analysis of the audiovisual media law, no. 26 for the year ...jordan: analysis of the audiovisual...

Analysis of the Audiovisual Media Law, No. 26 for the Year 2015

April2016

Author:TobyMendel

Jordan:AnalysisoftheAudiovisualMediaLaw,2015-1

Executive Summary InJordan,asinothercountries,broadcastinginthetraditionalsenseofradioandtelevisionstations remains by far the most popular, and arguably the most influential,communicationsmedia.Thepublicbroadcaster,JordanRadioandTelevision(JRTV),wasamonopolyuntilliberalisationwasfirstintroducedbylawin2002,butthenumberofprivatebroadcastershas grown rapidly since thenand therearenowdozensofbothprivateFMradiosandsatellitetelevisionstations.AnewAudiovisualMediaLaw(LaworAVL)wasadoptedin2015,1andthisnowgovernsregulation of the sector, while Bylaws are currently being drafted. Going back to 2002,regulation of the sectorwas put into the hands of an autonomous body, the AudiovisualCommission (AVC), now the Media Commission (MC), rather than this being done by agovernment ministry, in contrast to the print media. The 2015 Law introduced someimportantimprovements,doingawaywiththepossibilityofimprisonmentforbreachesofthe law, and providing applicants with the right to receive reasons for any refusal toprovidealicenceandtoappealsuchrefusalsbeforethecourts.At the same time, a key shortcoming of the system is that, although it is formallyautonomous, theMC lacks the structural independencewhich, according to internationalstandards, bodies which exercise regulatory powers over the media should have.Significantly, it does not have an independent governing board. Instead, it is run by adirector who is appointed by a resolution of the Council of Ministers based on therecommendation of the Minister. The director’s position is not guaranteed for any setperiod of time and he or shemay be terminated by the Council, without any conditionsbeingsetforthis,suchasincapacityorafailuretodischargehisorherdutiesproperly.Asaresult,thedirectoressentiallyservesatthepleasureofthegovernment.Thedirectorisalsonotsubjecttootherinternationallyrecognisedprotectionsforindependencesuchasabaron individualswith strongpolitical connections frombeingappointedanda requirementthat the individual be of recognisedmoral character. TheMC also lacks independence infinancialterms,sincetheMinisterandthenCouncilofMinistersneedstoratifythebudget.Furthermore, the MC does not have the power to make final decisions regarding thelicensing of broadcasters. Instead, final licensing authority rests with the Council ofMinisters,whichhasdiscretiontograntorrefusealicence.Thepowertoimposesanctionsonbroadcastersforbreachoftheirlicences,includingfinesandultimatelythecancellationofthelicence,alsovestsintheCouncil.

1AudiovisualLawno.26fortheyear2015,publishedintheOfficialGazetteNo.5343,p.5614.AvailableinArabicat:http://www.lob.gov.jo/AR/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx.


According to international standards, a key goal of broadcast regulation is to promotediversityinthebroadcastingsector.Thereareanumberofaspectstothis.OneisthatStatesshouldputinplaceeffectivemeasurestopreventundueconcentrationofmediaownershipand cross-ownership. The AVL does not include any provisions limiting concentration ofmedia ownership. Another is that States should promote diversity through the licensingprocess,essentiallybyincludingthisamongthecriteriabywhichapplicationsforalicenceareassessed.Again,theAVLdoesnotprovideforthis.Athirdimportantmeansofpromotingdiversityinbroadcastingistoensurethatallthreetypes of broadcasters – public service, commercial and community – are representedequitablyinthesector.Asnoted,commercialbroadcastingwasrecognisedalongsidepublicbroadcasting with the adoption of the 2002 AVL. However, the Law fails to set out anyspecific rules for community broadcasters, although a few such broadcasters have beenlicensed.Inparticular,betterpracticeistoreserveaportionofthefrequencyspectrumforthesebroadcastersandtoput inplace lessonerouslicensingrules,alongwith lowerfees,forthem.TheAVLrequiresofarangeofentitiesandproductstoobtainlicences,including‘recordedmaterials’(anyaudioorvisualoraudiovisualcontent),andplaceswheresuchmaterialsareshown (‘show rooms’) or circulated. This essentially represents a system of priorcensorshipforavastrangeofmaterialwhichdoesnotmeettheconditionsforrestrictionsonfreedomofexpressionunderinternationallawandisprobablynotverypracticalinthedigital era in any case. The definitions of over-the-top (OTT) and Internet Protocoltelevision (IPTV) are also unduly broad, andwould cover anywebsite that hosted videocontent.Thisshouldbenarroweddowntocoveronlyserviceswhichmorecloselyresemblebroadcasters.Intermsofthelicensingprocess,itisveryimportanttosetoutclearlytheconditionsunderwhich licences will be granted or refused. For competitive licensing processes, the lawshouldestablishclearlythecriteriabywhichthecompetitionwillbejudged,whilefornon-competitiveprocesses,thelawshouldsetout,againclearly,theminimumstandardswhichneed to be met to obtain a licence. The AVL fails to provide for either competitiveassessmentcriteriaorminimumstandardsforassessinglicenceapplications.Therulesalsoprovide limited informationabouttheproceduresaccordingtowhich licenceapplicationswillbeprocessed,contrarytobetterpracticeinthisarea.Although the draft Bylaws do introduce a definition of digital terrestrial televisionbroadcasting, theAVL fails toprovide foranysystemfor thedigital transition,whichwillpresumablyat leastaffectthepublicbroadcaster, JordanTelevision.TheBylawsalsoseekto impose a number of formal conditions on whomay serve as a director of a licensedbroadcaster.Suchconditionsdonot,inpractice,provideanyguaranteeofqualityandsuchmattersarebetterlefttoberegulatedbythemarket.


TheAVLincludesanumberofgeneralpositiveobligationsonbroadcasters.Theseincluderequirementsto“facilitatethework”oftheauthorities,tocooperatewithotherlicensees,to“give priority to Jordanian human andmaterial resources” and to contribute to nationalaudiovisual production industries.While these are all laudable goals, there are problemswith including them as formal legal requirements. It would, for example, be almostimpossibletoapplytheserules fairlyandtheycouldbeopentoabuse.Abetterapproachmight be to set clear minimum quotas for domestically and/or independently producedcontent. The Law also requires broadcasters to comply with instructions from theCommissionduringemergenciesanddisasters,whichisalsopotentiallyopentoabuse.Intermsmorespecificallyofcontent,theAVLandBylawimposeanumberofbothpositiveandnegativeobligationsonbroadcasters.Theformer,forexample,includesobligationstorespectthemoralrightsofothersandthe“pluralisticnatureofexpressionofthoughtsandideas”.While theseareworthyethicalstandards forbroadcasters, theyare, like themoregeneralpositiveobligations,bothimpossibletoapplyfairlyandpotentiallyopentoabuse.The negative obligations, or prohibitions, include such things as damaging the nationaleconomy or currency, undermining relations with other countries and prejudicing thevaluesandheritageofthenation.Thesearesimplytoovagueandgeneraltobeacceptableaslegalrestrictionswhichmay,furthermore,attractquitesignificantsanctions.Onamorepositivenote,theAVLprovidesforthecreationofanexpertcommitteetoreviewcomplaintsaboutmediacontent.Inpractice,thecommitteedecidescomplaintsbasedonacodeofethicsadoptedonavoluntarybasisbybroadcasters,aswellasprinciplesofjusticeandequity,althoughthereisnothingintheLawtothiseffect.Againasamatterofpractice,thesanctionsappliedbythecommitteewhereitfindsabreachoftherulesaretoorderthemediaoutlet toprovideacorrection,replyorapology,ordelete thematerial.TheBylawswould add some limited procedural rules and render the decisions of the committeeformallybinding.Thisisaveryinterestingdevelopmentinasmuchasitrepresentsaco-regulatorysystemforaddressingcomplaints.Itcouldbeimprovedbyformalisingsomeoftherules,forexampleregarding the standards to be applied by the committee, the procedures it should followwhendeciding complaintsand the sanctions that itmayapply. Itwouldalsobeuseful todevelopmore formal rules regarding themembership of the committee, to guarantee itsexpertnatureandalsotoensurethatitrepresentskeystakeholdergroupsinthecountry.Itwouldalsobeusefulforittoserveasameansofreplacingmanyofthevaguebothnegativeandpositiveobligationsplacedonbroadcastersinthecurrentversionofthelaw.


