mathematical analysis of the case of Nijmegen station, we had to identify the actorsthat were involved in the process and their preferences on the decisions and outcomes. The most importantissues/considerations in the process had to be identified. This created a clear overview of the important issuesin the process, the people involved and their opinion on the issues. By analysing the results, we saw thatthe order of actors is important when making proposals in the Issue-by-Issue game. In this decision-makingprocess it did not matter for the theoretical results of the Issue-by-Issue game whether the issues were dealtwith in the order in which they occurred in the real process, or whether the game was arranged in such away that the issues were dealt with of their importance. This was because there was no consensus among theactors about the importance of the issues. If we compared the theoretical results of the different analyses,the best theoretical outcome of the process was achieved with the Multi-Issue game, viewed in relation toeach other. This corresponds with findings in the literature [3]. The Multi-Issue game is often regarded asa better option in the theory of complex decision-making processes. If only one issue is dealt with at thesame time (as in the Issue-by-Issue game), it is possible that no decision is reached, actors can block thedecision-making process on this single issue. By adding multiple issues to the agenda (and thus changingthe game to a Multi-Issue game), there can be negotiation of all issues and its actors are willing to makeconcessions on certain points if they get their preferred option on different issues. This makes it much morelikely that consensus will be reached an thus a final decision can be made [3]. Another insight that emergedfrom the analysis of the case study Nijmegen is that all actors wanted the speed increase on the north side
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of the station. In the real process, however, it was decided not to implement a speed increase. With thisinsight, alternatives 10’ and 11’ are not necessarily the best possible outcomes.
Because the case studies Nijmegen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam-Schiedam can also be formalised as a com-mittee problem, we can perform the same mathematical analysis. After comparing the results of the analysisof the different cases, we can conclude that it depends on the decision-making process if the order of actorsis important when making proposals in the Issue-by-Issue game. It also depends on the decision-makingprocess whether the Multi-Issue game is the best game. Because of this, as stated earlier, we can not drawany firm conclusions here. We have not yet been able to explain why in the Amsterdam case study therewas no difference in the outcome of the different scenarios of the Issue-by-Issue game. This is something forthe future to be further researched.
As we have seen in the results of mathematical analysis, the formalisation of a decision-making process as amathematical game does not fully describe reality. There are different results from the analysis than fromthe real world process. However, the formalisation is reasonably capable of describing the preferences ofoutcomes of the process of actors. In addition, the analysis also reveals preferences that actors theoreticallywant as the outcome of the process, but that have not been an option in the real decision-making process.These theoretically better options could maybe be a little more researched in the real world process. It alsoapplies that the analysis is a snapshot in dynamic reality. It does not describe the entire dynamic process.However, the analysis can be done at several moments in the process.
As a conclusion to this internship project, we can say that the mathematical formalisation and analysis,by using game theory, does not fully capture the elements and dynamics of the real world decision-makingprocess from case studies (as we anticipated). However, interesting insights from formalisation and analysiscan be drawn. This is further discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 11
Discussion
Following the analyses, results and conclusions, there are several points for discussion. There are somemarginal notes as well as opportunities that follow from this. We will discuss these in this chapter.
11.1 Marginalia
The analyses of the case studies are made of a simplified model of reality. Because of this there are somediscussion points about the analysis and the results. The points for discussion below are divided per topic.
11.1.1 Method
To establish the preference combinations, the actors were asked about their opinion on the four issues. Thiswas done via an online questionnaire. Because this was not discussed personally with the actors, it may bethat the online questionnaire was not completely interpreted correctly. As a result, the information obtainedfrom the online questionnaire may not be entirely correct. However, actors had limited possibilities to ex-plain why they choose a certain ordering.
For the analyses of the Amsterdam and Rotterdam-Schiedam case studies, we received the necessary infor-mation. Because we did not collect the information ourselves, we can therefore not assess whether the fourissues from these case studies were the right issues. Whether these issues were the most important pointsin the decision-making process and where there was a real difference in opinion between actors on those issues.
When determining the preference combinations, the actors were asked to give their opinion per issue. Basedon this, the preference combinations have been determined. The fact that actors are asked individuallyabout each issue instead of evaluating the total sum of issues (which corresponds to an alternative) couldgive different outcomes.
The choice of issues that were used for the analysis could play a role in the outcome of the analysis. Forthe analysis we used the four most important issues ( where there was no consensus in opinion between theactors). These issues have been determined by what has emerged in the interviews and this was also verifiedwith the contact person of each case study. However, it may have been the case that the respondents didnot consider (all) these issues as the most important issues of the case study. It may therefore be that thepreference combinations of the actors have not been completely corrected by the actors.
Only a limited number of decision makers have been interviewed. Not every actor was spoken to. In addition,the role of the actor in the steering group has been filled in by several actors, by changing people. However,
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at least one person was interviewed of the important actors. In addition, the information obtained from allinterviews was also justified with the project manager of the PHS project Nijmegen.
11.1.2 Formalisation
The acceptance set and rejection set is important for the outcome of the games. Which preference combina-tions are in the acceptance set and which are in the rejection set for an actor is an assumption that we didourselves. This information was not asked to the actors. As a result, the line between the two sets may nothave been drawn correctly for each actor as it would be in the real world. Additionally, in some cases theacceptance set had to be enlarged in order to find an SPE.
The mathematical analysis is done on the basis of backwards induction. A solution method that usuallyworks well, but with certain risks. An example of this is the centipede paradox (see [6] for more on thisparadox). In this paradox the outcome, through backward induction, is that you should do best not to startthe game. That is not always the outcome, however, when the game is played. The same applies to the realworld. The real world does not always behave as the theory prescribes. A reason therefore is that becausein the real world often more elements are involved than can be included in the model. This also applies tothe analysis of the Nijmegen case.
We opted for our formalisation model a committee problem as a framework, described as a non-cooperativebargaining game. The committee problem fits well with the type of decision-making process that took placein the case studies, there were several actors and they all had to reach consensus. In addition, this modeloffers us the opportunity to look at the preferences of actors. We have chosen to look at the preferences ofactors instead of a payoff function for actors, because preferences are easier to ask actors than to determineexactly the payoff function of the real world processes. It is possible that different results can be obtainedby by using a different model.
In this internship project we opted for the SPE as solution concept for the analyses. We have chosen thissolution concept because it is not a very complicated mathematical concept. That is why it may also beeasier for non-mathematicians to understand. In addition, this solution concept can also be used well in agame where the preferences of actors are asked instead of that a real payoff is calculated. Here again, it ispossible that different results from the analyses can be obtained by means of a different solution concept.
11.1.3 Analysis
Analysing the decision-making process about only four design variables with a bargaining game does notcapture the complete decision-making process with all its complexity. To describe the complete real worldprocess with all its influences and variables, this game is too simple. For example, my model does not directlyinclude the interests and role of the actors. However, it does include the most important variables as resultsfrom the interviews and is verified with experts.
When composing the preference combination, we only looked at the simplified model with the four issues. Indetermining the preferences of the actors, in the real process more aspects can influence the actors preferencecombination than just looking solely at the four issues. This may cause the preference ordering to work outdifferently than if only their opinion on the four issues are asked.
In some case studies, the results of the analysis show no difference between the different scenarios. However,we cannot say that it does not matter which type of game you play in a decision-making process. Althoughwe haven seen that in all case studies that the agenda setting of the Issue-by-Issue game does not matter,in other decision-making processes the agenda setting of the Issue-by-Issue game could be of importance.
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During the analysis, we made assumptions about the proposers of the issues and the order in which theactors made proposals. We made these assumptions because the real world decision-making processes werenot exactly played as an Issue-by-Issue game. Therefore it was not known which actor came up with exactlywhat option for the issues.
We have also seen in the results of the analysis that it is not always the best result for an actor if he is thefirst to make a proposal. This corresponds to the literature [12, 24]. The analysis does not take into accounthow the order of proposers and subsequent outcomes is related to the preference of actors in outcomes. Thiscould be added to the model in the future.
11.1.4 Generalizability
We only did the analyses with three case studies. By the results of the analyses of the cases and by comparingthese results with each other, we get some interesting findings. It is because we have done the analyses withonly three cases that we cannot draw very firm conclusions about this. For that, the analysis should first bedone for many more case studies. However, it can be seen as a first step towards formalisation and analysisof real-world complex decision-making.
11.2 Opportunities
The model used for the analyses is rather simple and therefore does not capture the complete decision-making process with all its complexity. However, the game in this form is therefore not immediately useless.Although it is a simplified version of reality, it can provide us with certain insights and opportunities. Theseinsights will be discussed in this section. The fact that this is a simplified model must always be kept in mind.
In order to be able to do the analysis, we need to know the important issues in a decision-making process.Such an analysis can therefore help to identify all the important issues at the beginning of the process (asfar as this is possible). In particular, issues that have different options on which the actors might disagree.Awareness about these different perspectives can help the process. Identifying the issues and the awarenessabout the different perspectives can be an added value for actors in the process, because it then has a clearoverview of what it really is about, and perhaps also easier to negotiate with other actors if you know whatis going on.In the case of Nijmegen, when identifying the important issues, it might also have emerged that transfer isan important issue for everyone. Maybe they would have come up with the alternative 11” earlier than hashappened in the real world process.
In order to be able to do the analysis, the preferences of all actors must be on the table. The analysis cancontribute to clarifying the preferences of the actors. This can help actors because they know where theystand and what position they can expect from the other actors. Especially if the clarification of preferencestakes place at the beginning of a decision-making process, this can have added value.Looking back at the decision-making process Nijmegen, the actors found out quite late in the process thatNS wanted to go for 10’. With the clarity of the preferences of the actors, the actors at Nijmegen could havebeen aware that NS wanted to go for 10’.
