ANIMALS & SEVERELY COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED HUMAN BEINGS Jeff McMahan !!

Bioethics

Jake Monaghan

University at Buffalo

Monday, October 29th, 2014

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRI two problems of equality

one is fatal, the other is not

it has some counter-intuitive results, but all correct theories will have this

the goal is to maintain the things we are most confident about in a principled way

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PROBLEMS FOR TRI

the problem which McMahan thinks is fatal to the TRI account leads him to offer a separate account of the morality of killing persons

the TRI account remains plausible (and McMahan thinks accurate) for the killing of non-persons

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RECAP TRI says that the badness of death varies with

the strength of one's TRIs

so a comparable amount of goods lost in the death of an animal, as in the death of a person, makes the death less bad for the animal

this account fits nicely with our intuitions

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POTENTIAL PROBLEM any psychological differences present between

animals and humans will also exist between some humans and other humans

1. immature humans (fetuses & infants)

2. those with acquired cognitive disabilities

3. those with congenital cognitive disabilities

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TRIS & INFANTS due to the cognitve structures of members of

groups 1-3, they have significantly weaker TRIs than normally functioning humans do

the difference in the TRIs for infants and many animals is not substantial

this has the potential to justify abortion

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TRIS & THE COGNITIVELY DISABLED

members of groups 2 & 3, those with acquired or congenital cognitive disabilities:

have weak TRIs

and also do not have the prospect of significant future goods

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TRIS & THE COGNITIVELY DISABLED

So the TRI account does not recognize a significant moral difference between the killing of the severely retarded and most animals

this, however, is a problem for everyone, not just the TRI proponent

e.g. we cannot make recourse to potential in these cases like we can for infants

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THE OPTIONS Anthropomorphism:

severely retarded human beings animals Consistent Elitism:

severely retarded human beings animals Radical Egalitarianism:

severely retarded human beings animals Convergent Assimilation:

severely retarded human beings animals9

1. ANTHROPOMORPHISM

this preserves common sense, and seeks to locate morally relevant features outside of psychology and cognitive ability

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2. CONSISTENT ELITISM

this preserves intuitions about the moral status of persons, and claims that it is permissible to treat the severely retarded the way we currently treat animals

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3. RADICAL EGALITARIANISM

this preserves intuitions about the moral status of the severely retarded, and accords the same moral status to animals

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4. CONVERGENT ASSIMILATION

this claims that the moral status of the severely retarded is roughly similar to that of animals, but that the current opinion of their moral status and the current treatment of both groups is unjustified

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AGAINST CONSISTENT ELITISM

no significant difference between the moral status of animals and the severely retarded

but refuses to abandon the current status and treatment of animals

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"Consistent Elitism, in short, regards congenitally severely mentally impaired human beings as morally comparable to animals, accepting the radical implication that it is permissible, other things being equal, to treat these human beings in the same ways in which we have hitherto found it acceptable to treat animals with comparable psychological capacities"

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AGAINST CONSISTENT ELITISM of course, some of us have special relationships

to the severely retarded, so it might be impermissible to e.g. experiment on them (according to this view)

but this is not due to their intrinsic value, but rather their instrumental value

this is so deeply repugnant that McMahan rejects it without much argument

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AGAINST RADICAL EGALITARIANISM

RE reverses the direction of assimilation (think something like Francione's view)

"In short, animals with capacities equivalent to those of severely mentally impaired human beings must be our moral equals in those respects in which the impaired human beings are our moral equals."

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AGAINST RADICAL EGALITARIANISM the rights view "self destructs" at the lower end of the

scales of life

anencephalic infants have neither consciousness nor the capacity for it

so the morally relevant features are not psychological

thus, since people think AIs have the right to life, we must conclude that very low animals, and perhaps plants, also have this right

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views about the morality of killing anencephalic infants are changing; so we might not need to think plants have right to life after all

but there is another problem:

on this view, we must regard the killing of (barely) conscious humans as just as wrong as the killing of persons; and thus the killing of e.g. a fish as just as wrong as the killing of persons

AGAINST RADICAL EGALITARIANISM

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SIDE-NOTE ON ANIMAL RIGHTS some rights theorists will stipulate a place on

the spectrum of consciousness at which a creature has a right to life

this threshold will be low enough to grant most mammals the right to life

these views are not, however, variants of Radical Egalitarianism

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"For Radical Egalitarianism is dis- tinguished by the fact that it preserves traditional beliefs about the special sanctity of the lives of even the most profoundly psychologically impaired human beings. But views that set a species-neutral threshold for the possession of certain fundamental moral rights or immunities require the abandonment or revision of certain of these traditional beliefs; for these views inevitably locate some mentally impaired human beings below the threshold"

