and social behaviour: a of homo economicus. by william...
TRANSCRIPT
Rational and Affective Commitment in the Explanation of Social Behaviour:
A critique of Homo Economicus. By William Langstone. May 2014.
1 Introduction
Norms are important to us, perhaps more than we readily admit. Norm‐following
may be constraining in that it involves negotiating institutional structures, but it may
also be part of a shared identity amongst individuals, based on a process of
enculturation whereby we internalize the basic beliefs and feelings prevalent in society
(Fay, 1996, 55‐6). Ordinarily, acting according to norms involves a commitment; norms
have a claim on us beyond mere acting a certain way, which involves the recognition of
quasi‐moral normative reasons for action (Brennan et al, 2013, p197). In
contradistinction to this, Rational Choice Theory typically explains norm‐following as
the individual rationality of self‐interested homo economicus, appealing either to
material gain or the desire for social approval (Pettit, 1990, 309).
In this essay I will argue that the nature of normative commitment, involving a
quasi‐moral affective commitment undermines the validity of homo economicus
explanations within the domain of social action, along with the associated notion of
rationality. However, in rejecting the homo economicus model of rationality I propose
reason‐based grounds compatible with an alternative, more foundational reasonbased
1
account of rational choice theory.
The essay will be divided into six sections. Section two will discuss RCT and the
rational‐choice account of norms. Section three will present some criticisms of this
account, based on the commitment norms demand. Section four will present a
taxonomy of motivational reasons and argue for the distinction between norm‐
following on a homo economicus account and that of commitment. Section five will
present a few aspects of a reason‐based RCT, showing how this may provide a solution
to the criticisms. Section six will offer some concluding remarks.
For more than half a century the Rational Choice paradigm has enjoyed
widespread acclaim as the best means of modelling agents in neo‐classical economics,
political science, international relations and other social sciences. As a result, many
other disciplines within the social sciences have sought to apply it in their respective
fields (Heap, 1992, p66). Two distinct versions of Rational Choice Theory (RCT) are
considered in this essay, a psychological one, in which the rational‐choice theorist
proceeds from postulating facts about the psychology of individuals, and a non‐
psychological one, based on observed behaviour, from which mental content may be
inferred. What is common to both of them is that rationality is defined primarily in
terms of consistency in one’s preferences and maximizing one’s preference satisfaction
(Binmore, 2009, pp21‐2). On the whole, this essay will focus on the former, which we
may take as amounting to the substantial thesis of man as homo economicus, a postulate
often m ade in economic modelling.
However, many philosophers hold is that much social decision‐making is sui
generis in that it involves not maximizing one’s preferences but interpreting the social
roles one plays and the non‐consequentialist rules integral to norms which we
encounter in society (Hollis, 1994). Such considerations form the the basis for the anti‐
thesis of homo‐economicus, homo sociologicus (Heap, 1992, Hollis, 1994).1 That social
reasoning seems both rational on a common sense notion of rationality and compelling
will be a significant point in my argument.
Another criticism is that orthodoxy among rational‐choice theorists denies that
social experiences and interaction can result in preference change other than as a result
of acquiring new information. However, if there is some sense in which commitment to
1 A proper discussion of homo sociologicus is beyond the scope of this essay; I mention it here mainly for completeness
2
a norm is genuinely a case of preference change it is likely to be the result a change of
the reasons we find motivating, rather than of acquiring new information. In order to
show why this is true I consider it is important to discuss why approval and disapproval
matter to us. Unorthodox scholars of RCT such as Elster have identified emotions and as
the primary means of regulation in social norms, being the medium through which
approval and disapproval are communicated between individuals (Elster, 1994).
Making a connection between these two considerations, I will argue that emotions have
an undervalued role in social reasoning, and that they largely explain commitment to
norms in virtue of their relation to normative reasons. In general, I intend the trajectory
of this essay to be consistent with Elster’s identification of Norms, Rationality and
Emotion as the triumvirate governing human action (Elster, 1994, p24.).
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2 Rational Choice Theory
Rational Choice Theory provides an account of rationality such that a choice is
rational if and only if it maximises a utility function given by the preferences of the
chooser (Pettit, 1991, p194; Sen, 1977, p323). The rational choice paradigm is
essentially Humean in that beliefs and desire are taken to be the jointly necessary to
explain intentional action, with reason serving as the “slave of the passions” (Hume,
2006, T2.3.3.1‐8)(Elster, 1988, 311‐2; Binmore, 2009, pp3‐4; Dietrich & List, 2013,
p104). As such, preferences are taken to be theoretically exogenous desires given the
agent’s beliefs about the possible alternatives. Accordingly, by ascribing information in
the form of belief, and introducing motive through preference, the actions of rational
agents may be explained, predicted and prescribed (Davidson, 1963, 675‐8; Dennett,
1987; Elster, 1988). Alternatively, under Revealed Preference Theory, preferences are
equated with revealedpreferences, the overt choices that one actually makes, which
relegates psychological assumptions to a black box (Sen, 1977; Binmore, 2009, pp8‐9).
