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Annex 3 Political Economy of Change in Nigeria

A3.1 Introduction The most striking feature of Nigeria’s political economy has been its “recursive” nature – the tendency to revert, despite a succession of reform attempts, shifting political alliances and institutional changes, to the same fundamental patterns of conflict and political behaviour. This reflects deeply rooted in structural features of Nigeria, that have existed at least since Independence and in many respects predate it. These can be summarised as: • A complex and shifting set of alliances and conflicts based around two divides

that have principally structured politics: a tripartite regional/ethnic divide (North – Hausa/Fulani, South West – Yoruba, South East - Igbo) and a Christian/Muslim religious divide, along with innumerable sectional and interest group divides (for instance between competing business interests). In general though regional/ethnic and religious politics have been of far more significance than class-based politics.

• The role of oil in providing since the early 1970s both the overwhelmingly most

important source of government revenue and the major source of economic instability.

• The predominantly rural population, despite a significant trend towards

urbanisation, and the concentration of poverty among the rural population, with the associated difficulties of achieving a united or effective political voice for the poor.

• The lack of any significant external threat or cultural or historical traditions

favouring national unity, in a large and diverse country with relatively poor communications and infrastructure.

Nigerian political leaders have faced the problem of maintaining national unity and containing potential and actual violence, through managing conflicts over resources and (increasingly) over religious ideology. This violence has, since the failure of the Biafran Secession, generally been contained to the local level. This has been achieved, in the absence of strong or effective state institutions, through a patrimonial politics which has sought to incorporate elite groups (and their clients) in the division of state resources, under the general hegemony of Northern elite groups focused on the military. But this has been at the cost of: • Failure to achieve fiscal control or to manage oil price-induced economic

volatility without incurring immense economic costs.

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• Failure to achieve “accountability to rules” or respect for public institutions throughout society and government, leaving the state vulnerable to larceny on a grand scale by those entrusted with the control of resources.

• A continuing fragmentation of the state through the creation of new government

entities (states, local governments, parastatals) in response to claims from those considering themselves disadvantaged under existing arrangements, and the lack of effective agencies of restraint at any level of government.

• The marginalisation of groups who are not effectively represented within the

patrimonial system. A variety of different regimes have grappled with varying degrees of seriousness with this set of problems. In particular, a large number of constitutional and policy solutions have been attempted. These institutional reforms have focused principally on: • Revenue-sharing arrangements between different regions and levels of

government. • The structure of local government. • The party and electoral system and the role of the legislature and executive. • Attempts to achieve fiscal discipline. Although there have been some periods of relative success (for instance the strong economic response to structural adjustment reforms in the earlier part of the Babangida period), the most striking feature is the continuity of the basic elements of the Nigerian political system, and the persistent failure of reform initiatives to effect decisive change to improve governance or economic management and to move Nigeria towards being a “developmental state.” This annex discusses the experience of institutional reform attempts in Nigeria since Independence. It is structured as follows. Section A3.2 discusses the concept of the developmental state and uses a typology of state types to elucidate a range of alternative models and the types of institutional change that would have been necessary to have achieved a movement towards a more developmental form of state. Section A3.3 summarises the main institutional reform efforts. Section A3.4 discusses the role of different agents in the political process, again focusing on continuities over the post-Independence period. The final section presents conclusions.

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A3.2 The Developmental State and Nigeria Leftwich (1995), based on a discussion of seven successful developing economies1, identified six key features that he characterised as constituting a “developmental state” that was able to pursue a coherent and long-term development strategy. These were: • A determined developmental elite, in: • A weak and subordinated civil society, which confers: • Relative autonomy, that is deployed by: • A powerful, competent, insulated economic bureaucracy, in: • The effective management of non-state interests, while: • Political legitimacy is conferred first by repression, and then by performance. Auty and Gelb (2001) characterise the developmental state as one state type defined in the framework shown in Table A3.1, which derives from Lal (1995). This framework defines the nature of the state in terms of the restraints on it and its aims.

Autonomy Aims Sub-type Markets role Examples Autonomous benevolent

Maximise social welfare

Developmental Hard constraint Indonesia, Hong Kong, S. Korea, Singapore, Taiwan

Paternalistic monarchy

Relaxed constraint

Brunei, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia

Autonomous predator

Maximise rent siphoning

Military elite Soft constraint Nigeria , Ghana

Central planning

Soft constraint Myanmar, N. Korea

Factional democracy

Maximise social welfare

Consensual Hard constraint Malaysia, Botswana, Chile

Polarised Relaxed constraint

Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, Jamaica

Factional oligarchy

Maximise rent siphoning

Urban/industry captures policy

Soft constraint Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, India, Mexico

Public officials capture policy

Soft constraint Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan

Ethnic alliance captures policy

Soft constraint Kenya, Sudan, South Africa

1 South Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Botswana.

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Within this framework, the autonomous state has the capacity to formulate and pursue its own objectives, while a factional state is beholden to political groupings that must be appeased. The aims of the state may be placed on a spectrum between predation (rent siphoning) and social welfare maximisation. The extent to which market constraints (including the government budget constraint) are relaxed is a measure of the pressures towards economic efficiency. 2 While this framework may be criticised as excessively narrow and failing to explain the relationship between autonomy and aims or the underlying causal mechanisms, it provides a useful perspective in which to consider the Nigerian experience, in terms of the types of policy and institutional changes that might be required in order to move towards a more developmental state model. Auty and Gelb note that resource-poor countries are particularly likely to follow the autonomous benevolent developmental state model, since there are few sustainable options for rent predation. Auty and Gelb characterise Nigeria as an autonomous predatory state. The discussion below suggests that this may be an oversimplification, and that in some respects Nigeria might better be characterised as a factional oligarchy in which policy has been captured by a military (and regional/ethnic) elite, but in which there are strong pressures from other elite groups that require accommodation by the ruling elite – which is not itself a single or entirely united group. Nigeria also has in certain respects an extremely active and organised civil (and unicivil) society. What Nigeria has conspicuously failed to achieve has been a hardening of market and government budget constraints, or a move under any type of political regime towards a consistent pursuit of developmental objectives, rather than the division of rents derived from oil revenues.

A3.3 Patterns of Institutional Reform

A3.3.1 Organisation of the Federal System In the words of one of the country’s most prominent nationalists in 1947, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Nigeria represented little more than a “geographical expression”. The biggest problem the country has faced since independence is to build national unity and establish a viable federal system of governance where ethnic and religious diversity can coexist and public policies are directed towards improving the welfare of all citizens. Constitutional negotiations in 1953/54 instituted a federal constitution, which transferred powers from the colonial government above and the native authorities below to regional governments. The country became administratively divided into three regions, each of which was relatively distinct and independent. At the end of the Colonial Rule in 1960, Nigeria as a state constituted a construct with a plurality of overlapping political and linguistic identities, founded on the federation of these three regions. Each region was 2 The lack of examples of a predatory state with hard market constraints suggests that in practice predatory state are rarely autonomous since softening market constraints is a characteristic way to accommodate and deflect conflicts over resources.

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dominated by one majority language group and incorporated minority groups that felt insecure and disadvantaged. The devolution of the central commodity marketing boards into regional marketing boards followed the creation of the regions. They provided the basis for increased spending, public service employment, party activities, political patronage and business activities at the regional level. Mineral rents and royalties accruing at the national level were allocated according to a revenue sharing formula over which fierce political conflicts would arise in later years. The fiscal arrangements set up prior to independence facilitated the emergence of regional elite coalitions that gained control over economic resources at the regional level and drew legitimacy from various sectional constituencies. This laid the grounds for the birth of a politics of patronage and the establishment of complex patron-client relationships. Once politicians had inherited control over the colonial state nationalist sentiments eroded and receded into sub-nationalism. Three main political parties emerged, each of which formed the government of one of the regions and consolidated power through the exercise of regional patronage and coercion. At independence in 1960 the federal government regained some authority over the regional governments and could increase the share of funds retained at the national level. This shifted the competition for power and access to public funds by sectionally backed politicians to the federal arena. During the 1960s, there were major challenges to the boundaries of the state with first the North first challenging, and then the East (seceding as Biafra) seeking Independence. The 1960s were marked by violent conflict between the regions. The subsequent history can be interpreted as one in which the powers of the original regions have been progressively weakened, and the claims of regional minorities for a share of power and resources accommodated, through the division of the regions into an increasing number of states, and the transfer of control of resources either to the federal level or to smaller units of state or local government, rather than to regional groupings. Military regimes (Obasanjo, Babangida) have subsequently tended to try and reduce the power of states through boosting local government, and during the 1980s and 1990s, traditional authorities through the payment of stipends to chiefs. The early post-Independence history illustrates clearly these basic trends. A coalition of two of the three regionally governing parties led the federal government of the First Republic. A Central Bank was created which extended the centre’s capacity to borrow money. The regulation of imports and financial markets furthermore increased the federal government’s economic and financial strength vis-à-vis the regions. Revenue from oil exports had begun to increase in 1959 and was shared amongst the federal government and the government of the East and, later, the Mid-West. The opposition party which exercised control only in the Western region but not at the centre split violently, allowing the federal government to remove the leadership of the Western state on the pretext of a state of emergency and took the opportunity to create a new, fourth Mid-West region. National elections to succeed the First Republic were held in 1964. But conflicts between the different regional parties led to the rejection of the results. New elections were to be

