andrew look presentation
TRANSCRIPT
UBS Investment Research
Hong Kong Market Strategy
Andrew Look
UBS does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. Customers of UBS in the United States can receive independent, third-party research on the company or companies covered in this report, at no cost to them, where such r e s e a r c h i s a v a i l a b l e . C u s t o m e r s c a n a c c e s s t h i s i n d e p e n d e n t r e s e a r c h a t
www.ubs.com/independentresearch
or may call +1 877-208-5700 to request a copy of this research.
This report has been prepared by UBS Securities Asia Ltd, an affiliate of UBS AG (UBS).
1
Key themesSub-prime fallout continues in 2009
—
Low-high-low trend confirmed; investors’
expectations now completely trashed
—
Credit market not taking the bait
—
Lower cost of capital just short term “pain killer”; not “surgical removal of tumor”
Key risks for 2009—
Rising equity risk premiums + deteriorating earning growth momentum
—
Share prices are never wrong; analysts may be wrong –
earning downgrades just beginning
Taking a first glimpse on 2009E index fair value after the latest round of result announcements
Negative real mortgage rates in sight hence supporting asset prices
—
Don’t bank on it
—
It was a good story two years ago
Take a closer look at developers, landlords, industrials/exporters, financials and Macau plays in search of value propositions
2
The impact of the recent US sub-prime fallout1.
The sub-prime problem is both a financial and a moral issue
2.
Rising volatility means uncertainty and risks
3.
Government led rescue package can only reduce but not eliminate the pain
4.
The EU/UK rescue package is far better than the US rescue package
5.
Time and patience the only medicine but government can help alleviate the pain of the adjustment process
6.
The only solution: change of spending habits and repair the household balance sheets
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%55%60%
Jan-
07
Feb-
07
Mar
-07
Apr-0
7
May
-07
Jun-
07
Jul-0
7
Aug-
07
Sep-
07
Oct-0
7
Nov-
07
Dec-
07
Jan-
08
HSI v olatility (annualised)Source: UBS estimates
3
Drastic cut in Fed Funds Rate but….
Source: CEIC
Pace of rate cut similar to year 2000 when TMT bubble burst, this shows how severe the credit crunch is
The property bubble saved the TMT fallout last time; do we have another bubble in sight?
4
Credit market not taking the bait; at least for now
Source: Bloomberg
5
US mortgage rates rise despite lower cost of capital
Source: FreddieMac
Provisions/losses reported and capital raised since Feb-07
6
US$ bln
US$ 470 bln
of provisions and losses reported
while US$ 436 bln
of new capital has been raised
Source: Company data
Is this the beginning of competitive devaluation? Is deflation imminent?
Impact on Hong Kong’s economy surfacing in 2009
7
Four pillars of Hong Kong’s economic growth: Finance, property, trade and tourism
Source: CEIC
A rapidly slowing property market affects more than just 33,000 property agents
Re-export / trade –
into a long cold winter
8
Source: CEIC
Trade and trade related businesses employ 1 million of Hong Kong’s 3.5 million labour force
Baltic freight index is a good indicator of trade volume growth
Macro tightening measures in China filtered through into tourism
9
Source: CEIC
Tourists account for at least 20% of Hong Kong retail sales
10
More downside risks?More than 15 IPOs cancelled/postponed YTD – negative impact on loan growth
Nearly half of 2007’s 19% loan growth came from IPO financing and analysts are expecting loan growth to be 15%+ in 08
IPO pipeline in 08, even if all go public, will be 15% less than 07’s US$ 87 bln
4 7 0 %
4 6 %1 5 % 1 0 % 6 % 1 2 % 1 7 % 2 %
0 %5 0 %
1 0 0 %1 5 0 %2 0 0 %2 5 0 %3 0 0 %3 5 0 %4 0 0 %4 5 0 %5 0 0 %
Stoc
kbro
kers
Over
seas
Tota
l
Trad
e
SME
Com
mer
cial p
pt
Unse
cure
d co
nsum
er
Mor
tgag
es
J a n - S e p 0 7 lo a n g r o w th
Domestic loans by economic sector
11
Source: HKMA
The “financial tsunami”
hits Hong Kong
12Source: HKMA
Recent chaos seen in the industrials / exporters universe was due primarily to liquidity crunch rather than US economic woes
Rising loan-to-deposit ratio as deposits leave the system
13
Source: HKMA
100% deposit guaranteed by government until 2010;
possibly just opened another can of worms…..
14
More downside risks?Warrants and structured product origination fell 90% YTD on a YOY basis as market lacked direction; average daily turnover also failed to impress; we expect 40% growth in warrant T/O in 08.