2.1 Preference, utility and Homo economicus
Using RCT, prediction of behaviour is facilitated by assigning a utility function
(U) to agents. This is derived from a consistent ranking of preferences, given by the
binary relations of strong preference, weak preference and indifference over available
alternatives in a choice set, where all rankings are taken to be transitive. These rankings
can be aggregated into a super set, from which the utility function is given by assigning
rde
4
values to all elements in the set, according to preference o r (Binmore, 2009, pp14‐5).
RCT orthodoxy equates preferences with states of affairs (W), which may be
termed prospects (Pettit, 1991, p201). Thus to prefer x over y is to prefer the way the
world is different when x holds rather than y. Under a modal interpretation these might
be regarded to constitute distinct possible worlds. Fundamental preferences are those
prospects we desire in all possible worlds, whereas derived preferences are those
prospects we desire in virtue of our fundamental preferences, because we believe they
are instrumental in attaining the former. Furthermore, fundamental preferences are
taken to be fully defined and fixed, whereas derived preferences may change (only)
ietrich & List, 2013, p104). when our beliefs change (D
Consequently, the utility function is derived from the subjective beliefs and
desires of the agent. That is, she believes that p with a certain degree of probability, and
desires W with a certain intensity. Thus by choosing x over y she is judging that x is
likely to satisfy her desires better than y. As such, an individual is said to choose x over y
based on a subjective expected utility (SEU) associated with that option (Pettit, 1991,
p194).
As well as the above, all orthodox rational choice accounts include the following axiom,
ion of economicuswhich is the paradigmatic explicat homo , or economic man:
Ax: A rational agent always chooses so as to maximize her subjective expected
utility.
When the above axiom is combined with certain conditions (such as the
rationality of her beliefs and optimization under uncertain conditions), it follows from
that by reading off the maximal value for an agent’s utility function in any choice set of
available alternative, the rational choice theorist may predict what choice the rational
individual will make, or explain the decision actually made as rational (Elster 1988;
Binmore, 2009).
RCT need not require that rational individuals be selfish (especially under
Revealed Preference Theory), for one’s preferences could be ‘altruistic’ as long as they
are stable and consistent; St Francis of Assisi might be considered rational and altruistic
(Binmore, 2009). However, many economic theories do assert that only self‐centred
desires are salient (Pettit, 1995, p224). Furthermore, utility should not be thought of as
causal; utility is not equivalent to any currency (social or economic) but is a
mathematical representation of one’s established preferences (Binmore, 2009). Finally,
an individual’s interests may be taken to be expressed by the prospects they prefer. In
d
5
light of these considerations, let us efine homo economicus as:
an agent (A) who chooses option x in virtue of her prospect‐desires, for the
reason that x maximizes her SEU. Thus homo economics is a self‐interested
maximizer. (D1)
2.2 Rationality and norms
It has been argued within the RCT literature that social norms are the means by
which recurring collective action problems (exemplified by multi‐party prisoner’s
dilemmas (Pettit, 1990, pp316–37)) of a social nature (such as gift‐giving, or the level of
effort put into work (Elster, 1994, p25)) are solved (or escaped), by prescribing a
certain pattern of behaviour (R). This may be taken as either a claim of abstract
derivation in that they are coordination equilibria, or merely asserting the existence of a
practice which people view as favourable; only the latter need hold for this argument.
Either way, in virtue of these interpretations norms generally make all involved better
off with respect to their own preferences (Pettit, 1990, p316). Furthermore, in order for
norm‐following to be rational, all individuals in P must have good reason to believe that
others will cooperate, which involves collective recognition of the norm (Pettit, 1990,
pp328‐9). The existence of norms explains why individual rational agents in a
population P choose to “cooperate” rather than “defect” when cooperation is mutually
beneficial: norms are things such as they regulate the behaviour of individuals in favour
of coop a
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er tion.
A common concern about norms is that they are non‐autonomous. Norms
involve rules of the form “Do X” or “If Y, do X”, imperatives which need not reference an
individual’s interests because they are not outcome‐oriented (Elster, 1994, p24). Thus
norm‐following often involves both costs and benefits; “cooperation” can constitute
either depending on whether particular instances are in one’s interests or not. A norm
of politeness may turn out in my favour when I am left the last slice of cake, but equally,
sometimes I am required to give it up, when I would have preferred to have it. But for
rational agents norm‐following must maximise SEU, outweighing the SEU of ‘defection’
or deviation, otherwise either autonomy is lost or they are acting irrationally. However,
for norms to be resilient the belief that others will cooperate (at least most of the time)
must be true; this requires cooperation to nearly always be a case of maximizing SEU.