During the analysis we saw that when an actor starts the decision-making process in an Issue-by-Issue gamewith making a proposal, the actor does not necessarily reach his best outcome. As the analysis of the casestudy Nijmegen show, when NS starts the Issue-by-Issue game, they end up with a less good outcome forthemselves than when ProRail makes the first proposal. This insight could be further researched and thatcould also be something that can be considered in a decision-making process.
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Another added value is that a game tree can be used to identify important decision moments, when theytake place and what consequences these moments have. This could provide additional insight into whichmoments are very important to them and therefore at what times they really have to convince the otheractors of their opinion and interest and keep them on board.
11.3 Future research
There are also some points on which the model and the analysis could be improved. This could maybeensure that the model is able to describe reality better than is currently the case. For example, more actorscould be included in the model. Now the set of actors always consists of four, but in the real world there aremany more actors involved in decision-making. The same applies to the number of issues that are looked at.During a decision-making process, such as the PHS project Nijmegen, many more decisions were taken thanjust the four we have looked at now. By taking more issues into account, you get a more realistic picture.As mentioned earlier, the actors were asked about their opinion on the issues via an online questionnaire.By asking the actors personally about their preferences instead of via the mail, and discussing them withthem, you might get a better/the right preferences order of the actors. We might also be able to improvethe model by letting the actors rank all preference combinations themselves. Now the order of preferencecombinations has been made on the basis of their opinion per issue, and this has been combined into anorder in preference combinations. If you let the actors themselves rank the preference combinations, youmay get a different, more realistic picture of the order of preferences. The best thing for the model wouldbe if more aspects could be included in the model that influence the decision-making process. Examples are:importance of actors, their mutual relations or the power that actors have. If this could be incorporated inthe model, this would give a more complete picture of the decision-making process.
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Chapter 12
Advise
Based on the conclusion and discussion of this internship project, an advice can be formulated to ProRail.The project arose from V&D’s request for more validation in their decision-making processes. This researchwas carried out at the Innovation department, they were commissioned by V&D to conduct research intodecision-making processes within ProRail. The advice will be two-part, an advice for V&D and an advicefor the Innovation department.
12.1 Advise to V&D
As the conclusion showed, there were no firm conclusions that could be drawn after the internship project.The results from the analysis of one case study are not confirmed in the other case studies. Therefore, theadvice to V&D would be to not (yet) use the formalisation and analysis during decision-making processesor afterwards to evaluate them. For this the formalisation must first be further optimised and investigated.This can be further researched at the Innovation department. This internship project does however revealinteresting insights, that we see possibilities for. That is why we would like to give V&D the advice to raise(more) awareness about certain aspects in decision-making processes. These aspects are: being well awareduring a decision-making process of all actors in the process, all (important) issues that occur in the processand the preferences of all actors. It is also good to know in which way a process is approached, so whattype of ’game’ you play during the decision-making process (Multi-issue or Issue-by-Issue), and that thisinfluences the outcome of the decision-making process.
12.2 Advise to the Innovation department
Because the research did reveal interesting insights that we see possibilities in, the advice is therefore tothe Innovation department to further explore and elaborate the obtained insights from the research. Theadvice is to further investigate how actors influence, with the making of proposals, the outcome of thedecision-making process and how the preferences of actors on issues can be used to steer and design thedecision-making process in order to reach good(better) outcomes for the process. This can be done, forexample, by extended and improving the formalisation and analysis of this internship project.
The formalisation and analysis from this internship project are now descriptive, it describes a decision-making process. It could also be considered whether these can be made prescriptive so that it can be usedas a tool for the decision-makers during a decision-making process. This can be done as described in section4.3.
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12.3 Other recommendations
This internship project is about a contribution to a question about decision-making processes from V&D.The insights gained with this internship project are not only applicable to decision-making processes withinthe V&D department. The insights could also be useful for decision-makers in other departments withinProRail where complex decision-making takes place. That is why the advice would be to V&D and theInnovation department to bring these insights, and any later acquired insights in decision-making processes(also from other studies), to other departments within ProRail.
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Bibliography
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[2] Hans de Bruijn and Paulien M. Herder. System and actor perspectives on sociotechnical systems. IEEETransactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part A:Systems and Humans, 39(5):981–992, 2009.
[3] Hans De Bruijn and Ernst Ten Heuvelhof. Management in Networks. Routledge, New York, secondedition, 2018.
[4] Philip D. Straffin. Game Theory and Strategy. The Mathematical association of America, Washington,first edition, 1993.
[5] Abhinay Muthoo, Martin J. Osborne, and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory., volume 63.1996.
[6] Martin J Osborne. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford university press, first edition, 2000.
[7] D. Snidal. The game theory of International Politics. World Polit, 38(1):25–57, 1985.
[8] L. Hermans S. Cunningham and J. Slinger. A review and participatory extension of game structuringmethods. EURO J Decis Process, 2(3):173–193, 2014.
[9] Y.-C. Lin T.-C. Chen and L.-C. Wang. The analysis of BOT strategies based on game theory – casestudy on Taiwan’s high speed railway project. J. Civ. Eng. Manag, 18(5):662–674, 2012.
[10] Akira Okada. The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person. Journal of Economic Theory, 1:1–24,2010.
[11] John Nash. Two-Person Cooperative Games. The Econometric Society, 21(1):128–140, 1953.
[12] E. Winter. Negotiations in multi-issue committees. Journal of Public Economics, 1997.
[13] Martin J Osborne. Strategic and extensive games. New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, pages 1–27,2006.
[14] Several Authors. ProRail, wie zijn we, accessed 2018-07-12. https://www.prorail.nl/wie-zijn-we.
[15] ProRail. ProRail jaarverslag 2017, accessed 2018-07-12. https://www.jaarverslagprorail.nl/.
[16] Several Authors. Focus, accessed 2018-07-12. https://www.focus.prorail.nl.
[17] Sebastiaan Meijer. Introducing Gaming Simulation in the Dutch Railways. Procedia - Social andBehavioral Sciences, 48:41–51, 2012.
[18] Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat. Voorkeursbeslissing PHS. 2010.
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[19] Bureau Spoorbouwmeester. Veelgestelde vragen PHS. Spoorbouwmeester, (september):1–10, 2013.
[20] Wouter Rappard. PHS Nijmegen, Nota Voorkeursalternatief. pages 1–70, 2017.
[21] Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu. Lange Termijn Spoor Agenda Vervoerwaardestudie. (Decem-ber), 2013.
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[24] Chaim Fershtman. The importance of the agenda in bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior,2(3):224–238, 1990.
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Appendix A
Template case description
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Stappenplan:
1. Template maken (systeem in kaart brengen).
2. Proces beschrijven door gebruik te maken van het ronde model.
3. Analyse maken; template en het proces naast elkaar leggen en analyseren wat
gebeurt is.
Template casusbeschrijving
1. Complexiteit a. Aanleiding
Onderbouwen met cijfers (bv hoeveel meer reizigers, groei, omgevingsdynamiek)
b. Systeemkenmerken (technische specs)
i. Waar kijk je naar, ie, welk deel van het spoor?
ii. Andere kenmerken van spoorsystemen die van buitenaf van invloed
zijn op het proces
iii. Kenmerken van vervoer van niet-spoorsystemen die van buitenaf van
invloed zijn
1. Welke kenmerken (van ii en iii) zijn de echte harde constraints
voor ??
2. Welke kenmerken (van ii en iii) geven mogelijkheden voor ??
iv. Besluiten uit het verleden die harde invloed hebben, zorgen voor
padafhankelijkheid (temporele component)
v. Belangrijke conflictpunten/dilemma’s
vi. Ontwerp specificaties
c. Actoren
i. Wie zijn de belangrijkste actoren
ii. Wat zijn hun belangen
iii. Wat zijn hun opvattingen
iv. Wat zijn hun resources, machtsmiddelen (hoe beïnvloeden ze de
situatie?)
v. Wat zijn hun strategieën, oftewel, hoe spelen ze het spel?
vi. Zijn i t/m v stabiel of dynamisch?
vii. Zijn i t/m v homogeen of heterogeen?
d. Formele besluitvormingsstructuur (technisch, actoren, afspraken)
i. Hoe zit zo’n besluitvormingsproces formeel in elkaar? (specs)
ii. Hoe komen we tot besluitvorming? (denk hier aan stuurgroepen,
directieoverleggen, werkgroepen etc.)
iii. Wat zijn de eisen aan deze besluitvorming (design requirements)? →
specs
1. Wat?
2. Wie?
3. Hoe?
e. Funding
i. Wie betaald er?
ii. Hoeveel geld is er?
iii. Hoe duur is het? (getallen)
f. Maatschappelijke zichtbaarheid/Mediagevoeligheid
i. Zichtbaar of niet? Hoog of laag?
ii. Media omstreden of niet? ja of nee
iii. Gevolgen voor politieke aandacht
g. Overig
Bij elk kopje a t/m g hoort een kopje ‘dynamiek’, dus overal beschrijven hoe stabiel of
dynamisch iets is.
2. Proces (Hoe is de besluitvorming verlopen) Bekijk het proces door de tijd heen (aan de hand van een tijdslijn). Doe een quick first scan
en definieer de belangrijkste (sub)besluiten in het proces. Deze vormen de input voor de
verschillende rondes (rondenmodel). Per ronde, kijk vanuit de actor, zet deze bovenaan.
Gebruik de andere onderwerpen (van A) als een soort check bij je actorbechrijving.
Beperk je tot X cruciale momenten/ronden. De rondes kunnen loosly coupled zijn. Er kunnen
verschillende besluiten zijn genomen in de verschillende ronden. Beschrijf deze op zo’n
manier dat de actor centraal staat. (Individueel → collectieve besluitvorming). Vervolgens ga
je per ronde de andere variabelen van 1 langs.
