Angola

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Angola

Author/Creator IDOC International; World Council of Churches

Publisher IDOC International

Date 1975-00-00

Resource type Books

Language English

Subject

Coverage (spatial) Angola

Coverage (temporal) 1485 - 1974

Rights By kind permission of the World Council of Churches andthe International Documentation and Communication Centre(IDOC).

Description This report comes from a study by the World Council ofChurches originally prepared for the Commission on WorldMission and Evangelism conference in Bangkok in January1973. It was later revised for publication. Foreword by JoseChipenda. Angola Fact Sheet. Maps. INTRODUCTION.General Situation and Population. Historical Sketch.Economy. PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM IN CONTEXT.Background. Atlantic Slave-Trade: 1485-1858. ColonialExpansion: 1858-1926. Fascist Angola: 1926-1974.ANGOLAN LIBERATION IN CONTEXT. ChronologicalTable. The 1961 Rebellion and Portuguese Repression. TheStruggle for Liberation: 1961-1974. The April 25 Coup inPortugal and After. BACKGROUND NOTES TO THELIBERATION MOVEMENTS (Development - Program -Structure -Political Stance - Relations). FNLA/GRAE. MPLA.UNITA. CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN ANGOLA. Statistics. TheCatholic Church in Angola. Early Evangelization.Decadence and Establishment. Concordat. RecentDevelopments. Missionary Dissent. The ProtestantChurches. Planting of the Protestant Churches in Angola:1878-1920. Development: 1921-1960. The War: 1961-1974.THE CHURCHES' RELATION TO LIBERATION.Theological Reflections. The Catholic Church. The

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Protestant Churches. The United Church of Canada. TheUnited Church of Christ. The United Methodist Church.WCC and other Ecumenical Bodies. CONCLUSIONS.Select Bibliography.

Format extent(length/size)

124 page(s)

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DOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIE

DOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIERDOSSIE'>ANGOLA)IDOC INTERNATIONAL

ANGOLAIDOCINTERNATIONAL

( FREE AT LAST! nANGOLA TALKS - Portuguese and Angolan leaders at talks In Alvor,Portugal,10 January 1975, concerning Angolan independence. From left: foreground,Ant6nio Santos, Portuguese Minister for Overseas Coordination; Agostinho Neto,MPLA president; Ernesto Antunes, Portuguese Minister Without Portfolio;Holden Roberto, FNLA president; Mirio Soares, Portuguese Minister for ForeignAffairs, and Jonas Savimbi, president of UNITA. The talks concluded on 15January 1975 with the signing of an agreement which will lead to theindependence of Angola on 11 November 1975.

PREFACEDuring the course of the CWME <SalvationToday > Bangkok conference in January 1973 as Frederick H. Bronkema,Associate General Secretary of IDOC International, was giving an action-reporton ( The White Fathers' Withdrawal from Mozambique > in one of the sub-sections; at the same moment another sub-section was hearing an actionreport onthe churches in Angola and the liberation movements - a Task Force XIII report.Out of both sub-sections came significant guidelines concerningthe issue ofmoratorium as well as deeper ramifications focusing on the essence of the Gospeland liberation or salvation today.Therefore it was with great pleasure that we accepted the request of theCommission on World Mission and Evangelism of the WCC to rewrite andupdate this Task Force XIII report. This study is even more significant at thismoment as the recent events in Portugal and Angola (independence guaranteedfor Angola by 11 November 1975) do give hope that in the daily affairs ofhumanity, liberation is possible for oppressed people. We should not be surprised,for this is the essence of the ( Good News o of God in Christ who was andisreconciling the world to Himself.Special appreciation is expressed to Dr. Peter Spring an editor ofIDOCInternational who has done the major work on this volume, and also toMr. JoseChipenda of the Program to Combat Racism of the World Council of Churches

who worked closely with us, essentially, as a part of the Angolan people to whomin their struggle for liberation we dedicate this work.IDOC InternationalFebruary 1975

SOUTHERN AFRICA(The land area entitled South-West Africa is usually called NAMIBIA by thoseinside and outside seeking Its independence from the Republic of South Africa).

CONTENTSPrefaceForward by Jose Chipenda Angola Fact SheetMapsI. INTRODUCTION .... 1-101. General Situation and Population . 1 2. Historical Sketch ... . 33. Economy .... .. 6II. PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM INCONTEXT ...... 11-191. Background .. ... . 112. Atlantic Slave-Trade: 1485-1858 . . 11 3. Colonial Expansion: 1858-1926 .13 4. Fascist Angola: 1926-1974 .... 15III. ANGOLAN LIBERATION IN CONTEXT.. ...... 20-301. Chronological Table .. .. 202. The 1961 Rebellion and PortugueseRepression ...... 233. The Struggle for Liberation: 1961-1974. 25 4. The April 25 Coup in Portugaland After 28IV. BACKGROUND NOTES TO THELIBERATION MOVEMENTS . . 35-64(Development - Program - Structure Political Stance - Relations)1. FNLA/GRAE35

2. MPLA .. . . . .. . 443. UNITA . . . . .. . 54V. CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN ANGOLA . . . . . . . . 65-821. Statistics ... 652. The Catholic Church in Angola. . 65- Early Evangelization .... 65- Decadence and Establishment . . 66 - Concordat . .. . 67- Recent Developments . . . 69 - Missionary Dissent ..... 693. The Protestant Churches . . . 71- Planting of the Protestant Churchesin Angola: 1878-1920 . . 71- Development: 1921-1960 . 74

- The War: 1961-1974 . . . 79VI. THE CHURCHES' RELATION TOLIBERATION ...... 83-951. Theological Reflections .... 832. The Catholic Church . ... 873. The Protestant Churches . . . 89- The United Church of Canada . 89 - The United Church of Christ . .91 - TheUnited Methodist Church. . 92 4. WCC and other Ecumenical Bodies . 94VII. CONCLUSIONS . 96-105Select Bibliography.101

FORWARDThe Church everywhere is associated with traditional institutionalized activitiessuch as schools, hospitals, interest groups, committees etc. etc. Thus the image theChurch has from North America to Southern Africa and from Russia to LatinAmerica is that of a conservative institution cooperating with reactionary secularpowers to preserve the status quo. Increasingly there are people, who, out of theirChristian conviction, understand and support forces 'promotingchange. Laypeople are leading in this direction and some ordained people are coming along.In Latin America more than in Africa there are priests and pastors who have leftthe safety of their congregations to join groups working for liberation. They veryoften do' so against the will of the Church.Francois Houtart and Andre Rousseau, in the preface to their book TheChurchand Revolution ask:,<Why is it that Christianity, a proclamation of man's total liberation,historicallyfinds itself in opposition to the movements which attempt to give concreteexpression to this liberation and almost always identifies itself with the forces ofoppression? Is Christianity itself and, perhaps, every transcendental vision of lifeto be blamed for this as so many social reformers have taught? Is it the way inwhich Christianity has become institutionalized that is to blame? Is there anecessary link between radical social reformand the rejection of religion? >>.Happily, this is the question concerned Church workers are raisingin this booklet.

The World Council of Churches has since 1966 become seriously interested in therelationships between church and society, and the pragmatic expression ofChristian faith in economics and politics. This was expressed at the 4th Assemblyof the WCC at Uppsala in 1968 when the study on the role of Christianswithinchanging institutions was authorized and later on when CCPD (Churches'Commission on Peace and Development) and PCR (Program to Combat Racism)were started. The same concern moved the three North American missionaryboards of the United Church of Canada, United Church of Christ, USA, and theUnited Methodist Church, USA, which set up a Task Force (XIII) to criticallyexamine their work inside and outside Angola in relation to the strugglefornational liberation. The outcome of the Task Force's work is this report that

presents a brief demographic and historical account of Angola; refers to thecomplicity of the Church in the slave trade; gives background information on eachof the three Angolan liberation movements; explains how the Protestant Churcheswere planted and how the three boards have been cooperating with thePCR tosupport the liberation movements.The first draft of this report was presented to the CWME Conference on((Salvation Today >) held in Bangkok in January 1973, in one of the sectionswhich dealt with ((Salvation and Social Justice *.In February 1974 the Commission on World Mission and Evangelism received itand recommended its publication for wide circulation. It was also decided at thistime that a rewriting and updating of this Task Force XIII Report bedone in orderto ensure a wider distribution. IDOC International (International Documentationon the Contemporary Church) was asked to do this and, as you will read

in the text, many new elements have been introduced, especially the situation ofthe Roman Catholic Church in Angola.It is to be hoped that mission agencies working in Southern Africa and elsewherewill study this report and consider its implications for their work in situations ofconflict and captivity.The concerns expressed in this report are closely linked to the concerns raised bythe PCR during these past five years. It is a call to the Churches to continueChrist's mission: to preach the good news to the poor; to proclaim release to thecaptives and recovery of sight to the blind; to set at liberty those who areoppressed and to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.This reminds us of what J. H. Oldham said in his book Christianity and the RaceProblem:(, when Christians find the world in a state of things that is not in accord with thetruth which they have learned from Christ, their concern is not that it should beexplained butthat it should be ended >>.Jose B. Chipenda

Angola Fact SheetAREA:LOCATION: GEOGRAPHY:CLIMATE: POPULATION:ETHNIC COMPOSITION:Angola, with its area of 481,226 square miles, is fourteen times larger thanPortugal.Angola is situated in the southern hemisphere on the Atlantic coast of the Africancontinent. To the north it borders on the Congo and Zaire, to the east, Zambia, andto the south, Namibia.Angola has 1,155 miles of coastline. There are three zones: a narrow coastal plainbetween fifteen and sixty miles wide; a mountain chain parallel to the coast; andin the interior a vast plateau averaging 3,000 feet in altitude. Angola is well

supplied with large rivers: Dande, Bengo, Cuanza, Catembela, Cubango, andCunene. Part of the northern frontier is formed by the Congo River.Varies with the altitude, latitude and the cold Benguela current in the Atlantic.Two seasons: one dry and cool, from May to October; the other, hotand rainy,from November to April.Total: c. 6,000,000 of which at least 5,500,000 are Africans. Recent studies inAngola after the 25 April coup in Portugal estimate the white populationno largerthan 320,000-370,000.Density: c. 12 per square mile. Rate of growth: 1.4%1960 Census: 86% of the Angolan population belonged to five ethno-linguisticgroups: Umbundu - 1,750,000; Kimbundu - 1,055,000; Kikongo620,000;Chokwe - 400,000; and Ganguela - 330,000.

MAIN CITIES: LANGUAGES: RELIGIONS: DISTRICTS:EDUCATION:GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT: CURRENCY: AGRICULTURE:Luanda (Capital) - 320,000; Lobito 89,000: Nova Lisboa. - 49,000; Benguela- 33,000; Mogamedes - 15,500; Sa da Bandeira - 33,000.Portuguese is the official language. There are eight other main language groups.50% of the population is Christian: 2,000,000 Roman Catholics and 750,000Protestants. Traditional religious beliefs and practices are strong inside and out ofthe Christian community.Angola is divided into 16 administrative districts: Cabinda, Zaire, Uige,Luanda,Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, Malange, Lunda, Benguela, Huambo,Bie, Cuando-Cubango, Moramedes, Huila, Moxico, and Cunene.(1968-1969) - Primary: 362,600 pupils, 4,246 schools, and 7,965 teachers.Secondary and Technical: 35,600 pupils, 115 schools and 1,087teachers. HigherEducation: 827 students, one university with three campuses: Luanda, NovaLisboa, Sd da Bandeira.$ 182 per capita in 1968.The unit of currency is the escudo, divided into 100 centavos. $ 1.00 = esc.24$50.Subsistence crops: corn, beans, cassava, millet, sorghum. Cash crops: coffee,sugar, sisal, cotton, wheat, rice. Livestock: cattle - 1,190,000 head; sheep -137,000; goats - 374,000; pigs- 254,000.Fishing: ranks third in Africa. Forests: very large area.

POWER:MINES:INDUSTRIES:Electricity: large hydroelectric plants on the Quanza Cambambe Catunbela(Biopio) and Cunene (Matala) are able to produce an adequate supply ofelectricity for present industrial needs.Angola has extensive mineral resources including diamonds, iron,copper, zinc,manganese, phosphates, gold, silver, kaolin, marble, etc.

Main productions: iron 5,473,000tons (1969), diamonds - 2,000,000 carats (1969); manganese - 9,150 tons(1968); bitumen - 39,282 tons (1969).(1968) Food: sugar - 64,000 tons;flour - 56,000 tons; beer - 531,000 hectoliters; tobacco - 1,844 million cigarettes.(1968) Textiles; cotton yarr tons; cotton textiles - 1 meters; wood & paper - 11meters.(1968) Oil: light oils - 135 heavy oils - 354,000 tons; g 66,000 tons.(1968) Cement: 312,000 tons.COMMUNICATIONS:- 1,9001 million 5,000 cubic,000 tons; 'asoline -Roads: approximately 45,000 miles, of which 2,500 miles are surfaced. Railways:about 2,000 miles. Airports: international airport at Luanda; many secondaryairports. Ports: Lobito and Luanda; twelve secondary ports.

ANGOLACongoZaire*MACarnag KWILU ILhr*dsAVM'ipNaAIU do CW441116Lu~wilws OW.WAN" S&~OVAMDOLANDNami biaBotwanaKATANGASWeydZaey"i.HUILA Veu N.,au

Lunda-ChokweRikongoHareroXimbunduNyaneka-:HumbeUmbundu 600000WOODAmboGanguelaETHNO-LINGUIOTIC kAP1111111111

I. INTRODUCTION1. General Situation and PopulationThe State of Angola, comprising an area of 1,246,700 square kilometers, liessouth of the Equator on the Atlantic coast of the African continent.Except for theoil-rich Cabinda enclave, the entire territory lies south of the Congo River.In 1970, population, according to provisional 1970 census figures, was 5,673,046,compared with 4,830,449 in 1960. The white European population has beenvariously estimated at 350,000, 500,000 and 600,000, and represents 5%-10% ofthe total population. Since the inception of the war of national liberation in 1961,the Portuguese authorities have made various attempts to encourage whiteemigration to the country, with the result that the white population more thandoubled in the decade 19601970. But it is mostly concentrated in some eightmajor towns, with over 100,000 in Luanda, the capital, alone. Since April 1974there has been, as in the other Portuguese African territories, a substantialmovement of white settlers out of the country, and the most recent estimate, madein late 1974, of the size of the white population puts it at no more than between320,000-370,000.Angola remains a vast, sparsely populated country: the mean population density isc. 4 per square kilometer. Three-quarters of the population live in a quarter of theterritory.The principal groupings of indigenous peoples in Angola are Kikongo,Kimbundu, Umbundu, Nhaneka-Humbe, Ambo, Ganguela, and Chokwe1.1 For the ethnography of Angola, see Fernando Neves, Negritude e Revolufgo emAngola. Paris, 1974, 23-29;

The Kikongo and Kimbundu peoples of the northwest had created the kingdomsof the Kongo and Ndongo before the Portuguese first reached the coast of Angolain the late fifteenth century. The Umbundu and Chokwe were both renowned astraders, particularly in the nineteenth century before the Portuguese establishedfull control over the country. Smaller in numbers, the Nhaneka-Humbe and Ambopeoples had economies based on herding; the Ganguela put more emphasis onfishing. Of the indigenous peoples, the greater part are Bantus, dominated by theUmbundu group, whose language is spoken or understood by over2 millionAngolans'. In the southeast are various tribes of Bushmen.Modern anthropological studies have paid scanty notice to the complexethnic,and linguistic, situation in Angola; some tribes, such as the Mbunda and theLuchazi in the southeast, have hardly been described at all 3. More information -historical and ethnographic - exists about those peoples, such as the Kongo,Kimbundu and Umbundu, who first came into contact with the Portuguese. Whatdoes seem clear is that the ethnic situation in Angola was drastically altered by thePortuguese intrusion; a succession of slave-wars, colonialist attempts at <<aggregation ,, etc., has irreversibly altered its structure.David Birmingham, Themes and Resources of Angolan History, in: AfricanAffairs, vol. 73 (1974), 188-195, with further bibliography.2 See further G. M. Childs, Umbundu Kinship and Character. Oxford, 1949.

3 But see Merran McCulloch, The Southern Lunda and Related Peoples.International African Institute. London, 1951.

2. Historical SketchThe prehistory of Angola remains largely unexplored; only recently has alecturer in the subject been appointed at Luanda University, and archaeologicalexcavations have begun 4. A systematic study of pottery styles would help todefine the cultural zones existing in Angola before the formation ofthe KongoKingdom. The situation is still far from clear. It is generally understood, however,that there was a considerable Bantu population movement southwards from theCongo basin towards 500 A.D. These peoples, who knew how to work metal,brought with them a culture of sedentary agriculture, based on fixed villages,which supplanted the stone-age hunting and gathering cultures of NorthernAngola. New social and religious structures were also introduced.These cultures, in turn, soon gave rise, possibly as early as the 8thor 9thcenturies, to the political development of royalties, and the dynastic strugglesconsequent on it. By 1450 the Kingdom of Kongo in Northern Angola and Congoproper had emerged as the most powerful in West Africa, and had reduced mostof its neighboring kingdoms to vassal states. It had been ruled bya succession ofseven kings by the time the Portuguese first anchored at the mouth of the CongoRiver in 1483.To the south of the Kingdom of Kongo lay the important Kimbundu-speakingKingdom of Ndongo; it was from the title of its king, Ngola, that the Portuguesederived the name of the country they were to occupy: Angola.Portuguese contacts with the Kongo and Ndongo4 David Birmingham, Themes and Resources of Angolan History, in: AfricanAffairs. vol. 73 (1974), 189.

kingdoms, at first friendly, soon came to be distorted by the demandsof the slave-trade. The long reign of Afonso of Kongo, who accepted Christianityanddiplomatic relations with Lisbon, was marked by growing disillusion with thePortuguese, whose presence within his realm was reinforced by local avidity forthe exotic consumer goods they brought. On his death in 1543, Portuguesepressure on the Kongo throne intensified; their military assistancewas called onto repel invaders in the east. A dependent relationship thus grew up.Further to the south, the phase of territorial occupation began with thearrival ofPaulo Dias de Novais in 1560. He founded the maritime city of Luanda. With thelater foundation of Benguela in 1617, Portuguese domination of the Angolancoast- vital for the Atlantic slave-trade - had been achieved. It was, except for a briefinterlude of Dutch occupation (1643-1648), to persist to the presentday.Growing Portuguese supremacy aggravated relations with Kongo, and finallyprecipitated the Portuguese invasion of 1665; the pitched battle of Mbwila sealedthe fate of the kingdom for good; the King, Ant6nio, captured on the field, wasdecapitated. Kongo survived in a state of servility.

