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STUDENT REPORT-THE SOVIET'S USE OF AIRPOWER

IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

MAJOR ROBERT A. SUTLEY 87-2425"insights into tomorrow"

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DISCLAIMER

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REPORT NUMBER 87-2425

TITLE THE SOVIET'S USE OF AIRPOWER IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ROBERT A. SUTLEY, USAII

FACULTY ADVISOR LT COL DIETER K. KRAUSE, ACSC/EDN

SPONSOR MAJOR LARRY FIGALLO, HQ USAFA/CW[S

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

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AIR UNIVERSITY

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-19 TITLE ,Include -ýeCwlltY CIOUficQarrn, I PIj'THE SOVIET'S USEOFARWE

e 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)Sutl6y, Robert A., Major, USAF

13a. TYPE OF REPORT 1j12U. TIME COVERED I DATE OF REPORT 0',. Mo.Day; 15.* PAGE COUNTIFROM ___ To __ 14987 April 27

- 16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

ITEM 11: IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

1 7 COSAT; CODES 18. SUBJECT TE RMS WOn inrue on reverseI it nceeassr, and IdentIf)y by block nu&nmberi

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-. 19 ASIS' ARACT 'L,. n'.I revers !/65f nfcesasO" and Identify by bl,,cI, n,.nrbelI

-' In December, 1979 the U.S-S.R. invaded Afghanistan and has

E been involved in a counter-insurgency ever since. Thi~i* study lookcs at one a-spect of that conflict, Soviet

airpower. Using the case study format it examines somedoctrinml tenets that drive the Soviet's use of airpower

- and specifically how they are employing their assets inAfghanistan. By viewing their tactics and choices of

S weapons, Western observers can learn a great deal aboutthe Soviet. military's capabilities. The study concludes

* with some of the lessons that have emerged from this

W 20 DIScRiljIjrIJ. VAILAB31LIT Or ABSTPiACT 21 ABSTFTA.CT SLCURIT Y CLASS-FICAYIONW4' ý,'jl -. IL 1 I) ;1.11 A A.4 E P X U T C USRSINCLASSIFIED)

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* AC'.(:/KI)C(. Maxwell AF1IP Al. 361 12'4? j"e ~ Y 48D)D FOR3M 1473, 83 APR E DITION 0OF I JAN 73 IS OBSOLFEtL IINCIIASSIF WI ED)

___ ___ ___ ___ ___PREFACE

This case study analysis of Soviet counterinsurgentoperations in Afghanistan was desý 'gixed as a backgroundreading for academic courses at the Air Force Academy.Depending upon the academic course requirements within theProfessional Military Studies Department it will be used asan instructor reading or an assigned reading for Cadets. itwill be reprinted either partially or in full in any fori.at

conducive to their style of presentation.

The research sources used were all unclassified. Thereis a multitude of information in a great variety of sources.Every attempt was made to cross-referet,.:e facts and figuresto mainstain the conf~idence of the author in their validity.

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_ _ _ _ ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Robert A. Sutley graduated from the USAF Acade-iyin 1974 with a Bachelor's of Science degree in International-Relations. He also received a Master's of Science degreefrom the University of Southern California in systems

management. Although his primary area of speoinlty is as aC-5 pilot, other assignments have included T-38 InstructorPilot, Simulator Test Manager, and most recently an academicinstructor of Military Theory and Soviet Force Analysis at"t~h. USAF Academy. Major Sutley is currently attending AirCommand and Staff College.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface .............................................. iiiAbout the Author ...................................... ivList of Illustrations ................................. viExecutive Summary .................................... vii

Chapter One---Introduction .............................. 1

Chapter Two--Geography of Afghanistan .................. 2

Chapter Three--Airpower for Low-Intensity"Conflict .................................. 5

Chapter Four--Soviet Miiitary and theirView of Airpower......................... 7

Chapter Five--Soviet's Approach toCounterinsurgency ......................... 9

Chapter Six--Soviet Counterinsurgent. Airpower ................................. 12

Chapter Seven--Lessons for Western Observers .......... 15

Conclusion ............................................ 17

Bibliography .......................................... 18

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___ ___...._LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

Afghaniotan ............................................ 4

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ASPart of our C ollege m ission is distribution of the

students' problem solving products to DoDK10• sponsors and other interested agencies to

enhance insight into contemporary, defenseSrelated issues. While the College has accepted this

-/ product as meeting academic requirements for: graduation, the views and opinions expressed or

0 implied are solely those of the author and shouldnot be construed as carrying official sanction.