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arranged in 1965, but the ruling coalition party at the federal level ousted what remained of the opposition party, which tried to regain control in the West. Again election outcomes were nullified. This led to political violence and the breakdown of the First Republic. After a failed coup and the assassination of senior political figures from the West and North power passed on to the head of the army, Maj.-Gen. Aguyi-Ironsi. His first initiatives focused on abolishing the regions and unifying the federal and regional public services in an attempt to pull together power at the national level. As these measures would have undermined regional politicians access points to public funds, they provoked ethnically motivated clashes and led to the killing of Aguyi-Ironsi who was of Igbo background by northern soldiers and officers. The northern forces first called for the separation of the country. But international persuasion and not least the fact that northern forces found themselves in the control of the federal government convinced them to maintain national unity. A new constitutional conference took place in the second half of 1966 to review the delicate issue of political reorganisation of the country. But different parties and regions favoured different solutions and no agreement could be reached. In May 1967, Lt. Col. Gowon3 declared a state of emergency under the pretext of which he divided the four regions into twelve states. This led the Eastern Region with its oil reserves to declare the independence of the ‘Republic of Biafra’ and sparked the civil war which lasted until January 1970. The army’s victory strengthened its national position and completed the transfer of power to the armed forces. The state system was institutionalised by military rule. For the next decade the military dominated politics at the federal level, but could not penetrate governance rules and institutions sufficiently to undermine the distributive conflicts amongst and between the already established, sectionally-backed political classes. While the initial drive towards state creation came from the military’s desire to strengthen the hand of the federal government, subsequent changes have reflected the incentives created by the revenue-sharing formula to multiply the number of states and local governments in order to establish more access points to public funds. The Obasanjo regime in the late 1970s created a further seven states. During the Second Republic (1979-83) government actively encouraged the multiplication of states and local authorities to boost the popularity of the ruling party. During the first two years of the Second Republic the number of states increased and the number of local government areas more than doubled. The Babangida regime attempted to reverse the process of multiplication of state and local governments by reorganising the system into nine new states and 47 new local governments in 1991, each to be established with a new capital. This was greeted by violent opposition and was a significant factor in his replacement by Abacha. The move towards the proliferation of states and local governments continued. The number of local

3 Gowon was a Christian from the Northern Middle Belt.

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governments increased from 301 in 1976 to 776 in 1996, with the process of state creation continuing (for instance the creation of Bayelsa in 1996). The 1999 Constitution redefined the expenditure and revenue responsibilities of each level of government as described in Annex 2.

A3.3.2 Revenue Sharing Arrangements and Local Government The revenue sharing formula was first introduced prior to independence with the regionalisation of the marketing boards. It was altered six times between 1966 and 1979 affecting the division of revenue between the centre and the states and the distribution among the states. During the same period, oil revenue had gained importance relative to other sources of revenue and the states became more dependent on federal transfers. In the 1970s federal expenditure increasingly dominated expenditure by the states, rising to 70 percent by 1975/76. The fastest growing revenue, such as petroleum profit tax and company income tax accrued directly to the federal government and remained outside the allocation system. Forrest (1995) notes that the combination of political autonomy and fiscal dependence of the states vis-à-vis the centre provided incentives for fiscal irresponsibility and set up strong pressures for the creation of new states. Federal control and direction over state finances was non-existent. Loans to the states constituted contingent liabilities. The fiscal dependence of the states on the centre was furthermore increased by federally-led dismantling of direct tax systems at the state level. The northern states appeared to have gained disproportionately from the changes in the allocation formula and new state creation between 1967 and 1976 and brought them in line with their share of the total population. The northern states also seem to have gained most from the pattern of federal capital expenditure. The constitution of the Second Republic in 1979 made the decisive step of incorporating all the important sources of revenue except personal income tax into the allocation system. This and an increase in the statutory share of the states somewhat reversed the declining share of federal revenue accruing to the states. The 1979 constitution also established a statutory share of revenue allocated to local government councils and furthermore amended the revenue sharing formula to take into account revenue efforts by the states to provide incentives to raise revenue locally. During the Second Republic differences over revenue allocation created division between the federal government and opposition states. Attempts to change the formula in favour of the states succeeded in 1982. In the late 1980s , Babangida increased the share of revenue to local government and gave them responsibility for the provision of primary education and health care. In 1991 and 1992 there are further revisions that increase the share to local government and to the oil-producing areas. Local government authorities emerged from the former ‘Native Authorities’. They have been crucial for extending central government power to the local level. Under the

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Obasanjo regime local government reforms attempted to create a uniform third tier of government with elected councils. Traditional rulers were assigned symbolic and advisory roles only. The councils obtained greater autonomy from the states and the 1979 constitution intended to allocate more funds to the local government level. During the Second Republic, in an effort to undermine traditional authorities, direct local taxes were abolished. In the second half of the 1980s Babangida increased the allocation share of the revenue sharing formula to local governments from 10 to 15 and later 20 percent and gave them responsibility for primary education and health care. Payments were also to be made directly, circumventing the state governments where leakages had occurred in the past. State governments were also supposed to pass 10 percent of internally generated revenue to the councils. Powers of ministries of local government were cut to a supervisory role. This constituted an attempt to bring about greater responsibility and participation at the local government level, but also served to reduce the authority and resources of the states.

A3.3.3 The Role of the Executive and the Regulation of Party Competition The presidential system was introduced in the second half of the 1970s as part of the package of presidential changes establishing the Second Republic. The system change was proposed as an institutional solution to regulate political competition and undermine patronage and clientelism. It strengthened control at the central level in the hands of a president to counterbalance distributive conflicts between different sectional-based interest groups. The initial drafting of the presidential constitution was carried out by a Constitutional Drafting Committee appointed in 1975 and amended by a Constituent Assembly elected via local government councils. It was finally introduced in 1977 along with a Federal Electoral Commission that was to ensure that parties were nationally organised and leadership drawn from across the country. The new constitution followed the presidential system of the United States in the election of the president and state governors. Periods of office were coterminous with bicameral national and unicameral state legislature. Ministers and state commissioners were not members of, nor responsible to, the legislature. Further regulations on election and party organisation were directed at ensuring that political competition would be fought on a national, rather than regional or sectional basis. This system made it a requirement for cross -regional coalitions to be formed in preparation for elections. In 1979 five political parties were recognised in preparation for the upcoming elections. There origins were predominantly traceable to the First Republic. Each party incorporated a coalition of mainly state-based interests but worked within broader regional and national networks. Politicians from the major language groups were divided over policy issues and the concern how their constituents’ interests could best be protected at the national level. In the elections one party, the NPN, managed to claim significant support in seven states and could alone claim national support, whilst the other parties drew support only from their respective home states.

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The failure of the Second Republic to break the mould of regionally patronage based politics induced the Babangida regime to modify the presidential system in preparation for the promised transition to the Third Republic by banning all existing parties and institutionalising a two party system with prescribed constitutions, manifestos, offices and the like. This was an attempt to redirect politics away from tripartite regional alignments experienced in the previous Republics and with a clear reference to features of the two-party system in the US. Babangida subsequently annulled the results of the election under this system. The role of the People’s Democratic Party since 1999 reflects a further attempt to build a cross-regional coalition. It evolved out of a group (Group of 34) established in the mid 1990s by former politicians led by Alex Ekwueme (former Vice President during the 2nd Republic) whose purpose was to prevent then president Abacha from succeeding himself and becoming Civilian President. By 1998, Abacha had already initiated plans to present himself as the ‘sole candidate’ at the forthcoming elections. After his death in June, it fell to General Abulsalami Abubakar to prepare for the elections that would usher in the transition from military to civilian rule. It was in this context that the Group of 34 transformed itself into the People’s Democratic Party. It was at this time that the full weight of the mainly Muslim northerners in the military (retired Generals) was brought to bear. Babangida himself was amongst them and played a prominent role in bankrolling the new party. It was this block that brought Obasanjo out of prison to ensure that he became President. It is the same block that has become disgruntled because Obasanjo appears not to have served their interests well. Prior to his election in 1999 (when the PDP won 60% of the seats in the National Assembly and 60% of the states, mainly in the north, the south south and the east), although he had been head of state in the late 1970s. Obasanjo’s relative absence from politics for some 20 years prior to his imprisonment by Abacha, meant that he was reliant on his old power base, at least during the early period of his term in office. Much of the instability from which his regime has suffered stems from the difficulties of imposing his authority on the party. In three years there were two speakers of the lower house and three presidents of the Senate, whilst three different chairmen have presided over the party. The establishment of an authoritarian developmental state along the lines of East Asian models has typically involved a strong and effective alliance between the military and technocrats in charge of policy making, which has provided for stable policies and a long-term time perspective in policy making. Nigeria has failed to institutionalise policy-making and advice and so to establish a stable and authoritative technocratic group. Regimes have differed with respect to the relationship between state administration and federal government. Military regimes tend to keep a tighter grip on the state governments and so have increased the power of senior federal civil servants. Particularly under the rule of Gowon in the early 1970s, the military relied heavily on civil servants to formulate and execute policy. Bureaucratic power was referred to as the rule of the ‘super-permanent secretaries’. However during the Obasanjo regime in the late 1970s, civil servants lost much of their power as outsiders were brought in to advise the government. Executive power shifted away from the permanent secretaries to the cabinet

