annis memory justification

8/12/2019 Annis Memory Justification

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International Phenomenological Society

Memory and JustificationAuthor(s): David B. AnnisSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Mar., 1980), pp. 324-333Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106396.

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MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATIONI. Introduction

Propositionalmemory s theretention f knowledge. Thus a per-son S remembersthath at t1 ifand only fthere s a priortimet suchthat S knows that h at t1 because he knew that h at t. Althoughphilosophershave proposed counterexamplesto theconditionsofpastand presentknowledge, I believe that a careful analysis of the ex-amples revealsthat theyfail.' To avoid tedious polemics however etme simply tipulatethat I am concernedwith cases of memorywherethese two conditions are satisfied.Thus the burden of the analysisisto explain the relation between the past and presentknowledge.Some philosophershave soughtto do this n termsofcausation.2Thus theystress he existenceof certainfactual relationsthat obtainbetween a personand theworldor betweenstatesofa person. Myap-proach howeverwill be to appeal to a familyof epistemictermsandrelations.AlthoughI willnot offer causal analysis,myaccount willbe compatible with such an approach. It may verywell be the casethat the two approaches yieldcoextensiveresults.3

II. Two Approaches toJustificationThere have been two approaches to the ustificationofmemorybeliefs in the literature. According to Russell rememberingsomethingrequiresan image. Thus if rememberthat I had eggsforbreakfast, must have an image ofthis.What justifiesme in believingthatI had them forbreakfast, s opposed to the beliefthatI willhavethemor where I simply magine havingeggs, is the factthat the im-

1 For instance counterexamples re proposed in C. B. Martin and MaxDeutscher, "Remembering,"Philosophical Review, LXXV, 2 (April, 1966):161-196.These examples nd others re criticallyiscussed y Don Locke,Memory(Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), and Robert K. Shope, "Remembering,Knowledge,and MemoryTraces," Philosophy nd PhenomenologicalResearch,XXXIII, 3 (March, 1973): 303-322.

2 AlvinGoldman,"A Causal Theory fKnowing, Journal fPhilosophy, X-IV, 12 (June 2, 1967): 357-372.3 MarshallSwainhasgiven causal accountofknowledge nd arguedthat t scoextensivewith n analysis fknowledge s indefeasiblyustified ruebelief.Seehis "Knowledge,Causality,and Justification,"ournal of Philosophy,LXIX, II

(June1, 1972): 291-300, and his "Reasons, Causes, and PrimaryKnowledge,"presented t the 1975WesternDivisionAPA meetings.324

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MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION 325age is accompanied by a feelingofpastnessand a belief-feeling.Thejustificationof my belief thus derives solely frommy present ex-perience.'

Although most philosophers now reject the phenomenologicalelements of Russell's analysis, the structureof justificationdepictedbyhim is stillaccepted. According to this structurewhat ustifies hebelief that h, whenthis s a memorybelief, are featuresof theperson'spresent mental state,namely, his believingthat he remembersthat hand this belief not conflictingwithhis otherpresentbeliefs.Call thisview (A).'Opposed to this approach is the view that (B) what justifiesamemorybelief is what ustified t originally. Thus if S comes to knowthat h on the basis of certain evidence at t and he retains thisknowledge at a later timet1, then what ustifiedthe beliefthath at t1is what justified t at t. 6It seemsto me that view A) is problematic. A child of four maybe justified n believingsomething about that world - that here is acar - and yetmay not have acquired the epistemicconceptsof ade-quate evidence, ustifiedbelief, memory,knowledge, and so on. Thuswhile he has justifed beliefsabout theworld,he lacks thosereflectivebeliefsabout hisepistemic status. The empirical literature n concep-tual development in children certainlysupportsthis.7 To maintainthatin orderfora personto be justified n believingsomething bouttheworld,he must have beliefsabout hispresentmental state s a badrelic of Cartesianism.Furthermore A) has some odd consequences. Suppose S comes