•. •"insights into tomorrow"-

REPORT NUMBER 87-2425

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ROBERT A. SUTLEY, USAF

TITLE THE SOVIET'S USE OF AIRPOWER IN A COUNTERINSURGENCYCAMPAIGN

I. P•"-ps': •' P-aflyý?- the cur-Rr-f. Soviet counterinsurgenteffort in Afghanistan in terms of airpower assets andmissions.

.II Problem: Using Afghanistan as a case study, are there"-'.ssons tu be derived for future Soviet air actions in acounterinsurgency campaign?

111. Discussion of Analysis: Afghanistan is a nation withharsh terrain, a limited transportation infrastructure and a"rural-based population. There are few major cities and the

". government has characteristically had little sway over thedaily lives of the people. These conditions are veryconducive to insurgent operations, and complicate thecounterinsurgent efforts. Many studies, as well asexperience, have shown that in these operations only certaintypes of aircraft are effective. This is due to fightingagainst elusive forces that use mobility and small unit sizeto protect themselves. High speed fighter type aircraft areof minimal use. What is needed are helicopters or slowerfixed-wing assets that can acquire smaller targets and react

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CONTINUED__

to this style of warfare in a constrained geographicalenvironment. The Soviets are also learning these lessonsbut have had to overcome some doctrinal constraints withintheir forces. nheir ideological orientation, historicalexperiences, and current assessments of the threats to theSoviet Union have driven force development. These factorshave led them to structure and train forces to fight againstWestern nations in the European environment. This is muchdifferent than the situation in Afghanistan. The initialapproach used by the Soviets was different than the waynations in the West would attempt to conduct acounterinsurgency. Western nations believe in the premiseof winning the hearts and minds of the people in order toseparate them from the insurgents. The Soviets, on theother hand, have attempted to remove the support of thepeople by killing them or through the use of terror tactics.These were designed to encourage their nnn--involvement oremigration from the country. Their tactics have involvedthe massive use of helicopter gunships, chemical weapons,anti-personnel mines, contaminating water supplies, andleveling entire villages to name a few. The seven years"spent in-country have taught them many valuable lssons. Wehave seen numerous changes in helicopter tactics as well ascommand and control of all airpower assets. All of theseare meant Lo emphasize more flexible and responsiveoperations. They have tested a great variety of weapons andtactics. This has given them current combat experience anda wealth of identified weaknesses to improve upon. Theselessons should not be overlooked by the Festern nationsThey can learn not only how the major adversary conducts

---i operations but what weapons may be used. Further, allnations should take note of lessons Lo be learned in thearea of counterinsurgent operations. Conflict in the"low-intensity range is predominant in our world today, andthere are still no universal rules of how to defeat aninsurgent force.

IV. Conclusions: The opportunity to view the Soviets inaction is rare. There are many valuable lessons to be

S.% learned to help us plan for operations against them, or forfighting in Soviet supported low-intensity conf]icts.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

In the decade of the 1980s low-intensity conflict hasbecome an area of analysis of increasing importance. Thisis not only because it is the predominant form of warfare inthe world today, but there is a painful awareness of ourinability to effectively fight this style of warfave. Oneof the primary reasons is the two major powers have focusedin the past on nuclear war, and now on major conventionaloperations against each other. This has led each nation toprocure weapons, train forces and structure theirorganizations with these conflicts in mind. Neither we northe Soviets know the "correct" way to use our assets in"'small wars". This paper will focus on how the Soviets areusing one aspect of their Lwilitary arsenal, airpower, in anattempt to crush the Mujahi4din insurgency in Afghanistan.By using this case study we can view how our major adversaryemploys their airpower and can learn from their mistakes andsuccesses in this low-intensity campaign.