+131% YOY in 03, +98% in 04, +64% in 05, +108% in 06, +161% in 07, +40% YTD in 08 (HK$ 30 bln per day)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Jan-
96
Jan-
97
Jan-
98
Jan-
99
Jan-
00
Jan-
01
Jan-
02
Jan-
03
Jan-
04
Jan-
05
Jan-
06
Jan-
07
Warrants as % of Total (rolling 12 mths)
Latest earning announcements give little visibility
15
Source: Company data; Bloomberg
Code StockInterim / Final Vs consensus
1 Cheung Kong Interim Above
2 CLP Hldgs Interim Above
4 Wharf Interim Below
5 HSBC Interim Below
6 HongKong
Electric Interim In line
11 Hang Seng
Bank Interim In line
13 Hutchison Whampoa Interim Above
19 Swire Pacific 'A' Interim Below
23 Bank of E Asia Interim Below
66 MTR Corporation Interim Above
101 Hang Lung Prop Final Above
144 China Mer
Hldgs Interim In line
267 CITIC Pacific Interim Below
291 China Resources Interim In line
293 Cathay Pac Air Interim Below
330 Esprit Hldgs Interim Below
386 Sinopec Corp Interim Above
388 HKEx Interim Below
494 Li & Fung Interim Below
688 China Overseas Interim Above
700 Tencent Interim In line
762 China Unicom Interim In line
857 PetroChina Interim In line
883 CNOOC Interim Above
906 China Netcom Interim Below
939 CCB Interim In line
941 China Mobile Interim Above
1088 China Shenhua Interim In line
1199 COSCO Pacific Interim In line
1398 ICBC Interim In line
2038 FIH Interim Below
2318 Ping An Interim In line
2388 BOCHK Interim Below
2600 CHALCO Interim Below
2628 China Life Interim Above
3328 BoCom Interim Above
3988 Bank of China Interim In line
16
Hong Kong remains under-leveragedBig swing after Asian Financial Crisis in 1997
Over HK$ 6 trillion record high deposit and total LDR at just 60%
19%+ loan growth in 07, US “surprised” rate cut, rising RMB – all pointing to a pendulum swing in the making
Source: HKMA
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
Mar-8
9Ma
r-90
Mar-9
1Ma
r-92
Mar-9
3Ma
r-94
Mar-9
5Ma
r-96
Mar-9
7Ma
r-98
Mar-9
9Ma
r-00
Mar-0
1Ma
r-02
Mar-0
3Ma
r-04
Mar-0
5Ma
r-06
Mar-0
7Ma
r-08
-2,500
-1,500
-500
500
1,500
2,500
3,500
Net Deposit (HKD bn) Total LDR (LHS)
17
Bull market always end with financial implosion
Bull market only ends with 1) financial implosion and 2) secular
earning decline –
we don’t see that happening anytime soon
Source: CEIC
-80%-60%-40%-20%
0%20%40%60%80%
100%120%
Sep-
82Se
p-83
Sep-
84Se
p-85
Sep-
86Se
p-87
Sep-
88Se
p-89
Sep-
90Se
p-91
Sep-
92Se
p-93
Sep-
94Se
p-95
Sep-
96Se
p-97
Sep-
98Se
p-99
Sep-
00Se
p-01
Sep-
02Se
p-03
Sep-
04Se
p-05
Sep-
06
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Hang Seng Index (YoY% change, RHS) HK: Loans: HK$
18
UBS HK coverage universe ex-financials
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007E 2008E
UBS Hong Kong non-financial coverage universe gearing ratio
Suboptimal capital
structure with under-
utilisation
of debt
6.0%
6.5%
7.0%
7.5%
8.0%
8.5%
9.0%
9.5%
10.0%
10.5%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007E 2008E
ROESource: Company data, UBS estimates
19
The changing landscape; impact on valuation & volatility?