Ensuring that these two requirements are compatible presents a challenge for rational‐
choice theorists.
A related problem that arises is that of free‐riders. If a norm is already adhered
to by most, but the rules are not actively enforced, then rationality should dictate that a
self‐interested agent would embrace the benefits without forgoing her other self‐
interested preferences (Pettit, 1990, p323; Sen, 1977, p331). Some social norms may
imply an entry cost, in virtue of only being able to benefit from them as a member of an
exclusive group. For instance, cooperation in certain social circles may be dependent on
adhering to a convention of fashion, or possessing knowledge of some subject, say jazz.
Both constitute opportunity costs which may deter free‐riding. However, not all norms
are like this; in particular basic norms of decency which constitute public goods: against
theft, of politeness, of sharing, of telling the truth, or of voting in a democracy (Heap,
1992 64‐5). In either case, we should not necessarily expect membership costs of a
group to be enough to prevent free‐riding. The rules must be enforced, such that
sanctions are imposed on those who don’t play by the rules.
However, sanctioning may impose new costs on rule‐followers: apprehending a
thief, reprimanding a rude man or excluding a selfish woman may involve risks; in any
case, time is a cost and must be accounted for. The question is, where there are no
obvious personal benefits to sanctioning others, on what grounds is enforcing the rules
rational? Such acts of ‘altruism’ should be excluded by rational individuals, unless they
happen to have a preference for rule‐enforcing.
The generally accepted solution to these problems invokes social utility―the
utility derived from a preference for social recognition2. Within the Rational Choice
literature it is assumed that people generally consider social acceptance as fundamental
to their self‐interest, along with economic gain, such that more or less everyone has a
preference to be approved of and an aversion to disapproval (Harsanyi, 1969, p524;
Pettit, 1991, p309). As it is assumed that “Doing X” is generally in (almost) everybody’s
interests, it must also be true that (almost) everybody approves of X, and disapproves of
not‐X (Pettit, 1990, p313). Consequently, norm‐following may be considered to confer
social value as well as any resultant economic value. Furthermore, sanctioning may be
especially socially rewarding, whilst deviation from norms incurs significant social costs
(Pettit, 1990, p327). On this basis, approval and disapproval can be included agents’ 2 Some “radical” Rational‐Choice theorists do not accept this and postulate that norm‐following is a rational calculation based only on some other fundamentally self‐interested ends. However, I am limiting the inquiry to more moderate theorists here.
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SEUs, entailing norm‐following will be rational most of the time. When this is the case
or most members in P, the norm is resilient (Pettit, 1990, p.309). f
2.3 The definition of social norms
That social norms are maintained by approval and disapproval is considered to
be a defining feature that makes them social norms (Elster, 1994; Pettit 1990). To sum
up this exposition we may define social norms as:
A regularity, R, in the behaviour of members of a population, P, when they are
agents in a recurring situation, S, is a norm if and only if it is true that, in any instance of
S among members of P,
; 1. nearly everyone conforms to R
2. nearly everyone approves of nearly everyone else’s conforming and
disapproves of nearly everyone else’s deviating; and
3. the fact that nearly everyone approves and disapproves on this pattern helps
to ensure that nearly everyone conforms. (Pettit, 1990, p338)
The RCT treatment of social norms and definition put forward here may serve a
variety of purposes, for example explaining the resilience of norms, or conditions in
which they are likely to emerge (Pettit, p317). However, we are concerned with the
claim that this account explains norm‐following as homo economicus maximizing.
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3 A critique of the rationalchoice explanation of social normfollowing
Whilst I consider this rational‐choice account of social norms to an interesting
account of how a self‐interested maximizer might respond to norms, it doesn’t seem to
fully capture the phenomenon of norms. In reality, norms demand more of us. As Elster
noted (following Weber):
“a social norm is not like a taxi from which one can disembark at will. Followers of a social norm
abide by it even when it is not in their interest to do so. In a given situation, following the norm
may be su eful, but that is not to say that it is always useful to follow it.” (Elster, 1994, p31)
I understand Elster to mean two things: firstly, that in the case of norms, one
rarely has the mental means of choosing whether to abide by a norm or not, based on
some SEU associated with the action: social norms are compelling and demand only
rule‐following; secondly, that norms lay a claim on our psychology such that we are
committed to them beyond merely an instrumental realization of our own self‐
interested ends―norms include non‐instrumental normative reasons for action. The
first denies that we really choose as homo economicus, whilst the second asserts that
norms mean that we are not only homo economicus. I will return to the first claim in
section four.
