anonymous authentication: a privacy-enabled esurvey use case

9
Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case Olivier Potonniée, Bart Bombay, Carole Bayle September 2013

Upload: olivier-potonniee

Post on 20-Feb-2017

577 views

Category:

Internet


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

Olivier Potonniée, Bart Bombay, Carole BayleSeptember 2013

Page 2: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

A case for privacy

2

Many web services ask for personal details that go beyond their strict needUsers do not know what this information will be used forPeople get spammed, tracked, profiledWeb services incur liability risk of data breach for data that they don’t even need

Only minimum personal information is disclosedUser is aware and consent to this information disclosureIdentity of the user may not even need to be disclosed!Web service reduces cost and risk by only retaining minimum information

Imagine if

Page 3: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

Sample application: eSurvey

3

Providing strong evidence to the Service Provider that user fulfills the access criteria

While disclosing only the minimum personal informationThe user can be anonymousThe user can present a selected set of trusted attributes

Based on user consent

And ensuring that the Service Provider and Identity Provider cannot track back to the end user real identity even if they collude

Demonstrate how an end user can prove his eligibility to an eService without disclosing all of his personal data

Selective Disclosure

Anonymous Authentication

Explicit Consent

No Traceability

Page 4: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

eSurvey Service Provider

eSurvey Demo Actors

4

Trusted Anonymous Identity Provider

Identity Provider

AuthenticatesUser

Issues a trustedanonymous credential

Verifies the trustedanonymous credential

End user

Issuer Verifier

Page 6: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

AgeCity

Country

Credential Issuance

6

• The User has a privacy card

• The User connects to the Trusted and Anonymous Identity Provider to activate her privacy card

• The User has first to authenticate to an Identity Provider to validate her personal data

• The Trusted and Anonymous Identity Provider gets the User ‘s consent to load the personal attributes onto the Privacy Card (Age and Residence City & Country)

• The User personal attributes (Age and

Residence City & Country) are signed and loaded onto the Privacy Card. No additional personal information is loaded

• The card generates a key pair for this given credential (not shared with issuer)

Trusted and Anonymous Identity

provider

Identity Provider

Privacy Card

4

0

2

3

1

31

2

2

4

5

5

Trusted

Untraceable

AgeCity

Country

Page 7: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

eSurvey Participation

7

The User has a privacy card storing her personal attributes

The User connects to the eSurvey portal and selects the eSurvey in which she wants to participate

eSurvey shows personal attributes it needs (Age and Residence Country), User agrees to disclose them

User votes. The Privacy Card generates a signed token including only the requested personal attributes (Age and Residence Country) + the vote

The Service Provider verifies:The credential is emitted by a trusted issuerRequired criteria (Age over 18 and resident of Utopia)Checks User did not already vote

Service Provider

Privacy card

0

1

2

3

4

User remains anonymous during the whole process

Explicit consent

AgeCity

Country

Selective Disclosure

Page 8: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

Sum up: Key Privacy Principles

8

Card credential does not contain the end user identity Thanks to privacy token public key, the service provider can ensure the uniqueness of the vote

Only required personal information is provided to the Service Provider

Each time personal data is used, the end user consent is requested (either to retrieve or to store her personal data)

The random public key generated by the card is never shared with the Trusted and Anonymous IdPCryptographic protection against collusion of issuer and SP.

Selective Disclosure

Anonymous Authentication

No Traceability

Explicit Consent

Page 9: Anonymous Authentication: A privacy-enabled eSurvey use case

Online Authentication9

Thank you