Red & H a/c for 18.4% of listco
but 50% of total market capitalisation
Red and H a/c for 43% of pre-x 07E index earnings
Source: Bloomberg, Hang Seng
Index Services Limited, UBS estimates
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Jan-
08
Red + H as % of Total Mkt Cap
0%2%4%6%8%
10%12%14%16%18%20%
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Jan-
08
Red + H as % of Total ListCo
20%25%30%35%40%45%50%55%60%
Jan-
01
Jul-0
1
Jan-
02
Jul-0
2
Jan-
03
Jul-0
3
Jan-
04
Jul-0
4
Jan-
05
Jul-0
5
Jan-
06
Jul-0
6
Jan-
07
Jul-0
7
China shares (Red and H) turnover as pct of mkt turnover
20
Index composition changes result in change in correlation
9 Red Chips and 6 H-shares account for 49% of Hang Seng
Index weighting today and 43% of index pre-exceptional earnings
Correlation between HSI and DJI fell from 0.8 to 0.5 but correlation between HSI and HSCEI improved from 0.4 to 0.9
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
Dec-9
7
Dec-9
8
Dec-9
9
Dec-0
0
Dec-0
1
Dec-0
2
Dec-0
3
Dec-0
4
Dec-0
5
Dec-0
6
Dec-0
7
HSI vs DJ Ind HSI vs HSCEI
21
After a >50% correction and 08E and 09E EPS growth downgrades
Source: UBS estimates
The upside risks are far exceeding the downside risks at this point in time
22
Rising NAV
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
E
2007
E
2008
E
2009
E
T + 4 Construction starts (i.e.lagged 4 years) Actual completions
31,386
21,557
17,830
21,321
26,77028,264
15,00017,00019,00021,00023,00025,00027,00029,00031,00033,000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
# of units sold in presale launches average (24,521 units)
HK absorbed on average 24,521
units per year during the
recession years of 98 -
03
Source: R & V Dept; Lands Dept, UBS estimates
Delivery of 12,000 residential
units in 2009E on a T + 4 basis
23
Developers no smarter than market
Source: Midland Realty
24
Monthly mortgage payment to median household income ratio
Affordability ratio now near late 1980s level when negative real
interest rates began to happen
Source: CEIC, UBS estimates
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
25
The reality between RMB and properties
Source: Datastream, Hang Seng
Index Services Limited
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
Dec-9
8
Dec-9
9
Dec-0
0
Dec-0
1
Dec-0
2
Dec-0
3
Dec-0
4
Dec-0
5
Dec-0
6
Dec-0
7
RMB
NDF
(1yr
)8000
13000
18000
23000
28000
33000
38000
43000
HS P
rope
rties
RMB NDF (1Yr) HS PropertiesCoefficient of correlation at 0.71 indicating a close and linear
relationship between RMB appreciation and Hong Kong residential property prices
26
Smart moneys on the move -
improving in volume
Source: Government Statistics, Midland Realty,
Land Registry
Premium pricing of presale due to lack of inventory and difficulty with respect to replenishment
4,0005,0006,0007,0008,0009,000
10,00011,00012,000
Sep-
05
Dec-
05
Mar
-06
Jun-
06
Sep-
06
Dec-
06
Mar
-07
Jun-
07
Sep-
07
Dec-
07
Leftov er units (launched but unsold)
Loan-to-value ratio at comfortable level
27Source: HKMA
28
Smart moneys on the move –
confirmor
activities rising
Residential confirmor
transaction volume spiked up but still just 1.8% of total S & P in Sep-08 Vs 9.4% seen in May-97
Source: Midland Realty
29
Return of negative real deposit rates
Source: CEIC, UBS estimates
Negative real deposit rate is positive for asset prices but one should not equate current situation with that seen in the late 1980s/early 1990s; drastic cut in US rates will help
-10-8-6-4-202468
10
Oct-8
1
Oct-8
3
Oct-8
5
Oct-8
7
Oct-8
9
Oct-9
1
Oct-9
3
Oct-9
5
Oct-9
7
Oct-9
9
Oct-0
1
Oct-0
3
Oct-0
5
Real deposit rate
Nominal passbook saving rate equals CPI today and real deposit rate should turn negative before the end of the year
Real mortgage rate is still near 3% but much lower than 15% seen in 2000 -
2001
-3-113579
111315
Jan-
86
Jan-
87
Jan-
88
Jan-
89
Jan-
90
Jan-
91
Jan-
92
Jan-
93
Jan-
94
Jan-
95
Jan-
96
Jan-
97
Jan-
98
Jan-
99
Jan-
00
Jan-
01
Jan-
02
Jan-
03
Jan-
04
Jan-
05
Jan-
06
Jan-
07
Real mortgage rate (%)
30
Property price Vs jobless rate and savings ratio
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Dec-
89
Dec-
90
Dec-
91
Dec-
92
Dec-
93
Dec-
94
Dec-
95
Dec-
96
Dec-
97
Dec-
98
Dec-
99
Dec-
00
Dec-
01
Dec-
02
Dec-
03
Dec-
04
Dec-
05
Dec-
06
Dec-
07
20
25
30
35
40
45
HK residential property price index Sav ings ratio - 12m rolling av g (RHS - inv erted)
-60%-40%-20%
0%20%40%60%80%
Mar-8
3
Sep-
84
Mar-8
6
Sep-
87
Mar-8
9
Sep-
90
Mar-9
2
Sep-
93
Mar-9
5
Sep-
96
Mar-9
8
Sep-
99
Mar-0
1
Sep-
02
Mar-0
4
Sep-
05
Mar-0
7
1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%9%
