Introduction

PAGE 8Introduction

Introduction

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robably in 800 AD Charlemagne and his court received a letter, the De substantia nihili et tenebrarum, written by a certain Fredegisus. This letter has an at first sight strange topic: nothing and darkness. More accurately said: Fredegisus tries to prove in this letter that the word nothing (nihil) refers to a real existing thing and that the word darkness (tenebrae) also has an existing referent. Thus, where ancient as well as modern philosophy of language considers these words to refer to intramental concepts, Fredegisus claims that there are two things outside the mind. We call one of these two things nothing, the other darkness. In his proofs Fredegisus used an array of techniques and theories from philosophy, but included Scripture as well to get to his conclusion. Charlemagne was confused. What was he to learn from this letter and from the way that Fredegisus used the Bible? Especially since the standard view was that the word nothing really had not extra-mental referent. That this view was the standard view can be seen in the educational dialogue that Alcuin, an important court scholar, wrote for young Peppin, the son and heir of Charlemagne. Alcuin was not ashamed to teach Pippin the following:

Alcuin: What is that which is and is not?

Pepin: Nothing.

Alcuin: How can it both be and not be?

Pepin: It exists in name, but not in fact.

Charles therefore commanded that a letter was sent to the astronomer Dungal for a second opinion and to divide the right from the wrong in the De substantia. Furthermore it is very interesting that Charles commanded Dungal to read the Bible specifically in the literal way. Would we only have Dungals response! But alas, the historian has to make do with the material that has survived the ages to tell his story. The letter that Dungal probably wrote to Charles has not lasted to our modern age. Still, the De substantia provides the historian with a very interesting text to study.

Who was the author that wrote this strange epistle? Modern historiography knows this person as Fredegisus of Tours. The date and year of his birth are unknown, but he died the tenth of August 833. In 800 Fredegisus was a deacon and shortly after he wrote the De substantia he was promoted to arch-deacon (before the fifteenth of April 800), one of whose main responsibilities was to oversee the instruction of the younger clerics. More important than the clerical rank that Fredegisus held was the place where he held it. Fredegisus exercised his function in the court chapel of Charlemagne in Aachen. In the late eighth century this chapel was a clerical institution owned by the ruler, which not only performed religious functions for him, but also governmental tasks. The members of the chapel held mass to pray for the well-being of the Carolingian dynasty, but also provided the notaries of the chancellery. This way the members of the chapel were the spiritual vassals of the king. A position in the chapel provided a respected office at court and therefore membership of the royal chapel usually proved to be an important step in a cursus honorum.

Yet most important was the fact that Fredegisus was one of the best pupils of Alcuin, the prominent spiritual guide of Charlemagne. Just like Alcuin, Fredegisus was of English origin and it is likely that Alcuin took Fredegisus with him when he went from the cathedral school of York to the Carolingian court in the early eighties of the eighth century. Their close ties are implicated by the nickname that Alcuin gave him. Alcuin defined his social world through nicknames and he was very generous to Fredegisus whom he called Nathanael. In his commentary on the gospel of John Alcuin explained that the name meant gift of God. In his role as teacher Alcuin dedicated two short treatises on the Trinity and on vision to Fredegisus. Through Alcuin Fredegisus probably gained easy access to the circle of court scholars that Charles had gathered round him and Fredegisus was benignly remembered in Theodulfs court poem. Moreover Alcuin used Fredegisus as a trusted messenger when he was made abbot of Tours in 796. Fredegisus not only carried letters to Arno, the bishop of Salzburg but also to Charlemagne. When Alcuin had finished his redaction of the New Testament and sent it as a Christmas gift to Charles, Fredegisus was the one to offer it. The best expression of Alcuins trust was that he also chose Fredegisus (together with Candidus) to intercede on his behalf in 802 when things were not so well between him and Charles.

The knigsnhe that Fredegisus acquired as Alcuins pupil transformed into intimacy with the royal family. Fredegisus taught not only young clergy as arch-deacon, but Charles sister Gisela and daughter Rotrudis as well. This way Fredegisus earned the trust of Charles, and his political career surged. He was made abbot of Tours after the demise of Alcuin in 804 and Einhard also reports that Fredegisus was among the witnesses of Charless testament in 811. After Charles death in 814 Fredegisus remained as respected as he had been. Under Louis the Pious he was appointed arch-chancellor in 819, which office he held until 832. Fredegisus certainly had organizational skills. The scriptorium in Tours was very productive during his abbacy and produced many pandects of Alcuins redaction of the Bible. Jozef Fleckenstein was impressed by the consistency and quality of the royal documents. In 820 Fredegisus received from Louis the Pious the abbacies of St. Bertin and St. Omer on top of his abbacy of Tours. But by alienating property from the abbacy of St. Bertin and reducing the number of clerics Fredegisus evolved a conflict with the monks of St. Bertin. This earned him a bad press in the tenth and eleven centuries. But for his lord Louis this was not a problem. In 826 Fredegisus took part in the cortege on the occasion of the baptism of Harald the Dane, walking first after Haralds wife and with a following of scholars.

At the end of his life Fredegisus was involved in a heated discussion with Agobard of Lyon. Only one letter of Agobard to Fredegisus is extant, yet their controversy was, among other topics, on the pre-existence of human souls and the relationship between God and truth. One other topic, which is of interest for this thesis, is the question whether the Bible holds to the rules of grammar and what the reasons for deviation are. Agobard held the opinion that the simple truth of the Bible evaded grammatical rules and that Fredegisus should not read the Bible so rationally, meaning that Fredegisus should not apply such strict rules to the Bible.

On a first reading of the De substantia many (modern) readers would have similar objections. In his proofs Fredegisus uses biblical authority, but Fredegisus has a very counterintuitive and alienating way of interpreting these quotations. To give one example: in the proof of the existence of darkness Fredegisus uses a quote from Mathew 6:23: If the light which is in you is darkness, how great will the darkness itself be? This sentence is preceded in Mathew by the idea that a pure eye illuminates the body (6:22). Most people will say that this means that someone with good (Christian) discernment will have a pure hart, but that someone with bad (not Christian) judgment will be rotten inside. Most people will say that in 6:23 a rhetorical question is posed. If any information about darkness is to be had from this rhetorical question, it is that it is opposed to the Christian light. And most people will therefore say that darkness is used here metaphorically, meaning something such as everything non-Christian. Not Fredegisus: he maintained that this sentence implies that darkness has a certain quantity and that it therefore exists. With the aim of the De substantia in mind (proving that nothing and darkness have referents) Fredegisus thus holds to totally different rules of searching for meaning and most people will feel gamed after reading the letter.

What Fredegisus in fact does is that he isolates sentences from Scripture and from orthodox doctrine in order to analyse these statements only on what they have to say on the words nothing and darkness. He totally disregards the context in which the sentences were made and any tacit knowledge on which these statements rely (it is for example tacit knowledge to know that usually a metaphor is nonsense when taken literally), or conventional explanations. There is a dictum that says that you should not trust the story teller, only trust the story. Fredegisus applies this dictum to the extreme, trusting only the literal propositional content of these sentences without taking any contextual information into account. Furthermore the rules that he uses in his analysis of the meaning consist in certain philosophical techniques derived from the categories and antique philosophy of language. With these techniques Fredegisus arrives at a totally different and restricted meaning of these sentences.

It is the strangeness of the letter and the use of these philosophical techniques that arouse and have aroused a long lasting interest in the letter from the nineteenth century onwards. Fredegisus claimed that Nothing is a thing, but what is this thing? What was his intention with showing that it is a thing? Was he doing exegesis of Genesis? What exactly were the philosophical techniques that he used and how did he use them? These are all questions that have to do with the manipulation of meaning by Fredegisus in the De substantia. These questions certainly will be treated in this thesis.

A first and very general realisation from which all answers have to start is that Fredegisus lived in a society which was text-based, since it interpreted reality according to a revelation in book form. The presupposition was that the Bible contained real and definite meaning. Humans were supposed to grasp this meaning, but the understanding of this meaning came far from easy. There were different levels (literal, allegorical, etc.) on which the meaning could be sought and different ways (explanation by context, meditation, etc.) to seek. In the couple of decades prior to the origin of the De substantia, a fertile experiment in the retrieval of meaning was conducted by Alcuin and his students. They used grammar and Aristotles theory of the categories to analyse certain theological concepts such as the Trinity. Fredegisus wrote his De substantia in this context of philosophical revival.

Yet there also was the much wider background of the Carolingian Renaissance. In the late eighth and early ninth century a strong impetus was given to schooling and scholarship (in which this experiment of Alcuin also took place). Charles himself and the court scholars that he had gathered around, him played an important role in this stimulation of learning. Fredegisus was operating in that very social surroundings of the royal court. His letter therefore was formed by the norms, values and concerns of these social surroundings. Fredegisus letter thus not only provides us with a witness of a revival of philosophical analysis, but it reflects contemporary court interests and values as well. It is this perspective on the wider historical context that shows at the same time how typical and strange Fredegisus letter was, and how various current developments, interests and values came together in one text. It is this combination of strangeness and normality that makes the De substantia such an interesting text to study. Further Fredegisus letter provides a perspective on the multifarious ways in which the transmission of knowledge could take place in the Carolingian Renaissance. In this one text such different forms as philosophical tracts, glossaries and court letters, could be fused.