3. Analyse van complexiteit en proces (wat is er nu gebeurd)
Hier doen we de analyse. Hoe is er tot het besluit gekomen?
Hoe is het mogelijk dat er een collectief besluit is genomen in zo’n complexe situatie?
Appendix B
Interview protocol
B.1 Interview protocol
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Meenemen:
- Stiften (verschillende kleuren)
- Groot vel
- Opnamemateriaal (zorg dat je mobiel opgeladen is!)
- Notitieblok
- Pennen
- Protocol
- Invulformulieren voor meerkeuze- /invulvragen
- Vragen uitgeprint voor de geïnterviewde, maar alleen geven als ze hier expliciet om
vragen
Inleiding (5 min)
Zoals u weet heb ik uw naam doorgekregen via Roland Jansen. Ik ben een student aan de
Rijksunivesiteit Groningen en doe onderzoek voor mijn afstudeerscriptie naar complexe
besluitvorming bij de afdeling innovatie bij ProRail. Dit doe ik binnen een
promotieonderzoek, samen met twee andere studenten die hun eigen casus onderzoeken.
Het doel van het interview is om inzicht te krijgen in het proces van besluitvorming voor de
voorkeursnota van station Nijmegen, die ik bestudeer van juni 2014 tot de voorkeurskeuze in
januari 2018. Dit project zal afgerond worden in juli/augustus van dit jaar, waarvoor ik een
verslag zal schrijven en een presentatie zal geven.
De resultaten van dit onderzoek zullen volledig geanonimiseerd worden en opgenomen
materiaal wordt vernietigd aan het einde van mijn stage (31 augustus 2018).
Bij verdere vragen over je studie, leg dit na het interview uit.
Met betrekking tot dit interview, we hebben een uur de tijd, klopt dit? Vind u het goed dat ik
dit interview opneem?
Voor het interview is het erg van belang dat u vanuit uw rol tijdens het proces antwoord
geeft.
Het interview heeft 3 typen vragen:
1. Open vragen: Antwoord vanuit uw rol en uw perspectief op het
besluitvormingsproces.
2. Meerkeuzevragen: Kruis een hokje aan (of specificeer een volgorde) en ligt uw keuze
toe. Er is ook altijd de optie om een keuze toe te voegen.
3. Check vragen: Op basis van eerdere interviews is al informatie over dit
besluitvormingsproces ontvangen. In sommige vragen wil ik deze informatie u graag
voorleggen met de vraag of u het hiermee eens bent en/of nog aanvullingen heeft.
4. U krijgt na afloop van dit gesprek een mail met een korte vragenlijst die u online kunt
invullen. Dit zal ongeveer 15 minuten duren.
Heeft uw voor aanvang nog vragen?
Zet nu recorder aan!
A. Validatie gesprek contactpersoon (20 min: 10 min: 1,2,3; 10 min: 4,5)
Hier expliciet maken dat een groot deel van onderdeel A een informatie check is. Hier moet
snel doorheen worden gelopen om de rest van het interview nog passend te krijgen.
Eventuele verdieping kan verteld worden vanaf deel B.
1. Ik bekijk deze casus tussen juni 2014 en januari 2018.
a. Van wanneer tot wanneer was u betrokken bij dit proces?
b. Wat is uw functie/verantwoordelijkheid in dit proces?
Tijdens dit interview vraag ik u de vragen te beantwoorden vanuit uw rol/functie/verantw in
het besluitvormingsproces. Mocht dit perspectief erg afwijken van uw persoonlijke dan wel
organisatie mening/antwoord op de vraag geef dit dan vooral aan.
Geef blaadje met organisaties/afdelingen en rollen
2. Op het blaadje voor u ziet u alle organisaties/afdelingen betrokken in het proces en
mogelijke bijbehorende rollen van organisaties/afdelingen.
a. OP het blad voor u ziet u de rol van uw organisatie/afdeling. Dit is vanuit een
eerder gesprek gedefinieerd. Klopt uw vanuit uw organisatie/afdeling rol? Zo
niet, wat is het dan wel?
b. Missen hier organisaties/afdelingen?
c. Kloppen de bijbehorende rollen?
3. Hoe omschrijft u de onderlinge samenwerking met de andere
organisaties/afdelingen? (Laat vertellen. Geef alleen het speciale bijlage blad als
iemand uit zichzelf wilt gaan tekenen)
a. Welke onderlinge samenwerkingen tussen verschillende
organisaties/afdelingen kwamen voor in dit proces? Op basis van de
organisaties/afdelingen genoemd in de vorige vraag.
Geef bijlageblad afhankelijkheden
b. Welke vormen van afhankelijkheden heeft u gezien tussen
organisaties/afdelingen? Kruis deze aan op het blad. En waarom zijn deze
organisaties/afdelingen dan afhankelijk?
i. Financiële hulpbronnen
ii. Productie hulpbronnen (land, machines enz.)
iii. Competenties: formele/juridische autoriteit om bepaalde keuzes te
maken.
iv. Kennis: het bezitten van bepaalde kennis en informatie
v. Legitimiteit: het hebben van draagvlak.
vi. Anders, namelijk...
c. Past u uw acties/handelingen hieraan aan of gaat u anders handelen naar
aanleiding van deze verschillende afhankelijkheden? Hoe ziet dat eruit?
d. Zijn er afspraken gemaakt over de samenwerking? Zo ja, welke afspraken
zijn er gemaakt en tussen welke organisaties/afdelingen?
e. Waren de samenwerkingsafspraken tussen organisaties leidend voor uw
handelen of waren gemaakte afspraken binnen uw eigen organisatie leidend
in het nemen van besluiten? Toelichting hierop vragen
Pak tijdslijn formulier voor vraag 4 en 5
4. Op het blaadje voor u ziet u een tijdslijn van het besluitvormingsproces
(Elementen voor onszelf: verschillende besluiten en wanneer, niveaus,
organisaties/afdelingen, issues/dilemma’s, cruciale momenten).
a. Volgens eerdere verkregen informatie zijn deze (deel)besluiten genomen,
klopt dit volgens u?
b. Door wie is het eindbesluit (specificeer dit per casus, zie je tijdlijn) genomen?
c. Klopt ook de tijdsperiode en de verschillende niveaus?
d. Wat waren volgens u de essentiële momenten in het proces voor de kwaliteit
van het besluit?
Een essentieel moment herken je aan:
1. Er was een verandering van de samenstelling van
organisaties/afdelingen
2. Interacties tussen organisaties/afdelingen veranderen
3. De gespreksinhoud van het proces veranderde (bijv.
percepties over dilemma’s, afwegingen en oplossingen)
e. Past u uw acties/handelingen hieraan aan of gaat u anders handelen naar
aanleiding van essentiële momenten binnen het proces? Hoe ziet dat eruit?
5. Welke grote dilemma's/afwegingen hebben zich afgespeeld binnen het proces?
a. Wanneer hebben deze zich afgespeeld? Geef dit aan op de tijdlijn.
b. Was er sprake van een oplossing en waarom wel/niet?
c. Past u uw acties/handelingen hieraan aan of gaat u anders handelen naar
aanleiding van grote dilemma's/afwegingen? Hoe ziet dat eruit?
d. In hoeverre liet u deze dilemma’s/afwegingen meewegen in het besluit?
6. Wat was de invloed van externe factoren (bv. andere projecten/besluiten, media,
politiek) op dit besluit?
a. Kunt u een paar voorbeelden hiervan noemen?
b. Past u uw acties/handelingen hieraan aan of gaat u anders handelen naar
aanleiding van externe factoren? Hoe ziet dat eruit?
B. Belangen (5 min)
Geef bijlage blaadje met mogelijke belangen.
7. Geef op het blad aan welk van de belangen u had in het besluitvormingsproces.
Kies hierbij uit de volgende belangen:
Opties belangen (hetgeen waar u waarde aan hecht):
a. Creëren van draagvlak onder aanwezige organisaties/afdelingen
b. Kosten laag houden
c. Veiligheid verbeteren
d. Efficiënter onderhoud van de infrastructuur
e. Tevreden reizigers
f. Meer capaciteit op het spoor
g. Bereiken van consensus met andere organisaties/afdelingen
h. Robuuster systeem (definitie hiervan)
i. Goede reputatie behouden/reputatie verbeteren
j. Systeem klaarmaken voor PHS
k. Anders, namelijk…
Vraag om 1 belang: wat was uw belang hier. Wanneer je opmerkt dat iemand moeite heeft
kun je voorstellen om 2 of 3 opties te laten kiezen, maar vraag dan wel om duidelijke
toelichting die je opneemt op band. Maak ook expliciet dat ze ook iets anders mogen zeggen
bij optie ‘anders’.
8. In hoeverre is gedurende het proces aan deze belangen vastgehouden en/of
concessies gedaan door u?
a. Kent u de belangen van andere organisaties/afdelingen binnen het proces?
Zo ja; ik constateer dat u de belangen van andere kent en hiervan op de
hoogte bent. Vraag gelijk door naar b.
b. Neemt u belangen van andere organisaties/afdelingen mee in uw handelen
en past u uw acties/handelingen hierop aan? Zo ja, kunt u een voorbeeld
noemen?
C. Besluitvormingsproces (10 min)
Geef bijlage blaadje met alternatieve uitkomsten
9. Voorafgaande aan het besluit bestonden er verschillende alternatieve uitkomsten. Op
het blad voor u ziet u een lijst met deze mogelijke uitkomsten van het
besluitvormingsproces.
a. Bent u het hiermee eens? Zo niet, als u nog mogelijke uitkomsten mist, kunt u
aanvullingen doen?
