176

H e is considered one of the mostimportant Polish writers of thetwentieth century. Deported by the

Soviets to a gulag in 1939, from which he wasliberated in 1942, he fought with Allied forcesin North Africa and in Italy. He told the storyof his odyssey in A World Apart:Imprisonment in a Soviet Labor Camp DuringWorld War II (Un mondo a parte, published inItaly by Feltrinelli). Among his mostimportant works are: Diary Written at Night(Diario scritto di notte [Milan: Feltrinelli]); Glispettri della rivoluzione e altri saggi (TheGhosts of Revolution and Other Essays[Milan: Ponte alle Grazie]); Controluce(Backlight [Naples: Tullio Pironti Editore]);Ricordare, raccontare: Conversazione suSalamov (Memories, Stories: Talking aboutSalamov [Naples: Ancora del Mediterraneo]),written with Piero Sinatti, one of east closestcollaborators (Ancora del Mediterraneo);Variazioni sulle tenebre. Conversazione sulmale (The Darkness Variations. Conversationson Evil [Naples: Ancora del Mediterraneo]);and Breve racconto di me stesso (A ShortStory about Myself [Naples: Ancora delMediterraneo]). The following interview wasconducted by Camilla Miglio and PaoloMorawski for Andrea and Paolo Morawski’s

book of essays, Polonia mon amour, publishedin 2006 by the Rome-based Ediesse.

What significance do you attribute to whathappened in Poland in 1956? Where were youat the time?In 1956 I was in exile in Italy (I had been

living in Naples since 1955), and I worked forthe Polish magazine “Kultura”, published outof Paris. It was an important, tumultuousmoment. Every day, Poles arrived in Parisfrom behind the Iron Curtain, having takenadvantage of the gaps that opened in theborders. We Polish emigrants to the Westnever knew how and if what we wrote wouldarrive in Poland. Quite suddenly, we weresurprised to learn that we had a public backhome. Up until that point, we’d had thesensation of tossing bottled messages into theocean, without knowing how they’d end up.And then we were overwhelmed by the echoesof our own ideas. (I felt the same emotionduring my first trip to Poland. A huge line ofreaders in front of a bookstore who werewaiting for a signed copy of my novel. I signeda lot of old copies of books, too, secret copies.So there had been a hidden thread all alongthat had kept me connected to them! Even asearly as 1956, the message in a bottle had

In Polonia mon amour, the Polish writer, Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski, re-

members the events of 1956, recalling the diverse elements that con-

tributed to the implosion of the Soviet system. Focusing particularly on

events in Poland, he draws lessons relevant to the present day noting,

for example, that the journey from Communism to democracy remains

incomplete. And in the case of Italy....

And so my Polandhas found itself again

edited by Camilla Miglio and Paolo MorawskiHISTORY

177

found the destination it was meant to reach.)We met often during those months, we talkedabout what was happening and about whatwas being written. The article on WladyslawGomulka that appeared in “Kultura” (Let’sGive Gomulka Credit), for example, provokedquite a few arguments. At the time it stillwasn’t clear what the role of this individualwould be – someone who was first expelled bythe Polish Communist Party and jailed, andthen later became its Secretary. Today [1996],the editor of the magazine [Jerzy Giedroyc]regrets that article, he maintains it was a falsestep. In my view, though, the enthusiasm forchange at the time was such that we, fromParis, could only support Gomulka asdecisively as possible. If we had been moreharshly critical (an attitude that would havebeen more correct, given the results), we’dhave created a wall of misunderstandingbetween those who were there in Poland,directly experiencing that reality, and weexiles who viewed the situation from theoutside. It was a kind of solidarity, a way ofsupporting the forces of change. From thatpoint, the movement soon exhausted itself,and Gomulka started his retreat. Setting hismask aside, he’d revealed the face of anapparatus that was utterly hostile to the idea

of concession. But in October 1956, in thewake of the workers’ strikes and of theprotestors who were killed, he was in power.He had the popular support as well as that ofthe so-called revisionists, who believed theycould reform Communism. Their assumptionwas that, in order to change Eastern Europe oreven the Soviet Union itself, one needed towork within the Party, acting from within theinternal workings of the various communistparties (and not from outside, in an “enemy”position). That’s why the revisionists (theyoung communists or even the less-youngones who wanted to improve or redesignCommunism) supported Gomulka’s comingto power. In the end, even the revisionistsended up being considered enemies, in theirown way. And everyone, including therevisionists, finally realized that it wasn’tpossible to reform Communism, a rigid andconservative regime that had no intention ofallowing true reforms. What happened withGomulka proves the point.