Introduction2 In Jordan,as inmostcountriesaroundtheworld,broadcasting in the traditionalsenseofradio and television stations remains by far the most popular, and arguably the mostinfluential,communicationsmedia.Thenumberofprivatebroadcastershasgrownrapidlysince liberalisation was first introduced by law in 2002, supplementing the publicbroadcasting provided through Jordan Radio and Television (JRTV), and there are nowdozens of both private FM radios and satellite television stations. Although there are noprivateterrestrialtelevisionstations,since2010over98percentofthepopulationhashadaccess to satellite television, meaning that this form of distribution has essentiallyleapfroggedterrestrialdistribution.3Prior to 2002, broadcasting was a State monopoly in Jordan but the adoption of theAudiovisualMediaLaw4thatyearheraldedinimportantlegalchangesand,inparticular,anopening up to private broadcasters. Although these changeswere perhaps late by globalstandards, inmanyways Jordanwas in this area, as in theareaof access to information,somethingofaregionalleader.5Unlike in theprintmedia sector,where the lawandregulationshavebeen inanongoingstateofevolution,regulationofbroadcastinghasremainedrelativelyconstantalbeitwithanew Audiovisual Media Law (Law or AVL) having been adopted in 2015.6 The Law ispositive inasmuch as it recognises the importance of private broadcasting as part of theoverallbroadcastingecologyandestablishesanautonomousbody to regulate this sector,rather than leaving this in the hands of a government ministry. The new Law alsointroducedsomeimportantimprovementsoverthe2002version,suchasdoingawaywiththepossibilityof imprisonmentforbreachesof the lawandprovidingapplicantswiththeright to receive reasons for any refusal to provide a licence and to appeal such refusalsbeforethecourts.

2ThisAnalysisisbasedonatranslationoftheAudiovisualMediaLaw,asamended,providedbyUNESCO.3SeeUNESCO,AssessmentofMediaDevelopmentinJordan:BasedonUNESCO’sMediaDevelopmentIndicators,July2015.Availableat:http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/assessment-of-media-development-in-jordan/.4ProvisionalLawforAudiovisualMediano.71fortheyear2002,publishedintheOfficialGazetteNo.4576,p.5941.AvailableinArabicat:http://www.avc.gov.jo/echobusv3.0/SystemAssets/f6197c07-5802-491b-b09d-14b39fc7d0c0.pdf.5SeeMendel,T.,AssessmentofMediaRegulationintheSouthernMediterraneanRegion,MedMedia,2015.Availableat:http://www.med-media.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/MEDMEDIA_REGULATION_COLLECTED_02_FINAL.pdf.6AudiovisualLawno.26fortheyear2015,publishedintheOfficialGazetteNo.5343,p.5614.AvailableinArabicat:http://www.lob.gov.jo/AR/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx.


Atthesametime,itcouldbefurtherenhancedinanumberofways,includingbybolsteringtheindependenceoftheregulatorandgivingitfullresponsibilityforlicensingbroadcasters,byputtinginplacestrongersystemsforpromotingbroadcastingdiversity,bylimitingthescope of regulation to broadcasters, per se, by further developing the rules relating tolicensing,andbyputtinginplaceamoredevelopedandrobustsystemofco-regulationtoaddresscomplaintsagainstthemedia.ThisAnalysisprovidesanassessmentof the2015AudiovisualMediaLaw,alongwith theBylaws.7Ithighlightsthestrengthsandweaknessesofthelegalframeworkforbroadcastingandmakesspecificrecommendationsforreformasneededtobringitmorefully intolinewithinternationalstandardsandbetterpractice.TheAnalysisreferstoanumberofleadinginternational sources, including UNESCO’s Assessment of Media Development in Jordan:BasedonUNESCO’sMediaDevelopment Indicators,8 the2011GeneralCommentNo.34bythe UN Human Rights Committee,9 the series of Joint Declarations by the specialinternational mandates (special rapporteurs) on freedom of expression,10 the regionaldeclarationsonfreedomofexpressionadoptedbytheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples’Rights11andtheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights,12relevantCouncilof Europe recommendations,13 and the UNESCO publication, Tuning into Development:InternationalComparativeSurveyofCommunityBroadcastingRegulation.14

1. Independent Regulation Itiswell-establishedunderinternationallawthatbodieswhichexerciseregulatorypowersoverbroadcasting,includingtheall-importantfunctionoflicensingbroadcasters,shouldbeindependent of the government and this is also reflected in the practice of democraticStates. The reason for this is clear: if the government exercises regulatory powers, andespecially the power of licensing which is a crucial gate-keeping function (i.e. since itdetermineswhocanparticipateinthesector),therewillinevitablybeabias,orattheveryleast a risk of bias, in favour of applicantswhich aremore friendly towards governmentratherthandecisionsbeingmadeonthebasisofthewiderpublicinterest.Thisundermines

7Fortheearlierlaw,thesewereBylawsontheRadioandTelevisionBroadcastingandRebroadcastingLicenceandFeesCollectedNo.(163)of2003.Sofar,newBylawshavenotbeenformallyadoptedalthoughasetofproposedBylawsisavailable.8Note3.9Availableat:http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fGC%2f34&Lang=en.10Availableat:http://www.osce.org/fom/66176.112002.Availableat:http://www.achpr.org/sessions/32nd/resolutions/62/.122000.Availableat:https://www.cidh.oas.org/declaration.htm.13Availableat:http://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/adopted-texts.142013.Availableat:http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002246/224662e.pdf.


respect for freedom of expression in the sense both of who gets to express themselvesthroughbroadcastingandoftherightofthepublictoreceiveawiderangeofinformationandideasthroughbroadcasting.Numerous authoritative international statements have beenmade along these lines. The2003 Joint Declaration of the special international mandates on freedom of expressionincludesthefollowing,generalstatementaboutindependence:

All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory powers over the media should beprotectedagainst interference,particularlyof apoliticaloreconomicnature, includingbyanappointments process formemberswhich is transparent, allows for public input and is notcontrolledbyanyparticularpoliticalparty.15

