andrew lewman the tor project andrew@torproject
TRANSCRIPT
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Outline
● Why anonymity?● Crash course on Tor● Future
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Informally: anonymity means you can't tell who did what
“Who wrote this blog post?”
“Who's been viewing my webpages?”
“Who's been emailing patent attorneys?”
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Formally: anonymity means indistinguishability within an
“anonymity set”
Alice1
Alice4
Alice7
Alice2
Alice6
Alice5
Alice8
Alice3
....
Bob
Attacker can't tell whichAlice is talking to Bob!
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Anonymity isn't cryptography: Cryptography just protects
contents.
Alice
Bob
“Hi, Bob!”“Hi, Bob!” <gibberish>
attacker
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Anonymity isn't steganography:Attacker can tell that Alice is talking;
just not to whom.
Alice1 Bob1
..
.
AnonymitynetworkAlice2
AliceN (Strong high-bandwidthsteganography may not exist.)
Bob2
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Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...
“You can't prove it was me!”
“Promise you won't look!”
“Promise you won't remember!”
“Promise you won't tell!”
“I didn't write my name on it!”
“Isn't the Internet already anonymous?”
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...since “weak” anonymity... isn't.
“You can't prove it was me!”
Promise you won't look!”
“Promise you won't remember!”
“Promise you won't tell!”
“I didn't write my name on it!”
“Isn't the Internet already anonymous?”
Will others parties have the ability and incentives to keep their promises?
Proof is a very strong word. With statistics, suspicion becomes certainty.
Not what we're talking about.
Nope! (More info later.)
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens“It's privacy!”
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Regular citizens don't want to be watched and tracked.
(the network can track too)
Hostile Bob
Incompetent Bob
Indifferent Bob
“Oops, I lost the logs.”
“I sell the logs.”
“Hey, they aren't my secrets.”
Name, address,age, friends,
interests(medical, financial, etc),
unpopular opinions,illegal opinions....
BloggerAlice
8-year-oldAlice
SickAlice
ConsumerAlice
OppressedAlice
....
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens
Businesses
“It's network security!”
“It's privacy!”
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Businesses need to keep trade secrets.
AliceCorp
Competitor
Competitor
Compromisednetwork
“Oh, your employees are reading our patents/jobs page/product
sheets?” “Hey, it's Alice! Give her the 'Alice' version!”
“Wanna buy a list of Alice's suppliers?What about her customers?
What about her engineering department'sfavorite search terms?”
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens
Governments Businesses
“It's traffic-analysisresistance!”
“It's network security!”
“It's privacy!”
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Law enforcement needs anonymity to get the job done.
OfficerAlice
Investigatedsuspect
Stingtarget
Anonymoustips
“Why is alice.localpolice.gov reading my website?”
“Why no, alice.localpolice.gov!I would never sell counterfeits on
ebay!”
Witness/informerAlice
“Is my family safe if Igo after these guys?”
OrganizedCrime
“Are they really going to ensuremy anonymity?”
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Governments need anonymityfor their security
Coalitionmember
Alice
Sharednetwork
Defense inDepth
UntrustedISP
“Do I really want to reveal myinternal network topology?”
“What about insiders?”
AgentAlice
“What does the CIA Google for?”Compromised
service
“What will you bid for a list of BaghdadIP addresses that get email from .gov?”
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens
Governments Businesses
“It's traffic-analysisresistance!”
“It's network security!”
“It's privacy!”
Blocked users“It's reachability!
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You can't get anonymity on your own: private solutions are ineffective...
OfficerAlice
Investigatedsuspect
...
AliceCorp
Competitor
CitizenAlice
AliceCorpanonymity net
Municipalanonymity net
Alice's smallanonymity net
“Looks like a cop.”
“It's somebody at AliceCorp!”
“One of the 25 userson AliceNet.”
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... so, anonymity loves company!
OfficerAlice
Investigatedsuspect
...
AliceCorp
Competitor
CitizenAlice
Sharedanonymity net
“???”
“???”
“???”
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Current situation: Bad people on the Internet are doing fine
TrojansVirusesExploits
PhishingSpam
BotnetsZombies
EspionageDDoS
Extortion
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IP addresses can be enough to bootstrap knowledge of identity.
Alice18.244.x.x
Amazon account
Hotlinked ad
Wikipedia post
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Tor is not the first or onlydesign for anonymity.
Chaum's Mixes(1981)
Remailer networks:cypherpunk (~93), mixmaster (~95),mixminion (~02)
High-latency
...and more!
anon.penet.fi (~91)
Low-latency
Single-hopproxies
V1 OnionRouting (~96) ZKS
“Freedom”(~99-01)
Crowds(~96)
Java Anon Proxy(~00-) Tor
(01-)
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Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks.
Low-latency: Alice1 sends: xx x xxxx x Bob2 gets: xx x xxxx x Alice2 sends: x x xx x x
Bob1 gets: x x x x x x
High-latency: Alice1 sends: xx x xxxx Alice2 sends: x x xx x x
Bob1 gets: xx xxxx ..... Bob2 gets: x xxxxx .....
Time
These attacks work in practice. The obvious defenses are expensive (like high-latency), useless, or both.
match!
match!
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Still, we focus on low-latency,because it's more useful.