3.1 The quasimoral status of norms
Taking up the second claim of psychological commitment, I would like to explore
the relation between approval and disapproval and normative reasons. Elster argues
that approval or disapproval does matter, but not merely as a matter of preference; they
matter in a much stronger way in virtue of how they make us feel, because of what they
convey about the emotional attitudes of others. For example:
“Sanctions ‐ whether mild or severe ‐ matter mainly because they are vehicles for the expression
of feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt. For most people, being the target of these emotions
is immensely unpleasant, much worse than what one suffers by mere material deprivation.
9
There is little worse than to cringe in shame before a look of contempt or disgust in another. If
the look is backed up by action, such as a refusal to invite you to the next dinner party or to give
you a daughter in marriage, the target may be truly devastated ‐ not because of the material
sanction as such, but because of what it conveys about the emotional attitudes of the
sanction (er.” Elster, 1996, p.1390)
This illustrates that the notion of social utility misses out what is compelling
about social norms: their emotive component. Norms are not only about one’s own
desire for approval or disapproval, and how the emotional attitudes of others may
undermine that desire―I think there is case for arguing that the emotional attitudes of
others matter not merely out of an interpersonal affective dynamic but because they are
interpr eet d qua normative reasons, in a way that makes norms quasi‐moral3.
It seems right to say that the prospect of failing to adhere to a norm that we
usually adhere to brings about the same feelings of guilty unease as failing to discharge
moral duties. Furthermore, in the case of norms how we react to the approval or
disapproval of others lies mainly in how we interpret the situation. Is Dave’s disapproval
that I didn’t buy the next round really justified? On the one hand if he bought the first
after which I left I should expect to feel slightly guilty at his disapproval. I should
consider it reasonable for Dave to be offended at my lack of flouting of the rules, in the
sense that he has good reason to be. However, if we were five rounds in on a Tuesday
lunchtime then it would seem perfectly reasonable to defect without compunction. In
this case his disapproval (or that of anyone else) seems unreasonable to me. Indeed, if I
made my decision on the basis of approval or disapproval it would seem to be irrational.
Disapproval might be relevant to my decision in the first case, but it would seem strange
to say i m c . t was the basis for y hoice
This irrationality is clear when we consider the rules governing moral
deliberation, according to which, normative reasons and principles are what justify the
judgements and pronouncements of others (Brennan & Pettit, 2005); we may
reasonably discount approval or disapproval that is not normatively justified. Similarly,
in the case of norm‐following it seems to be not merely the bare practice which is the
subject of public approbation, but rather the reasons for which the approbation is
justified. To generalize, in practice, approval and disapproval are most often valued only 3 This feature has been widely noted, e.g. in Pettit (1990), Hollis (1994), Brennan et al (2013)
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in virtue of some justifying interpretation involving reasons, and these are frequently
normative. Furthermore, it will be of no use for the rational‐choice theorist to appeal to
the collective approval of normative reasons for action as these are significantly
different from behaviours; if they are involved in action they are motivational causes in
themselves which implies an internalization of prevalent social values, a departure from
homo economicus (Brennan et al, 2013, p199).
To return to Elster’s point, we care about social sanctions because they convey
other’s emotional attitude towards us, attitudes which affect us emotionally. However,
we care about the emotional attitudes of others because we interpret them with
reasons, reasons we care about (or feel we ought to care about) ― in other words,
normative reasons. These reasons need not be moral (e.g. they could be aesthetic or
intellectual), only normative in a broader social sense of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. However, the
quasi‐moral nature of these reasons implies a degree of cultural embeddedness; the
salience of other’s attitudes towards us is dependent largely on the supposition of
shared values and a sense of shared social identity, better accounted for by a process of
encultu n r t f r ratio than me ely he desire or approval simplicite (Mead, 1963, pp186‐7).
This leads to the assertion that norm‐following is better explained by an
internalization of prevalent social values than by invoking homo economicus
maximization: if perceived violations of the rules are the reason for sanctioning, and
sanctions are important to us because they communicate the emotional attitudes of
others towards us emotionally, then it should follow that the rules are emotionally
important to us. We might term this emotional importance “affective commitment”
because it commits us to norms. In this case norm‐following is causally explained by a
desire to follow the rules, as a matter of affective commitment. It is hard to see how this
may be reconciled with the homo economicus model, which leads me to conclude that
the considerations so far undermine homo economicus on a typical account of norm‐
ollowing.f 4
4 Proviso: This isn’t to say that homo economicus cannot explain norm‐following. Rather, my claim is that ordinarily, norm‐following is such that homo economicus does not explain it.