Theyreiteratedthisideaintheir2015JointDeclaration,stating:“Administrativemeasureswhich directly limit freedom of expression, including regulatory systems for the media,shouldalwaysbeappliedbyanindependentbody.”16TheUNHumanRightsCommitteemadeasimilarstatementinitsSeptember2011GeneralCommentNo.34,withaspecificfocusonbroadcastregulators:

It is recommended that States parties that have not already done so should establish anindependent and public broadcasting licensing authority, with the power to examinebroadcastingapplicationsandtograntlicenses.[referencesomitted]17

All threeregionalbodies for theprotectionofhumanrights– inAfrica, theAmericasandEurope–havealsoreferredtotheneedformediaregulatorstobeindependent.18The system in place in Jordan somehow represents a halfway house in terms ofinternational standards relating to independence. On the one hand, regulation isundertakenbyaformallyautonomousbody–theAudiovisualCommission(AVC),nowtheMedia Commission (MC), established by Article 3 of the Law – rather than directly by agovernment ministry, as is the case in some countries. This conforms to the call in theHumanRightsCommittee’sGeneralCommentNo.34forStatestoestablishsuchbodies.Onthe other hand, the independence of the regulatory system is undermined in twoways:

1518December2003,note10.164May2015,clause4(a),note10.17Note9,para.39.18SeePrincipleVII(1)oftheDeclarationofPrinciplesonFreedomofExpressioninAfrica,adoptedbytheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeople’sRightsatits32ndSession,17-23October2002,note11;Principle13oftheInter-AmericanDeclarationofPrinciplesonFreedomofExpression,adoptedbytheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRightsatthe108thRegularSession,19October2000,note12;andRecommendation(2000)23ontheindependenceandfunctionsofregulatoryauthoritiesforthebroadcastingsector,adoptedbytheCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEuropeon20December2000,note13.


limits in the structural independence of the MC; and limitations on the powers actuallyexercisedbytheMC.Intermsofthefirstissue,Article3establishestheMCasabodywhich“shallenjoyfinancialand administrative independent juristic personality”, i.e. as a body which is formallyautonomous in the sense that it is not part of a ministry or a core government body.However, it also indicates that theMC is “under the jurisdiction of theMinister”, whichseemstocontradicttheideaofitsbeingadministrativelyindependent.Furthermore,therearekeywaysinwhich,fromastructuralpointofview,theMClacksindependence.Akeyindicatorinthisregardisthegoverningstructureofthebody,aswellasmannerinwhichthe individualswhichexercisekeygoverningrolesonthebodyareappointed. It isnormalforbroadcastregulatorstoberun,atleastadministratively,byadirector,andthisisalso the case in Jordan. However, in most cases regulators are overseen by a board ofgovernorswhich, inaddition toappointingand thenoverseeing theworkof thedirector,alsoservestoprovidealayerofprotectionagainstpoliticalinterferenceintheworkofthebody.TheMClackssuchagoverningboard.Intermsofthemannerinwhichthedirectorisappointed,accordingtoArticle6,heorsheisappointed“byaresolutionoftheCouncilofMinisters,basedontherecommendationoftheMinister” and termination takesplace in the sameway,without any conditions at allbeingimposedonthis.Onlyminorconditionsareplacedonwhomaybeappointed.Article7provides that thedirectorshouldbea Jordaniancitizen,haveauniversitydegree,have“adequate experience and competence” and not have been “convicted of a crime ormisdemeanour violating honour or honesty”. Aside from these rather formal technicalconditions, the director essentially serves at the pleasure of the government, and theimplicationsintermsofindependenceareclear.Internationalstandardsrecogniseboththatindependenceisarelativeratherthanperfectquality and that a number of different appointments models may serve to protectindependence indifferentcontexts.Broadlyspeaking, thereare fourmainmodels for thisglobally.Firstisamodelwherebydifferentsectorsofsociety–suchasmediabodies,civilsociety,thebarsociety,academics–nominatemembersofthegoverningboard(which,asnotedabove,thenappointsthedirector).Secondisanadaptationofthiswherebydifferentsectorsofsocietyformanappointmentscommitteewhichthennominatesmembersoftheboard. This model could also be used to nominate the director, if a governing boardapproachwerenotadopted.Athirdmodelhasacommitteeofparliament–amulti-party,representativebody–nominatingmembersbutsubjecttoproceduralprotections,suchastheabilityofcivilsocietygroupstoproposemembersforconsiderationandthepublicationof a shortlist of names for purposes of public consultation. Finally, some countries aremoving to a more professional model of appointments, whereby individuals, who arenominatedorwhonominatethemselves,areshortlistedorevenselectedviaacompetitive


processwhichresemblesajobselectionprocessandwhichisoverseenbyanindependentprofessional body. In all of these models, formal appointment as a final, usually purelyformal, step is often done by a leading political figure – such as the president or primeminister–orperhapsbytheKingintheJordaniancontext.Theseappointmentprocessesareaccompaniedbyrulesprotectingthetenureofthosewhoareappointed,normallyforaperiodofbetweenfiveandsevenyears.Inexceptionalcases,where an individual is clearly failing to discharge his or her duties, he or she may beremoved,butagainprotectionsareput inplacetopreventthisbeingdoneforpoliticalorany other non-professional reason. For a governing board, for example, grounds fordismissalmaybeafailuretoattendmeetingswithoutjustification,incapacitytodischargefunctions(forexampleongroundsofmentaldisability),orbeingconvictedofcertaintypesof crimes (for example of dishonesty or serious crimes). Individualsmay also withdrawfromthepositionandobviouslydeathwillalsobringtheappointmenttoanend.A number of other legal provisions can help bolster the independence of a board ordirector.Oneisaformalstatementofindependenceinthelaw(i.e.anoperativeprovisioninthelawstatingthattheindividualorindividuals,and/orthebody,areindependent).InadditiontothepositiverequirementssetoutinArticle7,manylawslimitthesepositionstoindividualswhoaregenerallyrespectedinsocietyfortheirhighmoralstandards,integrity,impartiality and competence.While these are ‘soft’ requirements, they are still useful asbenchmarkstoassesscandidates.Itisalsousefultoincludeinthelegislationaclearsetofpurposes of regulation, and then to hold the regulator to the goals of advancing thosepurposes.Most lawsalsoincludeprohibitionsor incompatibilitiesformembersoftheboardand/ordirectors, both to protect independence and to prevent conflicts of interest. Article 9requiresthedirector,priortoactuallystartingwork,tonotifytheMinisterthatneitherheor she nor his or her immediate family or relatives has any interest in the broadcastingsector (similarsystemsare inplace forseniorexecutives).Presumablyanappointeewhodidhavesuchan interestwouldhavetodivesthim-orherselfof itpriortotakinguptheposition. There is also the prohibition in Article 7 relating to crime. Better practice,however, is to go beyond this and to include prohibitions relating to strong politicalconnections, for example for individualswho are office-bearers or employees of politicalparties,civilservantsorelectedofficials.Fundingisanotherkeyareawhereindependenceneedstobesafeguardedbecausecontroloverfundingcanoftenbealeverforcontroloverthebody.Therulesonfundingaresetoutmainly in Articles 10-13. According to Article 10, the sources of funding for theMC arefunds allocated from the General Budget and, subject to the approval of the Council ofMinisters,donationsandgrants.Anyfeesobtainedthroughlicensingorfines,andevenfeesforservicesprovidedbytheMC,shallbereturnedtogeneralpublicrevenues(Article12).