This thesis sets out to study the De substantia in both its technical and philosophical features, and in the influence that the social surroundings and concerns of the royal court exercised on it. Yet the hypotheses and its argumentations will not be developed immediately after the introduction. I have divided the thesis in two parts. The first part comprises of the texts and translations of Charles letter to Dungal and Fredegisus De substantia. Furthermore I have written a commentary on the De substantia and the Latin texts which is also included in the first part, so that this first part with the text, translation and commentary can be separated as an autonomous entity. The second part will then consist of the chapters containing an elaborated interpretation of the De substantia. I have chosen for this division, instead of having several appendices, for the following reasons. A sentence by sentence commentary on the text is a first study tool in the understanding of a text. It should therefore literaly be read prior to an extensive study. A reader should be able to understand the De substantia and quickly arrive at results from current research without reading the whole thesis. This validated an autonomous first part. My own research results will be stated in the commentary, and cross references will point the way to their argumentation.

In my own research I have not only been occupied by Fredegisus technical argumentation or the theories from which it derives. The historical context has also been drawn in to elucidate Fredegisus concern with words and especially to gain a perspective on the purpose that the De substantia was supposed to serve. I have developed my argument along the lines of three questions: What has Fredegisus said? How has he said it? Why has he said it? The answer to the first question has been labelled the statement. The statement of the De substantia comprises Fredegisus question and his answer. It was necessary to write this chapter since there has been a misunderstanding in the historiography beginning with Max Ahner, who published his dissertation in 1878, down to Concettina Gennaro in 1963. In this period it was a common tenet that Fredegisus had the word nothing refer to prime matter, i.e. the stuff without properties with which God formed the world. Not only was this tenet itself faulty, but it sprang from a misguided focus on Fredegisus text. Most historians in this period were trying to figure out what Fredegisus thought that the referent of nothing was. Yet Fredegisus was writing about two words instead of one and his primary concern was to show that these words had referents in extra-mental reality. Research on Fredegisus should therefore have a main focus on these two words and on how Fredegisus thought that they referred. Historiography since the late 1970s has had a better grasp of Fredegisus list of priorities and has denied that Fredegisus identified the referent of nothing with prime matter. However, this denial has lacked argumentation and Fredegisus concern with words has never been put into context. Yet it is the context which puts Fredegisus concern into perspective and further substantiates the idea that words were his primary concerns, not the referents themselves. Since it is this idea that forms the starting point of the rest of the research, it is necessary to establish beyond doubt that Fredegisus question was about two words and that his answer was that they have extra-mental referents. Therefore the chapter starts with a substantiated denial of the identification of the referent of nothing with prime matter and next puts Fredegisus concern with words into context.

The answer to the second research question (how has he said it?) has been labelled method. The method comprises the techniques and theories that Fredegisus used to get to his answer. This topic has received ample attention in recent historiography, yet, once again, it has been preoccupied with Fredegisus treatment of nothing. I have treated the theories which Fredegisus used in both his part of nothing and his part of darkness. Thereby I found that, despite all the attention for his method, Fredegisus use of the categories has not yet been described and his use of etymological theory has not yet been acknowledged. Furthermore a balanced treatment of all the methods that Fredegisus used will clarify differences between the referents of nothing and darkness. Why did Fredegisus use the categories and elements from etymological theory in his part on darkness but not in his part on nothing? The answer to this question will, under the guidance of Shimizu Tetsuro, lead to another interpretation of the referent of Nothing. The first part of the chapter on the statement and the last paragraph of the chapter on the method are therefore concerned with the interpretation of the referent of nothing. This interpretation forms a small subplot of the thesis, as a secondary interest.

The answer to the third question (why has he said it?) has been labelled use. The use comprises the function that the De substantia was to perform in the social context of the royal court and its interests. Hitherto this aspect of Fredegisus letter has been left in the dark. The De substantia has been written in the context of the Carolingian Renaissance and the concerns of the royal court exerted a great influence both on the Carolingian Renaissance and the De substantia. I therefore thought it important to introduce the interplay between the court and the Carolingian Renaissance, in order to give some body to the ensuing hypothesis and argument. After this introduction, I have tried to answer several questions. How did Fredegisus letter played its part in the larger movement of the Carolingian Renaissance, what court values were of influence and what were the interests of Charles at the time. These questions zoom in from the general background of the search for Christian wisdom in the Carolingian Renaissance to the specific of a cosmological interest of Charles in the years 797-800. It is here that I propose the hypothesis that the De substantia has been written as two encyclopaedic lemmata. The result of the research on Fredegisus statement, that his primary concern was with words, has served as the presupposition for this hypothesis. This focus should clarify why Charles was so surprised. My hypothesis is that Charles expected different information from Fredegisus, and this can be partly be grasped from the letter he sent to Dungal and partly from other letters conversations that Charles had in this period.

Of course, the chapters on the statement, method and use of Fredegisus letter are preceded by a chapter on the historiography. The scholars treated were selected for their contribution to Fredegisus image in historiography or their exemplarity thereof. The focus in their treatment is on the context in which they have put Fredegisus, their usefulness for current research and their judgment of Fredegisus. There is a certain measure of redundancy between the historiographical part and the commentary on the text. I have chosen for this redundancy where it occurs except for the elaborate nine-step analysis of Mignucci- since the first and second parts of the thesis should be autonomous.

I would like to make a final note on the way that I will write nothing in this thesis. The word nothing has several different meanings. In order to prevent confusion, whenever nothing means the word itself, I will add quotation marks. An additional confusion might arise in the second part of the thesis, when Fredegisus idea of Nothing as a thing is differentiated from the normal meaning of nothing as not something. Therefore I will differentiate the orthography of the word in the second part of the thesis, by writing a capital N whenever I will refer to Fredegisus idea of Nothing. Since it is very unlikely that this last confusion will arise in the commentary on the De substantia, and since the commentary forms an autonomous part of the thesis, this differentiation between Nothing and nothing is not used in the commentary. It goes without saying that in the translation of the De substantia neither the quotation marks, nor the capital N are used.

Finally I want to express my gratitude to several people. First of all I am indebted to Mayke de Jong, who has endeavoured until the utmost end to raise the quality of this thesis, even though we had a distanced relationship. In her very busy stay at the NIAS she did find the time to support my thesis and I thank her. Arjo Vanderjagt was prepared to supervise chapters three and four in a very late stage, and I am grateful that jetlagged as he was- he read the chapters on very short notice. I am glad that Albrecht Diem has taken it upon himself to function as an unpaid supervisor at the start of my research, since I had some invaluable conversations with him in which I have been able to order my thoughts. Of course I also thank him for the gentlemanly remarks with which he sometimes glossed my chapters. David Howlett has provided me with a manuscript of a forthcoming article which he graciously permitted me to use for this thesis. I warmly support his cause of humour in science. Mary Garrison has provided her well-informed opinion on my thoughts and enthousiastically spurred me on. Arpd Orbn has used his command of the Latin language to check some translations and transcriptions. Lina van t Wout greatly helped me on the way during the first translation. I am afraid that in these times few illegal aliens receive such a warm welcome as I enjoyed in room 1.21 the past few years. Although, now that I think of it, Wolfert van Egmond has tried to poison me with his brews and Bram van den Hoven van Genderen with his cultural optimism. Nonetheless I thank Wolfert for the daily conversations, his help, and his comics and Bram for his tutorship in my career as student of medieval history. But I should not forget Alisa Bredo, my native speaker. For she has corrected my dunglish to American English. And the thesis would have been less readable if not for her. My last salute is to Gerja, whose love has supported me every single day.

PART I

Text tradition

Before we go to the translation of the text, a short note is needed to address the critical edition that was used as basis for the translation, and on the manuscripts on which this critical edition is based. Concettina Gennaro has made an elaborate comparison of the extant manuscripts and gave information on previous editions in her chapters two and three, on which the following is based.

There are four copies of Fredegisus letter left, or at least, known to us:

1)Paris BN Lat. 5577, fols. 134r-137r

(P)

2)Vatican Reg. Lat. 69 fols. 90v-93r.

(V)

3)Brussels, Bibl. Royale de Belgique 9587, fol 51v, r. 22 - fol 53r, r. 5

(B1)

4)Brussels, Bibl. Royale de Belgique 9587, fol. 168r, r. 31 fol. 170r, r.18(B2)

As can be seen, B1 and B2 are contained in the same codex, which has nr. 1372. B2 is a tenth century paper copy of B1; the rest of the codex is made of parchment.