Much the same fate lay in store for the Kingdom of Ndongo. Already Dias deNovais had advised the King of Portugal to undertake its conquest, and hadhimself led an abortive campaign in 1575. Bloody wars with Ndongo persisted till1680; the kingdom, eventually dominated by the Portuguese, lay in ruins.Other wars with minor kingdoms were instigated during the 17th and 18thcenturies, as the demands of the slave-trade intensified and the sources of

available manpower dried up.The official abolition of the trade in Angola in 1858 inaugurated a period ofeconomic stagnation. During the second half of the century, the diminutive whitepopulation (in 1846, apparently, no more than 2,000 (1,500 of them resident inLuanda alone) s, mainly engaged in commerce, was not, in contrast to othercolonial powers, significantly expanded. The Portuguese administration -sustained by the vision of a transcontinental empire - seemed more intent onexpanding the colony's frontiers than increasing its wealth. Thisprocess gatheredmomentum in the years following the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, duringwhich Angola's existence was underwritten by the neighboring colonial powers.Yet Portugal's relatively favorable outcome from the Berlin Conference bore littlerelation to political realities. Its status in the European concert of power had beendrastically reduced during the Napoleonic Wars; shorn of its main source ofwealth (Brazil having declared independence in 1822) and at themercy of Britishintervention, Portugal entered the cycle of economic impoverishmentand politicalinstability from which it has never since emerged. This reached farcicalproportions during the chaotic Republican era (19101926), which saw 44 separategovernments come and go.In 1926 a military coup ended the Republic, installed a totalitarian regime, andeventually made way for the dictatorship of Ant6nio Salazar, which was, underSalazar himself and later his disciple5 Basil Davidson, L'Angola au coeur des tempates. Paris 1972, 98-99.

Marcello Caetano, to persist until April 1974. The Salazarist epoch in Angola hasbeen characterized by authoritarian rule, white domination, forced labor, and, inthe face of escalating guerrilla activity, rigid opposition to all calls for self-determination. This whole system of organized and futile repression- buttressed by South Africa, and covertly reinforced by various forms of Westernand North American investment and arms supply - was finally swept away by theLisbon coup of 25 April 1974 led by the Armed Forces Movement. Convinced ofits necessity, the provisional government of Portugal, formed to prepare the wayfor democratic elections, has either promised, or has already accorded,independence to all the Portuguese overseas territories in Africa. Angola is tobecome independent on 11 November 1975.3. EconomyAngola is by far the richest of Portugal's African territories, and itsfull economicpotential is far from being realized. The Portuguese themselves,lacking drive andinvestment, had been late in developing the colony, and had only beguntoseriously do so since the war of national liberation began. Beforethe outbreak of

the war in 1961, the development of Angola's natural resources washampered bymonopoly controls, limited capital expenditure, and government restrictions. Butsince then the doors have been flung open to foreign investment in anextraordinary fashion. Various government-sponsored schemes have, at the sametime, been instigated, notably the Cunene River Scheme - a joint Portuguese-South African venture negotiated in 1969 to construct 27 dams and hydroelectricplants along the course of the Cunene River in southern Angola; this isplanned toproduce sub-

stantial irrigation for new farming in a hitherto barren area, and toprovide thenecessary hydroelectric power for the extensive mining interestsin Namibia andCassinga. The Portuguese also hoped the scheme would act as an incentive forEuropean settlement, as a bulwark against the growing strength of the liberationmovements. The latter, for their part, saw the scheme as an attempt to consolidatethe traditional Portuguese rural economy of huge landowning interests; at thetime, it was estimated that 60% of Angola's cultivatable land consisted oflargefarms belonging almost exclusively to Europeans 6Until recent years, a substantial proportion of this land was given up to coffeeproduction, on which Angola's economic strength traditionally rested. This nowcommands five per cent of the world's coffee export quota, and places Angolafourth among the main coffee exporting countries, behind Brazil, Colombia andthe Ivory Coast. In 1967 coffee still accounted for 52.5% of Angola's totalexports, but this percentage fell to 34.2% in 1971; this does not mean productionhas been cut back (since the yield from coffee-exports rose from3.5 thousandmillion escudos in 1967 to 4 thousand million escudos in 1971), but it does meanthat the Angolan economy was being diversified '.This has in part been dictated by fluctuating harvests and by the fixed andinadequate coffee export quota granted to Angola by international agreement. Asa result, production of other agricultural goods has been stepped up. Cottonproduc6 Frances S. Smith, The Cunene Dam Scheme: dream or nightmare? in:This Month, EPS (Geneva), April 1972, 2-4.7 Heinz Portmann, Angola's Developing Economy, in: Swiss Review ofWorldAffairs, May 1973, 1-8.

tion rose by 300% in the period 1969-1970. Sisal, maize, palm oil, ground nutshave all achieved increased exports, whereas sugar and tobacco have lost inimportance. A further growth area has been Angola's abundant and varied timber,of which exports almost doubled in the period 1962-66, reachinga peak in 1969when 152,071 tons were exported.Yet the main direction of this diversification has, over the last few years, beentowards mineral extraction. Angola, it is no exaggeration to say, has witnessed amining boom over the last decade: production quintupled during the period 1960-70 from 846 to 4,030 million escudos, and yet more spectacular figures have beenforecast for the future. At the forefront of the boom has been oilproduction,which achieved an output valued at 2.3 thousand million escudos in 1971following successful Gulf Oil drillings off the coast of Cabinda. This represents a

rate of increase of 806% since 1966, and puts Angola among the top oil-producingcountries in Africa. The Middle East crisis of 1973 underlined the advantage ofPortugal being selfreliant in its petroleum requirements; and this in turn hasstimulated further investment and increased production, reaching, it is thought, 15million tons in 1973. Higher prices have, at the same time, boosted oil'scontribution to Angola's total export revenue to an estimated 50% in 1974.Of the oil concessions granted by Portugal in Angola the most lucrative has beenthat held by the American-owned Gulf Oil Company, which monopolizesthe richoil fields below the Cabinda continental shelf. Gulf Oil investment in Angola hasbeen estimated at $150 million. In 1969, according to Gulf Oil's own statement,$11 million in concession payments etc. went to the Angolan Gov-

ernment 8. Gulf's payments of $16 million to the Portuguese in 1970 representedabout 30% of Angola's 1970 military budget of $ 54 million. Portugalretains thefirst option on the oil produced. Part of the problem of preparing Angola's path toindependence has been the need to protect Portuguese oil interests in the Cabindaenclave, the biggest material loss Portugal can expect from the loss of her Africanempire.American capital has also been heavily invested in the diamond industry,following the expiry of the Angola Diamond Company's monopoly in 1971.Diversa Inc. of Dallas and the West Angolan Diamond Company (73 %controlled by Diamond Distributors Inc. of New York) have, among others, beengranted prospecting concessions. Diamond production in 1971 has been valued atover 1.7 thousand million escudos, and is constantly rising.Iron ore production has also contributed to Angola's mining boom. Output hasrisen spectacularly from 638,000 tons in 1963 to 6.16 million tons in1971. Mostof the output comes from the iron ore deposits in Cassinga in southernAngola,among the richest in Africa, and production has been largely financed by WestGerman capital '.Recent prospecting has disclosed the presence of other important, and potentiallylucrative, mineral resources in Angola. Rich sulphur deposits were discovered in1969, and Tenneco Angola Ltd., the concessionnaire, has begun a hugeinvestment program calculated to run to $ 75 million.It remains to be seen what Angolan independence&William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West. Harmondsworth,1972, 119.9 ibid., 136.

will mean to the massive foreign investment in the country's mineral resources.But it is safe to say that an effort will be made to ensure that Angola's wealth willbe used to benefit the country and not enrich foreign entrepreneurs. The liberationmovements have clearly stated that there are sectors of the economywhich oughtto belong to the state because of their position in, and contribution to, thedevelopment of the total Angolan economy. And in February 1974 a MPLApronouncement denounced the activities of all oil companies working in Angolaand warned ,< that with the inevitable independence of Angola all those

companies which operate offshore or inland will be chased from our nationalterritory and all their equipment and assets seized >> 10.10 African Development, May 1974.

II. PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM IN CONTEXT1. BackgroundThe Portuguese entered Angolan history in the later 15th century, almost byaccident. Diogo Cdo, who in 1482 <( discovered ) the whole coastlineof Angolaand erected stone pillars at the mouth of the Congo River, belonged to the groupof Portuguese navigators searching for the road to the Indies; they venturedfurther and further down the African coast, until in 1490 Vasco da Gama roundedthe Cape of Good Hope and opened the way to the rich spice trade with theOrient. Diogo Cdo landed in Angola, and in 1483 came into contact with the Kingof Kongo, who sent an ambassador to the Portuguese court. In 1491 anotherPortuguese fleet arrived and sailed up the Congo River for over 120miles to thecapital of Kongo. The Kongo royal family was soon after baptized,and aPortuguese embassy permanently established. Trade relationsbegan.2. Atlantic Slave-Trade: 1485-1858The Portuguese presence in Angola speedily came to be dominated by oneoverriding interest: slaves. As early as 1485, the King of Portugal ceded the islandof Sdo Tome to one of his vassals, and sent him a company of Jews andcommoncriminals to work on the sugar plantations; they were eventually supplanted byslaves shipped from the African mainland. By the mid-16th centuryAngolanslaves were being shipped across the Atlantic to Portuguese sugar plantations onthe Brazilian coast. By 1580 Portuguese establishments in Brazil consisted of apopulation of an estimated 57,000 people, of whom about 44% were Europeans,32%

Indians, and 29% Africans; and the African populations was constantly growing '.It was, above all, to cater to Portuguese exploitation of Brazilian sugar-cane, andlater its mineral resources, that the slave-trade in Angola was intensified. It iscalculated that from 1580 to 1836 over four million Africans were exported fromthe Congo and Angola, and over three million from Angola alone. The effects arestill felt in the demography of Angola today.Certainly, the slave-trade could never have assumed the proportions it didwithout Portuguese royal protection and the complicity of the Church, which itselfmade undisguised use of slave-labor in the colony 2. The trade dominated thecolony's administration, and dictated its belligerency; for the Portuguese, lackingsufficiently attractive goods to exchange for slaves, were frequently obliged,during the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, to instigate wars toobtain them.Even after Brazil had declared independence in 1822, the slave-trade fromAngola showed no signs of abating. From 1823 to 1825 more than 20,000 slavesa year were being exported to Brazil, accounting for 92% of Angola's totalexports. Between 1830 and 1833 ninety Brazilian slave-ships docked at Luanda.International pressure on Portugal to stop the trade (which had inthe course of the

early 19th century been extended to Mozambique as the Angolan supply dried up)did notI See Philip Curtin, The Slave-Trade and the Atlantic Basin, 81. During thegreater part of the 18th century it has been estimated that a million African slaveswere working on Brazilian sugar plantations, the great majority Angolans.2 Basil Davidson, L'Angola au coeur des tem ptes. Paris, 1972, 95-96.

finally lead to legislation outlawing the trade until 1858. Yet slave-exploitation inAngola was to persist.3. Colonial Expansion: 1858-1926The abolition of the Atlantic slave-trade deprived Portugal of its main source ofrevenue in Angola, and threatened its essentially maritime presence in the colony.Explorers, missionaries, soldiers, and a few settlers began, therefore, to penetratethe interior. A rudimentary system of military forts, mission postsand whiteplantations grew up. But it was hardly colonization in the French or Englishsense. During the second half of the 19th century white settlement of Angola waspursued in the most perfunctory fashion, and by the end of the century there wereonly an estimated 9,000 Portuguese in the colony, most of them employed in thetowns.It was only at the end of the century and the beginning of the present century,during the4 Scramble for Africa >>, that Portugal completed the conquest ofthe territory.But for the rivalry of other European powers, who turned her into a makeweight,it might not have been able to annex large areas of Angola and Mozambique;other powers such as Great Britain assumed that Portuguesecontrolled territorywould be open to their commercial penetration while Portugal paid the costs ofadministration; they were conscious, too, of the precariousness of Portuguesecontrol, as was illustrated by a secret Anglo-German agreement of1898 topartition Angola and Mozambique should it prove impossible to (maintain theirintegrity >>.The construction of the colonial administrative framework was largely completeby the end of World War I. Portuguese High Commissioners embarked onambitious projects of roadbuilding,

which helped to consolidate Portuguese control over the area. Economicdevelopment, in the standard colonial pattern, was oriented towards enterprisesbenefitting European interests. But in comparison with British and Frenchcolonies, even this kind of development was slight: agricultural exploitationlargely postdates Salazar's assumption to power, and mineral exploitation largelypostdates the inception of the war of national liberation in 1961.Portugal, too impoverished itself to put up the necessary capital foran adequatesystem of communication, was obliged to depend on British finance. It also haddifficulty in finding the necessary manpower to accomplish its tasks. The solutionwas forced labor. Eleven years after the final abolition of slaveryin 1878, forcedlabor was explicitly protected in the Labor Regulation of 1899:

<<All natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are subject to the moral and legalobligation of attempting to obtain through work the means that they lack tosubsist and to better their social condition. They have full liberty to choose themethod of fulfilling this obligation, but if they do not fulfill it, publicauthority may force a fulfilment >> 3.In many cases this <,fulfilment o was simply a euphemism for slavery; as late as1903 Henry Nevinson witnessed slaves being exported to the cocoa plantations ofSdo Tome. A brave effort to stem such abuses was made by Governor-GeneralJose Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos, who on his arrival in Angola in 1912, ashe later recalled, found in the province a system of native labor whichcould not,but for rare exceptions, be called3 William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West, 23.

free >>'. Three years later (when recalled to Lisbon as Minister of Colonies) hewas to claim that all traces of slavery had disappeared, and that forced labor hadbeen superseded by'a contractual system. Yet when Norton de Matos returned toAngola in 1921 as the Republican regime's High Commissioner, he found that thesituation had reverted to that of 1912; in his absence, a series of decrees hadeffectively put forced labor back on the statute book. His attempts to repeal them,and to liberalize Por.. tuguese administration, aroused strong hostilities in Lisbon,and helped fuel the military coup of 1926.4. Fascist Angola: 1926-1974The institution of the military regime in 1926, and of the Salazar dictatorship sixyears later, was to have far-reaching effects on the overseas territories. Subjected,like Portugal itself, to the whole apparatus of a one-party state (political police,summary imprisonment, censorship, etc.), they had to bear the further burden ofcolonialism in its extreme form. Angola became, in effect, an agriculturalsweatshop, its forced operation legally enshrined in the Native Labor Code of1928, which provided that Africans must prove they were not <(idle )) or elsethey would be liable for compulsory labor.There is no doubt that the coercive provisions of the Native Labor Code havebeen extensively enforced right up to recent times; the forced recruitment onminimal wages of African workers was noted by several well-informed visitors toAngola during the 1950's 1. <, In Angola and Mozambique ),4 Basil Davidson, L'Angola au coeur des tempates, 117; Jose Norton de Matos, Aprovincia de Angola, 126.5 William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West, 23.

writes William Minter, , the Portuguese, still unable to provide adequateincentives to get Africans to work for them, continue to use coercion tomake upthe labor force,> 6 The whole underlying philosophy of this exploitation wasepitomized by the late Prime Minister Caetano himself. <(The blacks of Africa ,>,he wrote in 1954 (when professor at Lisbon University), << are to be directed andorganized by Europeans but are indispensible as auxiliaries of the Europeans...They must be considered as productive elements who are organized, or to be"organized, in an economy directed by whites ), 7.

Portugal, under the dictatorship, nonetheless, rebutted charges of forced labor inits African territories, and consistently denied that its rule was in any wayracialist. On the contrary, it pointed to its <, civilizing mission >> of assimilatingAfricans into one common Lusitanian civilization. But the policy of assimilation,despite theoretical differences from South African apartheid, was far from beingnon-racialistic. It meant, in effect, ((portugalization >>; to attain it, the Angolanhad first to renounce his own culture, and become - socially, economically,linguistically - Portuguese.To become an assimilado involved, in any case, before the legal changes of 1961,a considerable procedure. An applicant had first to prove his ability to speak andwrite correct Portuguese; show that he had a certain income; submit a number ofdocuments and certificates; and, finally, pay a fee. With these limitations, thepercentage of assimilados reached one per cent at best, a fact initself indicative ofthe low economic and educational position of6 ibid., 27.7 Quoted by Basil Davidson, The New Portugal and Africa.

Africans, which Portuguese rule perpetuated.That the policy of (( assimilation ) was, in fact, aimed at indefinitely preservingwhite minority rule was, in any case, bluntly revealed in a course given byGeneral Kaulza de Arriaga to the Lisbon high command in 1966. He describesmaintaining , white rule in Angola and Mozambique >> as a <( national objective>>, and assures his audience that ( there is absolutely no doubt that the black racehas inferior characteristics to the white race >>. Statements by high-rankingofficials in the Portuguese administration in Angola have revealed similarprejudices.The 1961 revolt, and subsequent counter-insurgency strategies, led the Portugueseto revise, but not disown, their policy of ( assimilation *. Officially, all whowished were now to become ,, citizens >>. More educational facilities wereprovided by the state. The strategy was to counter the appeal of the liberationmovements by attempting to create a class of loyal Africans who couldbedepended on to defend Portuguese interests, as the French (and latertheAmericans) had tried to do in Vietnam. The most such a policy of belatedassimilation could accomplish was to recruit some Africans willing, more out ofopportunism than genuine conviction, to deny their own heritage.Many Africanswere drafted, during the war of national liberation, into the Portuguese army; thePortuguese tried to step up this use of Africans in order to relieve thestrain ontheir own manpower as well as for obvious political purpose. But the status ofmost Angolan people remained inferior, penalized by invidious laws,discriminated against by low wages, their movements controlled by administrativerestrictions and compulsory identification permits. Counter-in-

surgency measures of resettlement in ,strategic hamlets )> and theintensifiedsurveillance by the PIDE/ DGS (the security police) imposed new burdens on thepopulation. The continued encouragement of increased white settlement,moreover, and the close collaboration with the Republic of South Africa, tended

(contrary to Portuguese claims) to inflame racial disparities and aggravatetensions.Restrictions on free speech and a free press, prohibition of opposition politicalparties, the security police, abolition of unions and the illegality of strikes, rigidcontrols over the residence, movement and employment of the black population:such were the characteristics of Portuguese fascism. Literacy and propertyrequirements put severe limits even on the democratic facade of a NationalAssembly. The participation of the overseas territories was even more restricted:with a combined population substantially greater than that of Portugal itself, theyheld in 1969 only 20 seats in the 130-seat National Assembly. Whiledetailedelection returns from Angola are not available, the percentage of the populationthat went to the polls was estimated at less than 5 percent (hardly more than thepercentage of Portuguese settlers in the country). Reforms of the legislatureintroduced by the Caetano regime in 1972 were only token, in the sensethat theyperpetuated white supremacy in the African territories. Angola remained what ithad been since 1926: a police state.In return for its apparatus of security police and totalitarian control,what didPortugal give to Angola? Neither political determination, materialadvantage, noreducational opportunity, not even an adequate system of public health. By 1960only 3 percent of Angolan children enjoyed any kind of schooling, only a fractionof whom completed primary edu-

cation8, and some 250 doctors, most of them in the towns, had to cope with apopulation of 6 millions; the results have been mass illiteracy and one of thehighest infant mortality rates in the world. So much for Portugal's (civilizingmission >> in Angola!8 Af all schoolchildren in Angola during 1967-1970, only 4.4% completedprimary education: see further Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, Education etdiscrimination dans les territoires portugais d'Afrique, in: Unesco Courier,November 1973.