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office. The fiscal crisis during the Second Republic severely affected the payment of the civil service and disrupted the provision of public services. After the Second Republic the influence of the civil service increased. However, Babangida reversed this process by strengthening the Office of the President and setting up a parallel bureaucracy in the form of presidential committees, directorates and executive aides. In a move to increase the authority of the executive and to erode the position of senior civil servants, ministers were made both chief executives and accounting officers and each ministry was allowed to appoint and promote its own staff. Several changes with respect to political organisation and institutions were carried out with the result that administration and revenue were directly in the patrimony of the president. The way in which senior political and civil service appointments are used as a means principally to maintain ethnic and religious balance in policy making and access to patronage is well illustrated by Table A3.1. Table A3.1 Ministerial Appointments and senior civil service posts post 1999 Geographical Zone Predominant Religion Ministerial or Senior Civil

service Appointments North West (Hausa speaking Borno axis)

Islam 40

North East (Hausa Fulani) Islam 37 North Central (North Minority)

Animism and Christianity

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South West (Yoruba) Christianity and Islam 35 South South (minorities) Christianity 32 South East (Igbo) Christianity 31 Source: Mustapha (2003).

A3.3.4 Failure of Fiscal Control One of the main ways in which Nigeria has failed to emulate the model of a developmental state has been the failure of fiscal control and the poor quality of macroeconomic management – in particular in relation to inflation, debt creation, and the instability of the real exchange rate. As noted in Annex 2, Indonesia was able to grow fast and achieve poverty reduction over several decades under authoritarian military rule and with high levels of corruption in large part because the quality of macroeconomic management was not compromised – in part because of the traumatic experience of hyperinflation under Sukarno that had prompted Suharto’s coup. The breakdown of control over public expenditure was related to the massive increase in oil revenues after 1970 under the Gowon regime. In 1970 Gowon had promised to transfer power to an elected government by 1976. Military rule was generally viewed as a transitory arrangement, but the regime kept postponing the date for elections. While oil revenue flowed into the country, corruption driven by those in power escalated at all

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levels of government, exacerbated by the high level of autonomy over expenditures at the state level. The government had committed itself to an ambitious policy programme, but did not possess the administrative or political capacity to implement it or the ability to adjust expenditures downwards when oil prices declined. The economic consequences of financial irresponsibility and corruption were reflected in escalating inflation and provoked widespread industrial unrest. The attempt to buy political support by wage and salary increases only exacerbated the problem. With the objective of restoring central control over states, northern backed senior military officers succeeded in removing the Gowon government in July 1975 and made the new state military governors serving officers under the central government. The new regime under Gen. Murtala tried to establish a centralised military regime in the hands of northerners, but resentment from within the armed forces allowed Maj.-Gen Obasanjo in February 1976 to take over. He used the already initiated re-centralisation of state power to carry forward a series of reforms: Seven further states were created, trade unions restructured into industrial unions under the head of a single Nigerian Labour Congress and the rules governing the ownership of shares in foreign enterprises were revised. But the regime failed to control economic problems relating to high inflation, sharply rising debt levels and investments that did not render the expected return. This culminated in a balance-of-payment crisis in 1978. The Shagari government was particularly unsuited to achieving effective fiscal management, but benefited initially from the oil price rise of 1979-80. The politics of the Second Republic quickly returned on the distribution of federal oil revenue. The ruling NPN was not held together by a national ideology, but by a careful distribution of office and rewards to regions, groups and individuals. It was built with the express purpose of acquiring power to share state patronage on a national basis. It came to power through a loose coalition of politicians who mobilised political support through vertical political alliances that built on existing clientilist networks. The party lacked internal discipline to direct national policies and was unable to deal with the existing patronage system in a way that did not undermine the national economy. Power again shifted away from the centre and to the states and public expenditure escalated. Whilst some of the spending was directed at the funding of infrastructure, agriculture and irrigation schemes, funds were also paid out for contracts to political-connected suppliers that failed to deliver the intended goods and services. When oil prices fell in 1981 expenditure levels could not be cut back and mechanisms of administrative control designed to create rent opportunities were implemented, for instance through the use of import licensing to contain imports. An overvalued exchange rate generated a boom in illegal trading activities with bordering countries while manufacturing and agriculture suffered. Whilst some of the spending was directed at the funding of infrastructure, agriculture and irrigation schemes, funds were also paid out for contracts to political-connected suppliers that failed to deliver the intended goods and services.

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The military regime of Buhari which seized power in December 1983 had set out on a strategy of domestic austerity and rooting out corruption to restore the economic situation, but did not succeed in gaining sufficient support from the politically influential to implement its programme. When Babangida took control after a year, the government was facing a profound fiscal challenge which forced him to continue with austerity measures and strengthen direct control over state revenue. Whilst Buhari had suspended negotiations with the IMF and World Bank, Babangida first followed the prescriptions of the international financial institutions. But lacking a domestic constituency that would support the prescribed reform programme, he did not adhere to the conditions and pursued a strategy that redressed the reform package as ‘Nigerian-made’ as opposed to externally driven. The pretext of a state of emergency was used to push through an economic reform programme that broadly followed IMF lines. Babangida abolished marketing boards and import licences, removed the limits on foreign investors, liberalised tariffs, raised fuel prices and interests rates and instituted foreign exchange auctions. However he maintained import bans on basic food commodities, which had a negative impact on domestic prices, illegal imports and claims for fertiliser subsidies and banned the export of unprocessed cocoa beans. Overall, as discussed in Annex 2, this period saw economic recovery despite depressed oil revenues. However, the domestic political pressures towards increased public expenditure remained strong and an effective constituency in favour of the economic programme had not developed. When oil revenues increased in 1990-1 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the pressures for increased spending to improve the popularity of the regime could not be contained. Inflation accelerated in the first half of the 1990s, but was subsequently controlled under the Abacha regime with inflation brought below 10%. However inflationary pressures increased subsequently with inflation of 18% in 2001. While there have been initiatives to draft a Fiscal Responsibility Bill (IMF, 2003), the existing rules of revenue sharing exacerbate the pressures on every level of government to spend resources when they are available rather than encouraging a delinking of expenditure from short-term revenue fluctuations.

A3.3.5 Discussion This section has examined the attempts of successive regimes in Nigeria to address (with varying degrees of seriousness) the problem of combining the accommodation of regional and interest group claims on resources (while avoiding conflict and secessionist trends) with the establishment of policy coherence and effective central management of resources. While there have been periods of relative fiscal control and policy stability, these have been fragile and subject to ultimately uncontainable political pressures for increased spending and patronage politics. There has been no stable and powerful coalition of interest groups that has seen an interest in the long-term in increased fiscal discipline, more effective public spending, or a better enabling environment for the private sector. The Northern military elite has tended to favour greater fiscal discipline when this has been necessary to ensure order but has not had a long-term commitment to this goal.

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The following section therefore examines the roles played by some potentially or actually influential interest groups and the way in which they have interacted with the state.