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3.2 The Paradox of CounterPreferential Choice
So far I have argued that social norms have a quasi‐moral character which
undermines psychological homo economicus explanations of RCT. This is not to say that
RCT has nothing to say about norm‐following, but rather that ordinarily we are not only
homo economicus. However, there is still a possibility that Revealed Preference theory
could model us as such on a non‐psychological account, as an individual can be said to
be acting rationally even when we accept that he is not actively choosing on the basis of
SEU values of options (Binmore, 2009, pp12‐3).
How should RCT account for cases where social norms dictate that one should
act against one’s preferences, but where there is no reasonable expectation of approval
or fear of disapproval that would justify normative choice? Instances of adopting
normative behaviour over individually rational behaviour are termed counter‐
preferential choice (Sen, 1977, p328). In cases where maximizing SEU should result in
self‐interested behaviour, norms may require us to act otherwise. Sen argues that it is
unreasonable to prefer maximizing behaviours as rational a priori, as commitment to
norms isn’t irrational or foolish in any meaningful sense.
Sen gives this example of two kids, (say Jonny and Sophie) who have two apples
to share, one large, one small. Jonny says to Sophie “You choose”. She picks the large
one, to which Jonny is upset and says “That’s not fair!” "Why?" asks Sophie. "Which one
would you have chosen, if you were to choose rather than me?" "The smaller one, of
course," Jonny replies. Sophie is now triumphant: "Then what are you complaining
about? That's the one you've got!" (Sen, 1977, p328). Do we sympathize with Jonny?
Naturally we do, because we recognize that he actually wanted the large one, which he
should have got under the norm of politeness, whereby the chooser is expected to make
the polite choice. According to the rules of that game, the one who takes the initiative
has an advantage which constrains the choice of the other. The result is that in choosing,
the chooser is not expressing their preferences about apples, but about politeness (Sen,
1977, p328; Pettit, 1991, p210).
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When someone generally prefers the polite option this seems perfectly rational,
indeed it might be foolish not to. Nor should we account for this out of an aversion to
disapproval; it would be more accurate to characterize their choice as expressing their
commitment to the norm of politeness (Sen, 1977). We should just be able to say that
Jonny would have chosen the polite option because he values politeness, and we should
expect this value to lead to consistent choices in a way compatible with rationality.
However, as preferences are taken to be prospects his desire for the property of
politeness is not accounted for; politeness does not pick out some distinct state of
social property of affairs, but a them (Pettit, 1991, pp.209‐10).
One problem that this raises is the validity of the Revealed Preference theory,
which is blind to such properties. The problem is that unlike St Francis of Assisi, Jonny
would have preferred the large apple if it weren’t an impolite choice, a preference he
has previously revealed, whereas St Francis had already consistently revealed his
preference for renunciation, given his commitment to Christian values. Several
philosophers have agreed that the problem of counter‐preferential choice creates a
paradox for rational choice theory; it prescribes socially naïve choices for homo
economicus, such that we may describe him as a “rational fool” (Sen, 1977, 336; List and
Dietrich, 2014 pp1‐2).
The solution proposed by some philosophers is a Reason‐Based RCT, which will
be sensitive to reasons for choice such as politeness, rather than relying on revealed‐
preference, which may be suited to purely economic contexts, but less so where
sophisticated social concerns are salient (Sen, 1977; Dietrich & List, 2014, pp1‐4).
Significantly, this kind of theory implies a theoretical adjustment to the concept of
preferences. Rather than being fundamentally preferences over possible worlds or
prospects, they are taken to be derived from motivational reasons. Such reasons may be
said to be true of prospects, providing an explanation for why they are desired (Pettit,
1991, pp200‐218).
I will present some important aspect of such a RB‐RCT in section five. However,
first I will present a taxonomy of motivational reasons in way of assimilating the
rguments presented so far.
13
a
4 taxonomy of motivational reasons A
In section 2.2 I presented norms as explainable in terms of self‐interest under
RCT, to which I argued that the account wasn’t satisfactory as an explanation of norm‐
following, due to it failing to account for the quasi‐moral nature of norms ordinarily
attributed to such choices. I proposed that normative reasons provided a better
explanation, in light of affective commitment. This was not the claim that the homo
economicus explanation was insufficient for norm‐following, but rather than it could be
construed as inaccurate in many instances. Certainly self‐interested maximizing could
be a reason for normative choice, just not the only one—normative commitment could
do just as well without considering approval.