III. ANGOLAN LIBERATION IN CONTEXT1. Chronological Table1920 - Creation in Lisbon of the African League, branchof the Pan African Movement.1929 - Foundation in Luanda of the LNA, National African League.1951 - Foundation in Lisbon of a Center of AfricanStudies; among its graduates, liberation movement leaders, suchas Neto, Cabral,Mondlane, dos Santos, de Andrade.1953 - Foundation of the first revolutionary party inAngola, PLUA, party of the United Struggle ofAngolan Africans.1954 - Foundation in Kinshasa of UPONA, Union of Populations of NorthernAngola, under the Presidency of Holden Roberto.1955 - Creation of PCA, Angolan Communist Party.

1956 - Fusion of PLUA and MIA (Movement for Independence of Angola), andformation of MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)under the Presidency of Agostinho Neto.1958 - Fusion of MINA (Movement for National Independence of Angola) andMPLA.- UPONA becomes UPA (Union of the Populations ofAngola).1959 - Arrest of several hundred persons, including several MPLA leaders.1960 - Arrest of 52 Africans, including A. Neto and FatherJ. Pinto de Andrade.- Fusion of UPA and PDA (Democratic Party ofAngola) and formation of FCPPA (Common PopularFront of the Populations of Angola).1961 - Henrique Galvdo's seizure of the Portuguese cruiseship Santa Maria in the Caribbean (January).- Rebellion in Angola (February/March).- MPLA fails to establish a common front withUPA.

1962 - UPA and PDA found the FNLA (National Frontfor the Liberation of Angola).- Holden Roberto founds in Kinshasa GRAE (Revolutionary Government ofAngola in Exile), organof the FNLA.- Portuguese army admits on 28 May that the Nationalists hold 1/5 of Angola.1963 - Split in the MPLA between A. Neto and V. daCruz. MPLA headquarters moved to Brazzaville.- Rift between GRAE and MPLA grows.- Liberation Committee of OAU (Organization forAfrican Unity) recognizes GRAE.1964 - V. da Cruz leaves MPLA to join GRAE.- Growing dissension in FNLA, which is desertedby Jonas Savimbi and many other non-Kikongo.Liberation Committee of OAU recognizes MPLA.1965-1966 - Growing disaffection in MPLA's ranks ineastern Angola. Jonas Savimbi does not join MPLA, and instead founds UNITA(National Union forTotal Independence of Angola).- Hostility between MPLA and UNITA in easternAngola.- Opening of MPLA's second front.1967 - Installation of MPLA's Central Committee in province of Moxico.- Portuguese communique concedes that 9 out ofthe 15 districts of Angola are involved in theliberation struggle.1968 - Opening of a third front in the Northeast along

the Katanga frontier.- OUA retracts its support from GRAE, though notfrom FNLA, and accords recognition to MPLA.1969 - Portuguese offensive in the East.1970 - Portuguese employ napalm and defoliants inAngola.- Pope Paul VI accords papal audience to A. Neto,President of MPLA, and other liberation leaders.- WCC (World Council of Churches) decides to givefinancial aid to the humanitarian activities of theAfrican Liberation Movements.

- Agreement between FNLA and MPLA on joint military and political action.1972 - New effort at reconciliation between FNLA andMPLA, with intercession of OAU.- Meeting of President Mobutu of Zaire, PresidentNgouabi of Congo, Holden Roberto and AgostinhoNeto in Brazzaville on 9 June.- Liberation movements dismiss the so-called reforms of 1972, wherebyPortuguese colonies transformed into autonomous states, with legislativeassemblies.- Armed struggle for national liberation intensified.- Total Portuguese military expenditure in Angolareaches 2,585.8 million escudos, some 25% of totalbudget (UN figures).1973 - Portuguese troops in Angola reach an estimated80,000.1974 - Caetano regime toppled in Lisbon coup led by theArmed Forces Movement.- The liberation movements reiterate that the warwould continue until complete independence wasunconditionally granted.- Angolan authorities release some 1,200 politicalprisoners.- Lisbon junta offers ceasefire in Portuguese Africaand calls on all nationalist groups to take part indemocratic elections (6 May).- Portuguese military command in Angola orders ahalt to all offensive operations against MPLA andFNLA (29 May).- Announcement of Portuguese suspension of hostilities with UNITA(17 June).- Lisbon dissolves civilian government in Angolaand sets up military regime (July).- Lisbon formally acknowledges the right of theiroverseas territories to self-determination and independence (24 July).- MPLA Congress in Lusaka fails to resolve intersplits (August).

- Brazzaville declaration offers a modus vivendi toMPLA leadership crisis: Neto reinstated as President, with Andrade and Chipendaas Vice-Presidents (3 September).

- General Spinola resigns as Portuguese Presidentand is replaced by General Francisco da Costa Gomes, who reaffirmsthedecolonializing process laid down for Angola (self-determinationin twoyears) (30 September).- MPLA forces cease hostilities (late September).- Holden Roberto appeals to FNLA forces to suspendhostilities from 15 October.MPLA agrees to a formal ceasefire (22 October).FNLA, MPLA and UNITA delegation arrive inLuanda and officially set up offices in the capital(early November).- Agreement signed between FNLA and UNITA inKinshasa as a step towards presenting a unitedpolitical front (25 November).Admiral Rosa Coutinho dissolves the MilitaryCouncil in Angola and declares himself High Commissioner to prepare the wayfor a transitional government; he affirms that negotiations wouldsoon openbetween the Lisbon government and the three liberation movements (29November).- Divisions within MPLA gradually disappear assupport for Agostinho Neto's leadership grows.1975 - At a three-day meeting in Mombasa, Kenya,MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, represented by Neto, Roberto, and Savimbirespectively, agree on a common political platform as a step towards participatingin talks with the provisional governmentof Portugal (5 January).- Talks between Neto, Roberto and Savimbi and thePortuguese open in Alvor, Portugal, on 10 January, and an independence accord issigned by all parties on 15 January: Angola is to become independenton 11 November 1975.2. The 1961 Rebellion and Portuguese RepressionIn February 1961 trouble broke out in the Angolan capital of Luanda. ,Enraged bythe massacre of 30 political demonstrators at Catene, groups of armed Africans(under MPLA direction) simultaneously attacked the house of military detention,the civil

prison and the city police station. Several sentries were killed. Thefollowing day,during the burial ceremony for the dead, shots were fired at the mourners, andfighting broke out, until the police arrived to restore order. The Portugueseauthorities, in response to these disturbances, tightened security, arresteddissidents, imposed censorship, and suspended the entry of foreign journalists intothe country.

The Luanda disturbances were widely reported (they coincided with the seizure inthe Caribbean of a Portuguese luxury liner by Captain Henrique Galvdo, aPortuguese opposition leader). But a far more serious wave of repression followedthe riots caused by forced cotton cultivation at Baixa de Cassange in the Malangedistrict in January and February of the same year. Reprisals by thesecurity forceswere swift and brutal. In March rebellion broke out over wide areas of NorthernAngola. The ferocious Portuguese repression included the aerial bombardment ofa number of villages. A former staff-officer in the Angolan high command, JoseErvedosa, an eye-witness to these events, later alleged that, in one 14 week period(between March and June), between 50,000 and 80,000 Angolans were killed as aresult of attacks by air force and Portuguese ground troops in northeast Angola;the euphemism ,, armed reconnaissance > was used to describe systematic attackson supposedly hostile villages; rockets, machine-guns, napalm,even anti-submarine weapons were deployed'. The planes, like the bombs, were in manyinstances NATO in origin.I Tribune (U. K.), 27 August 1973. The allegations are substantially corroboratedin oral testimonies taken at the time by the British Baptist Mission in Congo-Kinshasa, and by British press reports on the rising in northern Angola: seefurther Basil Davidson, L'Angola au coeur des temptes, 190-207.

Thousands of refugees from northern Angola began to pour into the Congo2.Thousands more died on the way, or did not leave their villages in time.A waveof arrests directed against educated Africans, particularly Protestants, ensued;many were summarily executed.3. The Struggle for Liberation: 1961-1974Since the outbreaks of February and March 1961, right up to 1974, there has beenwar in Angola. There, as in the other Portuguese territories, Africans have neverhad the chance to organize peaceful political protest. The Portuguese explainedthe absence of protest by claiming that their Africans were happy to bePortuguese. But the events of 1961 destroyed that illusion, andthe savagePortuguese reprisals crushed any hopes there might have been for a peacefulsolution. At the same time, Portugal, shocked by what had happened, began toprovide additional social services and institute paper reforms, but such steps wereboth too little and too late. And the counter-insurgency efforts of thearmedforces, intent to crush the liberation movements at birth, took priority. But farfrom being crushed, the liberation movements, made resolute by Portugueseintransigence, only grew in strength. A revolutionary governmentof Angola inexile (GRAE) was formed in 1962, and in the following year, after aninternalstruggle, Agostinho Neto's leadership of a strengthened MPLA was secured.Until 1966 the war was largely confined to the area north of the capital Luanda,adjacent to the Zaire border, and to the enclave of Cabinda across theCongoRiver. But in 1966 the fighting intensified,2 By 1972 more than 600,000 Angolan refugees were reported as living in theRepublic of Zaire (U. N. figures).

with the opening of a second front in eastern and southern Angola, andthestepping up of MPLA guerrilla activities. In 1967 Portuguese armedforcesbulletins reported military actions in nine out of the territory's fifteen districts. Instrategic terms, the war had not yet significantly touched the partsof Angola withthe greatest population concentrations and the greatest economic resources. Butby early 1972 twelve districts had become involved in the struggle of nationalliberation, and the liberation forces were gradually moving towardsthe morepopulous zones when the coup in Lisbon opened the door to a ceasefire.In the face of the growing success of the liberation movements, and the growingdisaffection of the rural population, both in the East and the North, the Portuguesemilitary authorities stepped up troopreinforcements and introduced new counter-insurgency measures. These included the tightened control .of identification,travel, and residence (proclaimed in Law No. 3819 of 4 April 1968), the extensionof surveillance and espionage, and the forcible regroupment ofthe ruralpopulation into aldeamentos, which some consider a polite word for concentrationcamps. By 1968-69, 887,923 Angolans had been officially transferred to suchcamps. The authorities claimed they were for the inmates' protectionfrom (terrorism ,>, but reports submitted to the secret Luanda Symposium on Counter-Subversion (November 1968-March 1969), convened by the colonial regime,make it plain that the aldeamentos - infiltrated by a network of PIDE-recruitedinformers - were aimed at facilitating the surveillance of the rural population anderadicating guerrilla-subversion3.3 Angola. Secret Government Documents on CounterSubversion. IDOC, 1974,27-37.

The steadily escalating cost of the war, both in money and manpower,has placedhuge burdens on Portugal's economy. By 1967 her annual defense expenditureamounted to more than 40% of the total budget.-By 1973 over a quarter of thePortuguese budget was going to furnish the war in Angola alone. Troops hadreached an estimated 80,000. Portugal, the poorest country in Western Europe,was maintaining the largest foreign army in Africa to preserve the lastof Europe'scolonial empires. In fact, it was only by selling mineral concessions to foreigninterests that Portugal was able to finance the war at all.Yet all this vast expense proved futile. For 14 years Portugal's coffers weredrained in a colonial war it could never hope to win. It had neither resources tofinance it, nor popular support to sustain it. In none of Portugal's overseasterritories was there a layer of African society which saw its interestsdefended bythe maintenance of Lisbon's imperialist rule. Such a layer, had it existed, couldhave served, as Anna Libera has pointed out, as the basis for a classical neo-colonialist solution of the type imposed in former French colonies ofBlackAfrica4.Unable to muster any support other than that of the white minority, the Salazar-Caetano regime was forced into a kind of reckless, even blind, intransigence.Thus, it refused to recognize the existence of the liberation movements in Angola,let alone concede any justice to their claims. Prime Minister Caetano,in a

broadcast statement dated 15 January 1973, reiterated that negotiations were outof the question:,, I shall not go into the constitutional and4 Anna Libera, The New Slave Trade. Portuguese Colonialism in Africa, in:International Socialist Review (U. S.), February 1974.

moral impossibility of any Government gettting into contact with groups whosesole motivation is to spread violence and to be the tool of foreign interests, so asto hand over to them the administration of territories which the Constitution,history and the national sentiment enjoin on it to maintain as an integral,inseperable part of Portugal Y'.As late as 16 February 1974, Caetano - addressing the National Popular ActionGroup's Central Committee - went so far as to deny there was even awar goingon in Angola6. And a month later he assured the delegates of the regime'sNational Assembly that ( an unarmed tourist can be safer in Portuguese Africathan in the streets of many major cities which are said to be civilized 07.4. The 1974 Coup in Portugal and AfterLittle more than a month after making this comment, Marcello Caetano and hisfascist regime were ousted in an almost bloodless coup d'etat by the ArmedForces Movement (MFA) formed out of revulsion from the colonial wars. TheMovement instituted a caretaker junta, headed by General Ant6nio de Spinola, toprepare the way both for democracy in Portugal and self-determination in theAfrican territories.General Spinola, later to become President of the Republic in the provisionalgovernment, like many senior army officers who had served in Africa, had (asearly as 1969) become convinced that there could5 Portuguese Africa. An Introduction. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lisbon, 1973,95.6 Times (U. K.), 18 February 1974.7Daily News (Tanz.), 7 March 1974.

be no military solution in Africa, and that Portugal must come to termswith theAfrican majority. Two months before the coup, he published his views in a bookPortugal and the Future, soon after which he was dismissed from his post asdeputy chief of staff.In Spinola's view, the guerrillas, in all three Portuguese territories, had the benefitof porous borders and massive external aid; it was impossible to cut off theirsupplies. Since decisive military victory was unattainable, a political solution hadto be found: the answer, for Spinola, lay in a form of voluntary federation whichwould allow the right of political self-determination to each of its constituentparts, but with a federal parliament and a central government, presumably inLisbon, which would have final say on defense, foreign policy, and the economy.Yet in the aftermath of the coup, and in response to pressure from boththeliberation movements and the MFA, General Spinola and his junta had toabandonthese conservative, and basically neo-colonialist, ideas. At first, the situation, asfar as the African territories were concerned, was far from clear.It was not until 7

May that General Costa Gomes, in the first clear statement of the new regime'sAfrican policy, offered a ceasefire to the liberation movements and called on allnationalist groups to take part in democratic elections. He made itclear that, if theliberation movements refused the offer of a ceasefire, the wars would continuewhile political parties were being formed 8.How did the Angolan liberation movements respond to this appeal? Dr. Neto,President of MPLA, like other liberation leaders, rejected any8 Guardian (U. K.),7 May 1974.

thing less than total independence. Early in 1973 he dismissed the so-calledreforms of 1972, and denounced Portuguese atrocities on the Eastern front (whichincluded napalm and lethal defoliant strikes) His initial reaction to the coup wasunfavorable. It did not discourage his efforts to curtail NATO arms supplies toPortugal. On his arrival in London at the end of April 1974, Dr. Netodeclared thatthe fighting would go on until the Portuguese unconditionally recognizedAngola's right to independence '. MPLA military operations accordinglycontinued, especially on the North-East front of Cabinda. In fact, theemancipation forces of all three liberation movements were, in varying degrees,active right up to the ceasefire accords of October 1974.Spinola's rejection of outright independence for Angola and the other Africanterritories was corroborated in his policy statement dated 11 June 1974; it wasfirst necessary, he insisted, to establish ( a climate of freedom and aperfectfunctioning of democratic institutions ) 10. The conservatism of the statement wasmatched by the appointment of General Silverio Marques as governor of Angola apost he had held twelve years earlier under the dictatorship. On his arrival in theterritory, Marques offered the liberation movements complete amnesty as basisfor a ceasefire, which was refused.In Lisbon, pressure was, nevertheless, being put on General Spinola to liquidatePortugal's colonial involvement as soon as was possible. On 24 July Portugalfinally acknowledged the right of her overseas territories to self-determination andindependence. After disturbances in Luanda, Marques was9 Times (U. K.), 1 May 1974.10 International Herald Tribune, 12 June 1974.

recalled. The Lisbon regime now proposed a twoyear provisional government toassure Angola's evolution towards independence. But MPLA, at theircongress inLusaka, unanimously rejected this solution 11.Meanwhile, the 13-year old struggle for liberation in Guinea-Bissau wasconcluded on 27 August 1974, when PAIGC and the Portuguese authorities issueda joint statement declaring that Portugal would formally recognize the territory'sindependence as a sovereign state on 10 September. And on 7 September anagreement in Lusaka between FRELIMO and Portuguese Foreign Minister MarioSoares promised independence to Mozambique on 25 June 1975 and theimmediate formation of a FRELIMOdominated coalition (which came into poweron 20 September 1974). Yet Dr. Soares, on his way back to Lisbon after signingthis agreement, said, in an interview, that Angola was not yet ripe for negotiations

12. Spinola himself was known to be critical of what he called ( hastyabandonment * of Portugal's African colonies 13, and this is what prompted himto take over the negotiations from his apparently too precipitous Foreign Minister.But Spinola's attempts to reinforce his own position were in conflictwith thepolicy of the MFA, and his implication in an attempted right-wing coupeventually led to his fall; he resigned from the Presidency on 30 September 1974.General Francisco da Costa Gomes, his successor, in his first address to thenation, confirmed Mozambique's independence agreement and thedecolonializingprocess for Angola. The news11 Le Monde, 18/19 August 1974.12 New York Times, 8 September 1974.13 Guardian, 24 September 1974.

was welcomed by liberation movement leaders, with whom the new Lisbonprovisional government promptly made contact 14. During the course ofOctober 1974 ceasefire agreements were signed with FNLA and MPLA, and by22 October all three liberation movements in Angola had satisfied the Portugueseceasefire conditions required for them to become legitimate political movementswithin the country. Official delegations of each movement arrived in Luanda inthe course of early November, in order to set up offices in the capital.With the 25 November accord on the independence of So Tome and Principe, thePortuguese authorities could concentrate all their efforts on the problem ofpreparing Angola for independence. Further contacts were madewith liberationmovement leaders, as a prelude to reaching agreement on the formation of atransitional government. A renewed dialogue had, simultaneously, openedbetween, and within, the three liberation movements with a view to sinkingtheirdifferences and agreeing on a unified political front. This led to Holden Robertoof FNLA and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA signing an agreement of mutualcooperation on 25 November. It also led to the gradual disappearance of divisionswithin the MPLA, as support for Dr. Neto's leadership grew.Everything was now set for formal negotiations on Angola's independence and theformation of a transitional government. On 29 November Admiral Rosa Coutinhodissolved Angola's military council of which he was President, and declaredhimself14 Guardian, 2 October 1974; Le Monde, 15 October 1974; Paul Bernetel, Sur leyacht de la n6gociation, in: Jeune Afrique, no. 720, 26 October 1974.

provisional High Commissioner. His job was to prepare the way for atransitionalgovernment.Admiral Coutinho later confirmed that the Cabinet portfolios in such agovernment would be divided equally betwen the three liberation movements. Healso confirmed that only their recognized leaders, Agostinho Neto of MPLA,Jonas Savimbi of UNITA and Holden Roberto of FNLA, would be officiallyrepresented at the talks, although other e interested groups > would be allowed toattend as observers 15. The three leaders in question, for their part, succeeded inreaching agreement at a threeday meeting in Mombasa, Kenya, in early January

1975; they announced that they had agreed on a common political platform as abasis for participating in talks with the provisional government of Portugal.The talks, attended by Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi, opened on 10 January at thePenina Hotel in Alvor, a seaside resort in Portugal. Six days later,on 15 January,in an historic accord signed by all parties, Portugal undertook to cedeindependence to Angola on 11 November 1975 (a date coinciding with the400thanniversary of the founding of Luanda by the Portuguese).Under the agreement a transitional government, scrupulously balanced betweenrepresentatives of the three liberation movements and the Portugueseauthorities,was to be set up in Luanda to rule Angola during the ensuing ten months. It was tobe led by a three-man presidential council comprising representatives of the threeliberation groups; chairmanship of the council was to rotate between the three. APortuguese high commissioner with basic responsibilities for defense and securitywas to remain in Angola during the transitional period. Por15 Observer (U. K.), 8December 1974.

tuguese troops were also to remain, numbering 24,000, and each liberationmovement would contribute a contingent of 8,000 for a united Angolaarmedforces. The accord also provides for elections to a constituent assembly prior toindependence. It would be the task of this assembly to select the country's firstpresident from among the leaders of the three movements 16Welcoming the successful outcome of the talks, which marked the finalstage ofthe dissolution of Portugal's African empire, President Francisco da Costa Gomestold the delegates that the accord was a fundamental step in the decolonizingprocess generously conceived by the men of the armed forces in the clandestinenights that preceded the revolution of April 25 ) 17.16 Times (U. K.), 16 January 1975.17 International Herald Tribune, 16 January 1975.