The catalogues, and Bernard Bischoff for B, provide dates for the codices in which the manuscripts are contained. Since this thesis is not focused on the reception of the De substantia, but rather with the circumstances of its genesis, here we are chiefly interested in the dating of the manuscripts. On the basis of palaeographical evidence, in the palaeographical addition to Gennaros work, Anna Laura Martorana has dated the manuscripts of the De substantia as follows:

P

800-830

V

860-870

B1

800-830

Martorana has excluded manuscript B2 in her research since it is a copy of B1. In the rest of the analysis of the manuscript tradition, I will also exclude B2. Following Martoranas conclusions, this means that it is likely that P and B1 were written during Fredegisus life, since he died in 833.

There is also the question of possible relationships between the texts. On the basis of comparisons of variants and lacunae, Gennaro reaches the following conclusions: V is a descendant of P. But B1 and P are not related and stem from different branches. P and V have three lacunae that B1 has not, and B1 has a lacuna that P and V have not. This suggests that the text constitution of B1 is better than that of P and V. This last suggestion is corroborated by an important detail. In B1 (and its copy B2), Fredegisus letter is preceded by the letter Charlemagne wrote to Dungal requesting his opinion on Fredegisus claims. It is therefore very probable that B1 is closer to the archetype than P.

When using the editions of the De substantia one has to keep the following in mind: B1 was only discovered in the late nineteenth century. Thus the editions that were made before the late nineteenth century only used P and V, and therefore have the three lacunae. It is better not to use them. The edition in the PL is one of these. After the discovery of B1, several other editions on the basis of B1, P and V have come to light, among them Dmmlers edition in the MGH Epistolae. Another critical edition by David Howlett will be published in the Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi. In my thesis I have used his text constitution since he holds to contemporary norms (for example of orthography).

There are a few things to say about the translation of the text. In his article, David Howlett has also provided a translation of the text. This translation is very literal, so that the Latin can be followed very well. However, the understanding of the reader who is not versed in Latin is sometimes impaired by this literal translation. Therefore, Mayke de Jong and me deemed it necessary to translate Charles letter to Dungal, the De substantia nihili and part of the De substantia tenebrarum again. Together we have made this translation. Nonetheless, Howletts translation served as a point of reference for the translation I will put forward in this thesis, although at times the translation here sometimes differs radically from Howletts. From sentence 43 onwards, I have maintained Howletts translation. Latin text

INTERROGATIO DOMNI CAROLI SERENISSIMI IMPERATORIS

DE SUBSTANTIA NIHILI ET TENEBRARVM

IN NOMINE PATRIS ET FILII ET SPIRITVS SANCTI

CAROLVS SERENISSIMVS AVGVSTVS

A DEO CORONATVS

MAGNVS ET PACIFICVS IMPERATOR ROMANVM GVBERNANS IMPERIVM

QVI ET PER MISERICORDIAM DEI REX FRANCORVM ET LANGOBARDORVM

DVNGALO FIDELI NOSTRO

1 Sententias siue rationes quas tibi dirigimus de substantia nihili et tenebrarum diligenter ac studiose explorare te uolumus et utrum rectae ac uerae sint an aliqua falsitate notabiles nobis significare stude.

2 Nihil tamen allegorice aut figurate ibi adtendas sed nudum sermonem nudamque litteram rem nudam significantem.

3 Non autem nos latet quid allegorice maiores nostri in his intellegere uoluerint quoniam si alia exempla quaeres quam plurima prompta sunt sicut in Psalmis Pro nihilo saluos facies illos et in Iob Qui appendet terram super nihilum et cetera.

4 Similiter si de substantia tenebrarum alia exempla quaesieris inter cetera haec etiam adhibere poteris ut est Benedicite lux et tenebrae Domino et Apostolus Deus qui dixit de tenebris lumen splendescere in Propheta lex Domini uoce Ego Dominus formans lucem et creans tenebras et in Iob Tempus posuit tenebris et uniuersorum finem ipse creat item ibi Terminum dedit aquis donec finiantur lux et tenebrae item aliud Omnes tenebrae absconditae in occultis Dei et Noctem uerterunt in diem et rursum post tenebras spero lucem.

OMNIBVS FIDELIBVS DEI ET DOMNI NOSTRI SERENISSIMI PRINCIPIS KAROLI

IN SACRO EIVS PALATIO CONSISTENTIBUS

FREDEGISUS DIACONVSDE SUBSTANTIA NIHILI

1 Agitatam diutissime a quam plurimis quaestionem de nihilo quam indiscussam inexaminatamque ueluti inpossibilem ad explicandum reliquerunt mecum sedulo uoluens atque pertractans tandem uisum mihi fuit adgredi eamque nodis uehementibus quibus uidebatur inplicita disruptis absolui atque enodaui detersoque nubilo in lucem restitui memoriae quoque posteritatis cunctis in futurum saeculis mandandam praeuidi.

2 Quaestio autem huiusmodi est Nihilne aliquid sit an non?

3 Si quis responderit Videtur mihi nihil esse ipsa eius quam putat negatio conpellit eum fateri aliquid esse nihil dum dicit Videtur mihi nihil esse.

4 Quod tale est quasi dicat Videtur mihi nihil quiddam esse.

5 Quod si aliquid esse uidetur ut non sit quodam modo uideri non potest quocirca relinquitur ut aliquid esse videatur.

6 Si uero huiusmodi fiat responsio Videtur mihi nihil nec aliquid esse huic responsioni obuiandum est primum ratione in quantum hominis ratio patitur deinde auctoritate non qualibet sed diuina dumtaxat quae sola auctoritas est solaque inmobilem obtinet firmitatem.

7 Agamus itaque ratione.

8 Omne itaque nomen finitum aliquid significat ut homo lapis lignum haec enim ut dicta fuerint simul res quas significant intellegimus.

9 Quippe hominis nomen praeter differentiam aliquam positum uniuersalitatem hominum designat lapis et lignum suam similiter generalitatem conplectuntur.

10 Igitur nihil si modo nomen est ut grammatici asserunt finitum nomen est.

11 Omne autem nomen finitum aliquid significat.

12 Ipsum uero aliquid finitum ut non sit aliquid inpossibile est ut finitum aliquid non sit inpossibile est ut nihil quod finitum est non sit aliquid ac per hoc esse probabile est.

13 Item nihil uox significatiua est.

14 Omnis autem significatio ad id quod significat refertur.

15 Ex hoc etiam probatur non posse aliquid non esse.

16 Item aliud Omnis significatio eius significatio est quod est.

17 Nihil autem aliquid sifnificat.

18 Igitur nihil eius significatio est quod est id est rei existentis.

19 Quoniam uero ad demonstrandum quod non solum aliquid sit nihil sed etiam magnum quiddam paucis actum est ratione cum tamen possint huiusmodi exempla innumera proferri in medium ad diuinam auctoritatem recurrere libet quae est rationis munimen et stabile firmamentum.

20 Siquidem uniuersa ecclesia diuinitus erudita quae ex Xristi latere orta sacratissime carnis eius pabulo pretiosique sanguinis poculo educata ab ipsis cunabilis secretorum mysteriis instituta inconcussa fide tenere confitetur diuinam potentiam operatam esse ex nihilo terram aquam aera et ignem lucem quoque et angelos atque animam hominis.

21 Erigenda est igitur ad tanti culminis auctoritatem mentis acies quae nulla ratione cassari nullis argumentis refelli nullis potest uiribus inpugnari.

22 Haec enim est quae praedicat ea quae inter creaturas prima ac praecipua sunt ex nihilo condita.

23 Igitur nihil magnum quiddam ac praeclarum est quantumque sit unde tanta et tam praeclara sunt aestimandum non est.

24 Quippe cum unum horum quae ex eo genita sunt aestimari sicut est ac definiri non possit.

25 Quis enim elementorum naturam ex asse metitus est?

26 Quis enim lucis aut angelicae uel animae substantiam ac naturam conplexus?

27 Si ergo haec quae proposui humana ratione conprehendere nequimus quo modo obtinebimus quantum qualeue sit illud unde originem genusque ducunt?

28 Poteram autem et alia quam plurima subicere sed docibilium quorumque pectoribus satis his insinuatum credimus.

DE SUBSTANTIA TENEBRARUM

29 Quoniam his breuiter dictis commode finem inposui mox ad ea expedienda intentionem retuli quae curiosis lectoribus non inmerito uidebantur digna quaesitu.

30 Est quidem quorundam opinio non esse tenebras et ut sint inpossibile esse.

31 Quae quam facile refelli possit Sacrae Scripturae auctoritate prolata in medium prudens lector agnoscet.

32 Itaque quid libri Genesis historia inde sentiat uidebatur.

33 Sic enim inquit Et tenebrae erat super faciem abyssi.

34 Quae si non erant qua consequentia dicitur quia erant?

35 Qui dicit tenebras esse rem constituendo ponit qui autem non esse rem negando tollit sicut cum dicimus Homo est rem id est hominem constituimus cum dicimus Homo non est rem negando id est hominem tollimus.

36 Nam uerbum substantiale hoc habet in natura ut cuicumque subiecto fuerit iunctum sine negatione eiusdem subiecti declaret substantiam.