Vanaf hier opnemen, niet op laten schrijven.
b. Kunt u deze mogelijke uitkomsten ranken? Van minst optimaal naar meest
optimaal voor u. En waarom is dit zo?
c. Heeft u in de samenwerking sterk vastgehouden aan uw opvatting, of bent u makkelijk van uw opvattingen afgeweken en zich aangepast aan de opvattingen van andere organisaties/afdelingen binnen de samenwerking? Kunt u een voorbeeld/toelichting geven over hoe u zich heeft aangepast? Vanuit hun achtergrond kijken naar het probleem; is het een gunstig besluit?
d. Wat was/is in uw ogen een worst-case scenario?
Worst-case scenario is de slechts mogelijke uitkomst van het proces. Een
uitkomst die niemand wilt. Dit kan ook iets anders zijn dan de eerder
genoemde opties.
e. Wat werd er gedaan een sub-optimaal besluit te voorkomen?
10. Was er bepaalde kennis nodig voor het nemen van besluiten binnen het
besluitvormingsproces?
a. Was deze kennis bij u altijd aanwezig gedurende het gehele proces?
b. Miste u informatie ergens in dit proces? Had u het idee dat informatie om tot
het juiste besluit te komen een issue was?
c. Was er verschil in kennis tussen organisaties/afdelingen? Om welke
informatie ging dit? (sprake van informatie asymmetrie)
Specifiek: stel ze hebben het niet over hun eigen organisaties/afdeling, vraag
daar nog specifiek over
d. Heeft u informatie/kennis gedeeld met andere organisaties/afdelingen binnen
het proces, of was u voorzichtig in het delen van kennis? Vraag toelichting.
Als mensen hier moeilijk kijken, benadruk nog even dat je alles anonimiseert.
D. Acties/handelingen (10 min)
Geef bijlage blaadje met mogelijke acties/handelingen en aankruisblad.
11. Deze vraag gaat over uw acties/handelingen in het besluitvormingsproces:
a. Welk acties/handelingen vertoonde u in het besluitvormingsproces?
Vink op het blad aan welke uw acties/handelingen u hanteerde tijdens het
besluitvormingsproces, kies hierbij uit de acties/handelingen lijst
Kunt u vertellen wanneer en hoe deze acties/handelingen tot uiting kwamen?
b. Heeft u op verschillende momenten gedurende het proces verschillende
acties/handelingen gehanteerd? Bijvoorbeeld tijdens verschillende cruciale
momenten binnen het proces?
c. Waren er momenten in het proces dat uw eigen belang belangrijker was dan
het collectieve belang en vice versa; waren er momenten in het proces dat
het collectieve belang belangrijker was dan uw eigen belang? Waar blijkt dat
uit?
12. Over de acties/handelingen van anderen in het besluit:
a. Vink op het blad aan welke acties/handelingen u terugzag bij anderen tijdens
het besluitvormingsproces.
b. Heeft u op verschillende momenten gedurende het proces verschillende
acties/handelingen gezien bij anderen binnen de samenwerking?
Bijvoorbeeld tijdens verschillende cruciale momenten binnen het proces.
c. Past u uw acties/handelingen hieraan aan of gaat u anders handelen naar
aanleiding van acties/handelingen van andere organisaties/afdelingen binnen
het proces? Hoe ziet dat eruit?
Acties/handelingen lijst:
● Go-alone gedrag
○ Partij streeft zijn eigen doelen en belangen na en kijkt en luistert niet
naar andere partijen.
● Samenwerkend gedrag
○ Partijen zoeken de samenwerking op, enerzijds omdat dit moet
(afhankelijk van elkaar zijn) of anderzijds omdat partijen streven om
gezamenlijke doelen te bereiken.
● Vermijdend gedrag
○ Partij neemt een passieve instelling aan binnen de samenwerking
(bijvoorbeeld neemt geen initiatief in het uitvoeren van taken).
● Schendingsgedrag
○ Partij schendt de gemaakte samenwerkingsafspraken, omdat dit een
voordelig effect heeft voor de partij.
● Druk uitoefenen
○ Een partij vertoont gedrag waarbij het druk uitoefent op andere partijen
binnen de samenwerking om bijvoorbeeld bepaalde afspraken af te
dwingen.
● Vergroten van complexiteit
○ Het bewust toevoegen van nieuwe issues en/of partijen waardoor het
proces te complex wordt en een besluit nemen wordt onmogelijk
gemaakt.
○ Conflicterend gedrag vertonen
● Salami tactiek
○ Een partij kan binnen het proces over elk besluit een ander standpunt
aannemen. Hierdoor worden alle besluiten binnen het proces
opgeknipt waardoor een partij onberekenbaar is in het proces.
● Afwachtend gedrag
○ Niet het voortouw nemen in het proces
○ Alle opties open houden
○ Wachten tot goed moment om je punt in te brengen of actie uit te
voeren.
● Anders, namelijk…
F. Vragen/opmerkingen (5 min)
10. Zijn er ontwikkelingen geweest in het proces waarover u zich heeft verbaasd?
a. Hadden er dingen nog beter gekund?
b. Wat heeft u nog te vertellen wat nog niet ter sprake is gekomen?
c. Heeft u zelf nog toevoegingen of opmerkingen, of vragen?
Extra vragen: (deze gaan we alleen vragen als we tijd over hebben)
G. Overig
Tijdsdruk
11. Zat er tijdsdruk achter dit proces? Zo ja, waarom?
a. Op welk moment in dit proces was dit zichtbaar?
Vertrouwen en sensitiviteit
16. Vindt u dat er voldoende naar uw belangen en standpunten is geluisterd door andere
organisaties/afdelingen?
a. Kunt u zich inleven in andere organisaties/afdelingen binnen het
besluitvormingsproces?
b. Voelt u zich verantwoordelijk voor bepaalde taken binnen het
samenwerkingsproces?
c. Vind u het erg om taken uit te besteden aan een andere organisatie/afdeling
of voert u uw eigen taken liever zelf uit?
d. Heeft u vertrouwen in de samenwerkende organisaties/afdelingen?
Afsluiting (5 min)
● Dit waren de vragen van mijn kant.
● U krijgt via de mail een korte online vragenlijst, dit kost u max X min. Wilt u deze zsm
na dit gesprek invullen?
● Mochten er eventuele vervolgvragen zijn, mag ik u dan mailen, bellen of een
vervolgafspraak maken?
● Ik zal dit interview uittypen. Wilt u de uitgetypte versie van het interview ontvangen?
● Dank voor uw medewerking!
B.2 Appendix respondents
82
Vraag 2: Betrokken Organisaties/afdelingen
Betrokken partij Rol partij
ProRail Afdeling
V&D
AM
Stations
VL
Projecten
NS Reizigers
NS Stations
Ministerie van I&W
Gemeente Nijmegen
Provincie Gelderland
Arriva
Veolia
KNV
Vraag 3: Afhankelijkheden
Opties vormen van afhankelijkheden:
▢ Financiële hulpbronnen
▢ Productie hulpbronnen (land, machines enz.)
▢ Competenties: formele/juridische autoriteit om bepaalde keuzes te
maken.
▢ Kennis: het bezitten van bepaalde kennis en informatie
▢ Legitimiteit: het hebben van draagvlak.
▢ Anders, namelijk...
Vraag 7: Belangen
Opties belangen (hetgeen waar u waarde aan hecht):
▢ Creëren van draagvlak onder aanwezige partijen
▢ Kosten laag houden
▢ Veiligheid verbeteren
▢ Efficiënter onderhoud van de infrastructuur
▢ Tevreden reizigers
▢ Meer capaciteit op het spoor
▢ Bereiken van consensus met andere partijen
▢ Robuuster systeem
▢ Goede reputatie behouden/reputatie verbeteren
▢ Systeem klaarmaken voor PHS
▢ Anders, namelijk…
Vraag 9: Mogelijke uitkomsten proces
1. Optie 1
10’/B
Met directe verbinding spoor 6 richting REP, zonder doorgetrokken
tunnel voor de gemeente Nijmegen
2. Optie 2
10’/C2
Met directe verbinding spoor 6 richting REP, met doorgetrokken tunnel
voor de gemeente Nijmegen
3. Optie 3
11’/B
Zonder directe verbinding spoor 6 richting REP, zonder doorgetrokken
tunnel voor de gemeente Nijmegen
4. Optie 4
11’/C2
Zonder directe verbinding spoor 6 richting REP, met doorgetrokken
tunnel voor de gemeente Nijmegen
Vraag 12 en 13: Acties/handelingen
Acties/handelingen Eigen Acties/ handelingen
Acties/handelingen anderen
Go-alone gedrag
Partij streeft zijn eigen doelen en belangen na en
kijkt en luistert niet naar andere partijen.
Samenwerkend gedrag
Partijen zoeken de samenwerking op, enerzijds
omdat dit moet (afhankelijk van elkaar zijn) of
anderzijds omdat partijen streven om gezamenlijke
doelen te bereiken.
Vermijdend gedrag
Partij neemt een passieve instelling aan binnen de
samenwerking (bijvoorbeeld neemt geen initiatief in
het uitvoeren van taken).
Schendingsgedrag
Partij schendt de gemaakte
samenwerkingsafspraken, omdat dit een voordelig
effect heeft voor de partij.
Druk uitoefenen
Een partij vertoont gedrag waarbij het druk uitoefent
op andere partijen binnen de samenwerking om
bijvoorbeeld bepaalde afspraken af te dwingen.
Vergroten van complexiteit
Het bewust toevoegen van nieuwe issues en/of
partijen waardoor het proces te complex wordt en
een besluit nemen wordt onmogelijk gemaakt.
Conflicterend gedrag vertonen
Salami tactiek
Een partij kan binnen het proces over elk besluit
een ander standpunt aannemen. Hierdoor worden
alle besluiten binnen het proces opgeknipt waardoor
een partij onberekenbaar is in het proces.
