ANALYSIS OF THE

DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS

DISPUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS CHENNAI CENTER FOR CHINA STUDIES

JAYATI SAGAR, RESEARCH INTERN

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ANALYSIS OF THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS

DISPUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON SINO-

JAPANESE RELATIONS

ABSTRACT The most important sector that continues to pose a threat to Sino-Japanese relations is the

dispute over the ownership of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Historical and cultural factors have acted as catalysts for the declining relations. Joint developments

in the East China Sea have failed and increasing Chinese presence in the maritime waters have further contributed to the worsening of relations. The claims on the islands worsened

since 2010 onwards and reached its peak in 2012, when the Japanese officials visited the Yasakuni Shrine as well as purchased three of the five islands which angered the Chinese and led to a stagnant halt in joint developments between the two countries. The islands

are considered as critical geostrategic points with abundant reserves of oil and natural gas. The current Chinese strategy is to challenge the Japanese claims of the islands using the

strategy of attrition. This strategy has become even more prevalent ever since the beginning of the pandemic in 2020. This paper will seek to explore (1) the claims on the

disputed islands and international law; (2) implications of the dispute on Sino-Japanese relationship; (3) defence strategies adopted by the two countries.

INTRODUCTION The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea have been a source of constant

confrontation between China, Japan and Taiwan. The group of uninhabited islands are known as Diaoyu in China, Senkaku in Japan and Tiaoyutai in Taiwan. The archipelago

has been under Japanese administration since 1895, however, in the period between 1945-1972 the islands were under United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. These set of islands are present northeast of Taiwan consisting of five uninhabited islands

and three rocks. It was in 1969 that the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East identified the islands containing potential reserves of oil and natural gas. However,

the extent of the reserves is often debated by the two countries. Since both China and Japan are the leading importers of oil and natural gas, it makes it all the more essential for

the two countries to have disputed claims over the islands. The islands also serve as lucrative seabed for fisheries and contain a diverse flora and fauna. Prior to 2012, the islands were administered by the Japanese government following which Japan

nationalised them further upsetting China.i The dynamics of the conflict is such that it poses a puzzle for scholars as well as policymakers for a peaceful resolution to the issue.

Since history is so closely tied between the two nations, it seems almost inevitable to keep the cultural differences aside. This paper is an attempt to understand the dispute and its

origin, as well as its impact on China-Japan relations. In doing so, this brief will explore not only the past Chinese and Japanese perspectives but also highlight significant gaps in

defence strategies adopted by the two nations.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The region of East Asia remains largely haunted by the histories of World War II where competing narratives shape regions national identities. China’s economic and military strength can be accounted to its history which has shaped a huge chunk of its public

education and state building. As per the Chinese point of view, its education system prompts the citizens to ‘never forget national humiliation’ suffered at the hands of the

Japanese and Western Imperialists. The Chinese are determined to overcome the unjust

and unequal treaties that were forced upon her during the Century of National

Humiliation. This is further strengthened by China’s cultural industry which has played an important part in shaping the public memory. The bravery of the Chinese in the

massacre can also be witnessed throughout Eastern and Southern China in Sino-Japanese

War museums.ii

The period between 1940’s to 1980’s did not talk much about the Nanjing massacre. This silence was a result of the Maoist thoughts and the constant actions of the CCP leaders.

The CCP leadership ignored much of the events that took place prior to 1980’s. However, this seemed to change when China refused to be known as The Sick Man of Asia and she

shook off its image by emphasizing the victories and endurance of the Chinese people. With this came the whole Century of National Humiliation which China rightly claimed

instead of being ashamed. However, Japan often blames China for its victimization culture and its extent of its legitimacy. After the Sino-Japanese war, many countries sought reparations from Japan, and so did China.iii

With Deng Xiaoping in power and the death of Mao, a modernization in official narratives

took place. China’s victimization period was freely discussed, and research was encouraged by scholars. Under his leadership, the Chinese thinking shifted from class

based to pragmatic nationalism. Chinese nationalism was thus redefined as celebrating not just the glories of its civilization but also acknowledging China’s Century of National Humiliation. This humiliation was crucial in shaping Chinese Nationalism thereafter.iv

On the contrary, such Chinese depictions are considered highly sensitive in topic in Japan.