Interactive apps: web, IM, VOIP, ssh, X11, ...# users: millions?
Apps that accept multi-hour delays and high bandwidth overhead: email, sometimes.# users: tens of thousands at most?
And if anonymity loves company....?
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Outline
● Why anonymity?● Crash course on Tor● Future
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What is Tor?
● online anonymity software and network● open source, freely available● active research environment
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● 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of tools for online anonymity and privacy
The Tor Project, Inc.
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Estimated 500,000 daily Tor users
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The simplest designs use a single relay to hide
connections.
Bob2
Bob1
Bob3
Alice2
Alice1
Alice3
Relay
E(Bob3,“X”)
E(Bob1, “Y”)
E(Bob2, “Z”)
“Y”
“Z”
“X”
(example: some commercial proxy providers)
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But a single relay is a single point of failure.
Bob2
Bob1
Bob3
Alice2
Alice1
Alice3
EvilRelay
E(Bob3,“X”)
E(Bob1, “Y”)
E(Bob2, “Z”)
“Y”
“Z”
“X”
Eavesdropping the relay works too.
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So, add multiple relays so thatno single one can betray Alice.
BobAlice
R1
R2
R3
R4 R5
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A corrupt first hop can tell that Alice is talking, but not to whom.
BobAlice
R1
R2
R3
R4 R5
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A corrupt final hop can tell that somebody is talking to Bob,
but not who.BobAlice
R1
R2
R3
R4 R5
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Alice makes a session key with R1
...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3
BobAlice
R1
R2
R3
R4 R5
Bob2
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Tor anonymizes TCP streams only: it needs other applications to clean high-level protocols.
Webbrowser
Webscrubber
IRCclient
SSH
Tor clientTor network
SOCKS
SOCKS
HTTP SOCKS
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We added a control protocol for external GUI applications.
Webbrowser
Webscrubber
SSH
Tor client
SOCKS
Control
protocol
HTTP SOCKS
ControllerGUI
(Change configuration,report errors,manage circuits, etc.)
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Usability for server operators is key.
● Rate limiting: eating too much bandwidth is rude!● Exit policies: not everyone is willing to emit arbitrary traffic.
allow 18.0.0.0/8:*allow *:22allow *:80reject *:*
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Server discovery must not permit liars to impersonate the whole
network.
Alice1Evil
Server
1. Alice says, “Describe the network!”
Alice1Evil
Server
E.S.
E.S.
E.S.
E.S.
E.S.
E.S.
2. Alice is now in trouble.
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Server discovery is hard because misinformed clients lose
anonymity.
SS
S
SS
S
S
S
S
Alice2
Bob1
Bob2
Alice1
Known to Alice1
Known to Alice2
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Early Tor versions used a trivial centralized directory protocol.
S2
S1Alice
Trusted directory
Trusted directory
S3
cache
cache
Servers publishself-signeddescriptors.
Authoritiespublish signedlists of all descriptors
Alice downloadsany signed list
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We redesigned our directory protocol to reduce trust
bottlenecks.
S2
S1Alice
EvilTrusted directory
Trusted directory
S3
cache
cache
Servers publishself-signeddescriptors.
Authoritiespublish signedstatements aboutdescriptors.
Alice downloadsall statements;believes themajority;downloads descriptors as needed.
(Also uses less bandwidth!)
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Location Hidden Services
● Developed by US NRL and Finnish Defense● Hides location and routing information of both
the server and client● DHT Directory design● Tor software required to host a hidden service
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.onion domains
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We're currently the largest strong anonymity network ever deployed.
S > 1800 running
A
S >
A > 500,000 in a dayAA
SS
> 350 MB/sec
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Problem: Abusive users get the whole network blocked.
JerkAlice
NiceAlice
Tor network
/.
wikipedia
Some IRCnetworks
X
X
X
Minimize scope of blocking?
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Other common abuses
● Somebody connects to Hotmail, and sends an obnoxious mail.
● Somebody connects to IRC and yells -> DDoS on Tor exit server.
● Somebody tries to get you shut down by connecting to Google Groups and posting spam.
● Somebody uses Tor to download a movie, and your ISP gets a DMCA takedown.
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Who uses Tor?● Normal people
● Law Enforcement
● Human Rights Activists
● Business Execs
● Militaries
● Abuse Victims● https://torproject.org/torusers
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● Tor doesn't magically encrypt the Internet
● Operating Systems and Applications leak your info
● Browser Plugins, Cookies, Extensions, Shockwave/Flash, Java, Quicktime, and PDF all conspire against you
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Outline
● Why anonymity?● Crash course on Tor● Future
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Community
● Many tools make a big splash in the press– Censors need to feel in control; publicity removes
the appearance of control
● Increase community diversity– Strong social network
● Funding– Donations, grants, contracts
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3-Year Development Roadmap
● Improve Performance● Client Safety● Ease of Use and Understanding● Core Research & Development
https://torproject.org/press/ for details
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Copyrights
● who uses tor? http://www.flickr.com/photos/mattw/2336507468/sizes/l/, Matt Westervelt, CC-BY-SA
● danger!,http://flickr.com/photos/hmvh/58185411/sizes/o/, hmvh, CC-BY-SA
● 300k, http://flickr.com/photos/tochis/1169807846/sizes/o/, tochis, CC-BY-NC