In order to relate reasons to preference in a way consistent with the account of
homo economicus given in section two I will present a taxonomy of how the reflexive
self‐/other‐regarding preferences can be combined with conceptions of interest to
produce reasons. This is intended as a conceptual sketch rather than a definitive
account. First, let me set out a few definitions:
Self‐regarding D2)
preferences:
Other‐regarding
preferences:
Preferences A holds in virtue of his personal goals and
desires;
Preferences A holds in virtue of his beliefs about the goals
and desires of others e.g. preference for cooperation. We
may consider these preferences to be conditional on such
D3)
beliefs;
Beliefs about the interests captured by the state‐of‐affairs D4) Self‐interest:
articulated under (D2);
Beliefs about the interests captured by the preferences A
ascribes to others;
D5) Other‐interest:
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I propose that the above definitions may be combined to produce motivational reasons
n the following ways: i
Motivational Reasons Explanation
Homo economicus (A) self‐regarding self‐interested reasons
ther‐regarding self‐interested reasons (B) o
Homo economicus
n) (rational‐cooperatio
(C)
(D)
self‐regarding other‐interested reasons
other regarding other‐interested reasons
Individual altruism
Normative value commitment
To illustrate how these reasons apply let’s return to Jonny and Sophie, only this time
n s bution. suppose there is only one apple, a d Jonny is in charge of di tri
The ive Sophie the apple (y)}. options are: {take the apple (x); g
e apple. A) Jonny takes the apple because he wants th
B) Jonny offers the apple to Sophie because she expects him to out of politeness (she
would think it rude not to).
C) Jonny offers the apple to Sophie because he cares more for her wants more than
his own.
D) Jonny offers the apple to Sophie because he is committed to politeness as a matter
of principle.
Areasons should need no further explanation: self‐interest interest fully explains
the choice. Breasons are those explicated already as the homo economicus account of
norm‐following. Creasons encompass sympathy for the wants and needs of others,
which will include most affective motives, including most of the moral sentiments
familiar to the tradition of David Hume and Adam Smith, apart from guilt and shame
15
which I reserve for B&D‐reasons respectively5. Lastly, Dreasons are reasons that one is
committed to in principle, regardless of whether it is in his or her selfinterest. I consider
Dreasons to be other‐interested as they are most appropriately rationalized on
principled grounds, which may be deontological, consequential, aesthetical etc.;
particular to principles is that one considers them to be universally applicable within
the scope of application. Thus whilst D‐reasons may sometimes work out in one’s self‐
interest, we do not value them because they are in our self‐interest; rather we take a
global perspective and stick to the rules on‐principle. This is consistent with Sen’s
treatment of the matter and Harsyani on “ethical preferences” (Harsanyi, 1955, 315‐6).
As both B‐reasons and D‐reasons invoke politeness as a reason, it might be
argued that there is no salient distinction between them, especially if we allow that the
option actually chosen is the same in both cases. I will defend my position on two
grounds. Firstly, that there are salient psychological differences between the two
options, and secondly that D‐reasons are much more amenable to deliberative
reasoning.
The psychological differences that I propose are salient are two‐fold: firstly, the
information that Jonny considers, and secondly Jonny’s emotional reactions to the
reasons in the case that he selfishly acts on A‐reasons. In order to up the ante, suppose
they are on a date. First consider the salience of Sophie’s expectations as relevant
information. If B‐reasons do not enter into his judgement, then he does not consider
Sophie’s expectations at all, and so they cannot be invoked as a causal explanation.
However, even if he considers both B&D‐reasons we should expect B‐reasons to be
over‐determined by D‐reasons because he is committed to politeness; that is he would
have chosen y qua D‐reasons regardless of whether he considered B‐reasons or not.
However, if he considers only A&B‐reasons then Sophie’s expectations do play a salient
role in his choice. Thus Sophie’s expectations are only salient to Jonny’s choice when
choosing as homo economicus.
Second, when we consider the case when the selfish option x is chosen I think we
may have an interesting account of emotional regulation. Suppose that although Jonny
values politeness, in a moment of akratic weakness he chooses x. Now when Sophie
5 See Adam Smith (1976, Sections III &IV)
16
expresses her disapproval, what response should we expect Jonny to have? Surely we
would expect him to feel guilty: he should have known better! Indeed, as soon as Sophie
expresses her disapproval he realizes this; he recognizes the quasi‐moral pattern of the
situation and remembers that he ought to be polite. Furthermore, we might expect his
guilt to motivate him to make amends (Elster, 1994, p33). However, if he were
unfamiliar with the norm of politeness, when he takes the apple and Sophie expresses
her displeasure we might reasonably expect him to feel shame, rather than guilt. This is
because he didn’t expect (either consciously or unconsciously) her reaction and cannot
understand it, but her approval matters to him, precisely in the manner of homo
economicus.