Article8(h)providesthattherateofchargesandfeesforservicesprovidedbytheMCshallbe approved by the Council ofMinisters, upon the recommendation of theMinister. TheCommission shall have its own budget which shall be prepared by the director for theapprovaloftheMinisterandfinallyratificationoftheCouncilofMinisters(Articles8(g)and11(a)). As a public body, the MC shall enjoy the “exemptions and facilities” granted toministries (Article 13(a)). Finally, theMC shall be subject to the rules and control of theAuditBureauandmayappointacertifiedauditorforthispurpose(Article13(b)).ItispositivethattheMChasitsownbudgetbutultimatelythisremainsunderthecontrolofthe government, mainly due to the power of the Council of Ministers both to ratify thebudget(andthepoweroftheMinisterinthesamearea)andtoapprove(ornot)anygrantsand donations. Better practice in this area is to allow the regulator to propose its ownbudgetandthentorequirethistobeapprovedaspartofthegeneralprocessofapprovalofthe general budget (which is normally voted on by parliament). It also seems counterproductivefortheCommissionnottobeabletoretainfeesforservices,otherthanitscorefunctionsundertheLaw,absentwhichtherewillbealmostnomotivationforittoprovideany such services in the first place. Finally, as a matter of cash flow, inmany countriesbroadcast regulators retain licensing fees, in accordance with their budget (so that anyexcessisremittedtogeneralrevenueswhileanyshortfalliscoveredfromthoserevenues).Another provision which affects the independence of the MC is Article 4(l), pursuant towhich itmustundertakeanyother taskassigned to itby theCouncilofMinisters.For itspart,Article8(m)providesthesameinrelationtotasksassignedbytheMinister,butthesemustberelevanttotheimplementationoftheLaw.The second area affecting the independence of the regulatory system is the fact that theMC’s powers are limited tomaking recommendations in the area of licensing, with finalauthority restingwith the Council ofMinisters. According to Article 8(d), the director isresponsible for making “recommendations to the Minister on the granting, renewal,modification and cancelation of broadcasting licenses”. According to Article 16(c), theMinistershallthenmakearecommendationinthisregardtotheCouncilofMinisters,whichshalldecidethematter.Fortheavoidanceofanydoubt,Articles18(a)and(b)makeitclearthattheCouncilofMinistersmayapproveorrefusetograntabroadcastinglicence,whileproviding reasons in the latter case (which also gives rise to a right on the part of theapplicanttoappealtherefusaltothecourts).AfterobtainingtheapprovaloftheCouncilofMinisters, the licence agreement shall be concluded between the MC and the applicant(Article20). In caseof a repeatedorongoingbreachof theagreementbya licensee, anduponafinalcourtverdict,theCouncilofMinistersmaycancelalicence(Article29(b)(2)).PursuanttoArticle18(d),itisalsotheCouncilofMinistersthatimposesfinesonlicenseesfor breach of their licence conditions. Finally, the Council of Ministers may, upon therecommendationoftheMinister,basedontherecommendationofthedirector,waivethe


licencefeesof“governmentaldepartmentsandinstitutionsandothers”,aslongastheydonotbroadcastadvertisements(Article22).Asaresultoftheserules,nomatterhowindependenttheCommissionmightbe,ultimatelyit does not itself undertake the key decision-making processes relating to broadcastregulation. It may be noted that, in democracies, broadcast regulators are granted fullpowers to oversee the licensing process right through to deciding upon and grantinglicences (and suspending or revoking them in appropriate cases). Although this is asignificantpower,thefactthatdecisionsaresubjecttojudicialreviewhelpslimittheriskofabuseorunfairdecisions.There are also practical reasons beyond the overriding imperative of independence thatsuggest that proper licensing powers should be granted to the regulator. Experience inothercountriessuggeststhat,absentsuchpowers,regulatorswillnotbetakenseriouslybybroadcastersandtheirabilitytodeliveronotherpartsoftheregulatoryframework–suchasmonitoringfrequencyusage,implementingtechnicalstandardsrelatingtoequipmentorcompliancewithotherlicencetermsandconditions–willbeundermined.

Recommendations:

Ø ThefollowingmeasurestoenhancethestructuralindependenceoftheMCshould

beconsidered:• ProvidingforanindependentgoverningboardfortheCommission.• Puttinginplacesystemstosafeguardtheindependenceoftheappointments

process,alongthelinessuggestedabove.• Providing for a system of protection of tenure, along the lines suggested

above,onceindividualsareappointed.• Formally guaranteeing the independence of the board, board members

and/orthedirectorinthetextofthelaw.• ProvidingforaclearsetofpurposesforregulationtoguidetheMC.• AddingapositiverequirementofbeingarespectedindividualtoArticle7.• Adding prohibitions on individualswith strong political connections from

beingappointed.• Providing for the MC to put forward its own budget for adoption by the

parliamentaspartofthegeneralbudget.• AllowingtheMCtoretainfeesforanyservicesitprovideswhichareoutside

ofitscorefunctionsundertheLaw.• AllowingtheMCtoretainfeesforlicensinginaccordancewithitsapproved

budget(i.e.asamatterofcashflow).• OnlyallowingtheCouncilofMinisterstoimposetasksontheMCwhichare

inpursuanceofitsresponsibilitiesundertheLaw.


Ø The MC should be responsible for all decision-making in relation to theregulatoryfunctionssetoutintheLaw,includingthefulllicensingprocess,ratherthanhavingtheCouncilofMinistersmakingfinaldecisionsinthisregard.

2. Promotion of Diversity and a Three-Tier System of Broadcasting While the principle of independence governs the manner in which broadcast regulationshould take place, the principle of diversity defines a key goal of such regulation. Underinternationallaw,therighttofreedomofexpressionprotectsnotonlythespeakerbutalsothe listener,19andtheprincipleofdiversity isderived fromthis.Akeyaspectof this is toplace a positive obligation on the State to takemeasures to promote an environment inwhich a diversity of information and ideas are available to the public. In terms ofbroadcasting,andtakingintoaccountscarcefrequenciesandthelicensingsystemsthatarein place inmost countries, thismeans using the licensing process and rules to promotediversity.The idea of diversity is reflected in most of the key international statements on mediafreedom.Thus,theideaisfoundintheverytitleofUNESCO’sleadingstatementinthisarea,the1991WindhoekDeclarationonPromotinganIndependentandPluralisticMedia.20Inits2011GeneralComment,theUNHumanRightsCommitteestated:

Asameanstoprotecttherightsofmediausers,includingmembersofethnicandlinguisticminorities, to receive a wide range of information and ideas, States parties should takeparticularcaretoencourageanindependentanddiversemedia.21

WithinEurope,theCouncilofEurope’sRecommendation2007(2)onMediaPluralismandDiversity of Media Content22 is entirely devoted to the question of media diversity andmeasures to promote it. TheDeclaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africastates:

Freedomofexpressionimposesanobligationontheauthoritiestotakepositivemeasurestopromotediversity.23

19Article19oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,forexample,protectsnotonlytherightto impart,butalsotoseekandreceiveinformationandideas.UNGeneralAssemblyResolution2200A(XXI),adopted16December1966,inforce23March1976.20Availableat:http://www.unesco.org/webworld/fed/temp/communication_democracy/windhoek.htm.21Note9,para.14.22RecommendationNo.R(2007)2,adoptedbytheCommitteeofMinisterson31January2007.ThisupdatesRecommendationNo.R(1999)1inMeasurestoPromoteMediaPluralism,adoptedbytheCommitteeofMinisterson19January1999.23Note11,PrincipleIII.