37 Praedicando igitur in eo quod dictum est Tenebrae errant super faciem abyssi res constituta est quam ab esse nulla negatio separate aut diuidit.

38 Item tenebrae subiectum est erant declaratiuum declarat enim praedicando tenebras quodam modo esse.

39 Ecce inuicta auctoritas ratione comitata ratio quoque auctoritatem confessa unum idemque praedicant tenebras scilicet esse.

40 Sed cum ista exempli causa posita ad demonstrandum quae proposuimus sufficiant tamen ut nullis contradicendi occasio aemulis relinquatur faciamus palam pauca diuina testimonia adgregantes e pluribus quorum excussi formidine ineptissimas ulterius uoces aduersus ea iaculari non audeant.

41 Siquidem Dominus cum pro adflictione populi Israel plagis seuerioribus castigaret Aegyptum tenebris etiam inuoluit adeo spissis ut palpari quirent et non solum obtutibus hominum uisum adimentibus sed etiam pro sui crassitudine manuum tactui subiacentibus.

42 Quicquid enim tangi palparique potest esse necesse est quicquid esse necesse est non esse inpossibile est quia esse necesse est quod ex eo quod est palpabile probatum est.

43 Illud quoque praetereundum non est quod cum omnium Dominus inter lucem et tenebras diuisionem faceret lucem appellauit diem et tenebras noctem.

44 Si enim diei nomen significat aliquid noctis nomen non potest aliquid non significare.

45 Dies autem lucem significat lux uero magnum aliquid est dies enim et est et magnum aliquid est.

46 Quid ergo?

47 Nihilne significatiuae sunt tenebrae cum eis uocabulum noctis ab eodem conditore inpressum est qui luci appellationem diei inposuit?

48 Cassanda est diuina auctoritas?

49 Nullo modo.

50 Nam caelum et teram facilius est transire quam auctoritatem diuinam a suo statu permutari.

51 Conditor etenim rebus quas condidit nomina inpressit ut suo quaeque nomine res dicta agnita foret.

52 Neque rem quamlibet absque uocabulo formauit nec uocabulum aliquod statuit nisi cui statueretur existeret.

53 Quod si foret omnimodis uideretur superfluum quod Deum fecisse nefas est dici.

54 Si autem nefas est dici Deum aliquid statuisse superfluum nomen quod Deum inposuit tenebris nullo modo uideri potest superfluum.

55 Quod si non est superfluum est secundum modum.

56 Si uero secundum modum et necessarium quia eo ad dinoscendum rem opus est quae per id significatur.

57 Constat itaque Deum secundum modum res constituisse et nomina quae sibi inuicem sunt necessaria.

58 Sanctus quoque Dauid Propheta Sancto Spiritu plenus sciens tenebras non inane quiddam et uentosum sonare euidenter exprimit quia quiddam sunt.

59 Ait ergo Misit tenebras.

60 Si non sunt quomodo mittuntur?

61 Quod autem est mitti potest et illo mitti potest ubi non est?

62 Quod uero non est mitti quolibet non potest quia nusquam est.

63 Igitur missae dicuntur tenebrae quia erant.

64 Item illud Posuit tenebras latibulum suum.

65 Quod scilicet erat posuit et quodam modo posuit ut tenebras quae erant latibulum suum poneret?

66 Item aliud Sicut tenebrae eius ubi ostenditur quia in possessione sunt ac per hoc esse manifestantur.

67 Nam omne quod possidetur est tenebrae autem in possessione sunt igitur sunt.

68 Sed cum ista talia ac tanta sufficient et arcem tutissimam contra omnia inpugnamenta teneant unde leui repulsu tela in suos iaculatores retorquere possunt ex euangelica tamen firmitate quaedam poscenda sunt.

69 Ponamus igitur ipsius Saluatoris uerba.

70 Filii inquit regni eicientur in tenebras exteriores.

71 Adtendendum est autem quod tenebras exteriores nominat extra enim unde exterius deriuatiuum est locum significat.

72 Quapropter cum dicit exteriores tenebras locales esse demonstrat.

73 Nam non essent exteriores tenebrae nisi essent et interiores.

74 Quicquid autem exterius est id in loco sit necesse est.

75 Quod uero non est id nusquam est.

76 Igitur exteriores tenebrae non solum sunt sed etiam locales sunt.

77 In Passione quoque Domini euangelista tenebras factas esse praedicat ab hora diei sexta usque ad horam nonam. 78 Quae cum factae sint quomodo non esse dicuntur? 79 Quod factum est effici non potest ut factum non fuerit quod uero semper non est nec umquam fit id nusquam est tenebrae autem factae sunt quare ut non sint effici non potest.

80 Item aliud Si lumen quod in te est tenebrae sunt ipsae tenebrae quantae erunt?

81 Neminem dubitare credo quin quantitas corporibus adtributa sit quae cuncta per quantitatem distribuuntur et quantitas quidem secundum accidens est corporibus accidentia uero aut in subiecto aut de subiecto praedicantur.

82 Per hoc ergo quod dicitur Ipsae tenebrae quantae erunt? quantitas in subiecto monstratur unde probabili argumento colligitur tenebras non solum esse sed etiam corporales esse.

83 Itaque haec pauca ratione simul et auctoritate congesta uestrae magnitudini atque prudentiae scribere curaui ut eis fixe inmobiliterque haerentes nulla falsa opinione inlecti a ueritas tramite declinare possitis.

84 Sed si forte a quocumque aliquid prolatum fuerit ab hac nostra ratione dissentiens ad hanc ueluti ad regulam recurrentes probabilibus sententiis eius stultas machinationes deicere ualeatis.

EXPLICIT.

Translation

INTERROGATION OF THE LORD CHARLES, MOST SERENE EMPEROR

ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF NOTHING AND OF DARKNESS

IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER AND OF THE SON AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

CHARLES, MOST SERENE AUGUSTUS

CROWNED BY GOD

GREAT AND PEACE-MAKING EMPEROR GOVERNING THE ROMAN EMPIRE

WHO ALSO THROUGH GODS MERCY KING OF FRANKS AND LOMBARDS

TO DUNGAL OUR FAITHFUL MAN

1 Assidously and painstakingly, we wish you to explore the pronouncements or arguments we have sent you about the substance of nothing and of darkness. Endeavour to make clear to us whether they are right and true, or whether there are any things notale for any falsity.

2 Do not apply yourself to any allegorical or figural [exegesis] but to the naked speech and the naked letter signifying the naked matter.

3 Yet it is not hidden to us what our elders may have wished to understand allegorically concerning these matters, for if you look for other examples how many are there at hand,

as in Psalms For nothing you will make those men safe

and in Job Who appends the earth above nothing

and the rest.

4 Similarly if you were to look for other examples of the substance of darkness you can also, among others, take one

like Bless, light and darkness, the Lord

and the Apostle God Who said from the darkness light should shine

in the Prophet the law of the Lord in an utterance I, the Lord, forming light and creating darkness

and in Job He has placed a time for darkness, and Himself creates the end of all things

in the same way there He has given a boundary to the waters until light and darkness be ended

in the same way another: All darkness hidden in the secret places of God

and They turned night into day and again after darkness I hope for light.

TO ALL THE FAITHFUL MEN OF GOD AND OF OUR LORD THE MOST SERENE PRINCE CHARLES

LIVING TOGETHER IN HIS SACRED PALACE

FREDEGISUS THE DEACON

ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NOTHING

1 They have left me the troubling question about nothing,

which has concerned many for a long time, however undiscussed, unexamined as if impossible to explicate.

Yet it seemed up to me, who wishes fervently to treat the matter, to tackle it.

I have untied the fierce knots in which it was tied, and clearing away the obscuring cloud, I have restored it to light

and taken care that it is handed over to the memory of posterity for all ages in the future.

2 The question, however, is this: is nothing something or not?

3 If anyone should respond It seems to me to be nothing this, his negation which he maintains compels him to state that nothing is something while he says,

It appears to me to be nothing.4 Which is such as if he should say It seems to me that nothing is a certain something.

5 Since, if something seems to be as if it does not exist, it cannot appear in any way, for which one leaves the position that it seems to be something.

6 If in truth a response of this sort should be made It seems to me that nothing is not something

to this response it should be objected,

first by reason in so far the reason of man [to say that nothing is not something] is obvious,

and subsequently by authority. Not just by any, but by nothing less than the divine authority which is the only authority, and the only one which provides unshakable certainty.

7 And so let us employ reason.

8 Thus every finite noun signifies something, as man, stone, wood

for these [words], as they may be said, signify at once things which we understand.

9 Indeed posited the noun of man designates, apart from any [individuating] difference the universality of men.

stone and wood include similarly their own generality.

10 Therefore if nothing is a noun at all, as grammarians assert, it is a finite noun.

11 Every finite noun, however, signifies something.

12 Yet that the finite noun itself may not be something is impossible,

so that, a finite that is not something is impossible, or nothing that is a finite is not something- and thus can its existence be deemed proven.