4 B. Russell, The AnalysisofMind (New York: HumanitiesPress,1st ed.,1921).5 This sort of view is held by JohnPollock, Knowledgeand Justification

(Princeton: PrincetonUniversity ress, 1974), ch. 7. Carl Ginet, Knowledge,Perception, nd Memory Dordrecht:D. Reidel, 1975),ch. 7. RoderichChisholm,Theory f Knowledge EnglewoodCliffs: rentice-Hall, 966), ch. 3. C. I. Lewis,An Analysis fKnowledge nd Valuation LaSalle: Open Court, 1946), ch. XI.6 This view is suggestedby Norman Malcolm, Knowledgeand Certainty(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 229-231. Andrew Naylor, "BRemembershat P FromTime T,"Journalof Philosophy, XVIII, 2 (January 8,1971): 29-41. Alan Holland, "RetainedKnowledge,"Mind, LXXXIII, 331 (July,1974): 355-371. Hollandgoes on to arguethat ucha view ommits ne toa causaltheoryfmemory. do notwish o take up his claimhere,however thinkt spro-blematic.See some of thepoints aised n thewritings entionednfootnote andmy paper referredo in 8.7 The best reviewof the empirical iterature s JohnH. Flavell, "ConceptDevelopment,"Carmichael'sManual of Child Psychologyed.) Paul H. Mussen(New York:JohnWiley,1970), Vol. I, pp. 773-848.



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326 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHto believe h at t on the basis of evidence e where e is not adequateevidence forh, so that S's belief is not justified at t. Later at t, Sbelievesthathe remembers hath. Suddenlyhisbelief thath becomesjustified.Worse yetsuppose that at t S has good evidence against hbut irrationally believes h anyway. Later at t S forgets hiscounterevidenceand comes to believe that he remembersh. Here afailure on S's part contributesto his being justified. In both of thesecases beliefs thatwerenot justifiedsuddenlybecome justifiedand allfor the belief that you remember. What wonders the mental canworkImagine now thatS has verygood evidence e forh at t so thatheis justified n believing h. Consider a slightlyater timet1. Accordingto (A), e no longerhas thedirect ustificatoryink withh. It is only fSbelieves that ti thathe rememberse, and this beliefdoes not conflictwiththisotherpresentbeliefs,thate is part of what ustifies 's beliefthat h. Apparentlyan instantof timeis sufficiento break the directjustificatoryink between the evidence e and the helief that h. If Sdoes not rememberthe evidence at ti, then it becomes irrevlevent owhetherhe is ustified n believingh. Again this can occur in theflashof a second. Such detachment of what originally ustifieda belief isodd to say the least.

Since view (A) is problematic I wish to develop an analysis ofmemorywhere the ustification fmemorybelief s based on view B).III. Conditions of Original JustificationSuppose thatS acquires the ustifiedbelief thath at t so it isnot acase ofmemorybelief.What are the conditions underwhichis beliefis justified? f the belief is nonbasic, then it is justified fand only ifthereis a set of propositionsel, e2, ..., en such that(1) For each el (i = 1, 2, ..., n) S believes that ei.

(2) For each e- S is justified n believing ei.(3) S believes that h on the basis of el - en.(4) The set el - en provides adequate supportforh.(5) There is no otherset of propositions ',, e'2, .... e' such thatS believes theelementsof theset and theconjunctionof theseelementswithe, - en does not provide adequate supportforh.I reject the further ondition that S must believe that the set e,-en provides adequate supportforh. One need not have such reflec-tive beliefs n order to be justified.88For a defense of these conditions see my "EpistemicJustification,"Philosophia,VI, 2 (June,1976): 259-266.