In order to effectively understand any militaryoperation one must gain some appreciation of the countryinvolved. This includes the geographical, demographical aswell as predominant cultural characteristics. These factorsgive the analyst some background into the unique elementsthat form and shape the conflict. From this beginning adiscussion of some of the general uses of airpower assets ina counterinsurgency campaign is included. With someknowledge of the country and its people, and how airpowercould be used, the Soviet approach will then be examined.The next chapter looks at how they view the use of airpower"because it is different than the United States'. Thesedifferences can be traced to their doctrine and currentexperience. Keeping this in mind their approach tocounterinsurgency is examined. The paper then reviews whichSoviet airpower assets are being used and how they have beenemployed in Afghanistan. The final section proposes some ofthe major lessons Western observers should glean from Sovietair involvement in this conflict.

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Chapter Two

GEOGRAPHY OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is located in Southwest Asia, with Pakistanto the south and east, Irtan on the west, the Soviet Union tothe north, and in the northeast there is a short border withthe People's Republic of China. In land area it is aboutthe size of Texas. The country can be divided into threedistinct topographical regions. The north is a low fertilearea that stretches from the Soviet Union to the Hindu Kush(the Killer of Hindus (16:4)). This mountain range withpeaks rising almost to 24,000 feet dominates the centralportion and effectively forms a barrier between north andsouth Afghanistan. The south is a desert that extends tothe Arabian Sea. The climate is characteristically hot anddry in the summer and cold in the winter.

The country is economically underdeveloped. More than90 percent of the populace relies on subsistence agricultureantd herding for their livelihood. This, in a nation withonly 12 percent of its land being arable. There is anextremely low level of literacy, and only about 10 percentof the people are found in the cities. Prior to the Sovietinvasion they were able to export limited quantities ofnatural gas, fruits, nuts, and lamb pelts (1:1-2).

The map on page 4 shows there are very few cities and avery limited transportation itifrastructure. This, combinedwith the harsh mountainous terrain, makes travel andcommunication throughout the country difficult. There areno rivers in the interior of the country for travel orshipping of goods.

Afghanistan, as many other countries ruled by colonialpowers, was formed and boundaries were drawn by the colonialruler's mandatcs. Borders betwee.n nations were establishedwith littl.- or no regard to cultural or ethnic divisions.'iio borders of today's Afghanistan bind together a varietyof people who in most cases do not speak the same languageand certainly don't share the same cultural heritage. Wefind there are ten major ethnic groups that in some cases

. spill over into neighboring •ountries (3:5). Vei.y few of",these groups, or tribal units, ca- live in close proximity

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without fighting; traditions of which can be found datingback centuries. Besides the intertribal warfare which ispart of rural life, there is a very long heritage of foreigninvasion. What has evolved is a warrior spirit among themen of each tribal unit that has been taught and nurturedfor many generations. For most of the pecple one findstheir identity is only with the tribe or maybe village.There is little or no national identity. The only thingcommon to the Afghan, people is their religion, and it is anextremely important part of their lives.

In understanding the Afghan's fight against the Sovietsone must gain an appreciation for the fanatical orientationIslam gives them. Each freedom fighter is willing to fightthe Soviets to the death. It is true they are fightinginvaders but the real reasons lie in their faith. Thereligious leaders have declared a jihad, which is "a holywar of true believers against infidels" (3:159). This meansit is a great religious honor to kill a Russian in battle,and if they die in battle they become a martyr. Further,Islamic law requires that if a relative is killed theirdeath must be avenged (3:159). So the Soviets are fightinga foe with fanatical convictions, and each time one iskilled there are many others who will swear to avenge thatdeath.

When the harsh, inaccessible terrain, is combined withthe rural-based population of tribal orientation andreligious fanaticism, the Soviets are faced with aformidable challenge. The geographic and demographiccharacteristics require specialized tactics and equipment tooptimize any attempt to control the people of Afghanistan.In terms of airpower past operations have shown not just anykind of aircraft can be effective in this type ofenvironment. Specialized assets have proven to be the mosteffective.

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Chapter Three

AIRPOWER FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

In any counterinsurgency effort there are two majorchallenges for airpower assets (2:127). The first is tolocate the enemy. Guerrilla forces are normally small, fastmoving forces whose main chance of survival lies in notbeing seen by the numerically superior and better armedI counterinsurgents. The second challenge is to destroy thetarget. Air assets combine the necessary characteristics ofresponsiveness, speed, range and flexibility to meet thesechallenges. But not just any aircraft can do theseeffectively. For example, high speed, high altitudereconnaissance aircraft, are of little use in locatingguerrillas travelling in small groups over rough terrain.