14 Every signification, however, is referred to that which it signifies.

15 From this also it is proven that it cannot be something that is not.

16 Similarly, another: every signification is its signification because it [i.e. the thing signified] is.

17 Nothing, however, signifies something.

18 Therefore nothing is its signification which means that it is an existing thing.

19 Since in order to demonstrate that nothing is not only something,

but also something important, little is to be gained from reason, but nonetheless of ths innumerable examples can be brought forth for consideration.

One ought to go back to divine authority

which is the stronghold of reason nd a stable foundation.

20 Just as the universal church, instructed by divine inspiration,

born from the side of Christ and educated with the food of His most sacred flesh and with the cup of precious blood, instructed from the cradle in the mysteries of its secrets,

professes to hold in unshaken faith that divine power wrought existence from nothing earth, water, air, and fire, also light, and angels, and the soul of man.

21 Sharpness of mind is therefore to be elevated to this superb level of authority, which can be thwarted by no reason, refuted by no arguments, attacked by no powers.

22 For this is what it [Scripture] preaches: that those who were the first and foremost among the creatures were created from nothing.

23 Therefore nothing can be something great and excellent,

and why it is so great and excellent is not for us to fathom.

24 Indeed not even one of these things which have been begotten from it can be understood as it is and defined.

25 For who has measured the nature of the elements from an as [i.e. from a small unit]?

26 For who has included the substance and nature either of angelic light or of the soul?

27 If therefore we do not know how to comprehend by human reason these things which I have proposed

in what manner will we ascertain how much or of what kind this [nihil] may be, whence they trace back their origin and kind?

28 I could have submitted many other arguments, but we believe that we have already insinuated enough into the hearts of men eager to learn.

ON THE SUBSTANCE OF DARKNESS

29 Given that I have put a suitable end to this brief exposition,

I now turn my attention to those matters to be explained

which seemed worth questioning to inquisitive readers.

30 Some are of the opinion that darkness does not exist, and that it can impossibly exist.

31 How easily this can be refuted, the prudent reader understands at once the authority of Scripture is brought into the discussion.

32 And so it becomes clear what the history of the book Genesis has to say about this question.

33 It says this: And the darkness was over the face of the deep. [Gen.1:2].

34 If it did not exist, by what reasonint is it said that it was?

35 Who says that darkness exists posits by constituting a thing

who, however, [says that it] does not exist takes away by negating a thing

just as when we say A man is we constitute a thing, that is, a man

when we say A man is not we take away by denying a thing, that is, a man.

36 For a substantial word has this in nature

that a thing joined to whatever subject it may be without negation of the same subject declares a substance.

37 By predicating, therefore, in that which is said Darkness was upon the face of the deep a thing has been constituted

which no negation separates or divides from existence.

38 In the same way darkness is the subject, was the declarative

for it declares by predicating that darkness exist in whatever manner.

39 Lo, with unconquered authority accompanied by reason, reason also having confessed authority, they predicate one and the same thing

understand, the darkness exists.

40 But though these things posited for the sake of example suffice for demonstrating the things which we have proposed

nevertheless that an occasion of constradicting be left to no envious men

let us make in the open, aggregating a few divine testimonies from many

so that, shaken by fear, they will not dare to raise their inept voices against them anymore.

41 When the Lord, because of the affliction of the people of Israel, castigated Egypt with severe plagues,

he also enveloped it with a darkness so thick that they could touch it,

and not only were men deprived of their ability to see,

but also, because of its density, it could be touched by hands.

42 Now whatever is tangible and palpable must necessarily exist

whatever has necessarily to exist cannot possibly not exist

and through this it is impossible for darkness not to exist

because existence is necessary which has been proved from that which is palpable.

43 That also must not be passed over

Because when the Lord of all things made a division between light and darkness He called the light day ad the darkness night. [Gen. 1:5].

44 For if the name of day signifies something

the name of night cannot not signify something.

45 Day, however, signifies light

light in truth is something great

for day both is and is something great.

46 What therefore?

47 Is darkness significative of nothing

since the word of night has been impressed on them by the same Creator

Who imposed for light the appellation of day?

48 Is divine authority to be frustrated?

49 In no manner.

50 For it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away [lit. to go across]

than for divine authority to be completely changed from its own state.

51 For the Creator impressed names upon the things which He created

so that each said thing might be known by its own name.52 Neither did He form anything whatever without a word

nor did He establish any word

unless the thing for which it was established existed.

53 Because it would seem superfluous in all respects it it should be

sthat something God made is to be called unspeakable.

54 If, however, something that God established superfluous is to be called unspeakable the name that God imposed on the darkness can in no manner be seen as superfluous.

55 Because if it is not superfluous it is according to measure.

56 If in truth according to measure, [then] also necessary

because by it the thing is a work to be known

which is signified through it.

57 And so it stands that God established according to measure things and names

which are necessary to each other in turn.

58 Also holy David the prophet, filled with the Holy Spirit,

knowing that darkness does not represent certain empty and windy thing

evidently expresses that they are a certain thing.

59 He says therefore He sent darkness [Psalms 105:28].

60 If it is not, how is it sent?

61 What, however, is it that can be sent and can be sent from Him where it is not?

62 What in truth is not cannot be sent from anywhere because it is nowhere.

63 Therefore darkness is said sent because it was.

64 In the same way that [quotation]: He placed darkness as His own hiding place. [Psalms 18:11]

65 What, understand, was it He placed, and in what manner did He place it

so that He should place darkness which was His own hiding place?66 In the same way another: Just as His darkness [Psalms 139:12]

where it is shown that it is in possession and through this it is manifested to exist.

67 For everything that is possessed is

darkness, however, is in possession, therefore it is.

68 But since these such and so many suffice

they should hold the fortress very safe against all attacks

whence with a light repulse they can return the missiles against their own hurlers

from evangelical firmness, nonetheless, whatever they are bound to be asked.

69 Let us put therefore the words of the Saviour Himself.

70 Sons He says of the kingdom will be ejected into the outer darkness. [Matt. 8:12]

71 It is to be attended to, however, that He names the darkness outer

for without, whence outer is derivative, signifies a place.

72 On which account when He says outer He demonstrates darkness to be local.

73 For there may not be outer darkness unless there be also inner.

74 Whatever, however, outer is, it is necessary that it be in a place.

75 What in truth is not is nowhere.

76 Therefore outer darkness not only is, but it is also local.

77 In the Passion of the Lord also the evangelist predicates darkness to have been made from the sixth hour of the day until the ninth hour.

78 Which, since it was made, how can it be said not to exist?

79 What has been made cannot be unmade

as if it were not made

what in truth is not always and is never made, that never is;

darkness, however, was made

wherefore it cannot be unmade as though it is not.80 In the same way another: If the light which is in you is darkness, the darkness itself how great will it be? [Matt. 6:23].

81 I believe no man boubts indeed that quantity is attributed to bodies

which are all distributed through quantity

and quantity indeed is in bodies according to accident

the accidents in truth either are in the subject or they are predicated from the subject.

82 Through this therefore which is said The darkness themselves how great will they be? quantity in the subject is demonstrated

whence by a provable argument it is gathered that darkness not only is, but also it is corporal.

83 And so I have taken care to write these few things by reason together also with authority,

put together for your greatness and prudence

so that clinging fixedly and immovealy to them

enticed by not false opinion can you decline from the path of truth.

84 But if by chance anything will have been brought forth by anyone dissenting from this our reason recurring [lit. running back] to this as to a rule you may be powerful enough to throw down thief foolish machination s with more proveable sentences.

IT ENDS.

Annotations to the text

The annotations are only to the text of the De subsantia, not to Charles letter to Dungal.

opening words The addressees of the letter were the faithful of God and prince Charlemagne. They were literally the men of Charlemagne, meaning the scholars and nobles at court. They were gathered in his palace, which was situated in Aachen.

1 The question in this paragraph is who were the many people that touched, but never directly answer the question that Fredegisus is attempting to solve. Fredegisus may refer to the patristic tradition that was available for him, e.g. Augustine and Boethius, or he may refer to an ongoing debate that was held amongst the intellectuals of the palace. Marenbon states that it was Alcuin who broached a discussion on negative concepts, although he makes no reference. Fredegisus could also be referring to both, of course. The debate was far from solved after Fredegisus contribution.

2 Statement of the question. The question is not so much what the word nihil means, but whether it is something or not.

3-5 This argument makes use from an ambiguity in the Latin phrase. Nihil can be used as a predicate, so that the implied object of the verb esse is denied. This subject is nothing, which would make the sentence that it seems to me that nothing is nothing. But nihil can also be used as the real subject of the verb, which would make an accusativus cum infinitivo construction. Then the sentence would mean it seems to me that nothing is, which asserts the existence of nothing. Here Fredegisus uses a normal thesis of logic in light of Aristotles categories. The idea in the theory of the categories is that if in a true proposition the subject is ascribed a predicate, then the subject must exist. The verb to be therefore not only serves as a copulative, but, as the first of the categories, also declares the existence of its subject.