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MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION 327Condition (3) is a complex condition forwhich it is difficult oprovide an analysis. It is intended to ensure that there is a certainrelationshipbetween S's belief that h and his evidence. Hence it ex-cludes thefollowing ituation:There is a setofpropositions atisfyingconditions 1), (2), (4), and (5) but theseare not the same reasonsforwhichS believesh. The setf f2, , fjwhichare poor reasonsare thereasons forwhichhe believes. In thiscase S would not be justified nbelievingh.To simplify he discussion assume that the set e1 - en is all theevidence S has forh and thatno element ofthe set is redundant (thatis, there s no elementel such that the degree of support the setpro-videsh is equal to thedegree ofsupportthe setminus el providesh).

Giventheserestrictions,we mightsay thatS's beliefthath is based onel - en at t just in case (C) S would not believe h at t ifhe did notbelieve el - en at t. However (C) does not implythe causal conditionsince counterfactualdependence is broader that causal dependence.In explicating (C) we may appeal to the Stalnaker-Lewisapproach.We assume a possibleworld inwhich the antecedentholds and whichdiffersminimallyfromour world, and see whetherthe consequentholds.There are however counterexamples which show that (C) isneithera necessarynor sufficient ondition for S's beliefthath beingbased on el - en. For example it has been suggestedthattwoproposi-tions h and i may be irrationally inked in S's mind so that ifhe weretogiveup the beliefthat he would no longerbelieve h. But wewouldnotwant to saythati was thereasonforwhichS believed h. This typeof case and the othersthat have been offered re all abnormal caseswhere the agent is not fullyrational.9 The beliefsare not affected nthewaythat a rationalperson's beliefswould be. Thus our analysis of(3) holds onlyfor normal cases.Next considerbasic beliefs.A belief s basic if t has some degreeof ustification ndependent of the support itmay derivefromotherbeliefs. This characterization of the basic allows something otherthan furtherbeliefsto provide justification,that is, there are othersources. Thus Quinton and Cornman allow a person's experiencesand observationsto justify basic belief, and Alston allows the factthat the belief arose in a certain way or is held in certain cir-

9Forvarious xamples eeKeithLehrer, HowReasonsGiveUsKnowledge,Orthe Case oftheGypsy awyer,"JournalfPhilosophy, XVIII, 10 May20, 1971):311-313. Alan Holland, "The Reasons For Which One Believes,"PhilosophicalStudies,XXIX, 6 (June,1976): 441-443. D. M. Armstrong, elief, Truth andKnoweldge London: Cambridge,1973): 82-85.



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328 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHcumstanceswhich do not require the having of evidence to justifybasic belief. For example the fact that S is paying attention,is notconfused,his perceptual organs are normal, and he is havingthe ex-perience of seeing something red, justifieshis belief that there issomethingred beforehim. Again to be justifiedS need not have thereflectivebeliefs that he is paying attention, that his perceptualorgans are normal and so on.'"If we wishto express this in causal terms,we can say that whatcausally explains thebeliefthath, its originand/orwhat substains t,is the set of experiences and not S's havingvarious evidence e forh.The experiences and observations re the basis of the belief.GivenS'ssituation f he had not had the experiencesormade theobservations,he would not now believe that h.Thus a person's nonmemorybelief that h is justifiedat t if it iseither basic or else satisfiesconditions (1) - (5). (It should be notedthat merely accepting the distinction between basic and nonbasicbeliefsdoes not commit one to foundationalism.We can accept theexistence of beliefs which are directly ustified and do not requireevidence and yet still deny a foundational view of knowledge. Thecontextualismof Popper and Austin are examples of this."' Whatdetermineswhetherone is a foundationalist is one's theoryof thebasic.) In the next sectionwe consider ustificationdiachronically.