A3.4 Agents of Change? Interest Group Organisations This section examines the way in which particular interest groups have interacted with the federal government in terms of the way in which their influence has been used. The main feature is the way in which interest groups and their organisations have functioned as instruments of access to and influence over government decis ion-making and resource sharing. The following interest group organisations are discussed: • Politically motivated cultural or ethnic groups • Politically motivated religious movements • Traditional rulers • The military • Professional and labour organisations • Community Home Town and Business Associations • Human rights organisations and democratic reform groups

A3.4.1 Politically Motivated Cultural or Ethnic Groups The “Kaduna Mafia” An informal socio-cultural institution, also known as ‘Committee of Concerned Citizens’, originated from a clique of middle ranking bureaucrats, and later included academics, professionals, who were mainly civilian but with intimate links to the military. They have been highly influential in determining political outcomes throughout Nigeria’s post civil war history. The original members were drawn from Regional Northern Premier, Ahmadu Bello’s office, prior to his assassination. He encouraged northerners to join the army straight from school to make up the ‘northern quota in the officer corps of the army’ (Othman, 1989:135). Their aim was to advance Northern interests and defend them economically politically and socially. The Kaduna Mafia became very closely linked to the military after the Nzeogwu coup and in developing and mobilising opposition to Ironsi’s attempt to create a unitary state which would end the power once enjoyed by the Regions. The break up of the Regions and their replacement by states persistently undermined the prospects for Northern cohesion. This explains in part why today the Arewa Consultative forum, established as an attempt to revive the ideology of ‘One North, One People’ has been unable to build effective bridges between the different northern interest groups in the wake of the institutionalisation of existing divisions between competing centres of power (north east, north central and north west).

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The importance of the Kaduna Mafia to policy choice during Obasanjo’s first administration (1976-79), partly explains the manner in which he is popularly perceived since his accession to power in 1999, as the choice candidate of the Northern political establishment. The lack of his electoral victory in the Yoruba south west where he is from, and his electoral victories in the North, give weight to such perceptions. Since May 1999, much has changed however. Obasanjo is now widely perceived to have unfairly favoured Yoruba interest groups (see later) as a means of securing an ethnic power base, and Northern Christians, this has undermined the support he once enjoyed amongst Hausa-Fulani Muslims. The Arewa Consultative Forum established in March 2001 by Northern ‘Leaders of Thought’ and Emirs, is the most recent incarnation of the Kaduna-Mafia, now deeply divided along zonal and religious lines, and focused on the issue of the selection of a presidential candidate to represent Northern interests. Ethnic Militant Organisations Ethno regional cultural organisations first emerged during the Babangida transition period (1986-89) as power brokers and partly in opposition to him (Vaughan, 1995: 509). Like traditional authorities, they were able in a context of highly proscribed political activity, to claim linkages with ‘home town’ or community based associations, Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba (a Yoruba Solidarity groups), Ohe n’Eze-Igbo (an Igbo Solidarity group) and the Committee of Northern Elders (a transient Hausa-Fulani group professing to represent the interests of the North), resurfaced during the post 1999 period, to spearhead the struggle of each of regional power blocks, for a greater share of the national cake. Common to both southern regional socio-cultural organisations, now called ‘Afenifere’ (Yoruba) and Ohanaeze Ndigbo (Igbo people) is the presence of former elite politicians, and a call for a sovereign national conference of all the ethnic communities in Nigeria, to debate how to restructure the Federation along ethnic lines. The calls for greater political autonomy at the local level, arose in the wake of the annulment of the election of Abiola, and was particularly popular amongst the Yoruba, but also the Igbo and southern minority groups in the oil bearing states. Like the Northerners, the Igbo consider that although they voted en masse for the PDP in 1999, and supported Obasanjo’s presidential aspirations, the y continue to be a marginalised group. The have over the last year been pushing for an ‘Igbo presidency’, convinced that the second civilian term will remain in the south, and should rotate to the Igbo. Although a range of different ethnic based organisations exist with more or less militant wings gravitating around them, it would be misleading to view all of them as the same or presume that there was a homogeneity of views within each ethic group, as to the legitimacy of these socio-cultural organisation as the representatives of the ‘ethnic nation’. Most of the organisations mentioned above are racked by internal factionalism,

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in particular in the organisations representing the interests of the majority ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. There is a great deal of debate particularly among younger elements within the ethnic groups about whether a break with past elite political leadership is required, more effectively to address concerns about poverty and social justice. The adoption of Sharia since 1999 by core Northern and north eastern states and the rise in religiously motivated violence, has also raised the profile of groups like Arewa that have become the advocacy mouthpiece of some northern elites, eager to maximise the political capital generated by the adoption of 100% Sharia. There are a number of groups in the North, even Muslim groups, which have strongly spoken out against the adoption of Sharia. For example a group called the Plain Truth Movement (Mustapha, 2000) notes the failure of northern elite to look beyond individual and collective political and economic advancement, towards masses wallowing in poverty, illiteracy and disease. Amongst the Igbo, younger groups do not see the Ohaneze Ndigbo elites as representing their interests. Organisations such as MASSOB (Movement for the Survival of the Sovereign State of Biafra) are championed by radical mainly young Igbo and some minority Ikwerre and Ijaw groups in the Niger Delta. Its separatist objectives are quite out of line with the aspirations of Ohaneze Ndigbo, which like Arewa is interested in strengthening regional claims on national resources. Obasanjo has also set up rival organisations – the Yoruba Elder’s Forum, to challenge the hegemony of the Afenifere lobby amongst the Yoruba, who are now deeply divided, as is their militant organisation the OPC. The minority ethnic groups however when complaining of marginalisation and using the ethnic cultural groups as a vehicle for demanding greater inclusion, are not speaking from the same perspective as the majority ethnic groups. The competitive politics between youth coalitions amongst the minority groups – for example the Ijaw Youth Council (1998-2000) and the organisations that represent their elders (for example the Ijaw National Congress) also attests to the generational and ideological tensions that persist within these ethnic organisations, about who should speak for the ethnic constituency and to what end. Regional ethnic socio-cultural organiations and the ethnic constituencies they represent as well as minority groups (particularly from the oil producing regions) have been using ethnic militias as bargaining chips, to push for political change for the majority ethnic groups. However where as the majority ethnic groups are using the ethnic militancy as a means of securing for themselves a larger slice of the case, they are not fundamentally questioning the manner in which the national cake is divided.

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Environmental Protest Groups One of the main successes of social mobilisation since 1990 has been that of environmental protest groups in the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta in seeking to secure more control over and benefit from oil revenues. In response to public opinion (domestic and international) and to the community protests themselves, the Nigerian government and the oil companies have started to invest more consistently in ‘development’ initiatives in the oil producing area. Previously ‘development projects’ such as the Niger Delta Development Board (set up in 1961), had foundered in the absence of clear political will to make them work. In the 1990s however committees and commissions were set up to look at socio-economic and environmental problems (Justice Alfa Belgore Commission of Inquiry in 1992, Ministerial Fact Finding Team 1994 under then Oil Minister Don Etiebet (who is from the Niger Delta). In 1996, a new state, Bayelsa, was also created for the Niger Delta –out of Rivers state. In 1992 Babangida’s government increased the financial contributions to oil producing areas from 1.5% to 3% of government revenue. OMPADEC, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission was established as a development agency, funded out of this extra 1.5%. However all these initiatives suffered inherent problems. Many of the recommendations of commissions were not followed up and OMPADEC simply became an instrument for enrichment of state functionaries who controlled it and misappropriated the funds. These problems simply intensified demands from the Niger Delta which had by the time OMPADEC was established already moved towards demands for a wholly new economic and political arrangement which would accept in principle that the communities themselves confer land ownership back on the communities themselves. Obasanjo since 1999 has made further concessions to the oil producing communities, increasing the percentage of oil derived revenues allocated to the oil producing states as extra grants from 3% to 13%. He also submitted a bill for the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission, which was to be funded by government grants and oil company monies. However these initiatives are still failing to satisfy the ever-increasing demands of Niger Deltans, who complain that the definition of what constitutes the Niger Delta has been enlarged to incorporate states which strictly speaking may be oil producers, (eg Imo and Abia) but which are not Niger Deltan – ie not predominantly populated by minority groups. Community demands are now articulated increasingly as political demands for greater autonomy within a reconstituted federal arrangement. It seems that the harder successive governments appear to be trying, the harder community demands are to satisfy. State governors since 1999 have been arguing for 100% control of the natural resources in the state – as a bargaining chip for extracting further concessions from the Federal government.

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The lack of legitimacy which these Federal initiatives appear to be having at a local level, is also because they are accompanied by contradictory responses to local demands. Violence, militarisation and campaigns of intimidation have been commonplace throughout much of the Niger Delta during the last decade. The intricate web of shared security provisions between the Nigerian government and the oil companies, also confirms the image of complicity. Pressured by increasingly organised and persistent oil producing communities, the oil companies have also adopted a number of strategies for dealing with them - granting concessions in the form of social amenities and social development spending as well as supplying arms to state security forces. Throughout the Niger Delta, the politics of oil, has also undermined social relationships and institutions like Chieftaincy, and created a kind of moral social disorder. The increase in intra-communal violence is as much generated by the attempts by new groups seeking to replace old groups who as clients are deemed to have ‘enjoyed’ for too long, as they are about conflicts directly with the oil companies. The violence has also intensified because oil companies have shown their readiness to be moved to action, by violence. In most communities, the limited infrastructural developments that they have seen over the last decade, or the provision of electricity or clean water, have only come after mass action- the occupation of oil company facilities and the closure of pipelines.