Regarding the interpretation of the events of1956, you argued with the journalist, IndroMontanelli, among others.Yes, because, in the case of Poland and of

Hungary as well, Montanelli saw national

Woj

ciec

h D

rusz

cz/R

epor

ter

Pol

and

movements at work in their pure state. Heexplained the 1956 movements as nationalrevolts against Russian dominance in theSoviet Bloc. Naturally, that was the mostvisible aspect (particularly in the face ofRussian military intervention, a factor thathad, on every occasion, led to an explosion ofanti-Russian feeling). Montanelli refused tosee that, even leaving Russia aside, the 1956movement was an opposition aimed at theregime itself. A revolt against Russianhegemony, yes, but also against the socialsystem introduced by the communists. For along time, the revisionists deluded themselvesinto thinking it was possible to realize whatDubcek – before Soviet intervention in Praguein 1968 – would call Socialism with a humanface. Today, revisionists like LeszekKolakowski, Karol Modzelewski, or JacekKuron are well aware of the end of that falsehope. Let’s consider the case of Kolakowski,just as an individual example: at first, hethought the system could be modified. In ourown magazine, “Kultura”, he published anessay entitled Communism Can Be Reformed.

At the time, he even seemed to believe it.Later, he abandoned that blunder – so muchso, in fact, that he was motivated to writeyears later, in a brief article, that the onlysolution was to make a kind of marriage usinga little conservativism, a little liberalism, and alittle socialism. The same goes forModzelewski and Kuron, who were friends. Fora long time, people remembered them for theirfamous Letter to the Party, as a result of whichthey were sent to prison. But if we talk to themtoday about that letter, their reaction is more awince of shame than a gesture of pride.

You’re very critical of revisionism.I’m critical in exactly the same way the

revisionists are critical. It’s not a matter ofcriticizing Kolakowski or Modzelewski orKuron or, among the younger examples,

AND SO MY POLAND HAS FOUND ITSELF AGAIN

_In October 1956, Gomulka (below, a public demonstra-

tion) was in power and had the popular support as well as

that of the so-called revisionists, who believed they could

change Communism

Cor

bis

179

Michnik. No. They understood that reform is aroad that can only carry you so far, then itcomes to an end and there’s nothing more tobe done. The conclusion they reached is thatthe idea of taking Socialism firmly in hand,rendering it fit to be used, is completelywrong. In my opinion, even Gomulka wasaware of that. Or else he well understood that,if he wanted to stay in power, he had to act likea good communist, behave like a loyalsubordinate. In that regard he was certainlyable to reassure Soviet communist leaders(Khrushchev himself and the commander inchief of the Warsaw Pact), using the wordsthat were appropriate for the occasion, whenthey made their lightning trip to Warsaw totake a hard line on the threat of militaryintervention. He convinced them that he hadno intention of dismantling the regime, but