What is needed is something that can operate at altitudesbelow 1500 feet and at speeds below 125 knots (2:127). Thisallows visual surveillance by humans who can iammediatelyrequest destruction assets prior to the target dispersingand/or disappearing. Many of the fighter aircraft developedfor conventional warfare can strike these targets, but inmost cases are useless for many of the roles of airpower insmall wars. Aircraft should be able to provide perimeterdefense, armed surveillance and reconnaissance, convoyescort and forward air control (2:128). The best aircraftfor these missions, as we found in Vietnam, seems to be thehelicopter. They are uniquely suited for these roles, aswell as rapid lift of forces, resupply in inaccessible areasand medical evacuation. Their use must be carefullybalanced with the threat, as they are vulnerable to smallarms fire and precision guided munitions (PGM). In today'sworld PGMs are available to almost anyone, considering theirrelatively low cost.

High performance aircraft can play a limited role forcertain strike missions. They can be used for interdictionif the guerrillas are relying on an outside supply of armsand the cache of arms can be hit in some central area. Ourexperience in Vietnam showed it is almost impossible to stopthe flow of supplies once they are dispersed in thelogistiev' infrastructure. They can also be used for area

I. bombing i1' those types of targets present themselves, suchas large groupings of enemy forces.

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The Soviets have learned these general guidelines forthe use of airpower assets in a counterinsurgency. Buttheir force struoture and tactics are also driven bydoctrinal tenets that are different than the United States'.

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Chapter Four

SOVIET MILITARY AND THEIR VIEW OF AIRPOWER

Soviet military doctrine is essentia] ly the CommunistParty's quidance given to the military for its future interms of political objectives. According to MarshalGrechko, a former Soviet Minister of Defense, militarydoctrine should answer the following questiuns:

1. What enemy will have to be faced in a possiblewar?

2. What is the nature of the war in which thestate and its armed forces will have to takepart; what goals and missions might they befaced with in this war?

3. What armed forces are needed to execute theassigned missions, and in what direction mustmilitary development be carried out?

4. How are preparations for war to beimplemented?

5. What methods must be used to wage war? (14:6)

The answers to these questions have provided the primaryfocus for Soviet military force development.

The first question is politically oriented. From theSoviet's viewpoint the enemy is of course the imperialistforces, with the United States being the main enemy. Thishas been true since WWII and continues to the present.

The "nature of war" has been described as "a decisivearmed conflict between two opposing social systems" (7:53).This implies a fight for a way of life that can end at noless than complete victory or defeat. The "goals andmissions" will necessarily be survival oriented in terms ofthe Socialist system.

The last three questions provide guidance to thespecific force mix and structure of the Soviet military.

The roots of Soviet doctrine can be found in history,which shows they have been a land-oriented military power.

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The Great Patriotic War (WWII) reaffirmed the supremacy andabsolute necessity of ground armies in the resolution of amilitary conflict. The Soviet Union, even with theiremphasis in the 1960s and 1970s on the Strategic RocketForces, has always accorded a position of prominence totheir ground forces. The technological advances in airpower have not really changed that perception over theyears. In 1948 the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forcesaid "the training of air force units is planned so thatthey can first of all provide direct assistance to theground forces in all types of operations. The development ofall branches of the Soviet Air Forces is carried out inaccordance with this fundamental principle" (6:325). Sowhere we see ground and air forces as interdependent, andequal, they view their air force as an auxiliary of thearmy.

They have developed air forces to support and defendthe Soviet Army against a nuclear or conventional attack,with primary focus on operations in the European theateragainst the United States. Organizationally, developmentshave paralleled this line of thought in terms of verycentralized, directed control of air assets by ground forcecommanders. Accordingly, their pilots have been viewed asinflexible, and incapable of initiative.

This was the military force inserted into Afghanistanin December, 1979. Their forces were "designed and trainedfor World War III on the plains of Europe'" (9:161). Theywere in no way prepared for a counterinsurgency effort inmountainous terrain. Consequently, we have witnessed theevolution of a Soviet approach to this form of warfare.

