answer brief - jackson · reid jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as mr....
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THE FLORIDA BAR
Complainant
v
LAWTON REID JACKSON
Respondent
Supreme Court Case
No SC12-1215
The Florida Bar File
No 2011-51133 (15D)
___________________________________
ANSWER BRIEF
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Ft Lauderdale Branch Office
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
Kenneth Lawrence Marvin Staff Counsel
The Florida Bar
651 E Jefferson Street
Tallahassee Florida 32399-2300
(850) 561-5600
Florida Bar No 200999
kmarvinflabarorg
John F Harkness Jr Executive Director
The Florida Bar
651 E Jefferson Street
Tallahassee Florida 32399-2300
(850) 561-5600
Florida Bar No 123390
jharknessflabarorg
Electronically Filed 04242013 041119 PM ET
RECEIVED 4242013 161334 Thomas D Hall Clerk Supreme Court
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS i
TABLE OF CITATIONS iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 20
ARGUMENT 22
ISSUE I 24
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE
AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS
CHARGED
ISSUE II 33
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
ISSUE III 38
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED RULE
REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD
THEREFORE BE UPHELD
ISSUE IV 40
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING MITIGATING
FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS
i
CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS HELD IN
TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE
ISSUE V 48
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN FAVOR
OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE
OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE
UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
CONCLUSION 50
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 51
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN 51
ii
iii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49
Rules
3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49
3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33
Standards
411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of
the record as follows
Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton
Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson
References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by
the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be
designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)
The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to
this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page
number
The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the
Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR
followed by the appropriate page number
The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary
hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the
1
emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the
Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___
(indicating the page number of the transcript)
References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___
(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title
or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar
exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol
TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of
Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did
not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine
the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the
record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4
2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in
conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
2
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 2: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS i
TABLE OF CITATIONS iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 20
ARGUMENT 22
ISSUE I 24
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE
AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS
CHARGED
ISSUE II 33
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
ISSUE III 38
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED RULE
REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD
THEREFORE BE UPHELD
ISSUE IV 40
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING MITIGATING
FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS
i
CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS HELD IN
TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE
ISSUE V 48
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN FAVOR
OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE
OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE
UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
CONCLUSION 50
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 51
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN 51
ii
iii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49
Rules
3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49
3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33
Standards
411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of
the record as follows
Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton
Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson
References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by
the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be
designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)
The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to
this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page
number
The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the
Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR
followed by the appropriate page number
The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary
hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the
1
emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the
Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___
(indicating the page number of the transcript)
References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___
(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title
or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar
exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol
TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of
Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did
not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine
the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the
record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4
2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in
conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
2
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 3: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS HELD IN
TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE
ISSUE V 48
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN FAVOR
OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE
OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE
UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
CONCLUSION 50
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 51
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN 51
ii
iii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49
Rules
3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49
3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33
Standards
411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of
the record as follows
Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton
Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson
References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by
the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be
designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)
The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to
this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page
number
The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the
Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR
followed by the appropriate page number
The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary
hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the