merely wanted to make it more palatable tothe citizenry. The Russians left quietly,thinking: “Gomulka is our man”. The Sovietleadership held the same view with respect toImre Nagy (who, just like Gomulka for thePoles, was a popular symbol for Hungarians ofthe hope of de-Stalinization). In that situation,Soviet intervention in Hungary in November1956 was provoked by the recognition thatNagy was in no way “their man,” that he wascompletely serious (János Kádár, on the otherhand, his successor, understood that there wasnothing to be done and was much moremalleable and docile). Nagy’s efforts, in fact,which led him to air the possibility thatHungary would withdraw from the WarsawPact (an extreme measure!), ended extremelybadly. Some years later, in 1968, during thePrague Spring, Moscow once again showeditself to be rather patient with the communistrevisionist, Alexander Dubcek, almost adoptinga “wait-and-see” attitude. Today, we know thatthe Russians and Dubcek met very often. TheRussians wanted to know if the Czechs andthe Slovaks would mount an armed resistanceto possible military invasion by the SovietUnion. In the last meeting between theRussians and the Czechs, Dubcek responded toBrezhnev: “In any case, Comrade Brezhnev,we’ll never shoot at the soldiers of the RedArmy”. As I see it, Brezhnev understood inthat very moment that he could intervenewith no risk of a response (which is what hethen did, in August 1968, meeting noresistance on the part of Czechs that could becompared to what took place in Hungary).What happened in 1956 in Eastern Europeancountries needs to be, at least with regard tocertain aspects, reevaluated. One sawimportant impulses toward change, but notprocesses that could have been sustained,developed, extended, and so forth. In the end,my criticism is the same one that the formerrevisionists came to. Those impulses couldhave been used (and they were) to get themachine to budge, but not to change it in anyfundamental way. Polish Communism was astrong regime that had no intention ofabandoning power (a fact that was hammeredhome on every occasion. As early as theimmediate post-war period, assertions likethese were already circulating: “We will nevergive up the power we have won”, or “We willnever share the power we have won”). So theidea of being able to do something together, of

HISTORY

_In 1968, during the Prague Spring, Moscow showed itself

to be rather patient with the Czech communist revisionist,

Alexander Dubcek, who had assured Brezhnev that, in the

event of a Russian invasion, he would take no action

Cor

bis

180

creating a coalition, for example, was acomplete sham. It was essential to get thatenormous machine moving in any waypossible. Certainly, the results that wereachieved in 1956 seemed – at the time – quitemodest. The dreams of that period werenegated by the events that came after. Thatnotwithstanding, what various revisionistswere doing at the time in Eastern Europe wasextremely significant: a seed. Much later, withthe passage of time, that seed bore fruit.

In short, 1956 is fundamental if we look at itin a wider historical perspective.Yes, from the perspective of Eastern

Europe’s progressive self-liberation from thecommunist regime. From that point, a slowprocess began which, in stages marked byperiods of greater or lesser intensity, led in1989-1991 to the fall of Communism and theSoviet system. That was an idea that madepeople laugh, back then, but not today. The firststage was the worker revolt in Berlin in June1953 (which followed the death of Stalin,March 5, 1953). And then, perhaps the mostimportant event in this story, came theKhrushchev Report to the XX CommunistParty Congress of the USSR in February 1956.That constituted a strong signal. It meant thatsomething could be done, that the regime,

which appeared utterly unshakeable, wasactually changing. And yet anyone who readthat Report with a certain level of intelligenceunderstood that what interested Khrushchevand his comrades were Stalin’s abuses towardcommunists, not the injustices he committedagainst the people, against the Soviet middleclass. That second aspect was never taken intoconsideration, the only thing that mattered wasthe internal settling of accounts. Which madeone think (the Polish revisionists, for example)that the only possible battleground was withinthe Party, in the hope that the work of reformwould slowly begin to spread from the inside.If we then look at this process historically as itmoved from 1953 to 1956 to 1968, and thenbeginning in the 1970s, at the movements thatlater culminated in Solidarnosc and so on, whatdo we observe? We see – in the first instance –the arrival of a growing economic, social, andpolitical crisis in the Soviet Bloc. There’s nodoubt that the Soviet Union could havecontinued in that way for quite a while, usingits police force and army as a strong arm. But

AND SO MY POLAND HAS FOUND ITSELF AGAIN

_Khrushchev at the XX Communist Party Congress of the

USSR in February 1956. On that occasion, Khrushchev

denounced Stalin’s abuses against communists, but not

the injustices he committed against the Russian people

Gra

zia

Ner

i_Ta

ssph

oto

181

in a world in which the rivalry between thetwo blocs was becoming clearer all the time, therhythm and the timing of Soviet development(if we want to call it development) was tooslow. The famous machine wasn’t working.Most important of all, it wasn’t moving incomparison to what was happening in Europeand in the United States. Therefore – and thisis a second aspect – we were witnessing parallelattempts on the part of the rigid Sovietcommunist system to reform itself. Evengiving people the opportunity – within certainlimits – to contribute to change (but alwayswithin the ranks of the Communist Party,never outside of it. Anyone who tried to escapethat logic was destined to fail).