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Chapter Five

SOVIET'S APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

An insurgent effort involving guerrilla forces,partisans, or freedom fighters is not a new phenomenom.Instances can be found as far back as Caesar fightingagainst irregulars in Gaul and Germany, almost 2000 yearsago. The major problem in all those years has been findingan effective way to counter its success. Today one findsdifferent approaches for a counterinsurgent effort that canroughly be divided by viewing it from a Western perspectiveor Soviet.

The Western approachLA to defeating an insurgent effortbasically comes down to "obtaining the support of thepopulation by any means, ... and by waging a hard war"against the enemy" (13:428). This is done by controllingthe villages and then extending one's influence throughoutthe countryside in an attempt to prevent infiltration by theguerrilla.s. The resistance needs the populace for support,food and supplies. The populace must be shown that theincumbent government can provide for their security andwell-being. It is essential to control food supplies inorder to distribute them to the villagers and deny them tothe insurgents. By protecting and feeding the populace amajor source of the guerrilla's ideological appeal has beenremoved. Once this has been accomplished, more and moremanhunts can be organized to track down and capture or killthe insurgent forces.

K The Soviets also realize the insu.;rgents must have thea populace on their side for supplies; however, they take a

"different approach. If the populace and/or all the suppliescan be removed you have defeated the revolutionary effort.This appears to be the general approach the Soviets areusing in Afghanistan. There has been little or no immediateeffort to win over the population.

Tactics have been designed to terrorize the populationand t.o remove all means of support for the rebels. The mainthrust is not to militarily destroy all of the elusiveMujahiddin, even though there have been a limited number ofmajor operations (15:2).

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Their approach can be divided into military, politicaland economic instruments of power. Militarily the Sovietshave attempted to keep the force levels and losses as low aspossible by substituting their massive firepower assets formanpower. They have used their forces to control the majorp urban areas, transportation networks, and supply lines(15:2), but hair made no effort to occupy other areas.Instead, by using scorched earth tactics, contaminatingwater supplies, killing livestock, and bombing villages intorubble there is no need for them to control the towns(3:161). They have effectively removed the sources ofsupport for the rebels without tying up large numbers oftheir troops. They have also employed terror tactics in aneffort to deD'oralize the populace and the resistance. Thisis done with antipersonnel mines sometimes in the form ofpens, toys, watches or books causing a large number ofpersonnel casualties, as well as livestock (1:146). Amilitary approach such as this creates a large number ofcivilian casualties as there is little effort to distinguish

between combatants and noncombatants. Reorts received fromFrench doctors who operate small clinics throughout thecountry, indicate approximately 80 percent of Soviet causedcesualtie;6 are civilian (15:2). Soviet tactic- haVL alsoresulted in a large number of people fleeing the country,with some estimates going as high as 20 percent of the

J%. preinvasion population being refugees (3:162). According toMao, the strength of a guerrilla movement lies in the "fishtaking to the water". The Soviets are effectively removingthe water (13:427).

Other instruments of power are also being used in theSoviet fight against the Mujahiddin. The Soviet Union ispursuing a long term approach by bringing large numbers ofAfghan youths to their country for education andindoctrination. Approximately 20,000 students will serve asa politically reliable cadre to properly administer theSocialist state after the resistance has died (1:146).Additionally, efforts are being made to exsc.tcrbate theintertribal conflicts that are a constant :_spect of Afghanexistence. This has been done 'y bribing selected triballeaders, and religious appeals from pro-Soviet Moslems(4:121). In the international arena the U.S.S.R. has beenpressuring Pakistan to refrain from supporting theresistance and providing sanctuary.

Economic programs have focused on curtailing foodproduction. The tactics of destroying crops has alreadybeen mentioned. Another program has the Soviets buyingsurplus food from peasants at highly inflated prices. Inaddition, selected peasants are given seed and fertilizer atvery low prices to produce food in government controlled

10

areas (15:3). These policies combine to make it verydifficult for the resistance to procure food and encouragesmigration tc areas controlled by the government or out ofthe country.

In Afghanistan the Soviets appear to be usingpolitical, military, and economic tools in an effort toremove the support base of the resistance. The mostsuccessful military tool has been the aircraft. The nextchapter discusses the types of aircraft and how they arebeing employed.