As per the scholar, Takashi Yoshida, there has been an open political debate on the atrocities conducted in the war which extends to the debate on remilitarization. The right-

wing historians in Japan stand against the harsh judgements of the Tokyo Trials

(Renouard 2017). Another Japanese historian namely, Shūdo Higashinakano denies such allegations saying that there is no evidence to support such claims (Sharma 2020). However, many Japanese citizens acknowledge Japan’s wartime aggression and seek

sincere apologies caused by their ancestors. Japan’s extreme nationalists deny the massacre altogether and have a victim perspective according to which the Japanese fought

wars only to keep off the Western imperialism, which resulted in the atomic bombings, destruction of cities, tribunals accounting to their aggression and the post-war humiliation

faced by Japan. In 2016, UNESCO declared Nanjing Massacre to the list of documents in its Memory of the World Register. It was at the same time that Japan, withheld its funding to the organization. Among the mainstream historians, there is no doubt that the Japanese

soldiers committed such atrocities yet due to some Japanese scholars disagreeing to the entire event, the extent of the massacre is often debated.v

The way historical events between China and Japan are tied often becomes the centre of

dispute in contemporary affairs. Nanjing Massacre was one such event that impacted

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Chinese citizens. Their dark history was carried by a legacy of differentiating claims with respect to events, dates, historical maps and even territorial claims. The way these claims

effect the boundaries in the East China Sea is highly complex. Therefore, it becomes important to understand the ramifications of these differentiating claims on this dispute.

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND UNCLOS

With respect to claims, the situation on ground is complex since it involves issues of sovereignty, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelves. Both China and

Japan claim to have sovereignty over the islands, with Japan controlling the features under its administration while China and Taiwan included them as a part of its official administrative system. According to Chinese claims, the islands are uninhabited and due

to the uninhabitable features, they are not entitled to have a 200 nautical miles EEZ or continental shelf of its own as per the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) 1982.vi Japan on the other hand claims that the islands ae legal and can sustain a life of its own, and therefore should have a continental shelf or EEZ. In accordance with

the Chinese claims which are well supported by the Republic of China (ROC) as well, the islands should not affect the delimitation in the East China Sea. For Japan, this becomes a problem since it uses these islands as base points to establish its EEZ and continental

shelf.

There are conflicting claims with respect to the continental shelves as well. China and Taiwan use the principle of natural prolongation, wherein it states that the East China Sea

continental shelf is a prolongation of the Chinese continental shelf and thus falls under China’s jurisdiction. For Japan, the trough is just a depression in the continuous margin and therefore, the continental shelf should serve as a boundary separating the two. China

also states how this claim is against the delimitation agreement and that consensus proceeds over the equidistance line principle.vii

Under UNCLOS, all claimants are entitled to a 200 nautical miles EEZ. Within a

country’s EEZ, a country has sovereign rights over its resources including the seabed and subsoil. Not only that, a country also has jurisdiction for marine scientific research as well as preservation of its ecosystem. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea all state their claim of a

200 nautical miles EEZ with respect to the 1982 UNCLOS.viii However, there are problems with applying this treaty to an agreement on boundaries. The contrasting positions arise

from the different baselines, and an added problem to that is the contrasting interpretations of the baselines for each country. Furthermore, the boundaries for EEZ claim and the

continental shelf are not always the same. While EEZ claims as per the UNCLOS are 200 nautical miles, the continental shelf stretches to as far as 350 nautical miles from the baseline depending on the geography.

LEGAL CLAIMS

According to China, the dispute over the ownership of islands dates back to 1534, where the features were a part of PRC and Taiwan (Valencia 2006). The Chinese claims further

state that the islands were under the Ming Dynasty from (1368-1644) and Qing Dynasty from (1644-1922). At some point Qing Dynasty also placed the jurisdiction of the islands

under the local administration of Taiwan. This is further reinstated by official documents and maps from China, Japan and the Kingdom of Ryukyu. Japan on the contrary denies that a dispute exists altogether, something the international law does not comply with.