IV. BACKGROUND NOTES TO THE LIBERATIONMOVEMENTS1. FNLA/GRAEDevelopmentThe Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was originallycomprised of two political movements. One was the Democratic Party of Angola(PDA) formed in 1960. But the stronger party in the Front was the Union of thePopulations of Northern Angola (UPA). The UPA (at first known as the Union ofthe Populations of Northern Angola) was organized in Kinshasa in 1957. As itsoriginal name indicated, the movement was composed of people from northernAngola. In 1958 <, Northern > was dropped from the organization'sname, and itsbase was broadened; its leaders became aware of the movement for freedomthroughout Africa and recognized that their national future lay not in ethnicsubdivisions but in the nationalist framework of an independent Angola.Nonetheless, UPA's support continued to come largely from the Kongo people inthe north.

In the latter part of 1958, Holden Roberto, one of UPA's young members, waschosen to attend the first All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra. From thattime to the present, Roberto was to be the dominant personality in the movement.Born in 1923 in Sdo Salvador, where his father worked at the BaptistMissionarySociety, he lived in Angola only two years before his family moved to Zaire.Roberto was educated in Kinshasa. He returned to study at a British MissionarySociety School in Sdo Salvador in 1940-1941. For eight years he worked as anaccountant in the Belgian administration, partly

in Stanleyville, where be became acquainted with Patrice Lumumba, the firstPrime Minister of Zaire. In mid-1960, after extensive travels in Africa and abroad,he returned to Zaire to take over the active leadership of the UPA. By theend of1960, after independence, the movement mushroomed with seventeen offices inlower Zaire.The destiny of the UPA, and indeed of all of Angola, changed dramatically on 15March 1961, when a revolt of major proportions broke out in northern Angola. Asa result of the savage Portuguese reprisals, at least a quarter of amillion peoplefled across the Zaire border, there to settle among their own tribesmen who wereliving in the former Belgian colonial area. Among this huge refugee populationUPA gathered support.The Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign in northern Angolaled in 1962 tothe creation of a strengthened liberation front in FNLA, into which UPA wasmerged. On 5 April 1962 Holden Roberto further established in Kinshasa theRevolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), ready to assume poweronce independence had been achieved.The movement continued to gain strength up to 1963. In the friendly sanctuary ofZaire it built up a trained group of guerrillas, established its own military camps,received significant help from the Zaire government and other governments inAfrica, and greatly hampered the plantation economy of the Portuguese innorthern Angola. It attracted Africans who had deserted from thePortuguesearmed forces, as well as political militants, not only from northernAngola, butfrom further south as well. The newly formed Liberation Committee oftheOrganization of African Unity recommended that the OAU should recognizeFNLA's government in exile, and for

several years all OAU assistance to Angola went through GRAE.The years 1964 and 1965 were much more difficult years for FNLA.Some of themost important non-Kongo leadership of the movement left, and there was anattempted coup against the President. More difficulties arose when Adoularesigned as Prime Minister of Zaire and pro-Portuguese Tshombe became the newPrime Minister.In November 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko succeeded Tshombe, and hassince givengreat help to FNLA, including both military aid and political assistance. From itsbase in Zaire, FNLA has since then built up the biggest military force operating inAngola; it claims to have 15,000 men in the field, and has, in recent times, prior tothe ceasefire, been particularly active in the Dembos.

In 1972 FNLA reported that it had under its control areas in the north-central_north-eastern and eastern regions of Angola with more than 900,000 inhabitants.It controlled, during the same year, an army of over 10,000 men, engaged in anarmed struggle on four fronts; in the spring of 1972 fighting was intensified insouthern Cabinda and elsewhere in the north.Simultaneously, talks were going on with MPLA with a view to presenting aunified front. At a meeting in Brazzaville on 8 June 1972, under theauspices ofPresidents Mobutu and Ngouabi, a temporary reconciliation was reached betweenthe leaders of the two movements, and a Supreme Council for the Liberation ofAngola established. Yet this, and subsequent, attempts to establisha modusvivendi between FNLA and MPLA have been bitterly contested. No joint militaryactivities have resulted from them. And as Angola moves towards

independence, both movements retain their separate identities.FNLA, like MPLA, has, since the 25 April coup in Lisbon, continuedhostilitiesup to October 1974. It has dismissed the idea of an Angolan referendum as aprelude to independence, and has, independently and through the offices ofPresident Mobutu of Zaire, pressed its claims to participate in the formation of anindependent government.These claims continue to be backed up by impressive military strength. It wasreported on 2 June 1974 that the first of over a hundred Chinese militaryinstructors had arrived in Kinshasa to train a FNLA army for the liberation ofAngola. Substantial arms shipments are known to have been receivedby FNLAforces since the coup, and it is generally recognised that FNLA, onthe eve ofindependence, is militarily the strongest of the three liberation movements. Thecessation of hostilities announced by Holden Roberto on 12 October 1974 wasthus particularly welcome to the Portuguese. ,( I consider v, said Foreign MinisterMatrio Soares, < that the statements by Holden Roberto confirming the de factoceasefire in Angola constitute a very positive fact which will allowus to start withconfidence the negotiations under way for the complete decolonization of Angola>>ProgramIn 1972 FNLA reported that some 800,000 inhabitants in northern and easternAngola were under its control. Economic activities in these areas are coordinatedthough a department of Land and Settlement. There is no system oftaxation.AgricultureI International Herald Tribune, 14 October 1974.

is organized along cooperative lines. To avoid famine resulting from Portugueseherbicide and defoliant attacks, farmers have also cultivated plots on an individualbasis.Yet much of FNLA's reconstruction program has rather been concentrating onimproving its facilities in Zaire, where most of its military operations originate,and to which thousands of Angolan refugees have fled. The refugeeproblem inZaire is serious, and explains why FNLA has based its health and educationalactivities there. The health service is called the Service for the Assistance of

Angolan Refugees (SARA); established in 1961, it provided tremendous aid torefugees in its Kinshasa clinic. Aided, at the outset, by churches and other bodies,including foreign medical personnel plus Angolans trained abroad, FNLA hassince expanded these services, and in 1968 purchased a 20-acreplot outsideKinshasa as a headquarters for refugees and a site for a new hospital. In 1970there were seventeen nurses there. There also exists a network of clinics(20) along the border of Angola and Zaire. In 1972 the staff of FNLA's medicaland social assistance services included 2 doctors, 69 assistants,150 nurses, 300midwives, 300 social workers and 350 assistant social workers.GRAE established a Ministry of Education in 1962 to deal with the educationalproblems of refugees. At first, educational classes were organized alongPortuguese lines, but as this was incompatible with the Zaire system,French wasadopted as a basic language for refugees beginning studies in Zaire.In 1964-65GRAE created a secondary school system, also patterned after theone in Zaire,and by 1970 there were 300 students with nine teachers at the school in Kinshasa.In the elementary schools there were about 1,500 students and 33 teachers, with

seven schools scattered through lower Zaire. Inside Angola, 92 schools with 7,000students and more than 100 teachers were reported. Rudimentary supplies go tothe schools inside Angola from FNLA headquarters. Primary responsibility forthis educational program was assumed by PDA leader Kounzika, whowasMinister of Education in the GRAE government until 1972.Support for the reconstruction activities of FNLA has come from various Africancountries, and from private organizations in Scandinavia, other parts of WesternEurope, the U.S.A., Israel and India.StructureWhen the FNLA was originally established as the policy-making bodyof theUPA, PDA, and a split-off of the MPLA led by Viriato de Cruz, each of thesethree movements commanded fifteen members on the National Council.Thedissident MPLA unit is now non-existent. The National Council, which isconsidered as the legislative branch of the coalition of UPA and PDA,is nowcomposed of 31 members; 26 represent the two movements (13 from each) and 5are chosen by the military. The Council is supposed to meet three times a year,though extraordinary meetings can be convened if necessary. Italso elects thePresident of GRAE, which is looked on as the executive branch of thecoalition.Holden Roberto, as President of GRAE, holds ultimate decision-making power.Ministries of the government-in-exile include Education, Defense, Social Affairs,Information and Economic Planning, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior andHealth.In addition to the legislative and executive branches of the FNLA, there is amilitary High Command. The President of GRAE is the Commander-in-Chief.

Thirty members compose the High Command, including the Commanders of theNorthern, NorthEastern, and Eastern Fronts, and seventeen members chosen bythe people contained by these fronts. The High Command is supposed tomeetthree times a year to coincide with meetings of the National Council.

Political StanceFNLA pronouncements suggest, that, in political terms, the key to the movementis a form of pragmatic nationalism. This has been reflected in its willingness toaccept help from all sides (the USA, China, Rumania, Libya, Sweden, etc.), andexpressed, from the outset, in its espousal of an armed struggle to oust thecolonial regime. Any statement of a theoretical nature is given in FNLA pressstatements, principally made by its President Holden Roberto, in presentation tothe United Nations, or irl the few brochures of the movement. The essentialposition of FNLA was enunciated in its ( Declaration of Principles ))signed on 5April 1962. It called attention to the Portuguese system of exploitation andstressed the necessity of carrying on the struggle for independence; it asked forrecognition by Afro-Asian governments and appealed for world support in itseffort to achieve liberation in the shortest possible time. Fundamental was theright of the Angolan people to self-determination. FNLA statements alsodenounce tribalism and advocate major land reforms in Angola. In this latterpolicy, Roberto has said that if the conflict resulted in a military victory for theAngolans, land would be confiscated from the Portuguese. If negotiation endedthe conflict, then there would be a re-distribution of land, but the Portuguesewould be accepted as eventual citizens.

RelationsThe greatest asset which FNLA has had as a movement, apart from itssupportamong large numbers of Kongo people, has been the help given to it by thegovernment of Zaire. The Zaire government (apart from the Tshombe regime) hasgiven military and material aid; it has supplied guerrilla-bases andpoliticalsupport. Since the 25 April coup in Lisbon, President Mobutu of Zairehas furtherexerted his influence to press the claims of GRAE in any eventual settlement ofthe Angola independence problem. During his meeting with PresidentSpinola inthe Cape Verde Islands in September 1974, Mobutu is reported to haveurged theLisbon government to open direct negotiations with GRAE, as it had done withFRELIMO in Mozambique 2. Since then, further representations have been made,but the new Lisbon government under President Costa Gomes has beendetermined to accord equal recognition to all three liberation movements.Other African governments have been helpful to FNLA, including Tunisia,Morocco, Liberia, and Nigeria, and, in the early years, Algeria and Ghana. Morerecently, substantial financial aid has been given to the movement by ColonelKhedafi of Libya.FNLA has never been part of a coalition of liberation movements comparable tothat between the MPLA, PAIGC, and FRELIMO. Nevertheless, it has forgedsympathetic relationships with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) ofSouthAfrica, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the MozambiqueRevolutionary Committee (COREMO), Militants from these movements havereceived training at FNLA camps in Zaire.2 Guardian (U. K.), 6 September 1974.

The relationship of FNLA to the OAU has changed since 1963. In late 1963 thenewly formed Liberation Committee of the OAU recognized FNLA alone as themovement carrying on the struggle in Angola. In July 1968, the Committeewithdrew recognition of GRAE as a government, and recognized only the FNLAas a political liberation movement. The move was corroborated by theOAUHeads of State in 1971. Therefore, at the present time FNLA and MPLA haveequal status before the OAU, although fewer funds have been goingto the former.In relations with non-African countries, FNLA has always had a pro-Westernemphasis. Yet this did not stop Holden Roberto from publicly announcing in early1964 that he intended to seek assistance from Socialist countries. Though theZaire government quickly intervened to stop any such possibility, Roberto hasmore recently succeeded in being given substantial military aid both by thePeople's Republic of China and Rumania. Hitherto, most assistancehad come toFNLA from nonCommunist countries with a ((neutralist)) tendency. This hasincluded Scandinavian countries and India. It is not unlikely that aidhas gonefrom the U.S. government or from U.S. business interests 3; if it has, it has gonevery secretly, through third parties.Assistance has also been given by some non-governmental organizations in theWest, including church bodies, though a small WCC grant was rejectedin 1971because it was less than money granted to other movements. This help has goneprimarily to medical and educational projects, particularly amongrefugees inZaire.3 On allegations that leaders of Zaire and of GRAE had entered intosecretagreements with the Gulf Oil Company in Cabinda, see Le Monde, 6 June1974.

2. MPLADevelopmentThe Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was formed insideAngola in December 1956. It brought together a number of individuals andclandestine groups opposed to Portuguese colonial rule. Initially,its roots wereprimarily in the urban milieu, especially in Luanda, In 1959 its growingunderground networks were disrupted by intense repression by the Portuguesesecret police (PIDE). Many MPLA leaders were arrested; a few succeeded inescaping into exile. In June 1960 Agostinho Neto, the poet-doctor who was tobecome the President of MPLA and perhaps the most distinguished figure to bethrown up by the Angolan liberation struggle, was also detained. Born at Icolo eBengo in the vicinity of Luanda, Neto had been trained as a medicaldoctor inPortugal, and had worked as a gynaecologist in the slums of Lisbon. He wasarrested in Portugal in the early 1950's for his connection with undergroundopposition to Salazar's dictatorship. On his release, he returned to Angola, butsoon came under PIDE-surveillance. He was rearrested in 1960.Two years laterhe escaped from prison in Portugal, made his way back to Africa, andin Kinshasaplayed a prominent role in the First National Conference of the MPLA,at whichhe was elected President - a post he has maintained to the present day.Since the 1961 revolt in Angola, the MPLA has gained in support. In the revoltfollowing 15 March 1961, the movement played a prominent role, notably in the

Kimbundu-speaking areas inland from Luanda, while most of the north respondedto the call of the UPA. MPLA headquarters in exile moved from

Conakry to Kinshasa in mid-1961, but was prevented from maintaining contactwith its supporters in Angola by the UPA, which dominated the Kikongo lands inthe north and regarded MPLA's presence in Zaire with suspicion. Aftertherecognition accorded to GRAE by both Zaire and the OAU, MPLA's headquarterswere in 1963 moved to Brazzaville.At the Kinshasa Conference of December 1962, an immediate concernexpressedhad been (( the organic installation of the MPLA on the whole national territory,particularly in rural zones ,,. But up to 1966 the opportunity of implementing thisplan in a serious way was confined almost entirely to Cabinda. Great difficultieswere encountered by MPLA, especially during the period 1962-1964, includingthe defection of leaders such as Viriata da Cruz (who had been the movement'sSecretary General), the isolation from its supporters near Luanda, and the lack ofconfidence of African states.In 1966, however, there was success for the first time in sending reinforcementsto MPLA combatants in the Nambuangongo region (near Luanda). Even moreimportant was the initiation of a new front in eastern Angola (the Moxico-Cuando-Cubango front). It was logistically made possible by access to Zambia,and the routing of arms-supplies (including those from the Soviet Union) fromDar es Salaam over 2,500 kilometers of Zambian territory to the Angolanfrontier.The opening of the Eastern front took the Portuguese by surprise, and MPLAforces made rapid advances towards Angola's heartland. But the drive westwardspenetrated areas which were sparsely populated, and its impetus was halted, or atleast delayed, by the Portuguese counter-offensive of August 1968; severefighting drove MPLA units back to the Zambian border. This military setback inturn precipitated, towards the end of 1968,

a political crisis within the MPLA. Daniel Chipenda, Vice-President and leader onthe Eastern front, accused the MPLA Directing Committee of pursuingthe samemilitary policy in Moxico as it had done in the more densely populated Cabinda.At the same time, there was widespread local resentment on the Eastern front atMPLA's failure to protect them from the Portuguese counter-offensive.Yet this was only a temporary setback, in political and military terms.In spite ofits often acrimonious internal wrangles - intensified in 1971 by Mario deAndrade's split - MPLA has been remarkably successful in the field. Fighting hascontinued on the Eastern front. Success here has posed a major threat to thePortuguese, and has evoked a more favorable attitude from the OAUand Africanstates. The 1972 reports from MPLA referred to continued fightingin ten ofAngola's fifteen districts (sixteen with the recent creation of Cumene district inthe south). A MPLA spokesman said. that MPLA-liberated territory in 1972 was (more than 500,000 sq. km. with a population of about one million inhabitants )> '.But the logistic problem of routing arms-supplies through Zambia proved anobstacle to further progress on the Eastern front, and this, in part, prompted Dr.Neto to seek a reconciliation with the FNLA, which would enable his movement

to gain access to the Zaire frontier; the accord signed between the two movementsin Kinshasa on 12 December 1972 only served, however, to provoke renewedcrisis within the MPLA. Many cadres refused to accept the accord. There wasstrong criticism, too, of Dr. Neto's failure to call a presidential election in thirteenyears. Yet after a precarious struggle in4 Ant6nio Alberto Neto, MPLA Representative to the Lund Conference,Sweden,April 1972.

which he looked like being deposed, Neto succeeded in surmountinghis ((dismissal >> at the Bukavu Conference (27 July 1974), when it was publiclyannounced that he had resigned to set up a private medical practice inDar esSalaam. He dominated deliberations at the MPLA Congress in Lusakain August1974, and firmly re-emerged as President in the Brazzaville agreement of 3September, which healed the threefold split in the MPLA (the factionsof Neto,Chipenda and Andrade), and pledged to continue the struggle for independence inAngola under his leadership. Since then, the MPLA has presented a more unifiedfront, and by the end of 1974, on the eve of independence talks with thePortuguese, all divisions within the movement had practically disappeared.ProgramThe reconstruction programs inaugurated in the areas under MPLA control havebeen conducted, theoretically, along Marxist lines. The most concerted programshave been undertaken in Moxico and Cuando-Cubango. Estimates of the totalnumber of people involved are almost impossible to make, but detaileddescriptions, particularly of education and health programs, indicate servicesprovided to large numbers of people. In 1972 Daniel Chipenda referred to about100,000 people in Moxico and Cuando-Cubango living under direct MPLAadministration.In MPLA-controlled areas, farmers are organized in collective farms as part of theprogram to change the agricultural pattern of the territory. Cropsare growncooperatively, by villages and guerrilla units, as well as in individual plots. Cropsunder cultivation include rice, cassava, potatoes, millet and maize. People's shopshave been established to enable peasants to exchange their produce for necessitiessuch as canned meat, salt, powdered milk, cotton cloth,

and soap, imported from Zambia. The people's shops are controlled by actioncommittees which fix uniform prices throughout the MPLA-liberated area. Eachshop serves from 80 to 125 villages.Education was, from the first, conceived as a reaction against thePortuguesesystem, and was inspired by the experiences of revolutionary countries. Itsactivities are based on Centers of Revolutionary Instruction (CIR), whichorganize short-term courses ranging from basic literacy to more advancedsubjects. Primary schools are established throughout the liberated areas, andprovide 5 years of schooling. MPLA has prepared its own literacy text-bookwhich relates literacy teaching to political training. The first MPLA secondaryschool opened at Dolisie in the Congo and provides four years of secondaryeducation divided into two-year terms.