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MEMBERSHIP IN THE HUMAN SPECIES

this section undermines the first option, Anthropomorphism

such a view is speciesist (this term was coined by X and popularized by Singer)

it is a disparaging term, intended to liken the view to racism or sexism

at base, the claim is this: being a human does not, in and of itself, give you a special moral status, just like being a white person or a man gives you special moral status

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MY FAVORITE ARGUMENT AGAINST SPECIESISM

1. Either speciesists will give criteria for humans having superior moral status, or not

2. If they do, they abandon the position (because not all humans will meet the criteria)

3. If the do not, then they are arguing in a circle

4. So either speciesists will abandon their position or beg the question/argue in a circle

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MCMAHAN AGAINST SPECIESISM the usual strategy is to find some intrinsic

property all humans have which animals lack

e.g. the soul

but this is a theological claim; or if understood metaphysically, it is implausible

Even if it were true, it is not clear that this supports our intuitions about the sanctity of human life

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"if the soul is immortal, killing an individual with a soul does not terminate that individuals existence. It merely causes that individual to undergo an invol- untary transition from one realm or mode of existence to another. If, therefore, all human beings have immortal souls while animals do not, it may actually be worse to kill an animal than it is to kill a human being, all things considered; for, given this assumption, killing an animal deprives it of any further good it might otherwise have, while killing a human being does not."

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ANOTHER REASON FOR DOUBT

McMahan: we are not identical to our human organisms; so we are not essentially members of the human species

So why think that some property not directly attributable to us is sufficient for high moral status?

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THE SPECIES CONCEPT a thorough discussion of this takes us into the realm of the

philosophy of biology, but briefly:

speciesism requires that species be categorized according to an essence

but the essence cannot be phenotypic (since species can have different morphologies and look very different)

and the essence cannot be genotypic, for we share many genese with other species, and do not share genes with other humans

there is also the possibility of human-animal chimeras

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"Compare, for example, two possible chimeras. In one, more than 99 percent of its genes are of human origin, though the genes responsible for the growth and development of its brain are from the original chimpanzee zygote. If species membership is determined by the genome, this chimera is presumably a human being, though its mental capacities are those of a chimpanzee. In a second chimera, more than 99 percent of its genes are of chimpanzee origin, but the genes responsible for the development of its brain have a human source. This is presumably a chimpanzee with human intelligence. If membership in the human species is sufficient for a certain high moral status, the chimera with the intelligence of a chimpanzee should have a moral status at least equal to that of the one with human intelligence. This, I believe, is implausible."

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ON THE INBREEDING VERSION OF "SPECIES"

"In any case, if potential for interbreeding were the criterion of species membership, that would make it unlikely that membership in the human species could by it- self be a morally significant property. It seems ridiculous to suppose that an anencephalic infant is sacred simply because it is potentially capable of interbreeding with people like you and me."

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THE SPECIES CONCEPT McMahan belabors the point

An alternative way to argue is this:

species is a biological term, but biologists do not agree on what constitutes a species

so the term cannot be used by moral philosophers in the way speciesists need

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WHY THINK THE CATEGORY OF 'HUMAN' IS DEVOID OF MORAL CONTENT?

Imagine that evolution turned out differently, and other hominid species did not go extinct

If we lived in a world with H. Neanderthalensis and H. Floresiensis, would they be as morally insignificant as we take other non-human animals to be?

this makes salient the way speciesism is similar to sexism and racism

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FINNIS & SCANLON moral worth is determined by what kind of thing we

are, and the normal characteristics of that kind

but again, if we are not essentially biological organisms, this view is implausible

and again, the kind is not what is morally relevant, but certain properties the kind typically has are;

so the properties are morally relevant, and not species membership

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COMEMBERSHIP IN A SPECIES AS A SPECIAL RELATION

we were previously concerned with intrinsic differences

now, we'll consider extrinsic (relational) differences

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SCANLON AGAIN claims that we are specially related to severely

cognitively disabled humans,

all creatures to whom we are specially related have high moral status

note: this is inconsistent with Scanlon's claim considered in the prior section

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MORAL REASONS intrinsic & extrinsic; or properties & relations

so if a being has an interest in living, that is a property which gives it some sort of moral status

if a being has a certain relation, it has some sort of moral status

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"One has more reason, or a stronger reason, to save the child if one is related to it in this important way than if one is not specially related to it. In short, special relations, such as the relation between a parent and child, are an independent and autonomous source of moral reasons."