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According to Japan, the islands have been under Japanese administration right from 1895 until they finally nationalised them in 2012.ix Japanese claims over the islands are

highlighted by the Okinawa Reversion Treaty passed by the US Senate in 1971 and the San Francisco Peace Treaty, however, the claims with respect to the San Francisco Peace

Treaty are not in accordance with Japanese actions. Apart from the disputed claims from the two sides, it is important to focus on the legality of these features under international

law.x Treaties play a preferential role both under international law and dispute solving

mechanisms relating to territorial sovereignty. With respect to this dispute, the origin starts with the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Article 2 (b) of the treaty entails the recognition of

Korea as a sovereign country by China (since Korea had been under China’s tributary

system under Qing Dynasty) and Taiwan (then known as Formosa) “together with all the

islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Taiwan”. This includes the Pescadores

and the Liaodong Peninsula. However, with Japan’s defeat in World War II, a series of

treaties and documents form the legal basis for China’s claim over the islands. One such international instrument was the Cairo Declaration of 1943 which states “that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan) and the

Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other

territories which she has taken by violence and greed” implying that the Diaoyu islands be

returned to China. With the surrender of Japan came the signing of the Potsdam

Declaration of July 1945.xi Article 8 of the declaration confirms the validity that “the terms

of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out”. Obligated to this, Japan accepted the Potsdam

Declaration as a part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and was entitled to relinquish control of all the islands except for “the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku” with

other minor adjacent islands including Tsushima and Ryukyu under the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers Instruction (SCAPIN) No. 677 of 1946. The Chinese claim

that the Diaoyu islands did not come under Japanese administration as per the SCAPIN No. 677.xii

Japan on the other hand doesn’t acknowledge that an ownership dispute exists between the two countries and that the Senkakus are an integral part of it. In September 2012,

Japan further reinstated this position in the UN General Assembly denying claims that China controlled the islands prior to 1895.xiii Before the islands became uninhabited, in

1900 Koga Tatsushiro, a Japanese entrepreneur established a fish processing plant with some 200 workers, however, the business gradually failed and since 1940 the islands have been uninhabited. It was only at the end of World War II, that the islands came under US

jurisdiction.xiv Furthermore, Japan denies the applicability of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and other legal documents such as the Cairo Declaration. Instead, heavily relies on The

San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral treaty between United States and Japan i.e., the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1971 as well as some laws subject by the

United States Ryukyu Administration (function from 1950-1972). The Okinawa Reversion Treaty ensures the transfer of administrative rights over the islands to Japan.xv The islands were under the administration of Japanese people until 2012 when the

Japanese central government nationalised them fearing Tokyo’s nationalist governor Shintaro’s demand to purchase the islands. This further upset the status quo between

China and Japan.xvi

Even though Japan iterates useful provisions from the San Francisco Peace Treaty (namely Article 3 Nansei Shoto) which forms the conventional basis of its argument, the

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claims with respect to the applicability and legality of the treaty are problematic. Article 3 which states that “any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its

trusteeship system”, and “powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction” does not

legitimise Japan’s sovereignty claims over the islands.xvii Not only that, the post-war

ratification of the treaty excluded China and it’s ally the Soviet Union which questions the legitimacy of the “peace treaty” since its violates the commitment by the allies under 1942

Atlantic Charter which requires “to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to

make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies”.xviii With respect to pacta tertiis nec nocent

nec prosunt, China is not obligated to the treaty due to its status as a third party (i.e., a treaty

does not create liability for third party). This only indicates why Japan disregards the

Treaty of Shimonoseki and treaties relating to world peace signed by signatories after World War II. The Japanese government often refers to the rules of territorial acquisition

(terra nullius and acquiescence) however, ICJ follows a Tripartite Hierarchy Rule with

respect to territorial dispute which provides preference to treaties and not the rules pertaining to territorial dispute. Therefore, in accordance with international law, the legal

arguments with respect to the islands are solid for China.xix

It is crucial to note that the dispute changed in dynamics ever since 2012, when Japan

nationalized the islands and repeated this position in the UNGA. Nonetheless, it was in 2004 that Japan started viewing China as a threat to its regional security after China

confirmed the establishment of a reserve vessel squadron which was capable of fighting wars. There was a warmup in relations between 2006-2007 when the Abe and Jiaboa made