And the Inter-AmericanCourt ofHuman rights has recognised that the right to seek andreceiveinformationandideasrequirestheexistenceofafreeandpluralisticmedia:

It isthemassmediathatmaketheexerciseof freedomofexpressionareality.Thismeansthat the conditionsof itsusemust conform to the requirementsof this freedom,with theresultthattheremustbe,interalia,apluralityofmeansofcommunication,thebarringofallmonopoliesthereof,inwhateverform,andguaranteesfortheprotectionofthefreedomandindependenceofjournalists.24

The 2007 JointDeclaration onDiversity in Broadcasting of the four special internationalmandatesonfreedomofexpressionidentifiedthreedistinctaspectsofbroadcastdiversity:content, outlet and source.25Diversityof content,which suggests theprovisionof awiderangeofcontentthatservestheneedsandinterestsofdifferentmembersofsociety, is inmanywaysthemostobviousandmostimportantformofdiversity.Diversityofcontent,inturn, depends on the existence of a plurality of types of media, or outlet diversity.Specifically, democracy demands that the State create an environment inwhichdifferenttypesofbroadcasters–namelypublicservice,commercialandcommunitybroadcasters–can flourish. Source diversity imposes an obligation on the State to combat the threat ofundueconcentrationofmediaownership.The need to prevent undue concentration ofmedia ownership and cross-ownership (i.e.between differentmedia sectors) is well established under international law. As the UNHumanRightsCommitteestatedinits2011GeneralComment:

TheCommittee reiterates its observation in general commentNo. 10 that “because of thedevelopment of modern mass media, effective measures are necessary to prevent suchcontrolofthemediaaswouldinterferewiththerightofeveryonetofreedomofexpression”.TheStateshouldnothavemonopolycontroloverthemediaandshouldpromotepluralityofthemedia.Consequently,Statespartiesshouldtakeappropriateaction,consistentwiththeCovenant, to prevent undue media dominance or concentration by privately controlledmediagroups inmonopolisticsituationsthatmaybeharmful toadiversityofsourcesandviews.[referencesomitted]26

There are differentways to do this, but the licensing process for broadcasters is both alogical one and the one that ismost commonly used in democracies. This requires rulesprohibiting ownership concentration above certain levels, which may then be appliedthrough the licensingprocess (i.e. ifanowner isalreadyat themaximumlevel,heorshewillnotbegrantedanyadditionallicences). 24CompulsoryMembershipinanAssociationPrescribedbyLawforthePracticeofJournalism,AdvisoryOpinionOC-5/85of13November1985,SeriesA,No.5,para.34.SeealsoCentroEuropa7S.R.L.andDiStefanov.Italy,7June2012,Applicationno.38433/09andInformationsvereinLentiaandOthersv.Austria,24November1993,Applicationnos.13914/88,15041/89,15717/89,15779/89and17207/90(bothEuropeanCourtofHumanRights).25Adopted12December2007.Note10.26GeneralCommentNo.34,note9,para.40.


The AVL does not include any provisions on concentration of ownership or cross-ownership.Itdoes,however,requireapplicantsforabroadcastinglicencetoprovidealistof shareholders and their share of the company’s capital, although it does not appear torequire them to keep this information updated over time (Article 16(b)(5)). Thisinformationcouldprovideabasisforregulatingundueconcentrationofmediaownership.TheAVLalsodoesnotincludeanymeanstopromotediversityinbroadcastingthroughthelicensingsystem.Itiscommonindemocraciestoincludeanassessmentofthecontributionaproposedservicewouldmake intermsofenrichingthevarietyanddiversityofcontentbeingprovidedthroughthebroadcastingsystemasawhole.This isdonethroughmakingthisoneofthecriteriafordecidingonlicenceapplications.NosuchprovisionisfoundintheAVL.Intermsofdiversityofoutlet,itisrecognisedthat,absenteffectiveregulatorymeasures,itis likely that public and commercial broadcasters will dominate because of the limitedability of community broadcasters to compete with these more powerful players, forexample for frequencies or in licensing competitions.27The2007 JointDeclarationof thespecialinternationalmandatescallsforarangeofmeasurestopromotediversityofoutlet,stating: “Different types of broadcasters – commercial, public service and community –should be able to operate on, and have equitable access to, all available distributionplatforms.” To achieve this, it calls for the reservation of sufficient space on differentbroadcasting platforms for all three types of broadcasters. It also makes the followingstatement,specificallyinrelationtocommunitybroadcasting:

Community broadcasting should be explicitly recognised in law as a distinct form ofbroadcasting,shouldbenefit fromfairandsimple licensingprocedures,shouldnothavetomeet stringent technological or other licence criteria, should benefit from concessionarylicencefeesandshouldhaveaccesstoadvertising.28

Thepointisquiteclear:special,lessonerouslicensingproceduresandrequirementsneedtobeputinplacetoencourageandsupportcommunitybroadcasting.TheAVLdoesnot includeany specific reference to communitybroadcasters and sodoesnotconformtotheserequirements.However,Article22doesallowtheCouncilofMinisters,ontherecommendationoftheMinister,inturnontherecommendationofthedirector,towaivelicensingfeesfor“governmentaldepartmentsandinstitutionsandothers”,aslongastheydonotbroadcastadvertisements.Thisisanimportantprovision,giventhehighrateoffees charged to radio stations in particular in Jordan. This provision could, at least 27See,generally,UNESCO’smainpublicationontheregulationcommunitybroadcastingisMendel,T.,TuningintoDevelopment:InternationalComparativeSurveyofCommunityBroadcastingRegulation,UNESCO,2013,note14.28Note25.


theoretically, be applied to eliminate fees for community broadcasters, although this hasnot happened yet.29 However, under international standards lower licensing fees forcommunity broadcasters should not be conditional upon them not carrying anyadvertisements, without which they could hardly be expected to survive. It may also benoted that the set of proposedBylawsbeingput forwardby theCommission,when theywaivefees,donotincludetheterm“others”asintheLaw,andsomayneedtobeamendedtoaddthis(seeArticles5(b)(1)(f)and5(b)(4)(b)).

Recommendations:

Ø Consideration should be give to adding rules on undue concentration ofmedia

ownershipandcross-ownershipintotheLaw,tobeapplied,amongotherthings,throughthelicensingprocess.

Ø Oneofthecriteriafordecidingonlicenceapplicationsshouldbethecontributionthe proposed service would make to the diversity of content being offeredthroughbroadcasting.

Ø Proper rules and procedures should be put in place to support communitybroadcasters including by reserving a portion of the frequency spectrum forcommunityradiosandbyestablishinglessonerouslicensingproceduresandfeesforthiscategoryofbroadcaster.