Generalizing from this analysis I suggest that shame is elicited when we are
disapproved of, but feel we could not have done any better―our disapproved‐of
behaviour was a fated incident we didn’t have the means to avoid. It is distinctly a homo
economicus emotion because it involves a judgement of self‐deficiency in the eyes of
others, undermining our desire for approval. Guilt, on the hand occurs when we believe
we could have acted otherwise (we had the relevant reasons at our disposal), but didn’t
due to some mitigating circumstances e.g. weakness of will. It focuses not on how others
see us, but on how we view our own actions as moralized. The perspective of guilt is
characteristically not homo economicus―it requires an embeddedness in society
involving a shared social identity, based on normative commitments independent of
ne’s self‐regarding desires. o
In light of this, I conclude that shame prompts social learning in a way that
induces individuals to internalize norms via the outcome of bad social choices. In future
similar situation one will fear being shamed, and thus actively consider the expectations
of others in a homo economicus‐style calculation (B‐reasons). Once this internalization
is complete, one is affectively committed and feels guilt rather than shame in cases
where one fails to act in the appropriate way. Furthermore affective commitment
enables us to pre‐empt the guilt associated with choosing selfishly―in assessing the
alternatives we can experience emotions as if we had already chosen (Damasio, 1994,
p155). This entails that D‐reasons will start featuring in one’s deliberation, and
17
eventually will start ‘crowding out’ B‐reasons, which are superfluous, resulting in a
transformation from homo economicus to a less self‐regarding “social man”.
These psychological differences provide independent support for my second line
of defence. As Dietrich and List have argued, choosing on the basis of maximizing SEU
leaves little room for deliberative reasoning as change in (derived) preferences is only
permissible when an agent’s beliefs about the outcome of uncertain prospects change
(Dietrich & List, 2013, p119). Certainly in moving from A‐reasons to B‐reasons this
seems to be the case―Sophie’s disapproval provides salient information for belief
change. However, in moving from B‐reasons to D‐reasons it seems that something else
is involved, namely deliberation involving a revision of one’s conception of the good,
which may involve reflecting on the reasons others find motivating. This is why we
didn’t find Jonny’s commitment unreasonable, as he considers politeness a good thing,
all things considered. Thus, whilst normative reasons may be supported by homo
economicus reasons, they go beyond them―norm‐following is explained not on the
grounds of seeking approval simpliciter, but as a means of practicing virtue. Thus the
disapproval that Sophie expresses which is salient to homo economicus simpliciter is
only salient to the social man when interpreted as justified by reasons that are
normative for us.
4.2 Implications for Rational Choice Theory
I believe these arguments provide compelling evidence for the challenges to the
homo economicus model set out in section two. These were that the nature of norm‐
following implies that a) we often do not choose as homo economicus, and b) that we
are not only homo economicus. The homo economicus model may explain why it is
rational to follow norms sometimes, but it denies that normative choice can be
conceived of as rational in and of itself, as a reasonable goal independent of self‐interest.
As a definition of rationality, homo economicus maximizing of SEU thus seems flawed;
there s
18
eems to be nothing irrational about commitment to normative choice.
From this we might be tempted to conclude that Rational Choice Theory is only
valid within a limited domain where the homo economicus model is more easily
defended, such as in the cases of economic and political agents. One way of resisting this
conclusion, presented by Pettit is by considering homo economicus as a “virtual agent”,
implicit in people’s behaviour in the sense that “even when people are not explicitly self‐
regarding in their deliberations, still self‐regard has a virtual presence”. The nature of
this implicit presence is that the self‐regarding mind motivated only by self‐interest, is
always on standby, ready to be activated when the likely consequences of a situation
pass a psychological threshold of unacceptability with respect to one’s self‐interest. The
passing of such a threshold involves psychological “alarm bells” which prompt us into
the homo economicus way of choosing (Pettit, 1995, pp230‐6). Thus, for Pettit, homo
economicus provides an explanation for why we do not become wayward people‐
pleasers, sacrificing our personal goals for the benefit of others (Pettit, 1995, pp237‐44;
Brennan & Pettit, 2005).
Furthermore, Pettit argues that his account allows RCT to explain the resilience
of norms as opposed to providing an account of norm‐following as rational:
“[homo economicus explains] not why the pattern emerged at a certain time, nor why it
continues over a certain range of time, but why it continues over a range of contingencies: why
it is modally as distinct from temporally persistent.”
P ( ettit, 1995, p239)
However, at the same time virtualizing homo economicus means that “self‐
regarding considerations… are not actual causes of anything agents do” although they
may be over‐determining “standby causes” (Pettit, 1995, 237). So while RCT is valid in
the domain of social life, this is only to a limited extent, acting only as a potential over‐
determining cause. This account is certainly insightful and seems to be plausible.
However, it does nothing for the problem of allowing for commitment in our account of
rationality.