6 This sentence is connected to the previous in that Fredegisus is clarifying the way in which a denial of the question should be stated. Next Fredegisus states the two ways in which he is going to resist the negative answer. He will first use ratio and then auctoritas. The question is what Fredegisus means by these terms. His term of reason means the use of the grammatical method, with the categories and vox significativa ranging among its theories, and the use of arguments in the form of syllogism. In the ninth century these provided the standard method for the science of dialectics. This science was part of the trivium, the first three of seven sciences, which had a specific scope on language and reasoning. In both parts on nothing and darkness, he uses the term reason when he proves that nothing is something in 7-18 and that darkness exists in 34-38. Reason then is distinct from authority, the religious doctrine or biblical quotations (strangely there are is no reference to patristics). This does not mean, however, that reason cannot be applied to authority. Statements derived from authority (everything is created from nothing; the darkness was over the face of the abyss) form a jumping-off point for Fredegisus to use reason. Yet Fredegisus does not think that mankind can gain complete insight by using reason. This seems not to be because reason is intrinsically limited or imprecise, but because man is not such a rational animal. In 27 it is the human reason which is incapable of comprehending the nature of light and the elements. Fredegisus explicitly confines his use of authority to religious authority. First he uses the Old Testament (32-33, 41-42, 43-50, 58-64, 64-65, 66-67), after that the New Testament (70-76, 77-79, 80-82). The New Testament seems to carry more weight. One wonders whether this is a generally shared conviction or that Fredegisus is typical. Yet church doctrine also is a source of authority, since it is directly bound to Christ by the sacraments (20). Authority is much more certain then reason. It is the stable fundament of reason (19) and can give rise to insight that no argument of reason can deny (21). But reason (when used correctly) and authority point to the same conclusions. In 39 Fredegisus mentions this explicitly when he discusses the word darkness but the conclusions of reason and authority on the word nothing too are in accordance.

7-18 Fredegisus presents three syllogisms here. Mario Mignucci made a very sensible logical analysis of the first syllogism that I would like to repeat here. He analyses the syllogism in 9 steps. (1) A nomen finitum signifies something in so far as we understand the thing that is signified by the name; (2) this is also valid for universal names; (3) nothing is a name according to the grammarians; (4) therefore it is a nomen finitum; (5) the referent of a nomen finitum in its turn is finitum; (6) some definite thing is something; (7) nothing as a nomen finitum refers to some definite thing; (8) therefore the referent of nothing is something; (9) concluding nothing, as something, must exist.

A nomen finitum as a technical term deriving from the commentary of Boethius on Aristotles De Interpretatione. There it is stated that a definite name, whether it be a specific or universal name, must signify a definite substance. It is contrasted with a nomen infinitum, like non-human, which signifies an indefinite multitude of different things (one can call both a rock and a tree non-human). Now there is a question as to what Fredegisus had in mind when he introduced the universality in (2). What is the force of quippe in 21? Mignucci thinks, in light of the previous statement, that it is Fredegisus reception of this theory of names. However, Colishs suggestion is that it reflects Priscians idea that some nouns, like man and stone can be used in a universal way and in a specific way. Because the examples of the words man, stone and tree were normal examples in the writings of the grammarians, her suggestion seems more plausible. Whether Colish is more on the spot than Mignucci, in this case quippe has a very weak meaning and is only meant to connect once sentence to the next. Fredegisus then stated that a name could have a secondary, universal meaning. Another explanation would be that Fredegisus was alluding to some sort of theory of universals. In this case, quippe would be used to signal that the reason for words like human to signify something is because they signify the universality of humanity. But in this second option, as John Marenbon has pointed out, Fredegisus avoided the problem of the universals more than he dealt with it. Did Fredegisus mean the concept of humanity, an Idea of humanity in Gods mind, or the set of all men and women? He gave us no clue. In this case we would have to ascribe an inclarity to Fredegisus text. Because of this and because Mignucci has shown a reliance on Boethius, I agree with Mignucci and Marcia Colish that the first option is the best one. To see this passage in the light of a theory of universals is misguided.

In (3) we have a reflection of a debate on the function of the word nihil. Is it an adverb, with nihilum as substantive, or itself a substantive? Agroecius, Beda and Alcuin chose the first function, but Fredegisus turned to Priscian, who stated that nihil is a nomen. The inference from (3) to (4) is facilitated by Donatus definition of a nomen, in which the signifying function of a name is stressed. His definition forms a bridge between the tradition of the grammarians, in which a vox does not necessarily have a meaning, and the Boethian-Aristotelian tradition, in which a nomen finitum necessarily refers to something. In (5) again the Boethian-Aristotelian tradition is used, that a nomen finitum must also mean something definite. (6) This argument again makes use of an ambiguity in the Latin (see 13-16). The qualification definite is transferred in 24 from a definite word to a definite something. It is included in response to the statement that nothing seems not to be something in sentence 6.

In the second syllogism, the vox significativa is also a term from Boethius commentaries on the De Interpretatione. Here Boethius follows the Aristotelian analysis of language in the three levels of a word, a concept and a thing. The idea is that a word as a verbal utterance gets its meaning from the concept in ones head, which in its turn is abstracted from an extra-mental reality. The term vox significata is coined in order to separate the words which refer to concepts from words which do not, e.g. jibberish words. Ultimately, a vox significata refers to an extra-mental reality, or thing. This is how Fredegisus interprets it in the second syllogism. Due to his ease in reasoning from a word to the signified thing, Mignucci claims that Fredegisus included all three levels of language at the same time. I think that this is correct. Yet it is even better to take Colishs argument that Fredegisus conflates significance, or the concept, with both the word and the thing.

Eleonore Stumps description of Boethius views of dialectic in the De topicis differentiis can be applied to Fredegisus construction of his syllogisms very well. The aim of dialectics, one of the branches of the trivium, is to discover arguments that are readily believable and that can be used to compel agreement from an opponent in disputation. In a question, two terms are put together (e.g. is a man a substance?) and an argument has to be devised to convince an audience to believe the answer is (in this case) positive. This means that the argument is not a necessary demonstration from self-evident axiomata, which one would expect in geometry. The argument is constructed by finding a third term (in the example this would be animal) with which the two terms of the question (man and substance) can be connected. This connection is made in a syllogism (A man is an animal. An animal is a substance. Therefore a man is a substance). This is just what Fredegisus did in 7-18. He put the two terms nihil and aliquid together in a question. Next he found three different third terms with which he could connect the two terms of the question. These third terms were nomen finitum, vox significata and significatio. His aim was to find convincing arguments for his solution to the question. It is in this way (convincing or trustworthy) that probabile in 12 should be read. His use of probabilis in 82 and especially 84 suggests that this aim was to be generalised over the whole of the letter, not only over the first syllogism of 7-12. Finally, it is in connection with the De topicis differentiis that the word differentiam in 9 can be put into perspective. A differentia is a technical term indicating a genus of third terms which can be used in a syllogism. I doubt whether Fredegisus used differentiam in exactly the same way, but it seems clear that he wanted to say that a word like man could have a general meaning if there were no other term with which it was connected (e.g. in Socrates is a man, the proposition connecting the two terms Socrates and man, it is clear that man does not mean man in general).

Then there is the question of why Fredegisus included three syllogisms. Logically, they are redundant, but I presume that Fredegisus believed them to be different. Colish thinks that at least the first and the second syllogisms are related. The first syllogism would only make the existence of nothing probable or possible. She thus reads probabile as something having a modal force. Therefore he needed a second syllogism to close the gap. In connection with Boethius idea that dialectic must yield convincing, instead of demonstrative syllogisms, I find her idea unlikely. Another speculation on the relation between the three syllogisms is from Mignucci. He speculates that the second and the third syllogisms in the discussion of nothing have backgrounds in different fields of philosophy. The second syllogism would derive from epistemology (we know that nothing is a meaningful word, so there must be an extramental referent) and the third from ontology (a meaningful word derives its meaning from an existing extramental-referent). But then what is the background of the first syllogism? Another speculation could be that there is a hierarchy in the syllogisms. The first syllogism starts with the idea that a name has a meaning. The second evolves around the idea that a meaning involves a reference. The third syllogism states that a reference is always made to something which exists. And so the three syllogisms together form a large syllogism itself. This explanation uses Mignuccis idea that the third syllogism is ontological and the second epistemological and that the starting point is the name nothing. By the same token we can even stipulate that Fredegisus included three redundant syllogisms instead of one because the three persons of the Trinity are one.

19 For annotations on ratio see the annotations of 6.

20 From here on Fredegisus uses the doctrinal authority of the church to solve the question of whether nothing is a thing. Along these lines he makes a distinction between the corporal matter of the elements and the spiritual matter. Ahner traced the same sequence of the elements, light, angels and the human soul in Alcuins Interrogationem et responsionem in libro genesi 20.

21 For annotations on ratio see the annotations of 6.

22-24 In the story of creation, nothing exists prior to the first corporeal matter of the elements and the first spiritual matter of the light and souls of men. Since these first corporeal and spiritual matters are prominent, the thing that is nothing must be great and noble. It is a matter of speculation whether one could thereby conjecture a hierarchy of things in which Nothing would stand above both the material and the spiritual things. Another thing that can be distilled from these lines is that the order of knowledge is the reverse from the order of creation. For we need to know the nature of the things created from nothing to be able to know the nature of nothing itself. There is also the question of why nothing would be something great and shining. In my opinion, this is because this thing is the divine essence, which I will argue in chapter four.