What about the role or the contribution of theWest in 1956?The West didn’t collaborate in any relevant

way, in part because it never really understoodwhat was happening in Eastern Europe. It’sinteresting to examine the many differentkinds of reactions there were in the West,

especially among intellectuals, to what wastaking place in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.In Italy, for example, I recall Antonio Giolitti’sprotest in 1956: it was the protest of adissident who later left the PCI (ItalianCommunist Party) in 1957. Nothing incomparison to Luigi Longo’s official protest in1968 in which he called the Soviet invasion ofCzechoslovakia by name. In my view, in 1956,those in the West – with Sartre at the front ofthe pack – didn’t understand what was takingplace. For them, it was essential to be able toidentify a homeland for Socialism: a myth thatwas useful to them in their activities in theWest, that helped them live, if you like, intheir environment. In fact, they weren’t evenslightly interested in what was actuallyhappening in that “homeland”, in the other“environment”, so to speak. In his famousdispute with Camus regarding the Sovietconcentration camps, Sartre went so far as tosay that perhaps they really had existed, butthat it wasn’t right to talk about them, so asnot to rob the workers in the French suburbsof hope, so as not to tarnish that shiningmyth. That was the opinion of many Europeanintellectuals on the left, communists, andcommunist sympathizers. Very fewunderstood at the time the seriousness of theprocesses of the breakdown of the Soviet

HISTORY

_Western European intellectuals, with Sartre at the front of

the pack, underestimated the first workers’ revolts (above

right, the revolt in Berlin in 1956) and failed to understand

the seriousness of the breakdown of the Soviet system

Cor

bis

(2)

system. The first skirmishes – worker revoltsin Berlin in 1953 and in Poznan in June 1956,mass demonstrations in Budapest in October1956 – didn’t stir their interest in the slightest.Nor did they really manage to attract theattention of governments in the West. Isuspect that those governments weren’texactly enthusiastic about these developments.Their vision for the world required thesubdivision of Europe into two solid, stableblocs. A divided Europe meant a stable Europe,and as a result they accepted the separation asa fact. The result was that it was pointless tohope for any support from that quarter[Western Europe]. When the demonstrationsbegan, in 1980, in the Polish naval shipyards, Iremember very well seeing an edition of the“Espresso” (Rome) at the newsstand with theenormous headline, Die for Gdansk?, with aquestion mark. They were alluding, of course,to the Second World War in which Gdanskwas a different Gdansk... I mention this detailto give you an idea of what was still more orless a widespread attitude in the 1980s. That’swhy I say that, in a certain sense, Eastern

Europe liberated itself. Small tremors, smallrevolts... impulses that slowly provoked anavalanche, or rather put into motion, a little ata time, the larger processes of thedisintegration of the Soviet empire. With nohelp nor even with any special solidarity onthe part of the governments in the West. Inthat sense there’s something miraculous aboutthe 1956 movements. Very rarely haveindividuals (intellectuals or workers) managedto shift what has seemed immovable. Theydeserve our entire gratitude and our respect.

The Pope played a very important role.The Pope was enormously important, but

only from October 1978 onward, when theArchbishop of Kraków, Karol Wojtyla, becamePope John Paul II. History will judge his

AND SO MY POLAND HAS FOUND ITSELF AGAIN

_The election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope and his

first visit to Poland in 1979 ignited an unanticipated for-

ce and energized movements such as Solidarnosc (on the

facing page, Lech Walesa)

actions. As far as I’m concerned, I maintainthat his first visit to Poland [June 1979] was anextraordinary event. It was as if people weremanaging to rise up from their knees, as ifthey’d regained their dignity or a sense ofpurity, as if they were receiving oxygen thatallowed them to breathe again. All of thismade an enormous impression. And it was thebeginning of everything that followed inPoland. The Pope was its first engine. Hiselection and his trip put an unforeseen andunexpected force into motion, which –according to some – at first frightened eventhe Pope himself who was seeing on television,from Castel Gandolfo in Italy [Summer 1980],a very tense, even explosive situation inPoland: the first strikes in the Polish yards, hispicture everywhere among the demonstrators,the unleashing of enormous forces that mightwell have been destructive or dangerous...