IV. JustificationViewed DiachronicallyThe justificationof a nonmemorynonbasic belief requires S tobelieve e, - en. This is not so in the case of a memorybelief. SupposeJonestellsme thathe is going to have an operation. I visithim at thehospital and his doctor tellsme it was a success. On thisbasis I come

to believe thatJoneshad an operation(h). At a latertimeI claim thath and am asked how I know this. My first esponsemight be that I10Anthonyuinton,The Natureof Things London: Routledge,1973),pt. II.JamesW. Cornman, FoundationalVersusNonfoundational heories f EmpiricalJustification,"orthcomingn A merican Philosophical Quarterly.William P.Alston, "Self-Warrant:A Neglected Form of PrivilegedAccess," A mericanPhilosophicalQuarterly, III, 4 (October,1976): 257-272. present theoryfthejustificationof basic beliefs in "Epistemic Foundationalism"forthcomingnPhilosophicalStudies."1KarlR. Popper,The Logic ofScientific iscovery NewYork: Basic Books,1959). 1.L. Austin, enseand Sensibilia London: OxfordUniversityress,1962).For a discussion f contextualismee my"A Contextualist heoryof EpistemicJustification"orthcomingn AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly.



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MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION 329remember it. But this s simply to classifymy knowledge as memoryknowledge as opposed to just having learned about the operation.The question "How do you know?" is a request for the evidence thatjustifiesthe belief or what puts the person in a position to know. Toanswerthe question in the above case I must appeal to the fact that Ivisited him at the hospital and so on. But suppose several years go byand, although I remember that h, I no longer recall how I learnedthis. Although I cannot answer the question "How do you know?" acorrect answer would still be that I visited him and so on. Whatoriginally ustified my belief continues to justify t; the justificationholds through time.Assume that a person S justifiablycomes to believe that h at t.Even if S continues to believe h, there are several ways in which hisoriginal justificationwill no longer justify his belief. In analyzingknowledge philosophers have introduced the notion of a defeasiblejustification. Although there have been a number of rather com-plicated analysesof thisnotion, the intuitive dea is that ofa person'sjustification being overriddenby further vidence.' One restrictionthat has been placed on this further vidence is that it be true. It isnot required however that S be aware of the defeating evidence.Defeasibilityin the case of memory is slightlybroader that this.Althougha person's ustificationfora memorybeliefmaybe defeatedby trueevidence ofwhichhe is unaware, his ustification lso may bedefeated by his coming to believe some false propositioni which iscounterevidenceforh or e, p en.Some philosophershave claimed that knowledge is extendable,that is, ifone has knowledge,then one cannot lose it simplybycom-ing to know some otherproposition. But this s false. Suppose Mrs.Jones who is honest and reliable informsme at t that (h) herhusband's name is Bob. Assume that this ustifiesmybelief thath andthat there s no defeatingevidence at t. It is thusplausible to assumethat I knowh. But suppose at t, fiveyears aftert, I develop a verybad memoryfornames. If I learned at t that I was going to developsuch a bad memory,thiswould not affectmy ustificationforh at t.But ifI became aware ofmy memoryproblem afterti, this nforma-

12See, for example, Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, "Knowledge:Undefeated ustifiedTrue Belief,"Journal of Philosophy,LXVI, 8 (April 24,1969): 225-237. Marshall Swain, "Epistemic Defeasibility," AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,XI, 1 (January, 974): 15-25,and my"Knowledge ndDefeasibility",hilosophical tudies,XXIV, 3 (May, 1973): 199-203.13RistoHilpinen, "Knowledge and Justification," jatus, XXXIII (1971):7-39.