an icebreaking visit to the respecting countries easing tensions and even carrying out joint developments of hydrocarbons in the region. Unfortunately, this did not last long, and the relations began to spiral downwards when Aso Taro visited the Yasakuni Shrine which

was consequently led by the realise of Nanking Massacre movie in China.xx

JOINT DEVELOPMENTS FAILURE AND SUCCESSES Joint developments between China and Japan started on June 18, 2008 after 11 rounds of

negotiations. The agreed consensus includes (a) bilateral cooperation in the East China Sea to main peace, cooperation and friendship; (b) joint development in the East China Sea and the joint development zone; jointly explore 2600 sq. km block claimed by Japan;

(c) participation by Japanese legal personnel in Chunxiao Gas Field in accordance with Chinese laws. The agreement covered joint development of China’s Longjiang (Asunaro)

gas field, with Japanese companies investing in Chunxiao (Shirakaba) gas field. This along with determining the future course of action for Kashi (Tianwaitian) and Kusonoki

(Duanqioa) gas fields was also considered.xxi Beijing was also in favour of cooperating on the gas fields near Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, however, this was explicitly rejected by

Tokyo. Instead, the agreement served as a provisional basis, that is a step to protect both

the country’s legal position. Keeping in spirit with the Laws of the Sea Convention (LOSC), if no immediate resolution of a dispute is possible, then “the disputants shall enter

into provisional arrangements of a practical nature”.xxii Nonetheless, it was a significant step

since the two countries decided to jointly develop on exact sites and share the profits of

investments.

However, the agreement began to collapse faster than one would imagine. Japanese investments in the Chunxiao Gas Field led to a series of protests near the Japanese

Embassy in Beijing. Chinese leadership was heavily criticised by Hong Kong media for betraying the national interest and humiliating the nation. This was addressed by the then

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Chinese foreign minister Wu Dawei stating that China had not abandoned its sovereignty claims in the East China Sea and that Beijing’s claims still extend up to the edge of the

continental shelf, denying Japanese claims of the boundary. This was further reinstated by President Hu Jintao, when he mentioned how Japanese investments in the gas fields were

welcomed like any investment done by a private company, denying claims of bilateral development project.xxiii This along with the entry of Chinese survey ships as close as 12

nautical miles of the islands, further upset the relations. A consequent agreement was decided in September 2013, however, the collision incident between Chinese fishing vessel and Japanese Coast Guard added to an indefinite delay in the signing of the agreement.xxiv

IMPLICATIONS OF FISHERIES AGREEMENT ON JOINT DEVELOPMENT

Since the broadest width shared by East China Sea is 400 nautical miles, it is important to note that the whole sea becomes EEZs shared by China, Japan and Korea. An agreement was reached between China and Japan in 1997 which later came into effect in 1 June 2000.

The agreement deals with significant provisions such as (a) affirming the conservation and protection of fisheries resources: environmental requirements under Agenda 21 and

others, in accordance with the LOS establishes the necessity to conserve and rationally utilise the marine living resources of common concern. Further, scientific research should

be conducted by the two countries for conservation measures. Compliance with fishing boats and nationals of the two countries should be respected, as such relevant laws and regulations of other party should be followed for such purposes when present in a given

party’s EEZ; (b) Providing reciprocal fishing rights: This agreement applies to the EEZ of both countries. It however excludes the EEZ area south of 27°N, and west of 125°30’E in

the East China Sea (i.e., the area surrounding ROC and Diaoyu/Senkaku islands); (c) Establishing the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ): The agreement calls for the creation

of a PMZ which passes through the middle of the East China Sea which is 52 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial seas of Chinese coast and the coast of the Ryukyu Islands with its northern limit being 30°40’N and the southern limit being 27°N.xxv Both

sides should comply with the decisions made by the Sino-Japanese Fishery Joint Committee. Each party should take administrative and needful measures in the PMZ and

should not force administrative measures on other party in this water area. The creation of a fishery zone is essential for cooperation between shared waters of two countries.

However, what separates this agreement from other fishery agreements is the creation of a PMZ, being first after the establishment of EEZ regime between China and Japan.

