answer brief - jackson · reid jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as mr....

56
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. LAWTON REID JACKSON, Respondent. Supreme Court Case No. SC12-1215 The Florida Bar File No. 2011-51,133 (15D) ___________________________________/ ANSWER BRIEF Michael David Soifer, Bar Counsel The Florida Bar Ft. Lauderdale Branch Office Lake Shore Plaza II 1300 Concord Terrace, Suite 130 Sunrise, Florida 33323 (954) 835-0233 Florida Bar No. 545856 [email protected] Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff Counsel The Florida Bar 651 E. Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300 (850) 561-5600 Florida Bar No. 200999 [email protected] John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director The Florida Bar 651 E. Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300 (850) 561-5600 Florida Bar No. 123390 [email protected] Electronically Filed 04/24/2013 04:11:19 PM ET RECEIVED, 4/24/2013 16:13:34, Thomas D. Hall, Clerk, Supreme Court

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Page 1: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

THE FLORIDA BAR

Complainant

v

LAWTON REID JACKSON

Respondent

Supreme Court Case

No SC12-1215

The Florida Bar File

No 2011-51133 (15D)

___________________________________

ANSWER BRIEF

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Ft Lauderdale Branch Office

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

Kenneth Lawrence Marvin Staff Counsel

The Florida Bar

651 E Jefferson Street

Tallahassee Florida 32399-2300

(850) 561-5600

Florida Bar No 200999

kmarvinflabarorg

John F Harkness Jr Executive Director

The Florida Bar

651 E Jefferson Street

Tallahassee Florida 32399-2300

(850) 561-5600

Florida Bar No 123390

jharknessflabarorg

Electronically Filed 04242013 041119 PM ET

RECEIVED 4242013 161334 Thomas D Hall Clerk Supreme Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

TABLE OF CITATIONS iii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 20

ARGUMENT 22

ISSUE I 24

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE

AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS

CHARGED

ISSUE II 33

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

ISSUE III 38

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED RULE

REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE

RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD

THEREFORE BE UPHELD

ISSUE IV 40

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING MITIGATING

FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS

i

CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS HELD IN

TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE

ISSUE V 48

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN FAVOR

OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE

OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE

UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

CONCLUSION 50

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 51

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN 51

ii

iii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49

Rules

3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49

3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33

Standards

411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45

iv

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of

the record as follows

Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton

Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson

References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be

designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)

The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to

this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page

number

The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the

Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR

followed by the appropriate page number

The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary

hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the

1

emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the

Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___

(indicating the page number of the transcript)

References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___

(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title

or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar

exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol

TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of

Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did

not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine

the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the

record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4

2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in

conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 2: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

TABLE OF CITATIONS iii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 20

ARGUMENT 22

ISSUE I 24

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE

AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS

CHARGED

ISSUE II 33

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

ISSUE III 38

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED RULE

REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE

RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD

THEREFORE BE UPHELD

ISSUE IV 40

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING MITIGATING

FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS

i

CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS HELD IN

TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE

ISSUE V 48

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN FAVOR

OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE

OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE

UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

CONCLUSION 50

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 51

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN 51

ii

iii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49

Rules

3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49

3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33

Standards

411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45

iv

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of

the record as follows

Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton

Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson

References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be

designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)

The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to

this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page

number

The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the

Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR

followed by the appropriate page number

The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary

hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the

1

emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the

Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___

(indicating the page number of the transcript)

References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___

(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title

or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar

exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol

TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of

Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did

not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine

the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the

record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4

2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in

conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 3: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS HELD IN

TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE

ISSUE V 48

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN FAVOR

OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE

OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE

UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

CONCLUSION 50

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 51

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN 51

ii

iii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49

Rules

3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49

3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33

Standards

411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45

iv

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of

the record as follows

Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton

Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson

References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be

designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)

The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to

this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page

number

The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the

Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR

followed by the appropriate page number

The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary

hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the

1

emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the

Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___

(indicating the page number of the transcript)

References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___

(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title

or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar

exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol

TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of

Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did

not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine

the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the

record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4

2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in

conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 4: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

iii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49

Rules

3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49

3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33

Standards

411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45

iv

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of

the record as follows

Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton

Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson

References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be

designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)

The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to

this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page

number

The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the

Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR

followed by the appropriate page number

The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary

hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the

1

emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the

Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___

(indicating the page number of the transcript)

References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___

(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title

or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar

exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol

TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of

Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did

not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine

the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the

record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4

2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in

conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 5: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33

Standards

411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45

iv

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of

the record as follows

Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton

Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson

References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be

designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)

The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to

this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page

number

The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the

Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR

followed by the appropriate page number

The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary

hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the

1

emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the

Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___

(indicating the page number of the transcript)