Property price index (YOY % change)Unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) (inverted) RHS
Source: CEIC
Rising jobless rate is -ve
A hgh
saving ratio is +ve
Capital flows dictate short-term price movements
31
This is likely to be like 1994/1995 and not like 1997/1998Source: CEIC
Don’t be fooled by rising rents or a favourable
mortgage-yield gap
32
Source: UBS estimates
Rents will fall faster than expected
33
Source: Midland Realty
Residential completion to be “normalised”
by 2011 the earliest
34
Source: Lands Department
35
ROE matters more than NAV in the long run
-15%-5%5%
15%25%35%45%55%
FY91
FY92
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
E
FY07
E
Cheung Kong SHKP Henderson LandNew World Hang Lung Properties Sino Land
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
FY91
FY92
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
E
FY07
EWharf Hysan Great Eagle Swire Pacific
Source: UBS estimates
Peak ROE seen not when
property or rent being
highest but when negative
real deposit rates most severe
The big players are getting bigger
36
Source: Midland Realty
37
Office demand on the rise again
38,258
46,55450,049
65,558
73,359
30,00035,00040,00045,00050,00055,00060,00065,00070,00075,00080,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005# of new companies registered in Hong Kong
Source: Hong Kong Statistical Department
Office demand growth is gaining momentum
500600700800900
1,0001,1001,2001,300
1991 19921993 1994 19951996 1997 19981999 2000 20012002 2003 200420050
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
New regional HQ New regional offices (RHS)
Hong Kong is always a preferred place due to low tax rate (16.5% Vs 33% in mainland China)
38
New prime retail space –
Kowloon Bay and TST
2007 District GFA Developer Completion
Megabox Kowloon Bay 1,100,000 Kerry Properties 2007
E-Max Kowloon Bay 900,000 Hopewell 2007
VisionCity Tsuen Wan 245,000 Sino Land 2007
Hanoi Road Redevelopment Tsimshatsui 346,000 NWD / URA Q307
Elements Kowloon Station 1,000,000 MTRC End 2007
Ex-Marine Police Headquarter Tsimshatsui 110,000 Cheung Kong Early 2008
I-Square (Hyatt Regency Redevelopment) Tsimshatsui 570,000 Tian Teck Land / AIH 2008
Hennessy Centre Redevelopment Causeway Bay 500,000 Hysan Development 2009
Tung Ying Building Tsimshatsui 400,000 Chinese Estates 2010
Total 5,171,000
1.
TST will see a near 1.5 mln
sq. ft increase in retail space or a
20% increase while Elements at Kowloon Station will compete with TST as well as Mongkok
2.
2 mln
sq. ft. new space in Kowloon Bay to compete with
apm
but not likely to offer much of a challenge
Source: JLL
Industrial/exporters have seen significant de-rating
39
Source: UBS estimates
Reliance on US consumers
40
Source: Company data
Consumer spending cooling off rapidly
41
Source: Datastream
US residential property foreclosures continue to rise
42
Source: Mortgage bankers association
Consumer confidence deteriorating rapidly
43
Source: University of Michigan
Relationship between US property prices and GDP
44
Source: Datastream
Residential property prices follow economic growth in the long run
Raw material prices also negatively affecting margins
45
Source: Datastrteam
Strong correlation between OECD economic growth and HK/China exports
46
Source: Datastream
Prime-HIBOR spreads tell an interesting story
47
Source: CEIC
48
Macau –
impressive numbers
Source: Government statistics
142,800
181,600195,200
230,900
292,200
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
GDP per capita (MOP)
205,400219,100
237,500
265,100
300,400
200,000
220,000
240,000
260,000
280,000
300,000
320,000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Employment
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Visitor arriv als ('000) y oy %
4,672 4,8015,167
5,773
6,701
7,8008,200
4,0004,5005,0005,5006,0006,5007,0007,5008,0008,500
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Q108
Median wage (MOP/ month)
49
But please focus on the supply side of the equation
Gaming tables to rise7 fold from 04 to 09
Slot machines will see a near 13 fold increase from 04 to 09
01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,0009,000
2004 2005 2006 2007E 2008E 2009EGalaxy SJM LVS Wynn PBL/Melco MGM
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Galaxy LVS SJM Wynn MGM Grand PBL/Melco
Source: Government statistics; UBS estimates
50
Similar story for properties
113,000
2,183,646
3,012,190 2,943,025
2,247,525
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 Beyond 2009Lettable GFA (sq. ft.)