Medical services are organized through the Medical Assistance Services (SAM),which operate a program of preventive medicine and training for medical cadres,and supply medical treatment to military and civilian populations '. In 1972 SAMhad a total of 7 doctors and 120 nurses and first-aid assistants. Asfor medicaltraining, SAM set up a school of elementary medical care in 1969 whichofferscourses in anatomy, physiology, first-aid, pathology and hygiene. The hospitaloperated by SAM at Dolisie has twelve beds, an operating room, two consultingrooms, a laboratory and treatment rooms. On the Eastern frontthe situation ismore difficult, as medical supplies have to be transported from Dar es Salaam; butdispensaries have been set up at MPLA5 B. Adjali in Southern Africa, August-September, 1971. On MPLA medicalservices, see further the brochure Medical Assistance Services, published byMPLA-SAM. Revised 2nd edition, Lusaka, November 1971.

military bases, and mobile teams accompany guerrilla units.These reconstruction programs, of agriculture, education and health, fit into thepolicy emphasized by President Agostinho Neto in a message of 1 January 1970:(One of the major principles which we must rigorously follow is to utilizeourown forces in resolving the problems of the revolution.This is not to depreciate in any sense the importance of international solidarity orsympathetic movements which are now emerging in all the capitalist countries ofEurope and America, including the United States itself.Nor of course, do we depreciate in any way the political and material supportwhich has been given by socialist and African countries - supportwhich hasgreatly facilitated our struggle. But we must recognize that all of this issecondary. What is primary and essential is our action within the country, for it isthrough this action that we will achievereal independence.To utilize our own forces in military activity means to arm our guerrillas with theweapons of the enemy; it means to regain the food, clothing, medicine, moneyand other means necessary for the guerrillas' existence ... In the zones under ourcontrol, to utilize our own forces means to produce, to organize industries,organize trade, organize schools, etc.without having to wait for outside assistance coming to resolve all ofour materialproblems ,,.

StructureIn its military organization, MPLA has divided its area of combat into six regions:(1) Uige, Zaire, Cuanza-Norte and Luanda; (2) Cabinda; (3) Moxico and Cuando-Cubango; (4) Lunda and Malange; (5) Bie; and (6) Huila and the rest of thecountry.The strategy is the classical one of protracted guerrilla warfare, the main elementsof which are:(1) close links between the rural population and the guerrilla units; (2) tacticsaimed at the dispersion of enemy forces; (3) escalation of tactics from mines andambushes to attacks on enemy posts;

(4) social reconstruction in semi-liberated areas;(5) the importance of political education of the liberation forces; and (6)maintenance of external support links to progressive states and organizations(above all, Zambia and Tanzania).MPLA military units are organized in small detachments of 25 men each.Theseoccasionally have combined into larger groups for major attacks. The totalnumber of MPLA forces approximates 6-7,000. They are trained inside thecountry. Columns carrying arms and ammunition must at times sustain marches ofsix to eight weeks. Not only journalists sympathetic to the MPLA, butalsoPortuguese and South African observers seem to agree that it was the best-trainedand militarily effective, even if not the best-equipped, opponent of the Portuguesearmy in Angola. Details from South African and Portuguese sources can rarely betaken at face value, but agreement on this point between Ventner,who travelledwith Portuguese troops in Cabinda and northern and eastern Angola in 1969, andMichael Morris, a member of the Security Branch of the South African Police,seem to indicate that this, too, was the judgement of the counter-insurgencyforces.

MPLA's wider structure reflects its political base among the rural peasantry.Unlike FNLA, it has focused its activities within Angola, and has forged few linkswith the huge refugee populations which have flooded since 1961 into Zaire andlater into Zambia, although during the period 1961-63 it did provide somemedical services to refugees in Zaire, a means of contact later cutoff. MPLApolicy with respect to Angolan refugees in these countries is to encourage them toreturn to MPLA-controlled areas within Angola and to contribute to the strugglethere.At its inception, MPLA's location in Luanda meant that much of its immediatesupport came from the Kimbundu-speaking group. It still retains a large followingin the muceques of Luanda and in Kimbundu-speaking rural areas.But laterexpansion and military action on the Cabinda and Eastern fronts have producedsubstantial ethnic diversity in support and participation in both itspolitical andmilitary programs. ( Tribalism )) and ( racialism > are, indeed, regarded as seriouspolitical errors, as tools which may be used by the Portuguese, and byopportunists within the nationalist ranks, to weaken the revolutionary struggle.The political structure of the MPLA was consolidated at the First NationalConference in 1962, when a Directing Committee and a Political-MilitaryCommittee were elected. In 1968 MPLA headquarters were moved inside Angola,and a local infrastructure elaborated. But the movement's popular base has, at thesame time, been respected. Village action committee members arechosen by thevillagers themselves, of both sexes. Political organizers tour villages in newlyliberated areas and explain MPLA's struggle. The villages are then asked toorganize themselves, to form action committees, and to

contribute to the revolutionary struggle.Political Stance

Dr. Neto has insisted that the MPLA shall be what its propaganda says itis: 4 amovement that is revolutionary but indigenous, African but nonracist, radical butindependent *Political education is stressed. Aspects with distinctly military significance are:(1) the analysis of the enemy as Portuguese colonialism, and its supporters, ratherthan any racial group as such, creating the opportunity of integrating all Angolans,regardless of origin, in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, and ofencouraging desertion and dissent within the Portuguese armed forces; (2) theimportance of discipline among emancipation forces and respect forlocalpopulations - no stealing, seduction of local women, etc., the participation ofmilitary units in production, and the maintenance of cooperative relations betweenMPLA units and local militia; and (3) opposition to superstition, dependence onfetishes and magical beliefs, and the emphasis on the importance of a rationalanalysis of military strategy.In a wider context, political education is Marxist in origin and revolutionary intendency. But it is not doctrinaire. It remains flexible in the face of specificsituations. And there is no intention of blindy following any Eastern bloc party-line. There is also a clear awareness of the dangers of neocolonialism followingindependence. MPLA hasalready had occasion to observe its effects on the6 Basil Davidson, Angola in the Tenth Year, in: Question 7: Southern Africa,Geneva 1972. On MPLA program and ideology, see further La vittoria Certa.Guida dell'alfabetizzatore. MPLA. Lerici Editore, March 1970.

policies of independent African states towards their own liberation struggle, and istherefore particularly sensitive to the dangers involved. Its analysis of Portuguesecolonialism springs, in essence, from its realization of its integrationin, anddependence on, a global imperialist system. It is this which must be confronted ifneo-colonialism is to be averted.Among the points of revolutionary strategy which might be singled out foremphasis are: (1) the central role of peasant participation in the armed struggle,but the impossibility of success without political leadership and educated cadres;(2) the national focus of the struggle, and the emphasis on political commitment,rather than ethnic background, as the criterion for participation in the struggle;and (3) the importance of recognizing the enemies of the revolutionary struggle,and of choosing international ties accordingly while remaining politicallynonaligned.RelationsMPLA is a member, with PATGC of Guinea-Bissau and FRELIMO ofMozambique, of a coordinating organization, CONCP, and cooperates closelywith both movements, with which it is, in political outlook, closely aligned.Among other African states, the closest and most important relationships are withCongo-Brazzaville, Zambia, and Tanzania. In general, the more radical Africanstates have supported the MPLA, including Algeria and the United ArabRepublic. Relationships with the OUA have varied considerably, leading fromhostility during the first few years of its recognition of GRAE to substantial

improvement since 1966. More recently, recognition of GRAE's governmentalstatus has been withdrawn, and MPLA has been accorded equal recognition withFNLA before the OAU. MPLA

has also formed an alliance with popular movements in the English speakingcountries of Southern Africa (ZAPU and ANC), which has led to cooperationbetween them.Further afield, MPLA currently enjoys the solid support of the full range ofSocialist countries. It is a member, with PAIGC and FRELIMO, of theOrganization for the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America(OSPAAL), with headquarters in Havana. The range of representation at theRome solidarity conference in June 1970 was even wider, including support-groups in Western Europe and America, as well as the WCC. Specializedagencies of the U.N. are exploring ways of assisting its non-military programs.MPLA seeks a wide range of support from all those committed to the liberationstruggle in Angola, while emphasizing at the same time the importance ofindependence from any outside force. As Dr. Neto has said, (, maintainingfriendly relations with the Soviet Union, China, Jugoslavia, Swedenor Hollanddoes not mean that we mechanically follow the policy or ideology of any of them,even if their experiences are useful to us3. UNITADevelopmentThe National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was formallyestablished through an organizing Constitutional Conference in March 1966 atMuangai in the interior of Angola (Moxico district), some 250 miles from theZambian border.7Agostinho Neto, President's Message, in: Angola in Arms. Information organ ofthe People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Dar es Salaam,January/February/ March 1972, vol. 3, no. 1.

The key figure in the inauguration of UNITA was its President, JonasSavimbi,who, like Roberto of FNLA and Neto of MPLA, has maintained his leadership tothe present day. Born in Moxico, and raised in Bie and along the BenguelaRailway line where his father (also a church leader) worked, Savimbi, accordingto Pelissier, was involved with the MPLA before joining the UPA. He studied atthe University of Lisbon on a United Church scholarship, but in 1960 fled underPIDE-harassment to Switzerland, where he continued his studies.On the adviceof the Kenyan politician Tom Mboya, Savimbi decided to join UPA and hischoice induced a number of other non-Kikongos to join as well. Savimbi becamethe Secretary General of UPA, and was Foreign Minister of GRAE fromApril1962 until July 1964, when he resigned, in repudiation of Holden Roberto'sallegedly conciliatory attitudes to the West and the movement's lack ofrevolutionary principle. Taking with him a number of followers of mainlvUmbundu and southern Angolan origin, Savimbi, on his defection from GRAE,left Kinshasa for Brazzaville where talks were held with the MPLA. When thesefailed to produce material results, Savimbi and his group moved to Zambia, from

which country it operated during the early period of UNITA's history, untilSavimbi's expulsion in 1967. Since mid-1968 the movement has claimedthat, incontrast to the leaders of the other two movements, Savimbi has only been livinginside Angola. His image 'is very much one of living with the people (a constanttheme since he returned from Zambia), and he has reiterated that (< a revolutioncannot be led, guided or controlled from the safety of a foreign country... ,,.Major milestones in UNITA's history include: the beginning of the armed strugglein Makafuma, Angola, in April 1966; the mass attack on the town

of Teixeira de Sousa near the Zambian border on Christmas Day 1966; theformation of the movement's military wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberationof Angola (FALA); the expulsion of Savimbi from Zambia in July 1967,especially because of UNITA's continued attacks on the Benguela Railway Lineneeded by Zambia for trade purposes; the establishment of the movement withinAngola in mid-1968; the two party Congresses held within Angola in August-September 1968 and 1969; and the celebration of the fifth year of the movementin March 1971.UNITA claims to have 34,000 combatants under its control and to have liberatedareas in eastern, central and southern Angola, involving a population of over onemillion people. In recent times, major UNITA activity has consistedof sabotageand hitand-run operations along the Benguela Railway, in centralAngola nearLuso, and in Moxico. Richard Gibson claims that clashes between MPLA andUNITA forces pushed the latter into a position in which it had to (( cedeconsiderable territory, falling back to the south and center of the country 1.In 1970 the Portuguese admitted being attacked by the liberation movements in2,518 actions, 59% attributable to MPLA, 37% to FNLA, and only 4% to UNITA.But UNITA would dispute that these figures represent the general level of itsinvolvement in the armed struggle. In 1972 it reported that its forces were activein 7 districts of Angola: Lunda, Cuando-Cubango, Bie, Huila, Benguela, Moxico,and Cumene. In March of the same year it reported over one million inhabitants inUNITA-liberated areas.Yet since the 25 April coup in Lisbon, UNITA8 Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements. Oxford, 1972, 240.

has capitalized on its position of being - in Portuguese eyes - the only liberationmovement centered within Angolan territory to reach a political settlement. Aftera secret meeting between the military authorities and UNITA representatives inthe east of Angola, a communique dated 17 June 1974 announced that anagreement had been made a to suspend, within the shortest time possible, militaryactions of mutual hostility, with the development of the political dialogue leadingto the restoration of peace in Angola *.Simultaneously, Savimbi published a letter in the Didrio de Noticias expressinghis views on the political situation in Angola; UNITA, he declared, was in favorof a period of preparation for independence; he rejected the idea of a speedyreferendum, defended the idea of multiracialism, and looked forward to a time ofreconciliation with the Portuguese.

Yet UNITA was swift to disabuse the widespread interpretation of the17 Junelocal truce as a formal ceasefire. It was, explained a further communique,restricted to Moxico, and did not mean that UNITA had submitted to Portugueseterms.More recently, at its 1974 Annual Conference held inside Angola from 16-19July, UNITA issued a policy declaration, deciding:(( 1. To call once again on all liberation movements to recognize theimmediate necessity for forming a broad National Democratic Liberation Frontwhich will be responsible for speaking with and fighting against thePortugueseon behalf of Angolaas a whole.2. To declare publicly and solemnly that the

UNITA Armed Forces shall never fight any other liberation forceexcept in self-defense 3. To place at the disposal of all the other liberation forcesall UNITA'seconomic and social apparatus already set up inside Angola so that the strugglemay be continuedif need be.4. UNITA strongly condemns all attacks, slanders and abuses amongst liberationmovements.5. UNITA condemns in the most clear terms all false theories of (( strategicretreat ) into the neighboring countries, and leaving to UNITA alone all theheavy-weight of the Portuguese colonial forces )>'.Since then, UNITA, in common with FNLA and MPLA, has agreed to a totalceasefire with the Portuguese authorities, and on an unified political platform withthe other two movements, as a step towards participating in the independencetalks which opened in Portugal on 10 January 1975.ProgramEstimates of the size of UNITA-controlled areas, and the number ofpeoplecontained in them, vary. The figure of 1.5 million inhabitants under UNITAcontrol appears as early as 1968, while at a later point a figure of500,000 isquoted. At the end of 1971 areas of five districts (Moxico, Cuando-Cubango, Bie,Lunda and Malange) were reported ((under control)) with little or no Portugueseinterference. Huambo District was reportedly opened to UNITA operations in1968 and Huila in March 1969.9 UNITA pamphlet, published at 25 Ospringe Road, London NW 5, U. K.

UNITA's own descriptions of its reconstruction programs lack consistency; theyhave been described as carried out along socialist, or maoist, lines,butdescriptions come only from UNITA sources. The self-sufficiency of the liberatedareas is stressed. Thus, food (although apparently scarce) is never cited as aproblem. It is grown in individual, cooperative and collective fields, cleared, onoccasions, by UNITA forces, and cultivated by the villagers. Civilians areexpected to work to maintain the army. After Portuguese herbicide and defoliantattacks, youth brigades were formed to help with farming.

Numbers involved in UNITA health programs vary; one source says that 25,000are being treated with medical supplies given by sympathizers or captured fromthe Portuguese. There are clinics in every UNITA zone, staffed by30 medicalpersonnel or trained orderlies. Medical supplies are admitted to bescarce.1,Although lacking in teachers and supplies, UNITA decided to establishrudimentary schools at its Second Congress. Three hundred pupils passed the firsttwo grades in 1969-70; children attend school in the mornings, adults in theafternoon. Political education is stressed. Children are taught that the history ofAngola is not made by a Portuguese elite but by the people themselves ,0.12,000children and adults are attending primary school, and two Centers of Political andMilitary Education (CIM) have been established.In terms of its program, UNITA finances are said to be obtained frommembership fees, subscriptions and donations. Some help has come from10 UNITA, The Armed Struggle in Angola. Freeland (Angola) (1972),4.

abroad. Savimbi claims to have received help in the form of training from thePeople's Republic of China. In 1967 UNITA appealed for aid in Westernpublications, and in 1969 Savimbi said he would accept any kind of support solong as there were no strings attached. UNITA claims that hostile relations withZambia and other countries have prevented external aid from coming in. It has notstopped contributions from the WCC, and from other European non-governmentalsources.UNITA's stress on self-reliance has been criticized as unrealistic in advancing astruggle. But the movement can claim impressive results on the basis of asubsistence economy, financial autonomy, and on military supplies captured fromthe Portuguese.StructureUNITA's military structure has developed from simple origins to the present welldeveloped organization. The movement's military wing (FALA) was notcreated until after the December 1966 attack on Teixeira de Sousa whichproduced heavy casualties. The descriptions of its organization vary from that ofa e popular militia)) involved in guerrilla sabotage and hit-and-runraids, to theexistence of battalion-size units involved in larger engagements. UNITA areas aredivided into 12 military zones and 20-25 sub-zones. There are various secretmilitary camps and centers for military instruction.The basic political structure of UNITA was established at the ConstitutionalConference in March 1966. The program it authorized described a politicalhierarchy ranging from the Nation, the Province, the District, the Region to theCell, with parallel UNITA structures at each level (the National

Council and Central Committee down to Regional Committees). The cellis the((basic organ > of the movement. The , supreme organ ) is the General Assemblyformed by delegates from all the other organs. Membership of UNITA is open to (any Angolan who accepts and fights directly for the integral implementation ofthis program o. After the Provisional Central Committee was selected in 1966,

National Central Committees have been chosen at the General Assembly orCongress meetings.The political and military structures of UNITA are apparently separate: theCentral Committee is the major decision-making body on the politicallevel, theHigh Command of FALA on the military level. In the liberated zones, there is avillage organization with a chairman and elected committee to implementregionalpolicies related to the branch (4-5 villages). The branch trains militiafor internalsecurity and works to supply food to the zone.UNITA primarily finds its support among rural populations in southern, easternand central Angola. Their ethnic diversity is reflected in the languages used byUNITA military cadres, and has promoted the movement's multiracialpolicy.Political StanceUNITA does not have a well defined and fundamental view of society. Itspublications are ideologically mixed: at times society is described in economicterms, at times in terms primarily of nation. Yet much thought has been givento<( correct revolutionary practice ) and to analyzing the colonialistsystem it isstruggling against. Portuguese colonialism is depicted in terms of a landednobility in Angola and a commercial bourgeoisie in Portugal, the latter being thedominant force.