3. Licensing Procedures Under theAVL,awide rangeofbroadcastersandrelatedbodiesare required toobtainalicence tooperate. Inaddition tobroadcasters,per se,Articles4(d)and8(f)also task theCommission with approving recorded materials – defined as any audio or visual oraudiovisualcontentrecordedbyanytechnicalmeans,suchastapes,recordsandcompactdisks–andgrantinglicencesfortheirdisplay(showrooms)andcirculation(distribution).These rules are elaboratedupon inmoredetail inArticles26and27,whichprohibit theimportationofrecordedmaterialsforpurposesofcirculationorthedisplayorcirculationofrecordedmaterialswithoutfirstobtainingtheapprovaloftheCommission.Thisisproblematicalfortworeasons.First,asregardsthematerialitself,thisisessentiallyasystemofpriorcensorshipforavastrangeofcontent.Notonlyisthisnotlegitimateasarestrictionon freedomof expression, it is veryunlikely tobe effective given thegrowingprevalenceoftheInternetasawayofaccessingthissortofmaterial.Suchcontrolsarenotimposed indemocracies. Instead, content in any form, including recordedmaterials,may 29SeeUNESCO,AssessmentofMediaDevelopmentinJordan:BasedonUNESCO’sMediaDevelopmentIndicators,note3,pp.108-110.


attract liability, post facto, under laws which prohibit certain types of content such asobscenematerials,hatespeechandsoon.Second, outsideof thequestionofwhether ornot thematerial is objectionable (whetherthisisestablishedviaaregimeofpriorcensorshiportheapplicationofpostfactoliability),it is unclearwhy therewould be a need to regulate, especially via a systemof licensing,thosewhodisplayand/orcirculatethismaterial.It is reasonably clear from the definitions section of the AVL, and, in particular, thedefinitions of audiovisualmedia and broadcasting, that the Law is intended to cover thedistribution of audiovisual content via the Internet andmobile phone technologies. ThisbecomesevenclearerwhenviewedinlightofthesetofproposedBylawsbeingputforwardby the Commission, which integrate OTT (over-the-top) and IPTV (Internet Protocoltelevision)intothelicensingframework.TherearesomeargumentsforbringingcertaintypesofcontentprovidersusingInternetormobile phone technologies into the framework for regulating broadcasting, especiallyinasmuchas theyareprovidingservices thatcompetewithmoretraditionalbroadcastingservices.At thesametime, thisneedstobedoneverycarefully toavoid imposingundulyonerous regulations on the Internet, as well as going beyond the practical or technicalregulatoryreachofaregulatory(withoutputtinginplaceveryrepressivecontrolsystems).The definitions of audiovisual media and broadcasting in the main legislation, and theproposeddefinitionsofOTTand IPTV in thedraftBylaws, are all verybroad indeedandsignally fail tostrike thecarefulbalancenotedabove.Forexample,OTTwouldcoveranyservicethatprovidesaudioorvideooraudiovisualcontentviatheInternetindependentlyof the Internetaccessprovider(commonlyreferredtoas the InternetserviceproviderorISP).Thiswould includenotonlyNetflix,butalsoYouTubeand, indeed,anywebsite thathostedvideocontent(whichcouldbeanyprivatewebsite).AccordingtoArticle4(f), theMCisresponsiblefor licensingtechnicalequipmentusedforbroadcasting,incoordinationwiththeTelecommunicationsRegulatoryCommission(TRC).Article5(c)callsontheMCtograntpermitsfortheimportationofthissortofequipmentand to monitor its use. Finally, Article 21(e) prohibits a licensee from using his or herequipmentforanypurposenotdefinedinthelicence.It is appropriate for broadcast and/or telecommunications regulators to set technicalstandards and parameters for broadcasting equipment for various reasons, including toensure that efficient use is made of the frequency spectrum and that common technicalprotocolscanbeimplemented.Itdoesnot,however,makesensetolicencespecificpiecesofequipment as these provisions suggest the Commission should do. Rather, broadcastersshould be responsible for conforming to the rules, including as regards technical


specifications for equipment, and there shouldbe systemsof sanctions for thosewhodonot.Finally,thereisnowarrantforlimitingtheuselicenseesmakeoftheirequipment.TheLaw already prohibits one from engaging in broadcasting without a licence, and that issufficient.Thereisnoreasonwhyalicenseeshouldnotusehisorherequipmenttoproduceafamilyvideooranadvertisementforacommercialcompany,whichcouldthentrytoplacethatadvertisementwhereveritwantedto.Broadly speaking, Articles 15-25 of the Law set out the rules relating to licensing ofbroadcasters. It isnot the intentionof thisAnalysis toassess inanysignificantdepth thecomplianceoftheseruleswithinternationalstandardsorbetternationalpractice,asthisisbeing done elsewhere. However, this Analysis does point to some weaknesses in thelicensingsystem,inparticularrelatingtoomissions.Inmostcountries,licensingofbroadcastersisdoneonacompetitivebasis,withthelimitsbeing dictated either by frequency scarcity or the commercial carrying capacity of themarket. In the latter case, the regulator limits the number of players allowed into therelevantmarket(forexample,nationaltelevisionstations),onthebasisthatthecommercialsizeofthemarketcanonlysupportthatnumberofqualityplayersandthattolicencemorewould lead to a proliferation of low-quality content and the inability of higher-qualityplayerstosurvive,totheoveralldetrimentofthepublic.Thereisastrongrationaleforsuchasystem,althoughmoderntechnologiesarefundamentallytransformingthebroadcastingenvironmentinwaysthatpresentchallengesforthisapproach.Where a competitive system is in place, it is essential, among other things, to maintainfairness,tohaveclearcriteriaagainstwhichcompetingapplicationscanbeassessed.Betterpracticeistosetoutthemaincriteriaintheprimarylegislation,andthentoallowforthesetobeelaborateduponthroughthecallfortendersinthecontextofanyparticularlicensingcompetition.Even if competition isnot themainapproach towards licensing,and insteadeveryapplicantwhichcomplieswithcertainminimumstandardsisgivenalicence,thereisstillaneedtosetoutclearlywhatthoseminimumstandardsare.This is fairvis-à-vis theapplicant and also provides shape and consistency to the assessment exercise for theregulator.The AVL does not include any such set of competitive assessment criteria or minimumstandards. Article 16(b) does provide a list of documents/information that must beprovided as part of a broadcasting licence application, and one might infer that this isrelatedtothecriteriaforassessingtheapplication,butthisisnotthesamethingassettingtheseoutclearlyintherules.It is also better practice to include at least a general framework of rules relating to theprocedures for processing broadcast licence applications in law. The Law does includecertain elements of this, such as the list of documents to be provided, in Article 16(b),