Five fold increase in prime retail space
Up to 21,000 units of new supply in 08 - 10
Source: Government statistics, Savills, UBS estimates
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
E
2009
E
2010
E
Units for Completion Serv ice Apartments (not in gov 't figures)
51
Property prices reflecting blue sky scneario
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000Ap
r/02
Jul/0
2Oc
t/02
Jan/
03Ap
r/03
Jul/0
3Oc
t/03
Jan/
04Ap
r/04
Jul/0
4Oc
t/04
Jan/
05Ap
r/05
Jul/0
5Oc
t/05
Jan/
06Ap
r/06
Jul/0
6Oc
t/06
Jan/
07Ap
r/07
Jul/0
7Oc
t/07
Jan/
08
Overall Mid-size units Large units
MoP psm
Source: Government statistics
52
Concentration of supply of retail space also a worry
Project name Timing Net lettable space (sq. ft.)
Wynn Phase Two Q3 2007 28,000
Venetian + Four Seasons Q3 2007 1,200,000
Ponte 16 End-07 350,000
Galaxy Mega Resort Q3 2008 80,000
City of Dreams 2008 50,000
Site 5 & 6 (beneath St Regis / Shangri-La) 2008 700,000
Site 7 & 8 (beneath Fairmont / Raffles) 2008 - 2009 700,000
One Central 2008-2009 266,000
Macao Studio City Phase One Q1 09 700,000
Far East Consortium 2009 250,000
Macao Studio City Phase Two 2011 280,000
Total 4,604,000
Total - Cotai 3,960,000
Source: Company data, press reports, UBS estimates
Retail space in Cotai
by end 2009 to be bigger than Pacific Place + IFC
Mall + Hongkong
Land Central + Times Square + Festival Walk
53
We have already incorporated a benign outlook
-10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000
100,000
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
E
2007
E
2008
E
2009
E
Mln
MOP
VIP Mass Market Slot
06 - 09: 18% CAGR
03 - 06: 25% CAGR
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Jan-
04Fe
b-04
Mar-0
4Ap
r-04
May-0
4Ju
n-04
Jul-0
4Au
g-04
Sep-
04Oc
t-04
Nov-0
4De
c-04
Jan-
05Fe
b-05
Mar-0
5Ap
r-05
May-0
5Ju
n-05
Jul-0
5Au
g-05
Sep-
05Oc
t-05
Nov-0
5De
c-05
Jan-
06Fe
b-06
Mar-0
6Ap
r-06
May-0
6Ju
n-06
Jul-0
6Au
g-06
Sep-
06Oc
t-06
Nov-0
6De
c-06
Mainland China Hong Kong Other
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
E
2007
E
2008
E
2009
E
VIP Mass Market Slot
We are already quite bullish
on CAGR and revenue mix
Source: Government statistics; UBS estimates
54
Statement of Risk
Stock markets are influenced by several factors, internal and external, that make predictions of market direction inherently difficult. Our stock ratings are based on earnings estimates, which are also subject to changes as a result of shifts in the operating environment of the respective companies.
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External Consultant to UBSAndrew Look
Contact information
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Disclaimer
"Mr Look
is not an employee, partner, agent or representative of UBS. Accordingly this material has been prepared for information and discussion purposes only. This material is for distribution only under such circumstances as may be permitted by applicable law. It has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any recipient. It should not be construed as an offer, recommendation or solicitation to conclude a transaction and should not be treated as giving investment advice. Any information and opinions expressed in this material and during any consultation with Mr Look (the "Consultation")are
subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by other business areas or groups of UBS AG, or an affiliate thereof("UBS"). UBS is under no obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein or during the Consultation. UBS, its directors, officers and employees' or clients may have or have had interests or long or short positions in the securities or other financial instruments referred to herein or during the Consultation and may at any time make purchases and/or sales in them as principal or agent. UBS may act or have acted as market-maker in the securities or other financial instruments discussed
during the Consultation. Furthermore, UBS may have or have had a relationship with or may provide or has provided investment banking, capital markets and/or other financial services to the relevant companies. Neither UBS nor any of its affiliates, nor any of UBS' or any of its affiliates, directors, employees or agents accepts any liability for any loss or damage
arising out of the use of all or any part of any material used during the Consultation or in this
material. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Foreign currency rates
of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or related instrument
mentioned in this presentation. You are advised to seek your own independent legal, tax and financial advice before you make a commitment to purchase any investment product."