Modern colonialism is described in terms of monopoly capital and foreigninvestment. The Portuguese are accused of racism, but it is stressedthat UNITA isnot fighting a racialist war or a war against the Portuguese people.The motivation of Africans in the struggle is said to be nationalism, described asthe ((correct liberatory creed), to unite the people. The method ofmobilizing thepeople seems to be through political education. In the UNITA philosophy the keyis an (< armed struggle waged... inside the country ) to the bitter end, irrespectiveof international pronouncements or Portuguese concessions. Emphasis is laid onself-reliant leadership based permanently inside Angola. Protracted struggle isnecessary for true development, and relies on mobilization of the most reliableclass o, the peasants.There is reference in UNITA publications to the struggle creating ((anew man ,,to the elimination of the ( bureaucratic, capitalist )) spirit, to. antiimperialism andto socialist orientation. The UNITA program calls for the emancipation ofwomen, the abolition of forced labor, and the institution of a planned economyRelationsZambia's role as the key to the development of UNITA has already been alludedto. It allowed the movement, in its early days, to function within its borders.Later, however, potential UNITA involvement in internal Zambian politics led tocool relations, and in 1967, after UNITA attacks on the Benguela Railway, to theeventual severing of ties.Savimbi, in search of African support, has visited various African states. UNITAstill maintains an office in Cairo. Since 1968 new efforts have been

made to achieve solidarity with Zambia and the Congo. Savimbi said, before theceasefire, that his movement was trying to improve relations with its neighbors bynot fighting near the borders, by no longer attacking the Benguela Railway, andby constant consultations with the governments of Zambia and Zaire. Variousconciliatory gestures have been made to Zambia, and in 1971 UNITA presentedher with 2,000 kilograms of corn".In its program UNITA calls for the implementation of OAU resolutions,and hascalled on the organization to help unify the liberation movements. Yetit has failedto win OAU recognition. UNITA also calls for cooperation with nationalliberation movements elsewhere in Africa, but the only alliance so far achievedhas apparently been with SWAPO.As far as external policy is concerned, UNITA's program stipulates ( non-participation in any military alliance or bloc >>, and an independent policy whichtakes into (< consideration the supreme interests of the Angolan people ),. Itchampions the U.N. charter, defends the principles of noninterference in domesticaffairs, and invites solidarity with ( progressive forces which fight againstcolonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism >.Savimbi, on his defection from GRAE, travelled to the USSR and Eastern Europebut found them willing only to support MPLA. In contacts with Chinahe got afavorable, if guarded, response, with an agreement to train somemen. As regardsthe USA, UNITA publications have condemned American imperialism andpraised the heroic peoples of Vietnam. They also declare solidaritywith the Blackpeople of America. Nonetheless, allegations of Savimbi's connections with theUSA (even the11 Times of Zambia, 4 April 1974.

CIA) and other right-wing political forces have been made. Attention has beendrawn to UNITA's affiliation with the pro-Western student group COSEC (knownto be CIA-financed at one time). UNITA representatives have also appeared atvarious international meetings, condemning some groups (OSPAAL, AAPSO) asnarrowly pro-Soviet.In recent years, UNITA has put considerable emphasis on influencing opinion inWestern Europe, where it has stationed at least two permanent representatives.The most concrete support has come from the WCC's Program to CombatRacism, which has also authorized funds to MPLA and FNLA.

V. CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN ANGOLA1. StatisticsAccording to the Census of 1950, 34% of the African population of Angola wasRoman Catholic, 13% Protestant, and 53% non-Christian. A decade later, theproportion of Christians registered had increased from 47% to 66%.The Christiantwothirds of the population was 49% Catholic and 17% Protestant. On a simplestatistical basis, the Roman Catholic Church would seem to have the support orallegiance of approximately half the population of Angola.In 1968 the total Protestant population, although it had almost doubled during theprevious decade, consisted of little more than 350,000, in comparison with over

two million Catholics 1. The figures reflect the relatively late arrivalof theProtestant churches, as well as the established nature of the RomanCatholicChurch in Angola.2. The Catholic Church in AngolaEarly EvangelizationIt is impossible to disentangle, historically, the interests of Roman Catholicismand Portuguese colonialism. Both, in the earlier 15th century, inspired PrinceHenry the Navigator with his mission x of solving the great riddle , ofAfrica 2.I Francois Houtart edit., Dossier sur les colonies portugaises. Brussels, 1971, 92-93.2 Charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal, 1952, 28. On Henry the Navigator'sdesire ((to make increase in the faith of Our Lord Jesus Christ ,, see furtherGomes de Zurara, The Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest ofGuinea,tr. and ed. C.R. Beasley and E. Prestige, vol. I, 27-29.

His combined colonial and evangelic mission sustained the conquistadores whocame to Angola in the later 15th century. In 1483 Diogo Cdo entered the mouth ofthe Congo River. On returning to Portugal, he took with him some Congolesewho were placed in a monastery. They were instructed in the faith andbaptized.In 1485 Diogo Cdo took them back to the Congo. Thus the course ofevangelization began. In 1490 the first priests settled on Angolan soil. The firstgreat King of the Kongo to be baptized took the name of Don Jodo. He soonapostatized. However, the second Catholic King, Don Afonso I, who reigned from1506 to 1543, was a devout Christian who strove to establish a Christiankingdom.The seed had been planted, but it did not really take root. Five years after thedeath of Don Afonso, the first Jesuit mission arrived in Angola. They observed:(Paganism and polygamy have practically supplanted Christian customs. Thecatechism is not taught, for the clergy which existed were convinced that therewas no point to this. They just practised baptism and littleelse )).With typical zeal, the Company of Jesus tried to remedy the situation and revivethe Church. In four months they baptized 2,100 persons, built three churches, andgave the capital the new name of Sdo Salvador.Decadence and EstablishmentThis brief revival lasted only two years, from 1553 to 1555. In the course of thesecond half of the 16th century the missions went into a period of decline, whichwas to persist until modern times. Indeed, the first long chapter in the -ittempt to

implant Christianity in Angola, despite the zeal of various religioushouses, mustbe classified as a failure.The preface to the modern chapter of this story was opened when theCongregation of the Holy Spirit was entrusted with Catholic mission activity inAngola in 1865. Perhaps a more exact date for the inception of the modem periodof evangelization is 1878 when Father Duparquet of that congregation became thefirst Apostolic Prefect. His work was mainly in Damaraland and southern Angola.

Three years later, the Mission of the Congo was resurrected under the leadershipof Father Ant6nio Barroso. Catholic missions spread rapidly throughAngoladuring the last two decades of the 19th century and up to the RepublicanRevolution in 1910.During the Republican period, Catholic religious establishments were oppressedin Portugal, and Catholic lands expropriated, but the Catholic missions inAngola, protected by international treaty, were left undisturbed.Yet the climate inRepublican Portugal was hardly favorable to them. From 1913 to 1926laymissions were introduced into Angola and their establishment, in the face ofChurch hostility, legally enforced.The military revolt of 28 May 1926 brought the Republican regimeto an end. Inthe same year, the Minister of Colonies, Jodo Belo, published a Statute of theMissions of Africa and Timor, which abolished the lay missions and gavemuchmore direct support to Catholic missionary activity in Angola.ConcordatAs the Salazarist dictatorship in Portugal consolidated its strength during the1930's, so its solidarity with the Catholic Church grew. This

process culminated in 1940 in the signing with the Holy See of the Concordat andthe Missionary Accord 3. The Concordat regulated the structure of theCatholicChurch in Portugal, recognized its juridical validity, and reinforceditssubservience to the Salazarist regime by economic inducements of one form oranother. The Catholic clergy were given state protection, in return for furtheringthe regime of (, portugalization ,> pursued in the colonies by the Salazar, and laterthe Caetano, dictatorship; Portuguese citizenship was enjoined on theCatholicprelatry, and Portuguese language on the missionary schools. In 1941 thePortuguese Roman Catholic Church and the Portuguese government signed aspecial Missionary Statute in which the selection, movement, remuneration, andactivities of missionaries in the overseas territories were subjected tofurthercontrols 4.Immediately following the signing of the Concordat, the Portuguese governmentbegan to increase its direct support to the Catholic missions in Angola:1940 U.S. $ 199,2371945 283,0321950 359,1341955 713,3561960 1,129,027The Catholic bishops are paid by the Portuguese government and are classified asfunctionaries. They are present at all official ceremonies, andhave repeatedlyexpressed their support of Portuguese colonial policy.3 English translation of both texts in Angola. Secret Government Documents.IDOC, 1974, 126-146.4 ibid., 147-168.

Missionary Dissent

The Concordat, entered into at the height of the Axis fortunes, is regarded bymany as evidence of Vatican complicity in fascism. Yet, despite mountingpressure, it has never been repealed. This has placed a great obstacle in the furtherdevelopment of the Catholic Church in Angola. Since the hierarchy itself has,generally, been composed of Salazar and Caetano partisans (a situationperpetuated by the Concordat), most of the protest has come from the lower ranks,and much has gone unnoticed. There can be no doubt that the Catholic Church'sidentity with the colonial regime has damaged its true interest. It has,tacitly andat times openly, condoned the savage Portuguese war against the liberationmovements in Portuguese Africa. It is against this background that mountingtension has been evident within the Church in Angola. Many more Catholicmissionaries have been expelled from the country than Protestants.But it isimpossible to ascertain the exact number, since they were not expelled by thePortuguese authorities; the government could work through the Catholic hierarchyto have undesirable personnel recalled to Europe. Angola has nothad such adramatic rift as that in Mozambique when the White Fathers withdrew en massein 1971 '. Yet the case of the Fathers of the Holy Spirit is analagous. In1970Father Jose Veiga, Superior of Nova Lisboa, with 21 fellow missionaries,addressed a letter to the Episcopal Conference of Angola criticizing thewholemissionary system 6. As a consequence, Veiga left5 See further Cesare Bertulli, Croce e Spada in Mozambico. Rome, 1974;Fernando Neves, Negritude e Revoluqdo em Angola. Paris, 1974, 181; The WhiteFathers and Salvation Today, No. 1, Future of the Missionary Enterprise project.IDOC International, Rome, 1973.6 T. Veiga et al numero special sur l'Angola, Revue Spi-

the country. He, and those missionaries who supported him, felt ,, it was senselessto convert people, when, at the same time, you didn't try to make them aware ofthe situation in which they had to live ). Veiga felt it was impossible for him tocarry out his functions and to remain in Angola: ( that would have meantcollaboration with the colonial oppressors ) 7The dissent expressed by Angolan priests and missionaries has beensupported byliberal elements within the Church, for instance the Pontifical Commission Justiceand Peace which, at its Second European Conference at Ostende inOctober 1972,as at other times, has called on the Holy See to act to obtain recognition of thePortuguese colonies' right to self-determination, and to revise the Concordat andMissionary Accord.Yet in recent times the most vociferous demands for the abrogation of theConcordat have not come from within the Catholic Church but from the AllAfrica Conference of Churches (AACC). In December 1972 Canon Burgess Carr,its Secretary General, called on Pope Paul VI to abolish the Concordat, and madea further appeal in the following year.At its meeting in Nairobi in September 1973, the Executive Committeeof theAACC issued a statement expressing ( deep concern about the extentto which theHoly See has involved Christianity in a political matter, and is unwilling, for

diplomatic reasons, to extricate itself from the repressive policies of Portugal'sstyle of colonialism in Africa)* 8. The statement appeals to the Pope toritus, no. 18, 1971; Terre Entire (Paris), 49-50, Sept./Dec. 1971; Kirchen imKonflikt. Freiburg, 1972, 114-125.7Facts and Reports, no. 462 (April 1972).8 Angola. Secret Government Documents. IDOC, 1974, 169-172.

abrogate the Concordat, and urges the (Catholic) Symposium of EpiscopalConferences in Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) to persuade the Vatican of theurgent necessity to liberate the Catholic Churchfrom the limits by which she is bound to Portugal's colonial policies in Africa.3. The Protestant ChurchesThe Planting of the Protestant Churches in Angola:1878-1920The Protestant incursion into Angola coincided with the ,< Scramblefor Africa>>, formalized at the Berlin Conference. The Baptist Missionary Society ofLondon's missionaries George Grenfell and Thomas Comber were received by theking of the Congo, Don Pedro V, in August 1878 at his capital, Sao Salvador. Inthe same year, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions(ABCFM), the missionary society of American Congregationalists, began to looktowards central Africa. In 1879 Dr. John 0. Means, ABCFM's recording secretary,drew up a report on eight possible fields in central Africa, and recommended theregion of Cuanza and Bie among the Umbundu people of central Angola.The ABCFM, at the recommendation of Dr. Means, approved the establishmentof the West Central Africa Mission in October 1879. A year later, the first threemissionaries, two white and one black, sailed from Lisbon for Benguela. TheCanadian Congregationalists, working through the ABCFM, sent their firstmissionary, the Rev. W.T. Currie, to central Angola in 1886. In 1880 theMethodist Episcopal Church in the United States considered the penetration of theAfrican continent at its General Conference. William Taylor was -

elected Bishop of Africa four years later, and in 1885 began the work of initiatingMethodist evengelization in Angola.By the end of the century the foundation of the Protestant churches in Angola hadbeen firmly laid. Three main characteristics of this process can be distinguished:their respect for the indigenous languages, their involvement in community life,and their self-reliance.Firstly, each mission society confined its activity to one region by comityagreement, and each put down roots primarily in one ethno-linguistic area. Thisgave special significance to the linguistic work of the pioneer missionaries.Holman Bentley of the BMS published a Dictionary and Grammar of the Kikongolanguage and in 1893 completed the translation of the whole New Testament.Among the first missionaries to arrive in, Luanda with Bishop William Taylorwas the gifted Swiss-American linguist Heli Chatelain; within three years helearned Kimbundu, reduced it to writing, prepared a grammar and dictionary, andtranslated the Gospel according to St. John, which was published in 1888.

William Henry Sanders and Wesley M. Stover were the pioneer linguistsofUmbundu; the ABCFM mission published a vocabularly and grammar in1884,and a New Testament translation had been completed by 1897.Secondly, the Protestant missions assumed responsibility for maintaining villageand community life, social structures which were crumbling under colonial rule.The village elders, depreciated by the Portuguese authorities, found a new statusas church elders. The church as a community assumed responsibility for maritaland domestic stability, for education and relations with other communities andwith the government.

Thirdly, the missions were to be self-reliant; they assumed that the church wouldbe self-sustaining, self-propagating, and self-governing. The missionaries in thefield were forced by slowness of communication to take initiatives, makedecisions and shape policy, with little consultation with board headquarters.During the first four decades of Protestantism in Angola, therefore, the power andinfluence of the mission boards constantly declined in proportion as that of themissionaries increased.The main instrument for the establishment and further developmentofProtestantism in Angola was the village school. From the late 15th century untilwell into the 20th century, neither the Portuguese government nor the CatholicChurch had considered, let alone implemented, universal education. Schools wereonly provided for the ((civilized ) population Europeans and assimilados. As faras the rest of the population was concerned, the Catholic Church hadonly twopractical reasons for promoting education. Firstly, the baptized had to be taught torezar, i.e. repeat prayers and bits of Catholic doctrine; whetherthe prayers orchants were in Latin, Portuguese or the local African languages, it was a matter ofmemorization. Reading was of no importance.Secondly, the church felt obliged to encourage those who might have a religiousvocation. The seminary course was in Portuguese, and so the national languagewas emphasized in the primary schools. These two purposes produced, on the onehand, many catechetical classes hardly worthy of the name school, and, on theother, a relatively rigid preseminary training for an elite which became proficientin Portuguese and was expected to pursue studies in seminary.The Protestant missions had a different goal. They wanted each person to be ableto read the

Gospel in his own tongue. This required schools academically above thecatechetical level, but below seminary standards. It is this which has encouragedthe Protestant missions to develop village schools, capable of catechist-trainingand of teaching the people how to read, write, count, and sing hymns.Development: 1921-1960During the 1920's the Protestant churches began to multiply and flourish.Membership of the churches planted by the ABCFM grew from 983 in 1920 to8,475 in 1930 when the Protestants of central Angola celebrated the 50thanniversary of the founding of the West Central African Mission.