It was in that climate that Solidarnosc wasborn in August-September 1980.Yes, but not even Solidarnosc would have

been able to do anything if the regime hadn’t

already been rotten. Let’s not forget that forthe entire decade of the 1970s in Poland,waves of strikes and riots (with resultingrepression) followed one after another. Theircommon themes were questions likeincreases in the price of food, raises insalaries, and, generally speaking, the(terrible) conditions the population wasliving under. In any case, the left wasSolidarnosc’s soul. It was Modzelewskihimself who coined the name Solidarnosc;and even Bronislaw Geremek, a formercommunist, was part of it. But themovement was really too vast to be able tosurvive for long. It was a nationalinsurrection that involved ten million people(nearly one-third of the population). Today[1996], a movement like that would have thechance to come to a more dignified, moresensible end. Not to completely fall apart.Instead, what happened is what happened:very little remains of all that Solidarnoscmeant and managed to build. Today, itrepresents a certain political strength, but it’snot a dominant force.

HISTORY

Cor

bis

(2)

184

The phenomenon isn’t just a Polish one. In allof the countries of Eastern Europe the post-communists have returned to power.The so-called post-communists, who

prefer to refer to themselves as socialdemocrats... Normally, I’d at least usequotation marks when talking about them,but in some cases I’d grant them specialhonorary titles – like the ones Michnikseemed to have recognized in the case ofJaruzelski when he maintains that, havingassumed power for the “good of Poland” asthe “lesser evil”, Jaruzelski would avoid a new“Polish 1956”. That’s a proposition Iabsolutely can’t agree with. Thedocumentation attests to an entirely differenttruth. There was never any danger of a Sovietinvasion. Vladimir Bukovskij, the famousSoviet dissident, wrote a book based onarchival sources he reviewed in Moscow, bynow published in Russia and in France. Whatthis material shows is that the Soviets, withenormous steadiness and stubbornness,always told Jaruzelski that he could not expectany “brotherly” help from them because theyweren’t in a position to repeat in Poland whatthey had done in 1956 in Hungary and in1968 in Czechoslovakia. It was a grave error,then, to elect Jaruzelski as the first presidentof the Polish Republic [in July 1989]. I’m notbeing vindictive. I’m not hoping to see himhanged from a lamp post. On the contrary, I’dhave wished him a happy retirement. But toremember him as the savior of the homeland– him, an oppressor, the man who introducedmartial law in Poland – that really strikes meas an exaggeration. And yet there are thosewho try to maintain this bridge between thecommunists and the post-communists. AdamMichnik was a strong supporter ofKwasniewski’s candidacy for the presidency.And now, because of fear of “Polishnationalism” – as they themselves say – he’sready to lend a hand to the current politicalleaders. I can’t say whether all of this will leadto some positive result, but I have my doubts.Modzelewski and Kuron are operating on thesame line of thought. They recently publishedan article that they co-signed in a widelydistributed Warsaw daily newspaper, a kind ofan appeal in which they throw out the ideathat it’s essential to help the new post-communists in order to avoid a nationaltragedy, a civil war, or something along thoselines. When I read the article, I said to one of

the two authors, to Modzelewski, what Ithought: “It seems incredible to me, after thevictory of the post-communists, that anyonehas any desire to help them further”.