References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___

(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title

or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar

exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol

TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of

Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did

not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine

the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the

record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4

2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in

conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 6: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of

the record as follows

Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton

Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson

References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be

designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)

The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to

this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page

number

The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the

Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR

followed by the appropriate page number

The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary

hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the

1

emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the

Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___

(indicating the page number of the transcript)

References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___

(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title

or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar

exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol

TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of

Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did

not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine

the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the

record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4

2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in

conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 7: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the

Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___

(indicating the page number of the transcript)

References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___

(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title

or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar

exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol

TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)

THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of

Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did

not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine

the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the

record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4

2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency

suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in

conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 8: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

3

Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to

the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The

Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13

2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by

Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number

SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency

Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about

May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a

hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter

was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on

respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of

Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution

amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed

findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds

[IR 16 RR 11]

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 9: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show

cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated

January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636

and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay

In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant

matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]

Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing

on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars

motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing

conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The

Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order

dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty

of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the

complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-

11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was

conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December

10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The

4

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 10: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

5

Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar

Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on

February 11 2013

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain

extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact

contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary

hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension

case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the

Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL

LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff

Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the

Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the

June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are

contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the

instant case included the following factual findings

Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter

SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 11: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)

business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter

Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to

respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent

sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions

for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail

respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol

Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written

confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital

account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into

respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]

A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states

A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent

(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO

of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott

Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement

to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in

consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non

Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire

to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow

pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is

6

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 12: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed

immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay

___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of

an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq

[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]

Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier

version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent

also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his

client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for

work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he

had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to

him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified

he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and

that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the

escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]

In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls

to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred

[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to

see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its

account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR

34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June

7

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 13: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to

the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as

respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to

Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting

It stated

I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my

company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs

consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with

MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC

This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of

assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB

13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the

contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent

admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not

accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB

20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired

funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the

(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no

dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their

immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with

8

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 14: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

9

Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that

respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself

Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the

escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]

Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster

Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to

prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including

those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and

was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI

The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the

June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney

Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23

2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The

e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown

for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft

LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI

contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 15: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the

Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District

shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an

agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for

a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000

was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the

remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held

and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal

counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment

discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in

part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all

liens [Bold font added for emphasis]

The Report of Referee noted this provision stating

This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as

Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for

the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for

SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the

remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue

to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel

Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken

any of these funds [RR 5-6]

In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that

he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14

p 103 lines 2-3]

In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR

26] the referee found

Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further

negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the

refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second

10

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 16: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and

modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was

holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his

escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in

the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ

Order p 5]

The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete

the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states

Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts

to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable

deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)

Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund

Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on

September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton

testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and

Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living

expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to

Unishred [RR 6]

TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails

sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton

in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred

on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the

deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been

obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]

Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August

17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not

11

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 17: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third

request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent

did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he

went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to

respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account

would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self

finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-

mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3

Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko

sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr

Jackson

A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him

and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him

Q Was this after this September 1st email

A Yes it was

Q And can you tell us about that conversation

A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he

had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living

expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than

anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an

agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money

and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --

I was just in shock I mean --

Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had

taken that money

A Yes

12

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 18: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also

admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow

deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR

115]

The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the

escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial

and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally

took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See

also TR 92-94]

The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds

for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the

Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired

into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent

admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See

also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl

Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr

Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000

13

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 19: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

14

Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial

$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI

$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by

respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the

deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with

exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012

hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]

Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred

to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a

prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the

escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days

after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then

disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on

September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit

respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent

wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved

by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to

this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR

145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 20: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On

June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was

holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents

account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the

balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email

sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents

account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by

Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account

was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney

Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in

respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent

returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the

transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent

had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20

2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have

been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit

1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still

contained in his account [TR 147-148]

15

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 21: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own

personal use [TR 156-157]

Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken

the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to

complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred

would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told

Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a

lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI

from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note

Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed

Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB

Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he

never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For

purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19

the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit

filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was

substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests

between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ

16

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 22: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing

Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750

returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]

Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating

the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos

complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the

rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe

commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and

justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an

attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and

whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for

discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating

Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules

of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so

through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate

from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that

17

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 23: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds

including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or

savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers

office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and

clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other

property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees

costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose

Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not

subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and

deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)

[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an

interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in

this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer

shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that

the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or

third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and

4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter

18

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 24: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former

client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]

As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains

to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as

it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-

84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]

Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee

determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations

went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate

The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or

selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making

restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which

were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and

932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward

proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)

19

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 25: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make

restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR

11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-

10]

Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]

Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71

[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the

public or the legal system]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent

guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not

in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012

pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the

20

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 26: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by

respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the

guilty findings of the rule violations charged

The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000

from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was

holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly

erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his

role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred

and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the

escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact

Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit

intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had

participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding

that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of

intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-

19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore

be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit

against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251

21

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 27: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the

same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee

properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or

substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI

Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from

his former client for the conflict

Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional

misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction

of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the

applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case

The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar

when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos

costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did

not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The

Florida Bar

ARGUMENT

On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a

Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified

R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt

22

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 28: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

23

normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d

997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla

2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is

broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate

authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So

2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-

guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See

The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 29: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

ISSUE I

THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN

DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE

RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED

24

Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial

summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the

authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is

no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court

The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida

Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary

judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the

party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d

1255 1258 (Fla 2001)

In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]

Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred

containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account

Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to

confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR

p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 30: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct

A It says that in the email yes

Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation

of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct

A Yes

Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that

that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the

account by Memorial correct

A I have never denied that

Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval

by Memorial Hospital

A Thats what the email says

Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his

account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR

p 91 lines 13-18]

Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th

2009 correct

A Correct

Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct

A Correct

Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the

account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent

testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]

Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that

account

A There was not

Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it

25

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 31: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

A It did not

Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded

including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]

Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct

A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or

whatever it is but no the account was never transferred

Q The deposit should have been refunded correct

A According to the understanding yes absolutely

Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct

A Yes it does

Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he

took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred

Respondent testified as follows

At TR p 91 lines 10-12

Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did

they

A No

At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15

Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money

that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them

since 2007 correct

A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they

owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what

could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority

of what they owed me

Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD

Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction

26

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 32: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct

Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority

to take $30000 from the escrow account do you

A No

Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and

that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent

testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]

Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say

clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and

enjoyment correct

A I dont deny that

Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your

own personal purposes correct

A Again I dont deny that

Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes

A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont

recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a

couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used

it for but I mean --

Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction

A No it was not

Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his

involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth

Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009

LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97

line 14 to p 98 line 9]

27

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 33: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr

Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to

Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am

A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from

somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references

an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes

Q Well its possible that this was printed --

A Yes right

Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from

A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko

Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko

A I assume so yes

Q And you had some attachments to that email correct

A Yes

The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as

TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]

Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]

Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit

that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven

A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A

Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct

A This exhibit yes

Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth

Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the

result of your minor revisions correct

A Im assuming so

Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of

the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in

Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part

28

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 34: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of

Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the

ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be

held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be

combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)

above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to

deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for

emphasis)

Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p

101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the

representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true

Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3

Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund

is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow

account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal

counsel correct

A Yes

Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your

escrow account

A No it was not Q But that wasnt true

A No That is correct I answered that

In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature

of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]

Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster

lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet

29

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 35: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further

admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he

took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify

Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent

testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]

Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars

Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified

sending you earlier asking for the refund

A Uh-huh yes

Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you

A No I do not

Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on

August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be

returned

A No I do not

Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009

again essentially requesting a refund of the money

A No I do not

Q And you got wiring instructions to do that

A Yes

Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on

September 1st 2009 correct

A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked

Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this

where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash

because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to

indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her

to provide that and she didnt

Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009

A Yes

Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed

A As of September 1st 2009 correct

30

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 36: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton

or Unishred that you had taken that money until

September 13th 2009 correct

A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st

Q Well you said specifically September 13th

A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I

sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I

had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my

recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th

Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that

correct

A Correct yes

Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money

that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000

A The 12251 and the 30 yes

Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took

A Correct

Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct

A Yes

Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his

personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent

testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]

Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that

you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account

You had your own money in that account correct

A It was my personal checking account yes

Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you

A No I do not

Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against

SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the

31

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 37: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or

written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit

against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]

The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the

findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent

disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself

eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-

140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of

transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite

the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact

and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14

2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money

even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on

September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]

As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the

following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-

43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ

Order pp 3-9]

32

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 38: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations

Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR

26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)

[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and

5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order

pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt

of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing

to stipulate

The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees

findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the

rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and

admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual

findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved

ISSUE II

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT

INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE

ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED

UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT

INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED

BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND

SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

33

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 39: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated

$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states

Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the

$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to

misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]

Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money

because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow

account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial

[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later

demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email

Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as

required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents

fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided

a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in

escrow

34

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 40: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in

his initial brief at IB 24

While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for

UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document

which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not

an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an

inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an

act of omission rather than commission

Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a

lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI

As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in

strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d

1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for

himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money

until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI

which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was

not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief

respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not

correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely

believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take

steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting

35

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 41: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