A3.4.2 Politically Motivated Religious Movements Religion plays an important part in the lives of most Nigerians, who belong to one of a variety of strands of either of two monotheistic religions: Islam or Christianity, and /or a variety of other ‘traditional’ religions. However since the late 1970s and early 1980s’ religious observance has religion has increasingly begun to fulfil a social, economic and more recently political role. The salience of religion in the Nigerian political economy and the growth of religious movements in Nigerian social and political life, needs to be understood as an attempt by social agents (either elite or more popular forces), notably those who are find themselves excluded from opportunities determined either by access to networks of patronage 4to manage their exclusion, by protesting against it or creating new conditions in which they might more readily become adopted as clients for prospecting patrons. The post 1999 resurfacing of the Sharia issue (which was a focus of constitutional debate from the 1950s) and the unilateral decision of core Northern states to introduce ‘full’ Sharia in civil and criminal law have marked an intensification of politico-religious conflict. Debates no longer centred on the establishment of a Sharia court of Appeal or the applicability of limited Sharia throughout the Federation for all Muslims, but on the

4 For example as a result of the divestment from small scale agriculture and lack of an adequate response to drought in the Sahelian belt of Northern Nigeria in the early 1970s under Gowon, against the background of an oil boom, cohorts of unemployable former migrant labourers were created, they became vagrants in the industrial city of Kano, unable to find work for which they are ill equipped and a ready breeding ground of support to the religious millenarian cults – Maitatsine.

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unilateral adoption of Sharia, initially by the Zamfara state governor, then by other states in the north west and north east. The key players have been politicians who felt that they had lost out in the new political realignments that came with the power shift to the South and to a president who was not Muslim (an actively Pentecostal Christian). Another difference is also the widespread popular appeal amongst people who see Sharia as finally having recourse and access to justice, which has so long been denied and as a means of imposing some kind of moral sanction on elites. The heightened support for Sharia also came after over a decade of heightened conflicts between Christian and Muslim communities, and a fear that Obasanjo’s accession to power was to be accompanied by a pentecostalisation of power. In a polity so deeply administratively segmented along state lines and ideologically divided according to language group / regional lines, religious institutions remain one of very few structures that can boast of having a national reach, which parallels that of the state, albeit one that discriminates on a confessional basis. The fact that religious divisions more or less mirror ethnic / regional divisions has made it difficult for religious institutions to serve as a foundation for national mobilisations in a manner which could fundamentally challenge the hegemony of the Nigerian state or the nature of governance. Pentecostal churches which have grown up since the 1980s have either preached a withdrawal, abstinence from the excesses of modernity and a repentance culture or preached a prosperity gospel, serving in effect as a means of developing patronage networks. Both of these strategies have essentially consolidated (ideologically) the patterns of patrimonial politics which have characterised Nigerian political life and encouraged adherents not to challenge political authority. The growth of parallel private social institutions, like clinics and schools around the churches has strengthened their social role. In 1993, the spiritual head of the Zionist Church, Cardinal Oyeniran, described Abacha’s assumption of power as ‘God’s Wish’ and called upon the government not to allow ‘politicians and lobbyists …to flout God’s order’ (Oyeniran, Agbaje, 1999:935) The Catholic church however and the more established ‘orthodox’ Christian churches represented in the Christian Association of Nigeria, have however played a more prominent role in challenging authoritarian patterns and encouraging their followers to play a more political role. In many ways Pentecostal Churches are occupying a space once occupied by the Catholic and orthodox Churches. The Catholic Church’s role in the social arena, particularly in education, was seriously challenged after the Biafran war, when it was accused of having sponsored the Biafran war effort. Catholic schools throughout the country were subsequently taken over by the state. Returning them to Catholic control has been the subject of much advocacy on the part of the Catholic Church ever since.

5 Quoting from Sunday Tribune 26/12/93

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A3.4.3 Traditional Rulers Chieftaincy has featured prominently in a federal system as both representatives of their communities in their dealings with the state, and as representatives of the state vis a vis their communities. Although during decolonization and immediately after independence, the new Regional governance structures began to divest chiefs of the roles they had played in the Native Administrations, chiefs have continued to enjoy the support of local, state and Federal administration, because of their influence at the community level. This has been the case particularly since the mid 1980s which has seen the rise in the weight and political significance of chieftaincy institutions. For the state, the usefulness of traditional structures is that they are able to mobilise youth and non-elite groups (poor social groups) which otherwise are beyond the patrimonial reach of the state. Traditional authority structures are another intermediary (like urban elites running home town associations) through which ‘the poor’ stand a chance of gaining access to state resources. But at the same time chieftaincy structures have encouraged the consolidation of elite power based on ethnic and communal doctrines. Throughout Nigeria, in the 1980s and 1990s, chiefs received regular stipends from government. These stipends were recently removed with the coming of the Obasanjo administration in 1999, and there continues to be much debate about the need to revive the stipend and the influence and power of chieftaincy structures, within the political domain. During periods of military rule in particular, when competitive politics along party lines has been restrained, kings and traditional rulers have acted as representatives of the administration at local level. In many cases, this has been in opposition to their ‘own people’, the communities which they profess to represent. During the periods of civilian politics, struggles between political parties have played themselves out as struggles between different chiefs. This was particularly noticeable during the 2nd republic (1979-83) and also during the transition and post transition politics of the Babangida regime. The intricate relationship between traditional rulers and the state has however made the institution increasingly partisan and undermined the legitimacy of the institution in some areas. Notable examples of this are found throughout the oil producing states, where chiefs have through collaboration with the oil companies, also for a long time enjoyed privileged relationships and benefited from a wealth of related material opportunities – opportunities which they have not necessarily shared with the wider community. Since the 1990s uprisings in the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta, the authority of members of chiefs’ councils has been undermined essentially by youth. Chieftaincy institutions deemed to represent local interests have therefore in many ways blocked the transformation of local communities, plagued by poverty and marginalisation. Dur ing the Abacha regime (1993-98), overt forms of political expression became dangerous. Traditional authority was however one way in which individuals and groups from Western Nigeria in particular could negotiate their access to the state, without

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directly posing a challenge to Abacha’s government. At the same time, this period saw an intensification of competition and therefore conflicts between chiefly rulers and the communities they controlled.

A3.4.4 The Military Divisions within the military have been as crucial in dictating the course of events in Nigeria’s political history, as have divisions between the army on the one hand and civilians on the other. The last forty years has seen the erosion of professional ethos and the respect for hierarchy and rank within the army, whilst the intrusion of ethnic and religious divisions has formed the basis of coups and counter coups. During periods of civilian as well as military rule, the military has also never been insulated from constituencies amongst civilians, constituencies that they often helped to promote and back, in their struggles to ensure that their particular interests are served. Nigerian political life has therefore been characterised by recursive patterns of mutual assistance between an essentially civilian cultural/political group - the Kaduna Mafia and key Hausa speaking pro northernisation elements within the military, who have operated to ensure their respective and collective interests are upheld. Since July 1966, control of army has entered into the hands of Northerners with ties of religion, culture and schooling. However this is not a monolithic block. Up until the 1980s most northerners (90%) in the army were Middle belt Christians, who traditionally had their own interests for autonomy, and who throughout the period developed an antagonism to the idea of ‘One North’. So-called ethnic constituencies in the military as well as outside it, have not necessarily however always acted in unison. Concerns for ‘personal’ enrichment advancement and patron-client formation, have also consistently ensured that ethnic, regional or religious loyalties themselves compete with non-sectional based interests. President Obasanjo’s structural reforms of the military, his mass retirement of ‘political Generals with a history of direct and indirect involvement in Nigerian political life, and attempts to re-professionalise the army, has also done much to antagonise the proponents of a resurrected ‘One North’ agenda (Kaduna Mafia). Throughout Nigeria’s history, instances of such antagonism and attempts to reform of the military, have usually resulted in internal palace coups (Murtala Muhammed against Gowon 1976) or military coups to replace civilian regimes (Buhari’s coup against Shehu Shagari’s NPN government during the 2nd Republic, in 1983). The difference today however, is that Obasanjo’s selective sponsorship of Northern Christian interests and the aftermath of successive religious riots throughout the North (throughout the 1990s) has created deep cleavages within the north itself, reducing the likelihood of interests successively coalescing around the ‘One North / Kaduna mafia’ agenda, sufficient enough to galavanise support within the military for another military coup.