The first missionaries had sought centers of population which,in late 19th centuryAfrica, were tribal capitals in rural areas. The missionary residence soon became amission station with a chapel, school, and clinic. Agriculture was promoted tofeed the expanding population of the mission station. As the first pupils learnt toread and write and could expound the Gospel, they were sent out to neighboringvillages. In turn, a new school was founded which became the basis for a newChristian community. Each mission station thus became the ecclesiastical centerof an expanding area.All the Protestant missions which entered Angola, with the exceptionof theMethodists, were Congregational in polity. The local congregation,in this system,is both the basic unit and the ultimate authority.In northern Angola the many small congregations of the Baptist mission werebound together into three regional churches which were given a hierarchy ofresponsibility. The basic unit was the village congregation. The ideal envisagedwas that

each village should have two leaders: a catechist, who could give religiousinstruction and, if qualified, act as a schoolteacher, and a deacon, who wouldperform the functions of spiritual counselor or local pastor. As the number oflocal congregations grew in number and spread over an increasingly wide area,they were organized into circuits of approximately ten villages each.The apex ofthe pyramid was (( the church)> which had its headquarters at themission station.Thus, the three BMS mission stations produced three churches: SaoSalvador,Kibokolo, and Bembe.In central Angola, where the United Church of Christ and the UnitedChurch ofCanada had introduced a similar congregational tradition, the church developed,as in the north, a hierarchical ecclesiastical organization based onthe missionstation. The village churches or congregations were gathered together intodiaconal areas. The six to ten congregations served by one deacon joined withother diaconal areas to form a pastorate served by an ordained minister. Thepastorates were dependent upon the church headquarters locatedat the missionstation.The United Methodist Church, which is episcopal, also developed a hierarchicalstructure, both in response to the African challenge and in obedience to theMethodist discipline. The result is not very different: congregations, circuits, anddistricts come together at the Annual Conference. Above this, in thehierarchicalscale, is the Central Conference of Africa. This in turn is subject to thejurisdiction of the General Conference which represents the Methodist Church inthe whole world, and meets every four years.But while the missions were expanding and elaborating these hierarchicalstructures, they were

increasingly becoming the objects of government supervision. Protestant activitiesin Angola had early aroused the suspicion of the Portuguese authorities inLuanda, who felt them to be at variance with Lusitanian culture. The notion of theProtestant missions as being actually subversive in fact goes back to their earliest

days, when the West Central African Mission came into conflict withtheUmbundu King Ekwikwi; the Portuguese authorities reconciled the dispute. In theBailundo war of 1902 Portuguese control of the Umbundu kingdom wasachieved; the American missionaries tried to occupy a neutral position which wasinterpreted by the Portuguese as pro-African.Yet these were minor incidents in comparison with the clash which developedbetween mission and government in the 1920's: over Decree 77 in 1921, and overthe Ross Report in 1925.In 1921 the High Commissioner in Luanda promulgated the famous Decree 77,which regulated the Protestant missions (( so as to ensure security and publicorder, and to guarantee the maintenance of the precepts of the Portugueseconstitutional law . The Decree stipulated that:( Missions are not allowed to establish branches or schools to be incharge ofNatives, or to entrust Natives with the work of religious propagandawithout suchNatives being in possession of a recognized identification card granted by therespective administrator or military officer when they shall have been presentedby the principal of the mission >).After the Protestant missions had reduced the major languages of Angola towriting, and had translated the Gospels into them, Decree 77 now forbadethe useof the native languages in written

form by means of pamphlets, papers, leaflets or whatever kind of manuscripts inthe religious teaching of the missions, in their schools, or in whateverrelationswith the Natives. (< To teach the Portuguese language > became, afterDecree 77,a prime condition for the establishment of a mission.In return for cooperating with the Portuguese ((civilizing mission >>,the ((religious missions )> were granted the following advantages by Decree 77, Article6: (a) a free concession of land up to 500 hectares; (b) free cutting of timber; (c)an annual subsidy to each mission with a European professor to teach Portuguesein its permanent employ; and(d) an annual subsidy for each permanent rural school. The missions accepted theland concessions, but refused the financial grants.Decree 77 caused much anguish among Protestant missionaries in Angola. Theirmissions came from the extreme free-church tradition - Methodist, Baptist,Congregationalist, Plymouth Brethren and were habituated, in North America andWestern Europe, to the doctrine of the separation of church and state. As a result,they had positively welcomed the Portuguese refusal to officially recognize andsubsidize them.Church-state conflict was further exacerbated by the inflammatory Ross Reporton labor conditions in Angola, which had been commissioned by the League ofNations and derived much of its information from Protestant missionaries andchurch leaders in the country.Simultaneously with these developments, antagonism between church and statewas growing at the catechetical level. By the 1920's, the Protestant missions inAngola had grown into theocracies, at variance with the doctrine ofchurch-stateseparation; when the catechist - the theocratic leader - had

to be confirmed by the state, and when the schools supported by the theocracybecame subjected to state inspection and regulation, the conflicts became morepronounced. The Portuguese colonial regime accused the Protestant missions ofhaving a <, denationalizing ,) influence, and complained that Angolan Protestantsshowed more loyalty to their missions than to the legal authorities. In manyinstances, this was undoubtedly true.The conflict between church-state separation and the Protestant missionsintensified as the Portuguese government moved more vigorously into the fieldsof health, education, and welfare in the 1950's. When the educational servicesestablished a new school, they frequently did so in the vicinity ofa long-established Protestant school. This only made sense if the aim was to dilute, orneutralize, the energy of the Protestant theocracy. Analagously, restrictions onvillage clinics were imposed by the government even though the public healthservices were incapable of supplying the needs of the people. These and similarmeasures were prompted by Portuguese antagonism to the allegedlya subversive)) role of the Protestant missions - exemplified in documents furnished to theLuanda Counter-Subversion Symposium of November 1968'.The Protestant missions, in short, were regarded by the authorities as inimical totheir policy of , portugalization ,>; their well equipped schools, hospitals, andhealth-care institutions were interpreted as an elaborate exercise onthe part of (,foreign agents >) to subvert Portuguese authority in the territory. This state ofaffairs, while undoubtedly exacerbated by the war of national liberation was farfrom being caused by it, and goes back,9 Angola. Secret Government Documents. IDOC, 1974, 112-125.

as we have suggested, to the earliest days of the Protestant mission.But after theserious confrontations of the 1920's, a period marked by decreased missionaryactivity dissipated some of the tension. This lasted until the Second WorldWar,after which pressures began to build up on both sides. While missionary personneland resources were increased, the Portuguese pressed for more effective controls.Antagonism grew as the first signs of anti-colonialism in Angola beganto be feltin the mid-1950's. Repressive measures were taken against Protestant Africanchurch leaders; several were arrested in Lobito in 1957, and otherseriousprovocations ensued.The War: 1961-1974When the war began in the spring of 1961, Portuguese hostility to Protestantismbecame yet more marked. In the North, most of the Protestant mission stationswere closed in 1961. The Portuguese army took over the Sao Salvador Mission(BMS) for headquarters and -barracks in 1961. Portuguese authorities ordered theevacuation of the Bembe mission in the early days of the war, and an UPAmilitary group occupied the premises; the Portuguese army and airforce thendestroyed the main building. The third principal BMS station in the PortugueseCongo - Quibiciolo - was also evacuated by government order in 1961. DavidGrenfell, the director of the mission, protested. The government insisted, and

BMS headquarters in London also counselled the evacuation. Once announced,the general population began to flee towards the Zaire border.The North Angola Missiof stations of Uige and Sanza Pombo were thefirst to beevacuated in 1961. The stations of the Evangelical Mission of Angola,

founded by the British missionary Matthew Zacharias Stober, werestaffed byCanadian Baptist missionaries in 1958; they were withdrawn from northernAngola and Cabinda in 1964 by the Canadian Baptist Foreign Mission.When the war spread to eastern Angola in 19661967, more Protestantmissionswere closed: Boma, Cavungo, Cazombo, Calunda, Muie and Monte Esperanca.Many of the missionaries who were evacuated from the British and CanadianBaptist stations in the north were reassigned by their Boards to work across theborder in the Congo, mostly among Angolan refugees. One BMS missionary wasexpelled from Angola, and four American Methodist missionaries wereimprisoned in Luanda, sent to Lisbon, and finally deported. However, thedramatic decrease in the number of Protestant missionaries in Angolafrom 256 in1960 to 145 in 1964 and a mere 36 in 1972 was mainly due to the refusalof visasby the Portuguese authorities.Wide areas of Angola, in short, were, during the war of national liberation, closedto Protestant activities. In the areas where missions have not been closed, severerestrictions have been placed on Protestant work. Permission hasbeen refused tothe two largest Protestant organizations to hold annual meetings. Many prominentAfrican leaders of the Protestant churches have been imprisoned. The Rev. JesseChipenda, general secretary of the Church Council of Central Angola, wasdetained in 1968, and died in the Sdo Nicolau prison camp a year later. Scores ofother pastors, teachers, nurses, and lay leaders of the churches have beenimprisoned for years without formal charges or trial.Even in this situation, the Protestant churches continued to grow wherethey werenot actually

prohibited from functioning. In Luanda three Methodist churchesgrew intoeleven from 1960 to 1972. In central Angola from 1963 to 1970 the membershipgrew by 25%. The number of students enrolled at the United Seminary in Doncihas steadily increased.The United Church of Christ Board for World Ministries (UCBWM), theUnitedMethodist Board of Global Ministries (formerly Board of World Mission), and theUnited Church of Canada Division of World Outreach (formerly Board of WorldMission) frequently considered what action they should take to support the workin Angola in the face of increasing government hostility. Many missionaries haddelayed furloughs for fear they would not be able to re-enter the country. Finally,on 17 November 1967, the UCBWM and the United Church of CanadaBWMinstructed ((all missionaries in Angola who are due or overdue for furlough by 30June 1968, to return home on or about that date. For those whose normal terms ofservice would indicate a return to the field upon completion of furlough,application for reentry permits should be made before leaving the field >.

On 11 May 1968, the two Boards again expressed their concern over therole ofthe missionary in Angola in a communication handed personally to the Governor-General:,, The expatriate missionary enters a sovereign state not by right, butbysufferance of the duly constituted authority of that country.It is expected of the missionary that he will render appropriate respect andobedience to the laws of the land. However, prophetic utterances bythemissionary and his sending church, even though they may have politicalconnotations and be regarded by the govern-

ment as subversive, are always required by the Christian conscience. This isparticularly true if the missionary is confronted by a situation in which basichuman rights are violated, social injustices 'perpetrated or tolerated, and themajority of the citizens are ruled by an alien minority by the sole rightof conquestand settlement without theconsent of the majority freely ascertained and expressed without fear of reprisals.The compulsion to proclaim the Word of God under such conditions, even thoughit may incur the displeasure of government, is inherent in the Christian's duty toGod and hisresponsibility for his fellow mano.Yet while Portuguese hostility to the Protestant missions showed no signs ofabating, there were indications, at this time, that a new policy of subtleraccomodation rather than one of persecution might be more effective inneutralizing Protestant ( indoctrination ) of the masses with ideas (( opposed tothe sacred interests of the Portuguese nation o 10. The Protestant churches are,indeed, far more susceptible to the pressures resulting from a policy ofaccommodation. The mission agencies in North America, thus, may have beenpersuaded to keep silence, in order to avoid reprisals by the Portuguese authoritieson mission activities. The missionaries themselves were also, on manyoccasions,induced to avoid confrontations, in the interest of the continued existence of theirmissions.10 Angola. Secret Government Documents, 117-118. The report tothe Counter-Subversion Symposium urges the need <, to neutralize the disastrousactivity ofthe Protestant missions which, under the guise of disseminating religiousprinciples, continue openly to instill in the unprepared minds of the native massesan erroneous idea of nationalism.... ).

VI. THE CHURCHES' RELATIONTO LIBERATION1. Theological ReflectionsImplicit in this report is the assumption that what happens in the world hassignificance for the Christian and the church. It cannot be a mere backdrop againstwhich, obliviously, the drama of personal salvation takes place.:.For God, we believe, reigns not in isolation over some (( sacred, realm, or onethat is confined to the church, but is incarnate in the whole world: a divineconscience directing its struggles for the attainment of justice andpeace. And

Christians, alive to this force, are called upon to play their part: to discern God'saction in history and to model their own action accordingly.We now recognize that there are relations between peoples and nations, betweendiffering beliefs, which were not evident before, when the expansion ofChristianity was synonymous with colonial aggrandisement. Christians, aware ofthe injustices this gave rise to, have a duty to adopt a positive stance towards thestruggles for liberation from colonial oppression throughout theworld: inparticular, in the context of this report, the liberation struggle in Angola.We must acknowledge that our interpretation of this struggle may be mistaken.But in order to make decisions for the future, we need to define our attitude to thepast; someone convinced of the providential necessity of the Portuguese (<mission > would inevitably adopt a very different view.The history outlined in this report discloses, we believe, a dialectic of liberationand bondage. Subjected at once to the cross and the sword, the An-

golan people were simultaneously converted and exploited, ( freed and enslaved,,( enlightened Y and led into darkness. Their ethnic roots were cut asunder in thecolonial partition of Africa. Torn from their homelands, bereft oftheir separateidentities, estranged from their native beliefs, they were, either directly orindirectly, reduced into slavery.In the course of this sorrowful history, the Protestant missions have played aparticular role. Of a different nationality than the colonial power, they helped todivide the Christian community. In so doing, they took some steps towardsidentifying with African interests. But the steps were few and hesitant; they didnot extend beyond limited aims of social improvement to frontallychallenge thecolonialist system and embrace the vision of a new society in its place.The struggle for liberation, which has given birth to this vision, has, fourteenyears after it first burst into flame, brought independence for Angola, and a newsociety built for all, within reach.To claim that the dynamic of liberation, which has directed this struggle, is God-willed, as the churches who support the liberation movements have done, is not todeify any particular historical process. It is to say that the dynamic of liberation atwork in the world today, even, and perhaps especially, when it passes judgementon our own a Christian societies, cannot be isolated from our understanding ofGod's action in history. God stands with the oppressed and judges the oppressors.This is what cries out for our solidarity with the liberation struggle in Angola.Now, to be sure, with that struggle close to completion, it is a little late- but not too late - for the churches to think of participating in it. Such questionsshould rather

have been faced during the early days of the struggle. What, then, hindered usfrom doing so? In part, we, and the churches to which we belong, have beenblinded by our bondage to attitudes inherited from our privileged past. Threeparticular obstructing attitudes can be adduced: the tradition of accommodationwith authoritv; the vestiges of a o Christendom >> concept of mission, and aninterpretation of violence based on the status quo.

During the colonial period preceding the war in Angola, and progressively sincethen, missions and churches have been obliged to cooperate with the colonialregime. To dissent too strongly was to risk expulsion for foreigners, prison ordeath for Angolans. And not to dissent at all has often been justified by the needto keep the churches' work going, or even by the illusion that political matters areno business of Christians. The Portuguese authorities reinforcedsuch scruples byportraying the liberation forces as o communists >> and << terrorists >> whorepresented foreign interests rather than Angolan aspirations.A second obstacle to church solidarity with the liberation movements has been theprevalence of the <(Christendom>> concept of mission: the idea, that is, of themission of a Christian society to one that is not. Its belief founded ina <<Christ ofculture >> in the Niebuhrian sense, and its church unrealistically identified with aparticular society, << Christendom was one of the myths of the colonialist era:classically enunciated by Henry the Navigator at the onset of the Portuguesecolonization of Africa, it was propagated by the Catholic Church inAngola, andlater implicitly accepted by the Protestant missions. Though in recentyears suchan ethnocentric concept of Christianity has been discredited, itsimpact has farfrom disap-

peared, and it continues to distort the role of missionary activities in the ThirdWorld.A third obstacle is imposed by a status quobiased view of violence. Theologicalspeculation has, more often than not, assumed the value of order. Governments,who establish it, are apt to be regarded as in some way divinely ordained. Yet thisis too facile a distinction: governments, too, though we may be blind tothe fact,are institutions of violence. It is only when they reach demonic proportions, as inNazi Germany, or with the American intervention in Vietnam, that, belatedly,many in the church have been led to question or oppose them.We do not wish here to make any general rule justifying courses of revolutionaryviolence, but we must affirm that, in Angola's case, violence has been seen, by theliberation movements, as the only alternative left. The armed struggle against thecolonial regime has been, in the face of continued Portuguese intransigence, theonly means left of building a new life for the Angolan people. It is in this contextthat Christian solidarity should be seen.The espousal of a course of violence for the attainment of justice is not easy toaccept, and is hedged with moral ambiguities. Once accepted, the necessity forviolence in the liberation struggle can be romanticized, and the dilemmas, so closeto those actively involved in the struggle, obscured. The liberation leadersthemselves, clear about the necessity for armed struggle, are also clear inopposing indiscriminate violence. They have repeatedly declared their willingnessto negotiate, and have continually insisted that their enemy is Portuguesecolonialism, not the Portuguese people. Violence is the unavoidable means, notthe end. The end is rather freedom from bondage.

2. The Catholic Church

Official Catholic attitude to the war of liberation in Angola has been conditionedboth by its historic role and by the terms of the 1940 Concordat. The Holy See'sfailure to repudiate, or repeal, the latter, in the face of mounting pressure to do so,has been interpreted by some as proof of its complicity in Portuguese colonialism.Yet the Holy See, at the same time, has not been blind to the liberation struggle,nor has it closed its doors on the representatives of the liberation movements 1.Pope Paul VI himself paid heed to African aspirations during his visit to Kampalain 19692. Nonetheless, the Holy See, trapped in its traditional web of loyalties,has failed, despite widespread missionary anguish, to respondunhesitatingly tothe just aspirations of five million Angolans.In any event, it has been the case that the Catholic hierarchy in Angola has beenpro-Portuguese. It has tended to discountenance rumors of Portuguese atrocities,to brand the liberation movements as a terrorists )>, to recommend the way of lawand order, and to urge on its priests the course of nonintervention in politics. Sowell have the bishops of Angola played this role that the report furnished to theLuanda Counter-Subversion Symposium could fully endorse <( their patriotismand their dynamic will for the expansion of the Catholic faith among themasses o1.Regrettably, it is only in the aftermath of the 25c cf. Udienza di Paolo VI con i leaders dei Movimenti di Liberazione. PaesiNuovi, no. 9. Rome, 1970.2 Cesare Bertulli, Croce e Spada in Mozambico. Rome, 1974, 117.3 Angola. Secret Government Documents. IDOC, 1974, 119.

April coup that the Holy See has taken any steps to liberalize the Churchhierarchy in the Portuguese territories - the resignation in August 1974 of the pro-Caetano Archbishop Pereira of Lourenco Marques, and the appointment of anAfrican_priest Zacharias Kamuenho as auxiliary bishop of Luanda are instancesof this.The choice of an African priest was appropriate, for the war of national liberationin Angola has placed a particularly heavy burden of suffering on theAfricanclergy. During the 1960's many of them suffered detention at one timeor another.The most celebrated case was that of Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, brother ofone of the founders of MPLA. Father Andrade, an academically distinguishedcleric, who studied at the Pontifical Institute in Rome, became chancellor to theLuanda Archbishopric in 1958. On 30 June 1960 he was arrested forhis presumedconnections with the liberation movements, and spent most of the following tenyears in prison. On 7 April 1970 he was detained for the sixth time, and on 30March 1971 sentenced to three years further imprisonment 4.Andrade's case, and those like it, should be borne in mind in understanding thewidespread anguish among Catholic priests and missionaries overthe war ofnational liberation and the Catholic Church's attitude to it. Missionary dissent,throughout the 1960's, continued to build up, as the war escalatedand themagnitude of Portuguese oppression became clear. It reached a crisis point in theearly 1970's with

4 Account of the trial in Ma'rio Brocha do Coelho, Em defesa de Joaquim Pintode Andrade. Portugal (Edirdo do Autor), 1971. A brief memoir by Father Andradehimself is published in Kritische Katholizismus, no. 12, Dec. 1971, 10-11.

the mass protest of the Fathers of the Holy Spirit and of others '.3. The Protestant ChurchesA comprehensive treatment of all the Protestant churches in Angola inrelation tothe liberation movements is beyond the scope of this report. Our attention will beconfined to the activities of three North American mission boards.The United Church of Canada Division of World Outreach (formerly Board ofWorld Mission)The outbreak of the war in early 1961 produced a massive influxof Angolanrefugees into Zaire. To show solidarity with them, the United Church of Canadaplaced missionary personnel in the district where the refugees were concentrated;help was given to health, agricultural and community developmentservices. Thisministry had political as well as humanitarian significance. Portugalcondemnedthose churches which encouraged Angolans to flee, and gave them the minimalconditions for living in exile. The commitment of the United Church of Canadawas shown by the transfer of several wellknown missionaries to Zaire, includingDr. and Mrs. Allen Knight, Miss Frances Walbridge, and Dr. and Mrs. W. S.Gilchrist, who had consistently supported self-determination in Angola.5 Cesare Bertulli, Croce e Spada in Mozambico, 1974, with further bibliographyon Catholic dissidents. See also the critique of the Portuguese episcopacy in theoverseas territories, and of Portuguese policy in Angola, published in 1972 byFather Jorge Sanches, Les missions Catholiques et la Politique de l'r.tat Portugais,in: Revue Spiritus, Dec. 1972. On the hierarchy's response to Sanches' article, seeibid., 1973.