How do you explain the return of the post-communists?I’ll limit myself to highlighting two

aspects that the West takes little intoconsideration. In Eastern European countries,with the growth of resistance to Communism,

AND SO MY POLAND HAS FOUND ITSELF AGAIN

_The Soviets always told Jaruzelski that he could not ex-

pect any help from them because they weren’t in a posi-

tion to repeat in Poland what they had done in 1956 in

Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia

Gra

zia

Ner

i_A

FP

185

various illusions were in general circulation.There was the belief, for example, that oncecommunism fell, all problems would beresolved in a climate of enormous joy.Obviously, it isn’t like that. Today, whatprevails is a recognition of complexity, acoming to terms with the difficulties. On theother hand, in fifty years the Soviet regimecouldn’t help but leave behind notablelegacies, notable impressions. Those long-lasting marks remain still (like the morainedeposited by a retreating glacier). First andforemost, what the Soviets left behind is hate,social as much as national hate, an inheritancethat’s perhaps more on the surface. What liesdeeper are the effects of Sovietization. To putit more simply, the homo sovieticus becameused to a life that was, to put it in these terms,comfortable: aided by the State, far from thespectre of capitalism, from the laws ofcompetition and survival of the fittest. Theaverage citizen was deprived of the freedom tosay or to write what he thought, but on theother hand he could count on certain basicguarantees: social assistance, medicine,education. Each according to his needs. That’swhy the radical reforms put into place inPoland (Balcerowicz’s shock therapy) – andtheir price – disappointed people. Just as inHungary and in Czechoslovakia, in Polandthat disappointment was expressed in thevote, leading to the success of the post-communists in 1993, a choice that was laterreinforced in Kwasniewski’s victory in thepresidential elections [November 1995]. Theconclusion I draw from this is the following:the Soviet world and Communism no longerexist. But what continues to exist are certainapproaches that communism instilled both inthe Soviet Union and in the countries ofEastern Europe; and these approaches (habits,reflexes, ways of behaving and of thinking)are strong enough to make it possible tomobilize millions of people once again. It’s nottrue, therefore, that Communism no longerhas a chance. An enormous difference existsbetween people who are getting rich in themost frightful manner, especially in Russia,and those who live below even a minimumsurvival level. This extreme disparity in livingconditions has the power to unchain areaction. That is, it might be capable ofnourishing once again that shining myth thatwe talked about at the beginning of ourconversation: the myth of a regime –

disagreeable, certainly, inquisitorial andilliberal – but that nevertheless allowseveryone to survive, to eat, to go to school, toreceive medical care. And that’s the source ofthat odd nostalgia that winds throughoutEastern Europe. I’m not especially fond ofmaking prophecies, but I can observe that thepost-communists, especially in Poland, havethe difficulty of maintaining the power theywon. For the moment it’s easy, given that theso-called Polish “right” is very disorganizedand hasn’t managed to unite its forces. But thesituation is such that the same people whoelected the Polish post-communists will endup disappointed, sooner or later. And we’ll seeat that point which powers begin to stir.Forces exist in both Russia and other EasternEuropean countries – sleeping for themoment, apparently calm, not immediatelyvisible, not in evidence – that will one dayrouse themselves. It isn’t over yet.

How do you judge the shift toward post-com-munism in Western Europe, on the otherhand?Surprisingly, in West Europe the shift has

been rather painless. But let’s be clear: in Italyjust as in Eastern Europe, the process is notfinished by any means. One fine day, theItalian Communist Party woke up and hadturned into the Democratic Party of the Left(PDS). A miraculous transformation with alot of omissions along the way. Certainly,today the PDS is at the reigns of government,but it also has a long way to go. Just as ithappened in Eastern European countries, theresponsibility of government may providethe occasion for a much more detailedexamination of its motivations, of its ownpast. Up to now, the shift from Communismto social democracy has been easy, in partbecause no one has come forward to presentthe bill for what Italian communists did orwhat they were in the past. There’s a greatdeal of psychological repression on the part ofthe left, all of which will reemerge and play asignificant role. In the newspaper, I saw aphotograph of D’Alema sitting in anarmchair with a portrait of Togliatti behindhim. Well, that portrait can’t last forever.Togliatti is a figure in need of historicalreexamination. Former Italian communistsdon’t want to admit it, but history requiresexplanations - and the explanations can’t beavoided.

HISTORY