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The domestic and international climate has also dramatically changed. At the level of the African Union and amongst Nigeria’s key allies internationally (US and Britain) the return of the Generals is also likely to be frowned upon. Nigerians may have grown tired of the recursive pattern of coups and counter coups and the image of the Military has been ideologically tarnished by the repressive regimes of both Babangida and Abacha. Past military coups have generally come at the instigation of civilians, or at best public perceptions that the military could restore public order. The moral legitimacy of the military over the civilian politicians has also been much dented by the highly publicised accounts of the corruption of the past three military heads of state. The rise of heavily armed militia groups throughout the Federation, particularly amongst ethnic or regional groups which have had particularly conflicting relationships with military rule (oil producing communities in the Niger Delta, and parts of the South West after June 12), would also make it difficult for the military to effectively seize power throughout the whole country.

A3.4.5 Professional and Labour Organisations Professional organisations such as the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU) have played a critical role in influencing the development of Federal government policies with respect to the material concerns of public sector workers (labour) and academic staff. They have also particularly in the context of extended ‘transitions’ from military to civilian rule in concert with other professional organisations (eg the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and overtly political organisations (eg Campaign for Democracy and later NADECO) or human rights (such as CLO and CDHR) protested at irregularities in the transitional process and attempted to force the hand of intransigent military leaders, reluctant to give up power to civilian regimes, and strongly criticised the annulment of the June 12 elections. Many members of these professional organisations, have either tried to use their organisations to engage in overtly political work (as in the case of ASUU and the Nigerian Bar Association) or have as individuals joined up with overtly political organisations This move into the political terrain has made these organisations subject to political infiltration and internal factionalism, as military leaders have sought to ensure compliant less critical individuals in leadership positions and to undermine the ability of these organisations to speak and act with one voice. The late 1980s and 1990s period were characterised by such processes. There were many instances of successful cooption of compliant leaders once installed and the undermining of their ability to organise nationally. This made regional or ethnic or religious based forms of organisation more likely They are mainly urban based, largely staffed (apart from NLC) by middle class interests, who see themselves as the natural opposition to the military, who were doing jobs that they felt more legitimately equipped to do. They were unable to deliver mass / street action (except maybe in some cases NLC), always fearful or incapacitated by danger of

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being disorganised or infiltrate and narrow network base with very little involvement with peasant, petty traders or craftsmen, for whom it did not make sense to organise their interests on a national platform. Nigerian Bar Association Under the Babangida regime, the NBA under Alao Aka Bashorunthe, began to take a stand against some of the irregularities in the transition process. For example when the Gongola state government refused to comply with a court order which stipulated that elected local government council officials, whatever their political affiliation, should be sworn in, NBA members decide to call member out on strike for one week, in Gongola state, then in Ikeja and Lagos, where state governments would not accept pro-democracy members on local councils. The NBA was also a vocal critic at national level and through its active branches in different states, of the ‘ouster clauses’ which meant that courts were obliged not to enter any complaints of aggrieved citizens against aspects of transition process which went against their civil liberties. This period of critical leadership, however after 1992, was replaced by a collaborative relationship with Babangida regime during which appointments and cash donations were used to influence the Association, including the election of its officers. This meant that the NBA was unable to act with one voice. Once again federal policies prevented organisations with a national reach, apart from religious organisations, from functioning. Under Abacha, NBA members who had previously been ardently anti military, collaborated with the regime. Dr Olu Onagoruwa, former prominent member of NBA and very anti-military, became Attorney General and Minister for Justice under Abacha, and was subsequently expelled from the organisation. The NBA as an institution was unable to play a role in checking the legality of the transition processes, instead individuals within the organisation were forced to seek out alternative organisations, with a clearly political orientation (notably the human rights organisations and the Campaign for Democracy) in order to pursue less compliant agenda. ASUU - Academic Staff Universities Union. In the 1970s its strategy as an organisation, was essentially conservative. It viewed itself as ‘ a watch dog’ to contain excesses of political rulers and serve and train manpower requirements of country, and focussed mainly on securing material privileges for academic teaching staff. The subsequent decades however saw the organisation evolve into a wider platform for campaign not only for improving remuneration and university funding, but also for challenging the continued stay in power of the Nigerian military. By 1989 ASUU’s focus had shifted from union maters and welfare questions to problems related to the shrinking democratic space. Strike action was a persistent feature throughout this period (‘ASUU has been on strike for four years in the last fourteen years’, Tunde Adebanji, Guardian 17 March 2003). Strikes intensified during introduction of structural adjustment period in the late 1980s and in response to the austerity measures that had already begun under Buhari, from 1983 onwards. University

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governance, notably the excesses of Vice Chancellors, was also the target of ASUU frustrations. Many Vice Chancellors backed by power of state security forces, became actively involved restraining freedom of speech of students, undermining their rights to self-governance and association. The disturbances in Ahmadu Bello University, in Zaria in 1986, resulted from this and led to the killing of students by security forces. Widespread protests ensued throughout the country, involving media, market women and NLC. This led to the forced decoupling of ASUU and NLC, by Federal government, preventing dues from ASUU members going automatically to the NLC. The commission of inquiry set up by Babangida after the events in ABU, absolved the Vice chancellor of any responsibility for the students deaths and instead banned National Association of Nigerian students (NANS). Whereas university Vice Chancellors who control access to funds, appear to have vehicles for State patronage, ASUU itself throughout the 1990s has remained relatively independent, even though many of its activities have been proscribed, and its leaders imprisoned. Since 1999 however ASUU has managed through strike action to exact enormous concessions from Obasanjo’s government. Staff salaries have increased three fold as part of Obasanjo strategy to focus on generating economic stability through reconstituting the middle class, whose wealth and status had been much eroded in the preceding years. Since Obasanjo’s arrival in 1999, university teaching staff, and public sector workers, have been promised salary increases (July 2000 of up to 22%) and increases in university funding. They are widely perceived to have benefited more than any other social category, from substantial pay increases. However the failure of Obasanjo’s government to fulfil promises particularly with respect to university funding and the use of high handed tactics to break strike action, by halting pay for striking staff and threatening vice chancellors who continue to pay them as well as encouraging the dismissal off striking staff, have all served to fuel conflict between the Federal government and ASUU. ASUU has proved however that in the context of an exposed civilian government, conscious of its public image it is able, through strike action, to secure concessions. These concessions have involved attempts to disorganise and discredit the union, whilst strike action itself is proving to be increasingly unpopular. Trade Unions: Nigerian Labour Congress Throughout the independence period, trade unions have also been heavily managed by the Federal government, and in the 1980s disbanded and reconstituted with compliant leaders on numerous occasions. They have effectively become another forum for patronage and entrepreneurial activity as leaders compete amongst themselves for patronage. During Babangida’s ‘transition’ programme of the 1980s and early 1990s, members of the NLC were nominated by the government to sit on the Political Bureau (a consultative forum staffed by academics charged with the task of putting forward recommendations to solve some of the political issues in the transition period), the Constitutional Review Committee and Constituent Assembly.

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This followed a campaign by Babangida’s regime to infiltrate and weaken the NLC, particularly because since 1985 the NLC had become a rallying point against SAP and IMF / World Bank policies and removal of oil subsidy planned for October 1988. Babangida’s adjustment strategy had meant a general 20% pay cut which affected NLC members. When the NLC organised a national day of protest with ASUU against the killing of students of ABU (Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria) by security forces, union leaders were arrested and ASUU banned from being an NLC member, 1986). By 1989, Babangida invoking the powers of the National Economic Emergency Powers Decree of 1985, voided election results within NLC, because a faction opposed to the government had won. After the annulment of June 12, the NLC threatened a national strike to bring an end to military rule but eventually the NLC threw its weight behind the Interim National Government. Nevertheless when Abacha seized power, in 1994, he still closed down the NLC along with NUPENG and PENGASSAN, the oil workers unions which had taken the lead in sustained strike action which had brought many parts of the country to a stand still for two months, imprisoned their Secretary Generals (who were only released after his death in 1998) and appointed sole administrators to run each of the unions, thereby preventing any possibility of them becoming a site of resistance in the future. The Trade Union Amendment Decree of 1996, which defined who could be a member of the NLC and which union members could seek elective offices in NLC was the culmination in a long process of state intrusion into the organisation of one of the few organisations in Nigeria, with a national reach and socio-political objective. It was only when Abacha died in June 1998 that much of the draconian legislation proscribing union activity was lifted. Since then the NLC appears to have retrieved its independent voice. In 2000 a successful General Strike was organised against planned fuel price hikes, which after 5 days of near total compliance throughout the Federation (with the exception of one state), brought Obasanjo’s government to revise earlier intended increases by 50% downwards to 10% (Remi Ojo, IPS 13 June 2000). In January 2002, the NLC, backed by its 29 affiliate unions, called another General Strike, in response to another attempt by the government to raise fuel prices by 18%. This time however Obasanjo’s government was able to use a legal technicality, backed up by the courts, to imprison Oshiomole, who had not given the requisite 21 days notice before calling for strike action, which was then declared illegal.