The United Church of Canada has made grants to the Zaire Protestant ReliefAgency, IME (Evangelical Medical Institute), CEDECO (AgriculturalDevelopment Center), the Sona Bata Secondary School for Angolans, and thescholarship fund for Angolan refugee students. A conservative estimate of thesegrants is in the order of US $ 450,000.During this decade of identification of the United Church of Canada withAngolans under Portuguese rule or in exile, the support for liberation becamemore explicit. In August 1972 the General Council, the church'shighest policymaking body, resolved as follows regarding the Portuguese territories:(Whereas Portugal, while receiving support from NATO, continuesto oppress herindigenous peoples contrary to the principles of the United Nations Declaration ofHumanRights; andWhereas Canada has supported those United Nations resolutions which haveconsistently condemned Portugal's colonial practices which bar progress towardindependence for Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau:Be it resolved that this General Council:

(1) Urge the Canadian government through NATO to discontinue assistance toPortugal until Portugal has given independence to herAfrican territories; and(2) Continue to give humanitarian aid and succor through the World Council ofChurches or other international agencies to the African people in these territoriesin theirstruggle for liberation >.In November 1970, the Board of World Mission, in annual session, took thefollowing action, with

regard to the liberation movements:(, Re support of WCC Program to Combat Racism, recommend that the Boardaffirms its support of the World Council of Churches in providing funds tocombat racism in many parts of the world, including grants to humanitarianprograms of Southern African liberation movements; that appropriate churchagencies and the press be so informed, with provision of adequate backgroundmaterial; and that we ask the Joint Angola Committee to support the WorldCouncil of Churches' Program to Combat Racism according to itsresources. Agreed ).This action was reinforced at the 1971 annual meeting of the Board of WorldMission as follows:((On motion, it was unanimously agreed that the Board of World Mission reiterateits support of the WCC in this matter and in particular support the secondallocation of money to movements in Africa and other parts of the worldconcerned with self-determination of peoples and combating racism.The United Church of Christ Board for World MinistriesThe United Church of Christ, USA, sent the first group of students from CentralAngola to Lisbon for higher education in 1958; several, including Jonas Savimbiand Daniel Chipenda, later became liberation movement leaders.The Eighth General Synod in 1971 gave the church its first clear directive for thesupport of the liberation struggle in Africa. Under (( Church Action AgainstRacism o, the United Church of Christ de-

termined:((To encourage actions which combat racism and which alleviate human sufferingcaused by racism, including (1) support of the Program to Combat Racism of theWCC; ... and (2) of the liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere which needmedical, educational,and welfare assistance... >>.Under the priority (( Peace and U.S. Power >>, the General Synod also approvedthe following resolution:((To develop understanding and support forindigenous liberation movements... )>.It then recommended that the various agencies and boards of the United Churchof Christ urge the USA and her NATO allies to end those policies which supportminority rule and colonialism in Southern Africa.

The United Church Board for World Ministries has given US $ 21,000 to theWCC's Program to Combat Racism. Direct contributions have been made to eachof the three Angolan liberation movements, some contributions beingfor specialhealth, education and welfare programs, and others to be used at the determinationand discretion of the movements.The United Methodist Church Board for Global Ministries (formerly Board ofWorld Mission)The United Methodist Church, the largest of the three North American churchesreferred to, has given the greatest support to the Angolan liberationmovements.Several Methodist agencies had expressed condemnation of white minorityoppression in Southern Africa, and support for basic human

rights. A comprehensive policy was adopted at the annual meeting of the Board ofWorld Mission in January 1968. Support for the liberation movements was calledfor, and a three year program with funding of US $ 600,000 set up;this moneywas to be used to aid those working for social change both inside and outsideSouthern Africa.The largest direct contributions were allocated in 1968: US $ 50,000to MPLA,and US $10,000 to SARA, FNLA's health service in Zaire. The United MethodistChurch has also contributed US $100,000 to the WCC's Program to CombatRacism, which has, in turn, made grants to the Angolan liberation movements.At its Annual Conference in Angola in August 1974, the United MethodistChurch reassessed the political situation in the light of the 25 April coup, andreaffirmed its continuing loyalty to the liberation movements. In a policydeclaration it affirmed that it:<,1. Recognizes the valuable action developed by the liberation movements;2. Makes a strong appeal and urges the immediate reconciliation of themovements and the formation of a common front, solidly united, anddenouncesany divergencies in the movements because, besides the fact that these are out ofdate, they create a climate of indecision and insecurity and prolong unnecessarilya situation which is alreadydeteriorating;3. Gives its unconditional support to the total and complete independence ofAngola, as well as of Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde andMozambique;4. Repudiates racism and any other form

of division;5. Supports and appeals for a majority government for the colonies withoutdepreciating the values of the minority;6. Desires to see implanted a democratic government and desires that within thisdemocracy Angola may be truly free andindependento.PostscriptSince the change of government in Lisbon, it is true to say that the activities of thevarious Protestant missions in Angola have been facilitated and augmented. Now

that the churches can meet and discuss openly, they need a periodof reflection toformulate plans and establish priorities, as they relate to the shifting politicalscene in Angola today. A useful forum will be provided by the CouncilofEvangelical Churches of Central Angola, which will hold its first GeneralAssembly in thirteen years in January 1975. In the meantime, the task of nationalreconstruction has begun, and the Protestant missions, in collaboration with theliberation movements, have an important role to play in it.4. WCC and other Ecumenical BodiesThe resolute stance taken by the World Council of Churches against colonialoppression has not overlooked the situation in Angola. Nor has it been confined tomere pronouncement. On 27 August 1973, for instance, the WCC votedto raisefunds to aid Portuguese draft evaders and deserters who opposedtheir country'swar in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Other WCC initiatives have,either directly or indirectly, given aid and support

to the liberation movements in these territories: funds have gone to them directthrough the Program to Combat Racism, and other funds authorized by theCommission on Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service have,in variousways, benefited Angolan refugees in Zaire and elsewhere.On the 25 April coup in Lisbon, the WCC issued a communique to GeneralSpinola and his junta,' which was, on 6 May, read on national television:itexpressed the hope that e the steps taken and principles established inPortugalshall also be promptly and fully extended to all the territories presentlyadministered by Portugal and with an equally full and unfaltering respect for thedignity of all their inhabitants, fully respecting their right of political self-determination... o. In an interview with Mr. Frederick Bronkema of IDOCInternational on the following day, Mario Soares, the Portuguese ForeignMinister, affirmed that ((the WCC had the courage to be the first church bodystrongly to support the liberation movements in Africa 0.WCC's prompt response to the aspirations of the peoples of Angola, and the otherPortuguese territories, has been followed, on the international scene, by otherinterdenominational bodies, notably the All Africa Conference of Churches, and,in Angola itself, by the UCBWM, the Council of Evangelical Churchesandothers.6 IDOC Interview with Mario Soares, in: IDOC Bulletin, no. 20 (June 1974), 3.

VII. CONCLUSIONSIt can be claimed that the overthrow of the Caetano regime was ultimatelyachieved by the liberation movements in Africa. For the Armed Forces Movementwhich engineered and led the 25 April coup had been formed out of revulsionfrom Portugal's colonial wars. The officers who composed it recognized that amilitary solution was inconceivable, that the aspirations of the Africanmajoritieswere just, and that a war without end was draining Portugal of all her resourcesand morale. They came to feel a bond of sympathy with the liberationmovementsthey were fighting, and saw their own role as the liberators of Portugal in thislight.

The coup opened the door to both democracy in Portugal and independence in theoverseas territories. That Portugal wants to liquidate her colonialinvolvement assoon as possible, in order to concentrate her limited resources onsolving theburning political and economic problems at home, has been made clear by theprovisional government. Thus, in the course of 1974 it has successivelyrecognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau (10 September), set up aFRELIMO-dominated transitional government in Lourengo Marques to preparethe way for independence in Mozambique on 25 June 1975, and concededindependence to Sdo Tome and Principe (25 November). Angola lay next on theagenda. Stumbling blocks which had hitherto stood in the way of a speedyindependence accord have now been removed, and the road is now clear for theformation of a transitional government. The recognized leadersof the threeliberation movements have agreed on a common political platform. And in theaccord of 15 January 1975 the provisions for a transitional government, sharedbetween the three

movements, and leading to full independence on 11 November 1975, were laiddown.Since April 1974, the role of the liberation movements has fundamentallychanged. Their main enemy - the colonial regime - no longer exists. Their militaryoperations have ceased. After fourteen years of clandestine activity and guerrillawarfare, they have won recognition as legitimate political forces, backed by thepeople. In the light of these changed circumstances, FNLA, MPLA and UNITAhave had to re-define their positions and to prepare for their eventual participationin government. Now, on the eve of independence, the supporters ofAngolanliberation will need to find ways of maintaining solidarity with them, to help themin their task of building a new nation.Relations with the liberation movements in Angola can now be more freelyexpressed, and the churches' activities more openly performed. This is all to thegood. But it should not mean that the churches no longer have a part to play inemancipation, or that their solidarity with the liberation forces hasbeen emptiedof significance. It is important that they continue to show their support. This theycan do by moral solidarity, by financial and material aid, by reciprocalarrangements. It was the recommendation of the Task Force XIIIreport, fromwhich the present dossier derives, that all the churches should extend theirrelations with, and commitments to, the liberation movements of Angola. Amongthe specific recommendations it made, the following still hold good, and offervarious feasible alternatives for the distribution of aid and the furtherance ofcontacts:1. To give financial and material aid directly to the Angolan liberation movementswith donor agencies clearly identified. The move-

ments have detailed lists of their needs in the fields of health, edtkcation, welfare,etc. These lists should be distributed.

2. To respond to emergency appeals from liberation movements forsuch things astravel or hospitality grants for visits of liberation leaders to North America andEurope.3. To give to the Angolan liberation movements through interdenominationaland international organizations such as the Program to Combat Racism, theCommission on Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service (CICARWS),Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief, Zaire Protestant Relief Agency,Zambia Christian Refugee Service, Organization of African Unity LiberationCommittee. The contributions should be given for the overall humanitarian andpolitical programs of the liberation movements and not be earmarked simply forrefugee work.4. To support organizations which aid the Angolan liberation movements, such asthe Liberation Support Movement (United States and Canada), Africa Fund(United States), Angola Committee (Holland), etc.5. To strengthen relations with leaders and units of the Angolan movements, inparticular through links between parallel organizations, such as women'sorganizations, youth groups, labor, etc.6. To invite leaders of the liberation movements to undertake speakingtours; toinvite them to participate in the programs and meeting of churches.7. To accept invitations from liberation movements to visit Angola.

8. To educate the constituencies of the churches about liberation movements usingthe publications of the movements, sponsoring special events, and disseminatinginformation.9. To participate with the movements in reflecting through political andtheological dialogue on the significance of liberation andsocial change.Since these recommendations were put forward in the Task Force Report, thesituation in Angola has fundamentally changed: the colonial militaryfront hasbeen closed. But new pressures have emerged in its place, which the churches, incommon with the emancipation forces, must confront. They must:1. Oppose divisions among the Angolanpeople and help to unite the nation.2. Oppose neo-colonialist efforts to retaincontrol of Angola's natural resources.3. Oppose plots to attack the territorialintegrity of Angola.4. Oppose white reactionary forces favoring the establishment of a white minorityregime.Apart from fulfilling these recommendations, the churches havean immediatepart to play in the country's reconstruction. Already there are various signs thatthey have begun the task. Protestant missionaries have returned fromexile;mission stations have been re-opened; urgently needed medical supplies are beingprovided; new integrated programs of evangelical, medical, educational andagricultural assistance, such as the ,, New Life >> program of the EvangelicalChurches of Central Angola, have. got under way, and need to be expanded.

In conclusion, the liberation movements must be given credit for starting theprocess of human f'reedom and dignity now evident in Portugal, Mozambique,Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. The challenge now facing not only the peoples andchurches of these countries, but peoples and churches throughout the world, whohave committed themselves to this process, is to find ways of participating in thisstruggle for emancipation. The challenge is the need for change at all levels, in allcountries. It is a revolutionary challenge to resist oppression andachieveliberation everywhere. K It is >>, as Jos6 Chipenda writes in his preface, < a callto the Churches to continue Christ's mission: to preachthe good news to the poor;to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind; toset atliberty those who are oppressed and to proclaim the acceptable yearof the Lord>>.100

Select BibliographyABSHIRE, David and SAMUELS, Michael, Portuguese Africa: A. Handbook.Praeger, 1969.ALBANO, M., Angola, una rivoluzione in marcia.Testi e documenti sulla rivoluzione angolana.Milan, 1972.ANDERSON, Perry, Le Portugal et la fin de l'ultracolonialisme. Paris, 1971.ANDRADE, Mario de and OLLIVIER, Marc, LaGuerre en Angola. Paris, 1971.ANGOLA: QUELLE INDEPENDANCE? (articlesby Paul Bernetel and Bruno Crimi), in: JeuneAfrique, no. 710-711, 17-24 August 1974.ANGOLA. Secret Government Documents on Counter-Subversion. edit. and tr.by Caroline ReuverCohen and William Jerman. IDOC (Rome), 1974.BERTULLI, Cesare, Croce e Spada in Mozambico.Rome, 1974.BIRMINGHAM, David, Trade and Conflict inAngola: the Mbundu and their Neighboursunder the Influence of the Portuguese, 1483-1790.Oxford, 1966.BIRMINGHAM, David, Themes and Resources ofAngolan History, in: African Affairs, vol. 73(1974), 188-203.BOAVIDA, Americo, Angola: cinco s~culos de exploracdo portuguesa. Rio deJaneiro, 1967.BOXER, C. R., Race Relations in the PortugueseColonial Empire, 1415-1825. Oxford, 1963.BROCHA DO COELHO, Mario, Em defesa deJoaquim Pinto de Andrade. Portugal (Ediqaodo Autor), 1971.

CAETANO, Marcello, Os nativos na economiaafricana. Coimbra, 1954.CAPUTO, Livio, Tre liberatori si contendono l'Angola, in: Epoca, 9 November 1974, 33-42.CHILCOTE, Ronald, Portuguese Africa. PrenticeHall, 1967.CHILCOTE, Ronald, Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: ABibliography of Documentary Ephemera through 1965. Hoover Institute, 1970.CHILDS, G. M., Umbundu Kinship and Character.Oxford, 1949.CONFERENCE EPISCOPALE DE L'ANGOLA, Lesmissions catholiques et la politique de l'ltatportugais. 1972.CURTIN, Philip D., The Atlantic Slave-Trade: ACensus. Madison, 1969.CURTIN, Philip D., The Slave-Trade and the AtlanticBasin, in: N. I. Huggins M. Kilson, D. M. Fox edit., Key Issues in the Afro-American Experience.New York, 1971.DAVEZIES, Robert, La guerre d'Angola. DucrosBourdeaux, 1968.DAVIDSON, Basil, Angola in the Tenth Year, in:Question 7. Southern Africa, Geneva, 1971, 3-11. DAVIDSON, Basil, In the Eyeof the Storm. Angola'sPeople. London, 1972.DAVIDSON, Basil, L'Angola au coeur des tempetes.Paris, 1972.DAVIDSON, Basil, The New Portugal and Africa, in:New Statesman, 24 May 1974.DELGADO, R., Hist6ria de Angola, 1482-1836. Vols. IBenguela and Lobito, 1948 - (Cont.).

DUFFY, James, Portuguese Africa. Harvard, 1959. DUFFY, James, Portugal inAfrica. Harmondsworth,1962.EGLISES ET POUVOIRS POLITIQUES en Angolaet au Mozambique, (special number) RevueSpiritus, 1973.FACTS AND REPORTS. Press Cuttings on Angola,Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Portugal and Southern Africa. Fortnightly reviewpublished by theAngola Committee, Amsterdam.GIBSON, Richard, African Liberation Movements.Oxford, 1972.HARGREAVES, J.-D., Prelude to the Partition ofWest Africa. London, 1963.HEIMER, Franz-Wilhelm edit., Social Change inAngola. Munich, 1973.

HOUTART, Francois edit., Dossier sur les coloniesportugaises. Analyse d'une lutte de liberation.2nd. edn. Bruxelles, 1971.HUMBARACI, Arslan, and MUCHNIK, Nicole, Portugal's African Wars.London, 1974.KIRCHEN IM KONFLIKT. Auseinandersetzungenim siidlichen Africa. Missionsjahrbuch derSchweiz. (Freiburg) 1972.LE MASTER, Edwin, I Saw the Horror of Angola,in: Saturday Evening Post, 12 May 1962.LIBERA, Anna, The New Slave Trade. PortugueseColonialism in Africa, in: International Socialist Review (U.S.), February 1974.McCULLOCH, Merran, The Southern Lunda andRelated Peoples. International African Institute.London, 1951.MARCUM, John, The Angolan Revolution. Vol. I:103

The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950-62.Cambridge, Mass., 1969.MINTER, William, Portuguese Africa and the West.Harmondsworth, 1972.NETO, Agostinho, Fighting for Freedom and a BetterWorld, in: Review of International Affairs(Jugoslavia), March 1973.NEVES, Fernando, Negritude e Revolugdo emAngola. Paris, 1974.NEVINSON, Henry W., A Modern Slavery. (Reprinted) New York, 1968.NORTON DE MATOS, Jose Mendes Ribeiro, de, AProvincia de Angola. Porto, 1926.PORTMANN, Heinz, Angola's Developing Economy,in: Swiss Review of World Affairs, May 1973,1-8.ROSSI (Pierre-Pascal), Pour une guerre oubliee.Paris, 1969.SANCHES, Jorge, Les missions catholiques et laPolitique de l'Mtat Portugais, in: Revue Spiritus,December 1972.SMITH, Frances S., The Cunene Dam Scheme: dreamor nightmare? in: This Month. EPS (Geneva),April 1972, 2-4.SOUSA FERREIRA, Eduardo de, Portuguese Colonalism from South Africa toEurope. Freiburgim-Bresgau, 1972.SOUSA FERREIRA, Eduardo de, Education et discrimination dans lesterritoiresportugais d'Afrique,in: Unesco Courier, November 1973.

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AN IDOC DOCUMENTATION . MISSIONARY PARTICIPATIONPROJEC1ENERP HIS[The Future of the Missionary Enterprise Dossiers:No. 1 The White Fathers and Salvation Today No. 2 Social Justice: Latin Americaand BangkokConferenceNo. 3 Namibia, Now! No. 4 Justice and Evangelization: Catholic Bishops'Synods of 1971 and 1974No. 5 An Asian Theology of Liberation: Philippines No. 6 The Indian inLatinAmerica No. 7 Mission Through People's Organization: South KoreaNo. 8 Proclamation and Development: Ethiopia No. 9 In Search of Mission No.10 Mission and Migration: Europe No. 11 -12 The Gospel and Violence: Bolivia

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