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330 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHtion would defeatmy ustification forbelievingh. It is thuspossiblefora person to know thath at t, sincethere sno defeatingevidence atthattime,but fortheperson to lose thisknowledge at a latertime dueto defeatingevidence.Anotherway in which the ustificatory inkbetweenthe originaljustificationfor the beliefthat h and the later belief can be broken,besidesbydefeatingevidence, is byrelearning.Suppose thatS retainstheknowledgethath. Some philosophers have claimed thatretentionrequires continuous possession.'4 However this is dubious. Considerthe followingcases of forgetting. a) Jones is supposed to buy somemilk afterwork. It slipshis mind untilhe pulls intohis driveway. b)Jonescannot recall a period in hischildhood. But whenplaced underhypnosis he recalls. (c) Jones is in an automobile accident anddevelops amnesia withregard to all events eading up to the accident.Even hypnosiswill nothelp. Years later and forno explanation itsud-denlybecomes clear to him again.In case (a) we say that he knew it all along; it just slipped hismind forthe moment. In case (b) we are inclined to say he knew itsubconsciously. But it is far less plausible to say that in the anmesiacase Jonescontinuouslyknew that such-and-sucheventstook place.There seems to be a period in whichhe simplycould not rememberand hence did not know.The importantfeature ofretention s not the continuousposses-sion of the knowledgethat h but not having to relearn h. Expressedsomewhat paradoxically we might say that one can lose theknowledge that h (by forgettingh) and regain the knowledge (byremembering t) and not have relearned that h at all.There is a whole batteryofrelated notions and idiomswe use indistinguishing etentionfromrelearning. For example we saythat theperson did not ust findout, discover,infer,or learn that h; he didnot have to have anynew confirming xperiences or evidencetoknowthat h is true. Suppose S came to knowthat h at t on thebasis of e, -enor on the basis of havingcertainexperiences ormakingcertainobser-vations. If S relearnsthath at a later timet, thenitwillbe S's learn-ing thatf1'f2, ...,f; at t1or S's havingvariousconfirming xperiencesat t1 that will provide the knowledge that h at that time. So theknowledge,even thoughthe content s thesame, willhave a differentbasis. Hence what justifiesthe beliefwill be different t t and t1.The justificatoryinkbetween the original ustificationforsome14Roger Squires, "MemoryUnchained,"PhilosophicalReview,LXXVIII, 2(April, 1969): 178-196.



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MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION 331beliefthat h and the laterbelief therefore olds if a) the ustificationhas not been defeated and (b) S has not had to relearn h. Somephilosophers however would object to justification at a temporaldistance. They interpret ustificationcausally. For what originallyjustifiedS in believingh to justify 's belief at a later time, the laterbeliefmust be causally related in an appropriate way to the originaljustification. But since they reject causation across temporal orspatial gaps, (mnemic causation in Russell's terms), it is claimedthatthere must be a continuouscausal (or justificatory)inkallowingfor no gaps. 15I do not object as some philosophers have to the idea of a con-tinuous causal process involved n memory.'6Perhaps information sencoded and forms the input of a neural storage-retrieval ystem.This neural mechanismwould explain howwe remember.However Ido not thinkthat such a continuous causal process is required forwhat origin lly ustifiedthebeliefto ustify hepresentbelief. Even ifwe interpret ustification causally, mnemic causation allows forcausation over a spatiotemporalgap.According to Russell mnemic causation occurs if what causessome presentevent s a spatially or temporallyremovedevent, wherethisdoes notrequire that there be a sequence of eventsforming con-tinuous causal chain fromthe previous event to the presentone. Itseemstome thatwe are all familiar withexamples of such causation.I have a fightwith my wifeand an hour laterwhen I ask her forthenewspaper she speaks sharply to me. The argument we had causedher to speak sharply. It is what explains her behavior. As Malcolmnotes, "It is a truismthatpeople respondto experiences and perceiv-ed events, weeks,months, years, afterthe occurence of those events.In ordinary ife our thinking snotboggled bythosetemporalgaps."'7Furthermore fwe consider some of the standard approaches to theconcept of causation - the regularity iew, the counterfactualview,thesingularistview,and so on - and take thevariousversions ftheseapproaches thatphilosophershave given,we findthatmanyof themare compatible with mnemic causation. Thus, even ifwe interpretjustification causally, justification can hold across temporal andspatial gaps.'8

"This is theviewofMartin nd Deutschern "Remembering.""See NormanMalcolm,Memory nd Mind (Ithaca: Cornell,1977).7Malcolm, Memory and Mind, p. 189.'8Furtherupportformnemiccausationmaybe found n Ginet,Knowledge,Perception nd Memory,ch. 7. Malcolm, Memoryand Mind, ch. 7. Shope,"Remembering, nowledge, nd Memory races."