COOPERATION IN BILATERAL RELATIONS Both nationalism and the past add up to become an integral part of regional security and

geopolitics. It can be seen in China, Japan and South Korea’s expenditure on defence. Beijing’s defence budget on the other hand is 1.27 trillion yuan with a focus on its force

projection capabilities. Tokyo and Seoul are constantly building their capabilities to counter China’s rise, threat from North Korea and a future retreat of the American forces

from the region. The Sino-Japanese relations have been very fragile in certain sectors, especially on the issue of Senkakus. The tension over the Senkakus is so strong that during a poll conducted, around 60 percent of the Chinese population predict a military conflict

in the near future.xxvi Nanjing Massacre has shaped the Sino-Japanese relations in the 21st century in a number of ways. Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, a shrine

that honours Japan’s war dead as well as convicted war criminals, infuriated the Chinese

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and the Koreans. This further detoriated relations between the two countries. For the Chinese, this visit was seen as being ‘completely unacceptable’ whereas Seoul expressed its

‘regret and anger’.xxvii

Relations between world’s second and third largest economies namely China and Japan have been affected, largely due to territorial dispute over the East China Sea islets. Not

only that, there has been Chinese suspicion for the efforts made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe to amend its pacifist constitution. On the 80th memorial ceremony

of Nanjing, ceremonial advisor to China’s parliament, Yu Zhengsheng said that ‘China and Japan are neighbours with deep historic ties’ and that ‘China would like to deepen relations with

all its neighbours, including Japan’. Back then Yoshihide Suga, who is currently the Prime

Minister of Japan said, ‘the leaders of Japan and China have agreed in past meetings to further

improve relations and it is important, while cherishing this trend, to together show a future-oriented

stance’.xxviii

Since Suga came to power, there has been a shift in the Japanese foreign policy. In the first

meeting between the leaders, Suga showed his interest to work with Xi to boost stability in the region and bring about international stability.xxix The prospects for Sino-Japanese

relations look flattering as of now, however, China often has a way of tying history to the security front, which makes Japan seek support from external sources, for instance South

Korea and QUAD to deter China in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the Biden-Suga summit conducted on April 18, 2021 highlighted the two nations interest to strengthen relations, and concerns ranging from Taiwan to rights to trade. Despite the differences,

the two countries economic ties have been strong and look conducive in the foreseeable future. The two countries’ have never let their diverging interests effect their economic

ties. This can be seen when Japan refused to call the pandemic as The China Virus or when

Japan refused to join Trump’s trade war with China. Japan also joined the RCEP which

is largely dominated by China and can be seen to cooperate with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. All these show Japan’s economic commitment towards China. Despite the growing pandemic, there has been a surge in Japan’s trade relations with China. The trade

between the two countries in the first half of 2020 was around $150 billion, with Japan’s investment in China reaching $2 billion.xxx

The bilateral relations have been treading on thin ice since the last four decades. The

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute further adds to the growing differences between the two countries. Despite being each other’s largest trading partners in the economic sector, their historic and cultural ties still have a great impact on their relations.xxxi In a recent event in

June this year, Chinese vessels sailed through the contiguous zone, marking 112 straight days around the islands. Ever since mid-February, Chinese naval vessels have been

entering the territorial waters almost every day breaking its own record.xxxii Following the strategy of attrition, China is increasing its naval presence around the islands which is a

major threat to Japan’s sovereignty.xxxiii Despite these skirmishes in the maritime waters, China and Japan depoliticized this issue for almost four decades.xxxiv This was a great achievement with respect to the implications of the dispute on Sino-Japanese relations.

Maintaining deep economic ties, the two countries set an example to bolster trade relations despite the maritime dispute. However, this couldn’t last long and the hope for joint

developments stalled when Fukohida and Abe visited the Yasakuni Shrine in Tokyo which commemorates the class A war criminals. This further angered the Chinese, and

they view this as a constant disrespect to their history.xxxv The prospects of Sino-Japanese relations look appealing considering the momentum the two countries have managed to

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bear during such testing times. However, history has its own disadvantages, especially for a country like China whose entire idea of nationalism revolves around its humiliation

days. The impact that the Nanjing Massacre has left on the psyche of the Chinese citizens is irreparable and obvious to reoccur on geopolitical and strategic realms.

MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY TOKYO

China views Japan’s growing partnership with the United States as a containment towards Chinese expansionism. As such, Japan is developing close ties with likeminded allies who

have a similar interest regarding China such as India and Philippines, both having border disputes with China. During Suga’s meeting with Biden in April this year, Biden reiterated Article V of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which states that “Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would

act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes”xxxvi

Thus, strengthening support to Japan on the issue of Senkaku Islands. At the beginning of

this year Japanese government thought to publicize the 19th century British and German maps which showed the islands as a part of Japan. These maps were printed in local newspapers to mark the formal ownership of the islands by the Japanese administration

in 1895 which in turn were put on display at the National Museum of Territory and Sovereignty in Tokyo.xxxvii Japan has also sought cooperation with European countries in

its attempt towards a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) to counter growing Chinese expansionism. The EU foreign ministers expressed their support for the FOIP to the

Japanese Foreign Minister, Motegi.xxxviii Increased Japanese engagement with Myanmar in sectors of health, negotiating peace between the Myanmar military and the Arakan

Army insurgents and contribution to the Dawei Special Economic Zone. This would be a part of the Japan-Mekong Southern Economic Corridor linking Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam to southern Myanmar. These are few measures undertaken by China since the

beginning of 2021 to counter China’s rise in Asia-Pacific.xxxix

However, a move made by China in the January worsened the ties between the two countries. China’s National People’s Congress adopted a law which gives coast guards the

right to take action by using weapons (if necessary) when national sovereignty or jurisdiction is threatened or infringed upon by individuals or foreign organizations at the sea.xl With the passage of this new law, Japan expressed its concern to Britain and London

in return decided to permanently deploy two warships along with its Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers to escort ships sail to Japan. The carrier will be carrying F-35B stealth jets

which will dock at Yokosuka in September this year. UK is also looking forward to deploying a Littoral Response Group to undertake evacuations and anti-terrorism

operations.xli Later this year, the Japan Parliamentary Alliance on China issued a statement condemning the violation of human rights of Uyghur and called for a legislation to impose further sanctions; however, Japanese government was very cautious of not using

the word ‘genocide’. This is mostly due to the large volume of trade with China, that both Japan and Germany are a little reluctant compared to other G7 members.xlii

Japan also deepened ties with Australia since relations between China and Australia

worsened after an independent research carried out by Australia to find the origins of the coronavirus. This led China to take retaliatory economic actions against Australia. Not

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only Australia, Japan is also partnering with neighbouring countries like India and United States i.e., the countries of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) to counter

China’s interests in the East China Sea. The G7 also acted as a catalyst wherein not only the member countries but also guest countries such as India and Australia expressed

concerns on human rights violations in China. In April this year, China has been actively engaged in the construction of undersea communication cables for the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI) which is backed by the Chinese government. This has become a serious concern not only for Japan, but also for India since the BRI is supposed to surpass India. As such, Japan, Australia and United States have agreed to share information on Chinese

activities in the region as well as finance submarine cables in strategically significant areas.xliii

China’s growing interest in the East China Sea is demonstrated by the increase in its

defence budget by 6.8 percent. Not only that, China has also sent aircraft carrier Liaoning through the Miyako Strait. In a counter move, Japan has commissioned an Aegis class destroyer to an Andaman Island which is strategically located away from the Malacca

Strait. With the advancement of drone warfare in China, Japan started developing remote control fighter aircrafts which will be functional by 2035. All these advancements by Japan

and China hint towards a war which is foreseeable in the East China Sea. Japan’s interest in becoming the ‘sixth eye’, a part of the Five Eyes alliance is also something Japan is

looking into. Due to lack of specialized intelligence organizations and weak anti-espionage laws, integration with other Anglo-Saxon countries is difficult. Nonetheless, the idea of intelligence interception is significant in Japan’s security domain. Japan is developing

multidomain combined capabilities with the US which includes Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite Systems and will provide US with Space Situational Awareness. This will greatly

help in better intelligence sharing and in tracking missiles. Moreover, the US-Japan Security Treaty also covers cyberattacks (June 2021). In an attempt to further counter