A3.4.6 Home Town and Community Associations Home Town Associations HTA’s or ‘improvement unions’ exist in most local communities in southern Nigeria and are one of the principal community based organisations. Originally set up by migrants who had left their ‘home town’ to provide solidarity to members in the urban centre and as a channel for the private development initiatives. Many have functioned for over 50

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years, providing many services to local communities, primary and especially secondary schools, medical services through construction and staffing health clinics, hospitals, electricity, telephone, water roads, public meeting halls and postal services. The ir income is raised through levies on membership, and they provide members particularly elite categories with positions in the executive, the opportunity of monitoring how funds are spent locally, whilst residents of the ‘home towns’ benefit from the provisions that they supply. There are also many equivalent organisations in the north, where however traditional aristocratic elements play a more important role. They are now found particularly in place of high migrant concentrations. HTA’s have evolved considerably over time, and come in many forms, the ‘home town’ to which they refer can be a village, a whole local government area, a ward, or extend across wards, and even a whole state. They are principally concerned in investing the individual contribution of members (raised through levies) in projects for the benefit of ‘the community’. One constant is that they have historically also interacted with the state (colonial and post colonial) and provided leverage for aspiring political elites, to bargain for political office and opportunities accruing from access to the state. They have also encouraged a tendency by aspiring political entrepreneurs to play the ‘community’ / ‘ethnic’ constituency card, in their political struggles. Structural adjustment of the 1980s, and the shrinking revenue base of the state, also increased the tendency for the Federal government to seek to use HTA’s as a vehicle through which to promote its linkages to rural communities, and as an alternative agent of rural and economic development. Contrary to the earlier industrial planning envisaged in the 1990s, medium and large-scale indigenous enterprises with strong communal ties and adaptability to a changing global economy, have increasingly gained currency as engines of local growth and development. The so-called ‘silent industrialization’ of towns like Nnewi and Aba in eastern Nigeria, is founded on the strength of local communal ties. Apprenticeship in the motor parts manufacturing industry is drawn from people with limited formal education but with strong ties to the community. Similarly towns like Onitsha and Aba have been key to Nigeria’s haulage transportation network. Initially they too were involved in motor vehicle spare parts, and are now the centre of lucrative transportation business. The extent to which the success of these industrial bases is reliant on patronage links to the state, at least at a Federal level, is a contested issue These industrial bases largely grew up in the wake of the Biafran war, as a result of adverse circumstances which the Igbo (the losing side) had to face. Forced to flee from urban centres which they had been instrumental in building, like Port Harcourt (capital of oil producing Rivers State), Igbo migrants moved to near by Aba (Abia state) and transformed the town into a budding commercial and manufacturing centre. It is partly as a result of exclusion within the upper echelons of the military, and relatively minor linkages to networks of patronage at the Federal level, which has precipitated the independent growth of these ethnic manufacturing and commercial centre. Community based organisations of the ‘traditional’ kind (HTA’s) in the wake of adjustment pressures, have particularly since the 1980s moved into a larger scale of

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operation. Many of them now undertake big projects attracting external funding, for example Otan Ayegbaju, in Ilesha, in Oyo state south western Nigeria, which constructed a 25 bed town hospital, which was part financed by the WHO (World Health Organisation), the Oyo state government and the University of Benin Teaching Hospital. Some have developed offshoot structures as strategies for attracting external funding or have transformed themselves into NGOs (1980s) or Community Development Associations. For example Egbe Omo Ibile Awe a cultural organisation started in 1912, in Oyo state, in 1982 set up ADC Awe development Corporation for strictly for development purposes (Barkan, Mc Nulty and Ayeni, 1991). The success of these organisations have however been mixed. The ability of HTAs to act as development agents is predicated upon their ability to mobilise resources from local or national governments for local development. Indeed this is from whence they derive their legitimacy in the eyes of members of the community, who rely on them to bring development goods back home. This undoubtedly makes these organisations prone to politicisation and consolidation of systems of patron-client, in fact their very existence is predicated on the need for their leaders to become effective clients within a system of patronage, which can be corrupt and corrupting. Regional politicians who use them, and military leaders who seek to capture them, are ultimately judged by their ability to influence the provision of basic infrastructure in their own home towns. During periods of civilian party politics, these organisations have a tendency to become party politicised as rival parties seek the support of existing association s and encourage formation of new ones to extend their political base. This has led many associations to become involved in political conflicts. Manufacturing Associations in the North Home Town Associations have traditionally been associated with communities from the south of Nigeria, where less rigid hierarchical social struc tures are deemed have facilitated their emergence. However cities like Kano in the north also boast of a wealth of associations, albeit with a much more occupational group / class focus that organisations in the south, which cut across social groups. In August 1991, there were 5,300 registered self-help groups in Kano state (comprising also Jigawa state carved out of Kano in 1991) (Lucas, 1994). Throughout the 1970s, associational life dwindled. It was only in the 1990s however that Kano witnessed the re birth of elite associations. The Kano State Foundation (KSF) was one such organisation, started in 1985 by community leaders led by wealthy businessman, to assist ‘indigenes’ of Kano state. It relied on private and public donations from all over the country to carry out school building work, engage in commodity marketing, set up small scale industries, and to provide loans to Kano indigenes at low or zero interest rates. The revival of the Kano Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (KACCIMA) was another such independent Kano business initiative, but one with a long history. Established initially by British businessmen, and indigenised in the 1970s, it had

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not really been active in the independence era until the mid1980s. By the end of the 1980s it had increased its membership substantially and its annual subscription fees, enabling the employment of 17 full time staff. It established a close relationship with government and was consulted on important economic decisions, with representatives on the most important government boards at a Federal level (Nigerian Electric Power Authority, export promotion and privatisation) One of their largest ventures, the construction of a permanent trade fair site, costing N120, 000,000 in 1991, was part financed by government loans. The Kano state government donated land for the site. This organisation was directly revived in response to the decreasing role of the state in the Nigerian economy. The Kano Traders’ Multi purpose Cooperative Society (KTMCS) was founded in 1986, boasting a membership of 2000 people and a capital base of N4, 600,000, which it used to invest in import export, joint ventures, investment in privatised companies and establishment of small scale industries. These associations tend not t o challenge the structure of the state directly, but tried to influence the way power is exercised, specifically as it relates to issues directly affecting the interests of their members. Vigilante Groups The inability of the Police to tackle rising rates of crime, especially in the context of transition to civilian rule, and the reigning in of military squads specifically established to target armed robbery, has led to the growth of a host of private security outfits / vigilantes throughout different states of the federation, particularly in the South. Lack of state capacity (leading for example to the total absence of police stations in communities like Okpara in Delta state, where 20,000 people live, (Ekeh, 2002)), means that in many cases the police are absent from people’s daily lives. In large cities, like Aba which has built up an important manufacturing base, special Police-Community Committees had been set up by members of the business community who would provide the police within information on suspected criminals gangs. However these arrangements, eventually led to more crime as police became patrons of robbers themselves and were able to pay them off, once caught and convicted. An example of a popular vigilante movement is the “Bakassi Boys” set up in Aba by the Shoe Makers Industrial Union Incorporated of Ariaria Market in November 1998, to arrest criminals and their patrons and destroy their properties. For the first few years, the vigilante outfit remained directly controlled by the members of the shoe makers union executive, and that it quickly spread to other eastern states, with important commercial or manufacturing centres (Anambra with Onitsha and Nnewi), which had also experienced high crime rates. In marked contrast with traditional policing methods, those used by the Bakassi Boys were swift and unconventional, with suspected criminals being weeded out by Bakassi Boys, emboldened with special powers of detection, through the use of charms and herbal medicines, and instantly being killed in violent ways (necklacing and returning dead bodies to the communities of origin). It is this seeming arbitrariness, and

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the violent justice with which the Bakassi Boys and similar outfits are associated, which has provoked the criticism of the international Human rights lobby (HRW-CLEEN report) which warn of the danger of vigilante groups being used by political parties as means of securing electoral success. Although many of these initiatives started as voluntary, the incoming state governors, particularly after 1999, recognised the political legitimacy that would come being associated with lower crime rates. The Aba state governor and the Anambra state governors proceeded to give the vigilante groups official recognition. The Bakassi Boys became known as the Anambra State Volunteer Force. This official recognition also brought many state governors into direct conflict with the Federal government as constitutional provisions 1999 stipulate that only the Federal government has jurisdiction over state security issues. In 2002, the Federal government cracked down and outlawed Bakassi in Aba (Abia state) and Onitsha (Anambra state), which have both subsequently seen a rise in the incidence of armed robbery and associated crime.