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332 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHV. The Analysis of Memory

According to the analysis of memory suggested in section I, Smust know that h at t1because S knew thath at some earlier time t.The burden of the analysiswas to explain the relation of the past andpresent knowledge. In section III the conditions of original ustifica-tion were explained. In section IV justification was vieweddiachronically and we discussed the conditions under which S'soriginal ustificationcontinued to justify 's belief. The relationbet-ween a person's present and past knowledge in the case ofmemory sto be accounted for n termsof what originally ustifiedS's beliefat tbeing at least partof what ustifiedhis beliefat t,. We cannot requirethat it be solely what ustifies hepresentbeliefsince S may continueto acquire further upportforh duringthe intervalt to t,.The fact that ustification s defeasible raises a problem. Supposeat t I know that (e,) birds withmarkingsX are Purple Martins andthat (e2) the bird I saw in bybird feeder had markingsX and madesounds Y. From thisI inferthat (h) the bird I saw in mybird feederwas a Purple Martin. At a later timet, I am informedbya leading or-nithologist hat e, is false. He is confused when he tellsme thissince e,is actually true. Nevertheless am now justified n believing that e, isfalse. Suppose further hat the ornithologist ellsme that (e3) birdsthat make soundsY are Purple Martins.The conjunctionofe2and e3provides adequate supportfor h so that although part of myoriginaljustification s defeated, I am presently ustified n believingh.'9Is this a case ofmemoryor not? We may wish to deny thatthis sa case of retained knowledge. It seems as if some relearning hashad to take place so there sreason for ayingthathe has notretainedhis original knowledge. Perhaps there s a weaker sense ofremember-ingwhereall that is required is a retained belief This would explainany inclination to classify he above example as a case ofmemory.However another approach would be to distinguishpure fromimpure memory. In the case of pure memory knowledgethat h, nonew evidence is required in order forS's belief thath tobe justifiedatti. S may have new evidence thathe did not have originallybut it isnot required. In thissituation what originally ustifiedthebelief s atleast part of what justifies t now.

Impure memoryhowever does require new evidence since somepart of the original justification s defeated. Thus only part of what19Iam indebted o Marshall wain forpointing ut this ype fexampletome.



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MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION 333originallyustifiedthe belief will be involved n justifyinghe presentbelief. Whether we say that a person remembers n such a situationdepends on howmuch new evidence is required. Ifthe entireoriginaljustification s defeated, we are forcedto say that it is not retainedknowledgebut a case ofrelearning.However ifa "sufficient" art oftheoriginal ustification s left ntact,we seemwillingtograntthat wehave a case of retained knowledge. The vaguenessheremay make itdifficult t times to decide whetherwe are dealing witha case ofim-pure memoryor simple relearning. But ifwe reflecton actual caseswe see that often t is difficult o decide.It is not clear tome whichpositionis thebest to adopt. Ifwe re-ject impurememory s retainedknowledge,our analysisofmemory smuch neater. On the otherhand we seem to have at least some in-clination to say that the person has retained his knowledge in casessimilar to our bird example. But whicheverpositionwe accept, theimportantfeatureof the retentionof knowledge, be it pure or im-pure, is that (at least part of) what originally ustifiedthe belief isessentiallynvolved n justifyinghebeliefat present. fno part oftheoriginal justification s involved in justifying 's belief that h at t1,then it is not a case ofmemory.20 DAVID B. ANNIS.BALL STATE UNIVERSITY.

20Amuchearlierversion fthispaperwaspresented t theWesternDivisionAPA meetingsn 1974. MarshallSwainwas thecommentatornd I wish othankhimforhishelpful omments.Researchon thispaper was supportedbytheNa-tionalEndowment or heHumanities.

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