referredtoabove.But it is limitedinnatureandwouldbenefit frombeingexpanded.Therulesmight, for example, refer to the rightof theapplicant tobeheard in relation to theapplication, the right ofmembers of thepublic to be informed about the application andalso to make representations, and so on. The obligation of the regulator to adopt moredetailedrulesinrelationtoanyparticularlicensingprocessshouldalsobesetoutinlaw.Finally, the Law fails to provide for any real system regarding the digital transition. Theproposed Bylaws do start to address this issue, for example by adding in a definition ofdigitalterrestrialbroadcastingandaddingsomeprovisionsonthistotherules,forexampleonfees.Butnorealsystemwhichtakesintoaccountthefundamentallydifferentnatureofdigital broadcasting has been put in place. Perhaps there is a sense that, at least for theprivate sector, distribution of television signalswill remain based in satellite technology,but if thereisanyintentionofofferinganydigitalterrestrialtelevisionlicences,this issueneeds to be addressed. There is also a need to transition JTV from analogue to digitalterrestrialtransmissionsystems.IntermsoftherulesregardinglicenseesintheLaw,afewofthepositiveobligationsmaybequestioned. For example, Article 20(d) calls on licensees to “facilitate the work” of theauthorities,whileArticle20(f)callsonthemtocooperatewithotherlicensees.Itisnottheroleofbroadcasterstofacilitatetheworkofpublicbodies;rather,themediashouldactaswatchdogoverthem.Licenseesareincompetitionwitheachotherand,whiletheyshouldbehave in a civil fashion towards each other, they should not be required by law tocooperate.Article20(h)callsonlicensees,wheneverpossible,to“giveprioritytoJordanianhumanandmaterialresources”,whileArticle20(m)callsonthemto“contributetothedevelopment”ofnationalaudiovisualproductionindustries.ThesearelessproblematicalthanArticles20(d)and (f), but it may be questioned whether it is necessary to include them as legalrequirementsintheLawandtheirvaguenessleavesthempotentiallyopentobeingabused.Employmentrulesarepresumablyinplacewhichalreadypromotethehireofcitizensoverforeigners.Amorepracticalapproach todeveloping localproductioncapacity, inplace insomecountries, is to requirebroadcasters to carrycertainminimumpercentagesof localcontent and/or to include aminimum percentage of independently produced content intheirprogrammeschedules.Article 21(j) requires licensees to follow any instructions the Commission issues duringemergencies anddisasters. Suchprovisions, once common inbroadcasting laws, arenowunderstood as an unacceptable restriction on freedom of expression. The important roleplayedbybroadcastersduringemergencyanddisastersituationsisclear,butachievingthisobjectivedoesnotrequiredraconianmeasuressuchasgivingregulatorsthepowertoissueorders tobroadcasters. Indeed, inmost countries,broadcastersnaturallydo theirbest to


providegoodcoverageofemergencies,becauseitistherightthingtodobutalsobecauseitmakesgoodbusinesssense(i.e.thissortofcoverageattractsaudiences).Article9of theproposedBylawsrequires licensees tohavea full timeexecutivedirectorwhohas “at least four years of experience and competency”, has relevant language skillsand has not been convicted of a “crime or misdemeanour violating honor or morality”.These sorts of regulatory conditions are unnecessary and unduly intrusive. It is up tobroadcasters, as part of their competitive success, to make sure they hire appropriatepeopletoleadtheirorganisationsandthisshouldnotberequiredofthembylaw.

Recommendations:

Ø Consideration should be given simply to doing away with the system of

regulatingrecordedmaterials.Ataminimum, thesystemofpriorcensorshipofthesematerialsshouldbeabolished.

Ø CarefulconsiderationshouldbegiventotheproperscopeoftheLawintermsofInternetormobilephonetechnologybasedformsofcontentdistribution,andthedefinitionsshouldbeadjustedtolimittheregulatoryreachoftheCommissiontothat.

Ø The MC, in collaboration with the TRC, should set standards for broadcastingequipmentand impose those standardsasa legal requirementonbroadcastersthrough the licensing process, but not otherwise issue permits or licences forindividualpiecesofequipment.

Ø Licensees should be able to use their equipment for whatever otherwise legalpurposetheyseefit.

Ø A set of broadcast licence application assessment criteria – whether forcompetitiveorminimumstandardspurposes–shouldbeaddedtotheLaw.

Ø TheproceduresintheLawforprocessingbroadcast licenceapplicationsshouldbereviewedandconsiderationshouldbegiventoelaboratinginmoredetailonthem,inlinewiththerecommendationsabove.

Ø Considerationshouldbegiven toputting inplaceapropersystem for licensingdigitalterrestrialtelevisionandforthetransitionofJTV’sterrestrialtransmissionsystemfromanaloguetodigital.

Ø Consideration should be given to repealing or amendingArticles 20(d), (f), (h)and (m) and Article 21(j), or to replacing them with alternative and moreeffectivemeasurestoachievethesamegoals,alongthelinessuggestedabove.

Ø Article9oftheproposedBylawsshouldnotbeadopted.


4. Content Regulation and Promoting Professionalism The Law includes a few rules relating to content issues and professionalism. Article 4(i)includesageneralreferencetotheMC“organizingmediaactivitiestoelevatethestatusofmediaprofession”,givingasexamplestraining,studiesandresearch,conferences,festivalsandthelike,whichisapositiveroleforit.Intermsofrulesrelatingtocontent,Articles20(k)and(l)oftheLaw,alongwithArticle8oftheproposedBylaws,containanumberofspecificcontentobligationsandrestrictions,aspartofthetermsandconditionstobeincludedinthelicenceagreement.Theseincludethefollowingpositiveprovisions:

• Respectingthemoralrightsofothers.• Respectingthetechnicalandintellectualpropertyrightsofothers.• Respectingthehumandignity,personality,freedomandrightsofothers.• Respectingthe“pluralisticnatureofexpressionofthoughtsandideas”.

Intermsoftheprohibitions,theseincludethefollowing:

• Not disseminating content which may “incite hatred or terrorism or violence, orincitesectarianorracialdisputes”.

• Not disseminating content which “may damage the national economy, nationalcurrencyorunderminethenationalandsocialsecurity”.

• Not disseminating any false content which may “undermine the relations of theKingdomwithothercountries”.

• Not disseminating content, including commercials, which “promotes sorcery andwhichmightmisleadpublic,blackmailanddeceivethem”.

• NotdisseminatingcontentwhichabusesAllahandreligiousbeliefs.• Notdisseminatingcontentwhichprejudicesthevaluesandheritageofthenation.• Not disseminating content which violates public decency or morals, including

pornographyorviolence.In general, Article 18(d) provides for the Council of Ministers, in accordance with aregulation, to impose fines on broadcasters that violate their licence conditions. Amorespecific rule for breach of the rules in 20(l),which coversmost of the both positive andnegativeruleslistedabove,isfoundinArticle29(b),whichprovidesforfinesofbetweenJD5,000 and 30,000, as well as paying compensation for any damages resulting from thebreach. For repeated or recurring violations, the fines are doubled and there is also apossibility, following a court verdict, of the licence being cancelled. According to Article8(o), inexceptional cases, theCommissionmaysuspendanybroadcast that isharmful tonationalsecurityorthecommunity,orthatcontainspornographicmaterial.