Chinese expansionism both in the East and South China Sea, Japan engaged in two-plus-two talks with Indonesia and an agreement was reached which facilitated transfer of defence equipment to Jakarta. These measures undertaken by Japan are crucial keeping in

mind China’s plan to build land around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.xliv

BEIJING’S STRATEGY OF ATTRITION Since the National People’s Congress (NPC) issued the coast guard law, there has been a

rapid increase in the presence of Chinese naval vessels in the territorial waters near the islands. The prolonged and continuous visits are an attempt by China to claim control

over the features which are of high geostrategic importance to both countries. The Chinese constabulary forces are working based on the Strategy of Attrition. These events are essential to the stability of the East China Sea as well as the broader Indo-Pacific since

Beijing’s three-pronged strategy of attrition deals with normalizing Chinese presence, exert law-enforcing rights, and ultimately claiming exclusive control over the features.

Currently, the islands are under Japanese administration but when does a claim become a reality? According to the historians, something of significant importance needs to take

place in contemporary affairs for it to become a reality. This is precisely what China is trying to do in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The deployment of Chinese law enforcement vessels from 2012 onwards, right after Japan purchased three of the islands was one such

step. As much as regular presence is one of the most crucial conditions to claim control, exercising sovereign law enforcement rights are equally significant to legally and

politically sustain such a narrative. This routinisation with respect to the deployment and

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patrol by Chinese naval vessels is characterised to challenge the status quo, often known as ‘Salami Slicing’.xlv

In Beijing’s attempt to take control over the islands without any possible armed conflict,

the strategy of attrition though a precedent in dispute management, however, undermines the law of the sea. But since the islands remain uninhabited, Beijing’s main focus is to

exercise maritime law enforcement rights in the territorial waters near the islands. This leaves Beijing with the scope to challenge the status quo also limiting the risk of war, putting pressure on the Japanese authorities to come up with a more nuanced reform.

Starting with phase one that is normalising China’s presence, in addition to the deployment of assets and normalising Chinese presence inside the territorial waters, the

Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies have experienced a transformation and are

closer to a paramilitary organization than coast guards. The fusion of five organizations

and integration of Chinese coast guards under the command of People’s Armed Police, are major developments for China to attain its ‘China Dream’. Today China has a fully integrated Eastern Theatre Military Command to challenge operations in the Sekankus.xlvi

In phase two which is exercising control, China has demonstrated its control by regular

visits in the territorial waters and increasing the length of these incursions each year. Since 2020, Beijing has set a new record of staying in the waters for as long as 100 days without

any interruption. Higher presence of Chinese vessels in the contiguous zones gives more ease of deployment. The last phase of the strategy includes take over. A number of factors are responsible for China’s rise as a challenge to Japan and the status quo between the two

nations. Highly militarised coast guards, improvised defence capabilities have given China enough confidence to turn the tables in its favour. Given the current situation, China is

not going to curb its maritime activities near the islands unless Japanese presence is reduced. This is the next objective of the strategy. However, this will increase pressure on

Japan and therefore Japan has made it clear its military is ready to ‘act firmly’ if situation demands. Not only Japan, since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are close to US bases in Japan, this puts the alliance between the two nations to test in events of war.xlvii

CONCLUSION

The Diaoyu /Senkaku Islands disputes is an alarming one, the one that puts not only the East China Sea but the entire Indo-Pacific to test. With two great Asian economies going

on war, the ramifications are larger than one perceives. It is therefore essential for Japan to analyse the notion of ‘control’ in territorial waters and impose limits on all fishing as

well as build lighthouses and shelters for fishermen to resume research and monitor activities in response to the focused strategy of attrition imposed by China. Since the dispute predates 1895, it exposes cracks that still lie unhealed between Beijing and Tokyo.

Despite differences in cultural and defence sectors, both the countries have managed to maintain good economic ties for a long time. Nonetheless, this however, does not assure

that peaceful resolutions are foreseeable in the near future since either country has the potential to upset the other on lines of defence (Japan by building multilateral alliances

and partnerships and China through its strategy of attrition) or cultural (visit by Japanese leaders to the Yasakuni Shrine to pay respect to the war criminals and realise of Chinese movies on Nanking Massacre). In addition to the above strategies adopted by both China

and Japan, the only scope of cooperation that remains is self-defence in accordance with international law.

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