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Chapter Six

SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENT AIRPOWER

In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.This initial invasion was not directed against theMujahiddin who had been waging an insurgent effort for morethan a year. Instead, the Soviets needed to intervenemilitarily to bolster the failing socialist regime underAmin. Massive conventional forces were initially used todiscourage any Afghan military resistance to the "socialistassistance" being given to the l~wful government (11:62).

The airpower assets initially used were divided betweenairlift and fighter aircraft. Transport planes were used tocarry airborne divisions that captured strategic points inthe capital, Kabul. These forces secured the airport, theradio station, and attacked the palace. Fighter aircraftwere used to cover the advance of motorized rifle divisionsfrom the Soviet Union (10:4). By the end of January, 1980 a

A new president was installed, and the capital and other majorpopulation centers and major roads were under Sovietcontrol. Their attention would now be directed toward thefreedom fighters.

The initial complement of troops used i-.A Afghanistanwere in no way prepared for counterinsurgent warfare. Theyhad been trained to fight a technologically advanced Westernforce in a European environment. They were not ready toface a guerrilla force in extremely rough terrain.

Soviet air assets used in Afghanistan include numerousfighters, Su-25 Frogfoots, bombers, and a large number ofhelicopters (1:144).

As discussed previously, high speed aircraft are ofminimal value against guerrilla forces. The Soviets aremainly using these assets in an air interdiction role, in anattempt to cut off routes of supply, and attack guerrillaassembly areas. In addition, they are employing them tonapalm villages and crops, drop mines, and cluster bombs onarea targets (17:25).

The Su-25 Frogfoot, much like our A-10, was first seen

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in Afghanistan in November 1981. This aircraft. has beenused extensively in the close air support role. Itsmaneuverability, accuracy dnd lethality make it an effectiveweapon against the Mujahiddin (17:19). It has a 30-mm gun,can carry bombs, precision guided munitions and rockets(29:2). Tticse charncteris'-ics and capabilities enable it tostrike point targets in extremely harsh terrain and in closeproximity to friendly ground forces. The evolution oftactics and doctrinal developments hive already been noticedin the employment of the Frogfoot. Improved accuracy atgreater ranges is evident since its introduction, and it isobvious its aiming systems and pilot experience haveimproved (17:23).

Transport aircraft are still being used tf ferry

troops. In addition, they are conducting reconnaissance,serving as airborne command posts, and providing battlefieldillumination for combat in night operations (17:26).

The helicopter is undoubtedly the most important airasset in the fight against the insurgents. Lt. Col. Romanovcites the following roles of helicopters in Afghanistan inKrasnaya Zrezda (29 April 1980):

lift motorized riflemen to 'high and inaccessible

mountains'

Sprovide direct fire support with rocketsheli-borne assaultaerial mine layingdelivery of BMPlift mountain guns and mortarsprovide forward air control servicesconduct reconnaissanceevacuate the woundedresupply (17:35)

Additional missions have involved a-rborne command andcontrol, troop transport, fire support, patrol of lines ofcommunication, air assault, delivery of chemical weapons,electronic warfare and convoy escort (1:147,149; 5:74;12:683; 17:35; 11:64).

The initial tactics employed by the helicopters showedlittle or no appreciation for the anti-air capabilities ofthe Mujahiddin, as modest as they are. In gunship attacksthey would hover at low altitude and deliver the machine gunand/or other munitions barrage. After losing quite a fewaircraft they changed to a nap-of-the-earth profile. Flyingin pairs for support, they would fly very low levelpopping-up to deliver their attack and quickly egress. Butthe crews were not trained in these tactics nor were the

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airframes designed to take these kinds of structuralstresses. As a result, numerous crews were lost to piloterror and many aircraft have excessive down time formaintenance (12:683). This is but one example of theevolving nature of tactics development the Soviets arehaving the opportunity to accomplish.