36

Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue

spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial

injury

There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence

Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never

approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to

misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions

were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total

disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against

Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while

leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact

The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be

without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and

in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the

misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as

follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]

The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by

Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account

This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 42: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

37

dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in

escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The

Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the

assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent

contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account

would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of

the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent

used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and

enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds

legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in

fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held

in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by

Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically

represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold

$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did

nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been

spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable

for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have

the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when

reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary

motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in

securing the Memorial Health account All parties including

Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent

on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the

assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to

open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the

money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred

realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund

of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed

it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this

Rule

The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]

The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent

offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the

Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 43: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of

Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be

shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip

Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the

purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and

instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then

utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the

money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the

Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for

doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is

unfathomable to imagine what ishellip

It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed

facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully

considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The

evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or

knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v

Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)

38

ISSUE III

THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED

RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD

The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief

respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note

originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an

attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 44: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the

specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the

former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-

19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial

brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to

the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee

stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]

After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the

refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised

Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do

them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would

never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to

Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to

recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent

from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses

Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees

earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent

from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow

Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot

remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was

acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he

asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that

occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never

obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to

represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note

which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and

filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which

Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees

from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took

from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by

39

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 45: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related

matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially

adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former

client SDDI did not give informed consent

In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was

guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because

the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the

same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse

parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow

deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI

The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly

supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld

40

ISSUE IV

THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING

MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN

RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT

PRESENT IN THIS CASE

While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous

or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it

reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the

ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 46: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla

1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held

three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an

attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment

must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter

others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos

recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the

standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d

1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the

instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following

case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar

v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542

(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The

Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]

In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected

the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case

Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an

41

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 47: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

42

unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client

the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay

back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized

use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional

misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving

money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In

the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to

correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in

truth he was spending the escrowed funds

This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate

discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be

rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689

(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida

Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this

Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred

attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating

evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not

overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 48: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to

the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution

to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the

attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he

intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports

disbarment in the instant case

The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable

Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or

knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury

Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the

Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument

above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for

Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10

I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent

Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other

intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found

that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly

43

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 49: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

44

argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or

activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard

also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or

misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686

(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended

lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain

access to an inmate

Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially

serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found

Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in

escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began

spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent

incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the

preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers

services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case

respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 50: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

45

holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla

2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and

The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein

above with respect to Standard 511(f)

The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The

aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of

misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the

practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The

mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full

and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings

The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution

and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]

A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of

correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v

Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The

Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 51: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to

apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]

The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the

misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained

Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending

the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the

representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow

account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI

disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]

For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive

as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent

Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals

for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received

the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being

held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of

Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he

misappropriated [RR 19-20]

46

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 52: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent

was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the

escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR

145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of

misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla

2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170

Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October

1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that

every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he

was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a

ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors

are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we

approve those findings

The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an

aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had

been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]

The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor

because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected

respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The

Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money

Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR

21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement

47

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 53: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if

he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR

21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make

restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]

The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents

continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the

refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between

Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of

culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or

escrow account [RR 22]

The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos

misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should

approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation

48

ISSUE V

THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN

FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS

SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN

THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE

OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have

discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 54: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is

successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the

respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive

or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast

majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and

a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has

contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any

evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly

authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)

The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel

provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in

this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement

executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating

Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla

1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing

costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs

against respondent

49

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 55: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

50

CONCLUSION

This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent

should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the

Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of

fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with

existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while

conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her

discretion in awarding costs to the Bar

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Page 56: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No

7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton

Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida

32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom

with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail

address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th

day of April 2013

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar

Lake Shore Plaza II

1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130

Sunrise Florida 33323

(954) 835-0233

Florida Bar No 545856

msoiferflabarorg

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN

Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14

point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been

filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned

counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief

has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for

Windows

Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS
  • TABLE OF CITATIONS
  • PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
  • THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
  • STATEMENT OF THE CASE
  • STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
  • SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
  • ARGUMENT
  • ISSUE I
    • THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
      • ISSUE II
        • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀  Ⰰ    䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
          • ISSUE III
            • THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
              • ISSUE IV
                • THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
                  • ISSUE V
                    • THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
                      • CONCLUSION
                      • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                      • CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN