AnitaGetsBailWhatAreOurCourtsDoing?

WhatShouldWeDoAboutThem?

ARUNSHOURIE

Bythesameauthor

TwoSaintsDoesHeKnowaMother’sHeart?

SelfDeception—India’sChinaPoliciesWeMustHaveNoPriceWhere

WillAllThisTakeUs?

TheParliamentarySystemFallingOverBackwardsWilltheIronFence

SaveaTreeHollowedbyTermites?

Governance,andtheSclerosisThatHasSetInCourtsandTheir

JudgmentsHarvestingOurSouls

EminentHistorians

WorshippingFalseGodsTheWorldofFatwas

MissionariesinIndiaASecularAgenda

‘TheOnlyFatherland’

TheStateasCharade

TheseLethal,InexorableLawsIndividuals,Institutions,ProcessesIndian

Controversies

ReligioninPolitics

MrsGandhi’sSecondReignInstitutionsintheJanataPhaseSymptomsof

Fascism

Hinduism:EssenceandConsequence

InthememoryofH.M.Seervai,N.A.Palkhivala,V.M.Tarkunde,K.G.

Kannabiran

AndforFaliS.Nariman,SoliJ.Sorabjee,RamJethmalani,AshokDesai,

ArvindDatar,PrashantBhushan

Havingknownwhom,havingbeenabletoseekcounselfromwhomhavebeenamongtheprivilegesofmylife

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Contents

Introduction

Forahouseweneverbuiltonaplotwedidnotown

Justicedone,undone,redone

Prosecutorhunting,andotherdevices

Whencourtsarecompelledtostepoutoftheirdomain

Adherence?

Whenoneofourownisinvolved

Banehainahl-e-havasmuddaibhimunsifbhi…

Whatifhehadnotwrittenthatletter?

Eloquence

AndyetIamtakenbysurprise

Somuchscience

Thinkingthrough

Circumstances,consequences,meta-consequences

TableofCases

Notes

Index

AbouttheBook

AbouttheAuthor

Copyright

Introduction

ThisbookelaboratesafewofthepointsthatIurgedintwolectures:oneat theNational JudicialAcademy,Bhopal, and theotherat theNationalAcademyofLegalStudiesandResearch,Hyderabad.Iamgratefultotheinstitutionsforinvitingmetodeliverthelectures.

Toillustratethepointswithexamplesfromrecentjudgments,Ihadtoturn to lawyer friends. Iamparticularlygrateful toAshokDesai,ArvindDatar, PrashantBhushanandGeetaOberoi fordrawingmyattention tothe relevant judgments. Saurabh Malik of The Tribune and VarinderBhatiaofTheIndianExpressbroughtmeuptospeedonthe‘cash-at-the-judge’s-doorstep’case.Mygratefulthankstothem.IoweanevengreaterdebttoRahulUnnikrishnan:atthecostofhisownworkhehelpedmegetjudgmentsandorderswithinmomentsofmyrequests. Ioweasmuch tomygoodfriend,ShantanuRayChaudhuriofHarperCollins,forseeingthebook through to press in the face of heavy responsibilities and pressingcircumstances.AwordofthanksalsotoAmritaMukerjiofHarperCollinsforherworkonthebookinthefinalstages.

Someoftheepisodes,andsomeofthethingsthatthejudgeshavesaid,aresoexceptionalthatIfearedreaderswouldscarcelybelievemeifIjustquotedasentenceortwo.ToreassurethemthatIhavenotjustpickedtheodd sentence, that what I am alluding to is the pattern, I have quotedpassagesatlength.Inonecase,Ihavereproducedanentirejudgment—sorivetingandsodeliciousitis.Ifeltdoublyjustifiedindoingsoasreadersof this book are unlikely to be regular readers of the judgments of theHimachalPradeshHighCourt.

At two places I have used examples that I hadmentioned in FallingOver Backwards: An Essay against Reservations and against JudicialPopulism.Butasthereaderwilldiscover,inquotingmyself,Ifollowveryhighauthority.

That book, and Courts and Their Judgments, which is beingrepublished by HarperCollins along with this book, contain a fullertreatmentofthepointsthatarementionedinpassinghere.Isincerelyhope

thatthethreebookswillbereadascomplementaryvolumes.

1

Forahouseweneverbuiltonaplotwedidnotown

‘Sir, policewaalaa ayaa hai,Madam ko bulaaney ko keh rahaa hai’—itwasthewatchman,hehadcomerushingup:‘Apolicemanhascome,andisaskingforMadam.’

‘Policewaalaa?Anitakobulaarahaahai?’Isaidinastonishment.Andrusheddownthestairs.

‘AnitaShourieyahaanrehtihai?’‘Jihaan.Meriwifehai.Uparbeemaarikekaaranletihuihai’—Anita’s

Parkinson’shadcontinueditsrelentlessmarch;shehadfallenafewtimes,bynowsheneededhelpinstandingandwalking,evenineating.

‘Uskeyliyearrestwarranthai.’‘Arrestwarrant?Anitakeliye?Parusneykiyaakyaahai?’‘Paanchbaarsummonsdodgekiyehain.BW1dodgekiyaahai.NBW2

dodgekiyaahai.Abuseybhagodaa3ghoshitkiyaagayaahai.’‘Koi summonsnahinaaye.Aur summonsbhejeykyungaye?’ Iasked,

totallybewildered.‘Yehmujhe pataa nahin.Meraa kaam sirf warrant serve karnaa hai.

Agarkalsubheynaubajevohcourtmeinpeshnaahuitopaanchsaalkiqaid.’

Icouldn’tbelievemyears.Ididn’tevenknowwherethecourtwasinwhichshehadtoappear.Frantic,Iphonedmyfriend,ShekharGupta,thenchief editor of The Indian Express. Did he have a correspondent inFaridabad who could help me get to the court? Shekhar deputed acolleague from the administrative side of the paper who handled the

paper’slegalwork.I left thehouse earlynextmorning—Faridabad is40kilometres from

our place; we did not know the way; and there would be the morningtraffic jams to get through.On theway, I read thewarrant for arrest: Ireproduce it—both for the outrage it triggered in me, as well as for itsliteraryelegance:

***

Ms4124 [Illegible]

InthecourtofYASHIKA,HCS,JudicialMagistrate1stClass-cum-PresidingOfficerSpeicial[sic]

EnvironmentCourt,Faridabad

PROCLAMATIONU/S82CR.P.C.

State VersusAnitaShourie4

FIRCaseNo.:363/09U/s:EPActP.S.:[Illegible]Peshi:26-8-13Time:9AM

WhereasthecomplainthasmadebeforethatMrs.AnitaShouriew/oArunShourie,R/oA-31WestEnd,N.Delhi,11-0021hascommittedtheoffencepunishableundersectionEPActandithasbeenreturnedtoawarrantofarrest there upon [sic] issued that the said accused cannot be found andthereforeithasbeenshowninmysatisfactionthatthesaidabscondedorisconcealinghimself[sic]toavoidtheserviceofthesaidwarrant.

ProclamationisherebymadethatthesaidaccusedMrs.AnitaShouriew/oArunShourie is required toappearatFaridabadbefore thiscourt toanswerthesaidcomplainton26-8-13.

Givenundermyhandandsealofthiscourton2-8-13.

Note:ExecutingConstableisdirected

to [Initialed]

Appearincourtforrecording hisstatementPresidingOfficer

Onthedatefixed26-8-13SpecialEnvironmentCourtFaridabad

934/8/8/13

***

ForthelifeofmeIcouldn’tfigureoutwhatpoorAnitacouldhavedonetoinjuretheenvironment.

Shekhar’scolleaguemetme.Hesteeredmetothecourt.Aladywithasomewhat stern visage was seated on a raised platform. Several personswere simultaneouslydirecting theirpleas toher.Manymorewere sittingon benches. Many, many more were standing and shuffling around.Outside:noise,loudshoutingtopersonsattheotherendoftheverandah,andovercellphones,namesbeingshoutedout.Shekhar’scolleagueaskedmetohaveaseat,andwaitforAnita’snametobecalledout.

Atlast itwas.Iwentuptothebarthatseparatedtheraisedplatformfrom us. ‘Who are you?’ I explained that I was the husband of AnitaShourieforwhomarrestwarrantshadbeenissued.‘Whyisshenothere?’Iexplainedhercondition,IexplainedtheeffectsofParkinson’s.

‘ButMadam,whyhaveyouthoughtitnecessarytoissuewarrantsforherarrest?’

‘Becauseyouhaveevadedsummonsofthiscourtfivetimes.’‘Butwe received no summons. If they had come,whywouldwe not

obeythemforthwith?’‘Yes,sometimesithappens.Ourpeopledon’tactuallytakethetrouble

ofgoingtoservethesummonsandjustwritethatthesummonscouldnotbeserved.’

Iagainassuredherthatwewouldneverhaveevadedsummonsthatnoonehadevercometoservethem.

Bynow,shewasslightlysofter.So,Imadeboldtoask, ‘ButMadam,whydidyoudeemitnecessarytosummonusinthefirstplace?’

‘BecauseyouhavebuiltanillegalfarmhouseinAravali.’‘Butwehavenotbuiltanyfarmhouseatall.’‘Haven’tyoubuiltahouseon’—shelookeddownatthefileinfrontof

her—‘plotF-35inAravaliRetreat?’‘Madam, we had bought a plot there. But we needed money for

buildingahousenearPune,andsowesoldit.Wehadnotsomuchasputdownaloosebrickontheplot.’

‘Yes,Madam, inhonney plot toh bech diyaa thaa. Isi liye buyer bhiaccusedhai—accusedno.2.Vohpresenthai’—agentlemanstandingtomyrightpointedout.Hewas thepublicprosecutor,onewhowas tobe themosthelpfulofguidesinthemonthstocome.

‘Madam, thepublicprosecutor ishimselfacknowledging thatwehadsoldtheplot.AndIassureyouthatwehadnotputasinglebrickdown.Ihad myself pointed that out in several letters to the Haryana StatePollutionControlBoard—inresponsetoroutinecircularnoticesthattheykeptsendingus.’

‘Butnowtheprocesshasbegun,’ shesaid. ‘Youcanrecordall this inyour defence. In any case,Anita Shourie has to be produced before thiscourt.’

Someoneproddedmetoaskforbail.Idid.‘Butformetograntbail,shehastobepresent.’Iagainexplainedhercondition, thatwewould literallyhave tocarry

her.‘But that is the law. The person seeking bail has to be physically

present,’shesaidandclosedthematter.ShegavemefifteendaystoproduceAnitabeforeher.Igotacall:ifyoucan,itwillbebettertobringyourwifeearlierasthe

judgemaybetransferred,andwedon’tknowwhattheattitudeofthenextjudgewillbe.

So, on2 September 2013,with twoof us holding her up,Anitawas‘produced’beforethejudge.Aswehauledherbeforethejudge,shemusthaveseenwhatshe—or,inherview,thelaw—hadinflictedonAnita,whatwith her inability to standbyherself,whatwith the unsteady, shuffling,shortstepstypicalofaParkinson’spatient.Thejudgerecorded:

Filetakenuptodayasaccusedno.1hasappearedbeforethecourtandmovedanapplicationforbail.Sincethepresentisacomplaintcase,nocustodialisrequiredasnothingistheretorecoverfromaccusedorotherwisealso,remainingaccusedhavealsobeengrantedbail,henceaccused no. 1 is also granted bail on furnishing bail and surety bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/-each…

But hadn’t that much been evident from the beginning—that there wasnothingthathadtoberecoveredfromtheaccused,etc.? I requested thatAnitabegivenexemptionfromappearinginperson,thatIwasresponsiblefor everything that was done or not done, and that I would be presentwhenever the court wanted me to be present. The judge said that shewould grant bail and exemption only till the next hearing, as it waspossible that she would be transferred, and it would be up to the nextjudge as to what he thought appropriate. (‘She is being promoted,’someone said.) In any event, a formal application for permanentexemptionwouldhavetobefiled.TheadvocaterepresentingAnitahadtheapplicationready.(Avenerable,elderlyman,hehadbeentheguruofthepublic prosecutor, and had been recommended by the public prosecutorhimselfwhenIhadsoughthisadviceonwhomIshouldengage.Heseldomsaid a word, was in court on occasion, but whenever he was, his verypresencecarriedweight;heneverchargedmeapaisa.)Thejudgetooktheapplicationon record,anddictated, ‘Copygiven toopposite counsel.Tocomeupon04.10.2013forfilingreplyandconsiderationonapplication.’

AndsoAnitabecamethefirstoneinourfamily

TobeoutonbailForhavingevadedsummonsthatwereneverserved Summonswhichhadbeen issuedbecauseofahousethatwehadnever

builtOnaplotthatwedidnotown

Intheevent,asdirected,wetookAnitabacktocourtonthespecifieddate,4October2013.Buttherewasnohearing.Thecourtrecordisintheformofthefaintimpressionofarubberstamp:

Present:NoneCasetakenuptodayasIshall

beonCL/EL/SL/ML5on4-10-2013Case[illegible]15-11-13forthe[illegible]alreadyfixedParties/Counselsbeinformedaccordingly

Andwhilethedatescribbledbelowthestampseemstobe‘4.10.2013’,thejudgemusthave takenup thecaseonanearlierdate. Inanycase,Anitawasnowtobeproduced incourton15November2013.Butbefore theappointeddaycouldcome,weweredealtamightyblow.

ACATASTROPHE

‘Sahib,neecheyaao,ekdamneechayaao,ekdam’—Iwasworkinginthestudyupstairs;itwastheladywhousedtohelpAnita,shewasasgoodasscreaming.Anita’sParkinson’shadbeenmakingitsrelentlessadvance,asInotedearlier.Shehadfallenafewtimes.Ithoughtshehadfallenagain.Irusheddown.Butthescenewasentirelydifferent.Anitawaspanting,shewas having the greatest difficulty taking a breath and exhaling it. Sheseemedexhaustedbythestruggle.

Icalledthedoctornearestourhome:‘Couldyoupleasecometolookather?Ifyoucan’t,mayIbringhertoyou?’

‘Iamnotcomingtoyourplace.Norareyougoingtobringherhere,’the doctor said. ‘There is something serious going on.Rush her to thehospitalimmediately.’

We piled into our car. On the way to Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, IphonedSamiranNundy,ourfriend,anda leadingsurgeon, thatwewererushing Anita to the hospital. ‘Take her to Emergency. I will meet youthere.’

By the time we reached, a team was waiting for her. They swiftlydiagnosed that she had suffered a pulmonary embolism—that clotsmusthave formed and travelled to her lungs.They immediately shifted her totheICU,andcommencedtreatment.

Theemphaticadviceofthedoctorthatwerushhertothehospital,thispromptdiagnosis,thecareandexpertiseofthedoctorsliterallysavedher.Tendaysinthehospital,tenharrowingdaysequalledinourlivesonlyby

thedaysthathadfollowedthemassiveconvulsionsthatourson,Adit,hadsufferedthreeyearsearlier,in2010.

‘TwiceIfeltIwasgoingtodie,’Anitatoldmemuchlater.At last we were able to bring her back home. In addition to her

Parkinson’smedicines,shewasnowtohaveblood-thinningmedicines,andhaveherINR6checkedeveryfewdays.

Slowly, ever so slowly, we settled into the new routine. With oneenormousdifference:fromnowonwewerealwaysonedge.Forinstance,a fall nowwould not justmean thatAnita could fracture some bone, itcould trigger internal bleeding which, because of the blood-thinningmedicines she was now taking, would be that much more difficult toarrest.

FURTHERPROCEEDINGSINTHECOURT

Therewas justnowayIcouldrisktakingAnitatothecourtonthedatethathadbeenset—15November.Leavingherinthecareofhersistersandhelpers, I made my way back through dense traffic over those 40kilometres.Anewjudgehadtakencharge.Thecourtrecordstates:

Present:PartiesinpersonBoth theparties requestedadjournmenton theground that theAdvocatesarebusy inBarElection.Heard. Case is adjourned to 28.02.2014 [changed by hand to ‘07/1/14’] for thepurposealreadyfixed.

Notpossible,notallof it inanycase: as I amopposed toadjournmentsbeinggranted,Iamunlikelytohaverequestedforanadjournment.Butthemovingfingerhadwrit,andmovedon.

Inaseparatenote,thejudgealsorecordedthatthiswasthefirsttimehewasseeingthefileafterhistransfer,andthathehadnowseentheorderof the Punjab andHaryanaHighCourt that the case be disposed of ‘asexpeditiously aspossible, includingday-to-day trial’.And so, hedirectedthatthecasewouldcomeupfor‘pre-chargeevidence’onthedatethathadalreadybeenfixed,namely7January2014.

IwenttothecourtthatdaywithafulllistofevidenceIwouldurgeouradvocatetopresent,andthequestionsIwouldurgehimtoaskwitnesses

thattheprosecutorwouldfurnish.Tonoavail.Itturnedoutthatthecasehad been taken up the previous day, 6 January 2014! The record ofproceedingson6January2014isagainthesame,onlyapartially legiblerubber-stampimpression:

Present:NoneCasetakenuptodayasIshallbeonHaliday[sic]on7-1-2014Caseisadjournedto28-2-14forthesamepurposeasalreadyfixedParties/Counseltobeinformedaccordingly

Mysteriously,thecasewasagain‘takenup’—noton28February,thedatethathadbeen fixed,butaweekearlier.Therecordofproceedingsof21February2014 isagainthesamerubberstamp—this timealmostentirelyillegible:

Present:NoneCasetakenuptodayasIshallbeonC[illegible,butfora‘tick’overthe‘C’]on28-2-2014C[illegible]15-4-14Pa[illegible]edaccor[illegible]

On15February,atlonglastourapplicationforgrantingAnitaexemptionfrompersonalappearancewastakenup.Youwillrecallthatthefirstjudgehadsaidthatshewouldgivebailandexemptionfrompersonalappearanceonlyuptothenexthearing,asshecouldbetransferredbythen.ShehadtakenonrecordourapplicationforexemptingAnitafrombeingpersonallypresent,anddirectedthat‘Copybegiventooppositecounsel.Tocomeupon 04.10.2013 for filing reply and consideration on application.’ Aswehaveseen,hearingshadcomeandgonebutforonereasonoranother—theBarelection,the‘CL/EL/SL/ML’,etc.—themattercouldnotbetakenup.

Bynowyetanotherjudgewasinthechair.Hewasthethirdasfarasmyattendancewent.Infact,hewasthefourthonourcase:for,asweshallsee,muchhadbeenhappeningbeforethepoliceman’svisithadawakenedustothefactthatacasewasafootagainstus.

WehadtotakeAnitaagaintothecourt—thebailcouldnotbegiven,

youwillrecall,norappearanceinpersonbewaivedunlessthepersonwasphysicallypresent.

BynowIhadrunoutofforbearance.ItwrenchedmyhearttosubjectAnita to the journey, up to the court, and then have herwaiting in thecourtroomwhensheshouldhavebeenlying inbed. ‘Butthat is the law,’youwillrememberourbeingtold.So,whenhernamewascalled,Iinsistedontakingher—leaningtooneside,withshort,stumblingsteps—rightupto the bar of the judge’s platform.Hewas a considerateman.When hesawhercondition,hesaid,‘No,no.Letherkeepsittingwheresheis.’ButIwouldhavenoneofit.Holdingherfirmly,Ipulledandshovedherrightupto the bar. The judge granted exemption from personal appearance.Taking her back to the chair, in fury, raisingmy voice so that all couldhear me, I blurted out, ‘I hope the majesty of the law has now beenupheld.’

Recordingtheproceedingsthejudgedictated,‘Replytoapplicationforpermanentexemptionofaccusedno.1notfiled.However,learnedcounselforthecomplainantmadenoobjectionontheapplication…Inviewofthenoobjectionaswellasmedicalgrounds,personalappearanceofaccusedno.1beforethiscourtisexemptedtillfurtherorders…’

Youwillrecallthat,inviewoftheHighCourt’sorderthatthecasebedealtwithexpeditiously‘includingday-to-daytrial’,thepreviousjudgehadfixed7 January2014 for ‘pre-charge evidence’.The current hearingwasbeing held on 15 April 2014. Apart from the judge accepting Anita’sapplication forbeingexempted,what transpiredwillbeevident fromtheconcluding sentence of the judge’s noting: ‘No CW7 is present.Adjournmentsought.Heard.Allowed.Nowtocomeupon12.5.2014forpre-chargeevidenceofthecomplainant.’

Thiswastobeafrequentpattern:theconscientiousPublicProsecutorwould be present; we, the accused, and some of our counsel would bepresent.Buttheofficialwitnesseswouldbe‘ontheirway’,ornoteven‘ontheirway’.Andthatisnotcountingwhattheysaidwhentheyturnedup.

Therecordfor12May2014:

One PW8 in pre-charge evidence is present and examined. No other PW is present.Adjournment sought. Heard. Now to come up on 26.5.2014 for remaining pre-charge

evidenceofcomplainant.

Therecordfor26May2014:

…No pre-charge evidence is present. Adjournment sought. Heard. Now to come up on11.7.2014forpre-chargeevidenceofcomplainant.

On11July2014:

…TwoPWsarepresentandexamined.NootherPWispresent.Adjournmentsought.Heard.Allowed.Nowtocomeupon25.8.2014forremainingpre-chargeevidenceofcomplainant.

In each of these hearings, these CWs/PWs would be asked three/fourformulaicquestionsandwouldgiveformulaicreplies.

On25August2014:

One CW is present and recorded. No other CW is present. Learned counsel for thecomplainanthasclosedpre-chargeevidence,videhisseparatestatement.Nowtocomeupon05.09.2014forconsiderationoncharge.

Beforeproceedingtothesubsequentrounds,Ishouldstepbackalittle.

THECYCLOSTYLEDNOTICES

Late in the 1980s or early 1990–91, a developer began laying theinfrastructure for a residential colony in the Aravali Hills. Like a fewhundredothers,wehadpurchasedaplot.Theplothadanentrancegate,and something thatwas someone’s idea of a barbedwire demarcating itfromtheadjacentplots.

InAugust2005,wereceiveda‘ShowCauseNotice’fromtheHaryanaStatePollutionControlBoard.Itwasasort-ofprintedstandardizednotice.Itstatedthaton7May1992theMinistryofEnvironmentandForestshadissuedanotificationwhichhadprohibitedaseriesofactivitiesexceptwithits permission. Among these were ‘locating/expanding/modernizing anynewindustry’;allnewmining,includingrenewalofminingleases;cuttingtrees; construction of ‘any cluster of dwelling units, farmhouses, sheds,community centres, informationcentresandanyotheractivity connectedwithsuchconstruction(includingroadsof[sic]partofanyinfrastructure

relating thereto)’; electrification. For any activity of this kind, theconcernedpersonmustgetpriorpermissionoftheministry.

No problemwith that: that the hills must be protected.Whowouldquarrelwiththe intentof thenotification?Theproblemwasthefactsonground:notificationornonotification,miningwasgoingonthereforalltosee—newspapersused toregularlypublisharticlesandphotographsoftruckscarryingminedstuffinbroaddaylight.

Therewas no problemwith the notification.Nor, as far aswewereconcerned, with the ‘Show Cause Notice’—a printed form, it wasmanifestly a routine one that had been sent to all and sundry. Yet itdisturbed me and angered me a bit, for it began by declaring, ‘It isintimated that you have constructed your FarmHouse/Residence/Establishment on a Ghair Mumkin Pahar9 in grossviolation of Aravali Notification dated…’ when, in fact, we hadconstructednothingatall.Thenoticeconcludedinanominoustone:

As you have carried out construction activities inGhairMumkin Pahar8 andviolated theAravaliNotificationwhytheactionasperEnvironmentProtectionAct1986shouldnotbeinitiatedagainstyou[sic].Youareherebydirectedtoreplythis[sic]showcausenoticewithin15daysotherwiseitwillbepresumedthatyouhavenothingtosayinthisregard&actionwillbetakenwithoutfurthernoticeandprosecutionwillbelaunchedagainstyou.

AnitaandIreplied:wehavebuiltnothingatallontheplot…shouldyouwantustofurnishanyfurtherinformation,wewillcomeover…

Weheardnothingfurther.Twoyears later, inAugust2007,we received another sort-of printed

communication.Itseemedtohavebeenpreparedforeverybuyer:allthathad been done was that three blank spaces—each having a printedunderline—hadbeenfilledinbyhand.Itacknowledgedthatourreply‘toShowCauseNoticeNo.NILdated18-08-05ontheabovesubjecthasbeenreceived. Inorder toenableoffice toappreciate thepointsraisedbyyou,thefollowinginformationmayalsobefurnished’:datesonwhich[i]‘plotwasallottedtoyou’[ii] ‘onwhichsale/transferdeedofthesamewasgotregistered[sic]beforesubregistrar’;[iii]‘onwhichyouobtainedelectricityconnectionfromElectricityBoard’;[iv]‘onwhichtubewellwasinstalled’;[v] ‘details of approval of building plan, if any, obtained from the

Competent Authority’; [vi] details ‘of change of land use/permissionobtained from Town and Country Planning Department/LocalAdministration,ifany’.

Again:replywithinfifteendays,orelse…Werepliedatonce:

1.Dateonwhichplotwasallotted:31.12.902.Dateofsale/transferdeedregisteredbeforesub-registrar:31.10.073.Noelectricityconnectionhasbeenobtained4.Notubewellhasbeeninstalled5.Nobuildingplanhasbeensubmittedforapproval6.Changeoflandusehasnotbeensoughtorobtained

Again we offered to personally come over to provide any furtherinformationthatmightberequired.

That was in November 2007. By now, Anita was having increasingdifficulties inbearingthecoldofDelhi’swinter.Afriendtoldusaboutanew ‘city’ thatwasbeingplannedbeyondPune.Thatwouldbe somuchbetterforherandourson,wethought.Buttogathermoneytobuildthathouse,weneededtoselltheplotinAravaliRetreat.

Wesolditon27March2008.Butnooneseemedtobepayinganyattentiontowhatthepositionwas

ontheground.WegotyetanotherShowCauseNotice.IranguptheheadoftheHaryanaStatePollutionControlBoard,andexplainedthesequenceofeventstohim:inparticularthatwehadbuiltnothing,andthatinfacttheplothadbeensoldtosomeoneelse.Hesaidthat,bychance,theofficerdealingwith thematter happened to be sittingwith him, that hewouldhand the phone over to him, and I should explain everything to him. Iwent over the dates and facts for this officer. He seemed satisfied. Heaskedmetosendthesaledeedthathadbeenexecutedwhenwehadsoldtheplot.

Ididso.ThatwasinJanuary2009.Manifestlytonoavail.ForinJuly2014wereceivedyetanotherprinted

ShowCauseNotice:

ToSmt.AnitaShouria[sic]…orToWhomsoeveritmayconcernWhereas, it has been reported tome that you have erected unauthorized construction forresidentialfarmhousepurpose(PlotNo.F-35)…Youareherebyorderedtostopfurthercontraventionandtoappearinmyoffice…withinaperiodofsevendays[inbold]andtoshowcausewhyyoushouldnotbeorderedtorestorethe landof theaforesaidcontraventionhasbeencommitted[sic], to itsoriginalstateor tobring it in conformity with the provisions of the Act ibid [sic] and Rules framed thereunder…

Irepliedtheverynextday,restatingallthefacts.Ialsopointedoutthatwehadbeensendingrepliestothesamesetofquestionsandallegationssince2005,and thatnooneseemed tohavepaidanyattention; that insteadacasehadbeenregisteredintheSpecialEnvironmentCourt,Faridabad,andthatthiswasnothingbutvexatiouslitigation.

Noreply.The court recordswhich I obtainedmuch later showed that, in fact,

whilewehadbeenundertheimpressionthatwehaddonewhatneededtobe done by sending the facts in response to those ShowCauseNotices,unknowntous,mattershadbeenproceeding in thecourt forquitesometime.

TheplothadbeenregisteredinAnita’snameon31October2007.Wehadsoldtheploton27March2008.

Acomplainthadbeenfiledon28October2009thatwehad illegallyconstructedafarmhouse.ThecourtrecordhadentriesofsummonshavingbeenissuedtoAnitainFebruary2010.AndtheninNovemberthatyear:‘Noticesissuedtoaccusednotreceivedback,’hencebailablewarrants.Andthen an order by the then judge containing all the allegations in thecomplaint. Then in February 2011: ‘BWs of remaining accused notreceivedback.FreshBWsofremainingaccused…beissuedfor25.5.11.’

Forthatday,thesamerubbed-outrubberstampdated24May2011:

Present:NoneCasetakenuptodayasIshallbeonCL/EL/SL/MLon25/5/11…

Anewjudge.WaitingfororderfromtheHighCourt.Proceedingson4May2012…Proceedingson28May2012:accused

no.2(thegentlemanwhohadpurchasedtheplotfromus)present…So,thecourtmusthavegottoknowthatwedidnotevenowntheplot.

Nextproceeding:BailablewarranttosecureappearanceofAnita.Proceedingsof3October2012: ‘…Inadvertently, thecase is fixed for

complainant’s pre-charge evidence, however, accused no. 1 has not putappearance before the court till date. Now, her presence be securedthroughwarrantsofarrestfor30.10.2012throughSHOconcerned.’

The same sort of entry for 28 February 2013—that Anita has notappeared,hence,non-bailablewarrantsbeissuedagain.Andagainfor23March2013,andon13May2013,andon30May2013…

All thiswhile,wewere living inourhouse—theaddressofwhich thecomplainant, theHaryana State Pollution Control Board, as well as thecourthad,asismanifestfromthecommunicationsfromtheBoardandthesummonsandwarrantsfromthecourt.Weweregoingonwithournormallives—completely oblivious of the avalanche that was building up 30kilometresaway.

Finally,on8July2013:

Warrants of arrest of accused no.1 not received back executed or unexecuted. On goingthroughthefile.[sic]Itisseenthatwarrantsofarrestofaccusedno.1isbeingissuedforlastseveral dates andon each, eitherwarrants [sic] is receivedbackun-servedor not receivedback. It is clear that accused is avoiding service and his [sic] presence cannot be securedthrough ordinary process, hence proclamation of accused U/s 82 Cr. P.C. be issued for26.08.2013. Executing police officer shall also appear on same date for his statementregardingpublicationofproclamation.

AndsoAnitabecameaproclaimedabsconder.

‘IFTHECASEAGAINSTYOUWERETOBEDISMISSED…’

Iwould go to the court on eachdate. In all, through those interminablehearings and adjournments, four government functionaries were‘examined’.That is, theywereaskedafewformulaquestions: ‘Isthisthenotification…?’ ‘Is this the entry in the village record…?’ ‘Didyou carry

outaninspection…?’Andtheygaveformulaanswers.Frommypointofview,fiveimportantpointscameonrecordfromthe

exchanges,perfunctoryandformulaicthoughtheexchangeswere:

Thevillagerecordclearlyestablishedthattheplothadbeenregisteredinournameon31October2007, and thatwehad sold it on27March2008toaccusedno.2.

Whatwasalwaysbeingreferredtoasa‘farmhouse’turnedouttobeonemeaslyroom—thesortthatsomeonemightconstructforawatchman.

Departmentalrulesrequiredthatthesitebe inspectedregularly. Infact,onlyone‘inspection’seemedtohavebeencarriedout.Thepersonwhowassaidtohavecarriedoutthe‘inspection’testifiedthathehaddonesoon17April2009:thatis,wellafterwehadsoldtheplot.

Inanswertoquestions,hesaidthathecouldnotstatewhetherthegateand ‘boundary wall’ had been constructed, and the road laid before1992—when the notification had been issued by the environmentministry—orafter.

Hecouldnotsaywhetherthatoneroomhadbeenconstructedbeforewegot the plot, during the time the plot belonged to us, or afterwehadsoldit.

Iwastold,‘Ofcourse,therecordisclear.Youpeopledidnotbuildanystructure.Theplotbelongs toaccusedno.2.But ifat this stage thecaseagainstyou isdismissed, itwillbealleged that thishasbeendoneunderpoliticalpressureorthatmoneyhaschangedhands.’Thepersonwhosaidthishadbeen,andwas tocontinue tobemostconsiderateandhelpful: Icouldn’tmusterangerathim.Anditwasfutiletogetangryat‘thesystem’.Theonlycoursewastoresigntothecircumstances.

Evenso,Iwasincensedwheninthehearingon5September2014,thejudge ruled, ‘Heard. Prima-facie a case punishable u/s 15 of theEnvironmentProtectionAct,1986 ismadeoutagainst theaccused.’Andchargesthathadbeenframedwerehandedtous.

‘No after-charge evidence is present,’ the judge recorded at the nexthearing,on13October2014.‘Adjournmentsought.Heard.Nowtocomeupon17.11.2014forafterchargeevidenceofcomplainant.’

And on 17 November? ‘No after charge evidence is present.Adjournment sought. Heard. Now to come up on 25.11.2014 for afterchargeevidenceofcomplainant.’

Andon25November?‘TwoPWsarepresentandexamined.NootherPWispresent.’Asthesamepersonswhohadbeen‘examined’and‘cross-examined’ in the pre-charge stage were repeating the same litany, thecounsel for us stated that ‘they do not want to re-cross the remainingwitnessesinafterchargeevidencealreadyrecordedinpre-chargeevidence.’The prosecutor closed his presentation and arguments. The date for thenexthearingwassetfor16December2014.

And thatday thehearingwasagainadjourned: the record states thatthiswas done ‘On the request of the ld. Counsel for the accused’—thatmustrefertosomeaccusedotherthanus,forIwaspresentandwaseagerthatthecasebeconcludedattheearliest.The judgeset16January2015forrecordingthestatementoftheaccused.

Onthatday,asAnitacouldnotbepresentinperson,thejudgedecidedthatheranswerswouldbeobtainedthroughaquestionnaire.Iwashandedthe questionnaire on 16 January before lunch. As the questionnairewaspresumably the sort that hadbeenhanded to several of the accused, theanswerstoowereready.Andsotheanswerswerehandedtothecourtafterlunch.

Theotheraccusedwerenotpresentatthenexthearing.Andattheoneafterthat,thecounselforthedevelopershandedajudgmentbywhichthedevelopershadalreadybeendischargedinasimilarcase.Hearguedthat,having been acquitted in that case, they could not be further prosecutedandpunished.Ourcounselpresentedhisargumentsatthenexthearing,on2March2015.

That day’s record states, ‘No defence evidence is present. Learnedcounsel for the accused no.1 has closed defence evidence … Vide myseparatejudgmentofevendate,alltheaccusedhavebeenacquittedofthecharges leveledagainstthem.Bailbondsandsuretybondsoftheaccusedstanddischarged.Filebeconsignedtorecordroomafterduecompliance.’

The judgment runs into twelve-and-a-half pages. The Haryana StatePollution Board had alleged that the developers had got wind of the

notification before it was issued, and ‘colluded with the officers of therevenue department and succeeded inmaking/preparingwrong, frivolousandillegalentriesintherevenuerecordofvillageRaisina’.Together,theyhadfabricatedthestatusofthelandintobeingoneinwhicharesidentialcolonycouldbesetup.Inturn,wewereaccusedofhavingpurchasedtheplotand‘constructedafarmhousebywayofillegalconstructioninformofboundarywall,main [gate?] and one room constructed etc. in collusionwithotheraccused…’

Thejudgmentrecalledthevarioussubmissions.Thejudge’sconclusionswere emphatic.As faras theparticularsofour casewere concerned, thejudge recorded, ‘In his cross-examination he [the patwari] admitted thatfrom1991tillthedate[ofthetransferoflandtous]thenatureoflandwasshownasghairmumkin farmhouse in the jamabandi.’10Second, thatonthebasisofthevillagerecordandthesaledeeds, theprosecutionwitnessacknowledged that the land had been registered in Anita’s name on 31October2007,andthatwehadsolditon27March2008.Third,thatthesite had been inspected more than a year after we had sold the plot.Fourth,‘he[theregionalofficer]couldnottellwhentheconstructionwasstarted and for how much time it continued.’ Fifth, ‘In his cross-examination he [the official who was said to have carried out theinspection, andwho had reported that ‘a boundarywall and one room’had been constructed] deposed that he could not tell about firstconstructionuponthefarmhouse.’

Butthemainreasononaccountofwhichthecasefellthroughhadlittleto do with us. What was called ‘the mother case’ by the lawyers wasagainst the developers. You will recall that the Haryana State PollutionBoard had maintained that the developer had falsified the records incollusionwithvillageofficialstoalterthestatusoftheland.Itwasonthischarge that everything that followed had become illegal.After reviewingtheevidence,thejudgeheld:

ItisadmittedfactthatthepresentlandinquestionhasbeenshownasGhairMumkinFarmHouseetc.inthekhasragirdawari11ofHaadi121991andinthejamabandiof1990-91,i.e.in the land/revenue recordsmaintained by the State Government. Now it was incumbentupon the complainant to prove that this record has been wrongly/falsely prepared incollusionwith revenue officials. But surprisingly no any [sic] evidence regarding collusion

betweenaccusedandrevenueofficialshasbeenbroughtuponfile…Further it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that these entries were falsely

madebutasalreadydiscussedabovethere isnoany[sic]documentuponfilewhichcouldestablishthatthepresentchangeinkhasragirdawariandsubsequentlyinjamabandiwasnotas per law…As already discussed above, the complainant has been unable to prove anycollusionorforgeryinpreparationofjamabandiforyear1990-91andthushasbeenunabletorebutthepresumption.

Headvertedtothechargesagainstusandconcluded:

EveniftheapplicabilityofAravaliNotificationbepresumeduponthelandindisputethentoothereisnoany[sic]evidencethatwhenconstructionwasstarted[sic]byaccusedno.1and accused no. 2 and when it was completed. There is no any [sic] building inspectionreportwhichcouldshowthattheconstructionwascompletedafter1992.FurtheritisalsonotcertainthatwhoconstructedtheroomavailableonthefarmhouseNoF-35,hencethebenefitofthisdoubtshoulddefinitelybegiventotheaccused.

Hencethejudge’sconclusion:

Thus the complainant/prosecution has miserably failed to prove upon file that AravaliNotificationwasapplicableuponthelandoftheaccusedsituatedinAravaliRetreatandhehas further failed to prove that the construction in any shapemade by accused after theissuance of Aravali Notification has made the present accused liable. Hence accused areliabletobeacquittedofthechargeframedunderSection15oftheEnvironmentProtectionActforviolationofAravaliNotificationdated7.5.1992.

In view of my above discussion all the accused are acquitted from the charge framedunder…

AFEWFACTS

Wehadsoldtheploton7March2008.TheHaryanaStatePollutionControlBoard filed its complainton28

October2009—andwewereimplicatediniteventhoughwehadsoldtheplotayearandahalfearlier.

We were all acquitted on 2March 2015, that is, six years after theproceedingsbegan.

Foralmostthisentireperiod,theracket,aslucrativeasitisdestructive—illegalmining—continued.Inbroaddaylight.

Duringthesixyears,fourjudgeshandledthecase.Itwastakenupinoneformoranotherbythejudgesfortytimes.On these forty occasions, in all, only fourwitnesseswere ‘examined’

and‘cross-examined’.As the ‘examination’ and ‘cross-examination’ were more or less

formulaic,themaximumtimeforwhichawitnesswasquestionedwasjustaboutfifteentotwentyminutes:atotalofonehourforthefourwitnesses,or,beinggenerous,letussaytwohours.

Inadditiontous,therewere706accused.Actually,Ishouldhavetyped‘are706accused’,not‘were’.BecauseseveralofthecasesarestillgoingonasItypethis.

And please remember, for each of the accused, each step involvedmany,manyothers.Youaregoingtostandsuretysothatyourwifemaygetbail?Youmust get proofof address, a statement fromyourbankofyourcurrentbalance,astatementofyourassets…Whatdidyousayyourwifehas?NotenoughthatyouhavethemedicalhistoryofherParkinson’sfrom1992;youmusthaveacurrentcertificate.Whatdidyousayshewasstruckby,what‘embo’?NotenoughthatyouhavethedischargesummaryfromGangaRamHospital for thepulmonaryembolismthatnearly tookher life. You must have a certificate from a doctor in a governmenthospital.

ALESSONFORTHEMEDIA

I alluded to this sequence in passing during a lecture at the NationalJudicialAcademy inBhopal. Ihadbeen invited toaddressagatheringofjudgesfromfourstates,includingHighCourtjudges.

Intheteabreakthatfollowedthelecture,Ichancedtodrifttowardsagroupofseniorjudges.TwoofthemhappenedtobejudgesofthePunjabandHaryanaHighCourt. ‘Butwhydidn’tyoucometous?’oneofthemremarked.‘Wewouldhavegivenimmediaterelief.’

ButhowwasItofindlawyersinChandigarh?HowwasItotraveltoChandigarheverytimethecasecameup?HowwasItoknowthatthecasewould come up before judges who would be as understanding as thesetwo?

Theotherreactionwasequallytelling:‘Ifthiscanhappentoyou,canyouimaginewhatthecommonmanhastogothrough?’

Actually,Icould.ForinthehoursthatIspentinthecourt,Isawfirst-handwhatothersweregoingthrough.Hundredsmillingaroundforhours,only to learn thatyetanotherdatehadbeen fixed. ‘Idhar lagaao, idhar,’someone would take the thumb of an elderly man, of a lady, her facecoveredbyaghunghat,andpressitdownonsomepaper.Didtheoldmanor ladyknowwhat theywereaffixing their thumb impression to?Dumbdrivencattle…

A lesson in that for us in themedia: if, instead of, or in addition tofocusing so much on lofty constitutional issues being debated in theSupremeCourt,weweretodeputeourcorrespondentsonceamonthonarandomlyselecteddaytoarandomlyselectedlocalcourt,andreportwhathappened in that court during that day—that would give readers andviewersasomuchtruerpictureofthestateofjusticeinourcountry.Andmayevenspursomeimprovements.

ANDLESSONSFORUS

Ifpossible,don’tbuyaplotoflandorbuildahouse. If you do, do not leave it to the developers to keep track of circulars,

notifications, changes in law; train someone in your family in this art,andconditionhimtodevotehimselfonlytoit.

Whenyoubuildthathouse,buildaseparateroomtostoreeveryscrapofpaper,everynoticeyoureceiveandeveryreplyyousend.

Besurethatnooneinthatgovernmentdepartmentwillreadanyofyourreplies.

So,iflightningistofallonyourhead,itwill.Theonlywaytoretainyoursanitythroughsuchstretchesistolookupon

them as yet another service that our systems provide: free lessons inpatience.

Butwhynotmovetoareasonforhope—asequencethatdemonstrates,as the phrase goes, ‘The wheels of justice grind slow but they grindexceedinglyfine’?

2

Justicedone,undone,redone

JayalalithaawasthechiefministerofTamilNaduforfourteenyears,insixseparateterms.Inherfirsttermfrom1991to1996,officiallyshedrewasalaryofonlyRe1amonth.TamilNadupoliticsbecameasortofseesawbetweenherandherarchrival,M.Karunanidhi.InoneoftheboutswhenKarunanidhiwasinoffice,acasewasfiledagainstherforhavingacquiredassetsdisproportionatetoherknownsourcesofincome.

Ina judgmentthat isamodelofmeticulousexaminationof thefacts,thetrialjudge,JohnMichaelD’Cunha,1heldherguiltyofhavingacquiredassetsthatcouldnotbeaccountedforbyherknownsourcesofincome.Healso held that Jayalalithaa, her close associate Sasikala Natarajan andotherrelativesofthelatterhadactedinconcert.He,therefore,foundthemguilty of conspiracy also. He sentenced the accused to six years’imprisonmentandafineofRs100crore.

AnappealwasfiledintheKarnatakaHighCourt.Inajudgmentthatisas much a model of misrepresentation and distortion as D’Cunha’sjudgment had been of meticulousness and rectitude, Justice C.R.KumaraswamyacquittedJayalalithaaandheraccomplices.Bycalculationssopatentlyfalseandabsurdastostrainone’scredulitythataHighCourtjudge could have advanced them, Kumaraswamy held that whileJayalalithaaandherassociatesdidhaveassetsthatexceededtheresourcestheycouldexplain,thedisproportionateassetsamountedtoamere8.1percentofherincomeand,therefore,inaccordancewitharulelaiddowninan earlier case by the Supreme Court, she and her companions wereentitledtobeacquitted.2Healsoheld that theevidencedidnotestablish

themtobeguiltyofconspiracy.3

Thematterwastaken inappeal totheSupremeCourt. Ina judgmentwhich is also a model of meticulous examination of evidence and closereasoning,JusticePinakiChandraGhose,onhisbehalfandthatofJusticeAmitava Roy, threw out Kumaraswamy’s judgment and restored thefindingsofandthesentencesthatD’Cunhahadawarded.4

Itwillpayustospenda little timeonthethreesuccessive judgments.Wewillgettoseewhatuprightjudgescando,andwhatthecreativelot,sotosay,do.Andtheywillpointusonceagaintotheone,sovereignremedy.

Therewerefouraccused:Accused1—SelviJ.Jayalalithaa;Accused2—her close friend and associate, Sasikala Natarajan; Accused 3—V.N.Sudhakaran,thesonofSasikala’seldersister;Accused4—J.Elavarasi,thewifeoftheelderbrotheragainofSasikala.

The resources that the four had at their disposal and the assets thatthey had acquired between 1 July 1991 and 30 April 1996—the ‘checkperiod’—weretakenupforexamination.Nooneobjectedthattheperiodwhichhadbeenchosenwasunfairinanyway.

D’Cunha found that during the ‘checkperiod’, the known sources ofmonies available to them totalled Rs 9.9 crore—from income asindividuals (for instance, as interest from deposits or returns frominvestments),fromloans,fromgifts;inaddition,therewastheincomethatthey claimed their companies had earned from business operations. Theexpendituresduring theperiod amounted toRs8.5 crore.Against these,Rs53.6croreworthofassetswereacquired,whichcouldnotbeaccountedforbytheaccusedashavingcomefromtheresourcesthattheyhadattheirdisposal.

Thejudgealsofoundthattheaccusedhadactedinconcert.Theyhadset up thirty-four companies and fifty-two bank accounts to cycle andrecycle funds. The inflow of cash came only to Jayalalithaa. The assetswereshowntobeinthenamesofAccused2to4andthecompanies.Theaccounts were operated by Sasikala. Both of these arrangements weremadeonlytocamouflagethefactthatthemonieswerebeingreceivedbyJayalalithaaalone;andtodistanceher fromtheoperations—ofaccounts,ofacquiringrealestateandtherest—sothat itcouldbeclaimedthatshe

didnotknowwhatwasbeingdone.Twenty-two of the thirty-four companies did not engage in any

business activity during the check period. Second, there were hugeexchanges of funds between the accounts—the transfers ranged fromRs12,000toRs25lakhinsingletransactions.Indeed,allthenumbersboggleour imagination: thatapublic servantwouldhave toaccount forninety-one watches; that the expenditure on a single wedding would be Rs 6crore; thatapublic servantwould,onherownclaim,havereceivedgiftsworthRs3 crore on a single birthday; that propertieswould have beenacquiredvia146sale-purchasedeeds.

Bycalculationssopatentlycraftedtoanend,Kumaraswamyfoundthattheyhadamuchlargeramountofresourcesavailableforacquiringassetsthan D’Cunha had calculated. With equal creativity, he found that thevalueofassets thatJayalalithaaandassociateshadacquiredwasonlyRs2.8crore.

Themomenthisjudgmentwasdelivered,itwaspointedoutthatevenifallhissuppositions,conceptsandestimateswereaccepted,theassetsthatcouldnotbeexplainedby theresourcesavailable to theaccusedcametoRs 14.4 crore. This meant that they were 41.3 per cent of the claimedsourcesofincome,and,therefore,evenintermsoftheSupremeCourt’s10percentruleofgrace,Jayalalithaaandothersstoodguilty.Moreover,theincomecametoRs13.5crorelessthanwhatKumaraswamyhadusedashis denominator. This latter exaggeration had come about becauseKumaraswamyhadtakentheloansthathehadlistedtobeRs24.2crore,butinfacttheywere,byhisownlisting,Rs10.7crore.Thisiswhatcaughtthe headlines, and it came to be believed that Kumaraswamy had letJayalalithaaoffbecauseofan‘arithmeticalerror’.

Innumeracyof thatorderwouldnotbe excused even ina schoolboy.ButwhatwasatdisplaywasnotthatKumaraswamycouldnotadd.Whatwasatdisplaywasapattern.

Byonebizarredeviceafteranother,KumaraswamyinflatedtheincomeofJayalalithaaandassociates;hedeflatedtheexpensestheyhadincurred(soas to leavea larger surplus thatwas supposedlyavailable to them toacquireassets);andhedrasticallyreducedthevalueoftheassetstheyhad

acquired.Letusstartwithincome.D’Cunhahadexaminedsixty-fourheads,and

arrivedatatotalofRs9.9crore.TheHighCourtaddedsevenheads,andgottoatotalofRs34.7crore.Andevenwheretheheadstallied,theHighCourt arrived at a much higher figure. For instance, Jayalalithaa andothers claimed that they had been growing grapes. Upon generousassumptions, the trial court estimated that they had earned Rs 5.8 lakhfromthisactivity.TheHighCourtasgoodasmultipliedthefigurebytenandarrivedatanincomeunderthisheadofRs52.5lakh.

Jayalalithaaandothersclaimedthattheircompany,JayaPublications,published a paper/magazine, Namadhu MGR, and that from this theyearnedRs14.2croreoversixyears.Thedevicebywhichtheyearnedthismuchwouldbetheenvyofnewspaperowners.Theyclaimedthatin1990theyhadstartedaschemebywhichsubscriberscouldreceivefour,fiveorsixcopiesofthepublicationfreeiftheymadeaninterest-freedepositofRs12,000,Rs15,000orRs18,000annually.(ThefirmwasalsoclaimedtohaveearnedRs1.1crorefromjob-printingandsaleofadvertisements;andfrom ‘agricultural activity’.)Theypointed to the income tax returns thathadbeenfiledonbehalfofthefirm.Courtshaveheldthatbythemselves,incometaxreturnsarenotproofoftheveracityofaclaim—submissionsinthe returns have to be tested for their truthfulness. Butmore than that,theseclaimshadbeenmadewellaftertheevents:thereturnsfor1991–92onwardshadnotbeen filed till1998and1999.First, theaccountbooksdidnotreflecttheinflowsfromthedepositscheme.Thirty-oneAIADMKfaithfulswereproducedaswitnesses.Theyaffirmedthat theyhad indeedmade the requisitedeposits ranging fromRs12,000 toRs18,000.Theiraverments ran toapattern.Noneof themcouldproduceany receipt forthedeposit.Moreover, thebalance sheets showed theamounts thatweresaidtohavebeencollectedasdepositstobeliabilitiesofthefirm.Thefirmwasaskedtosubmitapplicationsthatpotentialdepositorshadmade,thecounterfoilsofreceiptsthathadbeenissued,etc.Itclaimedthatthesehadbeenlost.AstheSupremeCourtnoted:

TheTrialCourtwascategoricalinbringingonrecordthefactthatitwasonlyaftertheCIT(Appeals) had set-aside the assessment order i.e. 3.3.1988 rejecting the claim of scheme

depositoftheassesseeon15.9.1998thatJayaPublicationsfileditsreturnsfortheassessmentyears1991-92,1992-93,1993-94on6.11.1998mentioningforthefirsttimesuchdeposits.

…TheTrialCourtonanoverall assessmentof the evidence concluded that the storyofschemedeposithadbeenintroducedbythedefenceonlyafterthecharge-sheethadbeenfiledon4.10.1997 i.e. through the income tax returns filed in theyear1998.ThatnoevidencehadbeenproducedbeforetheCourttoshowthattheschemehadbeenfloatedintheyear1990,wasrecorded.

The High Court noted all these facts, the Supreme Court observed, yetconfineditselftojustoneofthem,andthendisposedofthatsingularonewithatossofitshand:

TheHighCourtcategoricallyheldthatdelayedandunexplainedsubmissionof incometaxreturns did give rise to doubt of the genuineness thereof. This notwithstanding, theHighCourtonlyinthefaceoftheoralevidenceofthe31witnessesclaimingthemselvestobethedepositors/subscribers for the newsletter, returned a finding that the whole claim of theassesseecouldnotberejectedonlyonthegroundofdelayinfilingoftheincometaxreturns.Actingsolelyonthisconsideration,theHighCourtthusallowedadditionofasumofRs4croresasincomeofJayaPublications.

Notice,JayalalithaaandassociateshadclaimedanetprofitofonlyRs1.15crore for Jaya Publications between 1992–93 and 1996–97. As againstthis, theHighCourt ‘awardeda sumofRs4 croreas incomeearnedbyJayaPublicationsactingsolelyontheevidenceofardentpartyworkersdehorsanyindependentcorroboration’.

AndsotheSupremeCourtconcluded:

Inotherwords,thoughtheHighCourtitselfwasleftunconvincedabouttheacceptabilityoftheclaimofschemedeposit,duetolargelydelayedincometaxreturns,itbenignlydidawardan income of Rs. 4 crores to the assessee only on the basis of the oral testimony of 31witnesseswho, as noted by theTrialCourt, owedunstinted allegiance toAIADMKpartywithnolegallyacceptabledocumentaryevidencetocorroboratethesame.

Another one of their firms, SuperDuperTV, Jayalalithaa and associatesclaimed,earnedRs1crorebyprovidingTVequipment.But,theSupremeCourtnoted:

…therewasnothingonrecordtoshowhowtheinvestmentsweremadeforthepurchaseofequipmentclaimedtohavebeensuppliedbythecompanytovarioussubscribersandthatinany case, this amount could not have been availablewith theA3 as the stable corpus ofincomeforpurchaseofimmovableproperties,asclaimed.

Moreover,therewasanothertellingfact:

…theTrialCourtrecordedthehugecashinflowandoutflowtoandfromtheaccountofthecompany. Noticeably, such deposits and withdrawals had been vis-à-vis several accountsinvolvingA1toA4andthefirmsandcompaniesfloatedbythemduringthecheckperiodofwhichtheywerepartners/directors,asthecasemaybe.

These deposits andwithdrawals acquired significance in the light of thecharge of conspiracy and abetment, the Supreme Court observed. ‘ThesummarytreatmentoftheevidenceonthisissuebytheHighCourt,inourcomprehension, lacks the desired approach and insight and, therefore,cannot be sustained.’ The trial court had followed the money trail, itnoted. The High Court, by contrast, had confined itself to the oralstatementsofthe‘subscribers’.

Inanother typical instance, itwasclaimedthatoutof theearningsofoneoftheircompanies,SasiEnterprises,JayalalithaahadreceivedRs6.3lakhashershare.ItturnedoutthattheamountconsistedofnothingbutexchangesofreservesbetweenJayalalithaaandSasikala.

Jayalalithaa claimed that she had earned Rs 2.7 crore from JayaPublications.Uponexaminingtheevidence,asthetrialcourthaddone,theSupremeCourtconcludedthatthereceiptswerefictitious:

Thedepositsandwithdrawalsrepresentedthroughthedifferententriesinthebankaccountssuggestmultiplicationoftransactionsstemmingfromthesamecorpus.Themazeoffinancialexchanges in fragments involving different combinations hint at the attempt to inflateindividual and collective income of the respondents. The banking transactions, thoughresorted to for proclaiming genuineness thereof, having regard to the overall factualconspectusdonotappeartobereal.TheclaimofincomeofRs2,70,82,900/-ofA1bywayofreceiptsfromJayaPublications,therefore,isunconvincing.

Inthesameway,incomeswereshowntohaveaccruedtoSasikalaandhertworelatives.Kumaraswamytookagenerousviewofthesealso:hetookthem to be Rs 26.5 crore, instead of Rs 6 crore. These included hugeforeign remittances—no one could explain the sources from which andwhythesehadcometothem.TheyclaimedtohavereceivedRs2.2croreasincomefromthefrontfirmswhichhadbeensetup.Youwillrecallthatsomanyofthese‘firms’hadbeenregisteredonthesameday,eachofthemhavingthesameaddress.Theconclusivefactwasthattherewasabsolutely

no evidence that the ‘firms’ had earned the income that they were thensupposedtohavepassedontoSasikalaandherrelatives.

Oneofthe‘firms’wasAnjanyaPrinters.In1994–95,AnjanyaPrintershad shown income frombusinessoperations tobeRs747—yes,Rs747,that’s all. Income tax returnswere filedonly inAugust1997.Theynowdeclared undisclosed income for 1986–1996 to have been Rs 10 lakh.Besides, they claimed that the firm had received Rs 30 lakh from JayaPublications as share application fee in 1993 and 1994: of course, JayaPublicationshadnotfiledincometaxreturnsforthoseyears.Furthermore,it was now claimed that between 1 April 1994 and 31 March 1996,AnjanyaPrinters had receivedRs 55 lakh as net income and as advancerent. As you would by now expect, the ‘firm’ had not maintained anyregularbooksofaccounts.Onthisheadalso,Kumaraswamyacceptedtheclaimsmadeonbehalfofthe‘firm’wholesale.Reviewingtheevidenceonthe point, the Supreme Court observed, ‘…there seems to be noconsiderationoftheoralanddocumentaryevidenceinsupportthereofbytheHighCourt’.

Let’s now consider Sasi Enterprises. Itwas claimed first of all that ithad earned Rs 96 lakh from rent and from ‘agricultural activities’.Needlesstosay,incometaxreturnshadnotbeenfiled.Moreover,theleasedocumentsonthebasisofwhichrentwouldhavebeenreceivedturnedouttobeofquestionableveracity.Andtherewasnoevidencetosubstantiatetheclaimthatthefirmhadundertakenany‘agriculturalactivities’.

Nomatter!Kumaraswamyaccepted the ‘documents’ in their entirety,leadingtheSupremeCourttoobserve:

Itishowevernoteworthythatthenarrationinrelationtheretodoesnotrevealanyanalyticalapproach to fathom the probative value thereof on the touchstone of acceptability of theproofofthefactsproposedthereby.Neithertheoralnorthedocumentaryevidencehasbeentestedindependentoftheincometaxreturns,profitandlossaccountsandthebalancesheetstodeterminetheintrinsicworththereof.

Having accepted the documents wholly, Kumaraswamy opted formoderation:insteadoftheRs96lakhthathadbeenclaimedasincome,heallowedRs25lakh.Onwhatgroundsdidhecutdowntheclaim?Primafacie,none.

Next, it was claimed that Sasi Enterprises had earned income frombusiness operations in 1994 and1995 amounting toRs 2.4 lakh.As noonewasabletofurnishanyevidencetosupporttheclaim,thetrialcourtrejectedtheclaim.Next,itwasclaimedthatSasiEnterpriseshadreceiveda‘capital introduction’ of Rs 75 lakh: this was taken as ‘income’. Uponreviewingtheevidence,thetrialcourtconcludedthatthiswasnothingbuta diversion of funds into the account of Sasi Enterprises that had foundtheirway to Jayalalithaa.AndKumaraswamy? ‘TheHighCourt did notdealwith theoral anddocumentary evidence to this effect indetail,’ theSupremeCourtnoted.

After reviewing several such claims, and the complete absence ofevidencetosubstantiatethem,theSupremeCourtconcluded:

TheHighCourtgenerallyreferredtotheevidenceadducedbytherespondentsandwithoutanyendeavourtoevaluatethesametoascertainitsprobativeworth,readilyactedthereontoreturn a finding that the income of the firm, cumulatively having regard to the varioussourcesclaimedbyit,wasassessableatRs25lakhs.

Next,SasikalaandhertworelativesclaimedthattheyhadreceivedRs62lakh as dues paid back to Sasi Enterprises by two parties. D’Cunhaexaminedtheprofit-and-lossstatementofthefirmandfoundittobe‘notreliable and authentic’.He also found that the transaction had not beendisclosed to the income tax authorities ‘at any point of time before theregistration of the case’. And the persons who were supposed to haveborrowed the amounts and returned them were never examined. AndKumaraswamy?TheSupremeCourtfurnishestheanswer:

TheHighCourt,however,acceptedon its facevalue the relevantbalance sheet, theprofitand loss account aswell as theordersof the income taxauthorities to this effectwithoutembarking upon any independent verification of the contents thereof to ascertain thecorrectnessorgenuinenessofthesame,intheteethofthefindingoftheTrialCourt,contrarythereto.

Andsoon:itemafteritemturnedouttobebogus—sopatentaconcoctionthatevenKumaraswamydidnottakesomeofthemintoaccount.

ThenextfountofresourcesthatJayalalithaa,Sasikalaandherrelativesclaimedwasavailable to themwere loans that theyhadtakenfromtheir‘firms’and fromthebanks.First, theso-called loans that theyhad taken

fromtheirowncompanieswereneverrepaid.Moresignificant,thesourcesof the income of these companies, as we have seen, were themselvessuspect.

Then there were huge loans from banks. As our subject is what theHighCourtdidratherthanthemalfeasanceofJayalalithaaandassociates,how Kumaraswamy dealt with the loans is of even greater interest. TosustaintheconclusionthatJayalalithaaandothershadenoughresourcestohavepurchasedthepileofassetsthattheyhadacquired,itwasnecessarytoinflatetheamounttheyhadreceivedasloansfromthebanks.So,whatdidKumaraswamydo?

Simple.First,headdedtenmoreheadsfromwhichloanswerereceivedand thereby addedRs 24.2 crore to the resources thatwere available toJayalalithaa and associates. Presumably, as this did not prove sufficient,Kumaraswamy topped the total by his special contribution to ourjurisprudence—the ‘arithmetical error’: even if all the additions thatKumaraswamyhadincorporatedweretakenintoaccountatfacevalue,theadditional resources available through loans would have been Rs 10.7crore:hejusttookthattoreadRs.24.2crore.

Second, inaboldactofdouble-counting,headded to the total loansthatD’Cunha had already taken into account: an agricultural loan fromtheIndianBank—Rs3.7crore;aloantoSasikalafromtheIndianBank—Rs25lakh;aloantoSudhakaran,thenephewofSasikala,fromtheIndianBank—Rs 1.57 crore; a loan to one of their ‘firms’, MahalakshmiMandapam,fromtheIndianBank—Rs17.8 lakh.Eachoneof thesehadalready been taken into account by the trial court when totalling theresources that Jayalalithaa and associates had for acquiring assets.Incidentally, the IndianBankwasand remainsapublic sectorbank—thefelicitywithwhichthislotacquiredloansfromitprovesonceagainwhatIhave said all along: the only truly ‘private sector’ in India is the publicsector:itistheprivatepropertyofwhoeverhappenstobeinoffice.

Third, Kumaraswamy took as available loans, amounts that had notevenbeendisbursed: a loanofRs25 lakhwas sanctioned for JayaRealEstate,butonlyRs5lakhhadbeendisbursed;aloanofRs12.5lakhwassanctioned(againbyIndianBank)toJSHolding,butonlyRs7lakhhad

beenreleased;aloanofRs50lakhhadbeensanctioned(againbyIndianBank)butonlyRs28lakhhadbeenreleased;aloanofRs1.65crorehadbeen sanctioned forRamrajAgriculturalMills, but no amount hadbeenreleased during the check period. A loan of Rs 90 lakh had been takenfrom the IndianBank—but thiswas takenafter the checkperiodand socould not have been available during that period for acquiring assets.Therewasyetanotherloan,butithadbeenrepaidduringthecheckperiodalongwith an interest ofRs51 lakh, and so it too couldnot havebeenavailable for acquiring assets. Kumaraswamy was not deterred by suchtrivialities—of loans not having been disbursed, of loans having beenreceivedafter thecheckperiod,of loanshavingbeenrepaid. Ineachandeveryinstance,headdedthenominalvalueoftheloanthatwassanctionedtothepoolofresourcesthatJayalalithaaandassociateshadforacquiringassets.

Just‘errors’?Finally,JayalalithaaclaimedthatshehadreceivedgiftsofRs3croreon

herbirthday.Theseincludedremittancesfromabroad.Itwasclaimedthat300 to500admirersandparty faithfulshadgiven thesegifts.Ofcourse,noreceiptshadbeenissued,noraccountskept.Itturnedoutthattheywerealsonotmentioned in the income tax returns for the relevantyear.Theyfirst surfaced in supplementary returns filedone to five years later.Eventhat couldnot settle thematter—receivinggiftsof thismagnitudewas inblatantcontraventionofthePreventionofCorruptionAct.

The next task was to put a value on the assets which Jayalalithaa,Sasikalaandherrelativeshadacquiredduringtheperiodinquestion.Thesubstantialdifferencesbetweenthetrialcourt’sestimateandthevaluethattheHighCourt placedwere in regard to twomain items. The SupremeCourtfocusedonthese.

Thefirstwasaboutthevalueofadditionalconstructionthathadbeenundertaken by them. Jayalalithaa and associates claimed that at thebeginningofthecheckperiod,theirassetswereworthonlyRs2crore.Thedirectorofvigilanceandanti-corruption(DVAC)estimatedthatattheendofthecheckperiod,theyhadbecomeworthRs.68.4crore.ThetrialcourtplacedthevalueatRs55crore.JayalalithaaandothersvaluedthematRs

29.8crore.TheHighCourtwentonebetter:itvaluedthematRs25crore.Onallitemsexceptone,ineffecttheHighCourtacceptedthevaluationoftheDVACand the trial court.Onlyonnewandadditional constructiondid it take a different view: while the DVAC and the trial court hadestimated additional and new construction to beworthRs 28 crore, theHigh Court pulled the estimate down drastically—to Rs 5 crore. Thisfigure was even less than the value estimated by Jayalalithaa andassociates.

First of all, even if the estimate was accepted, the total value of theassets came toRs43.75crore rather than theRs25crore that theHighCourtmadethemouttobe.

Second,howdid theHighCourt alightona figureofRs5 crore foradditional and new construction rather than the Rs 28 crore that theDVACandthetrialcourthadestimatedittobe?Bythreesimpledevices.First, it excluded four of the twenty-one items that had been identified.Second, ithivedoffaquarterof thearea thathadbeenconstructed.Thethirddevicewasthemostdelicious:inestimatingthecostofconstructingthemostprominentstructure—inwhichmarbleandgranitehadbeenusedliberally,andwhichwasstuddedwithotherexpensivefixtures—ittook,asthebasisofcalculating,thecostpersquarefootofconstructingthesentryshed outside the building! As a result, in a typical instance, the cost ofinstalling anOtis lift came to be taken asRs 15,000only! In the event,Kumaraswamy’sestimateofthevalueofnewandadditionalconstructioncametobelessthantheestimatethateventheaccusedhadfurnished:theyhadclaimedthevaluetobeRs8.6crore;theHighCourtplacedthevalueatRs5.1crore!Gavahchust,muddaisust.TheSupremeCourtfoundthatthere was just no basis for what Kumaraswamy had done—that hisestimates were neither realistic nor rational, that they were ‘patentlyerroneous’,theywere‘visiblywrong’,anddeservedtoberejected.

Kumaraswamywasequallyhelpfulinregardtotheexpenditureonthatnephew’smarriage: theaccusedhadsaid thatRs3crorehadbeenspent;after examining each of the items on which money had been paid, theprosecution had said that double that amount—Rs 6.4 crore—had beenspent;KumaraswamyslashedtheexpendituretoRs28.7lakh.Havingre-

examined the evidence, the Supreme Court observed, ‘On an overallconsideration of the evidence adduced by the parties,we are inclined toholdthatthecomputationoftheexpenditureincurredbyA1[Jayalalithaa]inthemarriageasmadebytheHighCourtisunacceptableintheteethofthematerialsonrecordtothecontrary.’

Such slashing was not just a random swinging of the sword: itinevitablyleftalargerpoolofresourcesfromwhichassetscouldbesaidtohavebeenacquiredbyJayalalithaaandassociates.

ThenextitemonwhichtherewasasubstantialdifferencewasthesetofimmovablepropertiesthatJayalalithaaandassociateshadacquired.Thetrial court had estimated these to beworthRs 20 crore. Kumaraswamyslashed thevaluedown toRs6.2crore.Even JayalalithaaandassociateshadvaluedthematRs16.2crore.

How did Kumaraswamy accomplish this? Simplicity itself. Propertieshadbeenacquiredthrough146saledeeds.TheHighCourtlookedatonlyninety-sevenofthese,andjustshutitseyestoforty-ninesaledeeds.

But therewas somuchmore to the acquisition of these properties—features that had a direct bearing on the charge of conspiracy. Evidencehadbeenbroughtonrecordduringthetrialthatthepurchasesofpropertyhadbeen‘unevenbargains’;thepropertieshadbeenundervalued;officersofthestateadministrationhadbeentaskedtolocatepropertiesthatcouldbeacquired;often thenameof thepurchaserwasnotdisclosed—indeed,someofthesale-purchasedeedshadbeenregisteredwithoutanymentionof the name of the purchaser. As we learn from the Supreme Courtjudgment:

EvidenceonrecorddisclosedthatinstructionswereissuedfromthehigherauthoritiestotheRegistrars/Sub-Registrars to respond to the directions issued from the office of A1[Jayalalithaa]fordocumentationandregistrationofthedeedsinvolvingsuchpurchasesandasamatteroffact,onvariousoccasions,suchpreceptsdidcomeandwerereadilycompliedwith.

Inatypicalcase,thedistrictregistraradmittedthat‘heproceededwiththeregistration solely because the properties were purchased by A1…’ TheSupremeCourtfurthernoted:

TheevidenceofPW47,PW71andPW159takentogetherattestthatofficialswereusedto

locateandpurchaselandsatvariousplaces……thevendorswerekeptunawareofthepurchasers’identityandinsomecaseswerealso

putunderduresstoagreetothetransactions.TheirstatementsalsodivulgethatnotonlywasA1 [Jayalalithaa] aware of these transactions but on several occasions, the registrationsthereofwereperformedatherresidence.

…The Trial Court rightly remarked as well, referring to the evidence of PW 159 Sub-Registrar, North Beach, Sub-Registrar’s Office, and PW71 Radha Krishnan, HorticultureOfficer,thattheywerecalledtoPoesGardenandontheinstructionsofhigherofficers,theydidobligeA1evenbyrelaxingtherulesintheregistrationoflargenumberofdocumentsbytakingpersonalinterestandevenoverlookingthatthepropertieswereundervaluedtoholdadeep-seated involvement of A1 in these transactions. That the registering authorities hadgonetotheextentofpermittingregistrationofsixdocumentsevenwithoutincorporatingthenamesofthepurchasers,wasreferredto.

To camouflage the purchases, they were registered in the names of thefirms that Jayalalithaa, together with Sasikala, had set up. Examinationshowed that the firmshadnothadany funds for thepurchases, that thefunds had—nominally—come from other front companies and theiractivities—NamadhuMGR of Jaya Publications, etc. The companies inwhose names the properties were registered had maintained no regularbooksofaccount, theyhad filedno income tax returns fromthedateoftheirincorporationtothedateonwhichtheirpropertieswereattached.Nosale-purchasedeedhad the sealofanyof thesecompanies,nonehad thesignaturesofeitherthesecretaryoradirectorofthecompany.Enormousamounts had flown into the accounts of these so-called companies, butthey could not explainwhy such funds had come into their accounts.AsinglepassagefromtheSupremeCourtjudgmentsummarizingthefindingsofthetrialcourtwillgiveaflavourofwhatwasgoingon:

TheTrialCourtheldtheviewthattherespondentsinthecaseinhandhadfailedtoofferanysatisfactory explanationwith regard to the enormous unexplained credit/accumulations intheirbankaccounts.Itrejectedtheconfirmatoryletterofferedbytherespondentsasfalseandbogusandfurtherheldthattheidentityofthepersonwhodisclosedthesource,hadalsonotbeen proved. Further the transactions which generated such cash credits were also notestablished.Itrejectedaswellthebalancesheetandtheprofitandlossstatementclaimedtohavebeen filedbefore the income tax authorities andonwhich the respondents primarilyreliedastheirdefence,asnotprovedinaccordancewithlawbesidesbeingnotinconformitywiththestatutoryprescriptions.Itdiscardedaswelltheevidenceoftheauditorsexaminedbytherespondentswho,astheevidenceonrecordtestified,werenotconversantwiththetruefactsandhadnothandledtheiraccountsduringthecheckperiod.TheTrialCourtreturnedthe finding that the evidence on record cumulatively substantiated that the returns, thebalance sheet and the profit and loss accounts were framed and fashioned to offer an

explanation to the otherwise titanic unexplained credits in their respective bank accounts.TheTrialCourtthusheldthattherespondentshadfailedtoprovetheirdefence,whentestedontheevidenceadducedevenbythestandardofpreponderanceofprobability.

All these facts pointed to Jayalalithaa, Sasikala and her relatives havingacted in concert in pursuance of a conspiracy. There were other tellingdetails that pointed to the same fact. So many of the ‘firms’ had beenregisteredonthesameday.Somanyofthemhadgiventhesameaddress.OfficersusedtogotothePoesGardenresidenceofthechiefministerforenabling purchases and registering documents. Banks and personsassociatedwith the ‘firms’weregiven ‘ablanket instruction’by thechiefministerthattheyshouldactinaccordancewithinstructionsthatSasikalawouldgivethemfromtimetotime.Totopitall,thereweremassiveinter-account exchanges—but the only cash that was actually coming in andthen being distributed and redistributed into the accounts of the ‘firms’wasthecashthatcameviaJayalalithaa.Thisbecamesopatentduringtheproceedings that not just the trial court, evenKumaraswamy treated theaccounts, income,assetsandexpendituresasbelongingtooneentity.Noobjection was raised on behalf of the accused. And yet Kumaraswamydeclaredthattherewasneitherabetmentnorconspiracy.

NosurprisethenthattheSupremeCourtrestoredD’Cunha’sjudgmentinitsentiretyandthrewouttheHighCourtjudgmentjustascompletely:

Afteranalysingthefactsandcircumstancesofthiscaseandaftertakingintoconsiderationalltheevidenceplacedbeforeusandtheargumentsputforwardbyalltheparties,weareoftheunhesitant opinion that the impugned judgment and order rendered by theHighCourt isuntenableandisthussetaside.Wehaveconsideredthefactsofthiscaseandinouropinion,thepercentageofdisproportionateassetsas8.12%ascomputedbytheHighCourtisbasedon completely wrong reading of the evidence on record compounded by incorrectarithmeticalcalculations…

By the time the Supreme Court judgment came, Jayalalithaa had died.Kumaraswamy had retired. The consolations were that the courage andmeticulousness of a trial court judge had been upheld, and that at leastSasikalawassenttojail.

As for the judges, three lessons strike one. First and foremost, theultimatejudgmentofJusticesGhoseandRoygivesoneconfidencethattheSupremeCourtistheretoseethateventuallyjusticewillbedone.Yetthat

reassurance itself underlines an imperative: everyone—from importantpersonageslikejudgestoordinarycitizenslikeus—mustbeeverwatchful,andfightoffanyandeveryattempt, fromoutsidethecourtorwithin, tobreachthislastdyke.Second,aswehaveseenearlier,mechanicalsolutionswillnotdo.BothKumaraswamyandD’Cunhahadbeenelevatedstepbystepfromthecadreofdistrict judges.UnlikeC.S.Karnan,whomwewillencounterlater,neitherhadbeenpickedunknownfromtheBar.Third,ifaHigh Court judge could resort to such incredible distortions in such aconspicuous case—the judgment on which, he might have apprehended,wouldbescrutinizedfarandwide—whatwashenotcapableofdoinginrun-of-the-mill cases, judgments onwhich, he could be confident,wouldnotattractattentionotherthanofthepartiesdirectlyaffected?Oristherereasonforsuchajudgetofeelconfidentthathisjudgmenteveninsuchaprominentcasewillscarcelyberead,thattheremaybecriticismhereandthere but that the matter will soon be forgotten, and he will haveproceededtogreenerpastures?

3

Prosecutorhunting,andotherdevices

The complaint against Jayalalithaa—that she had amassed assets beyondher known sources of income—was filed in June 1996. The first chargesheetwasfiledayearlater,inJune1997.1Thefinalverdictwasdeliveredby the SupremeCourt in February 2017—that is, twenty years after thecharge sheet was filed. By that time, as we have seen, Jayalalitha hadalready died. That speaks of the condition of our courts, of course. Butalsoofseveralotherfeatures.

INTERTWINEDFORTUNES—POLITICALANDLEGAL

Consider first the effectsof the fortunesof Jayalalithaaherself.2 Shewasthe chief minister from 1991 to 1996. From 1997, her opponents, theDravidaMunnetraKazhagam(DMK),wereinoffice.TaskedbytheDMK,the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption carried outinvestigations.In1997,acasewasregisteredagainstJayalalithaaandthreeothers.Aspecialcourtwasconstitutedtotrythecase.Inwhatwastobethepattern for thenext twentyyears, Jayalalithaaand theotheraccusedpromptlyapproachedtheSupremeCourtandchallengedthedecisiontosetup a special court. The SupremeCourt rejected the challenge.3 The trialproceededbeforeaspecial judge inChennai.Twohundredandfifty-ninewitnesseswereexaminedfortheprosecution.Onlytenmoreneededtobeexamined.InMay2001,Jayalalithaabecamethechiefministeragain.Butsoonenough,theSupremeCourtheldthatshecouldnotbechiefministerasshehadbeenfoundguiltyofcorruptioninanearliercase.4Shehadto

vacate her office in September 2001. A factotum chosen by her becamechiefminister.Awhile later, theconvictionwassetaside.Shewonaby-election,andreturnedaschiefministerinFebruary2002.

Thereupon,astheSupremeCourtwastonotelater,‘Thetrial…wentthrough some kind of a legal tumult…’5 The investigating officer, thesenioradvocaterepresentingthestate,aswellasthreepublicprosecutorsallresigned.Jayalalithaa’sgovernmentappointedanewteam,includinganewpublicprosecutor.Thespecialjudgewhohadbeentryingthecasealsohappenedtogetchanged.‘Itmustbementioned,eventhoughwearesurethat it has nothing to do with the change in government,’ the SupremeCourtnoted inacase towhichweshallcome inamoment, ‘thatdue toretirementsand routine transfers therewere changes in theSpecial Judgealso.’

ThetrialhadcometoastopfromFebruary2002. Itresumedonly inNovember.Seventy-sixwitnesseswererecalledforre-examination,‘onthegroundthatcounselappearingfortherespondents[Jayalalithaa&Co.]orsomeofthemhadearlierbeenbusyinsomeothercasefiledagainstthem,’theSupremeCourtnoted.Outoftheseventy-six,sixty-fourwitnessesnowresiled from what they had stated on oath earlier. The new publicprosecutordidnotobjecttotheirbeingrecalled.Hedidnotdeclarethemhostile.Hedidnotseek toquestion themashewasentitled todounderSection 154 of the Indian Evidence Act—the section that provides, ‘TheCourtmay,initsdiscretion,permitthepersonwhocallsawitnesstoputany questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by theadverseparty.’Hedidnot request the court toproceedagainst them forperjury.

THESUPREMECOURTSTEPSIN

The general secretary of the DMK, K. Anbazhagan, brought these andother facts before the SupremeCourt. The facts showed that a fair trialwasnolongerpossible inTamilNadu,heaffirmed,andpleadedthatthecasemaybetransferredtoacourtinanyotherstate.Initsjudgment,6theSupremeCourttookseriousnoteofthesefacts.Itobservedthattheground

thathadbeengiven forrecalling thewitnesses—thatsomeof thecounselhad been busy in some other case at the time of their examination andcross-examination—‘could hardly have been a ground for recall ofwitnesses’.Itnotedtheconductofthenewpublicprosecutor—thathehadraisednoobjection,thathehadnottakenrecoursetoSection154oftheIndianEvidenceAct,thathehadneithermovedtodeclarethemhostilenortohavethemprosecutedforperjury.Afterreviewingthefactsandearlierjudgmentsonthematteraswellastherelevantprovisionsoflaw,thecourtwasemphatic:

…Asrevealedfromtheaforesaidrecitalof thefacts,greatprejudiceappearstohavebeencaused to the prosecution which could culminate in grave miscarriage of justice. Thewitnesseswhohadbeenexaminedandcross-examinedearliershouldonsuchflimsygroundnever have been recalled for cross-examination. The fact that it is done after the secondrespondent[inthisinstance,Jayalalithaa]assumedpowerastheChiefMinisterofthestateandthePublicProsecutorappointedbyherGovernmentdidnotopposeand/orgiveconsentto the application for recall of witnesses is indicative of how judicial process is beingsubverted.ThePublicProsecutorneitherresortingtoSection154oftheIndianEvidenceActnor making any application to take action in perjury taken against the witnesses alsoindicatesthattrialisnotproceedingfairly.ItwasthedutyofthePublicProsecutortohavefirststrenuouslyopposedanyapplicationforrecallandinanyeventtohaveconfrontedthewitnesseswiththeirstatementsrecordedunderSection161ofCrPC7andtheirexamination-in-chief.Noattemptwasmadetoelicitorfindoutwhetherwitnesseswereresilingbecausetheyarenowunderpressuretodoso.ItdoesappearthatthenewPublicProsecutorishandinglovewiththeaccusedtherebycreatingareasonableapprehensionoflikelihoodoffailureof justice inthemindsof thepublicat large.There isstrong indicationthattheprocessofjusticeisbeingsubverted.

Thecourtrecalledearlierjudgmentsinwhichithadbeenheldthatevenifawitnessresilesfromwhathehaddeposedearlier,‘…hisevidencecannot,asamatteroflaw,betreatedaswashedofftherecordaltogether.Itisforthejudgetoconsiderwhetherasaresultofsuchcross-examination[bythepublic prosecutor] and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughlydiscreditedorcanstillbebelieved inregardtoapartofhis testimony…’But when the public prosecutor does not even cross-examine such awitness‘thecourtmayfinditdifficultifnotimpossibletoaccepttheearlierstatement. The Trial Judge may find it difficult not to accept thesubsequenttestimonyofthewitness,whichhasremaineduncontroverted.This causes great prejudice to the prosecution culminating in great

miscarriageofjustice.’The judges came to similar conclusions regarding the application of

Jayalalithaanottobeexaminedinpersonbutviaaquestionnairethroughcounsel. It had been submitted on behalf of Jayalalithaa that she wasexhausted after electioneering in a by-election. Of course, the publicprosecutorhadnotopposedtheapplication.‘Inourview,’thejudgesheld,‘the grounds recited in the application … were not at all mitigatingcircumstancestohavegranteddispensationofpersonalappearance.Tosaytheleast,thatwasaployadoptedtocircumventthedueprocessoflaw…The conduct of the Public Prosecutor in not opposing such a frivolousapplicationhastobedeprecated.’

Accordingly,theydirectedthatthecasebeshiftedtotheneighbouringstateofKarnataka.Henceforth, in consultationwith theChief JusticeoftheKarnatakaHighCourt,theGovernmentofKarnatakawouldconstituteaspecialcourtforthecase,itwouldappointthepublicprosecutor,andsoon.Inaword,alldutiesfortheconductofthecasethatwouldhavebeenthe responsibilityof theGovernmentofTamilNaduwouldnowdevolveontheGovernmentofKarnataka.Inviewofwhathadhappenedinregardto those sixty-fourwitnesseswhohad resiled,while listing its directions,thecourtspecificallysaid,

(f)ThePublicProsecutorwillbeatlibertytoapplythatthewitnesseswhohavebeenrecalledandcross-examinedbytheaccusedandwhohaveresiledfromtheirpreviousstatement,maybeagainrecalled.ThePublicProsecutorwillbeatlibertytoapplytothecourttohavethesewitnesses declared hostile and to seek permission to cross-examine them. Any suchapplicationifmadetotheSpecialCourtshallbeallowed.ThePublicProsecutorwillalsobeatlibertytoapplythatactionforperjurytobetakenagainstsomeorallsuchwitnesses.Anysuchapplication(s)willbeundoubtedlyconsideredonmerits.

The special court was duly constituted. The Karnataka governmentappointedB.V.Acharyaasthespecialpublicprosecutor(SPP).Knownforhisfairness, thoroughnessandrectitude, inhisdistinguishedcareerat theBar, Acharya was advocate general for five terms, and handled severalcrucialcases.

ADEVICE

Thatwas inNovember 2003.The accusednow remembered, perhaps inresponse to a query from the new special judge, that in February thepreviousyeartheyhadfiledanapplicationthatthiscase—ofJayalalithaa&Co.havingacquiredassetsdisproportionatetotheirknownsourcesofincome—should be clubbed with that other case—that of their havingacquired the hotel in London.Acharya filed objections: the accused hadthemselveswaivedtheclaimthatwasnowbeingadvanced,hepointedout;no objection had been filed on their behalf for three years. ‘Moreover,while thewealth case has reached the final stage of trial, in theLondonhotel case even the charges have not been framed,’ he pointed out.Clubbingthetwocasesatthisstagewoulddragoutthetrial indefinitely.AndtheMadrasHighCourthadearlierapprovedtheprocedurethathadbeenadoptedbythetrialcourtjudgeinChennai.

The special judge, however, decided that the two cases should bemerged,andbetriedasonecase.Acharyadescribedtheconsequence:

Theeffectoftheorderwasthatonmergerofrecordsoftwocasestherewasonlyonenewcaseandproceedingshadtocommenceafresh.Immediately,oneaftertheotheraccusedwenton filing applications for discharge, as with the merger of the cases, the case had tocommence fromthe stageof framingchargesandbefore thateveryaccusedhada right toseekdischarge.

This was in 2005—by this device, two years had been gained since thespecialcourthadbegunitshearings.TheDMK’sgeneralsecretaryfiledanappeal in the Supreme Court against the merger of the two cases. TheSupremeCourttooktheappealonboard,andstayedallproceedingsofthecase.For a year,Acharyanotes, neither the accusednor the respondentswere served, ‘andevenafter the service, completionof thepleadings, theSupremeCourtwentonadjourningthecaseanddidnotfinallydecidetheappealtillaslateasJanuary2010.Hence,thesecaseswerependingbeforetheSpecialJudgeforaboutfiveyearswithoutanyprogress.’

After strenuous efforts, Acharya succeeded in delinking the Londonhotel case. He could now focus on the disproportionate assets case. Herecalled twenty-onewitnesses. ‘The process of recallingwitnesses took avery long time,’ Acharya recorded, ‘as several interlocutory applicationswere filedonbehalfof theaccusedseeking several reliefsand therewere

severalcriminalpetitionsbeforetheHighCourtandSLPs8filedbeforetheSupremeCourtchallengingtheordersofthetrialcourt.’

Though at a pace slower than that of a snail, the trial proceeded. InMay 2011, Jayalalithaa again became the chief minister. Somersaultscommenced again. The Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption oftheTamilNadugovernmentnowdecidedthatithadtocarryout‘furtherinvestigations’, and that it would henceforth have another counsel torepresent it. Acharya strenuously opposed these somersaults. Thematterwent to theHigh Court. TheHigh Court upheld Acharya’s position onbothcounts.ThedirectoratechallengedtheseordersintheSupremeCourt.ThatcourtalsoupheldAcharya’sposition.

TWO-PRONGEDASSAULT

Attacks now commenced from two directions. First, a petitionwas filedwiththegovernorthatAcharyashouldnotbeallowedtoholdtwopostsatthe same time—that of advocate general and special public prosecutor.Petitions were simultaneously filed in the High Court seeking the sameoutcome—one of the petitions was a public interest litigation (PIL)!Furthermore, two petitions were filed before the special judge allegingmalpractices inaneducationaltrustofwhichAcharyawasthechairman,and seeking a CBI inquiry. The judge gave a peculiar order. The HighCourtstayedtheorder.Therewerefurthertwistsandturns.EventuallytheHigh Court struck down the petition that had sought to embarrassAcharya and besmirch his reputation by alleging malpractices in theeducationaltrust.

And those petitions asserting that two posts should not be heldsimultaneously? The ‘vested interests’—asAcharya refers to them out ofpoliteness—hadexpectedthat,pressed intoacorner,Acharyawouldgiveup his position as the special public prosecutor. He surprised them: heresignedfromhispostasadvocategeneral!

Buthisheartwasno longer in thecase.Even thoughhe realized thatwerehetogiveuphispositionasthespecialpublicprosecutorhewouldbehelping those ‘vested interests’ attain their objective, he resigned. The

GovernmentofKarnatakatriedtomakehimchangehismind.Hestucktohisdecision.

THEACTINGCHIEFJUSTICE’SSUGGESTION

TheKarnatakagovernmentthenapproachedtheactingChiefJusticeoftheHigh Court for appointing a successor to Acharya. It proposed fourpossiblenames.TheactingChiefJusticeaskedthemtoconsiderappointinganotherperson,G.BhavaniSingh,eventhoughhisnamewasnotinthelistsubmittedby theKarnatakagovernment.Accordingly, inFebruary2013,theKarnatakagovernmentappointedG.BhavaniSinghastheonetoarguethecase.

Hehadbeenspecialpublicprosecutor-2earlierbeforetheHighCourt.However, in the present case, the trial judge,Michael D’Cunha, was tonote thatapart from just readingoutpages thatwerealreadyon record,BhavaniSinghmadenoothercontribution. In fact,hedid, saysasenior:when the request on behalf of the accused for adjournments would beturned down, Bhavani Singh would ask for them! The trial judge wascompelledtonotethatBhavaniSinghwasnotcooperatingtoensurethatthecaseprogressed,andinsteadhehadbeenplacingimpediments.Atonestage—inMarch2014—aheavypenaltyofRs120,000wasleviedonhim:asthefeehewasreceivingwasRs60,000aday,thefinewasfixedattwodays’ fee.TheHighCourtconfirmedthefine.Anappealwasfiled intheSupremeCourt.TheSupremeCourtupheld theorder, though it reducedthe fine toRs20,000. In its judgment, the trialcourtwasconstrained toobservethatwhiletheseniorcounselforaccusedno.1—Jayalalithaa—hadarguedforabouteightyhours,thepublicprosecutorhadonlyreadouttheexamination-in-chiefoftheprosecutionwitnessesandwiththatconcludedhisarguments.

THEACCUSEDGETTOCHOOSETHEPROSECUTOR

Bynow,thecontinuationofBhavaniSinghhadbecomeanembarrassment.On26August 2013, theGovernment ofKarnataka issued a notification

withdrawing the appointmentofBhavani Singhas SPP. It didnot assignany reason, and it did so without having consulted the Chief Justice ofKarnataka.

The accused—Jayalalithaa, etc.—approached the Supreme CourtagainsttheremovalofBhavaniSingh.Thosewhohadnotbeenfollowingwhat had been happening in the trial court would say ‘surprisingly theaccusedapproachedtheSupremeCourt…’Theaccusedarguedthatdoingsowoulddelaythetrial,andtheSupremeCourtitselfhaddirectedthatthetrial be concluded expeditiously.You have to appreciate the audacity oftheargument:hereweretheverypersonswhohadbeendraggingthecaseoutbyeveryconceivabledevice forover fifteenyears arguing thata stepwaswrong,asitwouldprolongthetrial!

On 30 August 2013, the Supreme Court issued a notice to theKarnataka government and added, ‘In the meanwhile, no freshappointmenttothepostofSpecialPublicProsecutorbemade.’

Caught on the wrong foot, on 10 September 2013, the Karnatakagovernmentwithdrewthenotificationithadissuedon26August,sothat,itnowsaid, itmay, inaccordancewiththeearlierordersof theSupremeCourt, consult the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court.Simultaneously,itissuedalettertoBhavaniSinghnottoappearbeforethespecialjudge.

Jayalalithaa,etc.,swiftly—on13September—approachedtheSupremeCourtagainstthenewnotification,theonethattheKarnatakagovernmenthad issued threedays earlier, aswell as the letter toBhavani Singh.TheSupremeCourtstayedthenotification.

TheKarnatakagovernmentnowtookanotherham-handedstep:on14September, even as Jayalalithaa’s writ was pending before the SupremeCourt, it approached the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court inregard to the removal of Bhavani Singh. By a letter, the Chief Justice,Karnataka, concurred with the proposal that Bhavani Singh no longercontinueasSPP.

Thusarmed,on16September,theKarnatakagovernmentissuedanewnotification removing Bhavani Singh as SPP. Jayalalithaa, etc., nowapproached the Supreme Court challenging this new notification. The

challengewasheardbyJusticeDrB.S.ChauhanandJusticeS.A.Bobde.9

Onbehalf of Jayalalithaa andCo., the counsel argued that the SupremeCourt had itself directed that the trial proceed expeditiously,10 that thismanoeuvreofremovingtheSPPwasdesignedtodelaythetrial—especiallyasthetrialcourtjudgewasduetoretirewithinafewdays,onthe30thofthatverymonth.Theyarguedthatdelayinthetrialwouldjeopardizetherights of the accusedunderArticle 21 of theConstitution; this, as I justmentioned, frompersonswhohadbeen adopting every device under thesun—and themoon—todragout the trial.The ironyaside, theSupremeCourt sawmerit inonepart of their claim—that,with the recordof thetrial now running into 34,000 pages, a new special judge or, byimplication, a new prosecutor would necessarily take time to acquainthimselfwiththemattersonrecord.‘Accordingly,wehavenohesitationinholdingthatthenotificationpurportingtorevoketheappointmentofShriG.BhavaniSinghasSPPisliabletobestruckdown.’ItwasfurtherarguedonbehalfofJayalalithaaandCo.thatBhavaniSinghhadbeenfunctioningasSPPforsixmonths—theKarnatakagovernmenthadnotobjected.Thereasontheywereobjectingtohiscontinuancenowwasdifferent: inMay2013, therehadbeenachange in thegovernment inKarnataka,andthiswaswhatlaybehindhisremoval.11ThisargumentalsoseemedtoresonatewiththeSupremeCourtbenchfor,citinganearlierjudgment,itobserved:

Theprinciplesofgovernancehavetobetestedonthetouchstoneofjustice,equityandfairplay.Adecisionmaylooklegitimatebutasamatteroffact,ifthereasonsarenotbasedonvaluesbuttoachievepopularaccolade,thedecisioncannotbeallowedtooperate.Therefore,unlessitisfoundthattheactdonebytheauthorityearlierinexistenceiseithercontrarytothe statutoryprovisionsorunreasonable,or isagainstpublic interest, theState shouldnotchange its stand merely because the other political party has come into power. Politicalagendaofanindividualorapoliticalpartyshouldnotbesubversiveofruleoflaw.

—words so apt for the chiefminister ofTamilNadu, andwhat shehaddoneinregardtothiscaseafterreturningtopowerinFebruary2002!

Buttherewasanothertwisttothematter.OnbehalfoftheKarnatakagovernment, the attorney general, G.E. Vahanvati, advanced as hisprincipalargumentonethatwasjustaskingtobestruckdown.Hearguedthat theab initioappointmentofBhavaniSinghwasnotmadeafterdueconsultation with the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court as

directed by the Supreme Court. His reasoning was that Bhavani Singh’sname had not figured in the list of four whom the government hadrecommended to the acting Chief Justice. The Supreme Court wascompelledtocharacterizethisargumentas‘ratherunusual’—afterall,thegovernmenthadadopted thename suggestedby the actingChief Justice,andissuedthenotificationappointingBhavaniSingh;moreover,ithadnotraisedanyobjectiontohisappearinginthecaseforsixmonths.‘Itisnotlegitimateforthepartywhohasthedutytoconsultandwhohasfailedinthat duty, to make a grievance that there has been no consultation …ThereisnothingonrecordtoindicatethattheGovernmentofKarnatakahasbeenforcedbyanyonetomakethesaidappointment.TheGovernmentthusvoluntarilyacquiescedintheprocessandisnownotentitledtoraisethis grievance. The grievance is thus baseless and does not carry anyconviction.’

Onsuchconsiderations,JusticeChauhan,onbehalfofthetwojudges,declaredthat‘weareoftheconsideredopinionthattheorderofremovalofShriG.BhavaniSingh…isaproductofmalafidesandthe impugnedorder isnotsustainable in theeyeof the law,assuchthesame isherebyquashed.’

Thenetresult?Theaccusedgottochoosethepublicprosecutor!12

THEACCUSEDFIGHTTORETAINAPROSECUTOR

In any event, aswehave seen,with thehelpof or in spite of thepublicprosecutor, Judge D’Cunha roundly indicted Jayalalithaa and herassociates—in a judgment that stands as an example of a meticulousexaminationofthefacts.

JayalalithaaandassociatesfiledappealsintheKarnatakaHighCourt.Wehavealready seenhow theHighCourt sawsuchgreatmerit in theirappeals—sometimes even outdoing the averments of the accused! But atthemoment,wehavetotraverseanotherproceeding.

BhavaniSinghhadbeenappearingonoccasiontohandlethecaseinthetrialcourt.Thequestionnowwaswhether,byvirtueofhavingappearedinthetrialcourt,hewasautomaticallyentitledtohandle theappeals in the

HighCourt.Or,consideringhissterlingperformance,couldtheappointingauthority,theKarnatakagovernment,appointsomeoneelsetodoso?

IntheappealsthattheyfiledintheKarnatakaHighCourt,Jayalalithaaand Co. did not make the Government of Karnataka a party. TheGovernment ofKarnataka had been given sole charge of conducting thecase.But,perhapsonthespeciousreasoningthat ithadnotbeenmadeapartyintheappeals,itdidnotmoveimmediatelytoappointtheSPPwhowastohandletheappealsintheHighCourt.

‘On the other hand, Tamil Nadu acted with remarkable alacrity,’Justice Madan B. Lokur was to note later, ‘and on 29-9-2014 [that is,within two days of D’Cunha pronouncing his judgment] the PrincipalSecretarytotheGovernmentofTamilNadupassedanOrderauthorisingtheDirectorateofVigilanceandAnti-Corruption,Chennai,toengagetheservicesofMr.BhavaniSingh,SpecialPublicProsecutortoappearbeforetheHighCourtofKarnatakaforandonbehalfofthesaidDirectorateinany appeal/bail petition, any other petition that may arise out of theconvictionoftheaccusedpersons.’

K. Anbazhagan of the DMK now sent a representation to the chiefsecretaryagainst this step.Ashe receivedno reply,he filedawrit in theKarnataka High Court against Bhavani Singh continuing to argue thematter. He maintained that the Supreme Court had given the power toappointaspecialpublicprosecutorforthiscaseonlytotheGovernmentofKarnataka. After Acharya had resigned, the Karnataka government hadappointedBhavani Singh tohandle the caseonly in the trial court.Thatgovernment hadnot issued anynotification appointingBhavani Singh toargueagainsttheappeals intheHighCourt.JayalalithaaandCo.arguedthathehadbeenappointedtohandlethe‘case’,and‘case’encompassesallstages—includinginquiry,trial,appeals,etc.—untilitreachesafinalityandtheaccusedareeitherconvictedordischarged.

The High Court held that, indeed, the Supreme Court had given allpowersinregardtotheconductofthecasetotheKarnatakagovernment.The Government of Tamil Nadu had no role in the matter. Hence, itsorderappointingBhavaniSinghtoarguetheappeals‘iswithoutauthorityandnonest intheeyeofthelaw.Thatorderdidnotconferanyrighton

the fifth respondent [Bhavani Singh] to represent either the state ofKarnatakaor thestateofTamilNadu in thependingappealsbefore thisCourt.’Butontheotherhand,theHighCourtheld,therelevantsectionofthe Criminal Procedure Code—Section 301(1)—authorizes the personappointedtohandleacasetoappearin‘anycourt’inregardtothatcase,andthatwouldincludearguingintheHighCourt.Onceheisappointed,heisinchargeofthecasetillitreachesafinality,andcanappear,withoutanyfurtherwrittenauthorization,inanycourt.13Becauseofthislatterfact,BhavaniSinghcouldcontinue toappearonbehalfof theGovernmentofKarnatakainregardtotheappealsagainst thetrialcourt judgment,eventhough the government had not authorized him to do so by any freshcommunication.14

THEJUDGESDISAGREE

Therewas no dispute about the fact that TamilNadu did not have theauthority to appoint Bhavani Singh. The question was about what theCriminal Procedure Code provided. That brought the dispute to theSupreme Court. Two judges heard arguments, and came to oppositeconclusions.JusticeLokurheldthatBhavaniSinghdidnothaveauthorityto represent the state of Karnataka. Justice R. Banumathi, on the otherhand, held that Bhavani Singh could continue through all stages of thecase,tillitreachedfinalityintheconvictionordischargeoftheaccused.

Justice Lokur pointed out that the original notification of theKarnataka government by which Bhavani Singh was appointed wasspecific,andithadappointedhimtohandlethecaseonlyinthetrialcourt—the notification had stated that he was being appointed ‘to conductSpecial CC No. 208 of 2004 (in the case of Kumari Jayalalithaa andothers) pending on the file of XXXVIth Additional Civil and SessionsCourt(SpecialCourt)Bangalore’.TheSupremeCourt’sdirectiontoowaslimited to proceedings in the special court. If Bhavani Singh wasautomaticallyentitled todealwith theappeals in theHighCourt, JusticeLokurpointedout,wherewastheneedfortheGovernmentofTamilNadutoissueaneworderandappointhimtodoso?

Whenappealswerefiled,theKarnatakagovernmentcouldhavecomebacktotheSupremeCourtaskingforaclarificationofitsdirectionsorforfresh directions about the procedure to be followed for appointing aspecialpublicprosecutorforproceedingsintheHighCourt,JusticeLokurheld.That ithadnotdone sowas ‘unfortunate’, itwas ‘a shirkingof itsduty and responsibility’. Perhaps they were confused, Justice Lokurallowed: itmay be that as the state of Karnataka had not beenmade aparty to the appeals, the governmenthadnot actedon the apprehensionthat,whenitwasnotaparty,byappointingaspecialpublicprosecutoritwould be held to be interfering in a casewithwhich it hadno concern.This‘reason’wasunjustified,JusticeLokurpointedout.‘Butthen,itwasequally the duty and responsibility of Tamil Nadu to either take theopinion of Karnataka on the future course of action with regard torepresentationinthecriminalappealsortohavebroughtthe“vacuum”tothe notice of the learned judge hearing the criminal appeals rather thanrushing inwith the ill-advisedOrderdated29-9-2014.ThatTamilNadusoughttotakeadvantageofasituationthatoughtnottohaveevenexistedisalsounfortunate.However,togiveitthebenefitofdoubt,itispossiblethatTamilNaduwasalsoinastateofconfusion.’

Eitherway,‘thedirectionsgivenbythisCourtwerelimitedonlytothetrialofthecasebeforetheSpecialCourtinBengaluruandevenKarnatakaunderstoodthedirectionstobelimitedtothetrialandactedonlytothatlimitedextent’.ThenotificationthattheKarnatakagovernmenthadissuedandwhichlimitedtheroleofBhavaniSinghtothecase inthetrialcourt‘correctlyreflectedtheintentofthisCourt’.

As for reading Section 301(1) and others in the way that was beingsuggested,JusticeLokurpointedtoseveralanomaloussituationsthatcouldarise.The lowercourtwouldcometoadecision.Thoseconvictedwouldfileappeals.Thestatewouldappointaspecialpublicprosecutortoargueagainst those appeals in the High Court. But the prosecutor who hadhandledthecaseinthelowercourtcouldturnupintheHighCourt,assertthat,thoughhehadnotbeenauthorizedbythestate,byvirtueofhisinitialappointment, he and not the special public prosecutor had the right toargue the matter, and he could support the appeals. Nor were such

situationshypothetical,JusticeLokurpointedout:

That such an eventuality is not theoretical is clear from the facts of this case itself. Asmentioned above, the accused persons applied for suspension of the sentence. However,whentheapplicationwasheard,theSpecialPublicProsecutor(Mr.BhavaniSingh)didnotopposethesuspensionofsentence.ThelearnedSingleJudgehearingtheapplicationrecordedinhisorderrejectingtheapplicationasfollows…

‘4.WhentheSpecialPublicProsecutorwasaskedastowhetherhehasanysubmissioninthisregardtomake,hehasopenlysubmittedthathehasnoargumentstomakeandthat the sentence may be suspended and the accused may be released on imposingconditions deemed fit under the circumstances of the case. But he did notmake anysubmissionastowhetherhedoesnotpressthewrittenobjectionsalreadyfiled.’

HadtheStateofKarnatakaappointedaPublicProsecutorfortheHighCourttocontesttheappealsfiledbytheaccusedpersons,itisquitepossiblethatthesaidPublicProsecutorwouldhavesupportedthewrittenobjectionsandopposedthesuspensionofsentence.Inthatevent,there would have been a rather piquant situation (if not a spectacle)—the Special PublicProsecutor(Mr.BhavaniSingh)supportingsuspensionofthesentenceoftheaccusedpersonsandthePublicProsecutorfortheHighCourtopposingsuspensionoftheaccusedpersonsonthe basis of written objections. Surely, Section 301(1) of the Code is not required to beinterpretedinamannersoastocauseconfusion.

Indeed,thepersonappointedtohandlethematterinthelowercourtcouldappearintheHighCourtandarguethatthepublicprosecutorberemovedasheandhealonehadtheauthoritytodealwiththe‘case’in‘anycourt’righttillthecasereachedfinality.Otheranomaliestoocouldarise.JusticeLokur showed, for instance, that on the interpretationwhichwas beingpressed, Bhavani Singh as public prosecutor could be subordinate to thedeputydirectorofprosecutions.Forsuchanomaliesnottoarise,onemustsee what is plain—that the sections circumscribe jurisdictions for eachappointment:apublicprosecutormaybeappointedtohandleacaseoraclassofcaseswithinadistrict, for instance.Whenhe is soappointed,byvirtueofthesections,thepublicprosecutorisentitledtoattendtomattersrelatingtothecase inanycourt inthatdistrict. It is inthissensethathedoes not need a fresh written authorization as he moves from court tocourtwithinthatjurisdiction.

Jayalalithaa and Co. pressed another argument, ‘the doctrine of defacto’. The fact, they said, was that Bhavani Singh, the special publicprosecutorforwhosecontinuancethey,theoneswhohadbeenconvicted,were arguing, had been appearing in the High Court in regard to theappeals.JusticeLokurturneddownthisargumentneatly:‘IfMr.Bhavani

SinghisnotauthorisedtorepresenttheprosecutionintheHighCourt intheappealsfiledbytheaccusedpersons,hesimplycannotdosoandifhedoes so, the accused persons cannot put forward a fait accompli or relyuponthedefactodoctrineandsay:sobeit.’

ForreasonssuchastheseJusticeLokurconcludedthatthe‘overbroadopinionexpressedbytheHighCourt’couldnotbeaccepted.

JusticeBanumathiagreedwithJusticeLokurasfarastheorderoftheTamilNadu governmentwas concerned, bywhich it had authorized theDirectorateofVigilanceandAnti-CorruptiontoengageBhavaniSinghtorepresentitintheappeals:giventhedirectionsthattheSupremeCourthadgivenwhile transferring the case toKarnataka, the state of TamilNaduhad no authority to appoint Bhavani Singh to represent the DVAC forarguingon theappeals in theHighCourt, sheheld.But shecame to theoppositeconclusionasregardstheauthorityofBhavaniSinghtoarguetheappeals in the Karnataka High Court by virtue of his having beenappointedbytheKarnatakagovernmenttoassistinthetrialcourt.

Herreasoningwastwo-pronged.Firstwasherreadingofthelaw.Sheheldthatpublicprosecutorscan

beofthreetypes:

ByaplainreadingofSection24CrPC,threemaintypesofPublicProsecutorsarediscernible:FirstarethosewhoareattachedtoaparticularHighCourt,districtorlocalarea;secondarethosewhoareattachedtoaparticularcaseorclassofcasesbutinaspecifiedjurisdictionandlastly,theoneappointedtoaparticularcaseorclassofcases.Thelastcategorybelongsto‘Special Public Prosecutor’ appointed under sub-section (8) of Section 24CrPC, inwhichthereisnomentionaboutthejurisdiction/territoryinwhichtheSpecialPublicProsecutorhastoconductthecaseorclassofcases.Thelimitationofactingin[a]particularcourtorareaisconspicuously absent in the provision of Section 24(8) CrPC, when comparedwith otherprovisions.15

Hence,onceBhavaniSinghwasappointedasspecialpublicprosecutortoconduct the case, he could appear without any further writtenauthorization in any court where the case was under inquiry, trial orappeal.And,infact,duringthetrialproceedings,writs,appeals,etc.,hadbeenfiledonseveraloccasions,andBhavaniSinghhadarguedthematterintheHighCourt.Noonehadraisedanobjection.ButthatdidnotquitemeetthepointthathadappealedtoJusticeLokur.Forthoseappeals,etc.,

hadarisenduringthecourseofthetrial—andthepointat issuewasthattheappointmentofBhavaniSingh,havingbeenforthecourseofthetrial,hadceasedwiththeverdicthavingbeendeliveredbythetrialcourt.

Toreinforceherconclusion,JusticeBanumathiplacedemphasisonthewordsusedinSection301:thepublicprosecutorwas‘inchargeofacase’;hecouldappearin‘anycourt’.

Shealsooptedfortheexpansivemeaningoftheword‘case’usedinthesection—it covers inquiry, trial aswell as appeals, shemaintained. ‘I amconscious that the term“case” in theCodeat certain instanceshasbeenusedtolinkonlywith“trial”andhasbeencategoricallydistinguishedwiththe term “appeal”,’ she herself noted. She also acknowledged that inseveral sections—like Sections 209, 406, 407, 409—the words ‘case’,‘trial’,‘appeal’hadbeenusedtosignifydifferentstagesofacase.Butshegot around that, holding that the legislature had left it to the courts todecidetheambitoftheword‘case’withreferencetotheparticularcontextinwhich itwas being used and the onewhich theywere considering.Aslightgiveawaythere,Iwouldhavethought.

Thejudgesoonremediedthat.Havingdealtatlengthwiththeambitoftheword‘case’,shesaid:

However,IamoftheviewthatsuchauthorityoftheSpecialPublicProsecutortoappearandpleadacaseinrespectofwhichheisinchargeinanycourtoratanystageofproceedingsinsuch court may not emanate from the term ‘case’ of for that matter ‘class of cases’ asappearing under sub-section (8) of Section 24 CrPC, but for the reason of the broadercontextinwhichtheterm‘case’hasbeenusedinSection301(1)CrPCtoincludeanycourtinwhich that case isunder ‘inquiry, trialor appeal’.TheSpecialPublicProsecutor, after thetrialisover,derivesits[sic]authoritytocontinuetoappearandpleadbeforeappellateforumby virtue of language used in sub-section (1) of Section 301CrPC and the Special PublicProsecutorwillcontinuetohavesuchauthorityduetowidelanguageofSection301CrPC,until the notification appointing him has been cancelled by the appropriate StateGovernment.

Next,washerperceptionof the facts. JusticeBanumathi adverted to thetimingofthewritthathadbeenfiledobjectingtoBhavaniSinghappearingfor theprosecution in regard to theappeals in theHighCourt.The trialcourt had given its verdict on 27 September 2014.Thosewhohad beenconvicted had filed their appeals in the High Court on 29 September.BhavaniSinghhadappeared for the stateon the30th.Noobjectionhad

beenfiled.Thenextday,BhavaniSinghhadfiledhismemoofappearanceand filed objections to the accused being given bail. Thatmatter of bailhad gone twice up to the Supreme Court. It was only on 24December2014 thatAnbazhaganhad fileda representationbefore theTamilNadugovernment against their asking the DVAC to engage Bhavani Singh torepresent it as special counsel in the High Court. And that date ‘isinterestingtonote’,JusticeBanumathiremarked.‘Thesaidrepresentation[to theTamilNadu government]wasmade after thisCourt by its orderdated 18-12-2014 had directed hearing of the appeals on a day-to-daybasis and also fixed the period of threemonths for disposal of appeals.’EventhentheKarnatakagovernmentdidnotcometotheSupremeCourtfor clarificationor consultwith theChief Justice of theKarnatakaHighCourt for initiating the process of appointing a new special publicprosecutor.Itwasonlyon6January2015thatAnbazhaganfiledawritintheHighCourt, praying that someother senior counsel be appointed asspecial public prosecutor to represent the state of Karnataka. That tooJustice Banumathi found ‘interesting’: ‘Interestingly, here again theappellantchose to file thewritpetitionbefore theHighCourt insteadofdirectly taking recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court [that is, theSupremeCourt].’Infact,asthefullbenchwastonotelater,AnbazhaganhadwrittentotheGovernmentofKarnatakaaswellastheChiefJusticeoftheKarnatakaHighCourt,objectingtotheappointmentofBhavaniSinghasspecialpublicprosecutor.ItisonlywhenhehadnotreceivedanyreplythathehadfiledawritintheKarnatakaHighCourt.16

Even when the single judge rejected the plea, the Government ofKarnataka did nothing, Justice Banumathi proceeded to note: it did notappealagainsthisorder;itdidnotcommenceconsultationswiththeHighCourtChief Justice; itdidnot come to theSupremeCourt fordirectionsor, given its professed doubts about what it was supposed to do, forclarification.

Instead of directly coming to this court, Justice Banumathi observed,Anbazhagan appealed against the decision of the single judge to thedivision bench of theHighCourt.The division bench held that BhavaniSinghwas entitled to continue especially in view of the direction of the

SupremeCourtthattheappealsmustbedisposedofwithinthreemonths.Even after this decision, theKarnataka government did not come to theSupreme Court: ‘What the State did is that they took the shelter of theappeals filed by the appellant [Anbazhagan] and kept on rhyming abouttheir inability toappointanewProsecutor/counsel toconduct theappealproceedings. If theStateofKarnatakawasof theview thatMr.BhavaniSinghcannotcontinuetoappearfortheappeals, inconsultationwiththeChief Justice of the Karnataka High Court, it could have issued thenotificationappointinganotherSpecialPublicProsecutororitcouldhavesoughtdirectionfromthisCourt.Butthatwasnottobeso…’17

Byits‘inactiveattitude’thestateofKarnatakahadfailedtodischargeitsduty‘miserably’,andtheconductoftheappellant,Anbazhagan,‘lacksbonafides’,JusticeBanumathiconcluded.

THEQUANDARYOFLAYPEOPLE

Thereasonsforgoingthroughthereasoningofthetwojudgeswouldhavebecome apparent by now.Bothof themwere facedwith the same facts.They inferred different conclusions from them. Both cited the sameprovisionsoflaw.Theydrewdifferentdeductionsfromthem.Often,uponhearingsubmissionsoflawyers,theyreflecteduponthesamecasethatthecourthaddecidedearlier.Oneheldthatthecasewas‘notquiteapposite’,andgavecogentgroundsforthatconclusion.Theotheraffirmedthattheissue at hand—whether a special public prosecutor appointed underSection24(8)appearingintheappealmightleadtoananomaloussituation—‘hasbeenaddressedandansweredbyaConstitutionBench’inthatverycase.18

Fromthepointofviewof judgesandcourts, that theyoftendiffer inwhattheyinferfromthefacts,inwhattheygleanfromearlierjudgments,andwhattheytakethemeaningoflawtobeisbutnatural.Thatiswhywedonothavejustonejudge.Norarethejudgesrobots.Eachmustexercisehisownmindonfactsandprecedentsandthelaw.

Alltrue.Butequally,fromthepointofviewofthelaypersonwhomaygetcaughtinthewebofcourts,thiscompoundsuncertainty:itdoesleadto

the apprehension that the outcome of his case will too often come todependonchance—onbeforewhomhiscaselands.

Another featurewould strike him evenmore: the two empirical factsthat would be conclusive for him—the conduct of the special publicprosecutor in the trial courtand the fact that theaccusedwhohad beenconvictedweretheoneswhoweresoeagertohavehimhandleonbehalfofthestatetheirappealsintheHighCourt—weighedhardlyatall intheconclusions that the judges reached.One judge let them intrude only byallusion. The other abjured looking at them altogether—though she didconsider atquite some length the conductof theappellant,Anbazhagan,and thatof theGovernmentofKarnataka.Howdid this self-denial—thedecisionnot to look at the twomost obvious facts—comparewithwhatthe SupremeCourt had declaredwhen it initially transferred the case toKarnataka?Thecourthadsaid:

FreeandfairtrialissinequanonofArticle21oftheConstitution.Itistritelawthatjusticeshouldnotonlybedonebutitshouldbeseentohavebeendone.Ifthecriminaltrialisnotfreeandfairandnotfreefrombias,judicialfairnessandthecriminaljusticesystemwouldbeatstakeshakingtheconfidenceofthepublicinthesystemandwoewouldbetheruleoflaw.Itisimportanttonotethatinsuchacasethequestionisnotwhetherthepetitionerisactuallybiased but the question is whether the circumstances are such that there is a reasonableapprehensioninthemindofthepetitioner.19Inthepresentcase,thecircumstancesasrecitedaboveare suchas tocreate reasonableapprehension in themindsof thepublicat large ingeneralandthepetitionerinparticularthatthereiseverylikelihoodoffailureofjustice.20

—wordsthatwouldapplytotheTwereBhavaniSingh,givenhisconductinthetrialcourt,tocontinue,astheaccused/convictedsoferventlywantedhimto,andarguetheappealsintheHighCourt.

ORDEROFTHEFULLBENCH

In the event, as the two judges had come to different conclusions, theyreferred thematter to a larger bench. A bench of three judges—JusticesDipakMisra,R.K.AgarwalandPrafullaC.Pant—heardthematter.ThejudgmentwasdeliveredbyJusticeDipakMisra.21

Theyobservedhowvital itwas to scotch corruption fromourpubliclife. They noted the ‘enormous anxiety’ which had spurred the

GovernmentofTamilNaduto issue itsordertoenableBhavaniSinghtoappear in theHighCourt, ‘possibly beingworried about the “borrowedtroubles of future” and forgetting the age-old sagacious saying that“anxietyisthepoisonofhumanlife”.’Ontheimportofsub-sectionsandsectionsoftheCriminalProcedureCode,theyupheldtheconclusionsthatJusticeLokurhadspelledout.AsJusticeLokurhaddone,theyalsodrewattention to Rule 30 of the Karnataka LawOfficers (Appointments andConditionsofService)Rules,1977: itmakesadistinctionbetweenacaseandanappeal,theypointedout—‘ThisRuleclarifiesthatifanycounselistobeappointedforthepurposeofanappeal, theStateGovernmentmaydosoafterconsultingtheauthoritiesmentionedtherein,’andthat‘Thereisnothing on record that the fourth respondent [Bhavani Singh] wasappointedtodefendtheprosecutioninappealintheHighCourt.’

They considered the opposing conclusions that Justice Lokur andJustice Banumathi had reached regarding the expressions ‘case’, ‘anycourt’,‘withoutanywrittenauthority’.TheynotedthatSection24(1)and24(8)oftheCriminalProcedureCodeconferauthorityonthegovernmenttoappointpublicprosecutorsandspecialpublicprosecutors.Ifbyputtingtoowide a constructionon theword ‘case’, onewere to proceedon thepremise that once a person had been appointed to represent theprosecution ina trialheautomaticallyhad theauthority to represent thestate at theappellate stage, ‘itwill bedenuding thepowerof appointingauthority.The lawdoesnot socountenance.’Agreeingwithwhat JusticeLokurhadheld,theyconcluded:

Therefore,muchstresscannotbegivenonthewords‘withoutanywrittenauthority’asusedinSection301.ItcanonlymeanthatthePublicProsecutoronceengaged/appointedbytheState,hecanprosecutetheappealwithoutfilinganyformalauthorityforthesaidpurpose.Itcannotbeconstruedto theextent thatsolelybecausehehasbeenappointed inconnectionwiththetrialcase,hecanappearbeforetheHighCourtforwhichhehasnotbeenappointedinpursuanceofSection24(1)CrPC.Section301(1)CrPCcannotbestretchedtothatextent.Inthatevent,itwouldreallyleadtoananomaloussituation.APublicProsecutorhastobespecificallyappointed for theappealsor revisionsorotherproceedings in theHighCourt.The anomalous situations, which have been highlighted by Lokur, J. have our respectfulconcurrence … Therefore we ingeminate that a Public Prosecutor who is appointed toconductacasebeforetheTrialCourtcannotbedeemedtobeappointedforthepurposeofappealarisingtherefromsolelybecauseofthelanguageemployedinSection301(1)CrPC.

BhavaniSingh,therefore,couldnotrepresenttheprosecutionintheHighCourt.

ALITTLETWIST

But the judges turned down the further request that, given what hadtranspired,theyshoulddirecttheHighCourttoheartheappealsdenovo.They recalled what they had said about the importance of rooting outcorruption fromourpublic life, and expressed confidence that the singlejudgewhowashearingtheappealswouldbearthatimperativeinmind.

Aswehaveseen,theyhadunderestimatedJusticeC.R.Kumaraswamy!And there was a surprising twist to the order. The judges gave

Anbazhagan leave to file written submissions in the High Court up toninety pages, and to the Karnataka government leave to file writtensubmissions up to sixty pages. But here was the strange part. The fullbench delivered its order on 27 April 2015. While giving leave toAnbazhaganandtheGovernmentofKarnatakatofilewrittensubmissions,the judges laiddown that thesemustbe filedby28April2015—that is,withinonedayoftheirpronouncingthejudgment!

TheKarnataka government again approachedAcharya and requestedhimtotakeoverthecase.Hefiledthewrittensubmissionsbythenextday.

Kumaraswamywasunaffected!It is best to record the endof this sequence in thewordsofAcharya

himself:

Igaveawrittenopinionstronglyrecommendingthatappealsbefiledagainstthejudgmentofthe High Court. The Advocate General also fully agreed with me. So did the LawDepartment.Inspiteofalotofpoliticalpressure,theGovernmentdecidedtofileappealsandIwasappointedasSpecialCounseltoarguebeforetheSupremeCourt.Accordingly,appealswere filedbymebefore theSupremeCourtandtheSupremeCourtheardarguments fromFebruary2016toJune2016.InDecember2016Accused1[Jayalalithaa]expired.

On14.02.2017theSupremeCourtpronouncedthejudgmentrestoringthejudgmentoftheTrialCourtintoto,exceptforrecordingthattheappealasagainstA1hasabated.OnbehalfoftheStateofKarnatakaareviewpetitionwasfiledchallengingtheorderthattheappealasagainstA1hadabated.Thiswasdismissed.

Sincethen,acurativepetitionhasbeenfiledinthisregard.Accordingtosettledlawtherecanbe no abatement of appeal once arguments have been concluded and the judgment isreserved.

Thesedevelopmentswereonepartofthestory—theygiveusaglimpseofhowthe fortunesofanaccused, thepolitical fortunes in this instance,aswell asdifferencesamong judgesover themost elementarypointsof lawand procedure come to affect the journey of a case. But there was alsoanotherdimension,andthatiswhatwasbeingdonebythelawyersfortheaccusedinthedifferentcourts.Thathaslessonsofitsown.

LAWYERLYDEVICES

In theory, lawyers are, first and foremost, officers of the court. AshokDesai, the former attorney general, recounts a conversation with LordBingham,latertheLordChiefJusticeofEngland.

Ashok asked him, ‘What would you do if a lawyer arguing in yourcourtlied?’

Binghamdidn’tseemtounderstandthequestion.‘Whatdoyoumean,“ifhe lied”?’Binghamsaid. ‘Youmean ifhedidnotknowthe law,andmisrepresentedit?’

‘No,no. Imeanthathe lied—ifhesought toadvancehiscasewithafalsehood?’

Binghamstillcouldn’tgetthepoint.Ashokexplainedyetagain.‘But how could he lie?’ Bingham asked, and added, ‘Soon after the

hearing,wewouldbeassemblinginthediningroomoftheInnsofCourthavinglunchtogether.Ifhehadliedtomehowwouldhelookmeintheeye?Anditwouldgetknownthathehadliedincourtandthatwouldbeendofhim.’

Binghamaddedthatasanofficerofthecourt,alawyerhasthefurtherdutytobecandid.Hegaveanillustration.AQC22hadappliedforanexparte injunction against the imminent publication of a defamatorystatement. The matter came up before a recently appointed judge whoasked the counsel, ‘MrSmith, I amnew to this jurisdiction.Youare theexpert in the field. Tell me if you have made such applications in theabsence of the other side even on the ground of urgency.’ The lawyerreplied,‘Yes,mylord,onmorethanoneoccasion.’Hepaused,andadded,‘Butmy lord, none of themwere granted.’ And thatwas the end of his

application.Howdifferenttheworldinwhichweliveandmove!One of the reasons that the case took over twenty yearswas that at

every turn, indeed at virtually every hearing, the lawyers appearing forJayalalithaa and Co.—those ‘officers of the Court’—moved one petitionafteranother.Theyraisedoneobjectionafteranother.Onoccasion,whenthe objection or petition filed on behalf of one accused was rejected,lawyersrepresentingtheotherthreeaccusedwouldtakeupthebatonandfilethesame,orslightlyalteredobjectionorpetition.Andwhenthesetoowererejected,theywouldfileappealsintheHighCourt.23

Aspecialcourtcannotbesetupforacaseofthiskind…Takenrightup to the Supreme Court … The entire record of depositions anddocumentsbemadeavailable inEnglish…The twocasesbeclubbed…The order of the trial judge taking cognizance be struck down… Thescheduleforthetrialberefixed…(Thismatterwastakenall thewaytothe Supreme Court) … The proceedings be dropped entirely as theinvestigation that was conducted was illegal … The proceedings beadjournedasthespecialleavepetitioniscomingup…Threesetsofcopiesof papers be supplied: each set numbered around 70,000 pages… TheEnglish translations that have been supplied be scrapped, and newtranslations be supplied… An interpreter be appointed… Lawyers foraccused be allowed to cross-examine the interpreter … The attachmentorderbelifted…PetitionhasbeenfiledintheHighCourt,andthatcourthasobservedthatthetrialshouldnotproceed…Caseshouldbeadjournedto enable accused to approach the Supreme Court … Translations ofevidence tendered by some witnesses be corrected … An expert beappointed for translation … Mistakes be corrected in the new set oftranslations…Thecasebeadjournedforthreeweeksasthefatherofoneofthecounselrepresentinganotheraccusedhasdied…Casebeadjournedforsixmonths toenable legal teamsof theaccused to locatemistakes intranslations…Correctionsintranslationsbecarriedoutattheplacewherethe defect has occurred and not at the end of the translated version…Again: mistakes in translation … Yet again: mistakes in translation ofevidenceof somemorewitnesses…Onewitness be recalled…Lawyers

forSasikalachallengetherejectionofthatpetition…TheymakeDVACasthe sole respondent … The DVAC does not apprise the special publicprosecutor,insteadengagessomeotherlawfirmtorepresentit…DVACinformscourtdirectlythat ithasdecidedtoconductfurther investigation…Specialpublicprosecutorhasnotbeeninformedofthis…Courtobjectsto DVAC writing directly to it rather than through the prosecutor …ProsecutoriscompelledtopointtocollusionbetweenaccusedandDVACandpraysthat thecontentsof the letterbe ignored…CourtadmonishesDVAC for approaching it directly, decides to ignore contents of letter,acceptsapologyofDVAC…Jayalalithaafilesanapplicationthatthecasebe adjourned for fourweeks as a new counselwill be appearing on herbehalf… Sasikala files an application in theHighCourt…HighCourtdismisses the application with strictures that DVAC is subverting thecourseofjusticeandthatSasikalahasfiledtheapplicationonlytodragoutthe proceedings … Accused 1 [Jayalalithaa] be examined by videoconferenceandbeexemptedfrompersonalappearance…24AjudgeintheHighCourtrecuseshimselffromhearingapetition…Evensothepetitioncomesupbeforehim…Hearingsbeadjournedasanapplicationagainstarejection by trial court has been filed in the Supreme Court … CourtdirectsDVAC to stop further investigation, anddirects the trial court tobear inmind the direction of the SupremeCourt that the case be heardday-to-day till completion…Statementof Jayalalithaa isbeingrecorded,at 5 p.m.; her counsel seeks adjournment for threeweeks to seek orderfromtheSupremeCourtwhethertherestofherstatementcanberecordedbyvideoconference…Sasikalafilesanapplicationseekingeightweeksassheisnotwell-versedinEnglishandwouldliketorecordherstatementinTamil…Trialcourtdismissestheapplication,shenowseeksthreeweekstochallengetheorder…WritisfiledchallengingcontinuanceofAcharyaonthegroundthatheisholdingtwoposts…Writiswithdrawn…APILis filed to the same effect … Series of applications filed by lawyers ofJayalalithaaandSasikalaarerejectedbytheHighCourtandtheSupremeCourt…Theirlawyersnowfileapplicationstobeallowedtoexamine‘allunfiled documents in the case’ … Sasikala files an application seekingadjournmentonmedicalgrounds…Whenthecasecomesup,shefilesyet

anotherapplication for furtheradjournmentonmedicalgrounds…Twoof the accused file applications that the case be held in abeyance ‘sincethereisnonotificationappointingtheSpecialJudgetoconductthecase’—thisin2012,eventhoughthecasehasbeengoingonsince2009andtheyand their counsel have been participating in the proceedings … Anapplicationthat the ‘questionof law’ that theyhaveraisedbereferredtotheHighCourt…AnapplicationthatthecourtexerciseitspowerunderSection309oftheCodeofCriminalProcedureandadjournthecase…25

[By now,moves have been set afoot to get Acharya to resign as specialpublicprosecutorandtobesmirchhisreputation.Eventually,heresigns—first from the post of advocate general, and then, after he has beenvindicated in regard to the working of the educational trust, as specialpublicprosecutor]…Accusedbeallowedtimetoproducecertifiedcopiesof an order of the Supreme Court … Dispute is now raised about thenumber of days that the SupremeCourt has allowed for inspection—21daysor21workingdays…MatteristakenbacktoSupremeCourt…

Andthiswasonlytill17January2013whenthegovernmentacceptedtheresignationofB.V.Acharyaasspecialpublicprosecutor.

Reflectingonthesedevices,Acharyawrote:

My appearance in the above case has taughtme such variety of novel grounds onwhichadjournmentscouldbesuccessfullysoughtthatIcouldwriteabookonthesubject‘LawofAdjournments’.However,Idesistfromdoingso,asIdonotwantanyaccusedintendingtoprolongtrialstotakeadvantageofit.26

‘But,Sir, thescoundrelsand their lawyersalreadyknowthe tricks,’ I tellMrAcharya,tryingtoneedleafewmoreexamplesoutofhim.

In response, Mr Acharya gives further details about some of thedevices,andrecountsmoreexamples.

About those applications for translations of documents,Mr Acharyaadds, ‘Thoughtranslationcopiesof thedocumentshadbeenfurnished in2005,morethanfourorfiveyearslaterobjectionswerefrequentlyraisedwith regard to correctness of the translation.’ And these were raised ‘ininstallments’sothateachobjectionhadtoberuleduponinturn.Andthedocumentsinquestionhadtobetranslatedalloveragain.

Next,lawyerswerechanged.Thenewsetoflawyerswouldpleadthat

theyneededtimetostudythecase.Andthentheywouldapplyforcertifiedcopiesofthethreesetsofallthedocumentsrunning,aswehaveseen,intothousandsofpagesonthegroundthatthepreviouslawyerhadnothandedoverallthedocuments.Theofficecouldnotfurnishthecertifiedcopiesofsuchalargenumberofdocumentsinahurry.

In almost every instance, the plea would be rejected. That providedoccasions to the lawyers to challenge the decision. ‘Every interlocutoryorderwaschallengedeitherbeforetheHighCourtorbeforetheSupremeCourt,’MrAcharyarecalls,‘andthoughtherewasnoorderofstaybythesuperiorcourts,adjournmentsweresoughtonthegroundthatthematterwas coming up before the superior courts very soon and hence the caseshouldbeadjourned.’

We have encountered a reference to Sasikala’s lawyers asking foradjournment ‘on health grounds’. It turns out that several adjournmentswere sought on the ground that Sasikala was getting treatment for hereyes. The result, Mr Acharya recalls, was that ‘the recording of herstatementwhichshouldhavebeenover inadayor two, tookmore thanelevenmonthstocomplete’.

Andthen,aswehaveseen,soonafterJayalalithaaonceagainbecamechief minister in 2011, the DVAC decided that it needed to furtherinvestigate the case. The public prosecutor pointed out how this wastotally uncalled for—in his assessment the sole objective of this ‘furtherinvestigation’ was to gather material to support the accused. Even so,‘further investigation’was conducted.Thematterhad tobe taken to theHighCourt: itquashedthestratagem.Andthen,aswesaw, inregardtothatorderofitsprincipalsecretary,theTamilNadugovernmenthadgoneaheadandappointedasitsowncounselthesameBhavaniSingh.TheHighCourtheldthatitcouldnotdoso,andonlythespecialpublicprosecutorshould appear in the High Court. The law prevailed. But each of thedevices served the purpose: each of them necessitated furtheradjournments.

Next, applications were repeatedly filed seeking exemption frompersonal appearance and permitting Jayalalithaa to answer questions inabsentia.ThematterwastakenallthewaytotheSupremeCourt:itturned

down this request also and directed her personal appearance. Again, apurpose was served for these proceedings also led to number ofadjournments.

Andsoon.

LESSONS

Severallessonsleapfromtheforegoing.Itwouldbeenoughforustonotethreeof them.The roleof anAcharya is of course exemplary.Butwhatabouttheotherlawyerswhoparticipatedintheprotractedproceedings?

Thepurposeoftheapplicationsforadjournmentwouldhavebeencleartothemostinnocentperson.Canourcourtsnotdomoretoneutralizethesedevices?

Isdraggingcasesinthiswaytheproperroleoflawyers?Afterall,theyaresupposedtobeinthefirstinstance‘officersofthecourt’.

Recall also that, seized of just one question—whether thedisproportionate assets case and the London hotel case should beclubbedor not—the SupremeCourt itselfwas responsible for the caseremaining at a standstill for five years in the trial court. Had theSupremeCourtnotdirectedthatthecasebeconcludedasexpeditiouslyaspossible?

WHYDOTHINGSNOTGETDONE?

Thatthecasewasbeingdraggedoutwasforalltosee.Andmostcertainly,this is not the only instance in which lawyers representing the rich andpowerful have used devices to stretch out the proceedings in court. Thequestion,therefore,arises:Isitthatnothingcanbedone?Orthat,fortheusualreason,nothinggetsdone?

That litigants and lawyers can be impelled to shun these devices isevident from the experience of other countries. Why is it that thoseconvictedintheUSdonotgoonfilingappeals?Onepartoftheansweris

simple:becausetheyruntherealprospectthat,iftheirappealisfoundtobewithout foundation, the sentencewillbe severely enhanced.Why is itthat lawyers and litigantsdonotdeploy thesedevices in theUK?Again,onepartof theanswer issimple:becauseveryhighcostsare imposedonthosewhoarefoundtobeusingtheproceedingsincourttoescapeorevendelayjustice.Moreover,intheUS,whiledecidingtheextenttowhichthesentenceshallbeenhancedand,intheUK,whiledecidingthequantumofcoststhatapartyshallhavetopay,thejudgeconsiderstheconductofthelitigant before as well as during the trial. In the UK, each individualapplicationduringtrialorappealmayinviteaseparateorderastocosts.RecallthoseapplicationsthatwerefiledonbehalfofJayalalithaaandCo.;recall that almost every order turning down their applications wasappealedagainst,everysooften,allthewaytotheSupremeCourt.Wouldthis have been done if the litigants knew that every single application,everysingleappealcouldcompoundtheamountsthattheywouldhavetopayintheend?Andnotjustbecauseofthetimeofthecourtsthattheissueor appeal would entail but also because of the impression that thesedevices would be fortifying in the minds of the judges regarding thelitigants’conduct?

InIndia,thattheproblemisextremehaslongbeenrecognized;thattheexistingprovisionsof lawarewholly inadequate todealwith ithas alsobeenlongrecognized.Andpossiblesolutionstoohavebeenlistedforlong.Whathappensinpractice?Ananalogyfromcivillawwillbarethestateofaffairs.

Takingnoteofthewaycaseswerebeingdraggedout,in1973theLawCommission, in its 54th report, recommended that a new section beintroducedintheCivilProcedureCode.Thesectionshouldprovide,‘TheCourtmay,whilepassinganorder for costs,make theparty responsiblefor delay with reference to any step in the litigation, pay the costsproportionate to that delay, whatever may be the ultimate event of thesuit.’27In1976,theprovisionwasintroducedintheformofSection35-B.Itreads:

Costsforcausingdelay.(1)If,onanydatefixedforthehearingofasuitorfortakinganysteptherein,apartytothe

suit-(a)failstotakethestepwhichhewasrequiredbyorunderthisCodetotakeonthatdate,or(b)obtainsanadjournmentfortakingsuchsteporforproducingevidenceoronanyotherground,theCourtmay,forreasonstoberecorded,makeanorderrequiringsuchpartytopaytotheother party such costs as would, in the opinion of the Court, be reasonably sufficient toreimbursetheotherpartyinrespectoftheexpensesincurredbyhiminattendingtheCourtonthatdate,andpaymentofsuchcosts,onthedatenextfollowingthedateofsuchorder,shallbeaconditionprecedenttothefurtherprosecutionof-(a)thesuitbytheplaintiff,wheretheplaintiffwasorderedtopaysuchcosts(b)thedefencebythedefendant,wherethedefendantwasorderedtopaysuchcosts…

Thefirstthingthatstrikesoneisthatthisprovisioniswoefullyinadequatetodealwiththesortsofderailmentsthatwehavejustencountered.For,inthe section, the focus is solelyon the litigantnotdoing in timewhat theCode requires him to do or what the court has asked him to do. Thesecondfeatureisthatevenwhenthecourtslevycostsontheerrantlitigant,they require him to pay an inconsequential amount—while courts areallowed and do exercise discretion, the indicated ceiling is a paltry Rs3,000.

Injudgmentafterjudgment,theSupremeCourtitselfhasheldthattheprovision in theCode aswell as the amounts that are levied arewhollyinadequatetomeetthekindsoflitigantswhoneedtobebroughttoheel.‘Thepresentsystemoflevyingmeagrecostsincivilmatters(ornocostsinsomematters), no doubt, iswholly unsatisfactory and does not act as adeterrent to vexatious or luxury litigation born out of ego or greed, orresorted to as a “buying-time” tactic,’ the court observed in anoft-citedcase. ‘More realistic approach relating to costs may be the need of thehour…’28 That was in 2009—nine years ago. In the following year, theSupreme Court again spoke in the same vein: ‘The lack of appropriateprovisionsrelating tocostshasresulted inasteady increase inmalicious,vexatious, false, frivolous and speculative suits, apart from renderingSection89oftheCodeineffective.29Anyattempt to reduce thependencyorencouragealternativedispute resolutionprocessesor to streamline thecivil justice system will fail in the absence of appropriate provisionsrelatingtocosts.ThereisthereforeanurgentneedforthelegislatureandtheLawCommissionofIndiatorevisittheprovisionsrelatingtocostsand

compensatorycostscontainedinSection35and35-AoftheCode.’30TheSupremeCourtalsopointedoutthatthelimitthathadbeenlaiddownonthecoststhatmaybeimposedonthelitiganthadreducedtheamountthatthelitigantwouldhavetoshellouttoasgoodasnothing:‘Theprovisionrelatingtocompensatorycosts31 inrespectoffalseorvexatiousclaimsordefences has become virtually infructuous and ineffective, on account ofinflation. Under the said Section, award of compensatory costs inflationandvexatiouslitigation,issubjecttoaceilingofRs.3,000/-.ThisrequiresarealisticrevisionkeepinginviewtheobservationsinSalemAdvocateBarAssociation(II)…’Notjustthat.Thecourtnotedthatwhiletheprovisionforthismeagreamountexists,‘Section35Aprovidingforcostsforcausingdelay is seldom invoked … It should be regularly employed, to reducedelay,’itdeclared—towhateffect,weshalljustsee.

Inthefollowingyearthequestioncameupagain.TheSupremeCourtrequestedtheLawCommissiontoassistitinformulatingstepsthatwouldkeep litigants from dragging out cases andwhichwould also keep themfrom embarking on vexatious, false and frivolous litigation. The LawCommissionrecommendedseveralsteps.TheSupremeCourtincorporatedthese in an important judgment, and urged Parliament and the HighCourts tomake appropriate changes—both in theCode and in the rulesthat govern the conduct of cases.32 It also stressed thatwhile directing alitiganttopaycosts,theamountorderedmustberealistic,giventheactualcosts that the opposing party would have had to bear; moreover, itspecificallyobservedthattheamountsthatmustbeleviedagainstfrivolousand vexatious litigation stand on a different footing: in such cases, themischief-maker must not be asked to pay just ‘compensatory costs’; theamount levied must be punitive. It listed five goals that the levies mustserve. For our present discussion, the first two alone need be contrastedwith the years andyears it takes for cases to reachany stageof finality,and, though thatwas on the criminal side,with the twenty years that ittooktheJayalalithaacasetoreachaconclusion:

(a)Itshouldactasadeterrenttovexatious,frivolousandspeculativelitigationsordefences.Thespectreofbeingmadeliabletopayactualcostsshouldbesuch,astomakeeverylitigantthink twicebeforeputting forth a vexatious, frivolousor speculative claimordefence. (b)Costs should ensure that the provisions of the Code, the Evidence Act and other laws

governing procedure are scrupulously and strictly complied with and that parties do notadoptdelayingtacticsormisleadthecourt.

AsfarastheSupremeCourtitselfisconcerned,thecourtnoted,itcanimposecostshigherthantheRs3,000ceilingthathasbeenset.Itcandoso because of the unique plenary powers that it has been given underArticle142oftheConstitution.ThisArticle,thereaderwillrecall,states:

EnforcementofdecreesandordersofSupremeCourtandordersas todiscovery,etc.—(1)The SupremeCourt in the exercise of its jurisdictionmay pass such decree ormake suchorderasisnecessaryfordoingcompletejusticeinanycauseormatterpendingbeforeit,andanydecreesopassedorordersomadeshallbeenforceablethroughouttheterritoryofIndiain suchmannerasmaybeprescribedbyorunderany lawmadebyParliamentand,untilprovision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by orderprescribe…33

Soon, thecourtwasfacedwithacase inwhich, toquote itswords, ‘Theappellants…haveharassedtherespondentstothehiltforfourdecadesinatotallyfrivolousanddishonestlitigationinvariouscourts.Theappellantshavealsowastedjudicialtimeofthevariouscourtsforthelast40years.’34

Thecourtonceagainadvertedtotheneedtoimposeadequatecoststostopsuchmalpractices:

Impositionofactual,realisticorpropercostsand/ororderingprosecutionwouldgoalongway in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricateddocuments by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessaryadjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases the courts may consider orderingprosecution.Otherwise itmay not be possible tomaintain purity and sanctity of judicialproceedings.

ItimposedacostofRs200,000ontheoffendinglitigants.Didthissetthetrend?Weshallseeinamoment.

Theafflictions—ofdelays, andof vexatious and frivolous litigation—continued.TheLawCommissiondecidedtostudythematterindetail.35Itrecalled what the Supreme Court had observed in cases such as theforegoing. It once again listed recommendations for dealing with theproblem.Twopointsthatstandoutfromitsnarrativeexplainwhythingscontinuethewaythatwehaveseenthemdo.

The Law Commission noted that the Civil Procedure Code providesthatthecourtshalldirectwhatcostsshouldbepaidbywhomsoonafteror

alongwithitsverdict—‘followingtheevent’,asthephrasegoes.Thatshallbe the norm. And where it decides that costs may not be paid, it shallrecord its reasons inwriting.36Citing anotherwell-known case inwhichthe Supreme Court had dealt with the matter of levying costs, theCommissionnoted that the SupremeCourt itself haddrawnattention tothemodel rules that had been drawn up by a committee headed by thechairmanoftheLawCommission.Theseruleshadprovided:

8.Costs:Sofarasawardingofcostsatthetimeofjudgmentisconcerned,awardingofcostsmust be treated generally as mandatory inasmuch as the liberal attitude of the courts indirectingthepartiestobeartheirowncostshadledpartiestofileanumberoffrivolouscasesinthecourtsortoraisefrivolousandunnecessaryissues.Costsshouldinvariablyfollowtheevent.Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but loses on a number ofother issues or points which were unnecessarily raised, costs must be appropriatelyapportioned.Specialreasonsmustbeassignedifcostsarenotbeingawarded.

Costsshouldbeassessedaccordingtorulesinforce.Ifanyofthepartieshasunreasonablyprotracted the proceedings, the Judge should consider exercising discretion to imposeexemplary costs after taking into account the expenses incurred for the purpose ofattendanceontheadjourneddates.

The model rule on this point for an appellate court was along similarlines.37

ThatiswhattheCodelaysdown.ThatiswhatthemodelrulesthattheSupremeCourthadnotedlaydown.ThatiswhattheSupremeCourtitselfhasheldincaseaftercase.Inpractice?ThisiswhattheLawCommissionfound:

Sub-section(2)isindicativeofthelegislativepolicythatordinarilycostsshallbeawardedtothepartywho succeeds and if it is otherwise, theParliament requires theCourt to recordreasons for disallowing costs. Very often, the rule that costs should follow the event isobservedinbreach.Manyofthecasesaredisposedofeitherbysaying‘noorderastocosts’or‘partiestobeartheirowncosts’.WhentheCourt,especiallythesuperiorcourts,disallowcostsorsay‘noorderastocosts,’reasonsareseldomrecorded.SuchcrypticdirectivesdonotcontainanythingwhichindicatethemindoftheCourtastowhycostsarebeingdisallowed.

TheLawCommissionwentontostatetwofurtherfacts:

[One] There are also instanceswhere theHighCourts and the SupremeCourt have beendirectingcoststobepaidtoabodyotherthanapartytotheproceeding,fore.g.,acharitableorganization or legal services authority, which practice is disapproved in some judgmentswhileinothersitissodone.

[Two] Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein costs are awarded or not

allowed,donotgiveanyindicationofanyunderlyingprincipleandnoguidelineorrationalecanbededucedtherefrom.

Wewill see the relevance of both these observations as we come to anexemplary fine that was levied in a recent case involving contempt ofcourt.

In an annexure to its report, the LawCommission listed cases uponcasesinwhichtheSupremeCourtaswellasHighCourtsconcludedtheirjudgmentswiththosewords,‘Noorderastocosts’or‘Partiestobeartheirowncosts’withoutstatinganyreason.Indeed,inseveralofthecaseslistedbytheLawCommission,theSupremeCourtobservedthatthecasewasafit one for levying ‘exemplary costs’, and yet in the very next sentence,sometimes in the same sentence, declared that it was, nonetheless, notgoing to levy any costs. If the SupremeCourt itself does not follow theprovision in law; if the SupremeCourt itself does not dowhat it has sooftenproclaimedmustbedone,whywouldothers?

The Commission’s report also showed that no norms or rules werebeingfollowed infixingthequantumofcosts: in thecases itcitedwhereoneortheotherpartywasaskedtopaycosts,thepartiesweredirectedtopayanywherebetweenRs500andRs500,000.Therange isoneaspect.Themaximumamount—Rs500,000—thatitimposedtoohasalesson:dokeepthisamountinmindwhenwecometothatcaseinvolvingcontemptofcourt.

Andthentherewastheotherfeature.Norulesseemedtogovernwhatthecourtwoulddecreeaboutthepartytowhomthecostsshouldbepaid.Sometimes it was the party that had been subjected to the travail ofprotractedlitigation;inothers,thepartywasdirectedtopaytheamounttotheSupremeCourtMediationCentre,ortheNationalAssociationfortheBlind,ortheLegalAidSocietyoftheSupremeCourt.Forthisreason,dokeepaneyeout for theorganizations towhichand thecauses forwhichthe Supreme Court has recently directed the money to be paid in thatcontemptcase.

Now,itisnobody’scasethatthequantumofcostsandpenaltiesshouldbedetermineduniformlyandmechanically,andthatcourtsmusthavenodiscretion.Afterall,noonewouldwantthecostsandpenaltiestobeput

sohighthatthepoorwidowandthegiantcorporationshouldriskhavingtopayanidenticalamount.Judgesmustbeabletodeterminetheamounttaking into account the capacity of the litigant to pay, as well as therelevanceandintrinsicmeritoftheissuesthatarebeingraised.Evenmoreso, theymust have the discretion to discern the pattern of the litigant’sconduct.Thepointisthattheleviesbetraynoneoftheseconsiderationsashavingdeterminedtheoutcome.

BUTWHY?

Wenotedabove, ‘For theusual reason,nothing getsdone.’What is ‘theusualreason’? It is that in thissphere,as inothers, thedecisiontoaffectimprovementsrestsinhandsofpersonswhowouldbethefirsttobenailedweretheimprovementstobebroughtabout.

Twosmallchanges—oneinthewaycasesarereportedandtheotherinaprovisionoflaw—willhelp.

Today,itiscustomaryforjudgmentsofthehighercourtstorecordthedateonwhichthecasewasinstitutedorthewritwasfiled,andthedateonwhichthejudgmentisbeingdelivered.Thisshouldbesupplementedwithrecording how many adjournments have been allowed in the case. Andwhile thecourtsneednotbeburdenedwith the task,others—journalists,public-spirited organizations and individuals—should list the kinds ofissues that have been raised in at least cases involving public servants.Similarly, currently a judgment reports the date on which, say, theparticularwritwhichisbeingdisposedofinthisinstancewasfiledandthedateonwhichitisbeingdisposedof.Butfromthiswedonotgetanideaofthelengthoftimeforwhichtheoverallcasehasbeenknockingaboutinthe courts. We will learn, for instance, when the appeal against a trialcourtorderregardingdocumentsbeingimperfectlytranslatedwasfiledandwhenitisbeingdisposedof.Butwewillnotknowthedatefromwhichthedisproportionateassetscasehasbeengoingon.Theleastthatcourtclerkscanrecord,inanycasetheleastthatourlegalcorrespondentscandowhilereportingthehighercourt’srulingregardingtranslationsistoalsoremindreadersthatthiswritispartofacasethathasbeengoingonsince1997.

Thatisaboutreporting.Butthebasicproblemsaredifferent.First,aswehave seen, theprovisionsof lawarenot such aswoulddeter anyonefromdraggingoutcases.Surely,ifwereallyareseriousaboutdiscouraginglitigantsfromdoingthis,thelawmustprovidefornotjust‘compensatorycosts’—reasonablecoststhattheotherpartywouldhaveincurredhad,say,theadjournmentnotbeenwrested—itmustexplicitlyprovideforpunitiveandexemplarycosts.Theevengreaterproblemisthereluctanceofjudgesto use such powers as the law has given them. Recall the felicity withwhichsixty-fouroftheseventy-sixwitnesseswentbackonwhattheyhadstatedonoath—themomentJayalalithaacamebacktopower.Eitherwhatthey had stated earlier was false, or what they stated subsequently wasfalse. The punishment for false evidence is imprisonment from three toseven years, and fine.38 Was even one of those making the somersaultpunishedwithimprisonmentforevenoneday?Wasanyofthemaskedtopayevenasinglerupee?

Theprincipalremedylieswithcivilsociety.Wemust,allofusmustputpressure on the political class to implement the reforms that have beensuggested so often and for so long.Wemust, all of us must name andshame litigants as well as professionals like ourselves—lawyers in thisinstance—whousesuchdevicestokeeptheirclientsfromgettingwhattheydeserve.Ifprecedentiswhatweneed—well,theUKofficiallypublishesa‘List of vexatious litigants, banned from starting court cases withoutpermission’,andupdates it fromtimeto time.39Wecan improveon thatand publish a list of litigants and lawyers who specialize in securingadjournments and deploying other devices to keep cases lingering.Casesinvolvingpublicservantswouldbeagoodplacetostart.

4

Whencourtsarecompelledtostepoutoftheirdomain

In the 1950s, socialism was much in the air. The ‘socialist pattern ofsociety’ asdistinct from ‘socialism’.The ‘socialistic patternof society’ asdistinct from the ‘socialist pattern of society’—these were subjects ofheated debates across campuses. The distinguished and taciturn civilservant,DrTarlokSingh,thethensecretaryofthePlanningCommission,had come to our college. ‘What is the difference between “the socialistpatternofsociety”and“thesocialisticpatternofsociety”?’wehadasked,hopingtogetalistoffeaturesthatwecouldreproduceinourexams.‘Thesameasbetween“fouro’clock”and“fouro’clockish”,’hehadexplained,and,satisfiedthathehadexplaineditall,movedontothenextquestion.

A team had gone to study ‘cooperatives’ in China. It produced aneffusive report—in retrospect, its value consists in showing us how littletheygleanedofwhatwasactuallygoingoninChinabehindthefaçadeof‘cooperatives’. Dr V.K.R.V. Rao had come to the college to deliver alecture on the subject.He alluded to theway somemajor public figureschanged their positiondependingon the issue.Weare all against dowrywhenourdaughters are gettingmarried, he said.Butwhenour sons aregetting married, we want ancient traditions to be preserved! Much thesamegoes forourattitudes towards judicialactivism.Wewant judges tobeactivistswhenthecauseorcaseisonetowhichwearecommitted.Andweareagainsttheiractivismwhenthecauseorcaseisoneweoppose!

Hence, we need criteria that go beyond individual decisions, criteriathatgobeyondevenactivisminpursuitofparticularcauses.1

Butfirsttwogeneralpoints:Theneedforthejudiciarytostepoutsideitstraditionalrolehasarisen,

aswehavenoticedearlier,becausetheexecutivehasfailedtodischargeitsfunctions.TheSupremeCourtpasseditsfar-reachingordersinHussainaraKhatoon2 and similar cases after we established beyond doubt that theexecutive had been inhuman in regard to undertrials. Following up anaccountbyMrK.F.Rustomji, apoliceofficer renowned forhis integrityand service to the country—he was one of the major organizers of theMuktiVahini—mycolleaguesatThe IndianExpress visited jail after jailandestablishedthatsomeoftheinmateshadbeenlanguishinginjailsforuptofourteenyearsawaitingtrial;eversomanyhadbeenlanguishinginthose jailswaiting for thecourts to takeup theircases forperiods far inexcessofthemaximumperiodsforwhichtheywouldbesentencediftheywere convictedof the crime forwhich theyhadbeen charged.The samesequenceunfoldedinregardtoconsumerprotection.Andlaterinregardtotheenvironment.

Sometimes the Supreme Court has had to intervene not because theexecutive has been inactive but because it has not been doing its jobconscientiously.Recallhowinvestigatingagencieswerebeingmisused—topursueaninvestigationortodiluteacaseinaccordancewiththepartisanconvenience of the rulers of the day. This is what spurred the SupremeCourt, fromVineetNarain3 onwards, to takeadirect role inmonitoringthe investigation—even when it was fully conscious that a lower courtcould be influenced by the fact that the evidence and logic which werebeing subsequently placed before it had resulted from an investigationsupervisedbytheSupremeCourtitself.

The same thing happened in the case of legislators. Legislators oftenproclaim that theHouse alone shall decide on the conduct of legislatorsduring the proceedings of the House. The anti-defection law explicitlyprovidesthatthedecisionoftheSpeakershallbefinal.Butsomeyearsago,the decisions of the Speakerswere somanifestly partisan that legislatorsthemselves went to courts for redress. The courts heard them and gaveverdicts. Legislators did not—in fact, in view of how very partisan theSpeakershadbeen—theycouldnotobject.

Exactlythesamesequenceunfoldedinregardtomisuseofgovernors.Ithas long been accepted that when it comes to the grounds on which agovernorhasrecommendedPresident’sRule,thecourtsshallnotexaminethevalidityofthegrounds.Butsomanifestlypartisanhavetheactionsofgovernors been on occasion that the courts have had no difficulty ingettingaroundthisruleofself-denialbythemake-believethat,whiletheyshall not examine the validity of the grounds on which the governorrecommendedacourseofaction, theyshall examinewhetherhehadanygrounds at all. And some of themost far-reaching judgments have beendeliveredusingthistoehold.

Second, theopportunity to intervenehasarisenbecause the executiveand legislatureshavebecomelessand less legitimate.Forneitherof thesedevelopments—whetherfortheneedtointerveneorfortheopportunitytodo so—is the judiciary responsible. But as the judiciary is pulled fartherand farther afield, it would be well-advised to adhere to some rules ofthumb:

1.Lesttheyacquirethereputationofbeingknights-errantrushingaroundhuntingforissuesonwhichtheycanpronounce,courtsshouldinterveneonly after the fact that the executive is not going to discharge itsresponsibilitieshasbeenunequivocallyestablished.

2. When the judiciary does intervene to goad the executive to dosomething, itsdecisionmustbe informedby thehighest expertise, andafter thinking through the varied situations that may develop as aconsequence of its orders.Unfortunately—aswewill have occasion toseewhenweglanceatitsordersonadmissions,onshuttingdownliquorvends,onplayingtheNationalAnthem—thatisnotalwaysthecase.Onoccasion,whenithassetuppanelsof‘experts’,thesehaveconsistedofactivistswhoseadvice,asamatterofprinciple,isnotalwaysconstrainedbyfacts.

3. One of the elements in this expert analysis must be the effects thatalternative directionswill have on the ground.This is vital for severalreasons:

Thesecasesareoftenbroughtupbyactivists.Manyofthemareone-

issue fundamentalists. For them, the ‘principle’ to which they areweddedmustprevail,irrespectiveofcollateralconsequences.

Unfortunately,ourlawyersdonotalwaysthinkittobetheirdutytopresent thewhole truth, topresentall the facts to the courts.Theyproceed on the assumption that their duty is to present only thosefacts that will bolster the side of the case that they happen to berepresenting.

Thejudgesthemselvesarenotalwayssufficientlyacquaintedwiththesituation on the ground: few journalists would have been insidefactoriesandyetwepronounceonthem;inthesameway,fewjudgeswouldhavebeeninsidefactoriesandyettheirrulingshave life-and-deathimplicationsforprojectsandenterprises.

Among the effects that must be considered are the effects ofadjournments,andallowing lawyers togoonwith theirarguments.The project to develop Lavasa was a leap of the imagination. Forreasonsthatarestillnotclear,thegovernmentofthedaycalledahalttoallconstruction—andthisostensiblyonthebasisofa ‘report’byofficialswhopaidjustaperfunctoryvisittothesite.Allworkatthesitewasbroughttoastandstill.ThematterwenttotheBombayHighCourt.FromNovember2010,whenthe firsthearing tookplace, toNovember 2011, there were fifteen hearings. The benches changedseveraltimes.Duringthefirsttwomonths,andthenagainduringthelastsixmonths,lawofficersappearingforthegovernmentwouldsaythat they needed another few weeks to secure instructions fromDelhi. It was only in November 2011, when the judge gave anultimatumtothelawofficerappearingforthegovernmenttoeithergivesubstantivereasonsforshuttingdowntheprojectorclearit,thatthegovernmentclearedthewayforworktoresume.BythattimetheLavasa Corporation had suffered irreversible damage. And theinstance—alongwiththoseinvolvingPOSCO,VedantaandCairn—became an example that was cited at investor conferences as anargumentagainstinvestinginIndia.InCourtsandTheirJudgments,IhavedescribedthecaseofNarmada.TheSupremeCourtstayedtheraising of the dam height on 5 May 1995. The final hearings

concluded,fiveyearslater,inMay2000.ThefinaljudgmentcameinSeptember 2000. Over Rs 10,000 crore had already been investedbeforethecourt’sstayorder.Therewas,ofcourse,thelossintermsof interest. But even greater was the loss in regard to productionforgone.

AndIhavefoundittrulyshockingthatinjustifyingtheirconclusions,somejudgeshaveinvokedtheworst‘authorities’.InIndraSawhney,4

theSupremeCourtcitedwithapprovalthespeechofV.P.Singhathismost opportunist moment—the moment when he had panicked,fearingtherallythatDeviLalhadthreatened.‘Youtalkof“merit”,but what is themerit of a systemwhich…?’ he had declaimed. Inanotherjudgment,theSupremeCourtcitedthewordsofamanwhohadspenttwodecadesjustifyingoursubjugationbytheBritish;whofor twodecadeshadnot just spread,butadvocatedhatredbetweensectionsofoursociety;whohadopenlyadvocatedviolence—allthisso that the judges could joinhim inproclaiming that thenotionofmerit is an ‘Aryan invention’ to continue the suppression of theScheduledCastesandScheduledTribes!

Unfortunately,theirpronouncementssuggestedthatseveraljudgeshadthemselvesbeeninfectedbytheactivists’virus.HowcouldajudgeoftheSupremeCourt—JusticeD.A.Desai,inthisinstance—proclaimthathehadjoinedthebenchtooverturnthissystemfromwithin,andstillcontinuetoadheretotheoathhehadswornonhisappointment?

Nor can one believe that all this flowed from a bleeding heart. TwovenerableandacutelyobservantladiesusedtotourIndia,astheydidotherAsian countries, to select persons who might be considered for theMagsaysay Award. They used to seek the opinion of previous awardwinnersbecausetheyhadcometoknowthemwell.Ononeoftheirvisits,theyaskedme, ‘Butwhoisthis judge…?’Iexplainedhowhewasoneofthebest-knownjudges,wellknownforenlargingtheambitofourrights—albeitaftertheEmergencywasover—andaskedinturn,‘Butwhydoyouaskmeabouthim?’

‘Hekeepssendingushisjudgmentsthroughsomefriendofhis,ajudge

inAustralia,sothathebeselectedfortheaward.’Icouldn’thavefeltsmaller:ajudgesowell-knowndrawingattentionto

hisjudgmentsforamereaward.Inanothercase,itdidseemtoanobserverlikemethatthejudgehadgotcarriedawaybyhispublicimageofbeingasaviour of the voiceless. And the tragedy—one for which the country ispayingtoday—wasthat,becauseofthenatureofdiscourseinIndiaduringthelastthirtyyears,thishandfulacquiredthehighmoralground,andtheirpronouncements determined the direction of so many subsequentjudgments.Ofcourse,theprogressivejudgeswerenottheonlyoneswhowereresponsibleforthisoutcome:muchofwhathappenedsubsequentlyinjurisprudencewasduetothediffidenceoftheliberaljudges.Theydidnothavethecouragetostanduptotheintellectualfashionsoftheday.

Finally, it is imperative that once a court does give anorder, itmustensure that it is obeyed to the dot. In many instances, ringingpronouncementsweremade,theyweresentaround.Andthatwasit.Intheundertrial cases, the Supreme Court directed that a census of all jailinmatesbetakeneverytwoyears—hasitinquiredifsuchacensusisindeedbeing conducted? Several pronouncements on the environment havesuffered the same fate.Lookat theSupremeCourt’spronouncementsoncleaningourrivers,andlookattheconditionoftheriverthatflowswithinthreetofourminutes’drivefromit,theYamuna.

Themostconsequentialofsuchinstances,andtheonethathasadirectbearing on the security of the country and the violence that we havewitnessedinAssamperiodically,is,ofcourse,theSupremeCourt’sringingjudgment in the Sarbananda Sonowal case.5 Having concluded that theIllegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) (IMDT) Act was enactedprecisely toprotect illegal infiltrators; having concluded that the scaleofsuch infiltrationwasbynowagraveand imminent threat to thesecurityand integrity of the country, should the court not have set up somemechanismtomonitorwhetheranythingwasbeingdonetoimplementitsjudgment?

AcasethattheSupremeCourthastakenuprecentlyprovidesagoodtest case. In 2014, the SupremeCourt had taken note of reports that asmany as 1,581 criminal cases were pending against legislators. On 10

March 2014, it passed orders that cases in which legislators wereimplicated must be disposed of within a year. The prime ministerappropriatedtheidea,anddeclaredfromtherampartsoftheRedFortthathewouldbringalawtoensurethatcasesagainstlawmakersarefinishedwithinayear.MorethanthreeyearshavepassedsincetheSupremeCourtgave its order. In a hearing on 1 November 2017, it asked what hadhappened to those cases: how many had been disposed of? Far fromenacting the law that the primeminister hadproclaimedhis governmentwould have the Parliament pass, the government could not even giveinformationonthestatusofthosecases.Thejudgessaidthatspecialcourtsshould be established for cases involving legislators. The governmentdemurred:settingupsuchcourtsistheresponsibilityofthestates,itsaid!When the judgespersisted, thegovernment sought sixweeks to comeupwithascheme.

That three years should have passedwithout any action having beentakensincetheorderonsoimportantamatterwasgivenspeaksvolumes.On theotherhand, imaginewhatabeginning theSupremeCourtwouldmakeifitnowpersistsinthismatter,andensuresthatthecasesinvolvinglegislatorsareindeeddisposedofwithinayear.

Hence,IwouldurgeLenin’smaxim,‘Fewerbutbetter’—thatis,iftheissueisofsuchimportancethatthecourtfeelscompelledtostepoutsideitstraditional bounds, it must follow up its decision and institute amechanismtoensurethatitsdirectivesarecarriedout.

Above all, for the decisions to be effective, the peoplemust innatelyrespect them.And theywill have this respect for decisions to the extentthat they have respect for the court. Hence, nothing is more importantthanintegrityofeverysinglejudge.Themoreactivistacourtis,themoreevery judgemustbeseentobeaparagonofvirtueand impartiality.Themoreeverysinglejudgmentmustbebasedonthesoundestlegalprinciples.Themorecogentandimmaculatemustthereasoningbe.Andthemoreitmustbecomprehensibletoevenlaypeoplesothatnointerestedparty—inparticular the executive and the legislators—is able to sowdoubts in themindsofpeople,‘Thejudiciaryissteppingoutofline.’

Ofthese,letustakeuptworequirementsinturn:one,whenthecourt

feels compelled to intervene, itmust ensure that itsorders areobeyed tothedot;andtwo,thatitsreputationmustalwaysbespotless.

5

Adherence?

Time and time again courts pass far-reaching, detailed orders, and thenjustdon’tlookbacktoseewhethertheyhavebeenobeyed.

Severalyearsago,IhadoccasiontoexaminetwosuchordersthattheSupremeCourthadgivenin1996and1998regardingthedisposalofsolidwasteinDelhi.Apartfromgivingspecificdirections,thecourthadaskedthat reports be submitted every two months; later this was changed toevery fourmonths. In all, thirty-two reportswere submitted, twenty-twoafter theSupremeCourt’sorders.Eachandevery report stated that littlehadbeendone, that theproblemwasgettingworse.Yet,noonewastheworse for them. It seemed that the reports, having been asked for andreceived,werejustfiled.1

Ofcourse, therearecounter-instances: thedoggednesswithwhichtheSupreme Court has continued to follow Sahara to ensure that thecontrollersofthecompanymeettheirobligationsisanexcellentexample.

Butitisdistressingthatthatisnotthecaseintoomanyinstances.Theotherday,asIwasaskingadistinguishedadvocateaboutthemechanismthat the Supreme Court has for examining the extent to which itsdirectionsarebeing followed,hereferredme toacase thatcreatedsomeflutteringovernmentcirclesrecently:CommonCausev.UnionofIndia.2

The record indicated that theoriginalwritwas filed in2003.Thatmusthavebeenbymyfather—beforehepassedawayin2005,hewastheone-manCommonCause.The judgmentcamein2015,twelveyearsaftertheoriginalwritwasfiled,andtenyearsaftertheonewhofiledit,myfather,had passed away. The court was emphatic in its original judgment.

However, in deference to the urging of governments, it issued a partialmodificationin2016.Evenso,importantdirectionssurvived.

ThepetitiontothecourtunderArticle32hadpointedtothecolossalamounts thatwerebeingspentonadvertisementsbyrulingpartiesat theCentreandinthestates,amountsoutofthetaxeswepay.Itpointedoutthattheseadvertisementsgaveanunfairadvantageintheensuingelectionstowhicheverhappenedtobetherulingparty.Moreover,thephotographsof prime ministers, chief ministers, ministers and others helped buildpersonalitycults—sometimesofunworthypersons.Itprayedthatthecourtspelloutguidelinestoregulategovernmentadvertisements.

Thejudgmentcametenyearsaftermyfatherhadpassedaway.Inmanyways,itwasavindicationofwhathehadurged.Forourpresentpurpose,wemayconfineourselvestojustfivepoints.

The Supreme Court said that photographs did indeed foster apersonalitycult,thatinfuturegovernmentadvertisementscouldcarrythephotographsonlyofthepresident,theprimeministerandtheChiefJusticeofIndia—and,ineachcase,onlyaftertheirpermission.Inthesubsequentreviewwhichitissuedin2016,thecourtrelaxedthisdirectionsomewhat:inthecaseofadvertisementsputoutbystategovernments,photographsofthe governor and the chief minister could be published. Second, in thisregard the court said that the photograph of the minister handling theportfolio or project could be published ‘in lieu of’ the primeminister orchiefministerasthecasemaybe.

Who cannot see the matter that is being projected in governmentadvertisements thesedays—say, since2015and2016, theyears inwhichthe court gave its directions?On certaindays, photographsof theprimeminister appear onmultiple pages of a newspaper: it almost seems thatministries anddepartments are under instructions that theymust includethe photograph of the prime minister. Even in advertisements of statesruledbytheBharatiyaJantaParty(BJP)—forinstance,thoseputoutbytheGovernment ofMadhya Pradesh, the statemany senior people ofwhichareimplicatedintheVyapamscam,ascamthatisinthehandsoftheCBI—theprimeminister’svisageappearsprominently;inmostcasesitislargerthanthatofthepoorchiefminister.Andtherecanbenodoubtthatthis

hasbeenoneofthedevicesbywhichapersonalitycultisbeingsoughttobe built. Do these advertisements suggest that the order of the SupremeCourtisbeingcompliedwith?Andcoulditbethatjudgesdonotseefull-pageadsappearingdayafterdayinthepapers?

AnotherguidelineonwhichtheSupremeCourtwasemphaticwasthatmultiple advertisementsmarking the same event (say, the birth or deathanniversaryofsomedignitary)orschememustnotbe issuedbydifferentdepartmentsandministries.You justhave to lookat thepapers,andseethattheguidelineisbeingflouteddayinanddayout.

Third, the Supreme Court had directed that an ombudsman beappointed to ensure that government advertisements adhere to theguidelines.Asgovernmentsobjectedstrenuouslytothismandate,thecourtsaid that, all right, if not an ombudsman, let a three-person committeemonitor compliance with the guidelines—a committee of three personsknownfortheirexpertiseandimpartiality.Foralmostayearnocommitteewas formed. Eventually, the committee was indeed formed: I leave ashomework for the reader to find out who the three members are, andwhether they fit the description of persons that the Supreme Court hadmandated.Norisitthatthecommitteehasnotbeendoinganything.Thecommittee has indeed been taking the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)governmentinDelhitotaskforitsadvertisements,butnotawordontheever-moreblatantviolationoftheSupremeCourtguidelinesbytheCentralgovernment.

Next, the court stressed that advertisements using government fundsmustnotbeusedtoadvancetheinterestsofarulingparty.Whenfull-pageadvertisementsaretakenout,andgrandfunctionsorganizedtoresurrect,sayPanditDeendayalUpadhyaya,aretheinterestsofaparticularpartynotadvanced?

Finally, thecourtre-emphasizedthatgovernmentadvertisementsmustnot become a device of patronage or punishment, that the distributionamongmediamustbeaccordingtosomeobjectivecriterialikecirculation.Isitatallpossiblethatthecourtwouldnothavenoticedanyinstanceatallof discrimination? It would have to look no farther than Jaipur:government advertisements to theRajasthanPatrika were stoppedwhen

theystartedpublishingfactsabouttheRajasthangovernment.

‘WILFULANDDELIBERATE’DISREGARD

Inthefunctionstheyperform—forinstance,thatofinvestigatingcrimes,ofpresenting evidence to courts—the police are as much an arm of thejudiciaryastheyareoftheexecutive.However,overthedecadesthepolicehave become the private armies of those who are in office. Cases thatrulers-of-the-daywant pursued are pursued, the ones theywant derailedare derailed. ‘Evidence’ they want produced is fabricated, evidence theywant suppressed is suppressed. Lathi charge, false encounters … suchthingshavebecomesynonymouswiththeword‘police’.

Andyettheprimaryblamedoesnotliewiththepolice.Thatlieswiththe political rulers—they are the ones who have thought nothing ofconvertingwhatshouldbeashieldforlawfulcitizensintoaprivateposse.Thefaultofthepolice—andthatmeans,itsseniorpersonnel—liesisgoingalong.

Itwas inNovember1977—fortyyearsago—that theNational PoliceCommission was appointed. It consisted of distinguished, experiencedpersons.TheCommissionsubmittedeightreportsbetweenitsappointmentandMay 1981when it gave its final report. In the years that followed,severalothercommitteesandcommissionswereappointedtolookintothesame sorts of questions that the National Police Commission hadexamined.Theyalsosubmittedtheirreports.TheUnionhomeministerdidhisbit:hewrotealetter!Tothechiefministersandstatehomeministers,urging them to implement the recommendations. In 2002, the NationalHuman Rights Commission noted that far from steps being taken toreformthepolice,thesituationhaddeterioratedfurther.

Anofficerwhohadbeendirectorgeneralofpoliceofourlargeststate,UttarPradesh (UP), andalsoofoneofourmost troubled states,Assam,andthenthedirectorgeneraloftheBorderSecurityForce,PrakashSingh,watchedallthiswithmountingdismay.Havingwaitedforfifteenyearsforgovernments to implementmeasures to saveandreform thepolice,heatlast filed a petition in the Supreme Court requesting the court to give

directions to governments to take thenecessary steps in this regard.Thepetitionsetoutspecific,‘glaringinstances’ofwrongdoing.Iturgedspecificandeminentlypracticalmeasuresthatcouldbetaken.

The Supreme Court gave its verdict a decade after the petition wasfiled,twenty-fiveyearsaftertheNationalPoliceCommissionhadgivenitsrecommendations.3 The court directed the formation in each state of aState Security Commission that would insulate the police from undueinterference by the government of the day. It directed that the directorsgeneralofpolice,theinspectorsgeneralandotherofficersmustbepostedforfixedtenures, itspecifiedtheminimumtimebeforewhichtheofficersmust not be shunted out of their assignments. It directed that theinvestigative functions be separated from policing and prosecution. Itdirected that each state constitute a Police Establishment Board todetermineallpostings,transfersandpromotionsofandbelowtherankofadeputysuperintendentofpolice.AnditdirectedthataPoliceComplaintsAuthoritybesetupatthedistrictleveltowhichcitizenscouldreportpolicehighhandedness.

It specified that its directionsmust be implemented by 31December2006,andthattheCabinetsecretaryinthecaseoftheUniongovernmentandtherespectivechiefsecretaryinthecaseofeachstategovernmentmustreportcomplianceby3January2007.

Thecourtheard thematter twice in January2007 toassesswhat thestates had done.Most of the states had not implemented the directives.Instead of hauling those responsible for contempt, the Supreme Courtextendedthetimeto10April2007.

The deadline over, Prakash Singh filed a petition requesting theSupremeCourttoholdsixstatesincontemptfornothavingimplementeditsrecommendations.

Instead of complying with the directives, one state government afteranother now found fault with the directions. Some, like Tamil Nadu,maintained that in fact the Supreme Court had no authority to issuedirectionsinthisregard.Statesnowaskedforreviewofthejudgment.InAugust2007, theSupremeCourtdismissed the reviewpetitions thathadbeen filed by six states—Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab and

UP.Soon, state governments, led by Gujarat, passed laws and issued

ordinances to, in effect, circumvent and nullify the Supreme Court’sdirections.

InNovember2007,PrakashSinghagainmovedtheSupremeCourttohauluptheconcernedstates—thistimethefourthathaddonetheleasttoimplementtheSupremeCourt’sdirections—forcontempt.Hepointedouthowastate likeUPwas ‘openlyandbrazenlydefying thedirections’.Totakeoneexample, ithadbeentransferringseniorofficersatwhim:about200 officers had been shunted around, some twice in the precedingmonths.

He requested the Supreme Court to also ask the High Courts tomonitorcomplianceortoitselfsetupamonitoringcommitteeheadedbysomeformerjudgeoftheSupremeCourt.

Thecourt setupamonitoringcommitteeunderJusticeK.T.Thomas.The committee submitted four reports between October 2008 andSeptember 2009. The committee recommended contempt proceedingsagainstsixstatesfornotatallimplementingthecourt’sdirectives:Orissa,MadhyaPradesh,WestBengal,UP,TamilNadu,andJammuandKashmir.Itisnotjustthattheyhadnotbeenimplementingthecourt’sdirectives,thecommitteereported,theyhadbeen‘totallyindifferentformonthstogethereven to letters from theChairmanof theMonitoringCommittee seekingtheircommentsonreasonsfornoncompliance’.

Several states again directly challenged the authority of the SupremeCourttogivedirectionsinregardtothepolice.TheUniongovernment,inits turn, repeated the very arguments which the court had earlierconsideredandrejected.

Therefore,inSeptember2010,forthethirdtimePrakashSinghmovedthecourttoproceedagainstthestatesforcontempt.Heprovideddetailsofhowthecourt’sdirectiveswerebeingflouted.Totakeoneinstance,whilethecourthaddirectedthatthedirectorsgeneralofpoliceshouldbepostedforfixedtenures,andthattheyshouldnotbeshuntedtootherassignmentstill theminimumperiodwasover, inUPsixof thedirectorsgeneralhadhadtenuresrespectivelyofoneyear,eight-and-a-halfmonths,twomonths,

tenmonths,onemonth,andtwomonths.This contempt petition has been listed quite a few times for hearing,

but somehow has never come up for hearing. Forty years have gone bysince theNational Police Commission submitted its reports.Twenty-fiveyearshavegonebysincePrakashSinghbroughtthefactstothenoticeofthe Supreme Court about those recommendations having remained onpaper.Tenyearshavegonebysince thecourt issued itsdirectives.Sevenyears have gone by since Prakash Singh filed his contempt petition onceagain.

Ofcourse,theprimaryresponsibilityforthenear-collapseofthepoliceisthatofpoliticians.Butisthejudiciarysopowerlessthat,evenwhenfactsare brought before it about the condition to which the police has beenreduced, even when it itself passes specific orders, and then facts arebroughtbeforeitthatestablishthatitsdirectivesarebeingfloutedopenlyand brazenly, is it so powerless that it cannot do anything? Is it not anaccessorytotheresultingdeterioration?

THEJUDICIARYITSELF

In the early 1990s, The All India Judges’ Association approached theSupremeCourt.Itshowedhowappallingtheconditionswereinwhichthesubordinate judiciary had to work. It requested the court to direct theCentralandstategovernmentstotakeremedialsteps.TheSupremeCourtwent into the facts in detail, and then issued a series of specific andeminently implementable steps and directed that governments implementthem.4

Thegovernmentstooksomenominalsteps,butthesewerefarshortofwhatwasneeded.TheAssociationwentbacktotheSupremeCourt.TheCentral as well as state governments raised all sorts of objections, theyadvancedallsortsofargumentsagainstbeingaskedtodomore.Thetenorofwhattheyinsisteduponcanbegleanedeventwenty-fiveyearslaterfromthe decision of the Supreme Court: ‘Each of the specific and generalobjections of the Union of India and the states/UTswas dealt with andrejected,’thecourtnoted.

Far from taking steps to ensure that citizens get justice, governmentstrottedouttheusualargumentagainstthecourtgivingdirections—youaresteppingonthetoesoftheexecutiveandthelegislature.This iswhatthecourtwaspushedtoobserve:

Bygivingthedirections inquestion, thisCourthasonlycalledupontheexecutiveandthelegislature to implement their imperative duties. The courts do issue directions to theauthorities to perform their obligatory duties whenever there is a failure on their part todischargethem…Thefurtherdirectionsgiven,therefore,shouldnotbelookeduponasanencroachment on the power of the executive and the legislature to determine the serviceconditions of the judiciary. They are directions to perform the long overdue obligatoryduties.

The ultimate justification for not doing anything more was alsopredictable:financialstringency—andthisfromtheverygovernmentsandlegislatures which had been squandering public funds with utterirresponsibility.Thecourtnailedthisargumentgoodandproper:

Thecontentionwithregardtothefinancialburdenlikelytobeimposedbythedirectionsinquestion, is equally misconceived. Firstly, the courts do from time to time hand downdecisionswhich have financial implications and theGovernment is obligated to loosen itspurse recurrentlypursuant to suchdecisions. Secondly,when theduties areobligatory,nogrievancecanbeheardthattheycastfinancialburden.Thirdly,comparedtotheotherplanandnon-planexpenditure,wefindthatthefinancialburdencausedonaccountofthesaiddirections isnegligible.Weshouldhavethoughtthatsuchpleawasnotraisedtoresist thedischargeofthemandatoryduties.ThecontentionthattheresourcesofalltheStatesarenotuniformhasalsotoberejectedforthesamereasons.Thedirectionsprescribetheminimumnecessaryserviceconditionsandfacilitiesfortheproperadministrationofjustice.WebelievethatthequalityofjusticeadministeredandthecalibreofthepersonsappointedtoadministeritarenotofdifferentgradesindifferentStates.Suchcontentionsareill-suitedtotheissuesinvolvedinthepresentcase.

InfrastructureandemolumentsofthelowerjudiciarywerejusttwofacetsofthedirectionsthattheSupremeCourtgave.Anequallyvitalpointwasthatthenumberofjudges—atalllevels—wasjusttoosmallforacountrylikeIndia.Inits120threport,theLawCommissionrecommendedthatthenumberof judges for every ten lakh Indians,whichwas10.5, shouldberaisedto50.TherecommendationwasstronglyendorsedbytheStandingCommitteeofParliament.

Nothing substantial was done in this regard or, indeed, in regard toemolumentsofthesubordinatejudiciaryortheinfrastructureforthemto

dischargetheirfunctions.TheAllIndiaJudges’AssociationreturnedtotheSupremeCourtathirdtime.

The court set out the directions that had been given in its earlierdecisionsandthefatetheyhadmet.5Onthequestionoftheimperativetomultiply the number of judges, the court was emphatic. It recalled therecommendation of the Law Commission and its endorsement by theStanding Committee of Parliament. And, given that the requisiteenlargement and improvements would have to be made in theinfrastructureofcourtsalso,itdirectedthatthisprocessofincreasingthenumber of judges fivefold be taken up in a phasedmanner—but that itmustbecompleted‘withinfiveyearsfromtoday’.

That was said on 21 March 2002, the day the judgment waspronounced.Fifteenyearslater,andhowmuchofthatdirectivehasbeencompliedwith?

KEEPINGTHEJUDICIARYINTHEPOSITIONOFASUPPLICANT

Thatpointabout thenumberof judges,andhowsuccessivegovernmentshavesystematicallyignoredtheSupremeCourt’sdirectionsinthisregardisjustonefacetoftheexecutive’sdoggedeffortstokeepthejudiciaryunderitsheel,tokeepitinthepositionofasupplicant.Itisnotjustthenumberof judges thathasnotbeen increased, the infrastructure that courtsneedhasbeenkeptwoefully inadequate,andrulesandregulations thatensurethatthejudiciarywillhavetokeepcomingtotheexecutiveateveryturnforthebarestessentialshavebeenkeptinplace.

Insuccessivejudgments,theSupremeCourthasemphasized:

Therighttospeedyjusticeisafundamentalright. It is, therefore,theconstitutionaldutyofcourtstoprovidethatkindof

justice. By the same reasoning,asa constitutionalduty,governmentsareduty-

boundtoprovidethejudiciarywiththewherewithaltoprovidejusticetocitizens.

The plea of financial limitations cannot be advanced as an excuse by

governmentsfornotdoingtheirconstitutionalduty.6

Injudgmentuponjudgment,HighCourtshavespeltoutthespecificstepsthat need to be taken to enable courts in their jurisdiction to dischargetheirfunctions.ThereareLawCommissionreportsurginggovernmentstotakestepstoensurethattheinfrastructureincourtsisimproved.In2013,therewas a joint conference ofChief Justices and chiefministers on thematter, and they unanimously passed a resolution about the steps thatwouldbetakentoimproveconditionsincourtsforthwith.Whileensuringthat the states would have greater discretion over a much higherproportionofresourcesdevolvingtothem,the14thFinanceCommissionspecifically recommended that the states set aside higher amounts toimprovetheinfrastructureincourts.InApril2015,theprimeministerdidhispart—hewrotealetter!Alettertothechiefministerstosetasidefundsfor completing tasks that the Fourteenth Finance Commission hadmandated…

Andyetyoujusthavetovisitanyofourlocalcourtstoseehowlittlehasbeendoneincomparisontowhatisneeded.Youjusthavetoreadanyrecent judgment—for instance, Mumbai Grahak Panchayat v. State ofMaharashtra7—to drive yourself to tearing your hair in helplessfrustration. Courts are overcrowded. There is no place even to houserecords. Fire prevention equipment is wholly inadequate. Courts arefunctioningfrompremisesrentedfromprivateparties.Repairsareurgentlyneeded,thelandlordsrefusetocarrytheseout.Thereisnodrinkingwater.The washrooms ‘stink’. Some buildings have become structurally sounstable that theyhavehadtobeevacuatedatamoment’snotice.Whenjudgesare transferred toacity, there isnoplace for themtostay—oftentheyareputup‘inmakeshifthostels’.Acts,rulesarenotbeingpublishedinphysicalform;theyarenotbeinguploaded—especiallytheamendmentstothem;andversionspublishedbyprivatepartiesareneitherup-to-datenorcomplete—tosaynothingoflitigantsandlawyers,eventhecourtsdonothave the requisite bare acts. The situation is ‘very grim’. Projects aresanctionedforbuildingnewaccommodation;courtstaffhastoruntothefinancedepartmentforfunds;clearancestakelong;inthemeantime,costs

haveescalated;thecourtstaffhaveonceagainto‘runfrompillartopost’togetsanctionsforthehigheramountsthatarebynowrequired…8

This neglect, this ‘pronounce and move on’ disposition, harmsindividuals and communities, of course—to take one instance, theirfundamental rights remain on paper. But eventually the neglect infollowingupandverifyingthatthedecisionsthathavebeenhandeddownareactuallybeingadheredtoboomerangsonthecourtitself.

Consider theconsequencesof theSupremeCourtneglecting to followup on Prakash Singh’s pleas to reform the police forces. Cases remainunsolved. False cases get filed. Riots incinerate life and limb. Butconsequencesdonot stop at individuals and groups.Takeone right: thefreedomofspeech.OurSupremeCourthasbeenamongthemostzealousprotectorsofthisright.Butwhileringingjudgmentsareasourceofhopeandprotection,everyone inthefield isalsoconfrontedbythebrutal factthat fifty-six persons have been killed merely because they soughtinformationundertheRighttoInformationActandthejusticesystemhasnotbeenabletobringanyofthemurdererstobook:thatstarkfacthasallthe‘chillingeffect’thattheSupremeCourthassooftenspokenabout.

A new situation has arisen. Some years ago, when the pro-reservationists in Tamil Nadu declared that they would burn downtheatres that screened a film that they insisted was against thegovernment’sreservationspolicy,theSupremeCourtdeliveredalandmarkjudgment. It is the duty of the state to protect those who are merelyexercising their fundamental right, the court declared. If those who areexercising their constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right areimperiled,whatarefundamentalrightsfor, itasked.Butthescreeningofthefilmwillcreatea‘law-and-order’problem,thegovernmentargued.Thecourt had an unequivocal answer. The ‘reasonable restrictions’ that theConstitutionpermitsare,tosticktothepresentexample,intheinterestof‘publicorder’.And‘publicorder’isnotaffectedbyamereaffray,itheld.‘Publicorder’cannotbesaidtohavebrokendownmerelybecausethereisa‘law-and-orderproblem’.Whenthestateclaimsthatthereisthedangerofabreakdownof ‘publicorder’, itmustdemonstrate that there iseverylikelihoodofabreakdownofgeneralorder.

Suchjudgmentswereabulwarkinmoreinnocenttimes.Theywereourshieldwhensomeonesoughttopreventthepublicationorcirculationofabook, or the screening of a film. But today we have two newdevelopments.First,wehaveposseshuntingforissues.And,second,theseposseshavethesubrosaprotectionandencouragementofpoliticiansandpartiescontrollingthestate.Whatistheresult?TheSupremeCourtonceagainupholdsthescreeningofafilm—Padmaavat/i—inringingterms.Thestategovernments ruledby theBJP just look theotherway.Littlebandsintimidateandthreaten.Thepolice,nothavingbeenreformed,standsbyand does nothing. The SupremeCourt’s ringingwords are reduced to anullity. The iqbal of the court—and, after all, institutions run on theesteemandaweinwhichtheyareheld—drains.

TWOGENERALPOINTS

Thefirstthingthatleapsatoneisthatthepoliticalclassasawhole,andnotjustonepartyoranother,strivestokeepthejudiciarydown.Afterall,different parties have been in power at the Centre over the last threedecades,andyettheattitudetowardsthedirectionsofthecourts—betheseregarding the number of judges or the infrastructure of courts—hasremained the same. Similarly, at any given time, different parties are inpower in different states, and yet noncompliance is a feature commonacrossseveralstates.

The second point is a lesson for the judiciary itself. The courts,especially so overburdened a court such as the Supreme Court, have toproceed on the assumption that good faith and conscience would leadeveryone to instantly and to the fullest extent abide by its directions.Moreover,theassumptionisthatifgovernmentsorothersdonotabidebyits instructions, those aggrieved by their noncompliance will bring theinfraction to the notice of the courts. As instances such as the forgoingshow,thetwinassumptionsarenotentirelyinsyncwithreality.

Thelessonisobvious.Thecourtmust,fromtimetotime,andsuomotuas the expressiongoes,doa sortof randomcheckwhether itsdirectionsarebeingobeyedornot.Thereisaspecialreasonfordoingsonow.When

ajudgmentisdeclaratoryoflaworofwhatislawfulandconstitutional,inasensethatistheendofthematter.Butwhenajudgmentprescribesthattheexecutiveorotherstakecertainsteps,inasense,itisthebeginningofthematter.Andsuchjudgmentsaremoreandmorecommonthesedaysasall of us rush to the courts beseeching them to step in and directgovernmentandotherstodotheirduty.

Moreover,consequencesmustbevisiteduponindividuals—thesenior-mostinadepartment,etc.—forthedereliction.For,whenitsdirectionsaredisregarded, it isn’t just that the goals that, say, the SupremeCourt hadsought to achieve in that particular case are set back. Its authority ingeneralisdamaged.Andeveryactofnoncomplianceorpartialcompliancethatgoesunpunishedemboldensthosewhowilldowrong,andthusmakesthenextonethatmuchmorelikely.

Even more vital than ensuring that its orders are carried out to theletter, the judiciary must ensure that its good name remains free of theslightesttaint.

6

Whenoneofourownisinvolved

Today, the judiciary is among the few institutions—perhaps one of justtwoorthree—thatstillcommandsrespect.Itisoneofthefewfromwhichthepeopleatlargestillexpectsomething.Andithasmany,manysterlingachievementstoitscredit.

Firstofall, suchaccountabilityas survives inpublic lifedoes soonlybecause of the judiciary and sections of the media—more accurately,becauseofafewjudges,andafewjournalists.

Second, for seventy years, the judiciary—in particular, the SupremeCourt—hasbeenthedykethathaspreservedfreespeech.

Third,thesingularcheckthatexiststodayagainstmisuseofitspowerbyParliamentisinplacesolelybecauseofwhattheSupremeCourtdecidedinKesavanandaBharati1.Similarly,onehasonlytorecallhowfrequentlyandwithwhatimpunityArticle356usedtobeunleashedbytheexecutivebeforetheSupremeCourt’sjudgmentinBommai’s2caseandhowfewtheattemptstomisuseithavebeensincetorealizewhatasalutarycheckthejudiciaryhasbeenonexcessesoftheexecutive.

Fourth,someofthemostsalutaryimprovements,howeverlimitedtheymaybe, that have occurred in the last fewyears in our public life, haveoccurredbecauseof initiatives takenby the courts, indeed,by the courtsreachingbeyondwhatmanywouldargueareitsproperlimits.Recall,forinstance, the change that the Supreme Court brought about in thenominationformthatcandidatesmustfilewhentheystandforelections.Iwas ingovernmentat the time,andcan testify frompersonalknowledgehowintenselyeversomanypoliticians,amongthemprominentministers,

opposedtheSupremeCourt’ssuggestiontotheElectionCommissionthatthe nomination form include both the educational background and thecriminal antecedents of candidates. Similarly, themore recent change bywhich thosewho have been convicted are barred fromholding office orcontesting elections would never have come about if the matter hadremained in the hands of the political class. Aswe have seen, it is onlybecauseof theSupremeCourt that today, several conspicuouspoliticiansarenotabletositinlegislaturesanddecidethelawsunderwhichweshalllive,indeedtodecidethewaysinwhichourConstitutionitselfwillorwillnotbeamended.

Fifth,severalofthe‘excesses’forwhichthejudiciaryiscriticizedhavebeennecessitatedbytheexecutiveorourlegislaturesnotdoingtheirduty.The shameful way in which the self-serving sub-section, which enabledthoseconvictedevenofheinouscrimestocontinueaslegislators,remainedon the statute book is a ready example. Its perverse consequences werehighlightedtimeandagain.Legislaturesdidnothing.Andthatfortheall-too-obvious reason: the decision to undo it lay in the hands of the veryoneswhowouldbethefirsttosufferwerethelawtobechanged.ItisonlybecauselegislaturesfailedfordecadestoexcisetheperverseprovisionthattheSupremeCourtsteppedin.

Therefore,Iamamongthosewhofeeldeeplyindebtedtothejudiciary—bothasacitizenandasonewhoseworkistoreadandwrite.AndIamamong thosewho lookevermoreexpectantly to the judiciarybecauseofthe alarming deterioration in the standards of our legislatures, andthereforeoftheexecutive.Welookallthemoretothejudiciarybecauseoftheuniqueopportunitythatliesinitshandstoday.Thenumberofjudgesonehastoconvincetobringaboutachangeisfarfewerthanthenumberone must convince to bring about the same change via legislatures, forinstance.Moreover,judgesasaclassarefarbetterinformedthan,say,ourlegislators or evenministers as a class. There is also an opportunity foranother reason: today, twenty-to thirty-odd prominent politicians arearrayedbeforeonecourtoranother.Iffifteenortwentyofthemendupinjailservingseven-toeight-yearsentences,thousandswillcometofeelthat,despitealltheperversionsthathavetakenplaceinthelastthirtyyears—for

instance,inspiteoftheextenttowhichinvestigatingagencieshavebecometheprivatepossesofwhoever is inoffice—thecorruptcanbebrought tobook.Thatsinglefactwillgivehearttomillionstodotheirbittoreininthe wicked. Today, just a handful of judges can indeed trigger a newbeginning.

Allthisistrue,butitisequallytruethattherearegroundsforconcern.Recall,forinstance,thedirectionthatthediscourseonthecollegiumof

judges has taken over the last few years. After bitter experience, aninstrumentwasdevisedtowrestbackthekeyfromtherobber,ifImayuseaphraseIhadtouseinregardtothesecondTransferofJudges3judgment—an instrument to limit the power of the executive to determine theselection and postings of judges.Over the years, the very authors of thedevicecametofeelthatthecollegiumhadbecomeaforumforjudges—andthat too, the senior-most judges—to strike bargains over nominees. Theexecutive used the criticisms to try and grab back the power. To everythinkingperson’s relief, the SupremeCourtdefeated that effort.But thatthefieldcouldbepreparedforsuchanattempttobemadeshowedthatallhad not been well. And that in future the collegium would have to beguided evenmorebymanifestmerit of the candidates thanhasbeen thecaseinthepast.

Second,whileitistruethatthereisaonce-in-a-lifetimeopportunityforthejudiciarytotriggeranewbeginning—forinstance,considerstemmingcorruption—itisequallytruethattheopportunityisnotbeinggraspedasfirmlyas itneedstobe.Everysooften,cases incourtswaxandwane inaccordancewiththeconvenienceofthosewhohappentobeinpower.Andnot just in regard to corruption—recall theway several casesof terroristblasts,orofincitingriots,oroffakeencountershavegone.Thatevidenceisbeingdilutedorpervertedisevidenttoall—itmustbeevenmoresotothejudgeswhoarehearingthecasefromdaytodayandare,therefore,somuchbetterplacedtodiscernthechanges.Andyetright infrontoftheireyestheprosecutionemphasizesonethingonedayandburiesitthenext.Andthejudgessitandwatchsilently.

Third,whileeachjudgeasan individualmustbeascompassionateasthe rest of us, there is little doubt that the system taken as awhole has

becomeheartless—recalltheinstancewithwhichIbeganthebook.Fourth,itisindeedsadtoseethatasisthecasewithotherinstitutions,

there continues to be a secular decline in the excellence of the judiciary:one has only to read the judgments of the 1950s and those being giventoday to see this, andwewill come toa fewexamplesof the latter in amoment.

BEINGABOVESUSPICION

Fewwouldtodaysaythatthejudiciaryis‘abovesuspicion’.Everytimeonehears allegations about how a magistrate or judge has been suborned,one’sheartbreaks.Isaythisfrompersonalexperience,havingworkedinTheIndianExpress thatwasoften setuponby the rulers. I realized thatwhile we could indeed turn to the courts for protection as we did,ultimately the only protection for a paper or a writer was the reader’sfaith.Ultimatelytheonlythingthatwould—anddid—saveuswasthefactthat the readers sawthatwhatweweredoingwas in thepublic interest.One’sworkmustbesomanifestlyinthepublicinterestthat,whenrulersraiseahandagainstone, the readersmustknow, theymust feel that thepaperorwriterisbeingsetuponbecauseofwhatithasdoneorthewriterhaswrittenintheirinterest,theymustinstinctivelyfeelthatthepaperisinthe rightand the rulershave something tohide. It isbecauseTheIndianExpresswasseentobeactinginthepublicinterestthat,everytimeRajivGandhi’sgovernmentraidedusorfiledcasesandsetupinquiriesagainstus,ourcirculationwentup.Iwasabletorequestourcartoonisttodrawacartoon—atruthfulone—withtheprimeministerslumpedononeofourbroken-down desks, with a banner ‘Indian Express’ behind him, and asmallboardlyingonthedeskinfrontofhimwiththelegend‘CirculationManager’.Ifpeoplebegintofeelthatjudgesarenotaboveboard,iftheyget convinced that, the compassion of judges as individualsnotwithstanding, the systemhasbecomeheartless, theywillnot standbythe judiciarywhentheexecutiveor legislatorsofthedayraisetheirhandagainsttheinstitution.

Thatpointstothreerequisites.First,ofcourse,thejudiciarymuststand

firmagainsttheslightestattempttowhittleitspowersandambit—asithasrecently done in thwarting the attempt of the political executive toappropriate greater power for itself by tilting the membership of theproposed Judicial Appointments Commission. Second, it must deliverjustice—swift, certain,unambiguous—sothat thepeople see the judiciaryas their shield, so that when the executive raises a hand against thejudiciarythepeoplefeelthatitisraisingahandagainstthem.Third,andmost important, the reputationof judgesmustbesuch that—even inourtimeswheneveryoneisonlytooreadytobelievetheworstabouteveryoneelse—no one should even entertain the allegation that they will ever doanythingforanycollateralpurposeorconsideration.

Aninstitutiondoesnotrun,thestateitselfdoesnotrun,ondanda,onthe threat that itcanheappunishmenton thosewhodonotabideby itsdecrees. The judiciary cannot run on, say, the powers it has under theContemptofCourtsAct.Institutionsrun,thestateruns,oniqbal,ontheesteeminwhichpeopleholdit.Thatiswhytheslightesttearinreputationbroughtaboutbythemisconductofasinglejudgeissoinjurious:ittaintsthe reputation, and therefore whittles the power of the judiciary as awhole.

Andonemust remember that nothing remains hidden.The toutwhowouldhaveengineeredormediated thedealwill let itbeknownfarandwide that he has a special relationship with Judge X: it is only bybroadcastingthatfactthathewillgetmorebusiness.Infact,theinfirmitiesin the resulting judgment are manifest, they are enough to suggest thatsomethinghashappened.Inanycase,thebiggestlitigant—thegovernment—keepsaneyeonweaknesses,andgetstoknow.Fromthenon,thejudgeisunderitssway.

This entails three things at the least.Of course, every judgemust beabsolutelystraight.Second,andIamsorrytorecordthat this issooftenlostsightof,judgesmustneveracceptanounceofextraprivilegefromtheexecutive.HowwellIrememberthedayJusticeV.D.Tulzapurkarretired.Anita and I had gone to his house to bid Mrs Tulzapurkar and himgoodbye.Thehousewasbareexceptforgovernmentalfurniture—alltheirpersonal belongings had already been sent to Bombay.We accompanied

JusticeandMrsTulzapurkartotherailwaystation.Bothtooktheirseatsin the chair-car bogey. He had vacated the government house and leftDelhithedayhehadretired.Monthslater,IwasinBombay.Icontactedhim,and sought time tomeethim.When Iwent to theaddress, I foundhiminalittlecubby-holeofanoffice.Seeingmysurprise,hesaid,‘ThisiswhereIbegan,thisiswhereIhavereturned.’Whatacontrastitistoday,and how disheartening to hear of judges angling for appointments tocommissions.

A lemmafollows.Judgesmust taketheswiftestactionwhenevereventheslightestallegationismadeagainstacolleague.Oneofthefactorsthathasdrainedthepoliticalclassofall legitimacyhasbeenapervertedsenseof loyalty: ‘O,he isourbrother,he is fromourparty,wemuststandbyhim.’Unfortunately, judgesdonotalwaysactwith theswiftness that thematter demands when some inconvenient fact erupts about a colleague.Two examples will suffice to illustrate both—the course such instancestake,andtheinjurythattheprocrastinationinflictsonthegoodnameofthejudiciary.

AWRONGDELIVERYBRINGSAREALITYTOLIGHT

On13August2008,apersoncameanddeliveredapackettotheguardattheresidenceofJusticeNirmaljitKaur,ajudgeofthePunjabandHaryanaHighCourt.Amemberofherstaffbroughtittohersayingthatapersonhad brought case papers fromDelhi. She asked him to open the packet,andwas shocked to see that in fact thepacket containedmoney—Rs15lakh.Shehadherstaffseizethecourier.Policewerecalled.Themanwastakenintocustody.ThejudgealsoimmediatelyinformedtheChiefJusticeoftheHighCourt.4

Interrogationofthecourierandfurtherinquiriesrevealedfivethings:

The courier was the junior munshi of the then additional advocategeneralofHaryana,SanjivBansal.

The money was meant for another judge of the High Court—JusticeNirmalYadav: one explanation is that themunshiwas told to deliver

themoneyto‘Nirmalji’,heheard‘Nirmaljit’andthushelpedthecauseofprobity.

Themoneywasabribe in lieuofa favourable judgment thathadbeenhandeddown earlier in regard to aproperty case, a case inwhich thethenadditionaladvocategeneral,SanjivBansal,wasaninterestedparty.

According to the CBI, the judgment had been delivered ‘under theinfluenceof’abusinessman,RavinderSingh,‘whohadcloseassociation’withthejudge.

ThebusinessmanhadpaidthemoneythroughahotelierbasedinDelhi.5

Thecasewasfirsttakenupbythestatepolice.Itwaslatertransferredto the CBI. According to the CBI, the money not having reached her,Justice Nirmal Yadav again demanded Rs 15 lakh. This amount wasdeliveredtoherthenextmorning,14August2008.

Asweknow,ajudgecanbeprosecutedonlyafterobtainingsanctionofthe appointing authority, in this case the president of India. InVeeraswami’scase,6theSupremeCourtruledthat,indeterminingwhetherto sanction prosecution, the president must consult the Chief Justice ofIndia. In a host of judgments, the court has also laid down that the‘consultation’must be ‘full and effective’. In thematter at hand, namelywhetherajudgeshouldbeprosecuted,inVeeraswami,theSupremeCourthadinfactlaiddownthat:

…theChiefJusticebeingtheheadofthejudiciaryisprimarilyconcernedwiththeintegrityandimpartialityofthejudiciary.HenceitisnecessarythattheChiefJusticeofIndiaisnotkeptoutofthepictureofanycriminalcasecontemplatedagainstaJudge.HewouldbeinabetterpositiontogivehisopinioninthecaseandconsultationwiththeChiefJusticeofIndiawouldbeof immenseassistance to theGovernment incomingto therightconclusion.Wetherefore,directthatnocriminalcaseshallberegisteredunderSection154,Cr.P.C.againstJudgeoftheHighCourt,ChiefJusticeofHighCourtorJudgeoftheSupremeCourtunlessthe Chief Justice of India is consulted in the matter. Due regard must be given by theGovernmenttotheopinionexpressedbytheChiefJustice.IftheChiefJusticeisofopinionthatit isnotafitcaseforproceedingundertheAct,thecaseshallnotberegistered. If theChief Justice of India himself is the person against whom the allegations of criminalmisconduct are received the Government shall consult any other Judge or Judges of theSupremeCourt.ThereshallbesimilarconsultationatthestageofexaminingthequestionofgrantingsanctionforprosecutionanditshallbenecessaryandappropriatethatthequestionofsanctionbeguidedbyandinaccordancewiththeadviceoftheChiefJusticeofIndia.

Therewas a difference of opinionwithin theCBI between theDirector,Prosecutions, who felt that prosecution was not warranted, and theDirector,CBI,whofeltthatitwas.Accordingly,inaccordancewithwhatitsmanualprescribes,theCBIwrotetothegovernmenttoseektheopinionoftheattorneygeneral.

Fromthispointonthingsbegantogetcuriouserandcuriouser.TheattorneygeneralwasMilonBanerjee.Herenderedanopinionthat

canonlybedescribedasNelsonian.RememberthatbynowtheCBIhadalreadyestablishedthekeyfacts.Apart fromtheRs15 lakhhavingbeendelivered,apartfromthestatementsofthemunshiandothers,theCBIhaduncovered additional indications of the close acquaintance of JusticeNirmalYadavandRavinderSingh—forinstance,telephonicconversations,aswellasairtickets,mobilephone,etc.,thathadbeengiftedtothejudgebythisperson.Furthermore,theCBIfoundoutthatJusticeNirmalYadav,her brother (then the financeminister ofHaryana), Ravinder Singh andothershadjoinedtogethertoacquirelandinSolan,HimachalPradesh,andfor this undue influence had been used. Banerjeewas notmoved. Pleaseread the opinion he rendered as it shows how much the foremost lawofficer of the country can strain not to see what is manifest. Banerjeewrote:

9. Therefore, even assuming for the sake of argument that Justice Nirmal Yadav haddemandedRs.15lakhs,thereisabsolutelynoevidencetoprovethatShriRavinderSinghwasinanymannerorwaslikelytobeinanymannerconcernedinanyproceedingsorbusinesstransactedorabout tobe transactedbyJusticeYadavor thataccusedRavinderSinghwashaving any connection with the official function of Justice Yadav. The amount hadadmittedly originated fromShriRavinder Singh andwas beingmerely delivered by SanjivBansal.Therefore, theprosecution is required to establish that therewas someconnectionbetweenRavinderSinghandJusticeYadavbecauseofwhichthisamountwasdemandedordelivered.Eveniftheentireevidenceistobebelieved,suchaconnectionisnotevenremotelyestablished. There may have been, as alleged by the CBI or may not have been someconnection between Justice Yadav and Sanjiv Bansal in the past. This is a matter whichcannotbeasubjectmatterofinvestigationinthepresentFIR.Inanyevent,thatisabsolutelynoevidencetoindicate,farlesstoprovethatthisamountwasdemandedordeliveredforanyofficialconnectionrelatingtotheworkofJusticeYadavortoconferabenefitonRavinderSinghorSanjivBansaloranyotherperson.Therefore,onthematerialonrecordnooffenceunder Sections 11 and 12 is made out against Justice Nirmal Yadav. Consequently, thechargeunderSection120-BreadwithSections11and12ofthePCActwouldbebaseless.

10. At this stage I may indicate that from the notes it appears that the Deputy LegalAdviserwasoftheviewthatanoffenceunderSection11ismadeoutagainstJusticeYadav

because she had received mobile phone, air ticket etc., from Ravinder Singh and SanjivBansal.Inmyview,sincethereisnoevidenceofanyofficialrelationsbetweenJusticeYadavandRavinderSingh,Section11isnotattractedinthepresentcase.

11.InsofarastheallegedoffencesundertheIndianPenalCodeareconcerned,there isnot even an iota of allegation that Justice Yadav was involved in any manner in thestatements made by accused S/Shri Sanjiv Bansal, Nirmal Singh, Rajiv Gupta or thedocumentswhichweretenderedbythemtothelocalChandigarhPolice.ItappearsthatonceRs.15 lakhswere seized, the saidaccusedpersonsallegedlymadeupa storyofdeliveryofRs.15lakhstoaccusedNirmalSingh.AsrightlypointedoutbytheAdditionalLegalAdvisersuchstatementsordocumentsweregiventothelocalpolicepriortotheregistrationofFIRand therefore, the ingredients of Sections 192/193 IPC are not attracted. The AdditionalLegalAdviserhas rightlypointedout that since the statementsmade to thepolicearenotevidenceintheeyesof law,Section199IPCalsoisnotattracted.Therefore,there isgravedoubtastoanyoffenceunderSections192readwith193,199or200ofIPCwascommittedbyaccusedS/ShriSanjivBansal,RajivGuptaandNirmalSingh.Inanyeventofthematterinso farasaccusedJusticeYadav isconcerned, there isnotashredofevidence that thesaidalleged offences were committed by Sanjiv Bansal, Ravinder Singh and Nirmal Singh inconspiracywithaccusedJusticeYadav.There is definitelynomaterial toprosecute JusticeYadav for a charge under Section 120-B far less for substantive offences under Sections192/193ofIPC.

Are‘officialrelations’betweenajudgeandthesourceofmoneynecessary?Doesthesourceofthemoneyneedtohaveaconnectionwith‘theofficialfunction’ofthejudge?TorefutewhattheCBIhaduncovered,isitenoughtosay,‘Itappearsthat’—withoutindicatingthebasisonwhich‘itappearsthat’—‘onceRs. 15 lakhswere seized, the said accusedpersons allegedlymadeupastoryofdeliveryofRs.15lakhstotheaccusedNirmalSingh.’Andinhowmanycasesisthatcriterion—thatstatementsmadebeforethepoliceare‘notevidenceintheeyesoflaw’—deployed?

The CBI gave detailed answers to the conclusions that Banerjee hadformulated.Apart fromrecounting theevidence that ithaduncovered, itnotedthatonereasontheattorneygeneralhadconcludedthatnocasewasmadeoutwashispremisethattheFIRhadrelatedonlytothedeliveryofRs15 lakhtothehouseofJusticeNirmaljitKaur,andthat,as theChiefJusticehadnotgivenanyconcurrence to investigate transactions relatingto the land in Solan, it could not be brought into consideration of thematter.TheCBIrecordedthat, inpointoffact,theChiefJusticeofIndiahad given his concurrence in this regard—and it furnished acommunicationdated4September2008fromthesecretarygeneraloftheSupremeCourttothiseffect.

Andthencameanothertwist.Indeed,three.Bynowaseriesofchangeshadtakenplacefortuitously.ChiefJustice

K.G. Balakrishnan had been succeeded by Justice S.H. Kapadia. LawMinister H.R. Bharadwaj had been succeeded by VeerappaMoily. AndMilonBanerjeehadbeensucceededbyGoolamE.Vahanvatiasattorneygeneral,anotherofficeroflawcommittedtoprobity.

Mediapublished reports that theCBIhadbeen refusedpermission toproceed with the cash-at-the-doorstep case. On 15 July 2009, the lawministerrecordedonfile:

Theallegationsmadehereinarequiteseriousinnature.Theseallegationscannotbebrushedasideonlyontechnicalgrounds.Thecaseinquestion,ifnotpressedwillerodethefaithofpeopleinthejudiciary.

Inviewoftheabove,IstronglyfeelthatthemattermaybereferredtothepresentAttorneyGeneralforopinionandexaminethematteronmerits.

On19November2009,theCBIsentitsdetailedresponsetotheMinistryof Personnel, and requested that the matter be examined again and theopinionofthenewattorneygeneralbesought.

Vahanvati too shut an eye: whereas Milon had ensured that, inadditiontootheraspectsofthematter,hewouldnotseethetransactionsrelating to the purchase of land by Nirmal Yadav, Ravinder Singh andothers,Vahanvati ensured thathewouldnot see themainquestion—theRs15lakhthathadbeenwronglydelivered.HedealtwiththetransactionsrelatingtothepurchaseoflandatSolananddisposedofthemasfollows:

It is stated that oneRavinder Singhhadpurchased theplots of land at Solan jointlywithJusticeNirmalYadav,andthisislinkedtopara5ofthatletter,whereitismentionedthataccording to Shri Sanjiv Bansal, an amount ofRs.15 lakhswas to be delivered to JusticeNirmalYadavat the instanceofhis close friendShriRavinder Singh. It therefore appearsthat the reference toRavinderSinghand thepurchaseof land inpara6of the letter is toshow the connection between Ravinder Singh, and the cash of Rs.15 lakhs with JusticeNirmalYadav.Idonotfindanyreferenceintheletterdated4.09.2008toanyirregularitiesinrelationtopurchaseoflandatSolan.

4. The letter received from the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India in relation to grant ofpermissionforinvestigationisnotonthefile.Iassumethatitwaswrittenwithreferencetothe letter dated 04.09.2008. As mentioned above, there is nothing in the letter dated04.09.2008whichseekstoinvestigatetheallegedirregularitiesinrelationtothepurchaseofland at Solan. It therefore cannot be said that the learned Chief Justice had grantedpermissiontoinvestigateintoallegedirregularitiesinthepurchaseoflandatSolan.

5. Incidentally, this seems to be the understanding of the SP himself since in his report

dated13.01.2009inpara15.12,thefollowinghasbeenstated:‘15.12.ThescrutinyofthefilesrelatedtothegrantofpermissiontoMrs.JusticeNirmal

Yadav(A-6)and17othersforpurchaseoflandinDistrictSolan,HimachalPradeshrevealsprima facie commission of offences of forgery, cheating and abuse of official position byMrs.JusticeNirmalYadav(A-6),officersofHimachalPradeshGovernmentandothers.Asthis is a separate offence, committed in different territorial jurisdiction, it requires to beinvestigatedseparately,forwhichpermissionofHon’bleChiefJusticeandHimachalPradeshGovt.isrequiredaslaiddowninK.Veeraswamivs.UnionofIndia(1991SCR(3)189)aswellasnotificationunderSection5and6oftheDSPEActrespectively.’

6.ThisclearlyshowsthatevenaccordingtotheSP,theallegationsrelatingtotheallegedoffencesofforgery,cheatingandabuseofofficialpositionwithregardtopurchaseoflandatSolanconstituteaseparateoffenceandcommittedindifferentterritorial jurisdictionwhichwasrequiredtobeinvestigatedseparatelyandforwhichthepermissionoftheHon’bleChiefJusticeofIndiawouldberequiredinaccordancewiththejudgmentinK.Veeraswami’scase.

On7December2009,D.R.Meena,secretary,MinistryofLawandJustice,wrotetothedirector,CBI,that‘sanctionforprosecutionhasbeendeclinedon the grounds that after analysis of the available evidence, the learnedattorneygeneralofIndiahasobservedthatthereisnotashredofevidencethat thesaidallegedoffenceswerecommittedbySanjivBansal,RavinderSingh andNirmal Singh in conspiracywith JusticeYadav’ and that ‘thematterhadbeendiscussedwiththeCJI,whohadobservedthatnoactionwasrequiredforthepresent’.

Accordingly,theCBIfileda‘closurereport’inthecourtofthespecialjudgeonthegroundthatsanctionforprosecutionhadbeenrefusedbythecompetentauthority.

This too hit the headlines—that sanction had been refused afterconsultation with the Chief Justice of India. On 10 February 2010, thesecretary general of the Supreme Court wrote to newspapers that thematter had not been referred to the Chief Justice, and that he had notrecommendedthatsanctionforprosecutionberefused.

On26March2010,thespecialjudgeturneddownthe‘closurereport’,anddirectedtheCBItoinvestigatethematterfurther.

Thequestionwasnowproperly referred to theChief Justiceof India.SinceMay1997, a procedurehadbeen laiddown for dealingwith suchinstances. In accordance with that the Chief Justice set up an internalcommittee of three judges—the Chief Justices of the High Courts ofAllahabad and Gujarat and a judge of the Delhi High Court. The

committee examinednineteenwitnesses, including JusticeNirmalYadav,Justice Nirmaljit Kaur and others. It examined documents as well asrecords of telephonic conversations. The examination led it to infer thattheRs15lakhwasindeedmeantforJusticeNirmalYadav.

Eventually, on 1 March 2011, two-and-a-half years after themisdelivery, the president accorded his sanction for prosecuting JusticeNirmalYadav.

A year after her name figured in the case, JusticeNirmalYadavwastransferred to the High Court of Uttarakhand where, of course, shecontinuedtodispensejustice.

Itisonlyon4March2011—two-and-a-halfyearsafterthe incident—that the CBI filed a charge sheet. Justice Nirmal Yadav was accused ofcorruption, and, along with others, of criminal conspiracy. The chargesheet alsomentioned land that she,herbrother (then financeministerofHaryana),andotherrelativeshadpurchasedinHimachalPradeshthedayafter the money was delivered—to the wrong address! March 4, 2011happenedtobethelastdayofhertenureasajudge:sheretiredthatday.

Filingofthechargesheetwaschallenged.Afterdetailedhearings,on14November2011,theHighCourtrejected

the challenge. The principal ground for the challenge was that thesanctioningauthority,havingoncerefusedsanction,couldnotproceedtoreversehisopinionandgrantsanction.Inanexemplaryreconstructionofthelawandevents,theHighCourtshowedthat(i)thereisnobartothesanctioningauthorityreversingitsopinionwhennewevidenceisputtoit;and(ii)thattheconsultationwiththeChiefJusticeofIndiathatisrequiredbyvariousjudgmentsoftheSupremeCourtwasgonethroughonlyonce,and so there was no ground to maintain that he or the president hadreversedtheiropinion.

Furthertwistsandturnstookplace.Itwasonlyon31July2013—fiveyearsafterthemisdelivery—thattheCBIcourtinChandigarhacceptedthechargesheetagainstJusticeNirmalYadavandtheothers.

And it was only on 3 May 2016—seven-and-a-half years after thedelivery—thatthespecialjudgeframedchargesinthecase.

Thecaseisstillinthetrialcourt.

Theadditionaladvocategeneralwhosemunshihadmisheardandthusmisdeliveredthemoneyhasdiedofbraintumour.

JusticeNirmalYadavhasretired.JusticeNirmaljitKaurwhoraisedthealarmiscurrentlyajudgeinthe

RajasthanHighCourt.Nineyears,andthecaseisstillinitsfirstlap.Severallessonsleapupfromthesequence:

Theexemplaryroleofthespecialjudgewhorefusedtoacceptthe‘closurereport’oftheCBI

ThedeftnesswithwhichtheHighCourtdisposedofthechallenge The role of lawyers who—as in the case of Jayalalithaa before the

KarnatakaHighCourt—pressedargumentsthatcanonlybedescribedasargumentsofconvenience

Theroleofthehighestlawofficersofthecountry:weretheyactingasthejudicial conscience of governments, and of counsellors to the judiciaryitself,orasthehandmaidensoftheinfluential?

The role of civil servants: the record clearly showed that the sort ofconsultation with the Chief Justice mandated by law had not takenplace,and that the filehadnotbeensent to theauthority thathas thepower to accord or refuse sanction for the prosecution of a judge,namely the president of India. Hence, on what consideration—of lawand facts—did the law secretarywrite that sanctionhadbeen refused?On what basis did he insinuate the impression that this refusal hadoccurredafterconsultationwiththeChiefJustice?

TheodddecisionoftransferringJusticeNirmalYadavtotheHighCourtofUttarakhandevenas shewasunder suchadarkcloud.Why saddlecourts—whether it be the Calcutta High Court in the case of JusticeKarnan,or,ashashappenedeversofrequently,thecourtsofSikkimandother hapless states in theNortheast, or that of Uttarakhand for thatmatter—with such eminences? And notice too that the fact that thejudgewastransferredtotheHighCourtofUttarakhandbecameoneoftheargumentsthatwasurgedinherfavour. ItwasarguedintheHighCourt that thevery fact that thecollegiumhadtransferredhershowed

that, after examining the facts and consulting the Chief Justice, thesanctioningauthorityhadrefusedsanction.Afterall,iftheChiefJusticeandthepresidenthadconcludedthat,yes,shedeservedtobeprosecuted,wouldthecollegium,ofwhichtheChiefJusticewashimselfamember,haveallowedhertoassumechargeinanotherHighCourt?

And,ofcourse,abovealltheseisthecentralquestion:whatdoessuchasequence—one inwhichnineyears after it burst into thepublic arena, acaseinvolvingajudgeofaHighCourtisstillinthefirststage—dototheimageof the judiciaryasawhole?Arepeople liable toconclude that thesystemisgearedtoswiftlyexciseatumourorthatitisdesignedsothatafellowjudgewillgetthemostindulgentconsideration?

JUDGESANDIARETAKENTOBEFOOLS

InthesameyearinwhichthismisdeliveryhappenedinChandigarh,2008,after an investigation lasting three years, the CBI had registered a caseagainst a member of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) fordelivering ‘pre-decided’ judgments in favourof the clientsofone firmofchartered accountants based in Kolkata. The house of the member hadbeen raided andRs 28 lakh had been recovered. By January 2012,TheIndianExpresswasreportingthat the textof judgments—someofwhichhad not even been delivered—was found in the computers of that firm.Clearly, some members had outsourced their decisions, so to say. ThepaperreportedthattheCBIhadcomeuponreasonstodoubtatleastsixty-ninejudgmentsdeliveredbytwenty-threemembersinfavourofthefirm’sclients. The racket was obviously widespread. In May 2012, the paperreported,‘Theagencyseized75pre-datedjudgmentsfromtheharddiscs’ofthefirm.‘Ofthese,57werelearnttobedeliveredbyITATbenchesinChennai, Mumbai, Kolkata and Hyderabad.’ In the case of twelvejudgments,thetextwasfoundevenbeforetheyhadbeendelivered.Whentheyweredelivered,theyturnedouttobeidenticaltotheonesthatwerelodgedinthecomputersofthefirm.

In February 2012, the paper reported that theCBIwas still awaiting

permission to investigate a sitting High Court judge and sixteen others.TheCBIhadregisteredpreliminaryenquiriesagainsteightmembers—theyhad retired, and sonopermission from thegovernmentwasneeded.Butfor the rest, the CBI had applied to the law ministry for registeringpreliminaryenquiriesagainstfifteenmembersofITATandfourofficialsoftheincometaxdepartment.Thelawministrysentthefiletotheattorneygeneral. Four years went by. At last, in May 2012, the CBI receivedpermission to proceed further in regard to the remaining members andofficers.

ByMay 2014, one case was under trial. The CBI had closed all theothercases!Theevidencewas insufficient, itmaintained…therewasnodirectevidenceofquidproquo.And,loandbehold,theCBI,theExpressreported, had concluded that ‘the charge that the judgments were “pre-written”cannotbeproved,andit isanormalpracticeforthebenchestoseekassistancefromtheaccountantfirmsduetoshortageofstaff’.7

Igotdirectevidence,sotosay,ofthatalibi.IhadbeeninvitedbytheNationalJudicialAcademyatBhopaltodeliveralecture.JudgesfromtheSupremeCourt,HighCourtjudges,sessionsjudgesandotherjudgesfromfourstatesandseniorofficialsfromthelawministrywereparticipatingintheconference.ImentionedtheIncomeTaxTribunalcasetoillustratethepointthatthejudiciarymustactswiftlywhenoneofitsownisimplicatedinamatter,thattheconsequenceoflettingthematterdragorbederailedbylegalismsorlegalploysistoraisedoubtsaboutthejudiciaryitself.

Laterintheday,thesenior-mostofficialexplained,‘Sir,youdon’tquitefollow thematter.Thatdraft judgmentswere found in the computersoftheaccountants’firmdoesnotmeanthattheywerebeingpreparedthere.Yousee, toearna littleextramoney,our stenos takeuppart-timeworkafterofficehoursinsuchfirms.Thetribunalmemberswouldhavedictatedthejudgments,thestenoswouldhavetakenthedictationpadstothefirmand,betweentypingworkforthefirm,theywouldhavebeentypingwhatthemembershaddictated.Thatisall.’

HowwellthistalliedwithwhatTheIndianExpresshadreported:‘Theagency [the CBI] has also concluded that the charge that the judgmentswere“pre-written”cannotbeproved,and it isanormalpractice for the

benches to seek assistance from the accountant firms due to shortage ofstaff’—just that instead of the benches seeking assistance of firms ofcharteredaccountants, inthisofficial’sversionthestenoswereseekingtomakealittleextramoney!Ihadtotellhimthathemustbetakingmeandthejudgeswhoweresittingatourtabletobefools.First,stenosarebarredfrom takingdrafts outof theoffice. Second, they arebarred fromdoingpart-timework—certainly at firms that service clientswho are arraignedbefore the tribunal. And, third, how is it that sixty-nine judgments hadturned up in the computers of these firms, that twelve judgments whichhadyettobedeliveredhadturnedupinthecomputersofonefirm?Theofficerfocusedmoreintentlyonthefoodonhisplate.

Clearly,whenever a judge is foundor even suspectedof havingdonewrong, the judiciary must ensure that the investigation and the caseproceed with maximum speed. Second, the attitude must not be one offalseloyalty,‘O,heisourbrotherjudge.’Thejudiciarymustproceedwiththeconvictionthatifthereisatumour,itmustbeexcisedimmediatelylestitinfectthebodyasawhole.

Afterall,thejudiciaryis‘ahousesetonahill’—itisbeinglookedupon,and not just looked up to, by everyone.Does it reinforce belief in itselfwhen it rejects a request for information on a matter as simple as themedical expenses that have been incurred on individual judges and beenreimbursedbytheSupremeCourt?Doesitreinforcebeliefinitselfwhenitdecides not to take up the request for information on assets owned byjudgesandtheirimmediatefamilymembers?Doesitlessenorenhancethebeliefof citizens that it is seriousaboutdelivering justice swiftlywhen itrejects a petition seeking information about cases, arguments on whichhavebeenconcludedbutjudgmentsonwhichhaveyettobedelivered?8

Second,allofus,andthatincludesjudges,mustalwaysrememberthatinstitutions come down not so often by the sudden, great blow but bycorrosion—overdecades.Everydilution,everydeparturefromthehigheststandardaccustomsus to thenext lower level.Andsoonwearehurtlingdowna steepandgreasy slope.Whathashappened to thepolitical classshouldbeamplewarning.

Nor is it just that theprocedures that areprescribedand the systems

that are in place for dealingwith allegations against judges are the onlyones thatneed tobeexaminedafresh.A recent case,anda tragiconeatthat, showed how procedures and systems for dealing with far graverinfirmitiestoomustbethoughtthroughagain.

7

Banehainahl-e-havasmuddaibhimunsifbhi…

Developmentsof the recentpast leaveonedisheartened in the extreme—forthehighestcourtitselfhasbeenproceedinginwaysdirectlyantitheticaltothelessonsthatbecameapparentintheprecedingchapter.Threecasesthat caused much public unease will illustrate both what has beenhappening,aswellas theconsequences thathaveensued,not inthe leastforthecourtitself.

ASUICIDENOTE

KalikhoPulhadbeenanelectedrepresentativeinArunachalPradeshsince1995.HebecamechiefministerofArunachalinFebruary2016.Aseriesofeventsso tragicallycommonin theNortheast—trading,switchingsides—tookoff.ThematterwastakentotheSupremeCourt.On13July2016,thecourt’sjudgmentendedhisgovernment.

Pul’s body was found hanging on 9 August 2016. The additionaldistrictmagistrate founda sixty-pagehandwrittennotenext tohisbody.Each page had been signed and initialled by Pul. The last signaturewasdatedtheverydaythatPulhadcommittedsuicide—8August2016.

Toanyonewho is even in the leastbit familiarwith theNortheast—andIhadoccasiontolearnabouttheregionindetailbothduringtheAllAssam Students Union (AASU) agitation in Assam, and during MrVajpayee’sgovernment,as theNortheastwasoneof theministries that Ihandled—thenotehadtheringoftruth.Thecorruptionthathedetailed,

thedevicesbywhichmoneyallocatedtothestatehadbeenandwasbeingsiphonedoffbypoliticiansoftheregion—thesehaveindeedbeenthebaneof the Northeast, and the appalling misfortune of the good and simplepeopleof the region.Other thanparagraphs thatdealtwithhispersonallife,everyparagraphstatedfactsandcontainedfigures.

For our present purposes, what is of importance is that during thecourseofhisnarrationofhowthematterhadreachedtheGuwahatiHighCourtandeventuallytheSupremeCourt,andtheeventsthathadfollowed,Pulhadmadespecificandfar-reachingallegationsagainstpersonsinhighoffice, including those of the party, the Congress to which he hadbelonged, as well as against two former Chief Justices, the then ChiefJustice, the then second senior-most judge of the Supreme Court, andsenioradvocates.Thegravamenofthesestatementswasthathehadbeenaskedfor—huge—sumsofmoneytogettheSupremeCourttodecideinhisfavour.Hewrotethathehadhadneithertheresourcesnorthedispositiontopaytheamounts;thathisrivalshadbothinabundance,andthatishowtheyhadsecuredtheverdictintheirfavour.1

TheformergovernorofArunachalPradesh,RajKhowa,affirmedthattheallegations thatweremade in thenotewereofaveryseriousnature,andneededtobeinvestigatedthoroughly.

The widow of Pul, Mrs Dangwimsai Pul, wrote to the then ChiefJusticerequestingthatanindependentinquirybeinstitutedtoexaminethecharges.Wehave seen that sinceVeeraswami’scase,2 an inquiry into theconductofajudgecannotbeinitiatedwithoutthepermissionoftheChiefJustice.AsthethenChiefJusticehadhimselfbeennamedinPul’snote,andasthejudgenextinlinetobecomeChiefJusticetoohadbeennamed,themattershouldhavebeenreferredtooneormoreoftheotherseniorjudges.Thatwasnotdone.Moreover,thematterwasofanadministrativenature,dealingasitdidwiththefunctioningofthecourt.Instead,theChiefJusticetookthematterinhisownhands,convertedtheletterintoapetitionandassigneditonthejudicialsidetoCourtNumber13.Onlegaladvice,MrsPulwithdrewthepetitionandinsteadwrotetothenextthreesenior-mostjudgesforpermissiontohaveanFIRregistered.

Various turns occurred after that. Thematerial point is that nothing

cameofalltheefforts.Didthejudgesandadvocates,moreimportantdidthecourt,winorlose?

Three things stand out. First, it is wrong to presume that nothinghappened in the end.For in the end, theallegations levelledbyPulhavesurvived.Isthatgoodforthereputeofourcourtsandjudges?

Second,evenaweek’sworkwouldhaveestablishedwhetherthesuicidenotewas at allworthy of examination. Itwas repletewith references tospecificevents,dates,governmentalschemes,outlaysandtherest.Acheckwould have established whether the statements had any basis in fact. Ifstatements about these schemes, programmes, outlays, etc.—allunconnectedwiththejudgesandthecourts—werefoundtobeinventions,onecouldhaveconcluded,atleastprimafacie,thatoneneednotexamineassertions about the judges and courts. On the other hand, if thesestatements talliedwith facts—if the schemes thatPulhadmentioned, theoutlays that he had listed, the devices by which monies were beingsiphoned off, etc.—had indeed been as he had listed them in his note,further inquiry into other statements he had made would have beenwarranted.Eventhissimpleexercisewasneverundertaken.

Third,thereisthelaw.Adyingdeclarationisassignedgreatweightinour courts.And, in this regard,under the relevant sectionsof the IndianEvidence Act, a suicide note is akin to a dying declaration. It hasevidentiary status—all the more so if the person has recorded facts ofwhichhe is liable to have hadpersonal knowledge, andwhich implicatehimself.ConsiderSection32oftheIndianEvidenceAct:

32.Casesinwhichstatementofrelevantfactbypersonwhoisdeadorcannotbefound,etc.,isrelevant.––Statements,writtenorverbal,ofrelevantfactsmadebyapersonwhoisdead,or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whoseattendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under thecircumstancesofthecaseappearstotheCourtunreasonable,arethemselvesrelevantfactsinthefollowingcases:––

(1)Whenitrelatestocauseofdeath.––Whenthestatementismadebyapersonastothecauseofhisdeath,orastoanyofthecircumstancesofthetransactionwhichresultedinhisdeath,incasesinwhichthecauseofthatperson’sdeathcomesintoquestion.

Suchstatementsarerelevantwhetherthepersonwhomadethemwasorwasnot,atthetimewhentheyweremade,underexpectationofdeath,andwhatevermaybethenatureoftheproceedinginwhichthecauseofhisdeathcomesintoquestion.

…(3) or against interest of maker.––When the statement is against the pecuniary or

proprietaryinterestofthepersonmakingit,orwhen,iftrue,itwouldexposehimorwouldhaveexposedhimtoacriminalprosecutionortoasuitfordamages.

(4)orgivesopinionastopublicrightorcustom,ormattersofgeneralinterest.––Whenthestatement gives theopinionof any suchperson, as to the existenceof anypublic right orcustom ormatter of public or general interest, of the existence ofwhich, if it existed, hewould have been likely to be aware, and when such statement was made before anycontroversyastosuchright,customormatterhadarisen.

Now, Pul was indeed dead. The facts he had set outwere such that hewould ‘likely tohavebeenaware’of thempersonally.Thenotecertainlysetoutthecircumstancesinwhichhewasbeingcompelledtotakehisownlife.Manyofthedisclosuresexposedhim,andwere,therefore,againsthisown interest. The matters that he had set out were most certainly ofgeneralaswellaspublicinterest.

Goingby the lessons thatwehave gleaned from the cases consideredabove,farfromlettingthematter‘dieanaturaldeath’,theprudentcoursewouldhavebeenforthejudiciarytoinstitutethemostindependentinquiryassoonasthenotehadsurfaced.

APOSSIBLEMURDER

Thenextcase,andthejudiciary’sreactiontoit,wasofmuch,muchgreaterconsequence—for it involved notmoney but possiblemurder. A person,Sohrabuddin,hadbeenmurderedinGujaratalongwithhiswifein2005.Hewassaidtohavebeenkilledinan‘encounter’withtheGujaratpolice.And the poor wife? Could she too have been in the ‘encounter’? AmitShah,thenhomeministerofthestate,andlaterpresidentoftheBJP,wasamong thosewhowere chargedwith having engineered the deaths. ThehighercourtscametotheconclusionthattherewaseveryprospectthatthecasewouldnotbetriedfairlyinGujarat,sotheydirectedthatthecasebeshiftedtoMaharashtra.TheSupremeCourtalsodirectedthatthecasebetried by one judge from its commencement till it was brought to aconclusion. The case was assigned to the special court inMumbai thathandles CBI cases. The judgewas J.T. Utpat.He issued a succession ofsummons directing Shah to appear in court. Shah did not. On 20 June2014hereprimandedShah’scounselabouttheirpersistenteffortstohave

Shah exempted from appearing in court, and fixed 26 June as the nextdate,adateonwhich,hedirected,Shahmustappear.Loandbehold!Hewas transferred on 25 June! This in spite of the fact that the SupremeCourthaddirectedinitsorderof27September2012thatthecaseshallbeheard from start to finish by one judge. Andwho transferred him? Thevery committee—the Administrative Committee of the Bombay HighCourtheadedbythecourt’sChiefJustice—whichhadbeendirectedbytheSupremeCourttoensurethatthecasewillbeheardfromstarttofinishbythesamejudge.

Anewjudge,BrijgopalHarkishanLoya,waspostedtohandlethecase.HewasrepeatedlypesteredtodischargeShahwithoutdelay.Hetoldtheinterlocutors that he could not do so—the record of the case ran into10,000pagesbythen,andhecouldnotpassanyordertillhehadstudiedthe documents. Shah continued to not appear in his court also. Loyademanded the reasons for this non-appearance.He set the next date forappearanceas15December.

HewaspersuadedtoattendamarriageinNagpur.Amaninexcellenthealth,with no consequentialmedical history, indeed not a trace of anyheartailment,hewassaidtohavesuddenlyhadamassiveheartattackonthenightof30November/1December2014,anddiedearlyinthemorningof1December.

By somemagic, two persons—wholly unconnectedwith the family—had got the phone numbers of the judge’swife, sisters and father, all ofwhom lived in distant towns and villages—Mumbai, Latur, Dhule,Jalgaon,Aurangabad—andhadbeguncallingthemfrom5inthemorningthat the judgehaddied, and they shouldproceed toGategaon, adistantvillageabout30kilometresfromLatur,asthebodywasgoingtobesentthere.

Not just the calls, but the choice ofGategaonwas amystery. In thenormalcourse,thejudge’sbodyshouldhavebeentakentoMumbaiwherehiswifeandhisfamilyhadbeenliving.Thefamilymemberssaidlaterthat,evenintheirstateofshock,theywereastonishedthatthebodyhadarrivedunaccompanied.Thefamilywaspersuadedtocrematethebodyposthaste.

Acourageous journalist,NiranjanTakle,hadpursuedthedeathfora

year and a half. All sorts of inconsistencies had become apparent. Aftermuch dilly-dallying, the magazine for which the journalist worked,TheWeek, decided not to publish the journalist’s findings.He resigned, andcontinuedtogatheradditionalfacts.Eventually,theaccountwaspublishedbytheCaravanonline.3Itbecameasensation.

Loya had phoned his wife around 11 at night. They had talked forforty minutes. He had not complained of any uneasiness. He had beenlodged at a government guest house that is used by high-ups ingovernment.He is said to have complained of chest pain around 4 a.m.Therewouldhavebeenseveralvehiclesattheplace.Hewasnottakentoeither of the two well-known hospitals that were nearby, and couldprovidespecialistcare.Instead,hewastakentoanorthopaedichospital—the owner had connections with several right-wing organizations. Thejourneyfromthegovernmentguesthousetothehospitalwassaidtohavetaken forty-fiveminutes.When theCaravan reporters traversed thesameroad, it took them six minutes. Several judges were said to have beenpresent at the hospital—but no one seemed to know the name of theircolleague. In stories that appeared in leading newspapers, ostensibly torefute the Caravan account, the ECG was actually reproduced. Themachine had printed the time and date of the ECG as 5.11 a.m., 30November2014—that is,one fulldaybeforeLoyawas said tohavehadhisheartattackanddied!Questioned,thehospitalauthoritiesmaintainedthatthishadhappenedbecauseofa‘technicalglitch’.NootherECGhadsufferedtheglitch.Furthermore,eventhisECGdidnotshowthemassiveheartattackwhichLoyawassaidtohavesuffered.Thetimeofdeathhadbeen recorded as 6.15 a.m. But the family had started receiving callsaround5a.m.tellingthemthatthejudgehaddied.Twosources—oneattheGovernmentMedicalCollegeandtheotheratthepolicestation—toldthe follow-up team of Caravan that they had been informed aroundmidnightthatthejudgehaddied.

Thepost-mortemwassaidtohavebeenconductedbetween10and11a.m.on1December.Evenacursoryglanceatthereportshowedthatthedatehadbeenoverwritten.Thereportwassignedbyapolicesub-inspectorand someone who had identified himself as the paternal cousin of the

judge; but the judge had no paternal cousin.Had the post-mortembeenconductedatthetimementioned,thebodycouldnothavebeendeliveredto the distant village when it was. The occupancy register at the guesthouse had clearly been tampered with. The entries would indicate thatthreejudgeshadsleptinoneroomthathadjusttwobeds.

Thesisterofthejudge,herselfadoctor,toldTaklethatthebodyboreinjuries and blood at the back of the head, that his clothes werebloodstained,inparticularhisshirthadbloodfromtheleftshouldertothewaist—thepost-mortemandpolicereportswerenotjustsilentaboutthesefacts,theystatedthecontrary…Andsoon.4

Buttoreverttowhatwashappeninginthecourt.Anewjudge,M.V.Gosavi,wasappointedtotaketheplaceofLoya.Andwithindays,on30December2014,withouthearingsthatcouldbesaidbyanystretchoftheimaginationtohavegoneintothedetailsofevidence,hedischargedAmitShah.Shahhadbeendischargedwithoutfacingtrial—somethingthatwasagain in complete disregard of the law and of specific directions of theSupremeCourt.

The CBI had hitherto been maintaining—through the FIRs it hadregistered, through the charge sheets it had filed—that Sohrabuddin, hiswifeKausarbi andTulsiramPrajapati, akeywitness to the abductionofthe couple by the police, had beenmurdered in fake encounters. It hadstrenuouslyopposedtheorderoftheGujaratHighCourtgrantingbailtoShah, and had filed a petition in the Supreme Court against it. It hadmaintained in its charge sheet that Shahwas, in fact, presiding over an‘extortion racket’; that there had been ‘a larger conspiracy’ behind thekillings;thatShah‘wasthelynchpinoftheconspiracy’asaresultofwhichthe killings had been executed; that he had ‘constantly obstructed anyproperinvestigation’intothekillings,that‘itwasathisbehestandunderhispressurethatthetop-rankingpoliceofficerstriedtocoverupallsignsofhis involvementinthekillingsofSohrabuddin,KausarbiandTulsiramPrajapati and systematically suppressed and even tried to mislead thisCourt [the Supreme Court]’; that call records showed that during thekillings Shahwas ‘in regular touchwith the policemen’…But now, thesameCBIdidnotsomuchasraiseafingeragainstShah’sdischarge.

What had happened?DushyantDave nailed the answer: theBJP hadcometopowerattheCentreinMay2014,andinMaharashtrainOctober2014.

Here was a case not of mere corruption, but of probable, at leastpossiblemurder.Goingagainbythelessonsthatspringfromthecaseswehavegleanedabove,IwouldhavethoughtthattheSupremeCourtorHighCourt would immediately take note of the facts that had surfaced andensure that the mysterious death was promptly and thoroughlyinvestigated—they do, after all, take up all sorts of matters suo motu.5

Instead,forthreeyears,therewasradiosilence.EvenafterthedisquietingdetailswerepublishedinthethirdweekofNovember2017,andthevideorecordingsofinterviewswiththerelativesofJudgeLoyawerereleased,thejudiciarykept lookingtheotherway.Eventually,on4January2018,theBombay Lawyers Association took the matter up at the Bombay HighCourt:itfiledapetitionprayingthatthedeathbeinvestigated.Thecourttookthepetitiononboard,andissuednotices.

Within days of the Bombay High Court issuing notices, anotherpetition,inthe‘PublicInterest’,suddenlyappearedintheSupremeCourt.ThepetitionerclaimedtobeaMumbai-basedjournalist.6This ‘journalist’didnot endeavour to join the case thathadbeen takenonboardby theHighCourtinMumbai.HeapproachedtheSupremeCourt.Inthenormalcourse, as theBombayHighCourthadalready taken thematterup, theSupremeCourtwouldhave told thepetitioner to join thoseproceedings.ButthistimetheChiefJusticetookupthewrit.Hedidn’tjust‘takeupthewrit’.He took it upposthaste, andposted it for the verynextday!Andthenthenextexceptionalthinghappened.IfthecourtinthepersonoftheChief Justice had suddenly awakened—three years and more after thedeath of Loya—to the enormous importance of the matter, the matterought to have been assigned to some senior judges. Instead, the ChiefJusticeassignedittoCourtNumber10ofJusticeArunMishra.

Historywasrepeatingitself—buttherolesofthecourtswerereversed!Forthisdeviceofpre-emptingacourtthatyouthinkyoumaynotbeabletocontroland,withutmostdispatch,commencingproceedingsinanothercourthadbeenthestandardoperatingprocedureintheSohrabuddincase

from thebeginning.Apprehensive that theSupremeCourtmight step in,theGujaratgovernment twice tried topre-empt itsdoingsobyhurriedlyfilingthechargesheetsincourtsinGujarat.Recallingwhathappenedafterit directed that all records of the Prajapati death be handed over, theSupremeCourtnotedwhathadbeenhappening:

…GujaratPolice,however,wouldneitherhandovertherecordsofPrajapaticasetoCBInorallowit tomakeany independent investigation inPrajapaticase.Onthecontrary,GujaratPolice purported to complete its investigation and, like in the case of Sohrabuddin, ratherhurriedly filed the charge-sheet in the case on 30-7-2010, followed by a supplementarycharge-sheeton31-7-2010,beforetheJudicialMagistrate,FirstClass,Danta,BanaskanthaDistrict.TheMagistrate,equallyquicklycommittedthecasetotheCourtofSessionintwodays’timeon2-8-2010evenwithoutpropercompliancewiththeprovisionsofSection207oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure.

AfterexaminingfurtherfactsrelatingtothecoursethatmattershadtakenintheSohrabuddinandPrajapaticases,theSupremeCourtobserved:

…Itis,thus,tobeseenthatPrajapaticasealsofollowedexactlythesamepatternasthecaseofSohrabuddin.Initially,therewasacompletedenialbytheStatethathewaskilledinanykind of a fake encounter. But, when it became impossible to deny that the story of theencounterwas false, an investigationwas swiftlymadebyGujaratPoliceandcharge-sheetwassubmitted.Onthebasisofthecharge-sheet,ontheonehandanattemptwasmadetoproceedwithandconcludethetrialproceedingsasquicklyaspossibleandontheotherhandthiscourtwastoldthatafterthesubmissionofcharge-sheetitwasdenudedofauthoritytodirectanyfurtherinvestigation.Therewasthusclearlyanattemptnottoallowthefullfactstocometolightinconnectionwiththetwocases…7

Thesamedeviceswerebeingdeployedagain—except,andhowsaditistorecord, this time round the dramatis personae seemed to feel that theforumtheywouldbeabletoputtoworkintheirfavourwastheSupremeCourtratherthanthelowercourts!

In the unprecedented press conference that they, along with JusticeMadan B. Lokur and Justice Kurian Joseph, addressed on 12 January2018,JusticeChelameswarandJusticeRanjanGogoiacknowledgedthatitwas this decision of the Chief Justice that was the final trigger thatcompelled them to take the extraordinary step of directly drawing thepeople’s attention to the ways in which the functioning of the SupremeCourtwasbeingbent.

What ensued in Court 10 is best described by Senior AdvocateDushyantDave:

OnceitbecamepublicthattheBombayHighCourt,onJanuary23,waslikelytohearcasesseekinganinquiryintothemysteriousdeathofJudgeLoya,wheelsstartedmoving…

The matters were listed on 12th January, 2018.When I made a fervent prayer to theHon’bleBenchnottohear it inviewoftheforthcomingWritPetitionsbeforetheBombayHigh Court, my request was sternly declined. The Writ Petitioners were represented byAdvocates on Record and not by any Senior Counsel, clearly showing that there was noseriousnessonthatdayormaybebecauseoftheconfidenceintheCourt.

The hearing was brusque, nothing was argued, nothing was discussed and the CourtmerelyenquiredastowhethertheGovernmentofMaharashtrawaspresent.Shockingly,thecounselfortheGovernmentofMaharashtra—aBJPGovernment—waspresent,despitetherebeingnonotice.

IntheCourtandoutside,manylawyersrepresentingvariousBJPStateGovernmentswerepresentandsowas theAdditionalSolicitorGeneralof India,who isknowntobeclose toShri Amit Shah. It all looked too good to be true. The Court asked the counsel for theGovernmentofMaharashtratoproducedocuments,includingthe‘PostMortemReport’,onMonday,January15.

Ifthiswasnotenough,whattranspiredonthenextdateofhearingonJanuary16,whenthefollowingorderwaspassed,wassufficienttoshockthejudicialconscienceofanyJudgeorlawyerofrespect:‘Letthedocumentsbeplacedonrecordwithinsevendaysandif it isconsidered appropriate copies be furnished to the Petitioners. Put up before appropriateBench.’

What a contrast the step presented to what happens all the time: whenpetitionersgotheSupremeCourt,everysooftenthejudgesdirectthemtogofirsttotheconcernedHighCourt.

Butthelessonsdonotendthere.Dave’saccountillustratesamalaisetowhichwewillturnlateron,‘thelawyer’sdisease’:

A careful reading of the above order shows the appearance of Shri Pallav Sisodia, SeniorAdvocate, for one of the petitioners, and Harish Salve for the Respondent, State ofMaharashtra. Shri Pallav Sisodia, a respected lawyer, had appeared for ShriAmit Shah inSpecialLeavetoAppeal(Crl)No9003/2010filedbytheCBIchallengingthegrantofbailtoShriAmit Shah in the very sameSohrabuddin encounter caseby theGujaratHighCourt,before it was transferred toMumbai. He had appeared on 27.09.2011, 28.09.2011 and29.09.2011alongwithShriRamJethmalani,SeniorAdvocate,astheRecordofproceedingsof SupremeCourtdiscloses. Subsequently, he appeared in the samematteron30.11.2011and06.09.2012apparentlyforsomeotheraccusedinthesamecase.

ShriHarishSalvefirstappearedforRubabuddin,brotherofSohrabuddin,inWritPetition(Crl)No6of2007onmorethanoneoccasionandsubsequentlysuccessfullydefendedShriAmit Shah in opposing the Special Leave Petition (Crl)No 5000 of 2016 filed byHarshManderagainstthejudgmentandorderoftheBombayHighCourtupholdingdischargeonthe ground that since State has not filed appeal,HarshManderwas not the personwhocouldmaintainthepetition.8

The remarks of the four judges, the intense public controversy that hadensued, must have had some impact. It was reported that at the ritualmorningteaforwhichjudgesmeetbeforeheadingtotheircourts,JusticeArunMishrahadbrokendown.Hehadbeenworkinghardandsincerely,he is reported to have said, and now his competence and integritywerebeingquestioned.TheChiefJusticeandJusticeChelameswarweresaidtohave consoled him: ‘It isn’t personal, it is institutional…’ In the event,JusticeMishraandhiscompanionjudgeinCourtNumber10haddirectedthatthematterbeplacedbeforethe‘appropriateBench’.TheChiefJustice,his deft decision having been turned back, assigned the case to a benchheadedbyhimself.Thebenchhadchangedbuttheothercomponentofthedecisionhad remained—the casewouldbeheardon22 January2018, adaybeforetheBombayHighCourtwastohaveheardthematter…

KaidikaadilbehlaanekoDurbaanbadalteyjaateyhain…

If this is how the judiciary handles the possiblemurder of one of itsown,whatprotectioncantheaveragecitizenhopefor?

As this book closes, arguments are going on before the three-judgebench in the Supreme Court. One thing that Dave had predicted hasalreadycometopass:theBombayHighCourthavingbeenpreventedfromproceeding with the matter, the Mumbai-based ‘journalist’ has told theSupremeCourtthathedoesnotintendtopursuethecase,ashenolongerfeelsthatanyindependentinquiryintothedeathofLoyaisneeded!

MIDDLEMENANDINTERCEPTEDCALLS9

Medicalcollegesarebigbusiness—andsoisthegrantingofpermissiontosetupthecolleges.Thatmanyapartywhichhasneithertheinfrastructurenorexpertise to impartmedicaleducation isable to securepermission tosetoneuphaslongbeenamatterofgravepublicconcern.In2015,basedon assessments of theMedicalCouncil of India, the government refusedpermission to around forty-six parties which had applied for admittingstudentstomedicalcourses.AmongthesewasthePrasadEducationTrust

whichhadsoughtpermissiontosetupanewmedicalcollegeinLucknow.However,threedayslater,anOversightCommitteewhichhadbeensetupon the directions of the Supreme Court overruled the decision of thegovernment,andthetrustsecuredpermissiontosetupthecollege.

The Medical Council of India—which itself has had a chequeredreputation—conductedinspectionsofthecollege.Thecollegehadfailedtoimplement the undertakings it had given while securing permission; itwoefully lacked the expertise and infrastructure to impart medicaleducation. The government took two decisions: it debarred the collegefromadmittingstudentsfortwoyears—presumablythecollegewouldfirmupthefacilitiesandfacultyduringthisinterval;second,thebankguaranteethatthecollegehadgiven—Rs2crore—wouldbeencashed.

ThetrustfiledanappealintheSupremeCourtagainstthesedecisions.The court—speaking through a bench headed by Justice DipakMisra—directed the government to re-examine the assessment of the MedicalCouncilinregardtothiscollegeaswellasotherswhichhadbeenrefusedpermission.Thishappenedon1August2017.

Twodayslater,thegovernmentdecidedtostickbyitsearlierdecisions.ThesponsorofthecollegecontactedaretiredjudgeoftheOrissaHigh

Court,I.M.Quddusi,and,presumablyonhisadvice,withdrewthepetitionthatthetrusthadfiledintheSupremeCourt.Instead,itfiledapetitiontosimilareffectintheAllahabadHighCourt.Ontheverydaythatitfiledtheapplication—25August2017—atwo-judgebenchof theAllahabadHighCourt consisting of JusticeNarayan Shukla and JusticeVirendraKumarpassedaninterimorder:thecollegecouldcontinuecounsellingtillthenexthearing,andtheencashmentofthebankguaranteeisstayed.

ItwasnowtheturnoftheMedicalCounciltoapproachtheSupremeCourt.Duringthehearing,thecounselforthetrustaffirmedthattheonlyrelieftheywereseekingwasthatthebankguaranteenotbeencashed:theywould not continue the counselling, etc. The SupremeCourt—the benchwasagainheadedbyChiefJusticeMisra10—wasmosttrusting.Itdisposedof thepetition filedby theMedicalCouncil. It disposedof thewrit thatwaspendingintheAllahabadHighCourt.Itpermittedthetrusttocomebacktothecourt—i.e.,theSupremeCourt—withafreshwritunderArticle

32.11Thetrustpromptlycamebackwiththerecommendedwrit—itdidsoon31August2017,thatis,withinjustadayofthepermissiongrantedbythe Supreme Court bench. It prayed that the government’s decisions—preventingitfromenrollingstudents,andencashingthebankguarantee—bequashed.

Fromnowon the dates tell a tale.The trust had filed itswrit on31August2017.Thewritwas listed forbeingheardon4September2017.On that day, the Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice Misrastayedtheencashmentofthebankguaranteetillthenextdateofhearing—thiswasfixedforMonday,11September.

The CBI had evidently got wind of the efforts being made by thesponsorsofthetrust,andtheirhavingcontactedformerJusticeQuddusi.Theyhadbeguntappingtheirphones.Inconversationsthattookplaceon3 and 4 September, therewere themost damaging exchanges between aperson pushing the trust’s case, the ex-judge of the Orissa High Court,Quddusi, and a middleman, a resident of Bhubaneswar, Orissa. ‘PrasadhadtobedeliveredtotheTempleinDelhi’…Theworkwas‘100percentguaranteed’as‘ourpersonwhoisourcaptain,itisbeingdonethroughthecaptain’…[Thisintheconversationof3September:thewritwasadmittedbyabenchheadedbyChiefJusticeMisraon4September.]The ‘luggagewouldhave to be delivered—’; ‘nothingwill happen if the prasad is notgiven’—but there can be no meeting as the government is watchingeveryone…Hagglingover theamount thatmustbegivenasadvance…Haggling over the total amount that has to be given … How themiddleman has brought the demand down, now the amount is settled:‘Yes,conversationwasclear.Calculatedasperthree.They/hewon’tdoitfor less thanthree.’Andtheamountwillensurenot just theorder inthepresentcase:‘…Sir,Idon’twanttotakeanyriskhere,becauseitisa100percentguarantee.Noifsandbuts.Onceworkisdone,sirwillsitfor10-15months.Get14-15jobsdone,evenyouwillbelieveit.Hewilldoit101percent’… ‘Nowonlyone thing father is saying,one thinghe is sayingthat,thiscaptainofourshas…alloverIndia…whateverworkthereis,he iswilling to do.’ The ex-judge fromOrissa, ‘I am saying that I havesomeone I know frombefore or I am saying that someone I know from

beforehasapproachedme’…Theex-judgeagain,‘No,heissayingthatifmoneyisthere,thensomeoneshouldgoinsidethehouse,someoneshouldtalk’…Thedifficultyofarrangingtheentireamountimmediately:hence,thecasehasbeenlistedforMonday—11September—getitpostponedbythreetofourdays…‘Ifyougivetwopeoplethenwewillextendthedateby3-4days…’Atlast,thesponsortothemiddleman:‘Listen,youtaketwofromusnowandastheorderisgiven,wewillgetadmission,wewillsendonecroretothejudge.Yourplace,Quddusisir’splace,doitthisway.’

The CBI raided the houses of Quddusi and the others. It recoveredaroundRs2crore incash.Itarrestedtheex-judgeaswellasothers—theonepushingthetrust’scaseandthemiddlemanfromBhubaneswaramongthem.

Reliable sources told the Campaign for Judicial Accountability andReforms that two days after this second conversation, the CBI took thematerialithadgatheredtotheChiefJusticewiththerequestthathepermitthem to register a regular FIR against Justice Narayan Shukla of theAllahabad High Court. Chief Justice Misra refused permission and,instead,opted foran ‘internal inquiry’.But the inquiry thathe institutedwastobeinregardtoarelatedcase,onerelatingtotheGCRGInstituteofMedical Sciences, and not in regard to the case relating to the PrasadEducational Trust. He decided on this course even though sourceinformation pointed to questionable decisions of Justice Shukla in bothinstances.Refusedpermission,theCBIregisteredapreliminaryenquiry.Itsreportrecordedinpart:

SourcealsoinformedthatShriI.M.QuddusiandShriB.P.YadavmetHon’bleJusticeShriNarayanShukla in themorningon25.08.2017athis residence inLucknowregarding thematteranddeliveredillegalgratification.Sourcehasfurtherinformedthaton25.08.2017,anorderwas passed in petition,Misc. BenchNo. 19870 of 2017 filed by Prasad EducationTrust,byaBench,whichincludedHon’bleJusticeShriNayaranShukla.Theorderdirectedthat the petitioner’s college shall not be delisted from the list of colleges notified forcounselling till the next date of listing, i.e. 31.08.2017. Further the encashment of bankguaranteewasalsostayedtillthenextdateoflisting.Itwasfurtherclarifiedthatonthebasisoftheorder,thepetitionersshallhavenorighttoclaimanyadmissionofthestudents…

SourcesinformedthatJusticeShriNarayanShuklaassuredShriI.M.Quddusithathewillreturnapartofillegalgratificationpreviouslyreceivedbyhimshortly.

The aforesaid acts prima-facie reveal that Hon’ble Justice Shri Narayan Shukla ofLucknowBenchoftheHighCourtofAllahabadincollusionwithShriI.M.Quddusi,Retired

JusticeoftheHighCourtofOdisha;Smt.BhawanaPandey;ShriB.P.YadavandShriPalashYadavofPrasadEducationTrustandShriSudhirGiriofVenkateshwaraMedicalCollegeand unknown others, committed gross misconduct while discharging duties as a publicservant.

PermissiontoproceedagainstJusticeShuklahavingbeenrefused,theCBIregistered its preliminary enquiry report on 8 September. On 11September, the SupremeCourt directed that the trust’swrit be listed forthe 18th—recall how the one pushing the trust’s case had asked themiddlemantohavethehearingpostponedby‘three-fourdays’.

On the18th, thebenchpresidedoverbyChief JusticeMisradirectedthatthebankguaranteeshallnotbeencashed,anditdirectedtheMedicalCouncilofIndiatoyetagaininspectthecollege.Forreasonsthatarenotevident, theorder, issuedthoughitwason18September,wasputuponthewebsiteoftheSupremeCourtonlyon21September.

Soonenough, the internal inquiry intodecisions regarding the relatedcase—of GCRG Institute of Medical Sciences—revealed that indeed,JusticeShuklahadbeenguiltyofgrossimpropriety.Itseemedthataweekafter the Supreme Court had directed that this ‘Institute’ would not beallowed to enrol students for 2017/18, Justice Shukla had altered by hisownhand theHighCourtdecision, thusenabling the ‘Institute’ toevadetheSupremeCourtprohibitionandenrolstudentsfor2017/18.

Given the conclusionsof the internal inquiry, theChief Justiceof theSupremeCourtadvisedtheChiefJusticeof theAllahabadHighCourt tostopassigninganyworktoJusticeShukla.Thelatterproceededonleave.

ButwhataboutthecaserelatingtothePrasadEducationalTrust,andthoseconversationsaboutthe‘captain’whowasgoingtostayinplaceforthecoming ten to fifteenmonths?As thisbookgoes topress, thematterremains shrouded.Will the CBI move afresh to seek the Chief Justice’spermission?Willitconcludethat,permissionhavingbeenrefusedonce,itcannotgobacktotheChiefJusticeandaskhimtoreconsiderhisdecision?The only thing that is publicly known is the record of the CBI, andespecially its recent record—that it will act in accordance with theconvenienceofitspoliticalmasters.

SHOOTINGTHEMESSENGER

TheCampaign for JudicialAccountabilityandReforms—theCJAR—hadreceived informationabout theCBI’s findings, thecontentsof the tappedconversationsaswellasaboutthefateoftheirrequesttotheChiefJusticefor taking the next steps against Justice Shukla of the Allahabad HighCourt.

Accordingly, on 6 November 2017, the CJAR filed a writ in theSupremeCourt.Thegravamenof thewritwas that leaving thematter inthe hands of theCBIwould endanger the independence of the judiciary:the political executive would certainly have access to what the CBIuncovered,anditcouldusetheinformationtopressureindividualjudges;hence the prayer that a Special Investigation Team be formed under aretired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to investigate the allegationswhichhadbeenrecordedbytheCBIintheFIR,andtheevidencethatwasreproducedinitspreliminaryenquiry.On8November,astheChiefJusticewassittinginaConstitutionBench,inaccordancewithsettledconvention,Prashant Bhushan mentioned the matter in Court Number 2 before thebenchpresidedoverbythejudgenextinseniority,JusticeJ.Chelameswar.Justice Chelameswar and his companion judge, Justice Abdul Nazeer,directedthatthematterbelistedbeforethemon10November.Later,onthe 8th itself, the registry of the Supreme Court informed PrashantBhushanthattheChiefJusticehadpassedanorderthatthewritbelistedbeforeanotherbench.

On9November,anotheradvocate,KaminiJaiswal,filedawritalongthesamelines.IttoowasmentionedinCourt2.JusticesChelameswarandNazeer directed that thematter be listed before themat 12.45p.m.TheConstitution Bench in which the Chief Justice was sitting normallyadjournsforluncharound12.45or1p.m.TheChiefJusticeadjourneditunexpectedly at noon, saying that he had to attend to some domesticbusiness. In Court Number 2, after hearing submissions, JusticesChelameswarandNazeerdirectedthat,giventheseriousnessofthematter,Kamini Jaiswal’s writ be listed before a bench of the five senior-mostjudgesofthecourton13November.

Thenextday,10November2017,thefirstwritwhichtheChiefJusticehad in a sense taken away from the bench of JusticesChelameswar andNazeer came up before a bench consisting of Justices Sikri and AshokBhushan.PrashantinformedthemthatthebenchofJusticesChelameswarandNazeer had already directed that thewrit ofKamini Jaiswal,whichsought reliefs similar to the ones sought by Prashant’s writ, be placedbefore a bench of the five senior-most judges. The natural thing wouldhavebeentotagPrashant’swrit tothatofKaminiJaiswal’ssothatbothwouldbeheard togetherby that largerbench. Instead, Justices Sikri andBhushan directed that the writ be placed before the Chief Justice fordirections.

Withunheard-ofpromptness,onthatveryday,thatis10November,at2.45p.m.anoticewasputupthatthewritfiledbytheCJARwouldcomeupforhearingat3p.m.—thatis,withinfifteenminutes—beforeaseven-judge bench presided over by theChief Justice.When lawyers rushed toCourtNumber1, they foundtwothings.Thenamesof twoof thesevenjudgesandthechairsmeantforthem—JusticesSikriandBhushanwhohadheard thematter earlier in theday—werebeinghurriedly removed.And,second, a host of lawyers—in particular, office bearers of advocates’associations whom we shall encounter again—were crowded in theforefront. Prashant Bhushan who was representing the CJAR—the writwhichwas to be heardwas the one filed by it—was shouted out by theadvocates whowere not even party to the proceedings. In raised voicesthey kept saying that the order of Justices Chelameswer and Nazeer inregardtoKaminiJaiswal’swritwasbadinlaw.TheChiefJusticeletthemhavetheirsay.Soonenough,thebenchhandeddownadecision:theChiefJustice was the sole master of the roster, no one else could constitutebenches. In short, even though Jaiswal’swritwas not even listed beforethem,theChiefJusticeandhiscompanionjudgesstruckdowntheorderofJusticeChelameswarandJusticeNazeerthatJaiswal’swritbeheardbyabench consisting of the five senior-most Judges. Instead, this hurriedlyassembledbenchdecidedthatthewritwouldbeheardbyabenchthattheChiefJusticewouldconstitute.

On14November,KaminiJaiswal’swritcameupbeforeathree-judge

bench constituted by the Chief Justice. The judges dismissed the writ,holding that herplea—that thematter relating to theCBI’s findings andtheimperativeneedtoconstituteaSpecialInvestigationTeamshouldnotbeheardbyabenchofwhichtheChiefJusticewasamember—wasbadinlaw. Furthermore, that the concerns she had raised regarding the FIR—about bribes being paid for securing favourable orders—were whollywithoutmerit,whollyunethicalandunwarranted,andwerejustintendedtobringtheSupremeCourtintodisrepute.

On27November, thesame three judgesheard thewritof theCJAR.On 1 December, they dismissed the writ, holding it to be ‘whollycontemptuous’,‘scandalous’andunwarranted.TheyimposedapenaltyofRs25lakhontheCJARforpursuingthewritevenafterKaminiJaiswal’swrithadbeendismissed.

Naturally,theCJARfiledapetitiontoreviewtheorder.Thefactsthatithad stated in itswritwerewhollybasedon the conversations that theCBIhadrecordedandtheFIRwhichithadregistered.Themattertowhichit had drawn attentionwasmanifestly of the highest public importance,not the least for the esteemof the SupremeCourt itself.The judges hadheldthattheCJARhadscandalizedthecourtbystatingthatjudgesoftheSupremeCourthadbeennamedinthewrit:infact,thewrithadnotstatedthisatall.Thejudgeshadsaid,‘Wewonderastowhatfavourableordershavebeenpassed’intheinterestofthetrust:butthesecouldbeeasilyseen,and the CJAR listed them order by order. To hold that, as the writ ofKaminiJaiswalhadbeendismissed,theeffortofCJARtopursue itswritwas contemptwas unwarranted: earlier, in spite of a specific request tothat effect, benches of the same court had not agreed to club themtogether; moreover, a petitioner is fully within his rights to presentarguments in favour of his writ—it may well be, and this is just oneconsideration, that vital arguments may not have been satisfactorilypresentedwhentheotherwritwasheard;inanycase,thecourts,includingthe SupremeCourt, do change theirmind…Thepenalty ofRs 25 lakhhad been levied without hearing the CJAR at all: indeed, during thehearings,atnotimewasthecounseltoldthathewasopeninghimselfforsuchheavypenalty;furthermore,nopenaltyhadbeenimposedonKamini

Jaiswaleventhough,andonthesayingofthe judgesthemselves, thetwowritsweresimilar.Asforrequestingthatthematterbeheardbyabenchofwhich the Chief Justice was not a member, the fact was that the ChiefJusticehadpresidedovereverybench thathadheard themedical collegematter—the doings ofwhose sponsors, pushers andmiddlemenwere thesubjectoftheCBI’sFIR; itwasawell-settledprinciplethatnoonecouldbeajudgeinhisowncause…

Soon,on15January2018,theCJARfiledaformalcomplaintagainsttheChiefJusticewiththefivesenior-mostjudges.Thecomplaintwasoneof themostpersuasiveandoneof themostcourageousdocuments that Ihad read in a long, long time. It setout various actsof commissionandomission. These included, of course, a list of the ways that the matterrelating to the Prasad Education Trust had been handled. It set out thefactsthattheCBIhaduncoveredduringitsinvestigationsandraids.Itsetoutthetappedconversations.Itmadenewpoints:theorderbywhichthedecision of the Chelameswer–Nazeer Bench had been nullified, forinstance, seemed to have been antedated. There was also the questionabout the way land had been acquired by Mr Misra, as he then was,severalyearsearlierinOrissabyfilinganaffidavitwhichaninquirybytheofficialsconcernedhadheldtobefraudulent;andhow,inspiteofthis,MrMisrahadheldontothelandfortwenty-sevenyears,thatis, literallytillthetimehebecameajudgeoftheSupremeCourt.Thecomplaintrequestedthataninternalinquirybeinstitutedagainsthim.

Clearly, judges too are subject to Newton’s Third Law: ‘When onebody exerts a force on a second body, the second body simultaneouslyexerts a force equal inmagnitude and opposite in direction on the firstbody.’

‘ButcanIendthisaccountonthishopefulnote?’Iwondered.IaskedPrashantBhushanwhatcoursehispetitionforreviewofthecontemptistofollow.Itwouldbeplacedbeforethesamethreejudgeswhohadheldthathis writ was ‘wholly contemptuous’, ‘scandalous’ and unwarranted, heexplained,andwhohadimposedthatfineofRs25lakh.Andtherewouldbenoopenhearing, Prashantwouldnot have any chance topresent thefacts or law before them; the judges would merely discuss it among

themselves, inprivate. If they reconfirmedwhat theyhadheld,hewouldhavetheopportunitytofileacurativepetition.Andwhowouldhearthat?TheChief Justice, the three senior-most judgesand the three judgeswhoimposed the penalty in the first instance. Four to three! Kyaa karen,kahaanjaayen…

Banehainahl-e-havasmuddaibhimunsifbhiKisevakilkarenkissemunsifichahen…

Allthiswasbadenough.Butsoonthecountrywasjoltedintorealizingthat there was much worse, indeed that practices that would provedisastrousfortheinstitutionand,therefore,forthecountry,hadcometobe adopted. They transcended individual judges, they struck at the veryheartoftheSupremeCourtitself.

DILUTIONSANDTHEIRCONSEQUENCES

Public disclosure by the senior-most judges of the Supreme Court inJanuary 2018 gave us a glimpse of what has been happening inside thecourt, and it awakened us to another source of mischief that had creptbackin.Thatliketherestofus, judgeshavepredilectionsiswell-known,and in a sense quite natural: to take an example from far away, somejudges of theUS SupremeCourt have been ‘strict constructionists’—youhad toproveeverything to their satisfaction from theplainwordsof theConstitution itself; others, equally distinguished,weremore expansive intheir interpretations. In India also, especially from the 1970s onwards,while most judges would go back to the plain text of the Constitution,somefelt it theirdutytoreaddeeperandwidermeanings intothetext—witnessthewaytheambitofArticle21wasexpandedintheensuingyears.Thosewhosawthemselvesas ‘progressive’ felt that theyhadnot just theright but a mandate to change the way the Constitution had beeninterpreted: one judge of the Supreme Court, Justice D.A. Desai, as wesaw,went so far as to proclaim that he had joined the system so as towreck it from within. These differences in perspective translated intospecifics.Some judgeswerealmostself-consciouslypro-labour—‘Bonus is

adeferredwage’,and the rest—otherswereconservative.GautamBhatiaremindedus recently that in the firstdecadeof thenewmillennium,onebenchoftheSupremeCourtconfirmedalmostallthedeathsentencesthatcame to it inappealwhileanotherbenchcommutedalmostall thedeathsentences.12Therefore,theimpressiongotaroundthattheoutcomewouldnotdependsomuchonthe factsoreventhe lawasonthebenchbeforewhichone’scase landed.The lemmawas ineluctable:manya litigantdidwhateverhecouldtodeflecthiscasetoonebenchandkeepitawayfromanother.TheregistryofthecourtandtheChiefJustice’sofficebecamethefocusofspecialdeferenceandattention.

Tocounterthispractice,methodsandconventionsdeveloped.Bencheswould be formed subject-wise—the background of the judge, if he hadacquired special competence in a particular branch of law, for instance,would naturally be one of the considerations in constituting the subject-wise benches. As cases came up, they would in the first instance bechannelledtothesetofbenchesthathadbeenassignedthegeneralareaoflaw in which the case fell and, in the second step, within that set ofbenches thecasewouldbeassigned toaparticularbenchat random, ‘bythecomputer’asthepracticecametobeknown.

Other conventions also evolved. Sensitive cases—like those involvinginterpretationsoftheConstitutionorthoseinvolvingholdersofhighoffice—would be assigned to larger benches, and these benches would bemannedbyseniorjudges.Similarly,oncesomejudgeshadbegunhearingacase,itwouldnotbesnatchedawayfromthemandassignedtosomeotherset. If a bench maintained that the case ought to be heard by a largerbench, itwouldbereferredtoa largerbench.Andthose judgeswhohadbeenhearingthecaseinthefirstinstancewouldbeincludedinthelargerbench.Decisionshandeddownbylargerbencheswouldbeadheredtoasprecedentsbybenches consistingof fewer judges.Smallerbencheswouldnotreopenaquestionthathadbeensettledbyalargerbench,certainlynotmerelybyremarksmadeinpassing:Irememberwellhowinhisjudgmentin the Minerva Mills case, Justice P.N. Bhagwati criticized the way inwhichdeliberationsanddrafting in thecasehadproceeded—theremarkswereclearlydirectedatthewaythethenChiefJustice,Y.V.Chandrachud,

had handled the matter; the executive seized upon these remarks andsoughttousethemtoreopencasesoffoundationalimportance.13Butsuchinstanceswererare,and,ashappened inresponse toMinervaMills, theyalwaystriggeredastrongreactionwithinthelegalcommunity.

In recent years, the conventions have got diluted. Perhaps theconventionthathassufferedthemost isthatofsmallerbenchesadheringtowhatlargerbencheshaveheld.Apartfromsomeviewingthemselvesas‘progressive’ and, therefore, having a duty, so to say, to change thedirectionofrulings,thereisbynowsuchaplethoraofjudgments,andsomany of the judges have been so prolix, that it has become easier andeasiertofindthepassageonerequiresforbuttressingthepositiononehassetouttoaffirm.Thishascompoundeduncertainty.

But in the last two years, mere uncertainty has given way toapprehensionthatapatternisafoot.Sensitivecaseaftersensitivecase—inparticular,casesinwhichthecurrentrulershavehadastake—havecometobe assigned to a benchheadedby a particular judge.Cases thatwerepart-heardhavebeen takenaway froma set of judges and reassigned toothers,oftentheyhavebeentakenoverbytheChiefJusticehimself.Judgeswhohadbeenhearingthecase,andthesecasesagainhappenedtobeonesin which the current rulers had special interest—Justice Gogoi in theinstanceoftheappointmentofadirectoroftheCBI,JusticesChelameswarandS.A.BobdeinthematterofAadhaar—wouldsuddenlyfindthemselvespointedlyexcludedfromthebenchwhichwouldhenceforthhearthepart-heardcase.When,say,abenchoftwojudgesfeltthattheissuesinacasewereso importantthat itoughttobeheardbya largerbench,the largerbench would indeed be constituted but, in the face of well-settledconvention, the new bench would exclude the judges who had beenhearing the case. Senior judges in particular came to be excluded fromsensitive cases: the Sahara-Birla diaries case was assigned to a benchheaded by JusticeArunMishra overlooking ten benches that had judgeswhohadmoreexperienceandseniority—thiswasacaseaboutwhichtherulers were deeply apprehensive, for their names, along with those ofseveralotherprominentpersons, figuredashaving receivedhugepilesofmonies;similarly,theKalikhoPulcasewhichwehaveencounteredearlier

wasassignedtoabenchoverlookingelevenbenchesconsistingofjudgesofhigher seniority and experience.14 Worse, senior judges began to beconspicuouslyexcludedevenfromconstitutionalcases—JusticeA.P.Shah,theformerChiefJusticeoftheDelhiHighCourt,gaveatellingexample:ChiefJusticeDipakMisrahadconstitutedconstitutionalbenchesinsevencases;eachofthesewasheadedbyhimself,andnotoneofthefoursenior-mostjudgesfiguredinanyoneofthem.15

As such occurrences became more and more frequent, an alarmingbreach, reminiscent of theMinervaMills episode, occurred in a case. Alawyer,R.P.Luthra,filedapetitionintheSupremeCourtassertingthathehadbeendeprivedofhisrighttobeappointedasajudgeoftheSupremeCourt.HesaidthatastheMemorandumofProcedurefortheappointmentofjudgeshadnotbeenfinalized,allappointmentsthathadbeenmadeinthe preceding months were void. The case was assigned to two judges.TheyrejectedtheclaimofLuthra,butinthecourseoftheirjudgment,theyremarked that, indeed, the Memorandum of Procedure ought to befinalizedwithout furtherdelay.16But thematterhadalreadybeen settledby a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.17 After that judgment,therehadbeendetaileddiscussionsinthecollegiumofthefivesenior-mostjudges. JusticeChelameswarandhis seniorcolleagueswrote to theChiefJusticeaboutthispeculiarobservationbythetwojudgestowhomhehadassignedLuthra’scase.Sevenmonthshavepassedsincetheprocedurethatwasfinalizedwassenttogovernment,theypointedout.Itssilencemustbeconstruedasconsent,andthecourtmustproceedonthisbasis.18

Nogeniuswasrequiredtoseethattheobservationthathadfallenfromthe two judgeswould be grabbed by the rulers to proclaim that, on thesayingoftheSupremeCourtitself,theMemorandumofProcedurehadnotbeenfinalized.Thequestionwouldbereopenedandtherulerswouldtryasecond time within two years to wrest a larger say in the selection ofjudges.

TwomonthspassedandtherewasnoresponsefromtheChiefJustice.AndthenthecaseofJudgeLoya’sdeathinwhich,aswehaveseen,the

rulerswere not just apprehensive, theyweremortally apprehensive, wasalso assigned to Justice ArunMishra, bypassing all the seniors: he may

have been the most upright of judges but his family’s proximity to therulingpartywaswellknownand,ontheincessantlyrepeatedmaximthatjusticemustnotonlybedonebutbeseentobedone,thisseemedjusttoomuch to disregard as a mere coincidence. The deflection of this casebecamethelaststraw.

The judges were confronted by what Gandhiji used to call ‘anintolerablewrong’.Theyhadtriedothermethods:theyhadwrittentotheChiefJustice, theyhadmethim.Tonoconsequence.Theywere leftwithnoalternative:theymadeknowntheirmisgivingstothepeople.

Asthisbookgoestopress,asmallchangehasbeenmade:theregistryhasputupontheSupremeCourtwebsitethelistsettingoutwhichjudgeswill hear cases relating to which subject. But clearly it is but a smallchange. No institutional mechanism for assigning cases has been put inplace:thefourjudgeshadsuggestedthatacommitteeoftheChiefJusticeand of those who are in line to be Chief Justices decide the benches—nothing like that has been instituted. The prerogative has been retainedsolely in the hands of the Chief Justice. The assignments of subjects tospecified judges is ‘till furtherorders’.Furthermore, theorder is toapplyonly to future cases. And, most significantly, all cases originating fromPILs,allcasesrelatingtoelectionsandallcasesrelatingtotheappointmentof constitutional functionaries—that is, precisely all cases in which thecurrent rulersaremost liable tohaveastake—havebeenretainedby theChiefJustice.19Theoptimisticfeelthatthechangeisbutthefirststep,thattheChiefJusticewillseethegravityofthematterandwilleventuallyputin place institutional mechanisms. Others go by the record thus far—includingtherecordoftheexecutive.

8

Whatifhehadnotwrittenthatletter?

On23 January2017, a sitting judgeof theCalcuttaHighCourt, JusticeC.S. Karnan, shot off a letter to the prime minister. He named twentyjudges—starting with the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court—asbeingcorrupt.Hetoldtheprimeministerthatthiswas‘aninitiallist’,andthatthecorruptionofthejudges‘canbeprovedthroughsomecompetentagencies’.Hefurnishednoevidencetosubstantiatehisallegation.

On25January,heshotoffanotherletter—thistimetotheChiefJusticeoftheMadrasHighCourt,whosename,likeAbuBenAdam’s,hadledalltherestinthelistthatKarnanhadsenttotheprimeminister.ThereasonKarnan was writing to him, it seems, was that in his mind the ChiefJustice,MadrasHighCourt,wastheoriginofhistroubles.Karnanrecalledthat having been called by them, on 16 February 2016, he hadmet theChiefJusticeofIndiaandothermembersoftheCollegiuminthechambersoftheChiefJustice.TheChiefJusticehadtoldhimthatthereweremanycomplaintsagainsthisconductonthebench;henarratedhowhehadthenfallen at the feet of the Chief Justice and entreated him to institute aninquiryintotheallegations.Herecalledthathistroubleshadstartedwhen,sittingalongsideasenior judge,hehadobjectedtoacasebeingtakenupthathadnotbeenlisted;herecalledhowhehadlatertakenthecasebundletothesenior judgeandtouchedhis feet. ‘Thereafter,’hecontinued inhislettertotheChiefJusticeoftheMadrasHighCourt,‘Mr.JusticeIbrahimKalifullaandmostoftheotherJudgesstartedtheircontinuousraggingofmyself.’HerecalledthattheChiefJustice,Madras,hadmaintainedthatnosuchcasehadbeentakenup,andthat‘Nowthecollecteddocumentshave

beenmisplacedsomewhere…’Herecountedanotherinstance.‘OnoneoccasionyouandMr.Justice

AkbarAlicameuptomeatthesecondflooroftheAdditionalBlockoftheHighCourtwhereinHighTeawasprovidedforthesmallfunctionatthemeeting hall, during the social function you andMr. Justice Akbar Alibarged in front of my seat and indecently confronted me with wickedpostures and gestures, which is the lowest form of indecency exhibitedfromrespectedgentlemenlikebothofyouespeciallyfromthefraternityofJudges…’

He recounted that in his meeting with the Chief Justice and otherCollegiumjudges,hehadrequestedtheChiefJusticetocanceltheorderbywhich he had stopped all judicial and administrative work from beingassignedtohim.Heconcludedhis letter to theChief Justice,Madras,bymaintaining, ‘Nowit ispertinent toask—whois theculprit? Ithas tobedecided. My view is that you wantonly, deliberately and continuouslyinsulted me. Therefore, you should be prosecuted under the SC/ST[Preventionof]AtrocitiesAct.’

On8February2017,theSupremeCourt issuedasuomotucontemptorderagainsthim,anddirectedtheCalcuttaHighCourttoensurethatnojudicial or administrative work was assigned to him. On 11 February,Karnandashedoffa letter to theregistrargeneralof theSupremeCourt.HeaccusedtheChiefJusticeofIndiaandthesixotherjudgeswhohadsaton thebench thathadpreventedwork frombeingassigned tohim ‘withmalafide intentioninordertoprotecttheCorruptJudges’whomhehadnamed.Hemaintained thathehad sent the list of judgeshe regardedascorrupt only in accordance with the exhortation of the previous ChiefJustice of India who had exhorted that, if you believe any judge to becorrupt, ‘then take an open stand by publicly naming him’. ‘Hence, aquestionofcontemptdoesnotariseabsolutelysincethe[previous]C.J.I.’sadvicedoesnotcomeunderthepurviewofthecurrentCourt,neverthelesstheadviceisintandemwithNaturalJustice.’

On16March,headdressedalettertotheChiefJusticeofIndiaandthesix other judgeswhohad been on the bench, telling them that they hadbeen part of an ‘unconstitutional Bench after breaking the Indian

Constitutional Law’ and passed the order holding him in contempt andstoppingallwork frombeingassigned tohim.Heagainmaintained thattheyhaddonesotoprotectthecorruptjudgeswhomhehadnamedinhislettertotheprimeminister.‘Therefore,IamcallinguponallsevenJudgesto pay compensation since you have disturbedmymind andmynormallife,besidesyouhave insultedme in thegeneralpublic consistingof120croreinIndiaduetolackoflegalknowledge…NowallthesevenJudgeswill pay compensation within a period of seven days from the date ofreceipt of this order, failing which on the same stand of yours (samefooting),IwillrestrainJudicialandAdministrativeworkofyours.’

On17March,heagainchargedtheChiefJusticeandhissixcolleagueswith having ‘deliberately and wantonly failed due to lack of judicialknowledge’, and warned that ‘this kind of worst type of acrimoniousbehaviour will only endanger ultimately the General Public’. Hence, hedeclared,closethecontemptproceedings,lifttheorderpreventingworktobeassigned,etc.

Laterintheday,heshotoffanotherepistletotheChiefJusticeandhiscolleagues: policemen had come to his residence to execute the bailablewarrant that theSupremeCourthad issuedagainsthim,he recounted: ‘Irejectedthesameafterassigningvalidreasons…Thiskindofdemeaningacts from your Lordships and further perpetrating the Atrocities Act isabsolutelyoutoflawtotheutterembarrassmentofaDalitJudge.HenceIrequestyoutostopyourfurtherharassmentsinordertoupholdthedignity&decorumofourCourts.’

AstheSupremeCourtremainedfirminitsorders,on13April,Karnan,functioning from his house which he had declared to be his ‘make-shiftCourt’, passed a lengthy ‘SuoMotu JudicialOrder in the interest of theNation toprotect theGeneralPublicof their life,propertyand justice toall’.InthishechargedtheChiefJusticeofIndiaandhissixcolleaguesofpassingtheirorder‘withoutfollowingdueprocedureoflawwhileviolatingthe Principle ofNatural Justice and the PrimeArticles 14 and 21 of theConstitution further after breaking the Indian Constitutional Law’. Inaddition, he charged them with constituting ‘an unconstitutional Benchduetoextrememaliceandvengeance,whichamountstoviolatingArticle

219oftheConstitution’.HetermedthedirectionsthattheSupremeCourthadissuedtobe‘Atrocities’[withacapital‘A’],andthusbeinginviolationof the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)Act, 1989, and the subsequent amendment act. He maintained that inmovingagainsthim,thejudgeshadviolated,amongothers,theclausethatholdsapersonguiltyifhe‘Forcesorintimidatesorobstructsamemberofa Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, who is a member or aChairpersonoraholderofanyotherofficeofaPanchayatunderPartIXoftheConstitutionoraMunicipalityunderPartIXAoftheConstitution,fromperformingtheirnormaldutiesandfunctions’—aclausepertainingtopanchayats andmunicipalities invoked in the case of a judge of aHighCourt?Inaddition,heheldthemtohaveviolatedtheclausethatholdsaperson to have committed an offence who ‘intentionally insults orintimidateswith intent tohumiliateamemberofaScheduledCasteoraScheduledTribeinanyplacewithinpublicview’.Heheldthemguiltyalsoofpromotingfeelingsofenmity,hatredandill-willagainstmembersoftheScheduledCastesandTribes.

Herecordedthathehadpronouncedajudgmenton31Marchinwhichthesevenjudgesstoodaccusedunderthe1989Act,andadded,‘NowIamdirecting theHon’ble 7 Judges to give replies in personor through yourCouncil[sic]regardingdeclarationofguiltandquantumofpunishmentby28.04.2017 at 11.30 AM at my residence which has now become mymake-shiftCourt…’

Hechargedthemwithhaving insultedhimandharassedhimby theirorders. He directed the Airports Authority to ensure that they did nottravel abroad.Hedirected the judges to surrender their passports…Heprohibitedthemfromapproachinganycourtagainsthisorder.‘FurthertheRegistryof theSupremeCourt isnot toclear thepensionbenefitsof thesaidJudgestilltherecoveryofRs.14croresascompensationmentionedinmyearlierattachmentorderwhichhasbecomefinalandupheld.’

He declared them to be ‘National Offenders by showing casteprejudice’.Andheissued‘ageneralappealtoallforeigncountries’nottoallowanyoneofthesevenjudgestoentertheirshores‘becauseifallowedentry into a particular Country they could spread the virus of Caste

discrimination’.TheChief Justice had adjourned the contempt hearings for amonth,

sayingthatJusticeKarnandidnotseemtohaveaclearmind.Karnansawinthis ‘anadditionalbig insult’.TheChief Justicesuggested thatKarnanengageanadvocatetorepresenthiscase.Karnanrepliedthathewasmuchmorecompetenttodefendhimself,thathehaddisposedof‘about25,000casesduringmy tenureof servicewith theCourt’.TheChief Justicehadinquired—perhapshalf in jest—whetherall thecaseshadbeendismissed.‘ThiskindoflanguagealsoinsultedmeintheopenApexCourt.’Alltheseevents established that the seven judgeswere guiltyof having committedatrocitiesonaDalit.20

Inadditiontoaskingthejudgestoappearathisresidenceorsendtheiradvocates, Justice Karnan requested the Speaker of the Lok Sabha toinitiate impeachment proceedings against the seven judges ‘who havecommitted a major National Offence’. And he requested the ForeignSecretary,‘Pleasedonotallowtheabovementioned7erringJudgestovisitany foreignCountry until the serious heinous crime on discrimination isfinalizedbytheParliament.’

TheSupremeCourtdirectedthatamedicalexaminationbeconductedto determinewhether Justice Karnanwas of soundmind.He refused tosubjecthimselftotheexamination.Instead,on8May,hepassedanordersentencingtheChiefJusticeofIndiaandhissixcolleagues,plusaneighthjudgewhomheaddedtothelistforgoodmeasure,tofiveyears’rigorousimprisonment.InadditiontopayingRs2croretohimascompensation,hedirected each of the seven judges to pay Rs 1 lakh to the NationalCommissiononScheduledCastesandScheduledTribesasfineforhavingcommitted‘Atrocities’undertheSC/ST[PreventionofAtrocities]Act.

TheSupremeCourthadrunoutofoptionsaswellaspatience.On9May2017theseven-judgebenchorderedthathebearrestedandservesixmonths in jail forcontemptofcourt.By this time, JusticeKarnan, stillasittingjudgeoftheCalcuttaHighCourt,hadfledKolkata.

After a search by several agencies, a search that lasted over amonthandcoveredmanycitiesandsites,hewascaughtnearCoimbatore.TakenbacktoKolkata,hewaslodgedinPresidencyJail.Whathadbegunasan

amusing farce had by now become a tragedy. Many felt sorry for thejudge.Hewasmanifestlyinneedofhelp.

At the personal level, yes, it was a tragedy. But the episode raisedquestionsfarwiderthanthefateofanindividual.Afewpassagesfromthecover story that Frontline carried upon his arrest will refresh ourrecollectionofthefactsandhelpusgleanthelessons:

…Thebeginnings of the current controversy canbe traced to the elevation of 65-year-oldChinnaswamySwaminathanKarnan from theBar to a judgeon thebenchof theMadrasHighCourtonMarch30,2009,afterhehadservedasalawyerintheMadrasHighCourtformorethanadecade.Hewasmadeapermanentjudgetwoyearslater.

Untilthennooneseemedtohaveheardabouthim.Hiselevationtothebenchsurprisedmany then. Justice Karnan, a Dalit hailing from a village in Cuddalore district in TamilNadu,hasbeeninthelimelightsincethenforcourtingcontroversy.

In the view of many observers of the judiciary, only a thin line separated his unusualbehaviour fromanabnormality.Theunpredictability inhis character is tooobvious tobemissed.Thelatestwastheclaimof‘mentalfrustration’inhislettertotheapexcourtafterhewastransferredtoKolkata.Besides,whenheappearedbeforetheSupremeCourtinpersoninresponsetoacontemptnotice,hetoldthebenchthathe‘haslosthisphysicalandmentalbalance’.Andhehasalwaysusedhiscasteidentitytoclaimvictimhoodandintimidatefellowjudgesandextricatehimselffromembarrassingsituationshisactionscreated.

WhenhewasservingonthebenchintheMadrasHighCourtin2011,heaccusedbrotherjudges of harassing him since hewas aDalit. He sent a written complaint against a fewfellow judges and the thenChief Justiceof theMadrasHighCourt,R.K.Agarwal, to theNational Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC), accusing them of ‘harassing andvictimizing’himsincehewasaDalit.21

Thesequenceraisesseveralquestions:

HowhadKarnanbeenpickedupfromtheBarandmadeajudgeoftheHighCourt?After all, it isn’t that hewas a leading and distinguishedadvocate. Quite the contrary, explains one of most respected senioradvocateswhohaspractisedattheMadrasHighCourtforthirtyyears:he was unknown. He was picked up and made judge in 2009. Hisconductwasevidentfromhisveryfirstdaysonthebench.Howwasheconfirmed as permanent judge two years later, in 2011? Furthermore,rememberthateveryfewweeks,someanticofhisorotherwouldcauseconsternationamongfellowjudges,andyetKarnancontinuedasaHighCourtjudgeforseventoeightyears.

It turns out that as complaint upon complaintwas brought beforeMr

R.K. Agarwal, then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, herecommended to the then Chief Justice of India that Karnan betransferred to another High Court. This ‘remedy’ was adopted onlyyears laterupon the insistenceof thenextChief Justiceof theMadrasHigh Court. Karnan was transferred to the Calcutta High Court. Inwhat way did, in what way could shifting him to the Calcutta HighCourt solve the problem?Does shifting hazardouswaste from the leftsideofanICUtotherightsidemitigatethedanger?

HadKarnannot, to use his expression, ‘published’ the namesof thosetwenty judges he alleged were corrupt, had he not kept shooting offlettersandmakingthemavailabletothepress,hewouldhavecontinuedto dispense judgments—judgments that would have affected the livesandfortunesofnumerousindividuals.Wouldthathavebeenjust?

TheSupremeCourthadlittlechoicebuttomoveagainsthiminthewayit did. But several of the senior-most advocates I talked to felt thatKarnanshouldhavebeenhandledinsomeotherway.Thatpointstoabasic design defect. The process that the Constitution provides fordealing with erring judges, of disciplining a judge, in the end ofimpeachinghim,isjustnotanadequateone.Apartfromotherthings—like the time that theprocess takes—inabodysuchas theParliament,the eventual decision becomes a political decision. For instance, recallthe case of Justice V. Ramaswamy which went up for impeachment.Could it be that not oneCongressman sawmerit in the evidence thathadsurfacedagainsthim,and,correspondingly,notonememberoftheotherpartiesfelttheevidencetobeinadequate?IfearthatiftheKarnancase had gone to Parliament for impeachment, the fact of his castewouldhaveweighedjustasheavilywithmanyanMPandthecontrollerofmanyapartyasitdidwithJusticeKarnanhimself.

Thereistheobviouslessoninhowevery‘postureandgesture’,tousehisexpression, seemed toKarnan to be an insult, an insult hurled at himbecauseheisaDalit:coulditbethatapredilectionsostrongofseeingeverything in Dalit/non-Dalit terms would not have affected the wayargumentsandfacts thatwerepresentedbeforehimwouldstrikehim?AndthenthereisalessoninthefelicitywithwhichKarnaninvokedthe

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.Thiscametonothingbecauseinthisinstance,theactwasbeinghurledat theChief Justiceof Indiaandsixofhiscolleagues.Butwhatwouldhave been the case if the target was an ordinary citizen? Would thecitizenbeable towardoff themisuseof the act?Moreover, thepointtranscendstheinjusticethatthetargetedindividualwouldhavesuffered.WouldaKarnan-typemisuseof theactnot fomentabacklashagainstwhatmanywould regard as an essential remedy for the protection ofScheduledCastesandTribes?22

9

Eloquence

Mr Jayaprakash Narayan had passed away—weakened as much by thefailuresandbreakupoftheJanataPartyasbythecollapseofhiskidneys.Mr V.M. Tarkunde, one of our most distinguished and public-spiritedjudges and advocates, was the president of the People’s Union for CivilLiberties.Iwasitsgeneralsecretary.WehadinstitutedanannuallectureinhonourofJP.Thatparticularyear,itwasdecidedthatweshouldrequestJustice V.R. Krishna Iyer to deliver the lecture. He was known for hisprogressive views, and had deliveredmany a judgment that opened newvistasforcitizens.MrTarkundespoketohimaboutthelecture,andtoldhimthathewouldsendmeovertoexplainmoreabouttheseries.

Iwas a bit nervous: I had expressedmyself strongly against some ofJustice Krishna Iyer’s judgments—among these were his judgments onreservations,andother issuesdeartoprogressivesatthetime.IhadbeenparticularlyharshabouttheconditionalstaythathehadgivenonJusticeJagmohanLalSinha’s judgmentagainstMrsIndiraGandhi.HehadgonesofarastoindicatefromthebenchtoMrsGandhiandhersupportersawayoutofthebind:thisisasmuchasIcandowiththelawasitstands,hehad said in effect; but, of course, if youamend the law, the SupremeCourt will have to go by the amended law. That is exactly what MrsGandhi’stroopersproceededtodo.1

I had found him sitting in the veranda, wearing a Kerala-lungi andshirt, dictating to a steno. My apprehension had been completelymisplaced.Hegreetedmewarmly:‘Comeon,Shourie,comeon.Tarkundetoldmeyouwillbecoming.Justsitdown:Iwillfinishthisinamoment,and thenwewill talk.’As I sat listening tohimdictate, Inoticed that inaddition to thepileofcasepapers lyingaround, therewere twoor threedictionaries, and a thesaurus.The judgewouldpausemid-sentence, lookup the thesaurus, sometimes consult the dictionary and resume dictationwith an abstruse word or expression. In two editions of his critical

exposition of ourConstitution,MrH.M. Seervai had included a specialannexure on Justice Krishna Iyer’s prose and the perils it could pose ininterpretingwhathehadmeant.

Alas!Grandiloquencestillburstsforthfromtimetotime.TheopeningparagraphofthejudgmentofJusticeDipakMisrainthedefamationcase2

has often been cited in this context, and many a passage from it hasbecome famous.The question at handwaswhether defamation is just aciviloffenceagainstanindividualor,inaddition,isitacriminaloffence:inthe sense, in part because the person defaming another deserves, inaddition to paying a fine, to be jailed; and in part because defamationdisruptssocialrelationsandis thusacrimeagainstsocietyandstateasawhole.JusticeMisra3openedhisexpositionthus:

ThisbatchofwritpetitionspreferredunderArticle32oftheConstitutionofIndiaexpositscavilinitsquintessentialconceptualityandpercipientdiscordbetweenveneratedandexaltedright of freedom of speech and expression of an individual, exploring manifold andmultilayered, limitless, unbounded and unfettered spectrums, and the controls, restrictionsand constrictions, under the assumed power of ‘reasonableness’ ingrained in the statutoryprovisionsrelatingtocriminallawtoreviverandupholdone’sreputation.TheassertionbytheUnionofIndiaandthecomplainantsisthatthereasonablerestrictionsarebasedontheparadigms and parameters of the Constitution that are structured and pedestaled on thedoctrineofnon-absolutenessofany fundamental right,culturalandsocialethos,needandfeelof the time, forevery rightengulfsand incorporatesduty to respect [the]other’s rightand ensure mutual compatibility and conviviality of the individuals based on collectiveharmonyandconceptualgraceofeventualsocialorder;andtheasseverationonthepartofthepetitionersisthatfreedomofthoughtandexpressioncannotbescuttledorabridgedonthethreatofcriminalprosecutionandmadeparaplegiconthemercurialstanceofindividualreputationandof societal harmony, for the said aspects are tobe treated as thingsof thepast,asymbolof[the]colonialerawheretherulerruledoverthesubjectsandvanquishedconcepts of resistance; and, in any case, the individual grievances pertaining to reputationcan be agitated in civil courts and thus, there is a remedy and viewed from a prismaticperspective,thereisnojustificationtokeeptheprovisionofdefamationincriminallawaliveas it creates a concavity and unreasonable restriction in individual freedom and furtherprogressivelymars voice of criticism and dissent which are necessitous for the growth ofgenuineadvancementandamatureddemocracy.

The judgemoved to recapitulating the submissions that the counsel hadmadetothecourt:‘Wemayimmediatelystatethattheeffortwouldbetorecord the submissions in fullest, may be [sic] sans elaborations andindividualistically crafted and sculptured nuances during the oralhearings…’

Paragraphs followed summarizing the arguments of the counsel whoargued that defamation is just a civilwrong against a person, andnot acrime against the state. And thiswas followed by a section that set outwhatJusticeMisracharacterizedas‘ProponementsInOppugnation’.

And so on.Yet, such flights of eloquence are to a pattern. InManojNirula v. Union of India,4 the petitioner had urged that no one who isguiltyofaheinouscrimeshouldbeallowedtobeinductedintotheCouncilofMinisters.JusticeMisraopenedhisorationwithcustomaryeloquence:

Ademocraticpolity,asunderstoodinitsquintessentialpurity,isconceptuallyabhorrenttocorruption and, especially corruption at high places, and repulsive to the idea ofcriminalizationofpoliticsasitcorrodesthelegitimacyofthecollectiveethos,frustratesthehopesandaspirationsof thecitizensandhas thepotentiality toobstruct, ifnotderail, theruleoflaw.Democracy,whichhasbeenbestdefinedastheGovernmentofthePeople,bythePeople and for the People, expects prevalence of genuine orderliness, positive propriety,dedicateddisciplineandsanguinesanctitybyconstantaffirmanceofconstitutionalmoralitywhichisthepillarstoneofgoodgovernance.

PriyankaSrivastavaandOrs.v.StateofU.P.5dealtwithpersonswhohadborrowed from the Punjab National Bank and, instead of returning theloans, had begun filing cases against officials of the bank. JusticeMisrabegan:

Thepresentappealprojectsandfrescoesascenariowhichisnotonlydisturbingbutalsohasthe potentiality to create a stir compelling one to ponder in a perturbed state how someunscrupulous,unprincipledanddeviantlitigantscaningeniouslyandinnovativelydesigninanonchalant manner to knock at the doors of the Court, as if, it is a laboratory wheremultifarious experiments can take place and such skillful persons can adroitly abuse theprocessoftheCourtattheirownwillanddesirebypaintingacanvasofagonybyassiduousassertions made in the application though the real intention is to harass the statutoryauthorities, without any remote remorse, with the inventive design primarily to create amentalpressureonthesaidofficialsasindividuals,fortheywouldnotliketobedraggedtoacourt of law to face in criminal cases, and further pressurize in such a fashion so thatfinancial institution which they represent would ultimately be constrained to accept therequest for ‘one-timesettlement’with the fondhope that theobstinatedefaulterswhohadborrowedmoneyfromitwouldwithdrawthecasesinstitutedagainstthem.Thefacts,asweproceed toadumbrate,wouldgraphically revealhowsuchpersons,pretentiouslyaggrievedbutpotentiallydangerous,adopttheself-convincingmasterymethodstoachieveso.Thatisthe sad and unfortunate factual score forming the fulcrum of the case at hand, and, wepainfullyrecount.

Inthecourseofthejudgmentwelearnof‘…therespondentNo.3,possibly

nurturing the idea of self-centric Solomon’s wisdom…’; we are takenthrough amatter that seems somewhat removed from the issue at hand,onlytolearn,‘…Thoughthepresentcontroversyisdifferent,wehavedealtwith thesaid facetaswe intendtoemphasizehowtheCourtshavedealtwith and addressed to such amatter so that a borrowerwith vengeancecouldultimatelyexhibithishigh-handedness…’;welearnthat‘…Presently,wearerequiredtositinthetimemachineforawhile’;welearnhow‘…Atthis stage, it is apposite to state that the third respondent, if we allowourselves tosayso,have[sic]possiblymasteredhowtocreateasenseoffearinthemindoftheofficialswhoarecompelledtofacecriminalcases’,in fact that ‘…The labyrinthmaladroitly createdby the respondentNo.3doesnotendhere.ItappearsthathehadtheindefatigablespirittoindulgehimselfintheabuseoftheprocessoftheCourt’;wethenlearnabout‘thedevilishdesignofrespondentNo.3’;weareremindedthat‘Whenacitizenavailsa loan froma financial institution, it ishisobligation topaybackand not play truant or for that matter play possum’—do possums,transfixedbytheglareofheadlights,playtruant,youareleftwondering…6

VoluntaryHealthAssociationofPunjabv.UnionofIndia7movedthejudgeaslittleelse.Thequestionwastheevilofabortingfemalefoetuses.Alawhasbeenpassed.Governmentsholdworkshops.Yettheevilcontinues.His fellow judge, Justice K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan, wrote a succinctjudgment—nineparagraphs inall, the lastonebeing two lines. Inoneoftheparagraphs,he listedelevendirections forgovernments.JusticeMisranoted that he agreedwithwhat his fellow judge had said, including thedirectionsthathehadsetout,buthefindsitnecessarytowritemore.Asheobserved:

I respectfullyconcurwith thedelineationand thedirectionsenumerated in seriatimbymyrespected learnedBrother.However, regardbeinghad to the significationof the issue, themagnitudeoftheprobleminpraesenti,andthecolossalcataclysmthatcanvisitthiscountryin future unless apposite awareness is spread, I intend to add somethingpertaining to thedirectionNo.(8).

Thatwasadirectiontogovernmentstotakestepsforeducatingthepeopleabout the evil inherent in this terriblepractice.Yes,workshopsareheld,awarenesscampsareheld,JusticeMisranoted,but:

ItiscommonknowledgethattheStateGovernmentsandUnionTerritoriessometimesholdworkshops as well as awareness camps at the State and District levels which have thecharacteristic of a routine performance, sans sincerity, bereft of seriousness and shorn ofmeaning.Itisembeddedondata-orientation.ItdoesnotrequireSolomon’swisdomtorealizethattherehasnotyetbeeneffectiveimplementationoftheprovisionsoftheAct,fortherehasnotonlybeentotallethargyandlaxitybutalsofailureonthepartoftheauthoritiestogiveaccentonsocial,cultural,psychologicalandlegalawarenessthatafemalefoetusisnottobedestroyedformanyareasonapartfromcommandofthelaw.

The judge proceeded to set out the deep, and, as one might put it,multitudinous and variegated/diverse/wide-ranging and, lest we forget,pied8rootsoftheevil:

Femalefoeticidehasitsrootsinthesocialthinkingwhichisfundamentallybasedoncertainerroneousnotions,ego-centrictraditions,pervertperceptionofsocietalnorms,andobsessionwith ideaswhichare totally individualistic sans thecollectivegood.All involved in femalefoeticide deliberately forget to realize that when the foetus of a girl child is destroyed, awomanof [the] future is crucified.Toput it differently, the present generation invites thesufferingsonitsownandalsosowstheseedsofsufferingforthefuturegeneration,asintheultimateeventuate,thesexratiogetsaffectedandleadstomanifoldsocialproblems.Imayhastentoaddthatnoawarenesscampaigncaneverbecompleteunlessthereisrealfocusontheprowessofwomenandtheneedforwomenempowerment.

Butthatjustsetthestage:

Itisnotoutofplacetostateherethattherestrictedandconstrictedthinkingwithregardtoagirlchildeventuallyleadstofemalefoeticide.Afoetusinthewomb,becausesheislikelytobebornas agirl child, isnot allowed to see themother earth. InM.C.Mehta v. StateofTamilNaduandOrs.MANU/SC/0169/1997:AIR1997SC699,athree-JudgeBench,whiledealing with the magnitude of the problem in engagement of the child labour in varioushazardousfactoriesormines,etc.,speakingthroughHansaria,J.,commencedthejudgmentthus:-

Iamthechild.Allthewordwaitsformycoming.AlltheearthwatcheswithinteresttoseewhatIshallbecome.Civilizationhangsinthebalance.ForwhatIam,theworldoftomorrowwillbe.Iamthechild.Youholdinyourhandmydestiny.Youdetermine,largely,whetherIshallsucceedorfail,Giveme,Iprayyou,thesethingsthatmakeforhappiness.Trainme,Ibegyou,thatImay

beablessingtotheworld.

Thatturnsouttobethequotationofaquotation:

TheaforesaidlinesfromMamieGeneColeweretreatedasanappealbythisCourtandtheBenchreproducedthefamouslinefromWilliamWordsworth‘Childisthefatheroftheman’.IhavereproducedthesametohighlightthatthisCourthaslaidspecialemphasisontheterm‘child’asachildfeelsthattheentireworldwaitsforhis/hercoming.Afemalechild,asstatedearlier,becomesawoman.Itslife-sparkcannotbeextinguishedinthewomb,forsuchanactwouldcertainlybringdisastertothesociety.Onsuchanactthecollectivecanneitherlaughtodaynortomorrow.Thereshallbetearsandtearsallthewaybecauseeventuallythespiritofhumanityiscomatosed.

Thejudgefortifiedthemessagefurther:

VishwakaviRabindranathTagore,whilespeakingaboutachild,hadsaidthus:-EverychildcomeswiththemessagethatGodisnotyetdiscouragedofman.

Longback,speakingabouthumanbaby,CharlesDickenshadsaidthus:-Everybabybornintotheworldisafineronethanthelast.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that a society that does not respect its womencannotbetreatedtobecivilized.InthefirstpartofthelastcenturySwamiVivekanandahadsaid:-Justasabirdcouldnotflywithonewingonly,anationwouldnotmarchforwardifthewomenareleftbehind.

Next, the exhortation had to be made specific to women who wereagreeingtoabortthefoetus:

Whena female foeticide takesplace, everywomanwhomothers the childmust rememberthatsheiskillingherownchilddespitebeingamother.Thatiswhatabortionwouldmeaninsocial terms.Abortion of a female child in its conceptual eventuality leads to killing of awoman.Lawprohibits it; scriptures forbid it; philosophy condemns it; ethicsdeprecate it,moralitydecriesitandsocialscienceabhorsit.HenrikIbsenemphasizedontheindividualismofwoman.JohnMiltontreatedhertobethebestofallGod’swork.Inthiscontext,itwillbeappropriatetoquoteafewlinesfromDemocracyinAmericabyAlexisDeTocqueville:-‘IfIwere asked … to what the singular prosperity and growing strength of that people[Americans]oughtmainlytobeattributed,Ishouldreply:tothesuperiorityoftheirwomen.’

If, in turn, I were asked, I would point out that Ibsen, Milton and deTocqueville are not likely to carry much weight in Haryana: strict andpromptpunishmentsof theoffenderswilldomore.The judge reinforcedthequotationsbyrecallingourownjudgments:

Atthisstage,ImaywithprofitreproducetwoparagraphsfromAjitSavantMajagvaiv.StateofKarnatakaMANU/SC/0822/1997:(1997)7SCC110:-

Social thinkers, philosophers, dramatists, poets and writers have eulogised the femalespecies of the human race and have always used beautiful epithets to describe hertemperamentandpersonalityandhavenotdeviatedfromthatpathevenwhilespeakingofheroddbehaviour, at times.Even in sarcasm, theyhavenot crossed the literary limitandhaveadheredtoaparticularstandardofnobilityoflanguage.Evenwhenamemberofher

ownspecies,MadameDeStael,remarked,‘IamgladthatIamnotaman;forthenIshouldhavetomarryawoman’,therewaswitinit.WhenShakespearewrote,‘Agecannotwitherher;norcustomstale,herinfinitevariety’,thereagainwaswit.Notwithstandingthatthesewriters have cried hoarse for respect for ‘woman’, notwithstanding that Schiller said,‘Honour women! They entwine and weave heavenly roses in our earthly life’ andnotwithstanding that the Mahabharata mentioned her as the source of salvation, crimeagainst‘woman’continuestoriseandhas,todayundoubtedly,risentoalarmingproportions.

It is unfortunate that in an age where people are described as civilised, crime against‘female’ is committed evenwhen the child is in the womb as the ‘female’ foetus is oftendestroyedtopreventthebirthofafemalechild.Ifthatchildcomesintoexistence,shestartsherlifeasadaughter,thenbecomesawifeandinduecourse,amother.Sherocksthecradletorearupherinfant,bestowsallherloveonthechildandasthechildgrowsinage,shegivestothechildallthatshehasinherownpersonality.Sheshapesthedestinyandcharacterofthe child. To be cruel to such a creature is unthinkable. To torment a wife can only bedescribedasthemosthatedandderisiveactofahumanbeing.

‘[Emphasis supplied],’ the judge noted. A judgment quoting a judgmentquotingMadamedeStael,Shakespeare,Schiller,Mahabharata!9 Ididnotquite understand how putting woman and female in quotation markswouldcarrythemessagefarther.Thatapart,clearly,andtheMahabharatanotwithstanding, the point that women are vital to civilization neededfurther reinforcement.The judge continued: ‘Long back,Charles Fourierhadstated,“Theextensionofwomen’s rights is thebasicprincipleofallsocialprogress.”’

Toomanyforeignauthorities?Butthejudgmenthadalongwaytogoasyet:

Recapitulatingfromthepast,ImayrefertocertainsayingsintheSmritiswhichputwomeninanelevatedposition.ThisCourtinNikkuRam’scase(supra)hadalreadyreproducedthefirstlineofthe‘Shloka’.Thesecondlineofthesamewhichisalsosignificantisasfollows:Yatratastunapujyantesarvastatraphalahkriyah.

Afreetranslationoftheaforesaidisreproduced:Alltheactionsbecomeunproductiveinaplace,wheretheyarenottreatedwithproperrespectanddignity.

Anotherwisemanofthepasthadhisownwayofputtingit:Bhartrbhratrpitrijnatiswasruswasuradevaraih.Bandhubhiscastriyahpujyahbhusnachhadanasnai.Afreetranslationoftheaforesaidisasfollows:Thewomenaretoberespectedequallyon

par with husbands, brothers, fathers, relatives, in-laws and other kith and kin and whilerespecting,thewomengifts[sic]likeornaments,garments,etc.shouldbegivenastokenofhonour.

Yet again, the sagacity got reflected in following lines:- Atulam yatra tattejahsarvadevasarirajam|Ekasthamtadabhunnarivyaptalokatrayamtvisa||

A free translation of the aforesaid is reproduced: The incomparable valour (effulgence)

bornfromthephysicalframesofallthegods,spreading[sic]thethreeworldsbyitsradianceandcombiningtogethertooktheformofawoman.

FromoursagesofthepasttoaBritishsageofthepresent:

Fromthepast,ItraveltothepresentandrespectfullynoticewhatLordDenninghadtosayabouttheequalityofwomenandtheirroleinthesociety:-‘Awomanfeelsaskeenly,thinksasclearly,asaman.She inherspheredoesworkasusefulasmandoes inhis.Shehasasmuch right to her freedom—to develop her personality to the full as a man. When shemarries,shedoesnotbecomethehusband’sservantbuthisequalpartner.Ifhisworkismoreimportant in life of the community, hers ismore important of the family.Neither candowithouttheother.Neitherisabovetheotherorundertheother.Theyareequals.’

IhavereferredtocertainpronouncementsofthisCourt,thesayingsofthesagaciousones,thinkers,poets,philosophersandjuristsaboutthechildandwomenonlytoemphasisethattheyplayaseminalroleinthesociety.Theinnocenceofachildandthecreativeintelligenceof awoman cannever ever be brushed aside ormarginalized.Civilization of a country isknown[by?]howitrespectsitswomen.Itistherequisiteofthepresentdaythatpeoplearemade aware that it is obligatory to treat the women with respect and dignity so thathumanisminitsconceptualessentialityremainsalive.Eachmemberofthesocietyisrequiredtodevelopa scientific temper in themoderncontextbecause that is the socialneedof thepresent.Acosmeticawarenesscampaignwouldneversubservethepurpose.TheauthoritiesoftheGovernment,theNon-GovernmentalOrganisationsandothervolunteersarerequiredtorememberthattherehas[sic]tobeawarenesscampswhichare[sic]reallyeffective.Thepeopleinvolvedwiththesamemusttakeitupasaservice,acrusade.Theymustunderstandandacceptthatitisanartaswellasascienceandnotsimplearithmetic.Itcannottakethecolourof a routine speech.Theawareness camps shouldnotbe foundedon the theoryofEuclidian geometry. It [sic]must engulf the concept of social vigilancewith an analyticalmindandradiateintothemarrowsofthesociety.Ifawarenesscampaignsarenotappositelyconducted, theneededguidanceforthepeoplewouldbewithoutmeaningandthingsshallfallapartandeveryonewouldtrytotakeshelterincynicalescapism.

In practical terms, how should the camps be conducted? The judgewascontextual:‘Itisdifficulttopreciselystatehowanawarenesscampistobeconducted. Itwilldependuponwhatkindandstrataofpeoplearebeingaddressedto[sic].’

Butonethingwasclear—personsconductingsuchcampsmustbemenandwomenofwidelearning:

The persons involved in such awareness campaign are required to equip themselves withconstitutionalconcepts,culture,philosophy,religion,scripturalcommandsandinjunctions,themandateofthelawasengraftedundertheActandaboveallthedevelopmentofmodernscience. It needs no special emphasis to state that in awareness campswhile the deterrentfacetsoflawarerequiredtobeaccentuatedupon,simultaneouslythedesirabilityoflawtobefollowedwithspiritualobeisance,regardbeinghadtothepurpose[sic]oftheAct,hastobe stressed upon. The seemly synchronization shall bring the required effect. That apart,

documentaryfilmscanbeshowntohighlighttheneed;andinstiltheideainthemindofthepublicatlarge,forwhenmindbecomesstrong,mountainsdomelt.Thepeopleinvolvedintheawarenesscampaignsshouldhaveboldnessandcourage.Thereshouldnotbeanyiotaofconfusion or perplexity in their thought or action.They should treat it as a problem andthink thataproblemhas tobeunderstood inapropermanner toafforda solution.Theyshouldbearinmindthattheyarerequiredtochangethemindsetofthepeople,thegrammarofthesocietyandunacceptablebeliefsinherentinthepopulace.Itshouldbeclearlyspeltoutthatfemalefoeticideistheworsttypeofdehumanisationofthehumanrace.

Alltrue.Butwhatdidallthosequotationsaddtojurisprudence?Wastheirplaceinajudgmentorinapublicperoration?Thejudgehadhisreason:‘Ihavehighlightedtheaforesaidaspectssothatwhenawarenesscampaignsareheld,theyarekeptinview,forthatistheobjectandpurposetohaverealawareness.’

REPEATINGFOREMPHASIS

But,ofcourse,thatcouldnotbetheendofthematter.TheSupremeCourthad been issuing directions for eliminating this terrible practice since2001.10 The court had done so again in the judgment thatwe have justtraversed, a judgment delivered in 2013. Far from the directions beingfollowedwiththethoroughnessthatwaswarrantedbothbythegravityofthe practice and by the fact that the directions had been given by theSupremeCourt,duringproceedingsinthecourtinNovember2014itcameto light that several states—among them Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat,Kerala and Madhya Pradesh—had not taken even the most elementarystep: they had not even filed the affidavits that the Supreme Court haddirectedthemtofile.

In 2014, the Indian Medical Association (IMA) filed a writ in theSupremeCourt. The lapses forwhich severalmedical professionalswerebeing arraignedweremerelyminor clerical errors in fillingup forms.Asthe relevant act—Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques(Prohibitionof SexSelection)Act,1994—didnot classifyoffences, as alloffences had been made non-bailable and non-compoundable, and as itconferreddraconianpowersontheauthorities,theacthadbecomeanewwayforextortingbribes,theIMApointedout.Asaresult,thematterwasbroughtbeforethecourtagainin2016.11Thistimethebenchconsistedof

JusticeDipakMisraandJusticeShivaKirtiSingh.JusticeMisradeliveredthe judgmentonbehalfofbothof them.Thewrit filedby theVoluntaryHealthAssociationofPunjabwhichpointedtolapsesinimplementation(ithadbeenfiledin2006)andthewritoftheIMAweretakenuptogether.

Thejudgmentbeganwiththeeloquencewhichbynowwehavelearnttoexpect.The issues thathadbeen raised in the2006petitionhadbeenraisedearlieralso,thecourtobserved,‘andbeendealtwithseriousconcernandsolemnsincerity’.Theyarebeingtakenupagain:

It is because they relate to the very core of existence of a civilized society, pertain to theprogressofthehumanrace,andexposethemaladroiteffortstothrottletherightofalifetofeel themotherearthandsmell its fragrance.And, ifweallowourselves to say, the issueshavebeenhighlightedwithsincererhetoricsandbalancedhyperbolesandringthealarmofdestruction of humanity in the long run. It is not a group prophecy, but a significantcollectivepredication.Theinvolvementofallisobvious,andithastobe.

The court then proceeded to recount the history of judgments anddirectionsforstoppingtheabortionoffemalefoetuses.Aswehaveseen,inits judgment of 2013, it had reproduced passages from Ajit SavantMajagvai v. State of Karnataka.12 It now reproduced the same passagesagain,adding, ‘Wemay repeat, theaforestatedobservation thoughmadetotallyinadifferentcontextbutnonetheless,itseemlystatedthemarrowof the problem’—we thus had the judge quoting from his own earlierjudgment passages that he had quoted from another judgment.Next, hereproducedthedirectionsthatthecourthadgivenin2001and2003.Thenhereproducedthedirectionsithadgivenin2013.Asthislastsetincludedthatdirectiononeducatingthepeopletotheevil inherentinthepractice,Justice Misra now observed, ‘We may profitably reproduce certainpassagesfromtheconcurringopinion’—thatis,hisownopiniondeliveredin2013: passages inwhich,while agreeingwith thedirection to educatethe people, he had felt compelled to dilate upon the vital role and highstatus of women, of the child and of the female child. Then came arecapitulationand, so to say somediscussionof someof thedatawhichhad been furnished by the states. This was followed by reproducing atlengthprovisionsfromtheact—somethingthathadbeendoneineachoneoftheearlierjudgments.Andthentheconcludingorationtorivaltheones

inthe2013concurringopinion:

Beforepartingwiththecase,letitbestatedwithcertitudeandwithoutallowinganyroomfor any kind of equivocation or ambiguity, the perception of any individual or group ororganizationorsystemtreatingawomanwithinequity,indignity,inequalityoranykindofdiscriminationisconstitutionally impermissible.Thehistoricalperceptionhastobegivenapromptburial.Femalefoeticideisconceivedbythesocietythatdefinitelyincludestheparentsbecauseofunethicalperceptionoflifeandnonchalantattitudetowardslaw.Thesocietythattreatsmanandwomanwithequaldignityshowsthereflectionsofaprogressiveandcivilizedsociety.To think that awoman should thinkwhat amanora societywantsher to thinktantamountstoslaughteringherchoice,and[is]definitelyahumiliatingact.Whenfreedomof free choice is allowed within constitutional and statutory parameters, others cannotdeterminethenormsasthatwouldamounttoactinginderogationof law.Decreaseinthesexratio isasignofcolossalcalamityand itcannotbeallowedtohappen.Concretestepshavetobetakentoincreasethesamesothatinvitedsocialdisastersdonotbefallon[sic]thesociety.Thepresentgenerationisexpectedtoberesponsibletotheposterity[sic]andnottotakesuchstepstosterilizethebirthrateinviolationoflaw.Thesocietalperceptionhastobemetamorphosedhavingrespecttolegalpostulates.

If instead of quoting from earlier judgments, including one’s own, ifinsteadofonce again listing theprovisionsof theAct, if insteadofonceagainreproducingdirectionsthattheSupremeCourthadgivenrepeatedly,thejudgeshadactuallybroughtsomeconsequencestobearonthosewhosedutyitwastoimplementthedirectionsandwhohadnotdoneso—wouldthatnothavebeenarealsteptowardsmitigatingtheevil?

But what about the second writ—that of the Indian MedicalAssociation—which had been clubbed with the one by the VoluntaryHealth Association of Punjab? After all, it had made far-reachingassertions.Wasthereanyefforttoascertainifitsassertionwastrue—thatthe act had become an instrument of extorting bribes? Wouldn’t thatinquiry have taken us to, as the judge would say, the marrow of theproblem—theproblemwhythecourt’soft-repeateddirectionswerebeingtaken so casually? As the cause is so important, and was of obviousconcern to the judges, theassertionsof the IMAmerited inquiry. If theywerefalse,officebearersoftheIMAdeservedtobeseverelypunishedfortryingtomisleadthecourtonsoimportantamatter.Ontheotherhand,iftheywere true, if indeedprovisions of the actwere beingused to extortbribes, the fact would be of asmuch significance: it is well-known thatmisuseofa lawignitesabacklashagainst the lawitself—theresultbeing

that even a lawwhich is needed loses legitimacy, something that wouldhappenfromaKarnan-typemisuseofthelawtopreventatrocitiesagainstmembersofScheduledCastesandTribes.Butforthecourt,theperorationdelivered,therewasnothingfurthertobedone.Afterwereadofthatwrit—theoneby the IndianMedicalAssociation—inthe titleof thecase,wesee nothing of it till the very end of the judgment. In the third-lastparagraph, the IMA’s assertions are summarized. And in the nextparagraph,summarilydismissed.

WITHNOEDITORTOSAY‘NO’

Sometimesitseemsthatajudgehasbeendevotedtoaparticularcauseorhas a pet aversion, or he has some passages, perhaps an essay, that hadbeenpreparedforsomeoccasion,andhejustbungsitin.Noeditortosay‘No’,afterall.

InRamlilaMaidanIncident,13thejudgesweredealingwithallegationsthat thepolicehadusedexcessive forcewhiledispersingpeoplewhohadgatheredforwhatwassupposedtobeayogashivir.BabaRamdev’speoplehadobtainedpermissiontoholdaday-longshivirattheRamlilaGroundinDelhi.Thegatheringhadtakenonapoliticalcolour.BabaRamdevwasengaged in negotiationswithministers.Ministerswere visiting him. Theday stretched intonight.Around1 a.m., thepolice entered the area andsought to disperse the crowd. BabaRamdev had been sleeping in a sideroom.Hewas awakened. Some policemenwent to the dais to serve anorderonhimtohavethecrowddisperse.Hisfollowersclaimedthattheyclimbedtogetholdofhimandwhiskhimaway.Ameleeensued.Ramdevjumped down from the dais, into the gathering, and escaped. He wasarrestedattherailwaystation—attiredinawoman’ssalwar-kameez,withhisbeardhiddenunderadupatta:heclaimedlaterthathadhenotescaped,thepolicewouldhavekilledhim.Backatthepandal,therewerescuffles—thepoliceclaimedthat thecrowdhadhurledstones, the followersof theBaba claimed that it was the police that had started hitting them withlathis,andfiredteargasshells…Thejudgesheldagainstthepolice.Oneofthefactorsthatledthemtodosowasthatvideosshowedthefollowersto

havebeenasleepatthetime.Ofthetwojudgeswhoheardthecase,onewrotethemainjudgment.

Theotherconcurred.Butevenasheconcurred,hefeltitnecessarytodilateupon the significance of sleep.He came to the subject stressing that thedutiesofthestate—forinstance,topreventdisorder—hadtobebalancedagainsttherightsofindividuals:

Nodoubt, the lawofsocialcontrol ispreserved inthehandsof theState,butat thesametime, protection against unwarranted governmental invasion and intrusive action is alsoprotectedunderthelawsofthecountry.Libertyisdefinitelynolicenceandtherightofsuchfreedomisnotabsolutebutcanberegulatedbyappropriatelaws.Thefreedomfromofficialinterference is, therefore, regulated by law but law cannot be enforced for crippling thefreedommerelyunderthegarbofsuchregulation.Thepoliceortheadministrationwithoutanylawfulcausecannotmakeacalculatedinterferenceintheenjoymentofthefundamentalrightsguaranteedtothecitizensofthiscountry.Astowhatwasmaterialtoprecipitatesuchaprohibitory action is one aspect of the matter, but what is more important is theimplementation of such an order. This is what troubles me in the background that aprohibitoryorderwassoughttobeenforcedonasleepingcrowdandnotaviolentone.Myconcernisabouttheenforcementoftheorderwithoutanyannouncementasprescribedforbeingpublishedorby itsaffixation intermsofDelhiPoliceStandingOrder309readwithSection134CrPC.

Thatthevideosshowedthecrowdtohavebeenasleepbroughthimtothequestionofsleep:

It is believed that a person who is sleeping, is half dead. His mental faculties are in aninactivestate.Sleepisanunconsciousstateorconditionregularlyandnaturallyassumedbyman and other living beings duringwhich the activity of the nervous system is almost orentirelysuspended.Itisthestateofslumberandrepose.Itisanecessityandnotaluxury.Itis essential for optimal health and happiness as it directly affects the quality of life of anindividual when awake inducing his mental sharpness, emotional balance, creativity andvitality.

And then to what was perhaps an unconscious effort to provide anexplanationas towhysome in thecrowdhadstartedhurling stonesandbricks at the police: ‘Sleep is, therefore, a biological and essentialingredientofthebasicnecessitiesoflife.Ifthissleepisdisturbed,themindgetsdisorientedanditdisruptsthehealthcycle.’

Andthenbacktothesignificanceofsleep:

Ifthisdisruptionisbroughtaboutinoddhourspreventinganindividualfromgettingnormalsleep, it also causes energy disbalance, indigestion and also affects cardiovascular health.

These symptoms, therefore, make sleep so essential that its deprivation would result inmentalandphysicaltortureboth.Ithasawiderangeofnegativeeffects.Italsoimpairsthenormalfunctioningandperformanceofanindividualwhichiscompulsoryinday-to-daylifeof a human being. Sleep, therefore, is a self-rejuvenating element of our life cycle and is,therefore,partandparcelofhumanlife.Thedisruptionofsleepistodepriveapersonofabasicpriority,resultinginadversemetaboliceffects.It isamedicineforwearinesswhichifimpededwouldleadtodisastrousresults.

And then once again that, perhaps unconscious, urge to explain thecrowd’s conduct: ‘Deprivationof sleephas tumultuous adverse effects. Itcauses a stir anddisturbs thequiet andpeaceof an individual’sphysicalstate.’

AndthentolayingthegroundforenlargingthescopeofArticle21toincludetherighttosound,uninterruptedsleep:

Anaturalprocesswhichisinherentinahumanbeingifdisturbedobviouslyaffectsbasiclife.It is for this reasonthat ifaperson isdeprivedofsleep, theeffect thereof, is treated tobetorturous.Totakeawaytherightofnaturalrestisalsothereforeviolationofahumanright.Itbecomesaviolationofafundamentalrightwhenitisdisturbedintentionally,unlawfullyandfornojustification.

And then the explanation for the crowd’s behaviour again: ‘To arouse apersonsuddenly,bringsaboutafeelingofshockandbenumbness.’

Andthenbacktothecentralityofsleep:

Thepressureofa suddenawakeningresults inalmostavoidof sensation.Suchanaction,therefore,doesaffectthebasic lifeofanindividual.Thestateofsleepingisassumedbyanindividualwhenheisinasafeatmosphere.Itisforthisreasonthatthisnaturalsystemhasbeeninbuiltbyourcreatortoproviderelaxationtoahumanbeing.Themusclesarerelaxedandthiscyclehasanormalrecurrenceeverynightandlastsforseveralhours.Thisnecessityis so essential that even all our transport systems provide for facilities of sleep whiletravelling.Sleepistherefore,both,lifeandinherentlibertywhichcannotbetakenawaybyanyunscrupulousaction.

AnIrishproverbgoesontosaythatthebeginningofhealthissleep.ThestateofsleephasbeendescribedbyHomerinthefamousepicIliadas‘sleepisthetwinofdeath’.Aperson,therefore,cannotbepresumedtobeengagedinacriminalactivityoranactivitytodisturbpeaceofmindwhenasleep.Aristotle,thegreatGreekphilosopher,hassaidthatallmenarealikewhen asleep. To presume that a personwas scheming to disrupt public peacewhileasleepwouldbeunjustandwouldbeenteringintothedreamsofthatperson.

Thencetothewaythepolicesoughttoimplementtheorder:

I am bewildered to find out as to how such declaration of the intention to impose theprohibitionwas affectedon a sleeping crowd.Theremaybe a reason available to impose

prohibitoryorderscallinguponanassemblytodisperse,buttome,theredoesnotappeartobeanyplausiblereasonforthepolicetoresorttoblowsonasleepingcrowdandtothrowthem out of their encampments abruptly. The affidavits and explanation given do notdiscloseas towhythepolicecouldnotwait tillmorningandprovideareasonable timetothiscrowdtodispersepeacefully.Theunduehastecausedahugedisarrayandresultedinacatastrophethatwaswitnessedonmediaandtelevisionthroughoutthecountry.

Thencetoreinforcementbyreiteration:

I fail to find any explanation for the gravity or the urgent situation requiring such anemergent action at this dark hour of midnight. I, therefore, in the absence of any suchjustificationhavenooptionbut todeprecate suchactionand it also casts a seriousdoubtabouttheexistenceofthesufficiencyofreasonsforsuchaction.Theincidentinthislitigationisanexampleofaweirdexpressionofthedesireofatyrannicalmindtothreatenpeacefullifesuddenlyfornojustification.Thiscoupledwithwhatisunderstoodofsleephereinbefore,makesitclearthattheprecipitateactionwasnothingbutaclearviolationofhumanrightsandadefiniteviolationofprocedureforachievingtheendofdispersingacrowd.

Thenbacktothesignificanceofsleep:

It is in view of this fact that, inmany countries there are complete night curfews (at theairporti.e.banningoflandingandtakingoffbetweenthenighthours),forthereasonthatthe conceptof sound sleephasbeenassociatedwith soundhealthwhich is an inseparablefacetofArticle21oftheConstitution.Itmayalsobepertinenttomentionherethatvariousstatutory provisions prohibit the arrest of a judgment-debtor, a woman in the night andrestrain to enter in the night into a constructed area suspected to have been raised inviolation of the sanctioned plan, master plan or zonal plan for the purpose of survey ordemolition.(SeeSection55oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,Section46(4)CrPC,andSections25and42oftheU.P.UrbanPlanningandDevelopmentAct,1973.)

Fromthistoaconcessionfraughtwithdangerouspossibilities:

Whiledeterminingsuchmattersthecrucialissueinfactisnotwhethersuchrightsexist,butwhethertheStatehasacompellinginterestintheregulationofasubjectwhichiswithinthepolicepoweroftheState.Undoubtedly,reasonableregulationoftime,placeandmannerofthe act of sleeping would not violate any constitutional guarantee, for the reason that apersonmaynotclaimthatsleepingishisfundamentalright,andtherefore,hehasarighttosleepinthepremisesoftheSupremeCourtitselforwithintheprecinctsofParliament.Moreso, I amdefinitely not dealing hereinwith the rights of homeless personswhomay claimrighttosleeponfootpathorpublicpremisesbutrestrictthecaseonlytotheextentasunderwhatcircumstancesasleepingpersonmaybedisturbedandIamoftheviewthattheStateauthoritiescannotdepriveapersonofthatrightanywhereandatalltimes.

Nota fundamental right,butas importantarightas theright to—blink:‘Thus,itisevidentthatrightofprivacyandtherighttosleephavealways

been treated tobe a fundamental right like a right tobreathe, to eat, todrink,toblink,etc.’

Thenbacktowhatthecourtsliketocallthefactsituation:‘Therewasno gossip or discussion of something untrue that was going on. To thecontrary, it was admittedly an assembly of followers, under a peacefulbanner of yogic training, fast asleep. The assembly was at least,purportedly,…’

‘At least, purportedly’? Perchance a slight nod to what the assemblywasactuallyabout?Notreally.Itwas:

… a conglomeration of individuals gathered together, expressive of a determination toimprovethematerialconditionofthehumanrace.Theaimoftheassemblywasprimafacieunobjectionable andwas not to inflame passions. It was toward off something harmful.Whatwassuspiciousorconspiratorialabouttheassembly,mayrequireaninvestigationbytheappropriateforum,buttomymindtheimplementationappearstohavebeendoneinanunlawful and derogatorymanner that did violate the basic human rights of the crowd tohaveasoundsleepwhichisalsoaconstitutionalfreedom,acknowledgedunderArticle21oftheConstitutionofIndia.

Backtothewaythepoliceacted:

Suchanassemblyisnecessarilyillegalcannotbepresumed,andevenifitwas,theindividualswereallasleepwhoweretakenbysurprisealtogetherforasimultaneousimplementationandaction under Section 144 CrPC without being preceded by an announcement or evenotherwise,givingnotimeinareasonablewaytotheassemblytodispersefromtheRamlilaGround.Tothecontrary,thesleepofthishugecrowdwasimmodestlyandbrutallyoutragedanditwasdispersedbyforcemakingthemfleehitherandthither,whichbysuchprecipitateaction,causedamayhemthatwasreflectedinthemedia.

Andthenbacktothesignificanceofsleep:

Anindividualisentitledtosleepascomfortablyandasfreelyashebreathes.Sleepisessentialforahumanbeingtomaintainthedelicatebalanceofhealthnecessaryforitsveryexistenceand survival. Sleep is, therefore, a fundamental and basic requirement without which theexistenceoflifeitselfwouldbeinperil.Todisturbsleep,therefore,wouldamounttotorturewhichisnowacceptedasaviolationofhumanright.Itwouldbesimilartoathird-degreemethodwhichat times is sought tobe justifiedas anecessarypolice action to extract thetruth out of an accused involved in heinous and cold-blooded crimes. It is also a deviceadoptedduringwarfarewhereprisonersofwarandthoseinvolvedinespionagearesubjectedtotreatmentsdeprivingthemofnormalsleep.

Thenbegincitationsfromearlierjudgments,ascoreandmoreofthemarecitedandextractsfromthemarereproduced—ontherightto life,onthe

meaning of ‘life’, on the right to privacy, on public order. Then followsections detailing when the state may intervene immediately, and whatprocedureaforcelikethepolicemustfollow…

Finally, the conclusion: ‘For the reasons aforesaid, I concurwith thedirections issued by my learned colleague with a forewarning to therespondents topreventanyrepetitionof suchhastyandunwarrantedactaffectingthesafelivingconditionsofthecitizens/personsinthiscountry.’

Suchheavyartilleryjusttoconcur?

ONEJUDGMENTORSIX?

ProfessorGeetaOberoioftheNationalJudicialAcademyatBhopaldrawsmy attention to a variant of quoting oneself, of quoting oneself quotingothers.Often several petitions comebefore judges pertaining tomore orless the samematter. The general practice is to club them together, anddisposeofthemthroughasinglejudgment.Butsometimesitseemsthatthejudgetreatseachinaseparatejudgment—eachjudgmentbeingareplicaoftheother.Shedirectsmetoreadtwosetsofcasesasacontrast.InKalpanaPundlik Jamdade v. State of Maharashtra,14 Justice T.V. Nalawade hadbeforehimfourpetitions.Allof themadvancedpleasagainstorders thathadbeenissuedholdingthemguiltyofhavingviolatedthePre-conceptionand Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act,1994.He set out the facts relating to each case, as well as the relevantprovisionsofthelawandtherules,anddealtwithallthefourinasinglejudgment. By contrast, Justice A.I.S. Cheema, in the same bench of thesameHighCourt,15deliveredineffectthesamejudgmentsixtimesoverbytaking sixpetitionsonebyone. In each judgment, he cited at length thesame provisions of the act. In each, he cited the same rules. In each, heapplied the same reasoning.16 Result?As far as statistics of performanceareconcerned, JusticeNalawadedeliveredone judgment, JusticeCheemadeliveredsix!

STENOSANDSEARCHENGINES

Thatwomenarehalfthepopulation,thatmothersshapegenerations,thattheyarethefountoflove,thatkillingafoetusbecausetheto-be-bornisagirl, ismurder—isanyofthissoobscurethat itrequiresquotationsfromMamie Gene Cole, from William Wordsworth, from Charles Dickens,fromHenrik Ibsen, from JohnMilton, fromAlexis deTocqueville, fromMadamde Stael, fromWilliamShakespeare, fromSchiller, fromCharlesFourier,fromLordDenning,nottoforgetfromVishwakaviRabindranathTagore, from Swami Vivekananda, from the Mahabharata, from theSmritis,and,ofcourse,fromearlierjudgmentsoftheSupremeCourtitself:oneandallsayingthesamething—thatwomenarevital,inthemselvesandforcivilization?Itisasifsomeonehadabookofquotationsinhand,andlookedup‘woman’,then‘child’,then‘girl’.

There isaparallel trend: tociteone judgmentafteranother inwhichthe SupremeCourt has said on earlier occasionswhat onewants to saynow. The judgment we encountered on whether defamation is merely aciviloffenceor,inaddition,acriminaloffence,providesareadyexample.Thatforastatementtobedefamatory,theremustbeanimputation,andthatitmusthavebeenmadewiththeintentionofcausingharmorintheknowledge that harmwill be caused—this is well-known. The examplesthatMacaulaypennedas ‘Explanations’aremodelsofclarity.Asare the‘Exceptions’. But the judgment invokes six earlier judgments to explain‘Explanations’ItoIV—eachcitationfromeachofthejudgmentsineffectjustrepeatswhat theoriginal textof thesectionalreadysays.Toexplainthe ‘Exceptions’, the judgment cites thirty earlier judgments—each ofwhichineffectalsojustendsuprepeatingwhattheoriginaltextstates.Nowonder,thejudgmentcoversallof268pages,albeitdouble-spaced.17OnreadingsuchpassagesIamremindedofwhatapoliticiansaidaswestoodchatting and the photographers went on clicking their cameras: ‘Areybhaai,itnaakumself-confidencehaikyaa?Jahaanekphotosekaamchaljayegaa,aapclickkiyehijaaraheyho.’18

EVENWHENTHEMEANINGISSTRAIGHTFORWARD

Manoj Nirula v. Union of India,19 the opening oration of which we

encounteredearlier,showsanotherfacet.Aswenoticed,thepleabeforethecourtwasthatthosewhoareguilty

ofheinouscrimesmustnotbeallowedtobeinductedintotheCouncilofMinisters.ThecourtheldthatforittolaydownthateventhosewhohavebeenchargedwithhavingcommittedsuchcrimesmustnotbeallowedtobeintheCouncilofMinisterswouldbetointerposeadisqualificationthatisneitherprovidedinArticle75(1)oftheConstitutionnorimpliedbyit.

Not that complicated, it would seem. But the court took a typicallylongroutetogettothisconclusion.

First,itdilateduponthesignificanceofensuringthepurityofelections—and to carry conviction on this point, it invoked what the SupremeCourthadsaidinthreeearlierjudgments.

Next, itbemoanedthecriminalizationofpolitics.Tocarryconvictiononthispoint, itonceagain invokedwhattheSupremeCourthadsaid inthree earlier judgments.Thenwhat theN.N.VohraCommitteehad saidonwhatwasinfacthappeningandwhatconsequenceswouldfollow.ThenitinvokedtheLawCommission…Allthis,onlytoaffirm:‘Theaforesaidvividly exposits concern at all quarters about the criminalisation ofpolitics.Criminalisationofpolitics,itcanbesaidwithcertitude,createsadentinthemarrowsofthenation.’

Marrowcanbedented—likethefenderofacar?Thecourtthenturnedto ‘Corruption in the present scenario’. It went on to spell out howcorruption corrodes institutions, elections, the rule of law.And to carryconvictionthatthisreallyhappens,itinvokedwhattheSupremeCourthadsaidintwoearlierjudgments.

Next, thecourt turnedtoprovisionsrelatingtothequalificationsanddisqualificationsforMPs,MLAsandMLCs.ItreproducedinfullwhattheConstitutionprovides in this regard,what the IndianPenalCode says. Itthen reproduced what the Supreme Court has said in two earlierjudgments.

Itthenproceededtoreproducetheconstitutionalprovisionsrelatingtoministers,andtheoathstheyhavetoswearbeforeassumingoffice.

Counsel had argued that the criteria for selectingministers shouldbemorestringentthanforbeingelected,thatthiswasanimpliedlimitation,

and that the court had accepted the doctrine of implied limitation inKesavanandaBharati.

Thatbecametheoccasiontoreproducewhatwassaid inthatcasebyJusticeSikri;thenwhatwassaidbyJusticesShelatandGrover;thenwhatwassaidbyJusticesHegdeandMukherjea;thenwhatwassaidbyJusticeJaganmohanReddy;thenwhatwassaidbyJusticePalekar;thenwhatwassaid by Justice Chandrachud; and, finally, what was said by JusticeKhannainthecase.

ThencametimeforquotationsfromMinervaMills20.ThenforpassagesfromB.R.Kapur21.ThenforpassagesfromI.R.Coleho22.

The court then went on to consider the principle of constitutionalsilenceorabeyance:astowhatcouldbeconstruedoradvancedwhentheConstitutiondoesnotsayanythingspecificonapoint.

Then it felt it necessary to dilate upon the doctrine of constitutionalimplication.

Thenonthe‘doctrine’ofgoodgovernance.Governmentmustbegoodandclean.Forthistobeso,personsingovernmentmustbeonesofgoodcharacter and competence. To fortify these, surely unfamiliar theses thecourtinvokedwhattheSupremeCourthadsaidinfiveearlierjudgments.Andthenaperorationondesirables:

Inademocracy,thecitizenslegitimatelyexpectthattheGovernmentofthedaywouldtreatthepublic interestasprimaryoneandanyother interest [as] secondary.ThemaximSalusPopuliSupremaLex,hasnotonlytobekeptinviewbutalsohastoberevered.Thefaithofthepeopleisembeddedintherootoftheideaofgoodgovernancewhichmeansreverenceforcitizenry rights, respect for Fundamental Rights and statutory rights in any governmentalaction, deference for unwritten constitutional values, veneration for institutional integrity,andinculcationofaccountabilitytothecollectiveatlarge.Italsoconveysthatthedecisionsare taken by the decision-making authoritywith solemn sincerity and policies are framedkeepinginviewthewelfareofthepeople,andincludingallinahomogeneouscompartment.TheconceptofgoodgovernanceisnotaUtopianconceptionoranabstraction.Ithasbeenthe demand of the polity wherever democracy is nourished. The growth of democracy isdependentupongoodgovernanceinrealityandtheaspirationofthepeoplebasicallyisthattheadministrationiscarriedoutbypeoplewithresponsibilitywithserviceorientation.

But this cannot be mandated in every particular. It requires trust,‘constitutionaltrust’—thatis,wehavetotrusttheconcernedauthority,inthis case theprimeministeror chiefminister, todo right.To fortify this

leapoffaith,thecourtinvokeswhatDrAmbedkarsaidintheConstituentAssembly Debates. It invokes what Dr Rajendra Prasad said. It invokeswhat the Supreme Court has said in three earlier judgments. It theninvokesH.M.Seervai.AndthenaConstitutionalandAdministrativeLaw.And then a nextConstitutional Practice. And then Edmund Burke. AndthentheSupremeCourtagain.

Now, these ministers in the collective are to tender ‘advice’. Thattriggersadiscourseon ‘advice’.Themeaningof thewordasgiven intheNewShorterOxfordEnglishDictionaryiscited.ThemeaningofthewordasgiveninRamanathaIyer’sLawLexicon(‘SecondEdition’)iscited.Themeaningof thewordas given in theWebsterComprehensiveDictionary(‘InternationalEdition’)iscited.ThemeaningofthewordasgivenbytheSupreme Court in an earlier judgment is cited. Then Ivor Jennings isinvoked.ThenLovehead’sConstitutionalLaw,ACritical Introduction isinvoked.ThenwhatDrRajendraPrasadsaidintheConstituentAssemblyDebatesisinvoked.Andyettheword‘advice’continuestomeanwhatyouandIwouldnormallyunderstandittomeanwithoutallthesequotations.

Theconclusion?Thatthecourtcannotaddanotherdisqualificationtoministership—that is, it cannot lay down that a person who has beenelected cannot bemadeministermerely because he has been charged ashavingcommittedaheinouscrime.Wehavetoleavematterstothegoodsenseoftheprimeministerandchiefministers:

Thus, while interpreting Article 75(1), definitely a disqualification cannot be added.However,itcanalwaysbelegitimatelyexpected,regardbeinghadtotheroleofaMinisterinthe Council of Ministers and keeping in view the sanctity of oath he takes, the PrimeMinister,whilelivinguptothetrustreposedinhim,wouldconsidernotchoosingapersonwith criminal antecedents againstwhom charges have been framed for heinous or seriouscriminaloffencesorchargesofcorruptiontobecomeaMinisteroftheCouncilofMinisters.This iswhat theConstitution suggests and that is the constitutional expectation from thePrimeMinister.Rest has to be left to thewisdomof the PrimeMinister.We say nothingmore,nothingless.

Theresults—bothattheCentreandthestates—arethereforalltosee:‘Wesaynothingmore,nothingless.’

And contrast this reticencewith the excellent reasoningonwhich thesameSupremeCourtstruckdowntheself-servingsub-section8(4)ofthe

RepresentationofPeople’sAct,1951,andineffectlegislatedafar-reachingchangeinourelectorallaws.23Sub-section8(1)oftheAct listsaseriesofcrimesandprovidesthatifapersonisconvictedofanyofthem,heshalllosehisseatinthelegislatureforthwith,thatheshallbedisqualifiedforsixyearsfromthedateofhisconviction,and,ifheisimprisoned,forafurtherperiodof six years from thedateofhis release.24 But the very next sub-clause nullified this, and provided an escape hatch: ‘Notwithstandinganything [in the earlier sub-sections], a disqualification shall not, in thecaseofapersonwhoonthedateofconvictionisamemberofParliamentor the legislature of a state, take effect until threemonths have elapsedfrom that date or, if within that period an appeal or application forrevision isbrought inrespectof theconvictionor thesentence,until thatappealorapplicationisdisposedofbythecourt.’Asaresult,eventhosewho had been convicted ofmurder continued as legislators: upon beingconvicted, all theyhad todowas to file an appeal, and then stretch thecase out forever.25 The Supreme Court struck sub-section 8(4) down asunconstitutional—thebasicgroundbeingthatitcouldneverhavebeentheintention of the Constitution-makers and of the legislature to rendernugatory the basic disqualification that the lawhadprovided.The courtwas not restrained bywhat the law said and hownarrow a latitude the‘doctrineofimplication’gaveit.Ineffect,itlegislatedachangeinthelaw.

10

AndyetIamtakenbysurprise

Though I was inured by examples of the kind we have just glancedthrough,IwasjoltedbywhatIreadrecently.AstoryinTheWireledmetolookupthejudgmentsofajudgeoftheHimachalPradeshHighCourt.Tocheckiftherewasapattern,Idownloadedafewdecisionsthathehadhandeddowninthefirsthalfof2016,andthesecondhalfof2017.Andthen opened a judgment at random. It turned out to be State ofH.P v.NarottamSinghandOthers,decidedbythejudgeinMay2016.1

‘X’had twice struck ‘Y’witha sword.The latterhadwardedoff theattacks. In doing so, ‘Y’s’ index finger and thumb had been injured. Alower court haddecided that the assailant shouldbe tried under Section324oftheIndianPenalCode—whichdealswith‘Voluntarilycausinghurtbydangerousweaponsormeans’,andcarriesasentenceofimprisonmentuptothreeyears—ratherthanSection302—whichdealswith‘Attempttomurder’,andcarriesasentenceofimprisonmentuptotenyears.TheHighCourtjudgesawweightintheargumentsofthestate:‘X’shouldbetriedfor attempted murder—one should look at the weapon that had beenwielded, and that the accused had struck ‘Y’ twice, rather than the factthat the injuries that ‘Y’hadsufferedweremerelycutsonafingerandathumb.Had‘Y’notbeenabletowardofftheassault,hecouldhavebeenkilled. That, more or less, was all that there was to the case, and thejudgment.

Nowseehowthejudgeputthematter:2

The learnedAdditional AdvocateGeneral haswith pain staking efforts contended on thestrengthofallegationsconstitutedintheFIRrecordedinthePoliceStationconcernedwitha

portrayalthereinoftheaccusedwieldinga‘Kripan’withuserwhereofheattemptedtostrikeblowsatthevictim,blowswhereofstoodthwartedbythevictimtwicebyputtinghishandsagainstthe‘kripan’actwhereofhistobaulkitsstrikinghimsequelledhissustaininginjuriesonhisrightthumbwhereupontheaccusedrepeatedhisconcerttostrikeablowof‘kripan’athimwhichsuccessiveblowof‘Kripan’alsostoodthwartedbythevictimprojectinghishandsequellinghissustaininginjuriesonhisindexfinger.TheaforesaidechoingintheFIRbythevictimofthegenesisoftheoccurrenceperseprimafacieatthisstagestandscorroboratedbythe MLC of the victim prepared in quick spontaneity to the occurrence by the doctorconcernedwho in the appositeMLC has reflected of the victim sustaining injuries on hisrightthumbbesidesonhisindexfinger.Onanvillwhereof,thelearnedAdditionalAdvocateGeneralcontendedofsatisfactionstandingbegottenquatheingredientsofSection307oftheIPCoftheaccusedendangeringthelifeofthevictimconstitutedbyhiswieldinga‘Kripan’qua userwhereof he struck two abortive blows on the person of the victim of hence thelearned Additional Sessions Judge committing a gross error in concluding of the offencesconstitutedagainsttheaccusedrespondentratherfallingwithintheambitofSection324oftheIPC.

What thecounsel for theaccusedhad submittedwas setout ina similarexposition.Andthenthereasoningofthejudge:

Having considered the rival submissions addressed before this Court by the learnedAdditional Advocate General as also by the learned counsel appearing for theaccused/respondents herein, this Court is of the considered view that the submissionsaddressedbeforethisCourtbythelearnedAdditionalAdvocateGeneraloughttomerittheirsstanding accepted by this Court. There is a palpable display in the FIR lodged qua theoccurrencebythevictim,oftheaccusedattherelevanttimewieldingakripan.Withitsuserasaforestatedhestrucksuccessiveabortiveblowsonthevictim,yetthefactumofthevictimthwarting the blows of kripan successively struck at him by the accused, begot his hencesustaininginjuriesinitiallyonhisrightthumbandlateronhisrightindexfingerwhenstandsasreferredaforestatedcorroboratedbytheappositeMLCpreparedbythedoctorconcerned,whosubjectedthevictimtomedicalexaminationinquickspontaneitytotheoccurrence,isofpredominant significance. Moreover, since the recovery of the ‘Kripan’ wielded by theaccusedstandsrecoveredunderarecoverymemo,asacorollary,atthisstageitwouldbein-sagacious to accept the submission addressed before this Court by the learned counselappearing for the accused of the factum of the injuries sustained by the victim being apreeminentfactorasstoodtenablyborneinmindbythelearnedAdditionalSessionsJudgefor concluding of the penalmisdemeanors committed by the accused standing constitutedwithintheambitofSection324oftheIPCandtheirsnotfallingwithintheambitofSection307oftheIPC.ThereasonfordiscountenancingthesubmissionofthelearnedcounselfortheaccusedisofhishavingslightedtheeffectbesidestheimportoftheprovisionsofSection307of the IPCwhichmandate the preeminent factor relevant for concludingwhether theoffence as alleged tobe committedby the accused stands constitutedwithin its ambit notbeing the nature of the injuries ultimately sustained by the victim in sequel to the assaultperpetratedonher/hispersonbytheaccusedratherthestarkfactorforconcludingwhetherthe offence stands constituted within its ambit is of the endangerment emanating or theimminent threat accruing to the lifeof thevictim spurring from thenatureof theweapon

wieldedby theaccuseddehors the fact that evenon itsuser thevictimultimately sustainssimple injuries. In aftermath, at this stageprima faciematerialwhen is connotativeof theaccused wielding a ‘kripan’ which per se meted on its standing used by the accused animminentthreattothelifeofthevictimhencearousedendangermenttohislifebesideswhenwith its user he attempted to inflict fatal blows on the person of the victimwhich stoodthwartedbythelatter inthemanneraforestated,naturally,thelearnedAdditionalSessionsJudgewhile remanding the case to the committalMagistrate has committed a grave legalfallacywhilediscarding the factumof theaccusedat the relevant timewieldinga ‘Kripan’anditsuserbegettingendangermenttothelifeofthevictimratherhiscontrarilyandinaptlymeteingreverencetotheinjuriesmetedtothevictimbytheaccusedwhilestrikinghimwithblows of kripan has gone off the mark in capturing the subtle nuance and spirit of theprovisionsofSection307,IPC,ingredientswhereofforreasonsaforestatedstoodsatiated.Inaftermath, this Court is of the view that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, hascommitted a legal impropriety by remanding thematter to the CommittalMagistrate forframing a charge against the accused for theirs committing an offence punishable underSection324oftheIPC.

Apartfromthequestionwhetherthecasefellwithinthejurisdictionoftheadditional sessions judge, the latter’s conclusion was wrong, the judgeruled:

The learned counsel appearing for the accused/respondents has with much vigour on theanvilofthejudgementoftheHon’bleApexCourt,therelevantparagraphswhereofstandsextractedhereinabove,contendedofthelearnedAdditionalSessionsJudgehavingrenderedan apt order. However, with the relevant paragraph which stand extracted hereinabovefoistingajurisdictionupontheCourtconcernedtoweighandsifttheevidence,nonetheless,when the manner of weighing or sifting besides appraising the probative worth of thematerial on record by the learnedAdditional Sessions Judge suffers froma perversity andabsurdity, the contention of the learned counsel for the accused would not standcountenancedbythisCourt.

Whathadhappened?Had the thesaurus takenover completely? I readafewotherjudgments.Thatexerciseturnedouttobequiteunnecessary:thepatternwasthesame.Hence,itwillbeenoughtogobacktothejudgmentfromwhichTheWire had extracteda few sentences—as ithada specialending.

Here is the judgment.Pleasegathersomefriends,andread italoud—don’tgiveuphalfway,perseveretotheend:

2016SCCOnLineHP2699 J1IntheHighCourtofHimachalPradeshatShimla(BeforeSureshwarThakur,J.)Shri.PawanKumarSharma…Petitioner/JD

v.SarlaSoodandOthers…Respondents/DHForthePetitioner:Mr.DeepakBhasin,Advocate.ForRespondents:Mr.B.C.Verma,Advocate.C.R.No.184of2011DecidedonDecember5,2016Sureshwar Thakur, J.:— The Judgment debtor/petitioner herein, tenant in the demisedpremisesstandsaggrievedbythepronouncementmadebythelearnedExecutingCourtuponhisobjectionsconstitutedtherebeforevis-a-vis theexecutionpetitionconstitutedthereatbytheDecreeholder/landlord,wherewithintheappositeunfoldmentsquahisresistancetotheexecutionofthedecreestooddiscountenancedbythelearnedExecutingCourt.2.Thelearnedcounselappearingforthejudgmentdebtor/petitionerhereinsubmitsquathe

impugned pronouncement made by the learned Executing Court upon the appositeobjectionspreferredtherebeforebytheJD/tenantmanifestingthereinquathedecreeputto execution therebefore not warranting recording of affirmative orders thereon, itsstanding fully satisfied, standing stained with a vice arising from the factum of itspalpably slighting the factumofunfoldmentsoccurring in the relevant record existingtherebeforecomprisedinthetestificationrecordedon29.10.2004inRentPetitionNo.10/2 of 2003 by the General Power of Attorney of the landlord wherein he madearticulationsquaalltheoutstandingarrearsofrentquathedemisedpremisesstandingliquidatedby the judgmentdebtorexceptingconspicuously theone’spertaining to theperiod commencing from 1.9.2000 uptill 31.03.2003 whereupon he hence canvassedqua the executable pronouncement recorded in rent petitionNo. 1-2 of 1996 put toexecution before the learned Executing Court embodying therein qua the Judgmentdebtor,fallingintoarrearsofrentcommencingfrom1.9.1995uptothedateofpaymentstanding fully satisfied, satisfactionwhereof emanating from the factumof liability ofrent fastenedupon the tenant inaverdict recorded inRentPetitionNo.1-2of1996,standingacquiescedtostandliquidatedmoresowhentheaforesaidverdictstoodputtoexecution.However, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant/JD/petitioner hereincannot derive the fullest succour from the aforesaid acquiescence occurring in thetestificationof theGPAof thedecreeholder/landlord,given its sinewsufferingpartialdissipationfromanimminentdisplayoccurringintheimpugnedpronouncementhereatwherewithin unravelments are held qua the rendition recorded by the learned RentControllerinRentPetitionNo.1-2/1996standingassailedbeforethelearnedAppellateAuthority by the tenant/JD by the latter preferring an appeal therebefore whereat heunderanapplicationconstitutedunderSection5oftheLimitationActsoughtextensionof time fordepositinghis statutory liabilityqua thearrearsof rentdeterminedby thelearned Rent Controller in a pronouncement made by the latter on 6.11.1999,wherefrom an inference spurs of the JD acquiescing qua his notmaking the relevantdepositquahisliabilitytowardsarrearsofrentwithinthestatutorilyprescribedperiod,application whereof suffered the ill fate of its dismissal by the learned AppellateAuthority under the latter’s order recorded on 16.12.2000. Of course, the inevitableensuing sequel therefrom is qua the tenant/JD acquiescing to the factum of his notdepositing the relevant computations of arrears of rent made by the learned RentControllerconcernedinRentPetitionNo.1-2of1996withinthestatutorilyprescribedperiod for its deposit therebefore whereupon the apposite decree for his sufferingevictionfromthedemisedpremisesonaccountofhisfallingintoarrearsofrentbecame

executable qua him, whereupon, he stands estopped besides forestalled to derive thefulleststrengthfromanyacquiescencemadebytheGPAofthedecreeholder/landlords,ratherstandsentailedwiththemisfortuneof the learnedExecutingCourtensuringhisevictionfromthedemisedpremisesbyorderingfor issuanceofwarrantsofpossessionquahim.

3.Eventhough,thisCourthaspartiallybluntedtheeffectoftheaforesaidcommunicationoccurring in the testification of the GPA of the decree holder qua the tenant/JD notholdinganyliabilityquathelandlordvis-a-visliquidationquahimofrentfortheperiodcommencingfrom1.9.1995uptothedateofpayment,whereupon,thisCourtconcludesquaitsentailingtheeffectoftheExecutingCourtorderingforissuanceofwarrantsofpossessionuponthejudgmentdebtoryetbeforeordering,the learnedExecutingCourtto make the aforesaid pronouncement, this Court is enjoined to also not remainoblivioustothefactumoftheexecutabledecreestandingrenderedintheyear1999bythelearnedRentControllerconcernedinRentPetitionNo.1-2of1996,alsothisCourtstandsenjoinedtonotremainunmindfultothefactumofthelandlordsubsequenttohisobtainingaverdictinRentPetitionNo.1-2of1996hisalsoquathedemisedpremisesinstitutingRentPetitionNo.10/2of2003beforethelearnedRentControllerconcerned,duringproceedingswhereoftheGPAofthelandlordmadeacommunicationdisplayinghisacquiescencequathetenantliquidatinghisliabilityofrentquathedemisedpremisesin sequel to thepronouncementmade inRent PetitionNo. 1-2of 1996.Though, theacquiescenceoftheGPAofthelandlordwouldnoterodetheplayofthedicktatoftherelevant statutory mandatory provisions enjoining the tenant to within the timeprescribed therewithindeposit his apposite judicially determined liability of arrears ofrentbeforetheCourtconcerned,whereas,evidentlywiththetenantnotliquidatinghisappositeliabilitywithinthestatutorilyordainedperiodforitsliquidationwhereuponthestatutory consequence qua the Executing Court ordering for issuance of warrants ofpossessionquahimisaninevitableensuingsequeltherefrom.However,theacquiescencequa the relevant facetmade by theGPAof the landlord in rent petitionNo. 10/2 of2003whichstoodinstitutedsubsequenttothepronouncementmadeinrentpetitionNo.1-2of1996holdingbespeakings thereinof the tenantmaking therelevant liquidationholdsthesequelofthelandlordacceptingtheattornmentofrenttohimbythetenant/JDother than the statutory mode for its deposit. The effect of the landlordpersonally/directlyacceptingattorningofrentquathedemisedpremisesfromthetenantindetractionofthestatutorymodedoesholdtheconsequenceofthelandlordwaivinghisrightstoseekevictionofthetenant,rightwhereofstoodbestoweduponhimunderanexecutabledecreepronounced inRentPetitionNo.1-2of1996, inferencewhereofwhen stands construed in coagulation with the landlord subsequent to thepronouncementrecordedbytheRentControllerinRentPetitionNo.1-2of1996,hisintheyear2003 institutinganotherpetitionseekingevictionof theJDfromthedemisedpremises, ultimately also when both the factum aforesaid stand construed inentwinement with the apposite execution petition constituted before the learnedExecuting Court by the landlord whereupon he sought execution of the executabledecree rendered in Rent Petition No. 1-2 of 1996 standing constituted therebeforebelatedly on 30.08.2010 does foster an inference of with the landlord receiving rentdirectlyfromthetenant,heistostandconstruedtonotonlycreateafreshtenancyquathe demised premises upon the tenant besides is to stand construed to concomitantlyhence,waivehisrightstoseekevictionoftheJDunderanexecutabledecreerecordedin

Rent PetitionNo. 1-2 of 1996.Contrarily, it has to be concluded of the landlord byprocrastinating the executionof the executable decree renderedon6.11.1999 inRentPetitionNo. 1-2 of 1996 upto 29.09.2005whereat a pronouncement in rent petitionNo. 10/2 of 2003 also occurred his also thereupon renewing the tenancy qua therelevantpremisesvis-a-vistheJD.

4.Thesummombonumoftheaforesaiddiscussionisthatalltheaforesaidmaterialwhichexisted before the learned Executing Court standing slighted besides their impactstandinguntenably underminedbyhimwhereupon the ensuing sequel therefrom is ofthelearnedExecutingCourtwhilepronouncingitsimpugnedrenditionoverlookingtherelevantandgermaneevidencebesidesitsnotappreciatingitsworth.Consequently,theorder impugned suffers from a gross absurdity and perversity of mis-appreciation ofmaterialonrecord.Accordingly,theinstantpetitionisallowedandtheorderimpugnedisquashedandsetaside.Insequel,theappositeexecutionpetitionseekingexecutionofthe verdict pronounced in Rent Petition No. 1-2 of 1996 is dismissed, whereas, theobjections instituted thereat by the JD/petitioner herein/tenant are allowed. All thependingapplicationsalsostanddisposedof.

Didyouperseverereadingaloudtilltheend?Beatsthemerelyeloquentforsure!TheaggrievedpartytookthemattertotheSupremeCourt.Counselfor the two sides argued the matter before a bench of two judges. Thejudgesdecidedasfollows:

Afterhearinglearnedcounsel,itisnotpossibletocomprehendthecontentsoftheimpugnedorderpassedbytheHighCourt.TheorderpassedbytheHighCourtis,therefore,setasideandthematterisremandedtotheHighCourtforfreshconsiderationonmerits.

Thespecialleavepetitionsaredisposedof.TheHighCourtwillhearthematterdenovo.

For all I know, the judge concernedmay be the fairest of them all. Butsurely,at least tosomeextent, the languageoneuses isan indexofhowonethinks.Apersonwhoseflowofthoughtsandwordsissuch—andhasbeenforyears—isaHighCourtjudge.

Infact, the instanceholdsa lessonforthemethodofselecting judges.When we come across a judge like Justice Kumaraswamy of theJayalalithaa-judgment fame, who rose step-by-step through the lowercourts,weurge lateral entry fromtheBar.Whenwecomeacross JusticeKarnanwhohadbeenelevatedfromtheBar,weurgeanAllIndiaJudicialService, and urge that judges be elevated only from within the service.Well, in the present instance, like Justice D’Cunha—and JusticeKumaraswamy, for that matter—the judge had reached the High Courtafter having served in various capacities in lower courts.His father had

been a judge of the High Court. He himself had joined as additionaldistrictandsessionsjudgein2001.Hehadbeenpromotedtothepositionofdistrictandsessionsjudgein2005.In2013,hehadbeenappointedastheregistrarof theHimachalPradeshHighCourt. InMay2014,hewasappointedadditionaljudgeoftheHighCourt.Thereafter,asthewebsiteofthe High Court records, ‘Took oath as Judge of the High Court ofHimachalPradeshon30thNovember2014(Forenoon).’

Tosummarize,nomechanicalsolutionwillwork:neitherlateralentryfromtheBar,norelevationfromamongdistrictjudges.Manymorethingsare required. Among these is one that seems to me to be the sovereignremedy.

BUTNOTJUSTAHIGHCOURT

ButitwouldbeunfairtosingleoutthejudgeoreventheHighCourtsforadénouementofthiskind.Readerswillrecall,andinanearlierstudyIhadsetout,whathappenedinoneofthemosthotlycontestedsetofcasesofrecenttimes,thoserelatingtotherightsofminorityinstitutions.3

St.Stephen’sCollegev.UniversityofDelhihadgivenwidelatitudetominority institutions.4 In 1993, an institution by the name of IslamicAcademyofEducationapproached the SupremeCourt againstdirectionssought to be given by the Government of Karnataka. The matter wasassignedtoabenchof five judges.At theveryoutset, thebenchfelt thatjustbecauseaninstitutionwasaminorityinstitution,itdidnot,byvirtueofArticle30,gettherighttochooseanyoldmethodofselectingstudentsthat it thought fit. The bench felt that the decision of the court in St.Stephen’sCollegeneededtobereviewed.Thatcasehadbeendecidedbyabench of five judges—though Justice N.M. Kasliwal had contributed amost cogentdissent.The five-judgebenchwhichhadbeenconstituted todeliberate on thewrit of the IslamicAcademyaccordingly recommendedthat the case be placed before a bench of seven judges.On the basis ofwhat lawyers for the contenders argued, the seven judges recommendedthatabenchofelevenjudgesbeconstituted.

And so a bench of eleven judges was constituted. Their judgment in

T.M.A.PaiFoundationv.StateofKarnatakawasdelivered in2002.5Ataround92,000words,itislongerthanevenmyarticles!Actually,therearefour different judgments—five, if you count a concurring opinion as ajudgmentbyitself.

Setting aside what the other judges had said, even the judgmentdelivered by the majority was taken to say different things by differentstategovernmentsand,ofcourse,bydifferentinstitutionsthatclaimedtobe minority institutions. Such was the confusion and such the spate oflitigationthatfollowedinthewakeofT.M.A.Paithattheverynextyearabenchoffive judgeshadtobeconstitutedtoclarifywhattheT.M.A.Paijudgment had laid down. This bench delivered a judgment in IslamicAcademyofEducationv.StateofKarnatakain2003.6

The clarifications confounded! The very next year, in 2004–05, thematterswereagainbeforetheSupremeCourt.Accordingly,aseven-judgebenchwasconstitutedtoascertainonceagainwhattheeleven-judgebenchhad said and, next, to identify the questions on which the five-judgeclarificatory-bench, so to say, had done what it could not do, namelywhere it had departed fromwhat the eleven-judge bench had held. AndfromthiswegottheSupremeCourt’sjudgmentinP.A.Inamdarv.StateofMaharashtra.7

Thatthisisbynomeanstheendoftheroadisevidentfromwhatthefive judges themselves said at the veryoutset inP.A. Inamdar about theboundarieswithinwhichtheyhadtodecidethecase.Hereitis:

…Attheveryoutset,wemaystatethatourtaskisnottopronounceourownindependentopinionontheseveralissueswhicharoseforconsiderationinPaiFoundation[(2002)8SCC481].Evenifweareinclinedtodisagreewithanyofthefindingsamountingtodeclarationoflaw by the majority in Pai Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481] we cannot; that being apronouncementbyaneleven-JudgeBench,weareboundbyit.Wecannotexpressdissentordisagreement howsoeverwemay be inclined to do so on any of the issues. The real taskbeforeus is to cull out the ratiodecidendi ofPaiFoundation [(2002) 8 SCC481] and toexamine if the explanation or clarification given in IslamicAcademy [(2003) 6 SCC697]runs counter toPaiFoundation [(2002) 8 SCC481] and if so, towhat extent. Ifwe findanything said or held in Islamic Academy [(2003) 6 SCC 697] in conflict with PaiFoundation[(2002)8SCC481]weshallsaysoasbeingadeparturefromthelawlaiddownbyPaiFoundation[(2002)8SCC481]andontheprincipleofbindingefficacyofprecedents,overruletothatextenttheopinionoftheConstitutionBenchinIslamicAcademy[(2003)6

SCC697].8

Whowouldneedaclearerhintthatthejudgeswouldhavehelddifferentlyifonlytheyhadnotbeenjustfiveagainsteleven?

11

Somuchscience

On29April2015,twelvepeacockswerefounddeadinthecompoundofaprimaryschoolinavillageinBundidistrictofRajasthan.Autopsyreportsrevealed that someculprithad lacedwith insecticide thewheatand corngrainsthattheyusedtoeat.Aboy,seventeenyearsold,wasarrestedandchargedwithhavingpoisonedthepeacocks.Hislawyerarguedthathehadbeen picked up on mere suspicion, that there was no direct evidencelinkinghimtothecrime.Thelowercourthadrejectedtheapplicationforbail. Thematter had come before JusticeMahesh Sharma, a devotee ofLord Krishna, of the Rajasthan High Court. In his judgment, JusticeSharmanotedthatthepeacockisournationalbird,andthatitisindangerofextinction.Herejectedthebailapplication,butalsodirectedthejuvenilecourttotrythecaseexpeditiously.1

From the lofty podium of the High Court the judge explained thesignificanceofthecase,and,hence,thereasonforhisdecision:

ThepeacockisthebelovedandreveredbirdofLordKrishna.Theprincipalattributeofthepeacockisthatheisabrahmachari,acelibate.Itisbydrinkingthetearsofthepeacockthatthepeahenbecomespregnant.ItisthefeatherofsopureabirdthatSriKrishnawears.Thekillingofsuchabirdisindeedamatterofnationalconcern.Thepeacockisanationalbird,anditisonthevergeofextinction.Ifsuchendangeredflora,andwildlifeandbirdsarenotsaved,theentireenvironmentalbalancewillbebroughtintojeopardy,anddangerwillbegintohoverover theexistenceofmankind. Inalmostall the sacredbooksof theHindus, thepeacock has been spoken ofwith reverence. It is imperative that a restraint be placed onthose who play with the lives of such animals and birds. It is also the requirement ofenvironmentallaw.

Thejudge’sknowledgeabouthowthespeciesreproduce,theirimmaculateconception,thedrinkingoftears…thesemadetheheadlines.

THESCIENCEOFCOWS

Later, JusticeMahesh Sharmawas disposing of a case relating to a cowsanctuary.Rajasthan is the only state in the country that has a separate

ministry for promoting the welfare of cattle. The state banned theslaughter of cows in 1995.2 As a result, many an owner would just letloose cows that had stopped yielding milk. The government had set upHingonia Gaushala, a sanctuary for abandoned cows, in 2002. It wasplaced under the supervision of the Jaipur Municipal Corporation.Allocationswereregularlymadefortheupkeepofthecows.InNovember2010,aprivateorganization,theJagoJanataSociety,filedawritpointingout that,while fundswere being given to the organization, the gaushalawassopoorlymanagedthatcowsweredyinginlargenumbersforwantoffodderandwater.3

Between 22 November 2010, when the writ was filed, and 31May2017, when Justice Sharma delivered his 139-page judgment, the HighCourt held eighty-six hearings. After each of these hearings, it passeddetailedorders:whichofficerwastodowhat,whichdepartmentwastodowhat, who was to go to the site and inspect how things were in thegaushala,thedatebywhichthereportwastobefiled…

Inthemeantime,ofcourse,thecowscontinuedtodie.Thedeathswereregularlyhighlightedbythemedia,andtheycertainlycametothenoticeofthe court.Thus, for instance, the order passed by the court on 20April2016began:

Today the learned Senior Counsel, Shri S.R. Sarna has in themain submitted before thisCourtthatbetween250and300cowshavediedintheHingoniaGaushala.Eventhecauseof theirdeath isnotknown.Newsabout thesedeathsarebeingregularlypublished in themediaalso.Today,adoptingahumanitarianattitude,theCourtalerted[sevenseniorofficerswhomtheCourtnamed]whoarepresentinCourttoday…

Similarly,theproceedingsof4August2016begin:

Fromthelasttwodays,severalnewsarebeingpublishedinPrintMedia.TodayalsoanewshasbeenpublishedwhereinithasbeenmentionedthatinHingoniaGaushalafromlasttwodays,90cowshavebeendiedandinlasttwoweeksmorethan500cowshavebeendied…4

Inthesameorder,thecourtalsoexpresseditsanguishatthewayitsorderswerebeingflouted:

ItisunfortunateonthepartofNagarNigamJaipurastheyarefloutinganddisobeyingtheorders of the Court passed on earlier dates and also not taking care off [sic] theadministrationoftheGovernmentofRajasthanandbywayoftheirsuchworking[sic],the

reputation of the government is being damaged for notmaking compliance of the orderspassedbythisCourtearlierinthismatter,hencelookingtocoverallfactsandcircumstancesofthecase,thismatterhasbeentakenuptoday.5

Againordersweregiventoofficialstovisitthegaushalaandreportback,etc.

Withindaysthecourtwasdealingwiththefactthatcowswerebeingclandestinely shifted from the gaushala to other places, including tribalareas.Itorderedthatnocowshallbemovedoutofthegaushalawithoutpermissionofthecourt.Fivedayslater,thecourtcommissionerwasagainreportingtothecourtthat,inspiteofbeinginformedofthecourt’sorder,the concerned officials had not taken the requisite action.He had againsubmittedseveralphotographsabouttheconditionsinthegaushala,whichwerebeingbroughtonrecord,thecourtnoted.Letameetingbeheld…

Affairscontinuedthewaytheywere.Hearingskeptbeingheld.Orderskept being issued. Cows kept falling dead. On 28 September 2016, anagreement was entered into with the Hare Krishna Charitable Trust:henceforth,thetrustwouldmanagethegaushala.TheJaipurCorporationandgovernmentwouldprovidetherequisitefunds,theywouldensuretherequisiteinfrastructure…Bynowtherewere13,400cattleinthegaushala.

In118pagesofhisjudgment,JusticeMaheshSharmasetouttheentirehistory of orders, the woeful nature of compliance right up to the finalagreement.Hethenturnedtothegeneralsignificanceofcows.

The cow is so significant an animal, he observed, that Sri KrishnaHimselfbroughtittoearthonGauashtamiday.Itisbelievedthat33croregodsandgoddessesresideinitsbody.Thatiswhyithasbeensaidthatthecowisthemotheroftheuniverse.AsPrayagaisthekingofsacredplaces,soisthecowforemostamonggodsandgoddesses.Inthechurningoftheoceans,Surabhi,thecow,istheonewhoappearedalongwithSriLakshmi.Itisthesingularanimalthatinhalesoxygenandexhalesoxygen,thejudgerecordedinhisjudgment.

In itself thecowisapharmacy,the judgeobserved.Itsmilkandgheearecomparabletoamrit.Itsurineconfersthefollowingboons:

1.Ithasthemiraculouspowertoexterminateallpests.

2.Itrebalancesthetridosh6andillnessesareextirpated.3. By keeping the liver healthy and cleansing the blood, it gives one

strengthtocombatanyandeveryailment.4.Ithasalltheelementsforcombatingdiseasethatwelack.5. It has several minerals, in particular copper, whose deficiency in the

bodyitmakesup.6.Itendowsstrengthtothebrainandtheheart.7.Itisachemical,itstopsageinganddestroysdiseases.8.[Notenumeratedinthejudgment]9.Itmakesupforthedesiredelementswhicharedeficientinone’sdiet.10.Itengenderssaatvicwisdom.11.TheGangahasresidedincow’surine,theGangadestroyssin,andso

bydrinkingcow’surineonedestroysdiseasesthathavecomeupononebecauseofmisdeedsinpreviouslives.

All this science in a High Court judgment, remember—a judgmentdealingwiththemismanagementofagovernment-rungaushala.

Thegheefromthecowalsoconfersseveralboons,thejudgenoted:

1.Itisbeneficialforthenewbornchild.Thebreast-feedingmotherisalsocounselled to partake of it. It suffuses themother’s milk with health-givingelements.

2. It is also beneficial for the eyes and sight. In Ayurveda, it has beendescribedasonethatimprovesone’seyesight.

3.Ithelpscuregoutandrheumatismalso.4.Bycuringulcersinthemouth,itrelievestheburningsensation.5.Itisalsousedforcuringexternalinjuries.6.Itisalsousefulforone’sbrainandcalmingone’smind.7.Italsostrengthensone’simmunesystem.

Panchagavyaisproducedbyusingthecow’smilk,curd,ghee,urineandcowdung,thejudgenoted.Andwithpanchgavya,one’sabilitytofightoffdiseasesisfortified,therebybanishingailments.

From the point of view of science also, the cow has an enormoussignificance, the judge declared. Agricultural scientists Dr Julius and Dr

BookGermanhavesaidthatthecowistheonlyanimalintheworldwhichexhalesoxygen.AccordingtotheGermanscientistRudelStenner,throughits horns the cow assimilates cosmic energy.According to Shirovich, thefamousscientistofRussia,housesinwhichfloorsandwallsareplasteredwith cowdung are protected from radiation.According toDrKing, therenownedscientist fromMadras,cowdunghas thepowertodestroythepathogensof cholera…According toDrCrawfordHamiltonofBritain,drinking cow urine cures heart disease, and one’s own urine flowswithease.Afewdays’intakeofcowurinestabilizestheflowofbloodinone’sarteries, one’s appetite improves. It is the ideal remedy for endemic skinailments. According to Dr Simmers of Britain, cow urine destroysimpurities in the blood. According to Cornell University’s ProfessorRonaldRayetey, thevighmancerebrasais [sic] in cow’smilk ishelpful inimprovingone’sbrainandmemory.At the same time,becauseofMDGIprotein,cancercannotenterbloodcells.AccordingtoDrAnaam,thecowis theonlyanimalwhose large intestine is180 feet long.Becauseof this,the fodder it consumes is converted intokeratin, and this,uponenteringthehumanbody,producesVitaminAwhichisessentialforone’ssight.

Thecowisalsoverybeneficialfortheenvironment,thejudgewentonto affirm. According to the Russian scientist Shirovich, germs in theatmospherearedestroyedbythecow’sbellowing.Tengramsofcowgheeusedinahavanproducesonetonneofoxygen.Sprinklingcowurineandgobar are advantageous in the event of plague … Moreover, one canobtain4,500litresofbiomassfromonecow’sgobar…Ifcow’sgobarisusedasfuel,thecountrycansavesixcroreeightylakhtonnesoffirewood,andthuspreventthedestructionoffourteencroretrees…

Ofcourse, thatonedoesnotexist in Internetsearchenginesdoesnotmeanthatonedoesnotexist.Butit isastrangecoincidencethatnoneofthe‘scientists’invokedbyJusticeMaheshSharmafindanymentionthere:not ‘DrJulius’,not ‘BookGerman’,not ‘RudelStenner’,not ‘DrKingofMadras’,not‘CrawfordHamilton’,not‘RonaldRayete’,not‘Anaam’.

Wemaynotfindthescientists,true.Butthefountofsuchknowledgeisnotdifficult to locate.Here, for instance, isan interviewfromtheIndianExpress of 7 August 2016—recall that Justice Sharma delivered his

judgmenton31May2017:

Cellphonessuckenergy,justputsomecowdung:RSSideologue‘Cowisourmother.Itsexcretaandurinearenectarandhavepowertosavehumansfromanydisease.’

WrittenbyIshitaMishra|Published:August7,2016OnavisittoAgraandMathura,ShankarLal,RSS’sAkhilBharatiyaGauSewapramukh,

76,explainswhyhehascowdungonthebackofhisphone:

1.Whydoyouhavegobaronyourphone?Itisfreshcowdung.Ihaveputittosavemyselffromtheharmfulradiationsofthecellphone.Itworks,believeme.2.Doyoukeepapplyingfreshcowdung,likepeoplechangephonecovers?Cowisourmother. Itsexcretaandurinearenectarandhavepowertosavehumansfromanydisease.Ifcowdungcantreatcancer,whycan’titsaveusfromaphone’smicrowaves?Haven’tyouheardthatJunagadhscientists(inGujarat)havefoundgoldincow’surine(theyfoundtracesofit)?Iputfreshgobareveryweek.3.DoothermembersoftheGauSewaalsodothesame?Show, showyourphones (he says, gesturing to fourothers,who takeout their phones todisplaythecowdungattheback).Allthepeopleinmyteam,beitchildren,menorwomen,havecowdungontheirphone.Whywon’tthey?Theyknowitsmagicaleffects.4.Canyouprovethatcowdungcanblock‘harmfulphonewaves’?See this pendulum. See how when I place it over the hand of this RSS worker, it startsswinging (he gives it an initial jerk). Look, thisman’s body has somuch energy and thependulumisswingingbecauseofthat.Now,whenthismanholdsaphoneinhishand,thependulumwon’tmove.Thisisbecausethephone’sharmfulwaveshavesuckedallhisenergy.Now,lethimholdaphonewithcowdungonit,andholdthispendulumoverhishand.See,it’smovingagain…Hisenergyissaved!5.Whatelsedoyoudowithcowdung?Wedrinkcowurineandhaveextractsfromherdung,whichhaskeptmehealthyevenattheage of 76.Wemake pregnant women eat cow dung and urine paste to ensure a normaldelivery.Wetreatalldeadlydiseaseswithcowdung.ButthegobarshouldbeofourIndiandesicowand not western monsters like Jersey or Holstein. Their dung and milk are nothing butpoison.

The news story carried a photograph of this ‘ideologue’ holding hiscellphonewithcowdungsmearedonit.

Awhilelater,theideologuesoaredtogreaterheights.HedeclaredthattheRSS-affiliated gauseva organizationwould be arranging a fifteen-day‘GauJapMahayagna’tobringintobeingan‘Apraadh-muktBharat’—thatis,acrime-freeIndia.HetoldTheIndianExpressthatthecrimerateinthecountry had risen since the time people started drinking the milk ofbuffaloes and Jersey cows. This milk, he maintained, was tamasic, it

fomentsangerandintolerance.Ontheotherhand,themilkofIndiancowsis saatvic. He also disclosed that consuming 40 grams of liquid extractfromcowdungalongwithfiveleavesoftulsienableswomentogivebirththroughnaturaldelivery.Threethousandwomenhadalreadydoneso.7

Buttogetbacktothejudgment.Thejudgewentontoenumeratetheboons that would accrue to agriculture, to the economy. He cited theVedas,theBhagavataPurana,theSkandhaPuranaasextollingthevirtuesofthecow.HerecordedhowastrologyaswellastheDharmashastrashavelaiddownthatthetimeofgodhuli,thetimeofsunsetwhenthecowscomehome,isthemostauspicioustime,howthedustrisingfromthehoovesofcows as they tread home banishes all sins. The Shiva Purana and theSkandhaPuranaaffirmthatservingthecowremovesthefearofdeath…When the cow licks the newborn calf out of love, the spittle that fallspurifiesthesoilandremovesallimpuritiesfromit…

Andsoon.Somuchscienceinjustonejudgment.Andyet,thejudgenoted,itisalsotruethattheordersofthecourthave

notbeenimplementedinletter.He then turned to another subject. Following the lead given by the

UttarakhandHighCourt,inMohammedSalimv.StateofUttarakhand8inwhichtheHighCourthaddeclaredtheGangaandtheYamunaas livingpersons,andlegalentitieswithalltherightsaccruingtoindividuals,JusticeMahesh Sharma held that the cow should be declared as our nationalanimal—instead of the tiger, he did not add, which, after all, devourscattle. The Hindu Nation of Nepal in the Constitution adopted on 20September2015hasalreadydoneso…

Thejudgeconcludedwithdirections.Thegovernmentwillrendersuch-and-suchhelp to theHareKrishnaCharitableTrust to run theHingoniaGaushala, and fulfil allobligations contained in theagreement signedon28 September 2016. He listed a number of specific steps that thegovernment must take … He appointed the chief secretary, Rajasthangovernment,andtheadvocategeneral,Rajasthan,asthe‘PersonsinLocoParentis’ to take all appropriate measures to persuade the Centralgovernment so that it declares the cow to be the national animal …

Towardsthisend,theywillcomprehensivelypresentthecaseonbehalfofthe Rajasthan government, Justice Sharma declared, to every relevantdepartmentoftheCentralgovernment…

Thiswashislastjudgment:hedelivereditonhislastdayincourt.Bythatday,armedwithsuchbeliefsandsuchscience,JusticeMaheshSharmahadbeendispensingjusticeasaHighCourtjudgeforadecade.

Asinallsuchcases,thereisafootnote.Iwasnaturallycurioustoreadthewritingsofthescientiststhatthejudgehadcited.Effortstocontactthejudge failed.However,asenioradvocate inJaipurgotmethenumberofthejudge’sson,AdityaSharma—healsohappenedtobeanadvocate.Tendays later, I rang him up. I requested him to ask his father for thepublicationsofthescientistsonwhichthejudgehadbasedthose‘science-related’passagesinhisjudgment.Hefirstsaidthateverythinghadbeensetoutinthejudgment.WhenIpointedoutthatthejudgmentgaveonlythenames of sundry scientists, and that I had not been able to find anyreferencetotheirworkortheirpublications,hesaidthathisfatherwasontour,andthatIshouldringhimupafteraweekbywhichtimehisfatherwouldbeback.

I rang himup.His fatherwas backhome fromhis tour.Aditya saidthathehadcheckedwithhis father.The judgehadnotconsultedanyofthe writings of the scientists directly, and that he had gone by theinformation given in a booklet that had been put out by the AkshayaPatra.Inaddition,hesaid,therewasavideoputoutbyZeeTVwhichalsocontained informationon the benefits that accrued fromproducts of thecow, like its urine, dung, ghee, etc. He said that he would forward thevideoonWhatsApp.

Couldhepleasegetmeacopyofthebooklet?Iasked.Hesaidthathehadalreadygotacopy.Hepromisedtosenditbypostthefollowingday.Isenthimmypostaladdress.Twodayslater,hesentanSMS:thatdayhadbeenaholiday;hewouldsendthebookletthenextday.

I never received the booklet. I rang him up after a few weeks hadpassed.Hedidnotanswer the call. I requesteda senior journalistof theRajasthan Patrika to contact him. Aditya did not respond to his callseither.

EYEWITNESSESTOCELIBACY

IturntorationalistsinKerala.Theyarenotsurprisedatthescience!Asanexample,theyaskmetoreadS.Mahendranv.TheSecretary,TravancoreDevaswom Board.9 The issue before the High Court was the ban onwomenenteringandprayinginthetempleofLordAyyappaatSabarimala.Hasthisbanbeendecreedbythetempleauthoritiesforareason?thecourtasked in its judgment. And it proceeded to recount several reasons. Inolden days, journey to the temple involved a hazardous trek on difficultpathsandthroughforests.Ofcourse,conditionshadimprovedsince,andthe trek is reduced to just 5 km, but still…Moreover, said the court,‘Pilgrims are expected to observe penance. Purity in thought, word anddeed is insistedduring theperiodofpenance (Vratham).ApilgrimstartstrekkingforSabarimalaonlyaftercompletingthepenanceforaperiodof41days.Womenof the age group10 to 50will not be in a position toobserveVrathamcontinuouslyforaperiodof41daysduetophysiologicalreasons.’ Inanycase, theThantriof the templehasaverred that thebanhasbeeninforceforlong,andcustomsarenottobelightlyoverturned.

But that was not all. ‘There is a vital reason for imposing thisrestrictiononyoungwomen.Itappearstobemorefundamental,’thecourtobserved.Itisimportanttoreadthispartofthejudgmentinsomedetail.

‘TheThanthriofthetempleaswellassomeotherwitnesseshavestatedthatthedeityatSabarimalaisintheformofaNaisthikBrahmachari,’thecourt observed. ‘“Brahmachari”means a studentwho has to live in thehouse of his preceptor and study the Vedas living the life of utmostausterityanddiscipline.’Tomakemattersmorespecific,ontheauthorityofaformerChiefJusticeofIndia,thecourtwentontodescribenotjustaBrahmachaributaNaisthikBrahmachari:

SriB.K.Mukherjee,thefourthChiefJusticeofIndia,inhisLordship’sTagoreLawLecturesontheHinduLawofReligiousandCharitableTrustsaysatpage16ofthesecondaddition[sic]thus:

‘Ordinarily therefore a man after finishing his period of studentship would marry andbecomeahouse-holder,andcompulsorycelibacywasneverencouragedorsanctionedbytheVedas. A man however who was not inclined to marry might remain what is called aNaisthikBrahmachariorperpetualstudentandmightpursuehisstudieslivingthelifeofabachelorallhisdays.’

ABrahmacharishouldcontrolhissenses.Hehastoobservecertainrulesofconductwhichinclude refraining from indulging in gambling with dice, idle gossips, scandal, falsehood,embracing,andcastinglustfuleyesonfemales,anddoinginjurytoothers.

(vernacularmatteromitted)Mann[sic]SmritiChapterII,Sloka179.

But,assuming that thedeity isaBrahmachari,what is theproblem?Thecourtexplained:

ThedeityinSabarimalatempleisintheformofaYogioraBrahmachariaccordingtotheThanthri of the temple … Puthumana Narayanan Namboodiri, a ThanthrimukhyarecognisedbytheTravancoreDevaswomBoard,whileexaminedasC.W.1statedthatGodinSabarimalaisintheformofaNaisthikBrahmachari.That,accordingtohim,isthereasonwhyyoungwomenarenotpermittedtoofferprayersinthetemple.

SincethedeityisintheformofaNaisthikBrahmachariitisthereforebelievedthatyoungwomen should not offer worship in the temple so that even the slightest deviation fromcelibacyandausterityobservedbythedeityisnotcausedbythepresenceofsuchwomen.

Please read that again: ‘Since the deity is in the form of a NaisthikBrahmachari it is therefore believed that youngwomen should not offerworshipinthetemplesothateventheslightestdeviationfromcelibacyandausterity observed by the deity is not caused by the presence of suchwomen.’

Somuchfaith inanidol?Suchananthropomorphicconceptionofanidol? For that iswhat exists in the temple: that an entitymade of stonemightdeviate from itsvows?Andso little faith in thedeity?Presumablythe Lord has divine, therefore by definition infinite powers. And yet aglance at a youngwomanmight causeHim to deviate fromHis vowofeternalcelibacy?

Faith?Science?Jurisprudence?

AGOODRULE

AcclimatizedthoughIhadbecometoreadingsuchjudgments,IwastakencompletelybysurprisewhenanadvocatepractisingintheSupremeCourttoldmeaboutanorderofthecourtandaskedmetoreadtheleaditeminthatday’sissueofLiveLaw.in.10Onfirstreading,Ithoughtittohavebeenaspoof,especiallysoasIdidnotfindthecontenttowhichtheadvocatehadsoughtmyreaction.Andyet,thereitwasinanearlierorder.

Apersonhadbeenaccusedofmurder.Toescapeincarcerationhehaddonewhatsomanyofourpoliticalleadersdo—hehadfeignedamedicalcondition,andgottransferredtoahospital.Thecasewasheardbythreejudges,ledbytheChiefJusticeofIndia.Theydecidedthatthepersonhadthwartedtheirorder.Themurderaccusedapologizedunconditionally.Thejudgesruledthat‘consideringthefactthatthecontemnerhasexpressedanunconditionalapology,whilenotacceptingthesameinentirety,wethinkitappropriatetoimposeasentenceoftwomonthssothatjusticeisdone’.

Sofar,sogood—thoughhowonewishesthatthesamesortofjusticeisdonewhenleaderssuddenlydevelopchestpainsthemomenttheyaresenttojail.

Butitwasapreviousorderwhichtookmybreathaway.Foritturnedoutthattwodoctorshadcolludedwiththeaccusedtocertifythathehadthatmedical condition. Inanearlierorder, theSupremeCourthad finedthemRs1.4crore.Theyhaddulydepositedtheamountwiththeregistryofthecourt.

The question now was how this money should be utilized. Somesuggestionswereofferedduringthehearing.Thejudgesdidnotthinkthempractical. As for what transpired thereafter, it is best to read the orderitself:

Today when the matter was listed, a suggestion came that there are lawyers, who needmedical assistance because of many a factor. At this juncture, Ms. Nandini Gore, theSecretaryofSupremeCourtAdvocate-on-RecordAssociation(SCAORA),hassubmittedthatthere is need for three vending machines for dispensing sanitary napkins and threeincineratorsfordisposaloftheusedsanitarynapkins.

Mr.R.S. Suri, thePresident,Mr.AjitKumarSinha, theVice-President andMr.GauravBhatia, theSecretaryof theSupremeCourtBarAssociation (SCBA)andMr.GopalSingh,the President of the Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association have submitted thatsomeamountbegiventotheBarAssociations,whichshallbeutilizedincaseofneedforthelawyerswhenmedicalassistanceisrequired.

At this juncture,Mr. RishiMalhotra, learned counsel who has filed an application fordirectionsonbehalfof thedependentsof thevictim,has submitted thatas thevictimsarethere,theyshouldbegivensomeamount.

Havingheardallconcerned,itisdirectedasfollows:-(a)AsumofRs.85,00,000/-(Rupeeseighty-fivelakhsonly)begiventotheSupremeCourt

BarAssociation,whichshallbekeptinafixeddepositandtheinterestarisingtherefromshall be disbursed for medical assistance to the members of the SCBA on properverification.TheaforesaidamountshallbekeptinadifferentaccountbytheSCBA.

(b)AsumofRs.45,00,000/-(Rupeesforty-fivelakhsonly)begiventotheSupremeCourtAdvocate-on-RecordAssociation,whichshallbekeptinafixeddepositandtheinterest

arising therefrom shall be disbursed for medical assistance to the members of theSCAORA on proper verification. The aforesaid amount shall be kept in a differentaccountbytheSCAORA.

(c)Fromthebalanceamount,asumofRs.5,00,000/-(Rupeesfivelakhsonly)beusedbytheRegistryofthisCourtforpurchaseofthreevendingmachinesfordispensingsanitarynapkinsand three incinerators fordisposalof theused sanitarynapkins.TheRegistryshallalsofixthematsuitablelocations.

(d)AsumofRs.5,00,000/-(Rupeesfivelakhsonly)begiventoVimla,thewidowofthevictimandthesaidamountshallbekeptinafixeddepositinthenameofVimlasothatshecanutilize the interestof theamountduringher life time.Theamountgranted infavourofthewidowofthedeceasedshouldbedisbursedbywayofabankdraftinhernameonproperidentification.

(e) The interest that has been accrued in the sum deposited before the Registry of thisCourt,i.e.Rs.1,40,00,000/-(Rupeesonecrorefortylakhsonly)shallalsobedistributedonproratabasiskeepinginviewtheabovedirections.

Afterdistribution,asstatedherein-above,ifanyamountremains,theRegistryshallplacethematterbeforetheCourtforfurtherdirection.Needlesstosay,thecontemptproceedingsinitiatedagainstthedoctors-respondentNos.1and2standpurged.

The first thing to strike one surely is the court’s responsiveness tosuggestions from theassociationsofadvocates.The second is its concernfor personal hygiene—vending machines for sanitary napkins andincinerators to burn used sanitary napkins, a first, I would guess. Thethird, the comparativelypaltry amount—Rs5 lakh, that is 1/26thof theamount set aside forassociationsofadvocates—setapart for thewidow.Finally,itturnsoutthatthepoorwidow’snamewaswronglyspelt—ithadtobecorrectedinthenextorder.11

Wehaveallseenpoliticalpartiesthatareoutofpoweroppose,block,shout against what the one in office is doing. And when they, once inoffice, do the same things, the party which had till the other day beentryingtopushthosemeasuresthroughnowopposes,blocks,shoutsagainstthesteps.Thereisasimpleandgoodrule—forpersonaltopolitical,andIdaresayforjudiciallifealso.Inthepresentinstance,thinkoftheheadofthe customs service and his two senior colleagues. Their staff catches anotorioussmuggler.Inthestruggletocatchhim,amemberofthestaffiskilled.Theheadoftheserviceandhistwocolleagueslevyanenormous—and,letusassume,awhollyjustified—penaltyonthatsmuggler.Whentheamount is deposited, the three decide to distribute it between unions oftheirofficersandtheirstaff;andapportionsomeforconveniencesintheir

offices, and set aside a bit for thewidow of the customsmanwhowaskilled.Howwould judges lookupon thedecision?Once thepenaltyhadbeenreceived,wasthemoneythehead’sandhiscolleagues’todistribute?Orwas itmoneythatbelongedtothepublicexchequer?Hence,myrule:whenyouaredoingsomething,ask,‘WhatwouldIsayiftheotherfellowweredoingthis?’Iwouldurgeittothejudgestoo.

Andthentherewasthecoincidence,butexactlythekindofcoincidencethat triggers conspiracy theories. The reader will recall the events thatresulted from thepleaof PrashantBhushanandKamini Jaiswal that theSupreme Court appoint a Special Investigation Team to investigate theallegationthataretiredjudgeoftheOrissaHighCourthadofferedtofixajudgment through bribes. Thematter had been taken over by the ChiefJustice’scourt.SomeoftheveryofficebearersoftheassociationsthathadreceivedRs85 lakhand45 lakhrespectively inthiscasehadgatheredatshort notice in that court, and were the loudest and most energetic inshoutingdownPrashantBhushanandpreventinghimfromspeaking.ThebenchheadedbytheChiefJusticedecreedRs85 lakhandRs45 lakhtotheassociationson3October2017.TheruckuswascreatedinthecourtoftheChiefJusticeon10November2017.Acoincidence,ofcourse.But,asIsaid,exactlythekindofcoincidencethattriggersconspiracytheories.

12

Thinkingthrough

In the third week of October 2016, papers carried accounts of how awheelchair-bound paraplegic was thrashed in a cinema hall for notstandingupwhentheNationalAnthemwasbeingplayed.SalilChaturvediwasforty-eightyearsold.Hehadbeenparalysedwaist-downsincearoadaccidentin1984.Hehadstrivenhardtoovercomehisdisabilities,andhadtwice represented India in internationalwheelchair tennis tournaments inthe1990s.Hehadwonawardsforhiswriting.Hisbrotherwasagallantryawardwinner.HisfatherhadbeenintheAirForce.Therewasnoreasonto doubt his or his family’s dedication to our country. He had gone towatchafilminamultiplexinPanaji,Goa—astateknownforitstolerance.AstheNationalAnthemcommenced,thecoupleseatedbehindChaturvediandhiswifestartedhittinghimfornotstandingup.

A petition was filed in the Supreme Court, requesting it to givedirections so that the respect which is its due is shown to theNationalAnthem.Italsostatedthat‘sometimesNationalAnthemissunginvariouscircumstanceswhicharenotpermissibleandcanneverbecountenancedinlaw’.

The court heard the petition on 28October 2016—just aweek afternewspapershadreportedtheassaultonChaturvedi.JusticesDipakMisraand Amitava Roy heard it. The then attorney general and seven otheradvocates took part.On 30November 2016, the SupremeCourt issuedsevendirections.1Amongthese,threepertainedtocinemahalls:

(d)AllthecinemahallsinIndiashallplaytheNationalAnthembeforethefeaturefilmstartsandallpresentinthehallareobligedtostanduptoshowrespecttotheNationalAnthem.

(e)PriortotheNationalAnthemis[sic]playedorsunginthecinemahallonthescreen,theentry and exit doors shall remain closed so that no one can create any kind ofdisturbancewhichwillamounttodisrespecttotheNationalAnthem.AftertheNationalAnthemisplayedorsung,thedoorscanbeopened.

(f)When theNationalAnthem shall be played in theCinemaHalls, it shall bewith theNationalFlagonthescreen.

Thatapersonboundtoawheelchairjustwouldnotbeabletostandupdidnotcomeinthewayofthecourt’sdeterminationtoensurerespectfortheNationalAnthem.Amongothers,theattorneygeneralonbehalfofthegovernment had been most emphatic: ‘We have so directed,’ the judgesnoted,‘asMr.MukulRohatgi,learnedAttorneyGeneralforIndia,submitswith all humility at his command and recommend [sic] that NationalAnthemhastoberespected.’

Explaining the rationale for its directions, the court observed, ‘Thedirections are issued, for love and respect for the motherland is [sic]reflectedwhenoneshowsrespecttotheNationalAnthemaswellastotheNationalFlag.Thatapart, itwould instill the feelingwithinone,a sense[of?]committedpatriotismandnationalism.’

Thejudgesmusthavefeltthattheymustre-emphasizetheneedforthedirectionssotheydidsointheconcludingparagraphs,and,intheprocess,in these concluding expressions of the ruling aswell as elsewhere in thejudgment, the court introduced a new concept, a new dimension ofpatriotism—‘Constitutional Patriotism’; and a new attribute to ourcharacter—‘inherentnationalquality’:

Beitstated,atimehascome,thecitizensofthecountrymustrealizethattheyliveinanationand are duty bound to show respect to National Anthem which is the symbol of theConstitutional Patriotism and inherent national quality. It does not allow any differentnotionortheperceptionofindividualrights,thathaveindividuallythoughtofhavenospace[sic].Theideaisconstitutionallyimpermissible.

Thebestway to instill patriotism?Or just the temper of the times?Theattorneygeneralwasasemphaticonensuringthewidestcompliancewiththeorderashehadbeen inaffirming that theNationalAnthemmustberespected.Thecourtnoted:

Mr.Rohatgi has submitted that theUnion of India shall circulate this order to theChiefSecretariesofalltheStatesandUnionTerritories.Thatapart,Mr.Rohatgisubmitsthattheorder shall be shown in the electronic Media and published in the print media so thateveryoneknowsthatsuchanorderhasbeenpassedandfollow[sic]thesameinletterandspirit.

AMINORMIRACLE

Wewereallsurprisedatthejudgment—thepassionfordrillingpatriotism,thepremisethatthis isbestdonebydemonstrativeacts, thefervidprose.Butforthesurprise,wehavenonebutourselvestoblame:wejustdonotfollowwhatishappeninginthecourts.

Long ago there was a movie, Kabhi Khushi Kabhie Gham.2 And agentleman,ShyamNarayanChouksey:hewas,asthecourtwastorecord,‘amemberofcertainsocialandspiritualorganisationsandhastakenuponhimself the burden of canvassing national temper and launch [sic] acampaign, in the name of the “Jeevn [sic] Jagriti Prayas” to inculcatenational,[commaintheoriginal]spiritamongstpeople’.

Hetoldthecourtthathehadgonetoseethefilm.OnesceneissetinLondon.There is a school function.Children give performances.Oneofthe children is Indian. His parents are in the audience. When his turncomes,hismotherannouncesthathewillsingasongfromTheSoundofMusic.Butwhenthechildgetstothestage,hesingsourNationalAnthem.Theparents andother relatives standup. Seeing that Indianshave stoodup,others in theaudiencealsodoso.As thechildgets to theendof theanthem,heforgetsthelastfourorfivewords.Hismothertakesoverandcompletestheanthem.

Chouksey maintained that when the National Anthem was beingscreened, theaudience in thecinemahalldidnot standup.Thereby theyhad not shown the requisite respect to the National Anthem. HeapproachedtheMadhyaPradeshHighCourtforvariousdirections—aboutthefilm,aboutthesituationsinwhichtheNationalAnthemmaybesungordepicted,etc.

Hispetitioncameupbeforeatwo-judgebenchoftheHighCourt.ThebenchconsistedofJusticeDipakMisraandJusticeA.K.Shrivastava.ThejudgmentwasdeliveredbyJusticeDipakMisra.

JusticeMisra began by describing what a cinema is. He recalled theevolution of themedium.He recalled the importance of free speech andcreativity.Andthenthecontextinwhichtheymustbeviewed:

Oncewepenetrate into the sphereofanymediumofmasscommunication, theconceptof

democracy, sovereignty,patriotism,nationalismandcollectivegoodemerge, somerise likephoenix, someare immediatelyvibrant.Oneremembers the sayingbyAdli [sic]Stevensonthatpartriotism isnot short and frenziedoutbrustof emotionbut the tranquil and steadydedication of life time. One is also reminded that freedom is not caprice. And further,democracyiswordofdiscipliningoneselfsothatoneneednotbedisciplinedbyothers.Thusdisciplineisthesinequanonfordemocracythoughonemayconceivethenotionthatrighttodoawrongisthepartofdemocracy.

Next, to get a grasp of the manner and context in which the NationalAnthemhadbeensung,thejudgesdidtheexceptionalthing,somethingwewould all urge—that is, they actually saw the film. This is what JusticeMisrawrotehesawinthesequence:

(a) Before theNationalAnthemwas sungby the child, the sonof themain protagonist,there is an expressionof appreciationby theparents and themother gets indulged inwhistlingforinspirationofproperperformanceofherson.

(b)Themothersaysthechildwillbesingingasongfromthefilm.‘Thesoundofmusic,’anEnglishmovie,whichwasproduceddecadesback.

(c)Thechild,astudentofClassIV,makesanannouncementtothefollowingeffect‘THISISFORYOUMOM.’

(d)Thereisanexpressionofnervousnessbythemotherwhichhasbeentakencognizanceofbythefatherandtheysit,inamoodofapprehension.

(e)ThechildstartssingingtheNationalAnthemofIndia.(f)TheparentsoftheChild,hisfather’sbrotherandmother’ssistergetupimmediately.(g) On seeing the Indian citizens getting up other people who have been watching the

programmegetupinaphasewisemanner.Somepeoplegetupafteraline,someaftertwolinesandsomeafterthreelinesaftertheNationalAnthemhadcommenced.

(h)WhiletheNationalAnthemissungbythechildtheparentsexpresstheirfeelingsinanapprehensivemanner,butsuchanapprehensionhasbeenshownbyfacialgesturewithmovements.

(i)ThereafterthechildforgetsthelastpartoftheNationalAnthemandsays‘sorry’onthemicrophone.Themotherofthechildcompletesthelastfivewordsoftheanthem.

The judge detected several things in this simple sequence which werederogatoryoftheNationalAnthem.Tobeginwith,hestressed,avarietyfunction inaschool isnot thesortofoccasionduringwhich theanthemshouldbedepictedashavingbeensung.Andthen for thechild to forgetthelastfewwordsinit.Andthenforhimtosay‘sorry’inthemiddle…

NationalAnthemistobesungwithmagnacumlaudeandnobodycanostracizetheconceptof summa cum laude. In the case at hand, as we have noted earlier the son of theprotagonistssingstheNationalAnthemasasurpriseitem.Thepresentation,accordingtous,isinmediasres.Thechildactorforgetsthelineandutterstheterm‘sorry’.Tosomeitmayappear lapsus linguae, slip of the tongue or a natural forgetting but if thewhole thing isperceived, understood and appreciated in complete scenario, it is the scriptwriter’s fertile

imaginationandtheDirector’sidest.Itisdeliberate.Adeliberateslipofthepen.Itisbecausethereisinaway,deliberationtoprojectadramaticefforttoshowthatthescenedepictedinthefilmisonanabsoluteterrafirma.ThewriteranddirectorhavetotallyforgottenthattheywereportrayingtheNationalAnthemofagreatcountry.

Thejudgecitedshastrastopointouthowgreatwastheconceptionofourcountry in the minds of the rishis. And the scriptwriter, producer anddirector?

They have not kept in mind ‘vox populi, vox dei.’ The producer and the director haveallowedtheNationalAnthemofBharat,thealphaandomegaofthecountrytothebackseat.

Onafirstflushitmaylooklikeamagnumopusofpatriotismbutonadeeperprobeandgreater scrutiny it is a simulacrum having the semblance but sans real substance. TherecannotbelikeCaesar’sthrasonicalbragsof‘veni,vidi,vici.’Theboycannotbeallowedtomakehisinnocenceaparentsrodomontrade[sic],atthecostofnationalhonour.Inourviewitiscontrarytonationalethosandananathematothesanguinityofthenationalfeeling.Itisanexpositionofadlibitum.

Theentiresequencewasmisconceived,itwouldseem:

It isquitedemonstrableandpatently clear that thenationalanthemwasused inavarietyshowofaschool.ItwaspresentedasanitemonbehalfofClassIVstudents.Itisalsonoticedthat when the boy started singing the national anthem the audience do not stand upimmediately.Themovementisquiteslow.Theaudienceinthefilmistakenbysurprise.Theyarenon-plussed.Aswehavenoted,someoftheaudiencestandafterthreelines,someoftheaudienceafterfourlinesandsomeafterfivelines.Thenationalanthemhasnotbeensunginanuninterruptedmanner.Theboysays‘sorry’andmotherfillsupthewords.

‘Manyaquestionariseswhenoneseesthisscreen,’thejudgerecorded:(a)Whether national anthem can be used in a variety show/cultural show of an annual

schooldayofaschool?(b)Whetheritcanbedepictedasasurpriseitem?(c)Whetherdramatispersonaebepermittedtocauseinterruption?Wemayhastentoadd

herethatwheninreallifeattheendofaculturalshowwhennationalanthemissungonemayforgetormaynotbeabletocompleteduetocertainunavoidablecircumstancesbut in the film one knows the future.When a particular scene is put into cinematicmedium in the silver screen the child is directed, repeated rehearsals are done andmultipletakesaretakenand,therefore,everyoneinvolvedwiththescriptisawarewhatis going to happen. In view of this the question is important and the concept ofpermissibilitybecomesrelevant.

(d)Whethertheaudienceinthefilmcanbeallowedtostand/getuptakingtheirowntimebecauseexplanationisgivenslowlytheyunderstandthatthenationalanthemofIndiaissung?

(e)WhethernationalanthemofIndiacanbesunginsuchanatmospherewherepeopledonotunderstandthehonouranddignityofthesameandreactinadifferentmanner?…

(f) Next, but a vital question is whether national anthem can be picturised to gain anadvantageinacommercialmanner?…

‘Whenthesequestionsariseandwhatwehaverioted[sic]earlier,’thejudge concluded, ‘in our considered view that the national anthem hasbeensunginthemovieasifitisasongofadvertisementforacommercialpurpose.Itisabsolutelydiscernible…

‘Thenationalanthemispivotalandcentripetaltothebasicconceptionof sovereignty and integrity of India. It is the marrow of nationalism,hypostasis of patriotism, nucleus of national heritage, substratum ofculture and epitome of national honour…’ Justice Misra observed in atypicalpassage.Andfromthatthenextwasbutasmallstep:‘…Nationalanthemisthesymbolofourhistory,sovereignty,unity,prideandhonour.Anypersonwhoshowsdisrespecttothenationalantheminaway,hastoberegardedinvolvedinantinationalactivity.’

The counsel for the film producer, director, etc., had pointed to theregulations that governhow the censorboard is to assess scenes, etc., inwhich theNationalAnthemisplayed.Theseregulationsspecifically statethatwhentheanthemisplayedinadocumentaryornewsreel,theaudienceisnotexpectedtostandup.Thejudgesquashedthesubmission:butthisisnot a documentary or newsreel, it is a film. In any case, he had alreadypointedout,meretechnicalitiesarenottobeallowedtocomeinthewayofourshowingproperrespecttotheNationalAnthem:

Thededicationofourforefathers,thesincerityofthepeoplewhofoughtforthepeopleandsuffereddeathandsenseofpatriotismthatwasshown,cannotbethrownaboveboard[sic]on thegroundofhyper technicalitywhen the interestof thenation is involved.When theprideofthenationisinissueandwhennationalismhastoplayanessentialpartintheroleofdevelopingcountry,thoughthebasictechnicalityhasanentrybuttheycannotbeallowedtogovernordominateprimalorpivotal factors.Everycitizenshouldremember thateveryword,deedandthoughtbyhimhastobeindicativeoftherespectfortheConstitutionandthenational anthem.Noone is permitted topave thepathof deviancy and introduce thetheoryoftotalisticindividualisminthenameoffreedomofexpression.Inthateventfreedomof expression in the name of art or liberty of creativitywould amount to, to borrow theterminologyofDr.B.R.Ambedkar‘GrammarofAnarchy’.

Theguidelinessaythatthefilmhastobeseenasawhole,andtheymustbe assessed on the touchstone of what an average person of averagesensibilitieswillmakeof it, the counsel submitted. So theydo, the judge

allowed,but…

Guidelinesstipulatethatthewholemotionpicturehastobeseenfromageneralviewpoint.Ithastobecreative.Butasixty-fourmilliondollarquestionariseswhetherinthenameofcreativity in a feature film the national anthem can be utilized in this manner. NationalAnthem as has been indicated is the symbol of history, unity, and pride. In the film, thenational anthemhas been bifurcated into twoparts. The boy signs [sic] one part and themothersingstherest,maybethelastfivewords.Mr.Singh,learnedseniorcounselappearingfor the respondents 4 and 5 with all his forensic skill would submit that the motherimmediately thought it appropriate to complete the national anthem as it should not gounfinished. But the fact remains that the boy says ‘sorry’ in themidst of the anthem andmother after some time completes the same. All this has been done to create a dramaticimpactinthepictureforthebenefitoftheproducer.Thisshouldnotbeallowedtobedoneforthepopularisationofthenationalanthemashasbeenunderstoodinthisgreatcountry.Thatapartinourconsideredviewthenationalanthemwhichisthegloryofthecountryandportraystheunityofthecountrycannotbeshowninavarietyshoworaculturalprogrammeofaschoolasanitem.

A child forgets, says ‘sorry’, and our anthem is split in two!Hence, thecomprehensive,nottosay,minatoryorder:

Beingofthisviewwedirectasunder:(a)Thefilm‘KabhiKhushiKabhiGham’shallnotbeshowninanytheatreunlessthescenewhichdepictsthenationalanthemisdeleted.(b)Respondents4and5shallimmediatelywithdrawthefilmfromallcinema-hallsandthetheatreownersarerestrainedfromshowingthefilminthepresentform.(c) The respondent No. 3 [the Censor Board] shall withdraw the certificate unless thedeletioniseffectedanddeletedfeaturefilmisshowntothemembersoftheBoardasrequiredundertheActandtheRules.(d) The aforesaid film shall not be telecast in national channel and also in any satellitechannelwithoutdeletion.(e) If any video cassette/VCD/DVD is sold in themarketwithout deletion of the nationalanthemtheappropriateauthorityshalltakeactionagainstthesaidpersonsaspermissibleinlawasitwouldamounttodealingwithanuncensoredfilm.(f)Nocableoperatorshallshowthemovieaslongasthenationalanthemisnotdeletedasthatwouldtantamounttoshowingofanuncensoredfilm.

AndtheplaintiffwastobeawardedRs15,000incosts.Theproducer,etc.,ofthefilmappliedtothejudgesforleavetoappeal

againsttheordertotheSupremeCourt.BythenthearticlegoverningtheRight toAppeal prescribed thatwhen,upona judgmentbeingdelivered,those aggrieved request leave to appeal the order, the High Court shallgranttheappealforthwith.3Inthisinstance,theproducer,etc.,appliedinwriting for leave to appeal. The judges refused permission: the very

purposeof the change in the lawwas to expediteappeals; if appeals areallowedtobefiledinwritingafteraninterval insteadoforallythereandthen, the very purpose of the law will be defeated, they held. So, nopermissiontoappeal.Andnostayeither.4

In any event, the producer, etc., approached the Supreme Court. Athree-judgebench,headedby theChief Justice, setaside theorderof theMadhyaPradeshHighCourt:

WearesatisfiedthatinviewoftheinstructionsissuedbytheGovernmentofIndiathatthenationalanthemwhichisexhibitedinthecourseofexhibitionofnewsreelordocumentaryorinafilm,theaudienceisnotexpectedtostandasthesameinterruptstheexhibitionofthefilmandwouldcreatedisorderandconfusion,ratherthanaddtothedignityofthenationalanthem.We,therefore,setasidetheorderunderchallenge.5

But, asMarkTully has taught us, there are no full stops in India.Timeflies. JusticeDipakMisrawas elevated to the SupremeCourt.The samegentleman, Shyam Narayan Chouksey, who had pleaded before JusticeMisra’sbenchattheMadhyaPradeshHighCourtin2004,approachedtheSupreme Court in 2016. By one of these minor miracles, his petitionlandedupbeforeJusticeMisra’scourt.AndwegottheNationalAnthemjudgmentthatwehavebeenstudying!

That judgment as we have seen covered not just oneKabhi KhushiKabhieGham,itcoveredallfilms,andallcinemahalls.Poeticrevenge!Itsconsequencestoowerelarger,andburstforthinlittletime.

PREDICTABLECONSEQUENCES

RahulUnnikrishnan,advocateintheMadrasHighCourt,pointedoutthatthrough its judgment on the National Anthem, the Supreme Court hadcreatedanoffence—ofnotstandingupwhentheNationalAnthemissung,anoffenceforwhichthereisnolegislativebacking.6Hepointedout:

The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, criminalises an insult to theNational Flag, National Anthem and the Constitution. Section 3 of this Act says thatwhoeverintentionallypreventsthesingingoftheNationalAnthemorcausesdisturbancestoanyassemblyengagedinsuchsingingshallbepunishedwithimprisonmentforatermwhichmayextendupto threeyearsorwith fine,orboth.WhileSection2discusses indetail theactsthatinsulttheNationalFlagandtheConstitutionofIndia,Section3focusesonlyononeactof insult—preventionof singingofNationalAnthem.Noneof the sectionsof thisAct

makesitmandatoryforacitizentostandupwhentheNationalAnthemisplayed.Similarly,theIndianPenalCode,1860,doesnotcriminaliseanyactthatinsultstheNationalAnthem.

We saw how just before the Supreme Court gave its order, papers hadpublished accounts of a wheelchair-bound man being badgered for notstanding up as theNationalAnthemwas being played in a cinema hall.The Supreme Court had nevertheless decreed that the National Anthemmustbeplayedincinemahalls,andeveryonemuststandup.Unnikrishnanrecalled an equally bizarre incident that occurred in the wake of thejudgment:

ThingstookanuglyturnattheInternationalFilmFestivalofKerala(IFFK)whensixpeople—including journalists—were arrested for allegedly refusing to stand when the NationalAnthemwasplayedbeforethescreeningoftheEgyptianfilmClash.TheDirectorGeneralofPolice,LoknathBehra,reportedlyreceivedacomplaintfromthemembersofBharatiyaYuvaMorcha—theyouthwingof theBJPandbasedonthecomplaint,hedirectedtheAssistantCommissionerofPolicetoinquireintothematter.ReportsalsosuggestthatPolicepersonnelwereamongtheaudience.

The organisers of the film festival had earlier moved the Supreme Court to seek anexemptionfromitsorderowingtothelargenumberofdailyshowsscheduledatthefestival.Denying the relief, the SupremeCourtobserved that, ‘…if there are40movies running indifferentshows,youwillhaveto,well,stand40times’.

Unnikrishnan pointed out that as the direction to stand up had no lawbehindit,thepolicewasputinaquandary:forwhatoffenceshouldtheychargethesixtheyhadarrested?

ThePoliceinThiruvananthapuramwhoarrestedsixpeopleattheIFFKhavechargedthemunder Section 188 of the IPC which deals with the disobedience of an order dulypromulgated by a public servant. Under this section, a ‘public servant’ includes judges aswell. Hence, in the absence of any other provision of lawwhich criminalises an act thatinsultstheNationalAnthembynotstandingwhenitissung,thePolicehadnootheroptionbuttoresorttoSection188.LegalcommentariesontheIPCsaythattoconstituteanoffenceunderSection188,itisnecessarytoshow:•Alawfulorderpromulgatedbyapublicservantempoweredtopromulgateit;•Knowledgeoftheorderwhichmaybegeneralorspecial;•Disobedienceofsuchorder;and•Theresultthatislikelytofollowfromsuchdisobedience.It has been held by multiple high courts that a mere disobedience of an order does notconstituteanoffenceinitself.Itmustbeshownthatthedisobediencehasortendstohaveacertainconsequence,namelyannoyance,obstruction,etc.Further, it isalsosettledlawthatthe annoyance has to be proved as a fact; the mere mental annoyance of the concernedauthorities is not enough. The reliance on Section 188 by the Police, thus, lacks legal

wisdom.

Andsoonenough,therewasanechoindistantGuwahati.On2October2017,Gandhiji’sbirthday,TheTimesofIndiareported:

DisabledabusedfornotstandingupduringAnthemDate:02ndOctober2017GauravDas:TNN

Guwahati:Awheelchair-boundman,whohasbeenfightingforrightsofthedisabled,wasabusedatamultiplexhereonFriday fornot standingupwhen theNationalAnthemwasbeingplayed.

ArmanAli(36)saidhewasinoneofthefrontrowsand‘satupright’duringtheAnthem‘as amarkof respect’.However, at the endof theAnthem, twomen abusedhim for notstandingup. ‘SaamneekPakistanibaithahai (APakistani issitting infront),’oneof themreportedlysaid.

‘When I looked behind, they bore smug expressions on their faces. How easy to callsomeonePakistaniwithoutevenbotheringtoknowifthat‘Pakistani’canstandupornot?Maybe,tothem,theirnationaldutyisdonebycommentingonmynotstandingupfortheNational Anthem,’ Ali, executive director of Shishu Sarothi, an NGO working for theempowermentofdifferently-abledpeople,said.‘Thisiswhatoursocietyhascometo.IamplanningtowritetotheChiefJusticeofIndia.’

In any case, if cinema halls, why not drama theatres? If at thecommencementofcinemashows,whynotatthecommencementofmusicconcerts? If at these, why not at the commencement of KathakaliperformancesduringOnamcelebrations?Ifatallthese,whynotbeforethecommencement of proceedings every morning in courts, including, andespeciallytheSupremeCourt?Surely,exampleisthebestmotivator.

Whetherdecreeingpatriotism is thebestwayto instil itapart, shouldone not think through the different circumstances inwhich one’s decreewillhavetobeenforced?

ThetextoftheSupremeCourtjudgmentpromptsonemoresuggestion:thatatleastwhengivingdirectionsonamatterwhichitobviouslyregardsas sacred, such as respecting the National Anthem, one should be aspunctiliousaboutgrammarandspellingsasTagorewouldhavebeen.

WHATTHEGREATDO…

Ofcourse,thesequencedoesnotendthere.AsJusticeMisramightremindus,noonelessthanLordKrishnahimselfsaysintheGita,‘Whatthegreat

do, the rest emulate.’ A year had not passed since the Supreme Courtlegislating ‘Constitutional Patriotism’ than JusticeM.V.MuralidharanoftheMadrasHighCourt tookupapetition thathadbeen filed in2013.7

Thepetitionerhadappeared fora teachereligibility test in2013.Oneofthe questions in the multiple-choice paper was: in what language was‘VandeMataram’ originally written? Bengali?Marathi? Urdu? Sanskrit?Thepetitionerhadticked‘Bengali’.The‘answerkey’hadmaintainedthatitwaswritteninSanskrit.Thepetitionerhadtherebylostonepointinthescore. He had appealed to the High Court to direct the Teachers’RecruitmentBoardtoaddonepointtohisscore.

Attheveryoutset,thejudgeemphasizedtheimportanceoflanguage.Inprose that would remind us of what we have encountered above, heproclaimed:

A country with a population of more 1.32 billion people with 29 states and 7 UnionTerritories and extremelydifferent languages anddialects spokenacross everypartof thisnationmakesourcountrya [sic] largestdemocracy in thisworld.AsNelsonMandelahasremarked,‘Ifyoutalktoamaninalanguageheunderstands,thatgoestohishead.Ifyoutalktohiminhislanguage,thatgoestohisheart.’

Language has perhaps been bridge [sic] between people across towns, cities, states,countriesandcontinents.Ascivilizationsdeveloped, sodid languagesandourcountryhasthe pride of having many languages that have been in existence and practice for severalthousandsofyearstogether.

Hethenadvertedtothecomplexityofthequestionthatwasbeforehim:

Asthereareseverallanguagesinourcountry,itissometimesdifficulttoascertainastowhatevolvedinwhichlanguage.ThisCourtisnowposedwiththequestionastoinwhatlanguagewasourNationalsongoriginallywritten.Theanswerwouldinfactanswerthemain issueinvolvedinthepresentwritpetition.

Hence,researchwaslaunched.Thecourtdirectedtheadvocategeneral‘toappear and inform the correct answer to the question since there wereconflicting answers to the said question. This Court also sought theassistance of any advocate to offer their reply to settle the controversyinvolved in thepresentwrit petition’.Could it be that a judgewhoheld‘VandeMataram’ in such reverencedidnotknow the language inwhichBankimChandraChattopadhyayusedtowrite?

Inanyevent,manyintheBardevotedthemselvestofindingthecorrect

answer.Withtheresearchresultsinhand,thejudgeturnedtotheissue:

Our Independence struggle to attain freedom from the British has been one of the mosttoughest [sic] independence struggle [sic] across this world which resulted in loss ofnumerousnumber[sic]oflivesbutstillunifiedthiswholenationtogetherinapeacefulwaytoprotestagainsttheBritishtoleavethiscountryandreturnittothenativesandthesonsanddaughtersofthissoil.TounifyandtocreateafeelingofonenessamongstallIndiansacrossthe whole country, several renowned leaders and authors have composed several songs,poems,versesandalsoenactedseveralstreetplaysanddramastobringtogetherthepeopleforthesustainedindependencestruggle.

Onesuchsongs[sic]thattouchedtheheartsofthousandsofpeopleandactedasaunifierwasthesong‘VandeMatharam’whichmeant‘Ibowtothee,Mother’…

Themassofmaterialwhich theresearchhad thrownupwasbroughtonrecord. It convinced the judge that the song was originally written inBengali. Accordingly, he directed the board to award the petitioner anextramarkforhavingansweredthequestioncorrectly.Hespeltoutotherreasonsalso,anddirectedtheboard‘toaccommodatethepetitionerinanyvacancythathave[sic]arisenintheSC(G)categoryandconsequentlyissueappointmentorderasB.T.Assistant, ifotherwiseeligiblewithinaperiodoffourweeksfromthedateofreceiptofacopyoftheorder’.

Thatshouldhavesettledthematter.Butthejudgesawfittocoverthewider field, so to say.Having settled the specificquestion, emulating theSupremeCourt,heproceededtothegeneralimperative:

Patriotism is an essential requirement for every citizen of this country. The fact that thiscountry isourMotherland shouldalwaysbe rememberedby every citizenof this country.Severalpeoplehave sacrificed their livesand families to the independent [sic] struggle thatprolonged[sic]forseveraldecades.Inthesetoughtimes,itwassongslikeournationalsong‘VandeMatharam’whichcreatedasenseofbeliefandconfidenceinthepeople.

Perhapsintoday’smodernerawherewehavemarchedaheadwithtechnology,ourliveshavechangedalot.Wehavebecomebusywithourownlivesthatsometimesweforgetournation.SensingthisfacttheHon’bleSupremeCourtinShyamNarayanChoukseyv.UnionofIndiareportedin2016SCCOnlineSC1411hasdirectedthatNationalAnthemshallbestrictlyrespectedbyallcitizensandtheAnthemshallbeplayedinallcinemahallsacrossthecountrybeforethestartofthemovie.

HeproceededtocitepassagesfromtheNationalAnthemjudgment.Next,he recalled that the Madras High Court had itself directed the stategovernment to introduce aphorisms from the Thirukkural in schoolcurricula.Hence:

Consideringthe largerpublic interestandto instillasenseofpatriotismineachandeverycitizenof theState, thisCourt inaddition todirectionalreadypassed in thewritpetition,issuesthefollowingdirections:(a) The National Song ‘Vande Matharam’ shall be played and sung in all

schools/colleges/Universities and other educational institutions at least once a week(PreferablyonMondayorFriday);

(b) The National Song ‘VandeMatharam’ shall be played and sung in all GovernmentOffices and Institutions/Private companies/Factories and industries at least once aMonth;

(c) TheDirector of Public Information is directed to upload and circulate the translatedversionof ‘VandeMatharam’ inTamil andEnglish therebymaking it available in theGovernmentwebsitesandalsoinsocialmedia;

(d)LetacopyofthisorderbemarkedtotheChiefSecretaryoftheGovernmentofTamilNadu,whoshallissueappropriateinstructionstotheconcernedauthorities;

(e) In the event, anyperson/organisationhasdifficulty in singingorplaying theNationalSong, he or she shall not be compelled or forced to sing it, provided there are validreasonsfornotdoingso.

Theyouthofthiscountryarethefutureoftomorrow.ThisCourthopesandtruststhatthisorder shall be taken in the right spirit and also implemented in letter and spirit by thecitizenryofthisgreatNation.

Ispatriotism-by-fiatthewaytospur‘Theyouthofthiscountry[who]arethefutureoftomorrow’todevotethemselvestothecountry?

Nowitwastheboard’sturntostandfirm.Itfiledanappealagainstthejudge’s order. A division bench of the Madras High Court heard thematter. It decided that [i] both answers—Bengali and Sanskrit—werecorrect; [ii] that, therefore, thecandidate shouldbegivenanextramark;[iii] but that evenwith the extramark, the candidate fell short, ever soslightly,oftheeligiblebar;[iv]thatwhethertogivethecandidatethepostin spite of this is an administrative matter, and except in exceptionalcircumstances,courtsarenottointerfereinadministrativematters;[v]thatwhether‘VandeMataram’shouldbesungcompulsorilyasorderedbythejudgeisapolicymatter,andistobelefttothegovernment.8

Meanwhile,authoritiescontinuedtostraintoensurethattheSupremeCourt’s directive about respecting theNationalAnthem is adhered tobyall.

Ambur is a small town inTamilNadu.On IndependenceDay2017,thelocalMLAcametohoisttheNationalFlagatthegovernmenthospital.AstheNationalAnthemwasbeingsung, thechiefmedicalofficer,DrA.

Kennedy, was filmed talking on his mobile. A person filed a complaintwiththepolice.ThepoliceregisteredacaseagainstthedoctorforinsultingtheNationalAnthem.Theaccusedaverredthathehadreceivedanurgentcall from the office of the DMS—the Directorate ofMedical and RuralHealth Services—and that hehadmeantno insult either to theNationalFlagortheNationalAnthem.Apprehendingarrest,heappliedtotheHighCourt inMadras for anticipatorybail.As evidenceof theoffence that isallegedtohavebeencommittedisathand,theredoesnotseemtobeanyneed for custodial interrogation, theHigh Court reasoned, and, on thatground,itgrantedhimanticipatorybail.Butwhiledoingso,itlaiddownsevenconditions.Amongtheseisthefollowingone:

[b]thepetitionershallhoisttheNationalFlageverydayat10.00a.m.foroneweekattheGovernmentHospital, Ambur and salute the flag and singNational Anthem and therespondentpoliceisdirectedtomonitorthisandsendareporttotheJudicialMagistrateAmbur.9

Given this kindof enthusiasm,we shouldbe thankful for smallmercies.We justabout escaped theSupremeCourt stepping in to regulate, to thepointofbanning ‘sardar jokes’—onlybecause theChief Justicewhowaspursuingthematterretired.

AFTERALLTHATSOUNDANDFURY

As themonthswentby, thedifficultiesof enforcing theSupremeCourt’sorderaboutcompulsorilyplayingtheNationalAnthemincinemahalls,ofclosingdoors,ofeveryonestandingup,themeaninglessnessofstandingupagainandagainasfilmswerescreenedatfilmfestivals,theridiculousnessof jumping up themoment strains of the anthem cameup in a scene ordocumentary—all these became more and more manifest. The wayvigilanteshadbegunusingittobrowbeatothers,thesheerimpossibilityofenforcing the order on the handicapped, began to stare everyone in theface.That the courthadwaded into amatterwhichwasbest left to theexecutive;thatithadwadedintothesphereofParliamentandlegislatedanew offence, and on a matter which was not one of such emergentimportance—thesecametobetalkedofinlegalcirclesmoreandmore.

At first the court, having penned such ringingwords,was unmoved,and,ofcourse,sowasthegovernment—uniquelynationalistasitwas,inits own eyes. But step by tiny step, apertures began to open. The firstaperturewasopenedinthehearingon9December2016.Everyoneagreedthatinthecinemahallsanexceptionwouldhavetobemadeforthosewhojust could not stand up. In its majesty, the court allowed that thehandicappedwho just could not stand upmay remain seated, ‘butmustshow such conductwhich is commensuratewith respect to theNationalAnthem’—on reading this, I did feel that the judges just did not knowenoughaboutthehandicapped,someofwhomwould,forinstance,finditalmost impossible toevenholdtheirheadstill.Butonemustbethankfulfor small mercies. And then, the court ‘cleared’ another matter—the‘clarification’speakstowhatwashappeningasaresultofitsinitialorder.‘Whenwesaidthatthedoorsshallbeclosed,’thejudgesdeclared,‘wedidnot mean that the doors shall be bolted as mentioned in the case ofMunicipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi vs. Uphaar Tragedy VictimsAssociationandOrs.[(2011)14SCC481]butonlytoregulatetheingressandegressduringtheperiodwhiletheNationalAnthemisplayed.’

Atthenexthearing—on14February2017—onemoreapertureopenedup.Recallwhathadhappenedintheoriginalcase,theoneaboutthefilm,KabhiKhushiKabhieGham: toMrChouksey’s chagrin, the audience inthecinemahallhadnotstoodupwhen,inanincidentinthefilm,ayoungchildbegan to sing theNationalAnthem in someLondonschool.At thesuggestionoftheamicuscuriaeandthethenattorneygeneral,ChiefJusticeMisraandhiscolleaguesordered:

Inviewoftheaforesaid[thatis,thesuggestionoftheamicuscuriaeanditsendorsementbytheAttorneyGeneral],itisclarifiedthatwhentheNationalAnthemissungorplayedinthestorylineofafeaturefilmor[as]partofthenewsreelordocumentary,apartfromwhathasbeenstatedintheorderdated30.11.2016,theaudienceneednotstand.

Thecasecameupon23October2017—againbeforeathree-judgebench.The bench was headed by Justice Dipak Misra, by this time the ChiefJusticeof India. JusticeA.M.Khanwilkar and JusticeD.Y.Chandrachudwere the othermembers of the bench. By now, therewas a change: thegovernmentwasstillfirm,butthecourtseemedtobewantingtoshiftthe

matteroutofitshands,andintothoseofthegovernment.AsthecourtnotedinitsOrderof23October2017,alongwithother

advocates, the new attorney general, K.K. Venugopal, ‘strenuouslyopposed’thepleathatitrecallitsoriginalorder.Recallingtheorderwouldsend a ‘wrong signal’ to society, argued the amicus curiae.The attorneygeneraladvancedanewreason.Thecourtrecordedthisnewsubmissionasfollows:

Thesubmissionof the learnedAttorneyGeneral is thatbecauseof thevastdiversity inthecountry based on religion, race, caste and even region, it becomes necessary to haveuniformitywhichshouldbecultivatedbyplayingtheNationalAnthemsothatwhenpeoplecomeout fromthecinemahalls, instilling thebelief that theyareall Indians.Be thatas itmay.Inthiscontext,hehasreferredtoArticle51A(a)oftheConstitutionofIndia.

Justice Chandrachud was reported to have questioned both legs of theargument. In response toVenugopal’spremise about standingup for theanthem‘instillingthebeliefthattheyareallIndians’,JusticeChandrachudasked whether viewers, when they came out of the cinema hall, wouldremember having stood up for the National Anthem or the plot of thefilm?Andwhatifsomeonesaysthatstandingupisnotenoughbywayofshowing respect that is rightfully due to theNational Anthem?What ifsomeone says that no one should bewearing shortswhen the anthem isplayed? As for ensuring that everyone must discharge the FundamentalDuties listed in Article 51A, Justice Chandrachud was reported to haveinquiredhowfarwouldtheStatehavetogoandhowpervasivewoulditseffortshavetobetoensure,forinstance,thateverycitizenwasexerting‘tovalue and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture’?10 Andrightlytoo:afterall,wouldeveryoneinthenorthhavetodemonstratethathe was doing enough to revive and preserve the Yakshagana; wouldeveryoneinthesouthhavetomasteroratleastpatronizeqawwalis?

Asdirected,thecasecameupon9January2018.Argumentsflowedtoandfro—itspeaksvolumestotheprioritiesbywhichweasanationandStateareseizedthattheOctober2017orderofthecourtlists,apartfromtheattorneygeneralandtheamicuscuriae,fifty-twosenioradvocatesandadvocatesashavingappearedinthecase.Thejudgeslistenedpatientlytothearguments,andconcluded:

Havingheardlearnedcounselforthepartiesforsometime,wethinkitappropriatethattheCentralGovernmentshouldtakeacallinthisregardand,ifnecessary,asadvised,maybringouttherequisitenotificationorcircularorrules.Whenwesay‘takeacall’,needlesstosay,thediscretionrestswiththeCentralGovernment.Thediscretionhastobeexercisedwithoutbeinginfluencedbyourinterimorder.WemayfurtheremphasizethatthediscretionmaybeutilizedtoregulateinaninclusivemannerorastheCentralGovernmentfeelsfit.

‘…thediscretionrestswiththeCentralGovernment’,‘Thediscretionhastobeexercisedwithoutbeinginfluencedbyourinterimorder…’,‘…orastheCentralGovernmentfeelsfit’—asea-changefromthereverberantwordsofthe original order: the original ringing order had been written anddeliveredby JusticeDipakMisra, the final judgmentwasalsowrittenbyJustice—now Chief Justice—Dipak Misra. The argument that this wassomething that falls squarely within the sphere of the executive, theargumentthatthesubjectisoneonwhichtheexecutivehadinfacttakenvarious steps, the argument that by its original order the court hadlegislated a new crime, and also that theoriginal order of the court hadentailed toomany unintended consequences seemed to have gone home.The government for its part filed an affidavit that they had set up acommittee to study all aspects of the matter. The committee would beheadedbytheadditionalsecretary(bordermanagement)—asif,giventhesituationonourborders,thisiswhatheshouldbedevotinghistimeto—and would have representatives of ten other ministries. This seemed tosatisfythemajestyofthecourt,andtherefore,initsturn,whilelistingitsfinaldirections,itreiterated:

…(iii)SincetheCommitteeconstitutedbytheUniongovernmentislookingintoallaspectsofthematter,itshallmakeitsrecommendationsuninfluencedbytheinterimdirectionsofthisCourt,asclarifiedinourorderdated23rdOctober,2017.Similarly,thecompetentauthorityshall in taking its decision(s) not be constrained or influenced by any of the interimdirections.


The attorney general also suggested that theword ‘shall’ in the originalorder—theanthem‘shall’beplayedinthecinemahallbeforescreeninganyfilm—maybesubstitutedbytheword‘may’.Thecourtwhichhadbeensoabsolutely resolute just months earlier, now graciously accepted theattorneygeneral’ssuggestion.

AndthusChouksey’sstrenuouseffortstomakeuspatrioticwerefinally

disposedof.11

DRIVERSORROADS?

Thatinourcountryanappallingnumberofpersonsdieinmotoraccidentsiswellknown.Thatanumberof thesediebecause thedriversareunderthe influence of drugs or liquor is just as well known and just asinexcusable. The obvious remedy is to use Breathalysers and similardevices, and to give exemplary punishments to those who are caughtdriving after drinking. In the case at hand—State of Tamil Nadu v. K.Balu12—theSupremeCourt itselfnotedthatadrivercouldacquire liquorbeforecommencinghis journey,anddrinkalongtheway.Yet, insteadoffocusing on drivers, the three-judge bench of the court, headed by theChief Justice, chose to craft a remedybasedona classificationof roads,with predictable results. The court gave a number of directions. Amongthesewerethefollowing:

No licences shall be given that permit sale of liquor along national orstatehighways;

Thisprohibition‘shallextendtoandincludestretchesofsuchhighwayswhich fall within the limits of amunicipal corporation, city, town orlocalauthority’;

Noshopforthesaleofliquorshall(i)bevisiblefromanationalorstatehighway;(ii)bedirectlyaccessiblefromanationalorstatehighway;and(iii)besituatedwithinadistanceof500metresoftheouteredgeofthenationalorstatehighwayorofaservicelanealongthehighway.

ThefirstproblemthatarosewasthatinacitylikeChandigarh,aroaddesignated as a ‘national highway’ passed right through the city.Hotelsand restaurants that had been granted liquor licences and which weresituated along this road would have either had to shut down or theirlicences would have had to be revoked. The Chandigarh administrationadopted a simple expedient: it reclassified the roads—highways wererechristened:henceforth theywouldbemerely ‘majordistrict roads’.Theproblem was brought to the Supreme Court. The court issued a

‘clarification’.13Whereas theoriginal judgmenthadcategoricallydeclaredthat its direction ‘shall extend to and include stretchesof suchhighwayswhichfallwithinthelimitsofamunicipalcorporation,city,townorlocalauthority’, the court now ‘clarified’ that the direction shall apply to‘highwaysproperlyunderstood,whichprovideconnectivitybetweencities,towns and villages’. ‘Theorder does not prohibit licensed establishmentswithinmunicipal areas,’ the court added. ‘This clarification shall governothermunicipalareasaswell.’

There was the other predictable development. In its judgment, theSupremeCourthadbeenfirmascanbe.Aftersettingoutitsdirections,ithadrecorded,

AllStatesandUnionTerritoriesaremandatedtostrictlyenforce theabovedirections.TheChiefSecretariesandDirectorsGeneralofPoliceshallwithinonemonthchalkoutaplanforenforcementinconsultationwiththeStateRevenueandHomeDepartments.Responsibilityshallbeassigned, interalia, toDistrictCollectors andSuperintendentsofPolice andothercompetent authorities. Compliance shall be strictly monitored by calling for fortnightlyreportsonactiontaken.

The judgment had but to be given that reports started appearing in thepressabouttheingeniouswaysthatwerebeingdevisedtocircumventthedirectionsof thecourt.Ahotelhadchanged its entrance so that it couldnot be said to bewithin 500metres of the highway.A liquor vend hadspentRs2lakhandmadeamazesothatthedistanceonehadtotraversebeforeenteringitfromthehighwaywasmorethan500metres.ThechiefministerofGoaproclaimedthatdriverswerenowdrinkingevenmorethanthey used to do—for they were stocking their cabins with bottles anddrinkingwhiledriving.14Theacmeofsuchjugaadwastheoneadoptedbythe Government of Punjab. It issued the Punjab Excise (amendment)Ordinance2017.Thisprovided,

InthePrincipalAct,section26Ashallbesubstitutedbythefollowing:-26A(1):Saleorsupplyofliquor:(i)Thesaleofliquorshallbepermittedonlythroughlicensedliquorvendswhichshall not be located within 500 metres from the outer range of the National or StateHighway or by a service lane along such highway and such liquor vends shall neither bedirectlyvisiblenoraccessiblefromsuchNationalorStateHighway.

So far, so good—the ordinance was reproducing the direction of the

SupremeCourt.Butthiswasfollowedby,

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court,tribunalorauthority,everyclub,hotel,restaurantoranynotifiedplacehavingalicenceshallbe entitled to engage in the supply of liquor to members, guests or other persons forconsumptionof such liquorwithin thepremisesof such club,hotel, restaurantornotifiedplace, irrespectiveofwhethersuchclub,hotel,restaurantornotifiedplace is locatedonornearanyNationalorStatehighway.

In short, even ‘other persons’ could consume liquor in a ‘club, hotel,restaurantornotifiedplace’eveniftheplacewassituated‘onornearanyNationalorStateHighway’solongastheydidsowithinthepremisesoftheplace.Itdoesnotrequiremuchimaginationtoseehowourjugaadwillstretch, to take one example ‘members, guests or other persons’.‘Members’astemporaryasthemutaahmarriage?‘Guestsorotherpersons’toincludewhoeverwantstobeincluded?‘Premises’toincludetheparkinglotofahotelorrestaurant?

Similarly, where the Supreme Court had categorically directed, ‘Theexistinglicenceswhichhavealreadybeenrenewedpriortothedateofthisordershallcontinueuntilthetermofthelicenceexpiresbutnolaterthan1-4-2017,’theordinanceprovided:

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court,tribunalorotherauthority,anylicenceissuedtoanyclub,hotel,restaurantorothernotifiedplaceforthesaleofliquorshallbedeemedtohavebeenandalwaysbedeemedtohavebeenissued for the supply of liquor and all relevant provisions of thisAct and the rulesmadethereunderwillcontinuetoapplyastheydidforsaleofliquor.

Areweinforfurtherroundsoflitigation?Forsomemore‘clarifications’?Yet the root of the problem and its remedy were manifest from the

moment the judgmentwasdelivered:noneof thiswouldhavearisenhadthecourtfocusednotonclassificationofroadsbutonthedrivers.

CLARIFICATIONSCONFOUNDED

Thisreluctancetothinkthroughtheconsequencesofthejudgmentoneispronouncing has obliged the Supreme Court to issue not just‘clarifications’ but ‘clarifications’ of ‘clarifications’.When Iwas studying

judgmentsthattheSupremeCourthadhandeddownonreservations,myfriendArvindDatarpointedtocertainfeaturesandintheircontextaskedmetolookupAbhayNathv.UniversityofDelhi,15ajudgmentdeliveredin2009.As I reported inFallingOverBackwards,on reading it I learntthatthisjudgmenthadtobedeliveredto‘clarify’whatthecourthadheldfour years earlier in Buddhi Prakash Sharma v. Union of India.16 OnreadingBuddhiPrakash,Ilearntthatthatjudgmenthadtobedeliveredto‘clarify’ what the Constitution Bench of the SupremeCourt had held inSaurabhChaudri v.Union of India in 2003.17That judgment, it turnedout,hadbeennecessitatedbywhatthecourthaddecreedinDineshKumarII,asitisknown,ajudgmentdeliveredin1986.18DineshKumarIIhadtobe delivered as the schemewhich the court had prescribed the previousyear in Dinesh Kumar I had led to some untenable situations.19 Thatschemehadbeenprescribedto‘clarify’whatthesamebenchhadactuallymeantbythejudgmentithaddeliveredin1984inPradeepJainv.UnionofIndia.20

Ofcourse,therearesomanyfacetstoadmissions,andthestakesaresohigh—the entire future of children—that people are bound to approachcourtsagainandagain to see ifoneangleworkswhereanotherhasnot.But it does, literally, speak volumes when we learn that by now thejudgments of the SupremeCourt on educational institutions alone coverseven thick volumes of Supreme Court Cases—enough to form a sub-specializationinitself.21

There is the other aspect.A three-judge bench of the SupremeCourthad, in effect, modified the order made in a judgment delivered by aConstitutionBenchoffivejudges.Further,thecourthadrevieweditsownorder years after itwasmade, in adifferentproceeding.The reviewhadbeencalleda‘clarification’.

Thisisbutanillustrationofatrendinourconstitutionaljurisprudence.Ajudgmentoffivejudgesis‘clarified’byabenchofthreejudges.FortheSupremeCourt, clarification,modification, alterationandvariation, evencompletelynullifying—ashashappenedintheliquor-outlets-within-a-city-like-Chandigarhorder—haveallbecomesynonyms.

If onemay press the point, this trend showsmore than not thinking

throughthesortsofsituationsthatmayariseasaresultofone’sverdict.Somecasesclearlypointtoadeparturefromdiscipline.Ihavemypersonalexperienceasanexample.HindustanZincwasamongthecompaniesthatweredisinvestedduringAtalBihariVajpayee-ji’stenureasprimeminister.Sincethenthecompanyhasdonesomuchbetterthanitwasdoingwhenitwasundergovernmentalownership.Thedisinvestmentwaschallenged intheRajasthanHighCourt.Thecasewaswithdrawn.ThesamechallengewasthenmountedintheSupremeCourt.Itwasrejectedbyathree-judgebench,presidedoverby theChief Justice.Years later,whatwasvirtuallyan identical challenge was admitted by a two-judge bench. In February2018, this liberation from discipline entangled the SupremeCourt itself.Acquisition of land even for the highest public purposes is a matter ofintense contention: for those who own the land, the loss can spell thedifference between life and starvation; for the State, the refusal of just ahandfultopartwiththeir landcanstallanecessaryprojectforyears.TobalancetheinterestsofownersandtheneedsoftheState,theRighttoFairCompensation andTransparency inLandAcquisition,Rehablitation andResettlementActwaspassedin2013.In2014,athree-judgebenchoftheSupreme Court, consisting of the then Chief Justice R.M. Lodha andJusticesKurianJosephandMadanB.Lokur,held22thattheacquisitionofthe land would be valid only if the compensation had actually beendepositedintheaccountsofthelandowners;depositingit,forinstance,inagovernmenttreasurywouldnotbeenough.Lowercourtsbegandecidingcasesonthebasisofthisjudgment.Buton8February2018,byatwo-to-one judgment, another three-judge bench consisting of Justices ArunMishra, A.K. Goel and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar held23 that theacquisition would be valid if the State so much as offered thecompensationordepositeditin,say,thegovernmenttreasury,andevenifthecompensationdidnotgetdepositedintheaccountsoftheownersforfiveyears—forinstance,becauseoftheirrefusaltoacceptanamounttheyregarded as unfair. With one judge dissenting on the proposition, thebenchwent furtherandproclaimed that thedecisionof the earlier three-judgebenchhadbeenpassedwithoutdue regard to the law.Authoritiesthat had acquired lands swiftly approached the lower courts to now

validatetheiracquisitionsonthebasisofthisnewjudgment.Naturally,thematter soon came up in the Supreme Court again, before a three-judgebenchconsistingofJusticesKurianJoseph,MadanLokur—bothofwhomhad been part of the bench that had delivered the judgment which hadbeen pronounced to have been given without regard to the law—andDeepakGupta. Among others, former AttorneyGeneralMukul Rohatgiapprised the court of what troubles would arise if the situation wasallowed tocontinue:about5,000caseshadbeendecidedon thebasisofthe2014 judgment—allof themcouldnowbesought toberepoenedonthebasisofJusticeMishra’sbenchhavingheldthatthejudgmenthadbeenarrivedatdisregardingthelaw.Duringthehearing,JusticeKurianJosephrightlystressedthattheSupremeCourtwouldjustnotbeabletofunctionasoneinstitutionunlessdisciplinewasobserved:itwaswell-settledthatifabenchfeltthatanearlierdecisiontakenbyabenchofequivalentstrengthneeded tobereviewed, itwouldrecommendto theChief Justice that thematterbe referred toa largerbench.Howcouldabenchof three judgespronouncethatthedecisionofanotherthree-judgebenchhadbeenmadedisregarding the law? The bench comprising Justices Kurian Joseph,MadanLokurandDeepakGuptahadtodirectthesecretarygeneraloftheSupreme Court to urgently tell all High Courts not to deal with casesrelatingtothatsectionoftheactinquestiontilltheyhaddecidedwhetherthematterwouldbesenttoalargerbench,andithadtorequestallotherbenchesoftheSupremeCourtitselfnottodealfurtherwithpendingcasesinthisregardtillthequestionofreferencetothelargerbenchwasdecided.‘Be very clear,’ Justice Kurian Joseph said, ‘this is a matter of judicialproperietyandconsistency…Thesystemexistsbut ifyoustarttinkeringwithitthenitwon’tstop.Thisinstitutionwillgoforever.Therehastobewisdom and a proper method has to be followed… It is [my] painfulconcernthatifthisinstitutionistoremainasone,itshouldbeoneandyouhavetomakeitone.Youhavetohaveproperjudicialdisciplineforthat.’24

Apartfromthechaossuchinstanceswouldcauseinlitigation,thereareother, and Iwould think graver, consequences. Such instancesmake thelaw uncertain. Worse, they breed cynicism—‘The outcome does notdependsomuchonthelaworthefacts,’ litigantscometoconclude, ‘but

onwhoyougetasyourlawyer,andthebenchbeforewhichyourcasegetslisted.’

13

Circumstances,consequences,meta-consequences

Aswerushtothecourtstoremedywrongsfartherandfartherafield,thecourtsmustassesstheconsequencesthatthelawtheywilllaydownshallhave—andnaturally, theconsequenceswill extendbeyond the immediateissue that they are addressing in the judgment. For this reason, Iwouldurgeacloseracquaintancewiththeworldthatwehavetoface,andwhatwemustdotofaceit.Othersarenotgoingtoslowdownbecausewehavenotsolvedourproblems:foramoment,considerthetimeittakestoobtainjudgmentsinacaseinvolvingtheimpactofaprojectontheenvironmentandcontrastthiswiththepaceatwhichChinaisbuildinginfrastructureinTibet for troop movements. Similarly, consider the consequences thatjudgmentson reservations—withhalf the service recruitedandpromotedbybirthratherthancompetence—willhaveforourcapacitytodealwithaworldchangingatlightningspeed.Yes,itisaworldofopportunitiesbutitisalsoaheartlessworld: there isnoplace fora second-rate individual,asecond-rate firm,ora second-ratecountry.Andyetwhenwe lookat thecumulativeeffectofThomas,1IndiraSawhney,2Nagaraj,3therecanbenodoubt that together they strike a mighty blow against excellence andperformance. Even though, in each round, the Supreme Court tried torestrainthepoliticalclass,itwentalonginthesubsequentroundswhenthepoliticians came back with amended articles of the Constitution. As aresult, today vulgarity has become a right, mediocrity has become thenorm, standards are derided as a conspiracy to keep the poor down,ignoranceoffactsbecomesagroundforstickingtoanunfoundedopinion,

intimidationhasbecomeargumentandassaultisproof.Andwearegoingto compete in the world? Similarly, by extending the definition of the‘State’and‘otherauthorities’toencompassgovernmentalenterprises,havethe courts not enabled a perverse ‘work culture’ to spread in them; andtherebyhelpedinsendingthemtotheirdeaths?

I would, therefore, plead that judges make an extra effort to learnwhere the world is, where it is headed—in particular, where ourcompetitorsandadversariesareheaded.Everysooftenjournalistsdonotvisit factoriesandproject sitesaboutwhich theywrite.Their reportscancauseauthorities to takeunwarranteddecisions.But judgesvisit factoriesandprojectsitesevenless.Andtheconsequencesoftheopinionstheyformare infinitelymoresubstantial thanthewritingsof journalists.AsIsat inthe Faridabad court, I often askedmyself: here are 700-odd individualsbeingprosecuted;manyofthemmustbeinthesamepositionasus—theytoomaynothavelaidabrick;ontheotherhand,therealproblem—illegalmining—isgoingon inbroaddaylight;whydoes the judgenot leavehisroomforadayandjustmakeasurpriseinspectionofthesite?

Of course, every case is important. But given the importance of theState in our lives in India, cases involving public servants need specialattention and dispatch. In caseswhere, for instance, a public servant—aminister, a legislator, a judge, an officer or a policeman—is accused ofhavingamassedassetswhichhecannotaccountforbyhisknownsourcesofincome,

Judgesmust not allow adjournments at all.What a travesty it is thatyears and years go by after conclusive evidence is found about theaccumulationsofpoliticalleaders—buildings,land,cash—caseslanguishincourts.Andtheycontinuetomakeandunmakegovernments.

AstheCommissionontheWorkingoftheConstitutionurged,theruleofevidencemustnotbe‘beyondreasonabledoubt’but‘thepreponderanceofprobability’.

Judgesmustgobybrutefactsratherthanletpublicservantsgetoffvialegalisms.

Exceptwhereitisestablishedthatthewitnesswaspressuredtomakethe

original statement,witnesseswho resilemust be punished severely forperjury.

Courts have the power to punish for perjury—as they do to refuseadjournments.Yetitremainsoneoftheleastusedofpowers,anditsnon-useisresponsibleforgreatmischief.Lookatthewaytheprosecutionhasgonebackandwitnesseshavesomersaultedonwhattheysolemnlysworeincourtsinregardtoblaststhatkilledscores.Similarly,itdoesnottakeaSherlockHolmestoseewhentheprosecutionisdilutingitscase—theveryfact that this coincides so oftenwith a change of rulers should itself beenoughtoalertanyjudgetowhatishappening.

THEWIDERCONTEXT

And one must consider not just the specific problem which is beingaddressed in a particular case.Onemust consider thewider contexts inwhichwhatthecourtlaysdownwillbeapplicable.Imaybepermittedtofollowtheexampleofthelearnedjudge,andreproduceanexamplethatIused while delivering the Justice P.D. Desai Memorial Lecture inAhmedabad.4Asweknow,alongwithextendingtheambitofArticle21,theSupremeCourthasusedArticle22creativelytoenlargeourliberties.5

Evenaswewelcomethese,wemustbearinmindtheconsequencesthattheformulations by the courts have for persons operating in the field.Consider the SupremeCourt’s prescriptions vis-à-vis the procedures thatmustbeadheredto inregardto thosewhoaresuspectedtohavebrokenthe law. The courts have repeatedly invoked the adage, ‘The history oflibertyisthehistoryofproceduralsafeguards.’True,butnowconsidertheconsequences of the extent towhich the safeguards have been stretched.You will recall the anguish of the Supreme Court at custodial deaths—everyonewould share it.Thecourtdeliberatedover the relevantcase forten years: that is one aspect of the matter—even when the court feelsoutraged at something, evenwhen it feels that the impugned conduct is‘uncivilized’, that it is ‘the worst form of violence’, the court takes tenyears to come to a conclusion. But for the moment, I am not on that

aspect. For the present what concerns us are the directions that theSupremeCourtlaiddowntopreventthisabuse.

Fromthemomentthepersonistobearrested,thisishowtheSupremeCourtwouldhavethepersonnelofthesecurityforcesconductthemselves:

1. The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling theinterrogationofthepersonwhohasbeenarrestedshouldbearaccurate,visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations.Theparticularsofallsuchpolicepersonnelwhohandleinterrogationofthepersonarrestedmustberecordedinaregister.

2.Thepoliceofficercarryingoutthearrestshallprepareamemoofarrestat the time of arrest and suchmemo shall be attested by at least onewitnesswhomayeitherbeamemberofthefamilyofthearresteeorarespectablepersonofthelocalityfromwherethearrestismade.Itshallalsobecountersignedbythearresteeandshallcontainthetimeanddateofarrest.

3.Apersonwhohasbeenarrestedordetainedandisbeingheldincustodyin a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up shall beentitledtohaveonefriendorrelativeorotherpersonknowntohimorhavinganinterestinhiswelfarebeinginformed,assoonaspracticable,thattheattestingwitnessofthememoorarrestishimselfsuchafriendorarelativeofthearrestee.

4.Withineighttotwelvehoursofthearrest,thetime,theplaceofarrestandthevenueofcustodyofanarresteemustbenotifiedbythepolicetohisrelatives.Wherethefriendorrelativeofthearresteelivesoutsidethedistrictortown,thismustbedonetelegraphicallythroughthelegalaidorganizationinthedistrictandthepolicestationoftheareaconcerned.

5.Thepersonarrestedmustbemadeawareofthisrighttohavesomeoneinformedofhisarrestordetentionassoonasheisputunderarrestorisdetained.

6.Anentrymustbemadeinthediaryattheplaceofdetentionregardingthearrestofthepersonwhichshallalsodisclosethenameoftherelativeor friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and thenames and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the

arresteeis.7.Thearresteeshould,wherehesorequests,bealsoexaminedatthetime

ofhisarrest,andifthereareanymajorandminorinjuries,thesemustberecordedatthattime.The‘inspectionmemo’mustbesignedbothbythearrestee and the police officermaking the arrest and its copymust beprovidedtothearrestee.

8. Thearrestee shouldbe subjected tomedical examinationbya traineddoctor every forty-eight hours during his detention in custody, thedoctor being from the panel of approved doctors appointed by thedirector,healthservices,ofthestateorUnionTerritoryconcerned.Thedirector,healthservices,shouldpreparesuchapanelforalltehsilsanddistrictsaswell.

9. Copiesofall thedocuments, including thememoofarrest referred toabove,shouldbesenttotheIllaqamagistrateforhisrecord.

10.Thearresteemaybepermittedtomeethislawyerduringinterrogation,thoughthelawyerneednotbepresentthroughouttheinterrogation.

11. A police control room should be set up at all district and stateheadquarters.Informationregardingthearrestandtheplaceofcustodyofthearresteeshallbecommunicatedtothecontrolroombytheofficercausingthearrest,withintwelvehoursofeffectingthearrestand,atthepolice control room, it should be displayed on a conspicuous noticeboard.6

Now, imagine you are from one of our security forces. TransportyourselftotheKashmirValley.Anencounteristakingplace.SomeofyourcolleagueshavebeengunneddownbythePakistan-trained,localterrorists.Twoofthemhavebeenkilled.Twohavebeentakenalive.ProceedstepbystepinaccordancewiththedirectionsoftheSupremeCourt:

Make sure that, as youapproach the terrorists to arrest them, youarewearing your identification tags that bear your name and designationaccuratelyandclearly.Make sure that these tagsareclearlyvisible forall bystanders, among whom may be persons associated with theterrorists,tonotedown.

Make sure that your particulars are recorded in a register at the local

policestationfromwhich,asyouknow,gettingtoknowyour identityandthewhereaboutsofyourfamilywillbetheeasiestthingintheworldforthesponsorsandcoordinatorsoftheterrorists.

Prepareamemorecordingthatyouhavearrestedeachoftheterrorists.Haveeitheramemberofhisfamilyorapersonwhoisrespectedinthelocalitywitnessthearrest.Havehimorhersignthememo.Requesttheperson you are arresting to countersign the memo. Unless the personwhohassignedasawitnessishimselfafriendorrelativeoftheterrorist,be certain that you inform a friend or relative of the terrorist at theearliestpossible.

If the friend or relative resides elsewhere, inform him by telegraphthrough the legal aid organization of the district and the local policestation.

Makecertainthatthepersonyouhavearrestedisinformedthatitisyourdutytoinformhisfriendorrelative,andthatyouhavecarriedoutyourduty.

Writedownallthis—names,place,thetimesatwhichthestepshavebeentakenandall—inthediary.

Havethepersonexaminedforinjuries.Recordthese.Requesthimtosignthe record of the examination. Sign it yourself. Furnish a copy to theterrorist.

Havea traineddoctor fromapanelapprovedby thedirectorofhealthservicesinSrinagarexaminehimeveryforty-eighthours.

Each time youandyour colleagues interrogatehim, ensure that all theforegoingstepsaretaken—forinstance,thatyournameanddesignationtagsareclearlyvisibletotheperson.

Sendcopiesofalldocuments—severalofwhichwill includeyournameanddesignationaswellasthoseofotherpoliceofficialsandthedoctor—tothemagistrateofthelocality.

Ifhesowants,enabletheterroristtomeethislawyerperiodicallyduringthetimeyouareinterrogatinghim.

Ensure that thepolice control roomat thedistrictheadquarters and inSrinagarareinformedofthearrestandthatbothdisplaytheinformationonaconspicuousnoticeboard.

Thecourtmightaswellhaveaddeda final guideline: ‘Andawait thereprisalsthatwillsurelycomedownonyouandyourfamily’!

Is all this justmiasma? Is it so becauseArticle 22(3) expressly statesthat the protections under its first two clauses do not apply to alienenemies—butwe assumed inour example that the terroristswere locals;nortopersonswhoaredetainedunderalawthatprovidesforpreventivedetention,andthelawsonterrorismdoprovideforsuchdetention?PleasereadD.K.Basuandseeif,asabeleagueredsecurityofficial,youwilltaketheriskofproceedingontheassumptionthatthedirectionsapplyonlytopersonswhoareentitledtotheprotectionsofArticle22and,hence,nottothepersonsyouareapprehending.

ButeventhoughArticle22doesnotapplyto‘alienenemies’andthosewho are being arraigned under laws permitting preventive detention,Article 21 certainly applies to them also. May the court not hold thattreatingasuspectanddetenu inaccordancewiththeseguidelines followsdirectlyfromArticle21andthenumerousjudgmentsthathavebeengivenonit?Thatcareforhisphysicalandmentalsafetyisanobviouspartoftheperson’s right to life and liberty, both being taken to include all theelementsthattheSupremeCourthasheldfallunderthem?Afterall,bythegrace of the judgments, each suspect and detenu is entitled not just to‘animal existence’ but to life with dignity. And here, by theD.K. Basuguidelines,weareensuringjusthisphysicalsurvival.7

When I inquire from them, lawyers tell me that these guidelinestechnically remain binding. They have not been overruled, nor has theirambit been circumscribed by any subsequent judgment.The point is notthat custodial deaths ought to be condoned. The point is about theconsequencethat theremedywhichthecourts formulate formeetingoneill—thatis,oftramplinguponthelifeandlibertyofanindividual—hasforthwarting the incomparably greater evil—that of dismembering thecountry. And how it is necessary for the courts to bear that latterconsequencealsoinmind.Whenthisisnotdone,oneoftwoconsequencesisunavoidable.Eitherthehandsofthesecurityforceswillgetsofirmlytiedthatthefightagainstenemiesofthestatewillbehampered.Orthesecurityforceswill be compelled to disregard the guidelines in practice. In either

case,respectforthelawandthecourtswillbecalledintoquestion.HowwellIrememberthedaywhenIgotacallfromMrK.P.S.Gill.He

said that he wanted to come over to see me. No, no, sir, I had saidspontaneously.You just tellmewhere I should come, I will come over.No,hesaid,therewillbesomeofficerswithme:itwillbeeasierforustocomeoverandmeetyourfatherandyouboth.

Punjab had fallen under the sway of Pakistan-instigated-armed-financed terrorists. Administration had evaporated. The police hadevaporated. The magistracy had evaporated—terrorists and theirsympathizers used to, in open court, direct the magistrate to issue theorderstheywanted.ItwasinsuchcircumstancesthatMrJulioRibeiroandMrK.P.S.GillwerechargedwiththetaskofretrievingPunjab.Whentheytookupthetask,thepolicewasnotaforce.Individualofficerstookupthechallenge—almost as individuals. By the strategies he devised, by theleadershiphegave,byhispersonalbravery,MrK.P.S.Gill savedPunjabforourcountry.

As the terrorists were pushed back, their sympathizers began goingaroundthestateandexhortingpeopletofilecasesagainstspecificofficers—the very officers who had done the most to retrieve Punjab. Thepoliticianswhohadassumedpoweroncepeacewasrestoredwouldneverhave gained office but for what Mr K.P.S. Gill and his men hadaccomplished. But such was the opportunism and pusillanimity of thesepoliticians that theywent along, instituted ‘inquiries’ and the caseswereindeedfiled.Severaloftheofficerswerearrested,andthrownintotheveryjailswheretheterroristswerelodged.Someofthemwerethrashedbytheterrorists, andhad tobe rescued.Oneof thebravestof them,Ajit SinghSandhu,hadcommittedsuicide.And to top itall,MrGillwas finding itdifficulttogetlawyerswhowouldstandupforthebraveofficers.

Theopportunismandcowardiceoftherulerswerematchedbyanotherfeature: the exact sequencewhichhadbeen enactedduringandafter theEmergencywasrepeatednow.Courtswhichhadabdicatedtheirfunctionsuddenlybecamesopunctiliousaboutlibertyand‘procedureprescribedbylaw’. After all, the officers were thrown into jails with the judges’concurrence.Ittookthegreatestefforttogettherulerstoseereason.

Hence, one must see the circumstances in which others have tofunction.Onemust see beyond the case in hand, onemust visualize thesituationsinwhichtheformulationsthatarebeingdeliveredmaybeused.

ButIwouldurgemore:onemustseenotjusttheconsequencesofone’sjudgments,onemustseethemeta-consequences.Onceagain,IwillfollowtheexampleofthelearnedjudgeanddrawattentiontoasequencethatIhavedealtwithatgreaterlengthelsewhere.

THEACTIVIST’SCOMMITMENT

Overtheyears,asIhavegotknow,workwithandsupportactivists,Ihavenoticedoneunexpectedfeature:oftenthosewhoarestrivingtorightonewrongaredismissiveoftheworkofotherswhoaredevotingthemselvestosome other issue with as much commitment and zeal. This seems to bealmost an inevitable result of their determination to right that particularwrong,itseemstobealmostanaccompanimentofthesacrificesthattheyaremakingforthecausetheyhavetakenup.Apersonsacrificeshiscareer,his family, for preventing further denudation of theHimalayas.Anotherpersonsacrificeshiscareer,hisfamily,heriskshislifetostopthekillingofpersonsinfalse‘encounters’.Whenyoumentiontheworkofthepersoninthe Himalayas, the one striving to put an end to killings in false‘encounters’exclaims,‘Ofcourse,ofcourse,heisdoinggoodwork,butheisnotfocusingontherealissue.’Andviceversa.Thisisnotbecauseofanymean-heartedness.Itisbecausesacrificeoftheorderthatthesepersonsaremaking requires almost exclusive devotion to, it requires almost anobsessionfortheparticular issue.Allother issues, importantthoughtheybe,seemnottobetherealissue.

I fear thishappens to judgesalsoonce theyare seizedofaparticularwrong: theycome to focuson thatparticular issue so intensely that theybecomeobliviousof theconsequences that their rulingson this issuewillhaveonother,equally importantmatters.Aftertheyhavedeliveredsomejudgments advancing that particular cause—say, expanding the ambit ofArticle21—theycome tobeknown for theirwork in, say, enlarging themeaningof‘life’andthecorrespondingdutiesofthestatetoprovideone

thing after another. This reputation congeals into a self-image as thechampionof,say, therightofeverypersontoa lifewithdignity.Andinsubsequent rounds this self-image gives a further push to rulings in thesame direction. This sequence can be traced withoutmuch effort in therulingsofjudgeswhocametobeviewedas‘progressive’—especiallyintherulingstheyhandeddownaftertheEmergency.ItalmostseemedthattheSupremeCourtwascompensatingforitsrecordduringtheEmergency.

InFallingOverBackwards,8IhavedocumentedthetrajectorythattheSupreme Court has followed in regard to reservations, and how thesejudgments have brought us to a precipice—not just in regard tocompetitiveness and fairness,but also in regard to theonedyke that theSupreme Court itself constructed, a dyke that has saved us from theexcessesofauthoritarianleaders,thedoctrineoftheBasicStructure.

IfImayonceagainfollowthesterlingexampleoftheeloquentjudge,and cite two/three passages from that earlier study, we see the courtadvancingonthreefronts.

First, with each round, Directive Principles were vaulted higher andhigheraboveFundamentalRights.Firstitwassaidthatthetwohadtoberead harmoniously. Then that the two cannot be read except ascomplementing and supplementing each other. Then that FundamentalRightsmust be read in the light of Directive Principles. Then that theDirective Principles must be read into Fundamental Rights. Then thatFundamentalRights are themeans for achieving the goals set out in theDirective Principles. Then that no distinction can be made between theDirectivePrinciplesandFundamentalRights.Thenthat,whencourtscanadoptone‘principleofinterpretation’oranalternativeforexcavatingtheimport of an article of the Constitution or the validity of a law, theyshould choose the one that furthers a Directive Principle. The DirectivePrinciplesthusbecametouchstonesforassessinglawsandamendmentstothe Constitution: any restriction imposed with the objective of—thatshould read ‘with the stated objective of’—implementing a DirectivePrinciplehas tobepresumedtobe inthepublic interest, thecourtsheld,and the lawmust be deemed to be valid even if it impairs a notion likeequalityguaranteedbyArticle14.

Second, fromholding that theremust be equality of opportunity, thejudges began ruling that there must be equality of outcomes. And indecisions like Glanrock,9 equality of outcomes became the ‘egalitarianequalityofoutcomes’.

Third,thetouchstoneonwhichlawsandevenamendmentsweretobejudgedcametobetransmogrified:

ThetouchstoneusedtobetheviolationofaFundamentalRight—alawor an amendment of the Constitution would not pass muster if itviolatedaFundamentalRight.

That became the violation not of the Fundamental Right but of ‘theessenceoftheright’.

Thatinturnbecamenottheviolationofthat‘essenceoftheright’buttheobliterationoftheessenceoftheright.

Thatinafurtherturnbecamenottheobliterationoftheessenceofonerightbuttheviolationof‘theoverarchingprinciples’underlyingdifferentprovisionsoftheConstitution.

ByIndianMedicalAssociation,10 itbecamenot even theobliterationofthe ‘overarchingprinciples’.The touchstonebecame theobliterationofthe‘essenceoftheoverarchingprinciples’.

Thatbecametheobliterationofthe‘essenceoftheoverarchingprinciples’tosuchanextentthatwegotineffectanewConstitution.

InIndianMedicalAssociation,adivisionbenchoftheSupremeCourtenlargedwhathadcometobeknownas‘thedegreetest’—thatonemustassessnotjustwhether,say,aFundamentalRighthasbeenviolatedbutthedegreetowhichithasbeenviolated—toassessingalaworamendmentbytheShipofTheseustest,sotosay.Asaplankoftheshipgotdamagedorrotted,itwouldbereplaced.Thequestionwas:atwhatstagedoestheshipbecomeotherthantheshipithasbeen?Ihadarguedthatbythistest,theinfamous 39th Amendment that had been brought in to nullify theAllahabad High Court judgment holding Mrs Indira Gandhi guilty ofcorrupt electoralpractices—andwhichput the electionsof thepresident,vice president, speaker and prime minister beyond legal challenge—andeventhe42ndAmendmentwouldstandvindicated.

Bytheformer,afterall,theelectionsofonlyfouroutofthousandsofofficers of state had been put beyond legal scrutiny. By the latter, theoverwhelmingbulkoftheConstitutionhadremaineduntouched.Eventhesuccessivemutilations of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan by dictatorslike Zia-ul-Haq would have been held to have left that Constitution asakintotheoriginalasthesuccessivereplacementsofplankslefttheShipofTheseustobewhatithadbeen.11

In short, while delivering judgments, especially while penninggrandiloquent passages and crafting enlargements of settled principles,judgesmust visualize consequences for the caseathand,of course.Theymustinadditionvisualizethemanifoldcircumstancesinwhichtheirproseandenlargementsmightbeused.Butnotjustthat.Theymustvisualizetheconsequences that theirproseandenlargementsare liable tohave for theconstitutionalstructureitself.

Whilesucharethelessonsforjudges,therearelessonsfortherestofusalso.

LESSONSFORLAWYERSANDUSLAYMEN

Professions have developed many self-serving ‘principles’—these arenothingbutrationalizationsforgoingalong.Thecivilservantsays,‘Butheis the elected representative of the people.My duty is to implement hisdecisions,’andthereby,insteadofbeingacivilservant—aservantofcivilsociety—hebecomesaverycivilservantofwhoeverhappenstobeinofficeatthetime.Thejournalistsaysthathehastobe‘impartial’andthusgivesequalspacetothearsonistandthefirefighter.Insteadofbeingajudge-of-the-first-resort, instead of being an officer of the court, the lawyer says,‘Butmyduty is todefendwhoeverasksme torepresenthim.Mytask isnot to judge—that is the task of the judge. My task is to defend theinterests ofmy client to the best ofmy ability.’ Thereby, the bigger thecrook,thecraftierthelawyerheisabletofield.

Apartfromthefactthatjusticeisill-servedbythisrationalization,thereisinadditionapersonalcosttolawyers.Myfriend,K.G.Kannabiran,oneofthemostdoggeddefendersoffreedom,educatedmeonwhathecalled

‘thelawyer’sdisease’.Overtheyearswedefendsomanycriminals,hesaid,wedefend themwithanyandeverydeviceandprevarication,andworsethatwecan,thatwelosethesenseofrightandwrong.Webecomelikethecriminalswedefend.

Andthenthereiscomplicity.Afterall,ifwecomplainofajudgewhogoes on giving adjournments to a well-heeled accused, it is the man’slawyer who argues for those adjournments. And can a judge be bribedwithouttheknowledge,ifnottheactiveconnivance,ofalawyer?

Thatisthepricethattherationalizationextracts.Laypeoplelikeus,andespeciallythosewhoareinthemedia,toohave

lessons to learn from the kinds of sequences that we have encounteredabove.Wemustkeepahawk’seyeonwhat ishappeningincourts.Eventhe simple act of publishing a monthly calendar of when the case wasregistered,ofthenumberoftimesithasbeenadjourned,ofthewitnesseswho have resiled, of the months that have passed since the hearingsfinishedandthe judgmenthasyet tobeannounced—eventhis simpleactwillhaveasalutaryeffectonthefunctioningofthecourts.

Second,aswegleanedfromAnita’scase,whilewemustofcoursekeepaneyeonproceedingsandjudgmentsoftheSupremeCourtandtheHighCourts,weshould fromtimeto timesendreporters to the localcourts—andreportwhatishappeningthere.Simpleeyewitnessdescriptionsofwhattranspired in thecourtduring thedaywillopenpeople’seyes to the realstateofaffairs,and,Ibelieve,becomeapotentforceforimprovement.

Third, and here amore organized effort is required,we should keeptabsonseniormagistratesandHighCourtjudges—theyaretheoneswhoareliabletobepromotedtothenextrung.WhenanAmericannominatedforaHighCourtcomesupforconfirmationbeforetheSenate,awealthofmaterial is available on her or his record. That is because organizationsdevoted to, say, civil liberties, to race relations, etc., scholars in lawcolleges,keep tabson judgmentsand theworkingof judges in the lowercourts.Thecontrastcouldn’tbegreaterwhenapersonispickedupfromeven aHigh Court in India for our Supreme Court. Next to nothing isavailableontheworksheorhehasbeendoing.Ofcourse,themediacanplay a role in this regard. Members of law faculties can make a much

larger,andamuchmoreinformed,contribution.Thesovereigndeviceforensuringbetterjudgments,indeedforensuring

judicial accountability, however, is the simplest. We should analysejudgments, and we should publicize the results. The basic reason thatjudgmentsofthekindwehaveencounteredabovecontinuetobehandeddownisthatthejudgesareconfidentthatfewwillreadthem,and,thefewthat do,will keep silent—most of this tiny numberwill be lawyers, andeachofthemwillknowthathewillhavetoappearbeforethesamejudgestomorrow.

Each of us can break this protective cover. Judgments are not asdifficulttofathomastheyaremadeouttobe.Eachofuscantakeuponetheme, study the judgments that are handed down on that subject, andpublishtheresultsofourscrutiny.Evenifwecannotpublishtheminthemassmedia,we can use the newmedia—the Internet—to broadcast ourfindings.Indeed,Iamcertainthatevenifwemadejustafewcopiesofourfindings and sent them just to the judges and influential lawyers of theconcernedcourt,wewouldbeaffectingperceptibleimprovement.

Tableofcases

AbhayNathv.UniversityofDelhi,(2009)17SCC205.AllIndiaJudges’Associationv.UnionofIndia,(1992)1SCC119.AllIndiaJudges’Associationv.UnionofIndia,(2002)4SCC247.AnbazhaganK.v.StateofKarnataka,(2015)6SCC158.AnbazhaganK.v.SuperintendentofPolice,(2004)3SCC767.Anbazhagan K. v. State of Karnataka, Writ Appeal No. 260 of 2015,

decidedon11February2015(KAR).ArriveSafeSocietyofChandigarhv.TheUnionTerritoryofChandigarh,

Special Leave Petition (Civil) Number 10243 of 2017, decided on 11July2017.