Another major learning experience has involvedeffective use of their airpower assets. There are manyinstances of ineffective integration of air and groundassets where army forces need, or request, air support buteither do not receive it or it arrives too late. In aneffort to solve this problem, helicopter squadrons have beenassigned to army divisional commanders. But there are stillepisodes that exhibit an inflexible approach, or uneducatedapproach in the use of those assets. In counterinsurgenciesit is absolutely essential to have enough decentralizationof command to be able to respond to the very fluid nature ofguerrilla contacts. This is still a major drawback ofSoviet operations, in there is a tendency by lower levelcommanders to await instructions from higher command and/orapply rigid procedures that are ineffective (12:682-683).

Afghanistan gives the Soviets an excellent opportunityto test new weapons. The Su-25 Frogfoot has been in-countrynow for about five years. There have been chemicalsdelivered by helicopters and fixed wing aircraft givingtheir forces invaluable data and training (12:691). Inaddition, we have seen evidence of new scatterable mines,fuel-air explosives, and pressure-sensitive mines (1:147).These are but a few of the many innovations they have testedand there will undoubtedly be more in the future.

Combat experience is another benefit of the conflict.For many years the Soviets recognized how valuable the U.S.combat experience from Vietnam was to us. They now havethat edge, and are utilizing personnel rotational policies

that expose a large number of pilots to the environment.This may be the most valuable thing they are taking fromAfghanistan.

Overall the Soviets find themselves in an environmentto test new concepLs, and weapons, develop tactics anddoctrine, and gain combat experience. In many instances wetoo can learn from their experience. By analyzing theirsuccesses and failures we can examine our own assets andtraining methods.

14

Chapter Seven

LESSONS FOR WESTERN OBSERVERS

The manner in which military force was initiallyemployed in Afghanistan was almost. a carbon copy of theSoviet invasion of Czechoslavakia in 1968. Apparently theyfeel it is a tried and true formula for restoring order atthe national level in the shortest amount of time. Theinvasion of Afghanistan further strengthened that view.Soviet troops, emphasizing the principles of war ofsurprise, mass, offensive and objective, quickly removedAmin from power and replaced him with Karmal. Thegovernment was immediately bolstered by the presence of alarge number of Soviet troops who were there to help restoreorder. In terms of these immediate objectives they werevery successful. There should be no reason for the Sovietleadership to assume that a different method of employingtroops will work any better the next time they arc facedwith a similar situation.

After the initial invasion the Soviets confronted theMujahiddin insurgency. In this area there are a number oflessons that should be recognized. The Soviet's heavy useof helicopters, and gunships in particular, for firepowerand mobile support shou'i be identified as precursors offuture operations. If uhe United States is to support anygroup that may fight the Soviets, they will require massivesupplies of anti-aircraft arms. If the U.S. is everdirectly involved against the U.S.S.R. they must be awarethat operations in Afghanistan have shown Soviet militaryleaders the great value of helicopters in close air supportroles. Does the U.S. military currently have the equipment,doctrine, tactics, and training to adequately meet thatthreat?

Soviet. use of chemical agents in this environmentLainst an extremely inferior enemy should be a warnin•g toany who have doubts that they tould use them in future-onf]icts. This is an accepted part of their weaponry they

have trained with, developed tactics for and have nowoperationally used.

The conflicL has pointed out a number of weaknesses

15

inherent within their forces. These are being recognized atthe highest levels and changes for the better h, e beenoccurring. Numerous articles on mountain operations, theimportance of realistic training, mobile operations,helicopter support of ground forces, and decentralization (,fdecision making and flexibility have been appearing in theSoviet military press (1:166). To Western observers theseare clear signs of the amount of attention these areas arereceiving, as well as some inkling of possible futuredirections of their forces. All articles published bymilitary officers must be approved by high level governmentofficials. The appearance of these articles in open sourceswould imply at least a -tacit approval" of the concepts andtactics contained within by leaders within the Partyhierarchy (8:11).

The lessons they have learned in the area of fighter81nd bomber operations in a counterinsurgency reconfirm theUnited States' from Vietnam. They are of limited valueagainst insurgent forces except for interdiction of

* supplies, at i.heir in-country source, and if by chance you- -' carch a large number of enemy in the open.

Soviet experiences and developments in Afghanistanmerit our observation and analysis. From them we can seehow our major enemy fights an insurgent force, tests its newweapons, and makes changes in tactics and organization.These ]essons are not only valuable if we were to meet them, 4because some of their experiences will be trpnslated tomajor conventional operations, but we can also learn whatworks and what does not when fighting a guerrilla force.