Afwachtend gedrag
Niet het voortouw nemen in het proces
Alle opties open houden
Wachten tot goed moment om je punt in te brengen
of actie uit te voeren
Anders, namelijk…
Appendix C
List with conducted interviews
Interview Person1 Program manager Innovation and development2 Project manager case Nijmegen3 Chairman steering committee Nijmegen4 Representative ProRail in the steering committee and program
manager business unit transport and timetable ProRail5 Project coordinator and secretary steering committee Nijmegen6 Planning coordinator (from the asset management department)7 Plan developer in the project group8 Controller of the projectgroup9 Representative NS Reizigers in the steering committee10 Representative Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management
in the steering committee11 Projectleader station area municipality Nijmegen, representative
municipality of Nijmegen in the steering committee12 Official client for development of stations, representative munici-
pality of Nijmegen in the steering committee13 Person responsible for the rail and stations program of province of
Gelderland, representative province of Gelderland in the steeringcommittee
Below is an overview of which respondent was in which consultation or committee. The numbers correspondto the interview number in the list of interview candidates C.
Table C.1:
ProRail NS IenW Nijmegen GelderlandSteering committee 3,4 9 10 11,12 13
VD AM ProjectsGroot IPT 4 6 2,5 X X X XProject team X X 2,5,7,8 X X X X
88
Appendix D
Codings scheme
D.1 General codings scheme complexity
89
Operationalisering Aanleiding
Concept Dimensie Indicator Waarden
AP. Aanleiding project
RS. Reizigerscapaciteit spoorsysteem (stations)
RS.GR. Groei reizigerscapaciteit
RS.GR.1 Groei aan reizigers verwacht op stations RS.GR.2 Huidige transfercapaciteiten te klein voor het aantal reizigers RS.GR.3 Huidige perrons te klein voor het aantal reizigers
AG. Algemene groei spoorsysteem (stations)
AG.GC. Groei aan capaciteit AG.GV. Groei van voorzieningen AG.AS. Aanpassing stations
AG.GC.1 Meer treinen laten rijden 1.1 Meer goederentreinen laten rijden AG.GV.1 Huidige aantal voorzieningen te klein zijn voor het aantal reizigers AG.GV.2 Huidige stationsvoorzieningen te klein voor het aantal reizigers AG.AS.1 Het station is verouderd AG.AS.2 Het station voldoet niet aan de eisen van de omgeving AG.AS.3 Er deed zich een kans voor om werkzaamheden te combineren en zo extra kansen te creëren AG.AS.4 Lokale overheden willen een verandering/verbouwing
PH. PHS PH.1 De huidige infra kan geen PHS dienstregeling aan 2 Huidige station kan geen PHS treinen aan PH.3 Dit project is onderdeel van PHS
Oy. Omgevingsdynamiek
Ov. Overig
Operationalisering systeemkenmerken
Concept Dimensie Indicator Waarden
SK. Systeemkenmerken
Spoorsysteem; interne kenmerken (SSI)
SSI.St Station SSI.Sp Sporen SSI.Wi Wissels SSI.Di Dienstregeling SSI.Ss Spoorwegseinen (lichtseinen) SSI.Tr Treinen SSI.Ict ICT
.1 Perrons/platforms
.2 Stationshal
.1 Enkel spoor
.2 Dubbel spoor
.3 Spoorbrug
.4 Rangeerterrein
.1 ‘Gewone wissel’
.2 Kruising
.3 Overloopwissel
.4 Kruiswissel
.5 Wisselstraat
.6 Ontspoortong
.7 Engels wissel
.8 Driewegwissel
.9 Meegebogen wissel
.1 Ritnummer
.2 Vertrektijden
.3 Aankomsttijden
.4 Doorkomsttijden
.5 Aansluitingen
.1 Hoog geplaatste seinen
.2 Laag geplaatste seinen
.3 Snelheidsborden
.4 Armseinen
.5 Front- en sluitseinen
.6 Treinlengteborden
.7 Borden voor voertuigen met stroomafnemers .1 Intercity’s .2 Sprinters .3 Goederentreinen .1 Communicatie .2 Technologieën
Spoorsysteem; externe kenmerken (SSE)
SSE.Rv Railverkeersleiding SSE.Tl Treindienstleider SSE.Tm Treinmachinist SSE.Tc Treinconducteur
.1 Veiligheidsberichten
.2 Berichten over afwijking dienstregeling
.1 Bediening wissels
.2 Bediening seinen
.3 Instellen rijwegen (stuk rijweg voor een trein reserveren) .1 Acceleratie van treinen (versnellen) .2 Deceleratie van treinen (verminderen) .3 Opvolgen van seinen .4 Garanderen veiligheid van treinen .1 Veilig laten vertrekken trein (fluiten) .2 Reizigers informeren (omroepen) .3 Vervoersbewijzen controleren .4 Handhaven rust, orde en veiligheid .5 Uitdelen van proces-verbaal, boetes
Externe kenmerken van vervoer, niet trein spoorsysteem (EKV)
EKV.Av Autoverkeer EKV.Bu Bussen EKV.T/m Trams/metro’s EKV.Fi Fiets
.1 (Snel)wegen naar stations
.2 Parkeerplekken bij stations
.3 ‘Kiss and ride’ plekken bij stations
.1 Busplatforms bij stations
.2 Aansluiting tussen trein en bus
.1 Tram/metro haltes bij stations
.2 Spooraansluiting van tram/metro met treinen .3 In- en uitcheck poortjes tram/metro en treinen .4 Aansluiting tussen trams/metro’s en treinen .1 Fietspaden van en naar stations .2 OV fietsverhuur bij stations .3 Fietsenstallingen (onbeveiligd en beveiligd)
Externe kenmerken algemeen (EXA)
EXA.We Weer .1 Regen .2 Zon .3 Hagel .4 Wind .5 Onweer .6 Sneeuw .7 Ijs
Padafhankelijk heid [temporele component] (PAD)
PA.Ont Ontwikkelingen van het spoorsysteem PA.Be Besluiten over spoorsysteem uit het verleden PA. Ha Harde beperkingen voor ontwikkeling spoorsysteem PA.Mo Mogelijkheden voor ontwikkeling spoorsysteem
PA.Ha.1 Infra beperkingen (auto, bus, metro/tram, fiets) PA.Ha.2 Monumentale gebouwen PA.Mo.1 Infra mogelijkheden (auto, bus, metro/tram, fiets)
Conflicten/ dillema’s/afwegingen (CDA)
CDA.OA.Onenigheid actoren CDA.IC.Invloed conflict, dilemma of afweging
CDA.1 Conflict, dilemma of afweging in het proces CDA.OA.1 Onenigheid verdeling schaarse hulpbronnen CDA.OA.2 Onenigheid bepaling/gebruik van procedures CDA.OA.3 Onenigheid oordelen/interpreteren van feiten CDA.OA.4 Onenigheid vaststellen doelen CDA.OA.5 Onenigheid inrichting systeem CDA.IC.1 Conflict, dilemma of afweging heeft invloed gehad op de uitkomst CDA.IC.2 Conflict, dilemma of afweging heeft invloed gehad op het handelen van de actor CDA.IC.3 Er was sprake van een oplossing voor het conflict, dilemma of afweging CDA.IC.4 Er was geen sprake van een oplossing voor het conflict, dilemma of
afweging CDA.IC5 Conflict, dilemma of afweging heeft meegewogen in het besluit CDA.IC.4 Conflict, dilemma of afweging heeft niet meegewogen in het besluit
Ontwerp specificaties (OS)
OS.As Aantal sporen OS.Aw Aantal wissels OS.Ap Aantal perrons
Operationalisering Actoren
Concept Dimensie Indicator Waarden
Actor
PR. ProRail
PD. ProRail V&D
PV. ProRail-VACO
PP. ProRail-Projecten
PA. ProRail-
Assetmanagement
PS. ProRail stations
PL. ProRail
Verkeersleiding
NS. NS
NO. NSNO(Operatie)/nettrain/infrastructuur NC. NS commercie & ontwikkeling NR. NS reizigers NT. NS stations Ar. Arriva
Vo. Veolia
KN. KNV
IW. Ministerie van
Infrastructuur &
Waterstaat
IM. Ministerie van
Infrastructuur &
Milieu
GS. Gemeente
Schiedam
GD. Gemeente Delft
GR. Gemeente
Rotterdam
GN. Gemeente
Nijmegen
GA. Gemeente
Amsterdam
Bh. Betrokkenheid
Ra. Rol actor
Fa. Functie actor
Sa. Samenwerkingen
Af. Afhankelijkheden
.1 Betrokken gedurende het hele proces
.2 Betrokken gedurende een deel van het
proces
.1 Gedurende hele proces dezelfde functie
.2 Gedurende proces verandert van functie
.3 Opdrachtgever
.4 Projectmanager/procesleider
.5 Hiërarchische partij
.6 Dienstverlenende partij
.7 Initiatiefnemer
.8 Anders
.1 Afspraken zijn gemaakt
.2 Er zijn geen afspraken gemaakt
.3 Voelt zich verantwoordelijk voor bepaalde
taken binnen het samenwerkingsproces
.4 Voelt zich niet verantwoordelijk voor
bepaalde taken binnen het
samenwerkingsproces
.5 Vindt het niet erg om taken uit te
besteden
.6 Voert taken liever zelf uit
.7 Er was onderlinge samenwering tussen
actoren
.8 Samenwerkingsafspraken waren leidend
voor het handelen
.1 Hulpbronnen (financiële/productie)
.2 Competenties (Formele/juridische
autoriteit om bepaalde keuzes te maken)
.3 Kennis/informatie (was aanwezig
gedurende het proces/ ontbrak ergens
gedurende het proces)
.4 Legitimiteit/draagvlak (was aanwezig
gedurende het proces/ ontbrak ergens
PZ. Provincie Zuid-
Holland
PG. Provincie
Gelderland
PN. Provincie Noord-
Holland
MR. Metropoolregio
R’dam - Den Haag
(MRDH)
VA. Vervoersregio
Amsterdam
Ro. Rover
Be. Belangen
BO. Belangen, hoe is
ermee omgegaan?