Boththepositiveandthenegativesetsofruleshereareproblematicalinasmuchastheyarecastasobligationsforbroadcasterswhichmightattractrathersignificantfinesorworse.Itis legitimate to require broadcasters to respect the intellectual property rights of others.However, imposingvagueobligations likerespecting thedignityand freedomofothers isproblematical.Therearecertainrightswhichareprotectedbyveryspecificlegalregimes,suchas therights toreputationandprivacy. Ifabroadcasting lawwants toprovide foraparallel (and less onerous) system for protecting these rights, that is legitimate. Theproblemwiththeprovisionsastheyarecastnowisthattheyaretoobroadandvague,andcould,asa result,be thesubjectofabuse.Callingonbroadcasters to respectpluralismofexpression is even more problematical because it is entirely unclear what this mightactuallymean.Doesitrequirebroadcasters,forexample,toletsomeonewhohasadifferentperspectiveonanewsstoryparticipateinapaneldiscussionaboutit?Theprohibitionsarealsoproblematical,essentiallyforthesamereason,namelythattheyare simply too vague and unclear to be applied properly. One of the conditions underinternational law for restrictionson freedomofexpression isprecisely that theybeclearandunambiguous,sothatindividualsknowwhatisbeingprohibited.Someoftherulesarereasonablyclear, like incitinghatred,butothers - likeviolatingpublicdecency,damagingthenationaleconomyandunderminingrelationswithothercountries–arenot.Intermsofthe latter, for example, would criticising the diplomatic behaviour of a neighbouringcountry–otherwiseaperfectlylegitimateexerciseoftherighttofreedomofexpression–becovered?Article4(j)callsontheMCtoestablishacommitteeofexpertstoreviewcomplaintsaboutmediacontentandrecordedmaterialsfromthepublicoranothermediaoutlet.Inparalleltothis,Article8(j)callsonthedirectortorefercomplaintsagainstlicenseesfromthepublicor other licensees to the committee. Complaints between broadcast licensees andtelecommunicationsoperators,otherthanaboutfinancialissues,ontheotherhand,aretobedealtwithdirectlyby theMC,presumablyon thebasis that theseare likely to involvetechnicalorfrequencyrelatedmatters.Inpractice,thecommitteedecidescomplaintsbasedonacodeofethicsadoptedonavoluntarybasisbybroadcasters,30aswellasprinciplesofjusticeandequity.Inpractice,wherethecommitteefindsabreachoftherules, it issuesarecommendation to themedia outlet to do one of the following: provide a correction orreply; issue an apology; or delete the material which formed the subject matter of thecomplaint.TheproposedBylawswouldaddsome limitedprocedural rules to thissystemandmakethedecisionofthecommitteeformallybinding(Article24).Article 4(j) is a very interesting development – it was added as part of the 2015amendments to the Law – inasmuch as it represents a sort of co-regulatory approachtowards dealingwith complaints,with experts deciding on these complaints rather than 30Thiswasadoptedon26April2010.AvailableinArabicat:http://mc.gov.jo/Pages/viewpage.aspx?pageID=22.


officials.TherehasbeenalotofdiscussioninJordanaboutcomplaintssystemsandhowtomoveforwardonthis issue,andthis isauseful firststep.Furthermore, thissystemcouldavoid theneed for the vaguebothpositive andnegative rules discussed above, since theproblemsthoserulesaimtoresolvecouldinsteadbeaddressedthroughcomplaints.At the same time, there are a number ofways inwhich the system could potentially beimproved.First,inlinewiththeideathatrestrictionsonfreedomofexpressionneedtobeclearandunambiguous,betterpractice inthisarea is torequirecomplaintsbodiestousecodesofconductsettingoutwhatisexpectedofmediaoutletsandwhatisprohibited.Thisgivesnoticetobothmediaoutletsandthepublicregardingthisimportantissue,andhelpsensurethatdecision-makingprocessesaroundcomplaintsarefairandconsistent.Inmostcases, such codes are developed by the complaints body in consultation with interestedstakeholders,includingofcoursethemedia.As noted, the committee is currently relying on the voluntary code of ethics adopted bybroadcasters.Under theAVL,and inparticular inaccordancewithArticle8(l),oneof theroles of the director of the Commission is to issue “instructions of programs,advertisements and commercials”. It is not entirely clear but thiswould seem to suggestthatoneof therolesof theCommission is to issuecodesofconduct in theseareaswhichbroadcastersareboundtofollow.Wearenotawarewhetherornotanysuch‘instructions’haveyetbeenissued.BroadcastersaregenerallyrequiredtocomplywithanyinstructionsissuedbytheCommission(Article20(c))andspecificallyrequiredtofollowtheArticle8(l)instructions(pursuanttoArticle21(l)).Suchinstructionscouldserveasthecodeofconductforthecomplaintssystem,althoughthereareimportantadvantagestousingbroadcasters’owncode,includingthatitislikelytohavetherespectofthosebeingregulated.Second,betterpracticeistosetoutinthelegislationorregulationsthesanctionsthatmightbeappliedbytheco-regulatorybody.Onceagain,thisprovidesclarity,mostimportantlyforthemediabutalso for complainants. It canalsohelpensure thatonly limitedand lightersanctions are in fact applied, most commonly a warning or a requirement to publish orbroadcastastatementacknowledgingabreachofthecode.Asnoted,thecommitteeappliesthreetypesofsanctions,butthisisnotenshrinedbylaw.Third,atthemoment,thecompositionofthecommitteeisleftentirelytothediscretionoftheCommission,whichmightchangethememberswheneveritwishedto.Betterpracticewouldbetoprovidesomeguidanceinthetextofthelegislation,orinregulations,astothecomposition and conditions ofmembership. Ideally, this should ensure that a reasonableproportionofthememberscomefromthemediasectorandshouldalsoprovidememberswithsomeprotectionoftenure.Finally,thecommitteeshouldberequiredtoadoptatleastaframeworkofproceduresfordealingwithcomplaints.Thesecould,forexample,makeitclearthatboththecomplainant


andthemediaoutlethadarighttobeheard,clarifywhethercomplaintswouldnormallybeheardinpersonorsimplyviadocumentation,indicatethatadecisionwouldbeprovidedinwritingandsoon.TheproposedBylawswouldmake it incumbentonthecomplainant toprovideacopyofthemediacontenttowhichthecomplaintrelated(Article24(b)).Thisisnot reasonable in respect of broadcasters – it would often not be possible for thecomplainant tocapture thatmaterial–and it isalsounnecessarygiven thatbroadcastersare already, under the Law, required to preserve their content for six months (Article21(c)).

Recommendations:

Ø Boththepositiveobligationsforbroadcastersandtherestrictionsoncontentin

Articles20(k)and(l)oftheLawandArticle8oftheproposedBylawsshouldbereviewedandeitherremovedorredraftedinclearandunambiguousterms.

Ø Consideration should be given to further developing the co-regulatory systembasedonthecommitteeofexperts,takingintoaccountthefollowing:• Theneedtoclarifythestandardswhichthecommitteeissupposedtoapply,

whichmight suggest aneed to repealArticle8(l) if this isnot going tobeused.

• The need to provide a legal basis for the sanctions that the committeeapplieswhenitfindsthatamediaoutlethasoperatedinbreachofthecode.

• Theneedtoputinplaceatleastbasicrulesregardingthemembershipofthecommittee.

• Theneedforthecommitteetoadoptatleastaframeworkofrulesregardingthe manner in which it will process complaints (including abolishing theideaofarequirement forthecomplainanttoprovidethemediacontenttowhichthecomplaintrelates).

- Ends -

analysis of the audiovisual media law, no. 26 for the year ...jordan: analysis of the audiovisual...

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