25-27 These lines can again be interpreted as another comment on the relation between reason and authority. The human reason (reason in so far as it suffers humans in 6) is incapable of understanding how noble the thing is that is nothing. But, according to 19, reason in principle is capable of proving that nothing is something noble, although Fredegisus chooses to use authority here. This is in accordance with 39, where reason and authority reach the same conclusions.

28 After saying that we cannot know more about nothing, it seems a bit strange for Fredegisus to say that he could have said more, but that the public would then be overfed with information. If one has a low opinion of Fredegisus, this could well sound as an ill excuse for a lack of ideas. But, if we want to believe Fredegisus in 19, he has some more ideas. An alternate interpretation could be that the public really would have been satisfied with the argument thus far. If we realize that one of the prominent members of the audience would have been Charles, with his preference for concise answers, this option gains credence. The letter was probably meant to be read aloud publicly, without the audience in a position to take notes. Maybe this letter was also meant as a means of instruction in schools.

29 Before one goes into the specific elements of the piece on darkness, the question of the relationship between the discussion of nothing and darkness must be addressed. Of course in the discussion the same grammatical method was applied, albeit with different input. In the first part it was the word nothing in isolation that was analysed in the light of grammatical theory, while in the second part darkness was studied in the context of Scripture. In this way Fredegisus expanded his grammatical method in the second part.

But this is a comparison of the method used to address the two parts. Is there also a reason for discussing nothing and darkness in the same text? Corvino is the modern commentator who sees the strongest relation between nothing and darkness. He thinks that Fredegisus nothing refers to prime matter, just as darkness does in Augustines exegesis of Genesis 1. Therefore it would be an obvious choice to address them one after the other, since they refer to the same thing. I dont believe that Fredegisus was concerned with prime matter in his argument about nothing. Ahner, on the other hand, is the most pragmatical modern commentator, and thinks that it was only a question from the public that made Fredegisus write on darkness. It might well be a question that lived among his public, but I dont believe that these questions were totally unrelated.

Colish thinks that darkness is examined as an example to give more insight into the problem of nothing. This might seem convincing, since with the expansion of the grammatical apparatus used, the insight in the problem might deepen. However, I dont think this interpretation is correct. First of all, Fredegisus whole point of 22-27 is that it is impossible to know the nature of nothing. But in the study of darkness, Scripture seems to indicate the nature of darkness (it is corporeal, it has a place, it can serve as a material etc.) from which its existence is proved. Therefore it cannot be a simpler example from which to learn by analogy how to treat nothing. If this should serve as an example for something, it is therefore not for the problem of nothing, but an example for the method in which the existence of the referent of any other word can be proved. This method should be just as useful in dealing with the words that seem to deny their referent. I therefore agree with Marenbon that it is the problem of negative concepts, which connect the two parts. However, the words nothing and darkness are not only negative concepts, but also perform an important function in the story of Creation. In my opinion, Ahner was correct in this respect (but not in the identification with prime matter). Moreover, the study of these two words from a cosmological context fits the cosmological interest which Charles displayed in 797-800. This does not mean that there is a relationship between the words other than that they are negative concepts and perform a function in a cosmological context. My hypothesis is that the two parts were written as if they are fairly separate lemmata for an encyclopaedia, providing a concise explanation of the arguments for the existence of their referents (arguments are elaborated in chapter 5).

Fredegisus started right away with using authority to prove that darkness is something. This does not mean, however, that he neglected reason, for it was used in the next few lines.

29-30 The question that Fredegisus is going to answer concerning darkness has a slightly different nuance. Fredegisus wanted to prove the existence of darkness, not that it was a definite thing (aliquid). This slight difference has no real implications, however. The elements of the etymological theory and the categories that Fredegisus used stress the fact that darkness is a thing by proving that it has properties just like all things.

32-33 Fredegisus first uses the Old Testament, later the New Testament. See annotations to 6.

34-38 Just as in the part on nothing, first Fredegisus is going to prove the existence by grammar, secondly by examining what this thing is. Thus here he proves the existence of darkness through grammar. The idea is that the verb esse is a substantial verb, i.e. that it declares the existence of the subject. Therefore if in genesis 1.2 it is said without a negation that the darkness was over the abyss, the consequence is that darkness exists. It is from here on that the expansion of the grammatical method from the word itself to the context of a proposition is first seen. The word darkness combined with the verb esse constitutes a proposition after all. Influenced by the theory of the categories, Fredegisus imagined a correspondence between a true proposition and reality. Thus, if in a true proposition (and propositions derived from Scripture were a priori true) the predicate darkness was combined with the verb esse (the first category), this not only meant that the existence of the darkness was stated, but also that the darkness existed in reality. This idea of a correspondence between a true proposition and reality is a counterpart of Fredegisus idea of the relationship between a word and the thing it refers to. The theory of the categories and the way that Fredegisus used it, is further explained in chapter four.

The words ponens and tollens derive from stoic logics. Fredegisus argument is a modus ponens (In modern notation the modus ponens is the following argument: P ( Q, P, therefore P. Fredegisus thus says: if the verb esse is used in its declarative funtion, the nominative exists (P ( Q). The verb esse is used declaratively with tenebrae as nominative (P). Therefore tenebrae exists.). It would be interesting to research to what degree these terms were connected to logics and how logics were used in Alcuins circle.

39 for annotations on the relation between reason and authority, see 6.

41-42 This argument, and all the following except the one in 43-50, all depend on a, which Colish calls materialistic reading of the Bible. The idea is that everything that can be touched must be corporeal. If we compare these sentences with 80-82, then we encounter a similar argument: something that is corporeal must exist. The difference between both arguments is of course in the justification. The argument here is justified by perception to the sense of touch, while the argument of 80-82 is justified by the concept of accidens, i.e. that what is predicated of a real subject. The idea that an accidens is applied to a subject springs from the theory of the categories. Both the argument here and 80-82 can be derived from the Categoriae Decem, which Fredegisus very likely read (see chapter 4).

Fredegisus use of the categories is explained by the following inference in the Categoriae Decem: A predicate can be applied to a subject. In a true proposition this reflects a state of affairs in reality. Therefore, in a true proposition the use of a predicate is an indication of the existence of the subject. Fredegisus found his set of true propositions in the Bible.

43-57 This argument derives from assumptions about language from etymological theory (chapter 4). The idea is that words and things both have their origin in God. Therefore both perception in 41-42 and language play a role in the acquisition of knowledge. Added to this idea of a common origin of words and things is the principle of economy. Every action that God takes is filled with purpose; therefore the words He gave must have referents. Colish remarks that Fredegisus consciously brushed over the fact that there was no strict analogy between nothing and darkness. The problem that she addressed goes back to Genesis 1.1-5. In Genesis 1.3, God explicitly created the light (and in Genesis 1.4 even said it was good), but there is no parallel creation of darkness. The darkness just was over the abyss in Genesis 1.2. On the other hand, in Genesis 1.5 God gave names to light as well as darkness and the grammatical function of both the names in the sentence is the same. This may suggest that, since day and night have the same function, darkness and light are similarly linked. If one wants to see a difference between light and darkness, then one must explain why Gods names in the text have the same grammatical status. If, on the other hand, one wants to state that Gods names refer to entities that can be categorised together, then an explanation has to be given for why Genesis has this difference in the creation of light and darkness. Augustine, who chose the first option, has taken a lot of effort to explain this grammatical parallelism. As Colish observes, Augustines problem was that the darkness in Genesis 1.2, not being explicitly created, was not a thing (aliquid) like other created things. One of his solutions was to distinguish between an uncreated primal darkness referring to prime matter in Genesis 1.2, and a different darkness in Genesis 1.4 that was created to enhance the order in the Creation.

Colish makes the following inference: Fredegisus opted for a literal reading of the grammatical parallel between night and day, and therefore had to explain why the Bible made a difference in speaking about light and darkness. Colish stipulates that Fredegisus must have known about this difficulty. However, instead of treating the problem, he didnt even mention it, and instead piled together both the uncreated and created darkness. Thus he must have omitted it intentionally. I think that Colish is too influenced by an Augustinian reading of the Bible in making this inference. When would it have been important for Fredegisus to address this difference in the first place? It would only have been important if it made such a difference in Fredegisus mind that darkness couldnt be considered a thing anymore. We have seen that for Augustine, darkness was denied the status of a thing in Genesis 1.2. For Fredegisus, however, on grammatical grounds it was already apparent in 33-38 that darkness was considered a thing in Genesis 1.2. So Augustines problem just did not affect him. Therefore I also see no reason for Fredegisus to distinguish between the darkness in Genesis 1.2 and 1.4. The grammatical parallel between Gods baptism of light as day and darkness as light is therefore justified for Fredegisus. It attests to the wilfulness with which he used his grammatical tools.