AH.
Acties/handelingen
Ve. Vertrouwen
Co. Conflicten
gedurende het proces
.5 Anders
.1 Creëren van draagvlak onder aanwezige
organisaties/afdelingen
.2 Kosten laag houden
.3 Veiligheid verbeteren
.4 Efficiënter onderhoud van de
infrastructuur
.5 Tevreden reizigers
.6 Meer capaciteit op het spoor
.7 Bereiken van consensus met andere
organisaties/afdelingen
.8 Robuuster systeem (definitie hiervan)
.9 Goede reputatie behouden/reputatie
verbeteren
.10 Systeem klaarmaken voor PHS
.11 Anders, namelijk…
.1 Er is aan de belangen vastgehouden
.2 Er zijn concessies gedaan
.3 Belang is behartigt
.4 Belang is deels behartigt
.5 Belang is niet behartigt
6. Er is voldoende naar belangen geluisterd
door andere organisaties
.7 Kan zich inleven in andere organisaties
.8 Een actor heeft meerdere gelijkwaardige
belangen
.9 Een actor heeft meerdere
ongelijkwaardige belangen
.10 De actor kent het belang van andere
actoren
.11 Anders
.1 Go-alone gedrag
.2 Samenwerkend gedrag
.3 Vermijdend gedrag
.4 Schendingsgedrag
.5 Druk uitoefenen
.6 Vergroten van complexiteit
.7 Salami tactiek
.8 Afwachtend gedrag
.9 Anders
.1 Heeft vertrouwen in de samenwerkende
organisaties
.2 Heeft geen vertrouwen in de
samenwerkende organisaties
Op. Opvattingen
Mm. Machtsmiddelen
In. Individu
Cm. Cruciaal moment
Eb. Eindbesluit
Vz. Verbazing actor
.1 Over politieke voorkeuren
.2 Over waarden
.3 Over (weinig/geen) vertrouwen
.4 Over financiën
.5 Anders
.1 Actor heeft ergens in het proces gebruik
gemaakt van machtsmiddelen
.2 Geen actor heeft in het proces gebruik
gemaakt van machtsmiddelen
.3 Anders
.1 Tevreden
.2 Ontevreden
.3 Anders
Operationalisering Formele besluitvormingsstructuur
Concept Dimensie Indicator Waarden
FP. Formele procedure
KP. Kernproces
KP.Fs. Fase KP.Bs. Beslissing KP.IB. Invloed genomen besluit KP.Bl. Besluiter
KP.Fs.1 Het project zit in de voorfase KP.Fs.2 Het project zit in de alternatievenstudiefase KP.Fs.3 Het project zit in de planuitwerkingsfase KP.Fs.4 Het project zit in de realisatiefase KP.Bs.1 Er is een startbeslissing genomen KP.Bs.2 Acceptatie aanbieding KP.Bs.3 Er is goedkeuring voor de gekozen alternatieven gegeven KP.Bs.4 Beslissing voorkeursalternatief KP.Bs.5 Beslissing voorkeursvariant KP.Bs.6 Uitvoeringsbeslissing KP.Bs.7 Start uitvoering KP.Bs.8 Opleveringsbesluit KP.Bs.9 Decharge KP.IB.1 Besluit heeft invloed gehad op de uitkomst KP.IB.2 Besluit heeft invloed gehad op het handelen van de actor KP.Bl.1 Staatssecretaris/IenW KP.Bl.2 DO PHS KP.Bl.3 RvC KP.Bl.4 ExCo KP.Bl.5 Stuurgroep KP.Bl.6 Portefeuillehouder KP.Bl.7 Bedrijfseenheid/afdeling KP.Bl.8 Gemeente KP.Bl.9 Provincie
MR. MIRT MR.Fs. Fase MR.Bs. Beslissing MR.IB. Invloed genomen besluit MR.Bl. Besluiter
MR.Fs.1 Het project zit in de gebiedsagenda fase MR.Fs.2 Het project zit in de MIRT verkenning fase MR.Fs.3 Het project zit in de MIRT Planuitwerking fase MR.Fs.4 Het project zit in de MIRT realisatie fase MR.Bs.1 Er is een startbeslissing genomen MR.Bs.2 Er is een voorkeursbeslissing genomen MR.Bs.3 Er is een projectbeslissing genomen MR.Bs.4 Er is een opleveringbeslissing genomen MR.IB.1 Besluit heeft invloed gehad op de uitkomst MR.IB.2 Besluit heeft invloed gehad op het handelen van de actor MR.Bl.1 Staatssecretaris/IenW
MR.Sc. Scope MR.Dt. Doorlooptijd
MR.Bl.2 DO PHS MR.Bl.3 RvC MR.Bl.4 ExCo MR.Bl.5 Stuurgroep MR.Bl.6 Portefeuillehouder MR.Bl.7 Bedrijfseenheid/afdeling MR.Bl.8 Gemeente MR.Bl.9 Provincie MR.Sc.1 De scope van het project was vanaf het begin duidelijk MR.Sc.2 De scope van het project is gedurende het project aangepast MR.Dt.1 De vastgestelde doorlooptijd is gehaald MR.Dt.2 De doorlooptijd is tijdens het proces verkort MR.Dt.3 De doorlooptijd is tijdens het proces verlengt
AP. Aanvullende
procedures
AP.Ol. Overleggen AP.OD. Overige genomen deelbesluiten/ Afspraken
AP.IB. Invloed genomen besluit AP.Bl. Besluiter
AP.Ol.1 Er is een stuurgroep geïnstalleerd AP.Ol.2 Er is een directie overleg AP.Ol.3 Er zijn werkgroepen met verschillende actoren AP.OD.1 Er is een bestuursovereenkomst gesloten tussen actoren AP.OD.2 Er wordt en tracéwetprocedure gevolg AP.OD.3 Er is een Milieu Effect Rapportage (MER) gemaakt AP.OD.4 Overig genomen besluiten AP.IB.1 (deel)besluit heeft invloed gehad op de uitkomst AP.IB.2 (deel)besluit heeft invloed gehad op het handelen van de actor AP.Bl.1 Staatssecretaris/IenW AP.Bl.2 DO PHS AP.Bl.3 RvC AP.Bl.4 ExCo AP.Bl.5 Stuurgroep AP.Bl.6 Portefeuillehouder AP.Bl.7 Bedrijfseenheid/afdeling AP.Bl.8 Gemeente AP.Bl.9 Provincie
Ac. Actoren Ac.Vw. Verantwoordelijkheid
Ac.Vw.1 Deze actor in het proces neemt het besluit Ac.Vw.2 Deze actor geeft advies/informatie over het besluit
Uk. Uitkomsten Uk.MU. Mogelijke uitkomsten Uk.WS. Worstcase scenario
Uk.MU.1 Een mogelijke oplossing/uitkomst van het proces Uk.WS.1 Alle actoren hadden hetzelfde worstcase scenario Uk.WS.2 Er werd actie ondernomen om het
Uk.DU. Definitieve uitkomst/besluit
worstcase scenario te voorkomen Uk.DU.1 Er was verdeeldheid over de definitieve uitkomst van het proces Uk.DU.2 De definitieve uitkomst van het proces wordt gedragen door alle actoren Uk.DU.3 Het definitieve besluit is uitgesteld Uk.DU.4 Het definitieve besluit is nog niet genomen
Operationalisering Financiën
Concept Dimensie Indicator Waarden
FI. Financiën Ac. Actoren
1. Financier 2. Geldontvanger
1.1 Deze actoren (A, B, C …) financieren het project 1.2 Het was duidelijk wie het project zou financieren 1.3 Het was niet duidelijk wie het project zou financieren 1.4 Actoren weigeren (meer) geld te geven 2.1 Heeft actief gelobbyd voor meer geld 2.2 Gaat er vanuit dat het nodige geld er toch wel komt
Ks. Kosten Ks.Bd. Bedrag Ks.Vr. Veranderingen
Ks.Bd.1 De kosten zijn X voor dit project Ks.Vr.1 De beoogde kosten zijn het hele proces hetzelfde gebleven Ks.Vr.2 De beoogde kosten zijn veranderd gedurende het proces Ks.Vr.3 De uiteindelijke kosten zijn hoger uitgevallen dan gedacht/begroot Ks.Vr.4 De uiteindelijke kosten zijn lager uitgevallen dan gedacht/begroot
Bg. Budget Bg.Bd. Bedrag Bg.Vr. Veranderingen
Bg.Bd.1 Het budget is X voor dit project Bg.Bd.2 Er is nog geen echte zekerheid over het budget aan het einde van het proces Bg.Vr.1 Er was het hele proces genoeg budget Bg.Vr.2 Er was aan het eind van het proces genoeg budget Bg.Vr.3 Er was te weinig budget aan het begin van het proces Bg.Vr.4 Er is te weinig budget aan het einde van het proces Bg.Vr.5 Er zijn onderhandelingen geweest over het budget Bg.Vr.6 Het budget is overschreden Bg.Vr.7 Er was ruimte in het budget gereserveerd voor risico’s Bg.Vr.8 Er is een risico dat er niet voldoende budget komt
Operationalisering media- en politieke gevoeligheid
Concept Dimensie Indicator Waarden
MZ. Maatschappelijke zichtbaarheid
Mediagevoeligheid (MG)
MG.Ve Veel media-aandacht MG.We Weinig media-aandacht MG.In Invloed (gevolgen)
.1 Veel berichten over onderwerp in traditionele media (krant, tv, internet) .2 Veel berichten over onderwerp in sociale media (facebook etc.) .1 Weinig berichten over onderwerp in traditionele media (krant, tv, internet) .2 Weinig berichten over onderwerp in sociale media (facebook etc.) .1 Veel invloed gehad .2 Weinig invloed gehad
Politieke gevoeligheid (PGe)
PG.Ve Veel politieke aandacht PG.We Weinig politieke aandacht PG.In Invloed (gevolgen)
.1 Grote betrokkenheid van politici (wethouder, minister, raadsleden etc.) .2 Dossier heeft impact op politieke posities .1 Kleine betrokkenheid van politici (wethouder, minister, raadsleden etc.) .2 Dossier heeft weinig impact op politieke posities .1 Veel invloed gehad .2 Weinig invloed gehad
Operationalisering Overig
Concept Dimensie Indicator Waarden
Ov. Overig Td. Tijdsdruk .1 Gedurende gehele proces .2 Gedurende deel van het proces
Ke. Kennis Ke.De. Delen van kennis
.1Er was verschil in kennis tussen actoren Ke.De.1 Actor heeft kennis gedeeld met andere actoren Ke.De.2 Actor was voorzichtig met het delen van kennis
Vb. Verbeteringen .1 Er hadden dingen beter gekund in het proces .2 Er waren geen verbeterpunten in het proces
IE. Invloed externe factoren
.1 Ander project
SO. Sub-optimaal besluit
SO.Bn. Sub-optimaal besluit behandeling
SO.Bn.1 Er werd geprobeerd het sub-optimale besluit te voorkomen SO.Bn.2 Er werd niet geprobeerd het sub-optimale besluit te voorkomen
D.2 General codings scheme process
102
Operationalisering ‘ronde-model’
Het ronde-model kan gebruikt worden om besluitvormingsprocessen in kaart te brengen (Teisman,
2000). Het is een interactieve benadering om naar besluitvormingsprocessen te kijken (Scharpf,
1997). Hiermee wordt bedoelt dat beleid niet door één actor wordt gemaakt, maar in samenspraak
met verschillende actoren. Beleid is het resultaat van strategische interacties tussen meerdere
actoren, waar elke actor zijn eigen perceptie heeft, zijn eigen voorkeuren/belangen en zijn eigen
resources dat invloed kan uitoefenen op het eindresultaat. De focus ligt hierom op interacties tussen
actoren, waarbij het van belang is om te analyseren welke actor op welk moment participeert.