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NOZICK'S SUGGESTION

confined to intrinsic properties, there is no moral difference between the severely retarded and animals with similar cognitive faculties

the relational (extrinsic) properties yeild a moral difference, however

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SPECIESISM & NATIONALISM

patriotism might make us feel good, but

it has significantly bad consequences (the dehumanization & brutalization of foreigners)

speciesism is closely analogous

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"first, ... there are no morally significant intrinsic differences between certain animals and severely retarded human beings with comparable psychological capacities, and second, that we would not be justified in treating severely retarded human beings the way we treat these animals even if we were not specially related to them."

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POSITIVE & NEGATIVE DUTIES in inter-personal relations, special relationships serve

primarily to increase one's positive duties

(you owe more to your kids)

so if membership in the species is a special relationship, it is unclear how it entails that we have significantly less negative duties

consider: we still have the negative duty to not harm children who are not our own

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ARE BIOLOGICAL RELATIONS MORALLY SIGNIFICANT?

McMahan uses a thought experiment called "The Sperm Donor" to conclude that, perhaps they are

I think McMahan is mistaken about this conclusion

Nonetheless, even if he is right about the sperm donor case, speciesism is not vindicated

the relationship is no more morally significant than one of race

PRAGMATIC REASON FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT

it is unclear where to 'draw the line' of the moral community

we have a self-interested reason to draw it in such a way that we're always within it

this is no help to the speciesist:

it concedes that there is no morally significant difference between the severely retarded and many animals

but speciesism requires that there is a difference, not that we have a reason to pretend there is one

CONVERGENT ASSIMILATION recall the options:

1. maintain our commonsense view and current treatment of animals (anthropocentrism)

2. treat animals the way we treat the severely retarded,

3. or treat the severely retarded the way we treat animals

4. or convergent assimilation

we've seen very good reason to deny 1-3

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"apart from possibly being permitted a slight degree of partiality for the severely retarded on the basis of their membership in our species, we are required to accord the same degree of concern and respect to severely retarded human beings and animals with comparable capacities. ... we must revise our understanding of the moral status of both animals and the severely retarded."

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TYPES OF C.A.

s. r. humans animals

s. r. humans animals

the length of the arrow indicates the degree to which we have to revise our beliefs about each group

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CONVERGENT ASSIMILATION

To some degree, we must:

accept that the moral status of animals is higher than we've thought to date

accept that the moral status of the severely retarded is lower than we've thought to date

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"It is more reasonable to expect that we should instead alter some of our views about animals quite radically, alter others only a little, and retain yet others unchanged."

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THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF CAUSING PAIN

we typically think it is as morally objectionable to cause pain in someone who is severely retarded as it is in someone who is not

McMahan: there is no reason to substantially modify this view

if we maintain this view, CA requires that we substantially modify the traditional view about the moral permissibility of causing pain to an animal

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SOME CAVEATS pain has a higher 'opportunity cost' for persons

pain sometimes has long term ramifications (and these are longer term in creatures with longer lives)

persons can suffer from the anticipation of pain

persons can suffer from anxiety about the cause of pain

but these are all reasons for thinking that the pain of the severely retarded matter less

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THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE LIVES

according to CA, if we maintain that it is just as objectionable to kill an anencephalic infant as a cognitively normal adult, we must think the same about an animal without the capacity for consciousness

but this can't be correct

so our typical beliefs about the sanctity of the lives of anencephalic infants must be modified

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MODIFIED HOW MUCH? This can be answered by considering how much it is

reasonable to modify our views about the morality of killing animals

McMahan: our views about animals must be modified far more drastically than our views about the severely retarded

thus, it is morally permissible, if parents are willing, to kill or let die an anencephalic infant for the purposes of transplanting organs and saving others' lives

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PREFERRED VERSION OF CA

s. r. humans animals

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A SHOCKING IMPLICATION? NO! must we treat animals and the severely retarded equally?

no: there is no limit on supererogation ("going above and beyond")

so there is no downward pressure on our treatment of the severely retarded, although there is upward pressure on our treatment of animals

the severely retarded are also specially related to family members (parents, siblings, uncles, aunts, grandparents)

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ONE LIMIT ON SUPEREROGATORY ACTS

"the bestowal of a benefit can be supererogatory only if there are no moral demands that the bestowal of the benefit would prevent one from fulfilling. A person who, for example, leaves a fortune in his will with the instruction that it be devoted to the provision of luxuries for his pet cat is arguably neglecting his duties. In a world in which people are dying for want of basic necessities, it is ob- scene to spend large sums of money on frivolous indulgences for a pet, most of which the pet is incapable of appreciating or benefiting from at all."

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IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICINE it is morally permissible, with parental consent, to

kill or let die anencephalic or otherwise severely congenitally retarded infants for the purposes of saving the lives of others via organ donation

this view lays the groundwork for a defense of abortion

it also justifies embryonic stem cell research

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