58-63 These lines evolve around the idea that what exists must have a location, because it would have been impossible to send the darkness, if it was not something that could be located. This argument is therefore related to 69-76. These arguments derive from the theory of the categories, where place constitutes a category of its own.

64-65 Anachronistically one could say that the darkness is here interpreted as an Aristotelian material cause.

66-67 This is the category of or property, which is normally reserved for human subjects.

68 On the relation between the Old Testament and the New Testament, see the annotation to 6.

69-76 To read outer in this citation literally as a determination of place instead of metaphorically seems strange. See the annotations to 58-63.

77-79 If almighty God could choose to change his creation so that darkness didnt exist, he still couldnt undo the fact that darkness existed before his change.

80-82 Again, the idea that an accident is something that is predicated of a subject derives from the theory of the categories. New is the distinction which Fredegisus makes between asserting something of and finding in. The former happens when a universal is predicated of a subject, the latter when an individual property is predicated of a subject (see chapter 4). Fredegisus says here that quantity is a predicate that is found in a subject, thus that it is a property. This means that the subject of which the quantity is a property must exist.

On the use of the word probabilis see the annotation to 7-18.

84 Fredegisus again makes the distinction between reason and authority (see the annotations to 6). In 84 he compares his letter to a rule. In my opinion Fredegisus refers to a grammatical rule so that he teaches his audience like a Latin teacher (see chapter 3 for an elaboration).

PART II

Chapter 1

Historiography

t

here is a long tradition of research on the De substantia. From the nineteenth century to the late seventies of the twentieth century, historiography has counted/covered Fredegisus in the context of the reason-faith debate. Adherents of reason interpreted Fredegisus as an enlightened logician who used faith as a pretext to follow his reason. The philosophically minded historians who saw Fredegisus as such did not hold Fredegisus in high esteem: he was a failed logician, because his mind was feeble and impeded by Scripture. The faith side treated Fredegisus as a theologian who used reason to clarify his faith. They thought that with his letter Fredegisus was performing exegesis on Genesis 1. Due to Fredegisus literal-mindedness, they judged him as a failed proto-scholastic. Marcia Colish was right to deconstruct the images that were created of Fredegisus in this debate. Fredegisus was working under the assumptions and the knowledge of his time, and had no knowledge of the reason-faith categories as they were used by these historians. Current research on Fredegisus therefore benefits much more from the results of placing Fredegisus in the contexts of three late-antique traditions of knowledge. These traditions, along with chronology, will form the analytical instruments with which I have ordered the historiographical material. One tradition was the logical-philosophical tradition of Augustine and Boethius, with its commentaries on Aristotle. This tradition has recently been linked to the second tradition: the grammatical tradition of Donatus and Priscianus. The third tradition, with which Fredegisus is connected, is the tradition of the exegesis of Genesis 1, in which Augustine again figures prominently. In historiography Fredegisus has been successfully connected with these traditions. He was first linked with the exegetical tradition, and next viewed from the logical and grammatical traditions. Furthermore, a chronological treatment of the authors seems to show that in modern times research traditions in different languages succeeded each other. First the Germans researched Fredegisus, after which the Italians took over (not accounting for the odd Frenchman) and eventually an interest in the Anglo-Saxon world took hold.

I will let modern historiography on Fredegisus start in 1844, when Ritter published his Geschichte der Philosophie. Ritters important original point cannot be put into one of the three late-antique traditions of knowledge mentioned above. According to him, Fredegisus attempted to give a description of the point of contact between God and the creation in his concept of Nothing. Since Nothing is the source of everything, including the soul which is of a divine nature, Nothing itself has a divine nature. In other words, it is God. Ritter herewith envisioned a line of negative theology that runs from the Greek church fathers to Fredegisus and John Scottus. His judgment of the mental powers of our author is very positive, since he was gifted with a deep philosophical understanding. Ritter answered the most important question what did Fredegisus think he was doing? with the view that Fredegisus was searching as a philosopher or, what we would now call, a theologian seeking to understand his world. Ritters point, that the meaning of Nothing may be the divine essence, has not received the attention it deserved. Ritter did not take the three late-antique traditions of knowledge into account; his point can only be convincing if the logical and grammatical traditions are also used in his argument.

Carl Prantl reached a different view. His work deals with the history of logic and philosophy from the Greek Eleatics to the influence of the Arabs on medieval Europe. In this vast history, Fredegisus obviously deserves only a small place. Yet Prantl is rather positive about Fredegisus compared to the shoddy patchwork (Flickwerken) that Alcuin supposedly produced. At least some people like Fredegisus dared to pose a question of their own. However, a dense fog impeded their understanding of their problems (vlligst Unklar), and the way Fredegisus addressed his questions was Prantls object of scorn. According to Prantl, words have yet to be found to describe the level, or lack of it, on which logics were applied to the question. Therefore even Prantls wish to determine Fredegisus place in the nominalism-realism debate could not be fulfilled. This wish to apply the anachronistic terms of nominalism-realism to Fredegisus disqualifies his appraisal of Fredegisus for the current researcher. Yet, Prantl serves as a fine example of nineteenth and twentieth century historiography on Fredegisus, and he has had a profound influence on historiography. Many other scholars who study a longer period in which Fredegisus has to be placed, whether it is literature, like Max Manitius, or philosophy like Maurice de Wulf and Prantl himself, shared such a negative view. Moreover, Prantl is illustrative of two possible traditions in which one can place Fredegisus: the logical tradition and the exegetical tradition. To study Fredegisus in the former tradition was Prantls main concern, but he scratched on the surface of the latter when he claimed that Fredegisus question derived from Isidore. He ascribed the source of Fredegisus question to a statement by Isidore, who said that darkness didnt exist. Isidore wrote this in the context of the Christian doctrine that the world was created from nothing. Because Prantl viewed the origin of the question in Isidore, he thought that Fredegisus too commented on Genesis. So Prantl specified what Fredegisus was doing. He was not just interested in theology, but took a specific question from his patristic legacy. In answering this question, Prantl thought that Fredegisus was commenting on Genesis. With this suggestion that Fredegisus in his letter was actually doing exegesis of Genesis 1.1, Prantl exercised a long lasting influence on subsequent historiography.

The first monograph devoted entirely to Fredegisus was Fredegis von Tours. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie im Mittelalter of Max Ahner. He wrote this work as a Ph.D. in theology at the University of Leipzig in 1878. Ahners aim was to comprehend Fredegisus theological goal in researching the words. Ahner followed Prantl in his suggestion on Fredegisus aim and tried, respectfully, to fit him into the tradition of exegesis. Ahner confirmed Prantls negative judgment of the appliance of logic to solve questions, and accused Fredegisus of quibbling (Wortklauberei). But Ahner was willing to take the time to identify explicitly some sources of Fredegisus views on the relationship between words and things. Ahner connected Fredegisus to the tradition of the vox significata, i.e. that a meaningful word must have an extra-mental existing referent, which also surfaced in some letters of Alcuin. Thereby he gave a first shot to the important research into the state of knowledge in which Fredegisus operated.

Finally, he denied Fredegisus the inclinations to negative theology that were ascribed to him by Ritter. According to Ahner, Fredegisus had a triad in mind of a Creator, Nothing and a Creation, which meant that it was impossible to identify Nothing with the creator. Ahner had very different ideas on what Fredegisus meant by Nothing. Fredegisus observation that many people discussed the question of nothing in vain served as a signal for Ahner to search for a long tradition. Isidore, who was suggested by Prantl in this context, was just not enough. Ahner found a long tradition in the ideas on prime matter. Prime matter is the inchoate matter that God created, out of which He formed his creation. This tradition runs from Plato via the neoplatonists to Augustine and the church fathers. Following to this tradition, Alcuin presumably posed some questions in his work, to which Fredegisus reacted. According to Fredegisus, Nothing was the primal stuff from which both material and spiritual things were made. Therefore Nothing clearly bore the sign of prime matter. In this way Fredegisus sought to clarify the way in which the creation from Nothing functioned. With his idea that Nothing actually was prime matter, Ahner was elaborating on Prantl. Remember that Prantl stated that Fredegisus was commenting on Genesis 1.1. From Augustine on, the exegesis of Genesis 1.1 was linked to the ideas on prime matter. In the explanation of the heaven and earth that were created, Augustine envisaged the earth not as our corporeal globe, but as the unformed prime matter. An amalgam was thus made between a philosophical theory of the ancients and the exegesis of Genesis 1.1. When Fredegisus identified Nothing with prime matter, it was this assembly with which he connected. Augustine therefore served as the main buttress for Fredegisus. It was clear for Ahner that Fredegisus was doing exegesis and so he had clarified the how and the what of this exegesis. Through Ahners study the misapprehension that Fredegisus Nothing was prime matter firmly rooted itself in the historiography until the 1970s. Its rejection has so far not been substantiated.

Ahners nearly exclusive focus on the text concerning nothing and his occupation with prime matter led him to a pragmatic view on the occurr