-,

"IIa 1

)CONCLUSION

The case study method of analysis gives the reader anefficient mechanism to analyse a conflict. By using thisapproach, this paper has examined the characteristics uniqueto Afghanistan that have shaped the conflict both from theinvurgent's perspective as well as the government's. The

N uses of airpower in a counterinsurgency were then discussed,emphasizing the different requirements of those assets in alow-intensity conflict. An analysis of the Soviet approachin Afghanistan followed, with the emphasis on doctrinalinfluences as well as tactics employed. Finally, and mostimportantly, lessons were derived that allow Westernobservers to evaluate their own forces in light of Sovietexperiences with counterinsurgent operations.

The United States is presently involved in supportingboth an insurgency and a counterinsurgency. If ourcommitment were to escalate, airpower could play animportant part of une conflict resolution. We must beprepared for that contingency.

The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan gives us anopportunity to analyse how a major military power approachessuch a conflict. Their successes and failur6s should not beignored as they provide valuable lessons for the future.

17

-p.7

m _

BIBLIOGRAPHY___

A. REFERENCES CITED

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1. Collins, Joseph J. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.D.C. Heath and Company: Lexington Books, 1986.

2. Dean, David J., Lt.Col. (ed). Low Intensity Conflict andModern Technolo y. Air University Press, Center forAerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, MaxwellAir Force Base, Alabama, 1986.

3. Hammond, Thomas T. Red Flat Over Afghanistan. Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

4- Hosmer, Stephen T., and Thomas W. Wolfe. Soviet Policyand Practice Toward Third World Conflicts. D.C.Heath and Company: Lexington Books, 1983.

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8. Vernon, Graham D. (ed). Soviet P' -ceptions of War andP . National Defense UnivfLsity Press, FortLesley J. MuNair, Washington, D.C., 1981.

18

CONTINUED"I[

Articles and Periodicals

9. Collins, Joseph J. "Soviet Military Performance inAfghanistan: A Preliminary Assessment." ComparativeStrategy, Vol 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 147-168.

10. Furlong, R.D.M., and Theodor Winkler. "The SovietInvasion of Afghanistan." International DefenseReview Vol 2, 1980, pp. 2-8.

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19

CONTINUED _

Unpublished Materials

17. Stalder, Keith J., Major. "The Air War in Afghanistan."Unpublished report, Marine Corps Command and StaffCollege, Marine Corps Development and ElucationCommand, Quantico, Virginia, 1985.

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18. Cockhurn, Andrew. Th' Threat Inside the Soviet MilitaryMachine. New York: Random House, 1983.

19. Dziak, ,John J. Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The

Interaction of Theor and Practice. New York: Crane,Russak & Company, Inc., 1981.

20. Katz, Mark N. The Third World in Soviet MilitaryThought. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1982.

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d12. Karpov, R., Gds. Capt. "Maneuver in the Mountains.",""oviet Press" Selected Translations, AFRP 200-1 84*3S~(May-Jun 1964) pp. 90-92.

23. Konfindratov, H., Col. "The Mountains Teach, TheMountains To,ughen.- "Soviet Press" SelectedTranslations, AFRP 200-1 85*5 (Sep-Oct 1985) pp.31111 390.

20

II

CONTINUEDý

I

24. O'Ballance, Edgar. "Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan."Military Review, (August, 1980) pp. 45-52.

25. Shershnew, L., Col. "The Afghan Counterrevolution:Headquarters for Terror and Ideological Diversions.""Soviet Press" Selected Translations, AFRP 200-1,part one: 86*3 (May-Jun 1986) pp. 98-101; part two:86*4 (Jul-Aug 1986) pp. 141-143.

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27. Skrizhalin, V., Lt.Col. "Next to the Clouds." "SovietPress" Selected Translations, AFRP 200-1 85*2(Feb-Mar 1985) pp. 286-287.

28. Snigirev, V. "The Difficult Sky." "Soviet Press"Selected Translations, AFRP 200-1 83*3 (May-Jun 1983)pp. 80-85.

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31. Fukuyama, Francis. "The Future of the Soviet Role inAfghanistan: A Trip Report." Rand Publication,September, 1980.

Unpublished Materials

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21