A3.4.7 Human Rights Organisations and Democratic Reform Movements Civic Associations and Political Reform Movements Human rights organisations and political reform movements emerged directly as a consequence of the increasing repression of basic freedoms under Babangida and as a result of the economic austerity measures he imposed during structural adjustment of 1986 onwards. This gave birth to new type of organisations making link between democracy, respect for Human rights and economic empowerment (giving rise to democracy dividend discourses). Like the occupational groups referred to above, these are also very urban based, elite organisations. Human rights associations were established n the 1980s by concerned professionals (mainly lawyers) whilst political reform movements were es tablished during the same period tended to be sponsored by eminent Nigerians who had served in various capacities in private and public sector. Both types of organisations were very connected to each other, but with limited links to people in rural areas, or poor social groups in urban areas (except possibly in the parts of the Niger Delta). They were most active and visible in the West of Nigeria. Their aim was to push for thoroughgoing democratisation. But just like members of NBA and other national professional organisations, Babangida’s strategy with civic organisations was to attempt to neutralise their power, by co-opting their members, and undermining their ability to function at a national level. Cooption of civil society was possible through the use of patronage, ‘settlement’, contract awarding, gifts in cash and kind to individuals and groups. Although different military regimes succeeded in disorganising the resistance of these groups, they were still challenged by them. The recurring theme of ‘t ransition’ or ‘hand over’ to civilians was reinforced by these organisations. Together with other political reform movement, they provided the leadership which spearheaded nation wide protest

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after annulment, which eventually forced Babangida out of power. They were not however able to stop the imposition of Interim National Government. An example is the Association for Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria, which was a political reform group created by Obasanjo prior to his imprisonment. It was for ‘eminent Nigerians and Patriots’ who wanted to persuade Babangida to leave, but not by confrontation. It was made up mainly by retired military officers concerned about the future of the military and country and a desire to ‘save’ the military. Buhari and Idiagbon (who had always been opposed to Babangida since his coup which ousted them in 1986) were also actively involved in it. Eventually the group splintered because of differences over how to deal with Babangida and the ING. Obasanjo favoured talking with Babangida whilst Buhari wanted a forced removal. It was Obasanjo who eventually persuaded Babangida to step down. These groups played a significant role during the Babangida transition in securing the release of detainees, facilitating prison reforms, spearheading mass protest against Babangida. Under Abacha these organisations were generally less influential and many were co-opted by the regime.

A3.4.8 Political Parties The PDP has been the party in power since May 1999, when Obasanjo became Head of State for the second time round. It evolved out of a group (Group of 34) established in the mid 1990s by former politicians led by Alex Ekwueme (former Vice President during the 2nd Republic) whose purpose was to prevent then president Abacha from succeeding himself and becoming Civilian President. By 1998, he had already initiated plans to present himself as the ‘sole candidate’ at the forthcoming elections. After his death in June, it fell to General Abulsalami Abubakar to prepare for the elections that would usher in the transition from military to civilian rule. It was in this context that the Group of 34 transformed itself into the People’s Democratic Party. It was at this time that the full weight of the mainly Muslim northerners in the military (retired Generals) was brought to bear. Babangida himself was amongst them and played a prominent role in bankrolling the new party.. It was this block that brought Obasanjo out of prison to ensure that he became President. It is the same block that has become disgruntled because Obasanjo appears not to have served their interests well. Prior to his election in 1999, although he had been head of state in the late 1970s. Obasanjo’s relative absence from politics for some 20 years prior to his imprisonment by Abacha, meant that he was reliant on his old power base, at least during the early period of his term in office. Much of the instability which his regime has suffered from stems from the difficulties of imposing his authority on the party (In three years there have been two speakers of the lower house and three presidents of the Senate, whilst three different chairmen have presided over the party. The 1999 elections gave People's Democratic Party (PDP), 60% of the seats in the National Assembly and 60% of the states, mainly in the north, the south south and the east.

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Conservative politicians, many of whom backed General Abacha, dominated the All People’s Party (APP), the second largest party. Prior to the 1999 elections it drew much of its support mainly from north. Last year (2002), a it merged with a faction of another party (the UNDP which to avoid confusion with the UN agency, later changed its name to NDP). It is now known as the ANPP and is the main opposition party in the South South and maintains its northern base. The ANPP has put up (amidst much controversy) former Military Head of State – Buhari. His running mate is Chuba Okadigbo, one time Senate President. Buhari’s reputation of having come out in support of Sharia and memories of his authoritarian political style, have done little to endear him to the Ohanaeze Ndigbo socio-cultural group (who claim to represent the interests of the Igbo, his own ethnic group) in the east, in spite of the fact that he is being accompanied by Okadigbo The third major political party – the AD – which after the 1999 elections controlled all the states in the Yoruba south west, which is the extent of its base – has over the last few years become a shadow of its former self. Initially headed by Olu Falae, who in 1999 challenged the election results, claiming electoral fraud the radical stance of the party has been diluted by the attempts by Obasanjo to secure support in his ‘home’ base. Members of the AD (as well as of the former APP) now hold Ministerial positions in Obasanjo’s cabinet. The AD recently declared that it will not put up a Presidential candidate of its own, and will therefore advise voters to support the incumbent president (this will be done unofficially, as ‘formal’ electoral pacts are proscribed by the 1999 Constitution). Party strength, 1999

State governors

Senate(a) House of Representatives (a)

People's Democratic Party (PDP)

21 67 212

All People’s Party (APP) 9 23 80 Alliance for Democracy (AD)

6 19 68

Total 36 109 360 (a) No. of seats. Source: Press report EIU, 18 March 2003s. For the first time in Nigeria’s history 30 political parties have been registered. This came after initial attempts by INEC in June 2002 to register only 3 new parties. This was rejected as unconstitutional according to the 1999 constitution. After a Supreme Court judgement ruled against INEC, it was forced to come back on its previous decision. Political parties still reflect old alliances whilst new ones are backed by old politicians even if they are not fronted by them. Just as Babangida financed the PDP in 1998, he is also deemed to be financing at least 3 (if not more) parties. His long running feud with Buhari however means that he is unlikely to backing the ANPP’s bid to unseat Obasanjo. Given the weight Babangida still wields in Nigerian political life, his opposition to

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Buhari, could also paradoxically split the Northern Muslim vote between the PDP and the ANPP, The 30 new parties do not have clear ideological differences; many of them are small and very locally based. but reflect the attempt by the old political elite members, politicians from the 1st Republic, like Ojukwu, the former Biafra leader and presidential aspirant on the AGPA party ticket, seeking to realise the ‘Igbo presidency’ ambition. As in the past however when numerous associations emerged during constitutional conferences, these parties may be there as fronts for political interests, or as vehicles individuals can market themselves as potential clients for the main parties tha t will eventually emerge (indeed the ANPP and PDP have already emerged as the main contenders). Very few amongst them reflect the pro-democracy with which political life the 1990s was imbued. The NCP party of activist lawyer Gani Fawehinmi, who was the inspiration behind the Supreme Court ruling, which enabled the 22 new parties to be registered, is one of the very few parties with any ideological weight. The extent of his popularity may however have dwindled, given the fact that the radical pro-democracy platform upon which he stood in the 1990s was neutralized after his collaboration with the Abacha regime in the mid 1990s.

A3.5 Conclusions This review has documented the consistent failure of efforts by successive regimes to change the rules of the political game and to establish more effective governance arrangements and fiscal control. This failure reflects the pressing need to accommodate potentially explosive ethnic and religious divides as well as the fact that no organised and influential interest group has had a consistent interest in pro-poor or growth oriented reforms – including the regimes attempting to implement the reforms. The discussion of interest group organisations points to the richness of Nigeria’s civil society (though it is largely focused on the urban population and sections of the elite). It also suggest though that while these organisations have achieved successes in influencing government policies and securing access to resources for those they represent (and particularly for those who lead them), they function overwhelmingly within the framework of the patrimonial political system rather than seeking to challenge it. As such they are consistently vulnerable to co-option by regimes that they oppose, as well as to repression legally or extra-legally. A key issue is whether, as suggested, the prospects of a direct military threat to take over government can now be largely discounted as a result of the discrediting of military rule in the later years of Babangida and under Abacha. If so, then it is possible that the rules of the political game may change, though it is not immediately obvious that this would lead to a move towards the “factional democracy” model that can provide a more developmental orientation to policy. The pressing priority is for a more disciplined fiscal policy – since the autonomous benevolent model is not now attainable (if it ever was) the

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prospects for this depend fundamentally on the emergence of a consensus within the political elite that it will be in their interests to find ways of disciplining the competition for oil revenues, and channelling patronage politics towards more developmental outcomes.

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