AshokKumarMittalv.RamKumarGupta,(2009)2SCC656.BasuD.K.v.StateofWestBengal,(1997)1SCC416,at435-36.BasuD.K.v.StateofWestBengal,(1998)9SCC437.Bommai,S.R.v.UnionofIndia,(1994)3SCC1.BrijMohanLalv.UnionofIndia,(2012)6SCC502.BuddhiPrakashSharmav.UnionofIndia,(2005)13SCC61.Bunty alias Sandip v. State of Rajasthan,Writ 71/2016, High Court of

Rajasthan.CentreforEnquiryintoHealthandAlliedThemes(CEHAT)andOrs.v.

UnionofIndiaandOrs.,(2001)5SCC577.CenterforEnquiryintoHealthandAlliedThemes(CEHAT)andOrs.v.

UnionofIndiaandOrs.,(2003)8SCC398.

Central Bureau of Investigation v. Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah withCentralBureauofInvestigationv.DahyajiGobarjiVanzara,(2012)10SCC545.

Chairman,TeachersRecruitmentBoard,CollegeRoad,Chennai,600006v. K. Veeramani,W.A.No. 1040 of 2017 and C.M.P.No. 14776 of2017,decidedon12.10.2017.

Chaudri,Saurabhv.UnionofIndia,(2004)5SCC618.Chouksey,ShyamNarayanv.UnionofIndia,MANU/MP/0292/2003.Chouksey, ShyamNarayan v.UnionOf India,Writ Petition (Civil)No.

855/2016,decidedon30November2016.Chouksey, ShyamNarayanv.Unionof India, I.A.No.11/2017 inW.P.

(C)No.855/2016,Orderof23October2017.Chouksey, ShyamNarayan v. Union of India,Writ Petition (Civil) No.

855of2016,Judgmentof9January2018.Coelho,I.R.,v.StateofTamilNadu,(1999)7SCC580.CommonCausev.UnionofIndia,(2015)7SCC1,andthereviewOrder

(2016)13SCC.Dattatraya Dr. v. State of Maharashtra and Taluka Adhikari @ The

MedicalSuperintendentClass-I,2014ALLMR(Cri)3977.DineshKumarv.MotilalNehruMedicalCollege,(1985)3SCC22.DineshKumarv.MotilalNehruMedicalCollege,(1986)3SCC727.GuptaS.P.v.UnionofIndia,(1981)SuppSCC87.Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC

1369.ImtiyazAhmedv.StateofUttarPradesh,Decidedon2ndJanuary2017in

CriminalAppealNos.254–262of2012Inamdar,P.A.v.StateofMaharashtra,(2006)13SCC293.IndianMedicalAssociationv.UnionofIndia,(2011)7SCC179.Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (deceased) through LR,

(2018)SCCOnlineSC100.

Indra Sawhney v.Union of India, (1992) Supp (3) SCC 217; and IndraSawhneyv.UnionofIndia,(2000)1SCC168.

IndraSawhneyv.UnionofIndia,AIR2000SC498.IslamicAcademyofEducationv.StateofKarnataka,(2003)6SCC697.J.Jayalalithaav.StateofKarnataka,(2014)2SCC401.J.Jayalalithav.UnionofIndia,(1999)5SCC138.JagoJanataSocietyv.StateofRajasthan,CivilWritNumber15585/2010.

Decidedon31May2015.Jain,Pradeepv.UnionofIndia,(1984)3SCC654.Kalpana, Pundlik Jamdade, Kalpana Pundlik v. State of Maharashtra,

2015ALLMR(Cri)17.Kapur,B.R.v.StateofTamilNadu,(2001)7SCC231.Karan Johar v. Union of India, Decided on 19 April 2004,

MANU/SC/0535/2004,(2004)5SCC127.Kennedy,DrA.v.StateofTamilNadurepresentedbyInspectorofPolice,

AmburtownPoliceStation,VelloreDistrict,Cr.no.396of2017.KesavanandaBharativ.UnionofIndia,(1973)4SCC225.KrishnanandAgnihotriv.StateofMP,(1977)1SCC816.LilyThomasv.UnionofIndia,(2013)7SCC653.LokAdhikarSanghv.StateofGujarat,(1998)1G.L.H.768.LuthraR.P.v.UnionofIndia,decidedon27October2017,(2017)SCC

Online1254.Mahendran, S. v. The Secretary, TravancoreDevaswomBoard, Decided

on5April1991:AIR1993Ker42.MinervaMillsv.UnionofIndia,(1980)3SCC625.MinervaMillsv.UnionofIndia,(1986)4SCC222.MinervaMillsv.UnionofIndia,(1988)4SCC130.Majagvai,AjitSavantv.StateofKarnataka,(1997)7SCC110.MohammedSalimv.StateofUttarakhand,2017(2)RCR(Civil)636(PIL)

No.126of2014,decidedon20.03.2017.

Mumbai Grahak Panchayat v. State of Maharashtra, PIL 156 of 2001,CivilAppeal155of2015,CivilAppeal157of2015,andseveralothers,decidedon5May2017bydivisionbenchoftheBombayHighCourt.

Nagaraj,M.v.UnionofIndia,(2006)8SCC212.Nirmala, Dr. Sau. v. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary and

Appropriate Authority & Medical Superintendent through Dr. S.A.Sable,Beed,2016ALLMR(Cri)1034.

Nirula,Manojv.UnionofIndia,(2014)9SCC1.Pai,T.M.A.Foundationv.StateofKarnataka,(2002)8SCC481.Prakash Singh v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) 310 of 1996;

decidedon22September2006;(2006)8SCC1.PuneMunicipal Corporation v.HarakchandMisirimal Solanki (2014) 3

SCC183.Radhakrishnav.StateofMaharashtra,2016ALLMR(Cri)1556.RamrameshwariDeviv.NirmalaDevi,(2011)8SCC249.RamlilaMaidanIncident,inRe,SuoMotoWritPetition(Crl.)No.122of

2011,decidedonJune20,2011,(2012)5SCC125.Ravindra,Dr. andDr. Sudarshanav. StateofMaharashtra, throughDr.

B.R.Sonwane,2016ALLMR(Cri)1876.SalemAdvocateBarAssociationv.UnionofIndia,(2005)6SCC344.Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghuvir Saran Charitable Trust, (2012) 1 SCC

455.Sharma, Pawan Kumar v. Sarla Sood and Ors., CR No. 184 of 2011,

DecidedonDecember5,2016,2016SCCOnlineHP2699.ShyamNarayanv.UnionofIndia,MCCNo.591of2003,Orderof28

July2003,MANU/MP/1044/2003.Sita Ram v. Balbir@Bali, Conmt. Pet. © No. 374/2014 in Crl. A. No.

1834/2013,Ordersdated3October2017and1December2017.Sonowal,Sarbanandav.UnionofIndia,(2007)1SCC174.Srivastava,PriyankaandOrs.v.StateofUP,(2015)6SCC287.

St.Stephen’sCollegev.UniversityofDelhi,(1992)SCC558.StateofHPv.NarrottamSinghandOrs,decidedon20May2016:StateofHaryanav.AnitaShourie,FIRCaseNo.363/09StateofHaryanav.G.D.GoenkaTourismCorporationLtd.,Orderof21

February2018.StateofKarnatakav.SelviJ.Jayalalithaa,(2017)6SCC263.StateofKeralav.N.M.Thomas,(1976)2SCC310.StateofPunjabv.SurjitSingh,AIR1967SC1214.StateofTamilNaduv.K.Balu,(2017)2SCC281.SubramanianSwamyv.UnionofIndiaandOrs.,(2016)7SCC221.SuperintendentofPolicev.J.JayalalithaaandOrs.,Spl.C.C.208of2004,

decidedon27September2014http://164.100.138.228/casest/generatenew.php?

path=data/judgment/2016/&fname=CRCR.R201742015.pdf&smflag=N

SupremeCourtAdvocates-on-RecordAssociation,(2016)5SCC1.VeeramaniK.v.Chairman,Teachers’RecruitmentBoard,CollegeRoad,

Chennai-6,decidedon25July2017.VeeraswamiK.v.UnionofIndia,1991(3)SCC655.Vinayakv.StateofMaharashtra,2014ALLMR(Cri)3393.VineetNarainv.UnionofIndia,AIR1998SC889.VinodSethv.DevinderBajaj,(2010)8SCC.Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India and Ors.,

(2016)10SCC265.VoluntaryHealthAssociationofPunjabv.UnionofIndia,(2013)4SCC

1.Yadav, Mrs. Nirmal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, CriminalMisc.

NumberM-14289of2011.Zahedav.StateofMaharashtra,2016ALLMR(Cri)2049.

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Notes

1ForahouseweneverbuiltonaplotwedidnotownBailablewarrantsforarrest.Non-bailablewarrantsforarrest.Absconder.Words that have been underlined were entered by hand. The rest of the document was aprinted one.Unless otherwise indicated,wordswhich have been italicizedwithin quotationsfromjudgmentshavebeenitalicizedbyme.Casualleave/Earnedleave/Specialleave/Medicalleave.‘InternationalNormalizedRatio’—ameasureofthecoagulabilityofthe individual’sblood.AhigherINRmeanslesscoagulability—whichiswhyithastobekepthighwhenthepersonisatriskofthrombosis,asAnitawasfollowingherboutofpulmonaryembolism.Witnessforthecomplainant,inthiscasetheHaryanaStatePollutionControlBoard.Prosecutionwitness.Naturalhill.Recordofrights.Recordofcultivation.Thecropsowninwinter.

2Justicedone,undone,redoneAtthetimeofwriting,heisajudgeoftheKarnatakaHighCourt.InKrishnanandAgnihotriv.StateofMP,(1977)1SCC816,theSupremeCourthadheldthatif the assets that could not be accounted for by the person’s known sources of incomeamountedto10percentorlessthantheincome,thepersoncouldbeacquitted.JusticeKumaraswamyretiredthreemonthsafterdeliveringhisjustlynotoriousjudgment.StateofKarnatakav.SelviJ.Jayalalithaa,(2017)6SCC263.

3Prosecutorhunting,andotherdevicesTherewasonemorechargesheetrelatingtothepurchaseofahotelinLondon.Wewillcometothatinamoment.Fornow,allweneedtonoteisthatintheenditwasnotpursued.InadditiontothechronologiesandfactsmentionedinjudgmentsoftheSupremeCourt,Ihavereliedontheaccountsetoutbyoneoftheheroesofthecase,thedistinguishedsenioradvocate,B.V.Acharya,inhismemoir,AllFromMemory:AnAutobiography,UniversalLawPublishing,2014,inparticularChapterXXVandAppendixV.

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J.Jayalalithav.UnionofIndia,(1999)5SCC138.B.R.Kapurv.StateofTamilNadu,(2001)7SCC231.InK.Anbazhaganv.StateofKarnataka,(2015)6SCC158,para5.K.Anbazhaganv.SuperintendentofPolice,(2004)3SCC767.The relevant Section of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: ‘161. Examination ofwitnessesbypolice.—(1)AnypoliceofficermakinganinvestigationunderthisChapter,oranypoliceofficernotbelowsuchrankastheStateGovernmentmay,bygeneralorspecialorder,prescribeinthisbehalf,actingontherequisitionofsuchofficer,mayexamineorallyanypersonsupposedtobeacquaintedwiththefactsandcircumstancesofthecase.‘(2)Suchpersonshallbeboundtoanswertrulyallquestionsrelatingtosuchcaseputtohimbysuchofficer,otherthanquestionstheanswerstowhichwouldhaveatendencytoexposehimtoacriminalchargeortoapenaltyorforfeiture.‘(3)Thepoliceofficermayreduceintowritinganystatementmadetohiminthecourseofanexaminationunderthissection;andifhedoesso,heshallmakeaseparateandtruerecordofthestatementofeachsuchpersonwhosestatementherecords…’3[Providedthatstatementmadeunder thissub-sectionmayalsoberecordedbyaudio-videoelectronicmeans…]Specialleavepetitions.Forthefollowing,J.Jayalalithaav.StateofKarnataka,(2014)2SCC401.In itsorderdelivered inNovember2003onK.Anbazhaganv. SuperintendentofPolice, op.cit.,theSupremeCourthadobserved,interalia,‘Asthematterispendingsince1997theStateof Karnataka shall appoint a Special Judgewithin amonth from the date of receipt of thisorderandthetrialbeforetheSpecialJudgeshallcommenceassoonaspossibleandwillthenproceedfromdaytodaytillcompletion.’B.V. Acharya was appointed as special public prosecutor in 2003; S.M. Krishna of theCongresswasthechiefministeratthetime.TheBJPcametoofficeinKarnatakainMay2008.B.V.AcharyaresignedinDecember2012.TheBJPgovernment,withJagadishShettaraschiefminister, tried to persuade him to continue. He declined. Bhavani Singh was appointed asspecialpublicprosecutorinFebruary2013;JagadishShettaroftheBJPwasstillchiefminister—his term as CM lasted from 12 July 2012 to 12May 2013. InMay 2013, the CongressreturnedtopowerwithSiddaramaiahaschiefminister.Asforthedelaythatmightbecausedbytheretirementofthespecialjudge,theSupremeCourtexplainedthattheextantrulespermittedthegovernmenttoextendhisservicesonacontractualbasis.Thegovernmentrequestedhimtocontinue.Buthedeclined.JudgeMichaelD’CunhawasselectedbytheHighCourttohearthecasehenceforth.The relevant sub-section reads, ‘301. Appearance by Public Prosecutors: (1) The PublicProsecutororAssistantPublicProsecutor in chargeof a casemayappearandpleadwithoutanywrittenauthoritybeforeanyCourtinwhichthatcaseisunderinquiry,trialorappeal.’K.Anbazhaganv.StateofKarnataka,WritAppealNo.260of2015,decidedon11February2015(KAR).For thecontrastingconclusionsof the judges, the followingsub-sectionsofSection24of theCodeofCriminalProcedurearerelevant.Theyreadasfollows:

24. Public Prosecutors.—(1) For every High Court, the Central Government or the StateGovernment shall, after consultationwith theHighCourt, appoint a Public Prosecutor andmayalsoappointoneormoreAdditionalPublicProsecutors,forconductinginsuchCourt,anyprosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State

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Government,asthecasemaybe.(2)TheCentralGovernmentmayappointoneormorePublicProsecutors for thepurposeofconductinganycaseorclassofcasesinanydistrictorlocalarea.(3) For every district, the StateGovernment shall appoint a Public Prosecutor andmay alsoappointoneormoreAdditionalPublicProsecutorsforthedistrict:ProvidedthatthePublicProsecutororAdditionalPublicProsecutorappointedforonedistrictmaybeappointedalsotobeaPublicProsecutororanAdditionalPublicProsecutor,asthecasemaybe,foranotherdistrict…(8)TheCentralGovernmentor the StateGovernmentmayappoint, for thepurposesof anycaseorclassofcases,apersonwhohasbeeninpracticeasanadvocatefornotlessthantenyearsasaSpecialPublicProsecutor…C.f.,K.Anbazhaganv.StateofKarnataka,(2015)6SCC158,para8.In the relevant period, the government that was in office in Karnataka was the CongressgovernmentheadedbySiddaramaiah.See thecontrasting treatmentofStateofPunjabv.SurjitSingh,AIR1967SC1214 inparas86–89 and 158–59 of the judgment we are going through, K. Anbazhagan v. State ofKarnataka,op.cit.ThepetitionerinthecaseinwhichtheseobservationsweremadewasthesameK.Anbazhaganwho was the petitioner in the present case urging that Bhavani Singh would not assist inobtainingafairconsiderationofappealsbytheHighCourt.InK.Anbazhaganv.SuperintendentofPolice,op.cit.,para30.K.Anbazhaganv.StateofKarnataka,(2015)6SCC158.Senioradvocate.The list in the following paragraph reproduces some of the items in Appendix V of B.V.Acharya’sAllFromMemory,op.cit.,pp.314–331.Again,thisinspiteofwhattheSupremeCourthadprescribedinits2004order:

The Special Judge shall, after completion of evidence, put to all the accused all relevantevidenceanddocumentsappearingagainstthemwhilstrecordingtheirstatementunderSection313.Alltheaccusedshallpersonallyappearincourt,onthedaytheyarecalledupontodoso,foransweringquestionsundersection313oftheCriminalProcedureCode.Inpointoffact,thesectionisonlyanenablingone,andtheemphasisisonproceedingdaytoday.Thesectionprovides:

309.Powertopostponeoradjournproceedings.(1)Ineveryinquiryortrial,theproceedingsshallbeheldasexpeditiouslyaspossible,andinparticular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continuedfromday to day until all thewitnesses in attendance have been examined, unless theCourtfindstheadjournmentofthesamebeyondthefollowingdaytobenecessaryforreasonstoberecorded.(2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds itnecessaryoradvisable topostpone thecommencementof,oradjourn,any inquiryor trial, itmay, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on suchtermsasitthinksfit,forsuchtimeasitconsidersreasonable,andmaybyawarrantremandtheaccusedifincustody…B.V.Acharya,AllFromMemory,op.cit.,p.219.‘Whateverbe theultimateeventof thesuit’ refers towhatever is theultimatedecision in the

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case.AshokKumarMittalv.RamKumarGupta,(2009)2SCC656.Section89empowersthecourtstoassignadisputeforsettlementtoavenuesoutsidethecourt—suchasarbitration,mediation,LokAdalat,etc.VinodSethv.DevinderBajaj,(2010)8SCC.InSection35AoftheCode.SanjeevKumarJainv.RaghuvirSaranCharitableTrust,(2012)1SCC455.FaliS.Nariman,oneofourforemostjurists,hasoftendrawnattentiontothisarticleindiversecontexts.Underit,‘…fordoingcompletejusticeinanycauseormatterpendingbeforeit’thecourt‘maypasssuchdecreeormakesuchorderasisnecessary…’NoothercourtinIndiahasbeen given such power, he has emphasized. Indeed, no other Constitution anywhere in theworldconferssuchadecisiveandwide-rangingpoweronanycourtasthisArticledoesonourSupremeCourt,hehasremindedus.RamrameshwariDeviv.NirmalaDevi,(2011)8SCC249.LawCommissionofIndia,CostsinCivilLitigation,ReportNumber240,May2012.Section35oftheCodeofCivilProcedureprovides:(1)Subject tosuchconditionsand limitationsasmaybeprescribed,andto theprovisionsoflawforthetimebeinginforce,thecostsofandincidenttoallsuitsshallbeinthediscretionoftheCourt,andtheCourtshallhavefullpowertodeterminebywhomoroutofwhatpropertyand to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for thepurposesaforesaid.ThefactthattheCourthasnojurisdictiontotrythesuitshallbenobartotheexerciseofsuchpowers.(2)WheretheCourtdirectsthatanycostsshallnotfollowtheevent,theCourtshallstateitsreasonsinwriting.TheSupremeCourttooknoteoftheserules inSalemAdvocatesBarAssociationv.UnionofIndia,(2005)6SCC344.SeeSections191and193oftheIndianPenalCode.Thelatterprovides,

193.PunishmentforfalseevidenceWhoever intentionallygives falseevidence inanystageofa judicialproceeding,or fabricatesfalse evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall bepunishedwithimprisonmentofeitherdescriptionforatermwhichmayextendtosevenyears,andshallalsobeliabletofine,andwhoeverintentionallygivesorfabricatesfalseevidenceinanyothercase,shallbepunishedwithimprisonmentofeitherdescriptionforatermwhichmayextendtothreeyears,andshallalsobeliabletofine.…Explanation2-AninvestigationdirectedbylawpreliminarytoaproceedingbeforeaCourtof Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigationmay not take placebeforeaCourtofJustice.https://www.gov.uk/guidance/vexatious-litigants

4WhencourtsarecompelledtostepoutoftheirdomainForanoverallassessmentofjudicialactivism,AshokDesai, ‘JudicialOverreach’,(2013)SCCJournalSection,J-1.

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HussainaraKhatoonv.HomeSecretary,StateofBihar,AIR1979SC1369.VineetNarainv.UnionofIndia,AIR1998SC889.IndraSawhneyv.UnionofIndia,AIR2000SC498.SarbanandaSonowalv.UnionofIndia,(2007)1SCC174.

5Adherence?‘Demandand file’, inArunShourie,Governance:The Sclerosis thatHas Set In,ASA,Rupa,NewDelhi,2004,pp.161–80.(2015)7SCC1,andtherevieworder(2016)13SCC.PrakashSinghv.UnionofIndia,WritPetition(Civil)310of1996;decidedon22September2006;(2006)8SCC1.AllIndiaJudges’Associationv.UnionofIndia,(1992)1SCC119.AllIndiaJudges’Associationv.UnionofIndia,(2002)4SCC247.See,forinstance,BrijMohanLalv.UnionofIndia,(2012)6SCC502;HussainaraKhatoonv.State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98; Imtiyaz Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, decided on 2January2017inCriminalAppealNos.254-262of2012;AllIndiaJudgesAssociationv.UnionofIndia,op.cit.LiveLaw.in—PIL 156 of 2001, Civil Appeal 155 of 2015, Civil Appeal 157 of 2015, andseveralothers,decidedon5May2017bydivisionbenchoftheBombayHighCourt,CoramJusticeA.S.OkaandJusticeA.A.Sayed.For details in regard to the position inMaharashtra, see the judgment of JusticesOka andSayedjustcited—eachoftheexpressionsintheparagraphistakenfromthisjudgment.

6WhenoneofourownisinvolvedKesavanandaBharativ.StateofKerala,(1973)4SCC225.S.R.Bommaiv.UnionofIndia,(1994)3SCC1.S.P.Guptav.UnionofIndia,(1981)Supp.SCC87.IamgratefultoSaurabhMalikofTheTribuneandVarinderBhatiaofTheIndianExpressforrecallingthedetailsoftheepisode.ButforSaurabh,Iwouldhavemissedanimportantturninthecase.Inthissection,allmaterialwhichiswithinquotationmarksorindentedistakenfromtheexemplaryjudgmentofJusticePermodKohlioftheHighCourtofPunjabandHaryanainMrs.NirmalYadavv.CentralBureauof Investigation,CriminalMisc.NumberM-14289of2011.Whom Varinder Bhatia describes as being one who is ‘considered to be a well-entrenchedbusinessmaninNewDelhi,PunjabandHaryanajudiciary’.K.Veeraswamiv.UnionofIndia,1991(3)SCC655.Onallthis,seereportsbyRahulTripathiandRituSarin,inTheIndianExpressof11January2012,9February2012,14May2012and5May2014.C.f.,AnjaliBharadwajandPrashantBhushan,‘Atransparencydeficit,’TheIndianExpress,22February2018.

7Banehainahl-e-havasmuddaibhimunsifbhi…PulwrotethenoteinhisownhandinHindi—alanguageinwhichhewasproficient.Forthe

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complete text—translated into English—see the website of the Campaign for JudicialAccountability and Reforms: http://judicialreforms.org/cjar-covering-note-along-with-mr-kalikho-pul-former-arunachal-pradesh-cms-complete-suicide-note-without-redactions/. In thetextofthenote,see,inparticular,paragraphs9.7-8,15.19-27.K.Veeraswamiv.UnionofIndia,(1991)3SCC655.3. C.f., Niranjan Takle, ‘A Family Breaks Its Silence: Shocking Details Emerge in Death ofJudge Presiding Over Sohrabuddin Trial’,Caravan, 20 November 2017; and Atul Dev andAnoshMalekar,‘DeathofJudgeLoya:PossibleManipulationofRecordsandInconsistentNewTestimoniesRaiseFurtherQuestions’,Caravan,21December2017.On all this, theCaravan accounts listed above, and my conversations with Niranjan TaklebeforetheaccountwaspublishedbytheCaravan.AndforthatIdon’thavetolookfarforexamples.Icangiveareadyexamplefrommyownexperience.IwroteaneditorialinTheIndianExpress.ThethenChiefJusticetooksuomotunoticeofit,andacaseofcontemptofcourtwasregisteredagainstme.Thecaselingeredovermyheadfortwenty-sixyears.Iwasacquittedbyafive-judgebench,andallsubmissionsthatweremadeonmybehalfwereupheld.The Caravan recounted the background of the ‘journalist’: he turned out to hardly be apractisingjournalist;instead,personswhoknewhimtoldthemagazinethatheusedtoclaimtobeclosetoanddoingjobsforthepresidentoftheBJPinMumbai.Asecondwritwasfiled—thisonebyapersonwhoclaimedtobeaCongressman.Thepartyfunctionariessaidthattheydid not know of him or of hiswrit. After interactingwith him,DushyantDave, the senioradvocatewhohadbeenpursuingthecase,concludedthatbothwritswereput-upjobstopre-empt thehearings in theBombayHighCourt.C.f.,AtulDev, ‘Thebackgroundsof theLoyapetitioners in the Supreme Court raise questions about the legitimacy of their petitions,’http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantage/backgrounds-loya-petitioners-supreme-court-raise-questions-legitimacy-petitionsOn the contents of CBI’s charge sheets and the observations of the Supreme Court on theSohrabuddin and Prajapati cases, see Central Bureau of Investigation v. Amitbhai AnilChandra ShahwithCentral Bureau of Investigation v.DahyajiGobarji Vanzara, (2012) 10SCC545.C.f., DushyantDave, ‘Death of a Judge: There ismuchmore thanmeets the eye’,Bar andBench, 19 January 2018. Sisodia responded: he did not understand how arguing for anindependentinvestigationconstitutedaconflictofinterest,hemaintained:BarandBench,21January 2018. The question, of course, was different: ‘Who will select the “independent”investigators?’ThefollowingtwosectionsarebasedonirrefutablefactssetoutinwritsandpetitionsfiledbytheCampaign for JudicialAccountability andReforms and the documents annexed to thesewrit petitions, including the transcripts of tapped conversations and the CBI’s PreliminaryEnquiryReport.AlltherelevantdocumentsareavailableonthewebsiteoftheCJAR.See,inparticular, http://judicialreforms.org/cjar-complaint-cji-house-procedure/;http://judicialreforms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Final-Review-1.pdfJusticeDipakMisraassumedtheofficeofChiefJusticeon28August2017.Histermextendsto2October2018.The article has a wide sweep and specifies the right to seek constitutional remedies for theenforcementofFundamentalRightsguaranteedbytheConstitution.Itreads:32.RemediesforenforcementofrightsconferredbythisPart.-

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(1)TherighttomovetheSupremeCourtbyappropriateproceedingsfortheenforcementoftherightsconferredbythisPartisguaranteed.(2)TheSupremeCourtshallhavepowertoissuedirectionsorordersorwrits,includingwritsin the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,whichevermaybeappropriate,fortheenforcementofanyof(3)Withoutprejudice to thepowers conferredon theSupremeCourtby clauses (1)and (2),Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of itsjurisdictionalloranyofthepowersexercisablebytheSupremeCourtunderclause(2).(4)TherightguaranteedbythisarticleshallnotbesuspendedexceptasotherwiseprovidedforbythisConstitution.GautamBhatia,‘MasterandtheRoster’,TheIndianExpress,15January2018.Even after all these years, it is instructive to read—and bear in mind as a warning—theobservationsthatprovidedsuchaconvenientrationalizationforthepoliticalexecutivetoseektoreopensettledcasesthatweretheverydykesofliberty.HereiswhatJusticeP.N.Bhagwatiwrote: ‘Imaypointoutat this stage that theargumentson thisquestionwerespreadoveraperiodofaboutthreeweeksandconsiderablelearningandscholarshipwerebroughttobearonthisquestiononbothsides.Thehearingoftheargumentscommencedon22ndOctober1979and it ended on 16th November 1979. I hoped after the completion of the arguments onquestions of such momentous significance, there would be a “free and frank exchange ofthoughts” ina judicialconferenceeitherbeforeorafter thedraft judgmentwascirculatedbymyLordtheChiefJusticeandIwouldeitherbeabletosharetheviewsofmycolleaguesorifthatwasnotpossible,atleasttrytopersuadethemtoagreewithmypointofview.But,Ifindmyself in the same predicament in which the learned Chief Justice found himself inKesavanandaBharativ.StateofKerala.ThelearnedChiefJusticestartedhisjudgmentinthatcasebyobserving:“Iwantedtoavoidwritingaseparatejudgmentofmyownbutsuchachoiceseemsnolongeropen.We sat in full strengthof13 tohear the case and I hoped that after a free and frankexchange of thoughts, I would be able to share the views of someone or the other of myesteemedbrothers,butwewereovertakenbyadventitiouscircumstances”,namely,somuchtimewastakenupbythecounsel toexplaintheirrespectivepointsofviewthatverylittletimewaslefttotheJudges“aftertheconclusionofthearguments,forexchangeof draft judgments”. Here also, I am compelled by similar circumstances, though notadventitious,tohanddownaseparateopinionwithouthavinghadanopportunitytodiscusswith my colleagues the reasons which weighed with them in striking down the impugnedconstitutional amendments. Somehow or other, perhaps owing to extraordinary pressure ofworkwithwhichthisCourtisover-burdened,nojudicialconferenceordiscussionwasheldnorwasanydraftjudgmentcirculatedwhichcouldformthebasisofdiscussion,though,aspointedoutabove,thehearingoftheargumentsconcludedasfarbackas16thNovember,1979.Itwasonlyon8thMay,1980,justtwodaysbeforetheclosingoftheCourtforthesummervacation,thatIwasinformedbythelearnedChiefJusticethatheandtheotherthreelearnedJudges,whohad heard this case along with me, had decided, to pass an order declaring the impugnedconstitutional amendments ultra vires and void on the ground that they violated the basicfeaturesoftheConstitutionandthatthereasonsforthisorderwouldbegivenbythemlater.Ifounditdifficulttopersuademyselftoadoptthisprocedure,becausetherehadbeennojudicialconferenceordiscussionamongsttheJudgeswheretherecouldbefreeandfrankexchangeofviewsnorwasanydraftjudgmentcirculatedandhenceIdidnothavethebenefitofknowingthereasonswhythe learnedChiefJusticeandtheotherthree learned judgeswere inclinedto

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strike down the constitutional amendments. If there had been a judicial conference ordiscussion or the draft judgment setting out the reasons for holding the impugnedconstitutional amendments ultra vires and void had been circulated, it would have beenpossibleforme,asaresultoffullandfrankdiscussionorafterconsideringthereasonsgiveninthedraft judgment,eithertoagreewiththeviewtakenbymyLordtheChiefJusticeandtheotherthree learned judgesor if Iwasnot inclinedsotoagree, thenpersuadethemtochangetheirviewandagreewithmine.Thatistheessenceofjudicialcollectivism.It is,tomymind,essentialthatajudgmentofaCourtshouldbetheresultofcollectivedeliberationofthejudgescomposing the Court and it would, in my humble opinion, not be in consequence withcollectivedecision-making,ifoneormoreofthejudgesconstitutingtheBenchproceedtosaythattheywillexpresstheirindividualopinion,ignoringtheircolleaguesandwithoutdiscussingthereasonswiththemandevenwithoutcirculatingtheirdraftjudgmentsothatthecolleagueshave no opportunity of participating in the collective decision-making process. This wouldintroduce a chaotic situation in the judicial process and itwould be an unhealthy precedentwhich this Court as the highest Court in the land—as amodel judicial institutionwhich isexpected to set the tone for the entire judiciary in the country—should not encourage.Moreover, I felt that itwas not right to pronounce an order striking down a constitutionalamendmentwithoutgivingareasonedjudgment.Ordinarily,acasecanbedisposedofonlybyareasonedjudgmentandtheordermustfollowuponthe judgment.It is truethatsometimeswherethecaseinvolvesthelibertyofthecitizenortheexecutionofadeathsentenceorwherethetimetakeninpreparingareasonedjudgmentmightpre-judiciallyaffectthewinningparty,thisCourtdoes,inthelargerinterestsofjustice,pronounceanorderandgivereasonslater,buttheseareexceptionalcaseswheretherequirementsofjusticeinducetheCourttodepartfromthelegallysanctionedcourse.But,herethecourthadinfactwaitedforabout5½monthsaftertheconclusionoftheargumentsandtherewasclearlynourgencywhichrequiredthatanordershouldbemade though reasonswerenot ready, thedelayof about2months inmaking theorder was not going to injure the interests of any party, since the order was not going todisposeofthewritpetitionandmanyissueswouldstillremaintobedecidedwhichcouldbedealtonlyafterthesummervacation.ThustherewouldhavebeennoprejudicetotheinterestsofjusticeiftheorderhadbeenmadeonthereopeningoftheCourtafterthesummervacationsupportedbyareasoned judgment.Thesewere thereasonswhichcompelledmetomakemyorderdated9thMay,1980decliningtopassanunreasonedorderpronouncingonthevalidityof the impugned constitutional amendments and stating that Iwould “prefer to pass a finalorder in this case when I deliver my reasoned judgment”. This order unfortunately led toconsiderablemisunderstanding ofmy position and that is the reasonwhy I have thought itnecessarytoexplainbrieflywhyIactedinthemannerIdid.’C.f.,MinervaMillsv.UnionofIndia,(1980)3SCC625.C.f.,DushyantDave, ‘ChiefJusticeof India—Aboveorunderthe law?’,TheIndianExpress,10 January 2018. For several examples, see the note that the Campaign for JudicialAccountability andReforms issuedon12 January2018 in thewakeof thepress conferenceheldbyJusticeChelameswarandhiscolleagues.AnanthakrishnanG,Kaunain Sheriff,LizMathew,ManojCG,RavishTiwari, ‘DivisionandBench’,TheIndianExpress,21January2018.R.P.Luthrav.UnionofIndia,decidedon27October2017, (2017)SCCOnline1254.Asaconsequenceoftheletterofjudgestowhichweshalljustturn,theChiefJusticetookoverthecase in a three-judge bench. The bench upheld the decision of the two judges to rejectR.P.Luthra’sclaim,butheldineffectthatnothingotherthanthisrejectionwouldsurvivefromthe

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earlierjudgment.SupremeCourtAdvocates-on-RecordAssociation,(2016)5SCC1.Onallthis,thelettertotheChiefJusticeofIndiareleasedbyJusticesJ.Chelameswar,JusticeRanjanGogoi,JusticeMohanLokurandJusticeJosephKurianattheirpressconferenceon12January2018.C.f.,TheIndianExpress,2February2018.

8Whatifhehadnotwrittenthatletter?‘Isthereanywaytosubstantiatethatclaim—ofhavingdisposedof25,000cases?’Iaskedmyfriend,theadvocateRahulUnnikrishnaninChennai.Hisresponse:‘It isverydifficulttofindthe exact numberof cases disposedof by JusticeKarnan.Manupatra (thedatabase of courtjudgments)hasreported1,068decisions indeliveringwhichhewasapart.Outof1,068,hewrote 915 while sitting by himself. The remaining 153 were ruled when he was a part ofvariousdivisionbenches.However, thisdoesnotmean thatheauthoredall the153divisionbenchdecisions.’Rahuladded, ‘Allofusareoftheviewthathis judgmentswereerraticandnotverywell-reasoned…’IlangovanRajasekaran,‘JusticeC.S.Karnan:Acontroversialcareer,’Frontline,10June2017.After detailing Justice Karnan’s erratic ways, and showing how completely justified theSupreme Court was in holding him guilty of having committed contempt of court, ArvindDatarpointedout that thecaseneverthelessraisedaseriesofquestions inregardto lawandcourtprocedure.Helistedtheseasfollows:

Would ithavebeenproper to firstconvict JusticeKarnanandthenadjourn thecase forsentencing? (Thiswas done in the case ofVijayMallyawhowas also convicted on thesamedaybuthiscasehadbeenadjournedtoalaterdateforimposingasentence.)Can a High Court sentence a district judge to imprisonment by adopting a similarprocedure?CanadivisionbenchoftwoSupremeCourtjudgespassasimilarsentence?Whatshouldbethestrengthofabenchthatpassessuchasentence?TheConstitutionenablestheremovalofaHighCourtjudgeonlybytheprocessprescribedunderArticle124(4)—bywhat ispopularly termedas the ‘impeachmentprocess’. In thepresentcase,JusticeKarnanwouldhaveretiredon11June2017.Ifhehadseveralyearstocontinue, can a conviction for contempt result in his removal as aHighCourt judge inviewofthemandatoryprovisionofArticle124(4)?Will it be necessary for Parliament to pass a resolution for his removal under Article124(4)afterthesentenceofimprisonmentispassed?WhathappensifParliamentdoesnotpassanyresolutionforhisremoval?Willtheconvictedjudgecontinueinserviceevenifnoworkisallottedtohim?Is it not necessary to set-up an in-house correction mechanism to deal with judicialmisconductorothercasesofimpropriety?

C.f.,ArvindDatar,‘JusticeC.S.Karnan—anignominiousend,’BarandBench,11May2017,https://barandbench.com/justice-cs-karnan-ignominious-end-arvind-datar/

9EloquenceFor an appreciation of Justice Krishna Iyer’s contributions to Indian jurisprudence, a view

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stressing howhe had his heart in the right place, and howhis enlargements of the law andcreativeinterpretationsbroughtrelieftomillions,seeFaliS.Nariman,BeforeMemoryFades:AnAutobiography,HayHouse,NewDelhi,2010.SubramanianSwamyv.UnionofIndiaandOrs.,(2016)7SCC221.TunkuVaradarajanwastheonewhofirstdrewattentiontoJusticeMisra’sproseinthiscase.C.f.,TunkuVaradarajan,‘JudgmentbyThesaurus,Ora“ProponementinOppugnation”totheSupremeCourt’suseoflanguage,’TheWire,16May2016.Ashethenwas.Atthetimeofwriting,heistheChiefJusticeofIndia.(2014)9SCC1.(2015)6SCC287.Trends of this kind have invited comment from many quarters. In his succinct, and usefularticles ‘On judgmentwriting’, JusticeM. JagannadhaRao remarked, ‘…Some Judges thinkthatuseofhighflownlanguageisnecessary.Intheiranxietytodoso,theyusewordswhichareeithertotallyinappropriateor“disproportionate”tothecontextorthesituation.Inmyview,ajudgmentmustusesimple language,whichthe litigantpublicorthe legalprofessionorotherjudgescanfollow.Thereisnoneedtoshowoffandattemptastylishlanguagenotone’sownandleavethereadertosearchfortheratioofthecase.’Thefirstofthesetwoarticles—fromwhichthispassageistaken—wasbasedonanarticlepublishedbytheUPJudicialTrainingandResearchInstitute,Lucknow,whenhewasChiefJusticeoftheDelhiHighCourt.(2013)4SCC1.Youhadtolookupthedictionaryforthatone,didn’tyou?Theoriginaljudgmentconcernedthedeathbystrangulationofalady.Herhusbandwassaidtobe the one who had killed her. The trial court had acquitted him. The High Court hadoverturnedthetrialcourtacquittal.TheSupremeCourtupheldtheHighCourtdecision.Thejudgemightaswellhaveincludedtheparagraphthatprecededthetwohereproduced—foritwas just as eloquent: ‘BATTLE OF SEXES has always been a battle of wits. Today it isdenuded of its charms. It has degenerated into aWAR involving physical violence, torture,mental cruelty and murder of the female, including, particularly, the WIFE (caps in theoriginal).’Butthen,perhapsdoingsowouldhavemadethecontexttooobvious.C.f.,CentreforEnquiryintoHealthandAlliedThemes(CEHAT)andOrs.v.UnionofIndiaandOrs.MANU/SC/0291/2001,(2001)5SCC577;andCentreforEnquiryintoHealthandAlliedThemes(CEHAT)andOrs.v.UnionofIndiaandOrs.MANU/SC/0700/2003,(2003)8SCC398.VoluntaryHealthAssociationofPunjabv.Unionof India andOrs.,MANU/SC/1433/2016,(2016)10SCC265.(1997)7SCC110.RamlilaMaidanIncident,inRe,SuoMotuWritPetition(Crl.)No.122of2011,decidedon20June2011,(2012)5SCC125.2015ALLMR(Cri)17.TheAurangabadbenchoftheHighCourtofBombay.C.f., Dr. Dattatraya v. The State of Maharashtra and Taluka Adhikari @ The MedicalSuperintendentClass-I,2014ALLMR(Cri)3977;Vinayakv.TheStateofMaharashtra,2014ALLMR(Cri)3393;Dr.RavindraandDr. Sudarshanav.TheStateofMaharashtra, throughDr.B.R.Sonwane,2016ALLMR(Cri)1876;Dr.Sau.Nirmalav.TheStateofMaharashtra,through itsSecretaryandAppropriateAuthority&MedicalSuperintendent throughDr.S.A.Sable, Beed, 2016 ALLMR(Cri) 1034; Radhakrishna v. The State of Maharashtra, 2016

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ALLMR(Cri)1556;Zahedav.StateofMaharashtra,2016ALLMR(Cri)2049.OfLiveLaw.inLikeflowerylanguage,thisfeaturetoohasinvitedcomment,fromjudgesamongothers.Inthearticles on judgment writing cited earlier, Justice Jagannadha Rao observed, ‘Likewise,sometimes,Case lawissetout,referringtoonerulingafteranother.SomeJudgesmake longextractsfromjudgmentsoftheSupremeCourtorHighCourtcitedbybothsides.Onedoesnotknowwhichaspectoftheprecedent isbeinghighlighted.Onedoesnotknowwhichrulingisfollowedorapplied to the factsof thecasenorwhich isdistinguished…’He returned to thetheme:‘Therearedifferenttypesoflengthyjudgments.Someextractthepleadingsextensivelyandthenrefertotheargumentsofcounselonbothsides inextensoalmosttill theendofthejudgment and the ultimate conclusion follows soon thereafter without adequate reasons.Paragraphafterparagraphwouldstartwiththewords:“Itiscontendedby…”andonewouldneithergetthefactsnorthereasoninganywhere…Yetanotherformoflengthyjudgmentisthe“tonsorial and agglutinative” as described by JusticeCardozo… It is “shears and paste-potwhichareits implementsandemblem”;itconsistsoflongextractsfromjudgments,oneaftertheother, inunending succession.Everyparagraph starts: “InAvs.B, itwasheld”and themechanicallongextractstarts.Thereisnoemphasisonaparticularaspectnortothedistinctivefactsofthecasescited.Thecasesarenotevengroupedinrelationtoidentityorcloseproximityof facts or reasons. After long pages of quotations, towards the end, the result suddenlyappears. There is no connecting link between the extracts and results. In fact, the citedquotationsmaynotallbeuniformandtheJudgedoesnotsaywhichprecedenthefollowsorwhichprecedenthedistinguishes.Thejudgmentisnaturallyreportedbecauseofthequotationsitcontainsbuthasnoprecedentialvalue.’(2014)9SCC1.(1980)3SCC625;(1986)4SCC222;(1988)4SCC130.Kapur,B.R.v.StateofTamilNadu,(2001)7SCC231.Coleho,I.R.v.StateofTamilNadu,(1999)7SCC580.LilyThomasv.UnionofIndia,(2013)7SCC653.TheConstitutionReviewCommissionhadpointedtoanincongruity.Undersub-section(1),alegislator convicted, say, of rape, was to remain disqualified for six years. He would besentenced to spend tenyears inprison.Hence, in the last fouryearsofhis imprisonment,hecouldagainstandforelectionsfromwithintheprison,andbecomealegislator!Onthisandtheimperativetooverturntheself-servingsub-section8(4),seeArunShourie,TheParliamentarySystem:WhatWeHaveMadeofIt,WhatWeCanMakeofIt,ASAandRupa,NewDelhi,2007,pp.100–02.

10AndyetIamtakenbysurpriseHighCourtofHimachalPradesh,StateofH.P. v.NarottamSinghandOrs., decidedon20May2016:http://164.100.138.228/casest/generatenew.php?path=data/judgment/2016/&fname=CRCR.R201742015.pdf&smflag=NAs I havemerely downloaded the passages from thewebsite of theHimachal PradeshHighCourt,thesyntax,words,thevariationsinthewayaparticularwordisspelled,thevariationsinquotationmarksareastheyoccurinthejudgment.Ihadsetout thissequence inFallingOverBackwards,(HarperCollins,2012)fromwhichthe

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followingistaken.St.Stephen’sCollegev.UniversityofDelhi,(1992)SCC558.T.M.A.PaiFoundationv.StateofKarnataka,(2002)8SCC481.IslamicAcademyofEducationv.StateofKarnataka,(2003)6SCC697.P.A.Inamdarv.StateofMaharashtra,(2006)13SCC293.P.A.Inamdarv.StateofMaharashtra,op.cit.

11SomuchscienceOrderonBunty alias Sandip v. State ofRajasthan,Writ 71/2016. JusticeMahesh Sharma’sorders arewritten inHindi.Unlessotherwise indicated, thepassages are translated from theHindioriginal.Under theRajasthanBovineAnimals (ProhibitionofSlaughterandRegulationofTemporaryMigrationorExport)Act,1995.On all this, Jago Janata Society v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Writ Number 15585/2010.JudgmentofJusticeMaheshSharmadeliveredon31May2017.OriginalinEnglish.OriginalinEnglish.InAyurveda,itistheimbalanceofvata,pittaandkaphawhichcausesillnesses.LalmaniVerma,‘Togetmassestoyagna,RSSarmtoarguecowmilkcanarrestcrimegraph’,TheIndianExpress,6February2018.2017(2)RCR(Civil)636(PIL)No.126of2014.S.Mahendranv.TheSecretary,TravancoreDevaswomBoard.Decidedon5April1991:AIR1993Ker42.Ashok M., ‘SC sentences murder accused to 2-months imprisonment for contempt’,LiveLaw.in,4December2017.Onallthis,SitaRamv.Balbir@Bali,Conmt.Pet.©No.374/2014inCrl.A.No.1834/2013,Orders of Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar and Justice D.Y.Chandrachud,dated3October2017and1December2017.

12ThinkingthroughShyamNarayanChoukseyv.UnionOfIndia,WritPetition(s)(Civil)No(s).855/2016,decidedon30November2016.For the following, Shyam Narayan Chouksey v. Union of India, MANU/MP/0292/2003.?CoramJusticeDipakMisraandJusticeA.K.Shrivastava.TherelevantArticleoftheConstitutionreads:134A.Certificate forappeal totheSupremeCourt.—EveryHighCourt,passingormakingajudgment,decree,finalorder,orsentence,referredtoinclause(1)ofarticle132orclause(1)ofarticle133,orclause(1)ofarticle134,—(a)may,ifitdeemsfitsotodo,onitsownmotion;and(b)shall, if anoralapplication ismade,byoronbehalfof thepartyaggrieved, immediatelyafterthepassingormakingofsuchjudgment,decree,finalorderorsentence,determine,assoonasmaybeaftersuchpassingormaking,thequestionwhetheracertificateofthenaturereferredtoinclause(1)ofarticle132,orclause(1)ofarticle133or,asthecasemaybe,sub-clause(c)ofclause(1)ofarticle134,maybegiveninrespectofthatcase.

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Clause(b)whichappliestothematterbeingdiscussedhasbeenitalicised.Shyam Narayan v. Union of India, M.C.C. No. 591 of 2003, Order of 28 July 2003,MANU/MP/1044/2003.Karan Johar v.Unionof India,Decidedon19April 2004,MANU/SC/0535/2004, (2004) 5SCC 127. The judges were: Chief Justice V.N. Khare, Justice S.B. Sinha and Justice S.H.Kapadia.On the following, Rahul Unnikrishnan, ‘The Supreme Court’s TrystWith Patriotism LacksLegislativeBacking’,TheWire,20December2016.K. Veeramani v. The Chairman, Teachers’ Recruitment Board, College Road, Chennai-6,decidedon25July2017.TheChairman,TeachersRecruitmentBoard,CollegeRoad,Chennai,600006v.K.Veeramani,W.A.No.1040of2017andC.M.P.No.14776of2017,decidedon12October2017.DrA.Kennedy v.The state representedby Inspector ofPolice,Ambur townPolice Station,VelloreDistrict,Cr.no.396of2017.C.f.,TheWire,24October2017.Onthesedevelopments,seeShyamNarayanChoukseyv.UnionofIndia,I.A.No.11/2017inW.P.(C)No.855/2016,Orderof23October2017;andShyamNarayanChoukseyv.UnionofIndia,WritPetition(Civil)No.855of2016,judgmentof9January2018.(2017)2SCC281.Togetasenseofrelativeproportions,itisusefultonotewhattheofficialstudiesonwhich theSupremeCourt reliedhad found.Ofaccidents in2015which couldbetracedtothefaultofthedrivers,thosewhichhadbeencausedbydrivershavingbeenundertheinfluenceofdrugsoralcoholaccountedfor4.2percent.Theyaccountedfor6.4percentofthefatalitiesinaccidentswhichcouldbeattributedtothefaultofdrivers.Ofthe51,204personswhohadbeenkilled in roadaccidentsonnationalhighways, 2,591—about5per cent—hadbeenkilledinaccidentswhichcouldbeattributedtodrivershavingbeenundertheinfluenceofdrugsoralcohol.Arrive Safe Society of Chandigarh v. The Union Territory of Chandigarh, Special LeavePetition(Civil)Number10243of2017,decidedon11July2017.For typical reports, and a photograph of that low-cost maze, see, for instance,http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/04/08/this-kerala-bar-has-literally-built-a-maze-to-escape-supreme-cou_a_22031228/; http://www.hindustantimes.com/gurgaon/gurgaon-cyberhub-ambience-mall-change-entrances-to-beat-500-metre-sc-liquor-ban/story-YwWUzGQ5EavsZb2DxDc3oM.htmlAbhayNathv.UniversityofDelhi(2009)17SCC205.BuddhiPrakashSharmav.UnionofIndia,(2005)13SCC61.SaurabhChaudriv.UnionofIndia,(2004)5SCC618.DineshKumarv.MotilalNehruMedicalCollege,(1986)3SCC727.DineshKumarv.MotilalNehruMedicalCollege,(1985)3SCC22.PradeepJainv.UnionofIndia,(1984)3SCC654.ArvindDataralsohadme‘actuallyreadandnotskipthrough’paragraphs6and7ofAbhayNath.Hethenshowedmethatthereweretwotypographicalmistakesinthatorderwhich,iffollowed,wouldturnthepositionthatwasdecreedonitshead!Inparagraph6,thewords‘if22.5% are reserved for SC/ST students’must read as ‘if 22.5% are not reserved for SC/STstudents’sincethesentencewouldbeinternallyinconsistentotherwise.Andinparagraph7,thewords ‘to the effect that 50%of the seats for all-India quota shall exclude the reservation’,must read as ‘to the effect that 50% of the seats for all-India quota shall include the

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reservation’.InPuneMunicipalCorporationv.HarakchandMisrimalSolanki,(2014)3SCC183.InIndoreDevelopmentAuthorityv.Shailendra(deceased)throughLR,(2018)SCCOnlineSC100.StateofHaryanav.G.D.GoenkaTourismCorporationLtd.,Orderof21February2018;BarandBench,22February2018,andTheIndianExpress,22February2018.

13Circumstances,consequences,meta-consequencesStateofKeralav.N.M.Thomas,(1976)2SCC310.IndraSawhneyv.UnionofIndia,(1992)Supp(3)SCC217;andIndraSawhneyv.UnionofIndia,(2000)1SCC168.M.Nagarajv.UnionofIndia,(2006)8SCC212.‘Individual Liberty andNational Security’, in Arun Shourie,WeMustHaveNo Price, Andeveryonemustknowthatwehavenoprice,TheExpressGroupandRupa,2010,pp.10–45.Article22provides:22.Protectionagainstarrestanddetentionincertaincases:(1)Nopersonwhoisarrestedshallbedetainedincustodywithoutbeinginformed,assoonas

maybe,ofthegroundsforsucharrestnorshallhebedeniedtherighttoconsult,andtobedefendedby,alegalpractitionerofhischoice.

(2)Everypersonwhoisarrestedanddetainedincustodyshallbeproducedbeforethenearestmagistratewithinaperiodoftwenty-fourhoursofsucharrestexcludingthetimenecessaryforthejourneyfromtheplaceofarresttothecourtofthemagistrateandnosuchpersonshallbedetainedincustodybeyondthesaidperiodwithouttheauthorityofamagistrate.

(3)Nothinginclauses(1)and(2)shallapply-(a)toanypersonwhoforthetimebeingisanenemyalien;or(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive

detention.(4)No lawproviding forpreventivedetention shallauthorise thedetentionofaperson fora

longerperiodthanthreemonthsunless-(a)anAdvisoryBoardconsistingofpersonswhoare,orhavebeen,orarequalifiedtobe

appointed as, Judges of aHigh Court has reported before the expiration of the saidperiodofthreemonthsthatthereisinitsopinionsufficientcauseforsuchdetention:Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any personbeyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause(b)ofclause(7);or

(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made byParliamentundersub-clauses(a)and(b)ofclause(7).

(5)Whenanyperson isdetained inpursuanceofanordermadeunderany lawprovidingforpreventivedetention,theauthoritymakingtheordershall,assoonasmaybe,communicateto such person the grounds onwhich the order has beenmade and shall afford him theearliestopportunityofmakingarepresentationagainsttheorder.

(6)Nothinginclause(5)shallrequiretheauthoritymakinganysuchorderasisreferredtointhatclausetodisclosefactswhichsuchauthorityconsiderstobeagainstthepublicinteresttodisclose.

(7)Parliamentmaybylawprescribe-

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(a)thecircumstancesunderwhich,andtheclassorclassesofcasesinwhich,apersonmaybe detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing forpreventivedetentionwithoutobtainingtheopinionofanAdvisoryBoardinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsub-clause(a)ofclause(4);

(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases bedetainedunderanylawprovidingforpreventivedetention;and

(c)theproceduretobefollowedbyanAdvisoryBoardinaninquiryundersub-clause(a)ofclause(4).

D.K.Basuv.StateofWestBengal,(1997)1SCC416,at435–36.Seealso,D.K.Basuv.StateofWestBengal,(1998)9SCC437;andforthecoursethatthecasetookintheSupremeCourt,Arvind Datar, Constitution of India, Volume I, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, Secondedition,2007,p.246.AnambiguityinD.K.Basuleadstoatypicallyunwarrantedinference.Thisbecameclearwhena senior judge of theGujaratHigh Court came up to the podium after I had delivered theJusticeP.D.DesaiMemorialLectureandsoughtto‘correcttherecord’asfarastheSupremeCourt’sjudgmentinthiscaseisconcerned.HesaidthatinD.K.BasuitselftheSupremeCourthadclearly stated that theguidelineswouldnotapply to terrorists.Hewasemphatic, sayingthathehadhimselfstudiedthejudgmentand,infact,hadbasedhisjudgmentinLokAdhikarSanghv.StateofGujarat [1998 (1)G.L.H.768] inparton thedistinction that theSupremeCourthadmadeinthisregard.Hecitedparagraph32ofD.K.Basuforthispurpose.Hemusthavemeantparagraph33,asparagraph32consistsofapassagefromthejudgmentoftheU.S.SupremeCourtinMirandav.StateofArizonatotheoppositeeffect.Inparagraph33ofD.K.Basu, the Supreme Court does affirm that the freedom of the individual must yield to thesecurityof the state; andalso that ‘in the verynatureof things therewouldbe aqualitativedifference in the method of interrogation of such a person as compared to an ordinarycriminal’.But, intheverysameparagraph,thecourt isequallyemphaticthatthemethodsofinterrogation adopted for even such a person shall have to be in strict conformitywith therequirementsofArticle21.Moreimportant,whenitsetsouttheguidelines—infact,itreferstothem as ‘requirements’, and it italicizes the word for emphasis—the Supreme Court, inparagraphs 34 and 35, makes them mandatory for ‘all cases of arrest and detention’—nodistinctionisdrawnbetweenterrorists,theiraccomplicesandinstigatorsontheonehandandordinarycriminalsontheother.C.f.,D.K.Basu,(1997)ISCC416,paras32–35.Falling Over Backwards: An Essay against Reservations and against Judicial Populism,HarperCollins,2012.Originalpublicationin2006.GlanrockEstatePvt.Ltd.v.StateofTamilNadu,(2010)10SCC96.IndianMedicalAssociationv.UnionofIndia,(2011)7SCC179.Onthissequence,FallingOverBackwards,op.cit.,inparticular,pp.369–490.

Index

Acharya,B.V.:Activism, Judicial: need has arisen because executive& legislature have

neglected their duties: opportunity has arisen because of fallinglegitimacyofexecutive,legislatures:henceneedforoperatingprinciples:nullifies sub-section 8(4),Representation of PeoplesAct, 1951, createsnew crime but baulks at disqualifying convicted from Council ofMinisters: danger of getting carried away in a good cause:Advertisements,official:noverificationbycourtwhether itsordersarebeingimplemented:Agarwal,JusticeR.K.:

Ali,JusticeAkbar:Ali,Arman:abused:Ambedkar,B.R.:Ananthakrishnan,G.:Anbazhagan,K.:Ashok,M.:

Balakrishnan,ChiefJusticeK.G.:Banerjee,Milon:Banumathi,JusticeR.:BarandBench:Bhagwati,ChiefJusticeP.N.:Bharadwaj,Anjali:Bharadwaj,H.R.:Bhatia,Gautam:Bhatia,Varinder:

BhavaniSingh,G.:Bhushan,JusticeAshok:Bhushan,Prashant:Bingham,Lord:Bobde,JusticeS.A.:

Campaign for JudicialAccountability andReforms (CJAR):Caravan:onJudge Loya’s death: Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI): NirmalYadav case: ‘pre-written judgments’ case: somersaults on Sohrabuddincase:MedicalCollegecase:Chandrachud,JusticeD.Y.:

Chandrachud,ChiefJusticeY.V.:Chattopadhyay,BankimChandra:Chaturvedi,Salil:assaulted:Chauhan,JusticeB.S.:Cheema,JusticeA.I.S.:Chelameswar,JusticeJ.:Chouksey,ShyamNarayan:Contempt ofCourt: case against author: againstCJAR: JusticeKarnan’s

case: telling disbursal of fine collected under: Council of Ministers:judgment on whether convicted can be in: Cows: gross neglect ingovernment gaushala: judgment on boons from: as national animal:D’Cunha,JusticeJohnMichael:meticulousjudgmentof,upheldineveryparticularbySupremeCourt:Datar,Arvind:

Dave,Dushyant:onwritsinSupremeCourtaboutJudgeLoya’sdeath:onRoster:Desai,Ashok:

Desai,JusticeD.A.:Defamation:proseof judgmenton: ingredientsof:Delinquentborrowers:

proseofjudgmenton:Dev,Atul:ontrailofJudgeLoya’sdeath:Femalefoeticide:proseofjudgmentson:Frontline:

Gandhi,Mahatma:Ghose,JusticePinakiChandra:meticulousjudgmentof:Gill,K.P.S.:Goel,JusticeA.K.:Gogoi,JusticeRanjan:Gosavi,M.V.:dischargeswithouttrial:Gupta,JusticeDeepak:

Gupta,Shekhar:

Haryana State Pollution Control Board: sends unwarranted noticesmechanically: Hindustan Zinc: 3-Judges dismiss challenge, 2-Judgesreadmit it: HomeMinister: does his job, writes a letter: Income TaxAppelateTribunal:‘pre-writtenjudgments’case:IndianExpress,The:

IndianMedicalAssociation:InternationalFilmFestivalKerala:Jaiswal,Kamini:Jayalalithaa,SelviJ.:disproportionateassetscaseagainst:effectsoncaseof

changingpolitical fortunesof: devices employedby lawyersof: gets tochooseprosecutor:fightstoretainaprosecutor:Jethmalani,Ram:

Judgments:clarificationsconfound:Judgments,writingof:Judiciary: imperative that it act at once on allegations against its own:

record unforunate in this regard: Judiciary: imperative it visualizeconsequences far afield: Judiciary: kept in position of supplicant: itselfharmed by not ensuring its orders are followed: hence, should ensurestrictcompliance:Judiciary:ultimateprotectionfor:imperativesforthis:Judiciary,infrastructurefor:Courtdoesnothingaboutblatantdisregardofitsorderson:Judiciary,salutarycontributionsof:yetwarningsignals:cautionnecessaryeveninpursuingagoodcause:KabhiKhushiKabhieGham:judgmentonscenein:Kalifullah,JusticeIbrahim:

Kapadia,ChiefJusticeS.H.:Karnan,JusticeC.S.:Kaur,JusticeNirmaljit:Kennedy,A.:haplessmedicalofficer:Khanwilkar,JusticeA.M.:Khare,ChiefJusticeV.N.:Kohli,JusticePermod:estimablejudgmentof:KrishnaIyer,JusticeV.R.:Kumaraswamy, Justice C.R.: innovative logic and calculations of,

overturnedwhollybySupremeCourt:KurianJoseph,Justice:

LawCommission:imperativethatpenaltiesbeimposed:onSupremeCourtdisregarding itsownadmonitions:on increasingnumberof Judgesandproviding infrastucture: Lawyers: devices adopted by: why devicespersist: ‘lawyer’s disease’: Liquor sales along highways: judgment on:judgment clarified: Punjab by-passes: remedy could have been:

LiveLaw.in:Lodha,ChiefJusticeR.M.:Lokur,JusticeMadanB.:Loya,JudgeB.H.:circumstancessurroundingdeathof,subsequentcourse

incourts:Luthra,R.P.:Malekar,Anosh:ontrailofJudgeLoya’sdeath:Malik,Saurabh:Mallya,Vijay:Manoj,C.G.:Mathew,Liz:Media: a few of the things it can do:Medical College case: contention

betweenbenchesabout:Meena,D.R.:Mishra,JusticeArun:Misra,ChiefJusticeDipak:Moily,Veerappa:Mukherjea,ChiefJusticeB.K.:Muralidharan,JusticeM.V.:

Nalawade,JusticeT.V.:Narayan,Jayaprakash:Nariman,F.S.:National Academy of Legal Studies and Research: National Anthem:

wheelchair-bound assaulted for not standing up: abused for not doingso: judgment on standing up: scene in picture and: a hapless medicalofficerand:judgmentrolledback:NationalJudicialAcademy:

Nazeer,JusticeAbdul:Non-state posses: new danger to freedoms, and to judiciary: Nundy,

Samiran:

Oberoi,Geeta:Oka,JusticeA.S.:

Pant,JusticePrafulla:Peacocks:judgmentoncelibacyof:Penaltiesfordraggingoutcases:inUK,

USA:weak law:LawCommission recommendations ignored: SupremeCourt ignores owndecisions regarding:what ordinary citizens cando:

Perjury:mustpenalizefor:Policereforms:Courtdoesnothingaboutbrazenanddeliberatedisregard

ofitsorders:Prasad,PresidentRajendra:Prime Minister: does his bit, writes a letter: Karnan writes to: Public

Prosecutor:convictedgettochoose:convictedfighttoretain:judgmentson validity of appointment of: Pul, Kalikho: suicide note, fate of:Quddusi,I.M.:

Radhakrishnan,JusticeK.S.Panicker:Rajasekaran,Ilangovan:RajasthanPatrika:Ramaswamy,JusticeV:voteonimpeachmentof:Ramdev,Baba:Rao,JusticeJagannadha:Rao,V.K.R.V.:RayChaudhuri,Shantanu:Roadacccidents:proportioncausedbydrunkdrivers:Rohatgi,Mukul:Roster:Roy, Justice Amitava: meticulous judgment of: on National Anthem:

Rustomji,K.F.:Sabrimalai: reasons for preventing women from shrine: Sahara-Birla

diaries:Salve,Harish:Sanitarynapkins:moneyfromcontemptfinefor:Sarin,Ritu:Sasikala,Natrajan:disproportionateassetscaseagainst:devicesemployed

by lawyersof: gets to chooseprosecutor: fights to retainaprosecutor:Sayed,JusticeA.A.:

Science:injudgmentsonpeacocks,cows,deity:Seervai,H.M.:Shah,Amit:Shah,JusticeA.P.:Shantanagouda,JusticeMohanM.:Sharma,JusticeMaheshChandra:onpeacocks:oncows: likelysourceof

information:Sheriff,Kunain:Shourie,Anita:draggedintoacasefornofaultofhers:Shrivastava,Justice

A.K.:Shukla,JusticeNarayan:

Sikri,JusticeA.K.:Singh,Prakash:Singh,JusticeShivaKirti:Singh,Tarlok:Sinha,JusticeS.B.:Sisodia,Pallav:Sleep: judgment emphasizes, re-emphasizes, re-re-emphasizes importance

of: Sohrabuddin: ‘encounter death’ of, and its aftermath: Solid wastedisposal: no verification by Court whether its orders are beingimplemented:Suggestions:mechanical solutionswon’tdo:agoodrule:imperative to visualize consequences: a few specific:what lawyers andlaymen can do: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association:assignedRs45lakhoutofContemptofCourtfine:SupremeCourtBarAssociation:assignedRs85lakhoutofContemptofCourtfine:Takle,Niranjan:doggedlyuncoversdiscrepancies inaccountsof JudgeLoya’sdeath:Tarkunde,JusticeV.M.:

Thakur,JusticeSureshwar:TimesofIndia,The:Tiwari,Ravish:Tribune,The:Tripathi,Rahul:Tully,Mark:Tulzapurkar,JusticeV.D.:

Unnikrishnan,Rahul:Utpat,JudgeJ.T.:suddentransferof:Vahanvati,GoolamE.:VandeMataram:judgmenton:Varadarajan,Tunku:Venugopal,K.K.:

Week,The:Wheelchair-bound: assaulted for not standing during National Anthem:

abused:Wire,The:Women:‘reasons’forkeepingthemfromSabrimalaishrine:Yadav,Justice

Nirmal:

ZeeTV:

AbouttheBook

The judiciary has been the one sturdy dyke that has saved us from theexcesses of rulers. But recent events remind us of the cracks that haveformed: the quality of individuals apart, even the institutionalarrangements that had been put in place to preserve the purity andindependenceoftheinstitution—thecollegium,conventionsgoverningtheway cases are to be assigned among judges—have frayed. These cracksprovide a dangerous opportunity to political rulers to suborn thisinstitution.

Through actual cases and judgments—of subordinate courts, HighCourts,theSupremeCourt—ArunShourieenablesustoseehowfrailandvulnerablethis‘lastpillarstanding’hasbecome.

A judge who, by a brazen manipulation of facts, lets a prominentpoliticianoff…Eventsanda judgment that let theconvictedchoose theprosecutorwhoistoconductthecaseagainstthem…Courtsthatturnablindeyetolife-and-deathreformsevenastheypreoccupythemselveswithtrivia…Courts that deliver ringing judgments and then do not care tolook if their directions are being implemented… Courts that disregardtheir own judgments on penalizing persons for perjury, for dragging outcases … Courts that do not think through the consequences, even thepredictable consequences of their judgments… Judges who prevaricate,wholooktheotherwaywhensomeoftheirownfraternitycomeunderacloud…Ajudgewhoismanifestlyunbalanced, judgeswhoseknowledgeof themostelementaryfactsofscience is laughable,a judgewhoseproseeventheSupremeCourtisunabletocomprehend—allofthemcontinuetohanddownrulingsthataffectthefortunesandlivesofthousands…Judgeswhodisregardwell-settledprinciplestosuchanextentthattheircolleaguesarecompelledtomaketheirgravemisgivingspublic…

And thenon-bailablewarrants thatare issued for thearrestofAnita,

ArunShourie’s ailingwife, for evading summons thatwerenever served,summons thatwere ostensibly issued for their having built a house thatwasneverbuilt,onaplottheydidnotown…

Throughthemeticulousexaminationthatisahallmarkofhiswriting,ArunShourie leadsus through judgmentsand instances—somehilarious,somanyinfuriating—andpointstothingsthateachofus—judges,lawyers,laypersonslikeus—candotoretrievethismostvitalofinstitutions.

AbouttheAuthor

Scholar,author,formereditorandminister,ArunShourieisoneofthemostprominentvoicesinourcountry’spubliclifeanddiscourse.Hehaswrittenovertwenty-fivebest-sellingbooks.

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FirstpublishedinhardbackinIndiabyHarperCollinsPublishersin2018

A-75,Sector57,Noida,UttarPradesh201301,Indiawww.harpercollins.co.in

24681097531

Copyright©ArunShourie2018

P-ISBN:978-93-5277-777-8EpubEdition©April2018ISBN:978-93-5277-778-5

Theviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisbookaretheauthor’sownandthefactsareasreportedbyhim,andthepublishersarenotinanywayliableforthesame.

ArunShourieassertsthemoralrighttobeidentifiedastheauthorofthiswork.

AllrightsreservedunderTheCopyrightAct,1957.Bypaymentoftherequiredfees,youhavebeengrantedthenonexclusive,nontransferablerighttoaccessandreadthetextofthisebookon-screen.Nopartofthistextmaybereproduced,transmitted,downloaded,decompiled,reverse-engineered,orstoredinorintroducedintoanyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,inanyformorbyanymeans,whetherelectronicormechanical,nowknownorhereinafterinvented,withouttheexpress

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