Binnen dit model worden verschillende ‘ronden’ onderscheden binnen een besluitvormingsproces,
waarbij een analyse gedaan wordt naar verschillende probleem- en oplossingsbenaderingen die tot
stand zijn gekomen als gevolg van interacties van actoren. Een actor scoort punten als zijn probleem-
en/of oplossingsbenadering leidend is in een ronde. Een nieuwe ronde begint als de richting van het
proces veranderd, nieuwe actoren participeren, dat regels over samenwerking en onderhandeling
veranderen, technische onzekerheid toe- of afneemt en dat veranderingen in de context een rol gaan
spelen.
In het ronde-model zijn actoren dus het focuspunt van de analyse, waarbij de aanname heerst dat
benaderingen van problemen en oplossingen niet gekoppeld is aan één actor en voor aanvang van
het proces de probleem- en oplossingsbenadering niet vaststaat. In tegenstelling; meerdere actoren
zijn betrokken bij de besluitvorming en zij introduceren hun eigen percepties van problemen,
oplossingen en besluiten (Teisman, 2000). Om besluitvorming te begrijpen in dit model, is het
belangrijk dat de onderzoeker zich focust op de verscheidenheid aan actoren, doelstellingen en
oplossingen, de dynamiek van het besluitvormingsproces en de interacties tussen de actoren. Dit ligt
in lijn met complexe besluitvorming.
In het ronde-model wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen enerzijds een verticale classificatie van
besluitvorming, waarbij geanalyseerd wordt welke besluiten zijn genomen gedurende een
tijdsperiode. Hierbij wordt gekeken wat start- en eindpunten zijn en wat cruciale
momenten/besluiten zijn van een bepaalde periode. Dit wordt een ‘besluitvormings-ronde’
genoemd. En anderzijds een horizontale classificatie waarin aandacht wordt besteed aan interacties
tussen actoren over een bepaald onderwerp in een specifieke periode/ronde.
Het onderscheidt in rondes is belangrijk, omdat op deze wijze gedragingen van actoren op
verschillende momenten geanalyseerd kan worden (Teisman, 2000). De toepassing van het ronde-
model op besluitvorming zorgt ervoor dat een overzicht wordt gegeven van het proces, waarbij
inzichtelijk wordt of betrokken actoren in interacties de mogelijkheden hebben benut om van elkaars
afhankelijkheden en hulpbronnen gebruik te maken om tot een gezamenlijk besluit te komen.
Concept: Ronde-model
Dimensie Indicator
Globale analyse (GlA) 1. Beslismomenten
2. Chronologische volgorde
3. Verwijzing naar tijdlijn
Beslismoment/ronde (BR) 1. Richting proces veranderd (gespreksinhoud veranderd,
ontstaan van conflicten, deelbesluiten worden genomen,
nieuw dilemma/issue/afweging doet zich voor).
2. Nieuwe actoren participeren (samenstelling veranderd)
3. Regels over samenwerking en/of onderhandeling
veranderen (interacties veranderen)
4. Technische onzekerheid neemt toe/af
5. Verandering in de context gaat rol spelen in het proces:
politiek of media
Cruciale beslismomenten (CB) 1. Een besluit waar andere actoren zich niet aan kunnen
onttrekken
Gedragingen/strategieën per
ronde (GSpR); indelen naar
actoren
1. Go-alone gedrag
2. Samenwerkend gedrag
3. Vermijdend gedrag
4. Schendingsgedrag
5. Druk uitoefenen
6. Vergroten van complexiteit
7. Salami tactiek
8. Afwachtend gedrag
9. Overig…
Rollen per ronde (RpR);
indelen naar actoren
1. Opdrachtgever
2. Projectmanager/procesleider
3. Hiërarchische partij
4. Dienstverlenende partij
5. Initiatiefnemer
6. Overig…
Wederzijdse
afhankelijkheden per ronde
(WApR); indelen naar actoren
1. Financiële hulpbronnen
2. Productie hulpbronnen (land, machines enz.)
3. Competencies: formele/juridische autoriteit om bepaalde
keuzes te maken.
4. Kennis: het bezitten van bepaalde kennis en informatie
5. Legitimiteit: het hebben van draagvlak.
6. Overig…
Operationaliseringsschema ronde-model
Om het ronde-model per casus te hanteren, is het noodzakelijk dat bepaalde stappen worden
genomen. Deze stappen zijn hierboven ook in het operationalisering schema uitgewerkt.
● Stap 1: het proces globaal in beeld brengen (de tijdlijn), waarbij een chronologisch overzicht
wordt gegeven van de gebeurtenissen (beslismomenten).
● Stap 2: het identificeren van de beslismomenten/rondes. Kenmerken van een beslismoment
zijn: richting van het proces veranderd, verandering samenstelling actoren, verandering in
interacties, technische onzekerheid neemt toe of af, verandering in context gaat een rol
spelen.
● Stap 3: identificeren van cruciale beslismomenten. Een beslismoment is cruciaal, wanneer
actoren zich niet aan dit soort besluiten kunnen onttrekken en grote impact heeft.
● Stap 4: per ronde belangen wat belangen/opvattingen zijn per actor
● Stap 5: per ronde bepalen wat strategieën van actoren zijn geweest.
● Stap 6: per ronde bepalen welke rollen actoren aannamen.
● Stap 7: per ronde in kaart brengen welke afhankelijkheden zijn voorgekomen.
● Stap 8: per ronde bepalen welke technische onzekerheden spelen.
● Stap 9: per ronde bepalen wat de rol van de context heeft op het proces (politiek en media)
● Stap 10: start- en eindsituatie per ronde beschrijven.
Teisman, G. R. (2000). Models for research into decision‐making processes: on phases, streams and
decision‐making rounds. Public administration, 78(4), 937-956.
Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research. Hachette UK.
Appendix E
Case study of the rebuilding ofAmsterdam Zuid station
The case study of Amsterdam has been worked out by another student. The case description will not bein this report, but is available on request. Since this case study is not the main interest of this internshipproject, the mathematical analyses will not be described here. However, all preferences of actors are givenand the SPEs that follow from the analysis will be given in this appendix.
E.1 Actor preferences
We have the set of all actors N= {ProRail, NS, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, Munic-ipality of Amsterdam}.
The issues (design variables) we are going to look at in this formalisation are the sets given in table F.1.
Table E.1: The design variables used for the formalisationI1 = {Number of tracks at Amsterdam central station}I2 = {Number of tracks at station Amsterdam Zuid}I3 = {End point location of the international train service}I4 = {Type of train service on the Westtak }
For each issue, we consider two options:I1 = {a1, a2}I2 = {b1, b2}I3 = {c1, c2}I4 = {d1, d2}
106
Wherea1 : 9 tracks at Amsterdam central station
a2 : 10 tracks at Amsterdam central station
b1 : 4 tracks and 2 platforms at Amsterdam Zuid
b2 : 6 tracks and 3 platforms at Amsterdam Zuid
c1 : International train service at Amsterdam central station
c2 : International train service at Amsterdam Zuid
d1 : Sprinter train service on the Westtak
d2 : S-Bahn train service on the Westtak
The preference order of the issues and their options were asked to all the interview respondents. Thepreference order for each actor is given below:
ProRail : (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) >
(a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) >
(a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) >
(a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2)
NS : (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) >
(a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) >
(a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) >
(a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2)
IenW : (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) >
(a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) >
(a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) >
(a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d1)
Amsterdam : (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) >
(a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) >
(a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) >
(a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2)
The distribution of these preferences combinations over the groups is given below:
A : {(a2, b1, c1, d1)}B : {(a1, b1, c1, d2)}C : {(a2, b2, c1, d1)}D : {(a1, b2, c2, d2)}Remaining : {(a1, b1, c1, d1),(a1b1, c2, d1), (a1, b1, c2, d2),(a1, b2, c1, d1),
(a1, b2, c1, d2),(a1, b2, c2, d1), (a2, b1, c1, d2),(a2, b1, c2, d1),
(a2, b1, c2, d2),(a2, b2, c1, d2), (a2, b2, c2, d1),(a2, b2, c2, d2)}
In this case, all the preference combination options are feasible.We define the acceptance set of of each player as the set of the eight most preferred preference combinations.
107
The acceptance set and rejection set of the players in this game are:
AProRail = {(a1, b2, c2, d1)(a1, b2, c2, d2) (a2, b2, c2, d1)(a2, b2, c2, d2)}(a1, b1, c2, d1)(a1, b1, c2, d2) (a2, b1, c2, d1)(a2, b1, c2, d2)}
RProRail = {(a1, b2, c1, d1)(a1, b2, c1, d2) (a2, b2, c1, d1)(a2, b2, c1, d2)}(a1, b1, c1, d1)(a1, b1, c1, d2) (a2, b1, c1, d1)(a2, b1, c1, d2)}
ANS = {(a2, b2, c2, d1)(a2, b2, c2, d2) (a2, b2, c1, d1)(a2, b2, c1, d2)}(a2, b1, c2, d1)(a2, b1, c2, d2) (a2, b1, c1, d1)(a2, b1, c1, d2)}
RNS = {(a1, b2, c2, d1)(a1, b2, c2, d2) (a1, b2, c1, d1)(a1, b2, c1, d2)}(a1, b1, c2, d1)(a1, b1, c2, d2) (a1, b1, c1, d1)(a1, b1, c1, d2)}
AIenW = {(a1, b2, c2, d2)(a1, b2, c2, d1) (a1, b2, c1, d2)(a1, b2, c1, d1)}(a2, b2, c2, d2)(a2, b2, c2, d1) (a2, b2, c1, d2)(a2, b2, c1, d1)}
RIenW = {(a1, b1, c2, d2)(a1, b1, c2, d1) (a1, b1, c1, d2)(a1, b1, c1, d1)}(a2, b1, c2, d2)(a2, b1, c2, d1) (a2, b1, c1, d2)(a2, b1, c1, d1)}
AAmsterdam = {(a2, b2, c2, d1)(a2, b2, c2, d2) (a2, b1, c2, d1)(a2, b1, c2, d2)}(a2, b2, c1, d1)(a2, b2, c1, d2) (a2, b1, c1, d1)(a2, b1, c1, d2)}
RAmsterdam = {(a1, b2, c2, d1)(a1, b2, c2, d2) (a1, b1, c2, d1)(a1, b1, c2, d2)}(a1, b2, c1, d1)(a1, b2, c1, d2) (a1, b1, c1, d1)(a1, b1, c1, d2)}
.We also know the preference order of each actor regarding the outcome of the process. The preference inoutcome of the process according to the actors:
(>ProRail) : {C > D > A > B}(>NS) : {D > C > A > B}(>IenW ) : {C > A > D > B}(>Amsterdam) : {D > A > C > B}
In table E.2 an overview of all the SPE’s can be found.
Table E.2: SPE of the different analysesGame Specification SPE
Issue-by-Issue gameRandom agenda P-N-P-N a2, b2, c2, d2Random agenda N-P-N-P a2, b2, c2, d2With agenda setting P-N-P-N a2, b2, c2, d2With agenda setting N-P-N-P a2, b2, c2, d2Majority voting There is no real majority here
Multi-Issue game a2, b2, c2, d2
108
Appendix F
Case study of the four-track situationbetween Rotterdam and Schiedam
The case study of Schiedam has been worked out by another student. The case description will not be in thisreport, but is available on request. Since this case study is not the main interest of this internship project,the mathematical analyses will not be described here. However, all preferences of actors are given and theSPEs that follow from the analysis will be given in this appendix.
F.1 Actor preferences
We have the set of all actors N= {ProRail, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, Province ofZuid Holland, Metropoolregio Rotterdam}.
The issues (design variables) we are going to look at in this formalisation are the sets given in table F.1.
Table F.1: The design variables used for the formalisationI1 = {Number of tracks Schiedam center }I2 = {Whether or not to shorten the follow-up times}I3 = {Platform track length Rotterdam central}I4 = {Whether or not to include stricter design regulations }
For each issue, we consider two options:I1 = {a1, a2}I2 = {b1, b2}I3 = {c1, c2}I4 = {d1, d2}
109
Wherea1 : Use 2 tracks at Schiedam center
a2 : Use 4 tracks at Schiedam center
b1 : Shortening the follow-up times
b2 : Not shortening the follow-up times
c1 : To extend the platform track length of Rotterdam central
c2 : Not to extend the platform track length of Rotterdam central
d1 : Take into account stricter design regulations in the field of safety
d2 : Do not take into account stricter design regulations in the field of safety
The preference order of the issues and their options were asked to all the interview respondents. Thepreference order for each actor is given below:
ProRail : (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) >
(a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) >
(a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) >
(a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d1)
IenW : (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) >
(a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) >
(a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) >
(a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d2)
Metropoolregio Rotterdam : (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c1, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) >
(a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) >
(a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) >
(a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d1)
Provincie Zuid Holland : (a1, b2, c1, d1) > (a1, b2, c1, d2) > (a1, b2, c2, d1) > (a1, b2, c2, d2) >
(a1, b1, c1, d1) > (a1, b1, c1, d2) > (a1, b1, c2, d1) > (a1, b1, c2, d2) >
(a2, b2, c1, d1) > (a2, b2, c1, d2) > (a2, b2, c2, d1) > (a2, b2, c2, d2) >
(a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c1, d2) > (a2, b1, c2, d1) > (a2, b1, c2, d2)
The distribution of these preferences combinations over the groups is given below:
B : {(a1, b1, c1, d1),(a1, b1, c1, d2)}D : {(a2, b1, c1, d1),(a2, b1, c1, d2)}Remaining : {(a1, b1, c2, d1),(a1b1, c2, d2), (a1, b2, c1, d1),(a1, b2, c1, d2),
(a1, b2, c2, d1),(a1, b2, c2, d2), (a2, b1, c2, d1),(a2, b1, c2, d2)
(a2, b2, c1, d1),(a2, b2, c1, d2), (a2, b2, c2, d1),(a2, b2, c2, d2)}
In this case, all the preference combination options are feasible.We define the acceptance set of of each player as the set of the ten most preferred preference combinations.The acceptance set and rejection set of the players in this game are:
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NOG AANPASSEN
AProRail = {(a1, b2, c2, d1)(a1, b2, c2, d2) (a2, b2, c2, d1)(a2, b2, c2, d2)}(a1, b1, c2, d1)(a1, b1, c2, d2) (a2, b1, c2, d1)(a2, b1, c2, d2)}
RProRail = {(a1, b2, c1, d1)(a1, b2, c1, d2) (a2, b2, c1, d1)(a2, b2, c1, d2)}(a1, b1, c1, d1)(a1, b1, c1, d2) (a2, b1, c1, d1)(a2, b1, c1, d2)}
ANS = {(a2, b2, c2, d1)(a2, b2, c2, d2) (a2, b2, c1, d1)(a2, b2, c1, d2)}(a2, b1, c2, d1)(a2, b1, c2, d2) (a2, b1, c1, d1)(a2, b1, c1, d2)}
RNS = {(a1, b2, c2, d1)(a1, b2, c2, d2) (a1, b2, c1, d1)(a1, b2, c1, d2)}(a1, b1, c2, d1)(a1, b1, c2, d2) (a1, b1, c1, d1)(a1, b1, c1, d2)}
AIenW = {(a1, b2, c2, d2)(a1, b2, c2, d1) (a1, b2, c1, d2)(a1, b2, c1, d1)}(a2, b2, c2, d2)(a2, b2, c2, d1) (a2, b2, c1, d2)(a2, b2, c1, d1)}
RIenW = {(a1, b1, c2, d2)(a1, b1, c2, d1) (a1, b1, c1, d2)(a1, b1, c1, d1)}(a2, b1, c2, d2)(a2, b1, c2, d1) (a2, b1, c1, d2)(a2, b1, c1, d1)}
AAmsterdam = {(a2, b2, c2, d1)(a2, b2, c2, d2) (a2, b1, c2, d1)(a2, b1, c2, d2)}(a2, b2, c1, d1)(a2, b2, c1, d2) (a2, b1, c1, d1)(a2, b1, c1, d2)}
RAmsterdam = {(a1, b2, c2, d1)(a1, b2, c2, d2) (a1, b1, c2, d1)(a1, b1, c2, d2)}(a1, b2, c1, d1)(a1, b2, c1, d2) (a1, b1, c1, d1)(a1, b1, c1, d2)}
.We also know the preference order of each actor regarding the outcome of the process. The preference inoutcome of the process according to the actors:
(>ProRail) : {D > B}(>IenW ) : {D > B}(>ZuidHolland) : {D > B}(>MetropoolregioRotterdam) : {D > B}
In table F.2 an overview of all the SPE’s can be found.
Table F.2: SPE of the different analysesGame Specification SPE
Issue-by-Issue gameRandom agenda P-I-P-I a2, b2, c1, d1Random agenda I-P-I-P a2, b2, c1, d1With agenda setting P-I-P-I a2, b2, c1, d1With agenda setting I-P-I-P a2, b2, c1, d1Majority voting a1, b1, c1, d2
Multi-Issue game a1, b1, c1, d1
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