19
Alternatively, I propose that a reason‐based RCT may be able to allow for
commitment in a way that was problematic with Revealed Preference theory. Crucially,
it de‐emphasises SEU, explaining preferences as derived from the appraisal and
weighting of reasons, rather than appealing to a fully determined ranking of
fundamental preferences over prospects. In the final section I will present some aspect
of such a theory, and show how this may enable an alternate definition of rationality.
5 A reasonbased Rational Choice Theory
In the first version of a reason‐based RCT, recently developed by Dietrich and
hList (Dietric & List, 2013) reasons are related to preferences accordingly:
“An agent’s preferences over the relevant fundamental objects (possible worlds, states,
outcomes) depend on the reasons that motivate him or her and may vary with changes in them.
A motivating reason, as we understand it, is a proposition that is motivationally relevant for the
agent’s preferences towards the objects of which it is true … The preferences across [variations
in the agent’s motivational state] are then representable in terms of a single weighing relation, a
binary relation [≿M] that ranks different possible combinations of reasons relative to one
another. … The agent now prefers an alternative… if and only if his or her weighing relation
ranks the combination of motivating reasons of the first alternative above the second. In this
way, the agent’s weighing relation, together with his or her motivating reasons, determines his
or her preferences” (Dietrich & List, 2013, p105)
Under this account, preference for x over y (elements in choice set X) depends on
the motivating reasons (R) that an agent takes to be true of x and y (and any other
elements in a choice set). The set of motivating reasons for any given X in a given
psychological state is M (ibid, p107). The motivating reasons taken to be true of any
lternative x is Ma x.
Therefore: when y is preferred to x in motivational state M (y ≿M x) this is just because A
anks My ≥ Mr
x.
20
Interestingly, this theory allows for the psychological states involved in choice to
be accounted for. For any alternative x, Mx denotes the agent’s beliefs relevant to that
alterna ive (motivating reasons) from his own subjective perspective (ibid. p105). t
So in the example of Jonny and Sophie, we may characterize the possible
motivati f x and y as follows: onal reasons true o
x is a big apple {big}
x isapproved} will elicit disapproval {d
y is a small apple {Small}
y is a polite choice {polite}
will elicit approval {approved} y
We assume th motivating reasons (A&B) are: at for homo economicus, the relevant
{big, approved, small, disapproved};
Whereas we assume that for someone committed to politeness (Jonny) the motivating
reasons (A&D) are:
{big, polite, small}.
This allows for the facts that approval of disapproval is only salient if it is for the right
reason, i.e politeness. We can now capture the difference between homo economicus
hoice and committed choice as follows: c
Homo ed} Economicus: Mx={big, disapproved} My={small, approv
Jonny: Mx={big} My={small, polite}
21
So, for homo economicus, y ≿M x is explained because in that motivational state
the prospect of seeking approval and avoiding disapproval outweighs his desire for a
big apple. However, for Jonny, it is sufficient that the small apple is a polite option,
hich he considers to make y weigh favourably to x. w
We might also consider the following interesting case presented by Dietrich and List:
“We can think, … of a capitalist businessman who, after suffering a plane crash, consciously
forms a preference for a life devoted to charity over a life driven by income maximization”
(ibid p.120)
Interpreting this within the structure of motivational reasons I have presented, we
would expect to see a systematic shift in the salient motivational reasons from A&B‐
reasons to C&D‐reasons, resulting in an observable change in his preferences. This is to
say that he would cease being homo economicus and become a St Francis on his own
terms. Nor should we have any reason to doubt his rationality as long as he is consistent
in the weighing of his motivational reasons. Therefore, we can see that on this Reason‐
Based account of RCT, homo economicus is neither necessary for rationality nor a
satisfactory explanation of the kind of commitment norm‐following usually requires.
Furthermore, on this account homo economicus may only appear in certain
psychological states, in a manner consistent with Pettit’s conception of its “virtual
reality”.
6 Concluding remarks
To conclude, in this essay I have carried out an enquiry into the validity of homo
economicus as an explanatory principle within a non‐economic social domain,
specifically focusing on the demands that norms‐following usually makes on us. Whilst
the homo economicus account was of some interest, it failed to have any significant
explanatory power, except perhaps as a standby cause explaining in firstly why people
are limited in their altruism, and secondly, why norms are resilient. This was based on a
critical evaluation of norm‐following, in which I concluded that norm following involves
commitment, which may be characterized as both affective and principled. Taking an
example from Sen, I presented and examined four motivational reasons, encompassing
22
both homo economicus and a more social realistic model, allowing for moral reasoning
and empathetic concern. In the process I argued for a plausible process of
internalization, emotionally linking homo economicus to “social man”. My final
conclusion is that despite the lack of explanatory power from homo economicus, social
action may still be considered as rational under within the RCT under a Reason‐Based
ational Choice Theory. R
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