1
emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the
Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___
(indicating the page number of the transcript)
References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___
(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title
or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar
exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol
TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of
Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did
not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine
the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the
record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4
2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in
conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
2
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 4: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
iii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 (Fla 2011) 24 The Florida Bar v Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) 45 The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla 2002)41 42 47 The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 (Fla 2010) 44 45 The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So 2d 891 (Fla 2002) 23 The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 (Fla 1999) 49 The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d 1255 (Fla 2001) 24 The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla 2001)45 The Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999)39 The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999) 21 38 The Florida Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 (Fla 2006) 24 The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla 1997)41 The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d 1165 (Fla 1996)35 The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) 41 The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970)41 The Florida Bar v Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994)41 The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) 40 The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d 997 (Fla 2004) 23 The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) 41 The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d 1269 (Fla 1998) 41 The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 (Fla1999)23 The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009)45 The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996)41 42 The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) 41 42 The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 (Fla 2000) 23 The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 (Fla 2002)49 The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 (Fla 2000)49
Rules
3-42 4 17 19 32 33 3-43 4 17 32 3-76(q)(1) 49
3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33
Standards
411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of
the record as follows
Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton
Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson
References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by
the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be
designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)
The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to
this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page
number
The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the
Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR
followed by the appropriate page number
The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary
hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the
1
emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the
Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___
(indicating the page number of the transcript)
References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___
(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title
or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar
exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol
TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of
Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did
not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine
the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the
record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4
2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in
conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
2
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 5: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
3-76(q)(2) 48 3-76(q)(3) 49 3-77(c)(5) 22 4-115 4 17 19 32 33 4-19 4 16 18 21 32 38 39 40 4-84(a) 4 17 32 4-84(c) 4 17 32 36 4-84(d) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(a)(1) 4 17 19 32 33 5-11(b) 4 18 32 5-11(e) 4 18 19 32 33
Standards
411 20 34 42 43 511(f) 20 43 44 70 44 71 20 44 45 922(b) 19 45 922(c) 19 45 922(d) 19 45 922(i) 19 45 922(j) 19 45 932(a) 19 45 932(b) 19 45 932(d) 20 45 932(e) 19 45 932(l) 20 45
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of
the record as follows
Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton
Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson
References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by
the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be
designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)
The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to
this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page
number
The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the
Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR
followed by the appropriate page number
The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary
hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the
1
emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the
Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___
(indicating the page number of the transcript)
References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___
(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title
or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar
exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol
TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of
Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did
not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine
the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the
record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4
2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in
conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
2
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 6: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Answer Brief The Florida Bar will refer to specific parts of
the record as follows
Complainant will be referred to as The Florida Bar or as The Bar Lawton
Reid Jackson respondent will be referred to as respondent or as Mr Jackson
References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by
the appropriate page number References to the Index to the Record will be
designated as IR___ (indicating the index number)
The Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
dated November 13 2012 is Number 26 on the Index To Record References to
this Order will be designated SJ Order or IR 26 followed by the appropriate page
number
The Report of Referee from the June 4 2012 evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 is dated June 6 2012 and is Number 16 on the
Index to Record References to this Report of Referee will be designated FES RR
followed by the appropriate page number
The only transcript in the record is that of the June 4 2012 evidentiary
hearing on respondents motions for dissolution stay or amendment of the
1
emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the
Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___
(indicating the page number of the transcript)
References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___
(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title
or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar
exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol
TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of
Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did
not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine
the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the
record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4
2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in
conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
2
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 7: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
emergency suspension in Case No SC12-636 That transcript is Number 15 on the
Index to Record References to that transcript will be designated as TR___
(indicating the page number of the transcript)
References to pages in respondents initial brief will be designated IB___
(indicating the page number) References to specific pleadings will be made by title
or to the corresponding index number to the Index of Record References to Bar
exhibits admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012 hearing will be by the symbol
TFB Ex followed by the appropriate exhibit number (eg TFB Ex 10)
THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The respondent Lawton Reid Jackson is seeking review of a Report of
Referee recommending disbarment and payment of the Bars costs Respondent did
not file the transcripts of the November 7 2012 hearing on the Bars Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the November 20 2012 final hearing to determine
the recommended disciplinary sanctions in this case The only transcript in the
record before this Court is that of the evidentiary hearing conducted on June 4
2012 on respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay of the emergency
suspension in Case No SC12-636 The transcript [IR 15] was filed by the Bar in
conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
2
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 8: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
3
Respondentrsquos Statement of the Facts is largely without specific references to
the record In the interest of accuracy and to ensure the record is complete The
Florida Bar offers the following statement of the case and facts
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Florida Bar filed its Complaint against respondent on or about June 13
2012 following the respondents emergency suspension from the practice of law by
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dated April 19 2012 in Case Number
SC12-636 In the emergency suspension case respondent filed a Motion for
Dissolution of Emergency Suspension and a Motion for Stay of Emergency
Suspension or in the Alternative Amendment of Emergency Suspension on or about
May 24 2012 This Court directed the appointment of a Referee to conduct a
hearing and make findings concerning the matter The Honorable Lisa M Porter
was appointed Referee on or about May 29 2012 and a full evidentiary hearing on
respondents motions was held on June 4 2012 The Referee issued a Report of
Referee on June 6 2012 recommending that respondents motions for dissolution
amendment or stay be denied [IR 16] The Report of Referee contained detailed
findings of fact and determined inter alia that respondent misappropriated funds
[IR 16 RR 11]
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 9: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
This Court by Order dated August 13 2012 directed respondent to show
cause why the Referees recommendations should not be approved By Order dated
January 9 2013 this Court approved the Report of Referee in Case No SC12-636
and denied respondents motions for dissolution amendment or stay
In the follow-up Complaint to the emergency suspension filed in the instant
matter Judg e Porter was again appointed Referee The Florida Bar filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on or about September 25 2012 [IR 14]
Respondent filed his response [IR 24] on or about November 5 2012 and a hearing
on the motion was conducted by the Referee on November 7 2012 The Bars
motion was based on the evidence in the transcript from the evidentiary hearing
conducted in the emergency suspension case on June 4 2012 and the findings
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 [IR 15 and IR 16] The
Referee granted The Florida Bars Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Order
dated November 13 2012 [IR 26] Pursuant thereto respondent was found guilty
of violating the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar charged in the
complaint 3-42 3-43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d) 5-11(a)(1) 5-11(b)5-
11(e) and 4-19 A final hearing to determine the disciplinary recommendation was
conducted on November 20 2012 The Report of Referee was served on December
10 2012 and filed in this Court on or about December 14 2012 [IR 34] The
4
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 10: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
5
Referee recommended respondent be disbarred and pay costs incurred by the Bar
Respondent filed his Notice of Intent to Seek Review of the Referees Report on
February 11 2013
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Report of Referee and the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment [IR 26 and hereafter referred to as SJ Order] each contain
extensive findings of fact Both adopted and incorporated all findings of fact
contained in the Report of Referee issued on June 6 2012 from the evidentiary
hearing held on June 4 2012 in respondents underlying emergency suspension
case Case No SC12-636 [RR 2 SJ Order 2] At the June 4 2012 hearing the
Referee heard the sworn testimony of Scott Boynton a principal of Unishred FL
LLC (hereinafter Unishred) the respondent and Carl Totaro Branch Staff
Auditor for The Florida Bar The Referee received 10 exhibits in evidence from the
Bar and one exhibit in evidence from respondent [RR 3 FES RR 2-3] Both the
June 6 2012 Report of Referee and the June 4 2012 hearing transcript are
contained in the record of this case [IR 15 and 16] The Refereersquos Report in the
instant case included the following factual findings
Respondent represented Secure Document Destruction Inc (hereinafter
SDDI or SDD) who was approached by Unishred to purchase SDDI An agreement
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 11: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
was reached whereby Unishred would purchase SDDIs east coast (of Florida)
business which included major accounts with Memorial Health System (hereafter
Memorial) Pursuant to the agreement Unishred was to wire $50000 to
respondent to hold as an escrow deposit [RR 3-4] On June 15 2009 respondent
sent an e-mail to Fred Self a principal of Unishred which contained instructions
for wiring the $50000 deposit into respondents bank account In the e-mail
respondent stated he acknowledges on behalf of myself and my client Carol
Brown and SDDI that this is a refundable deposit and subject to a written
confirmation of a document securing the deposit with the Memorial Hospital
account [RR 4 TR 24-25 TFB Ex 2] Unishred wired the $50000 into
respondents bank account on June 15 2009 [RR 4]
A letter of intent (LOI) was also prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase [TFB Ex 3] With respect to this LOI the Report of Referee states
A letter of intent was prepared on June 15 2009 regarding the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred (See Exhibit 3) This letter of intent
(LOI) is addressed to Carol Brown of SDDI from Scott Boynton CFO
of Unishred The LOI is signed by Carol Brown but not by Scott
Boynton Scott Boynton did not dispute the existence of this agreement
to purchase the east coast business of SDDI The LOI states for and in
consideration of the transfer of assets and execution of the Non
Compete Unishred shall pay to SDDI the sum of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50000)the sum of $50000 will be transferred via fedwire
to Lawton R Jackson Esq who shall hold such sum in escrow
pending certain disbursements and customer approvals It is
6
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 12: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
understood and agreed that the sum of $12251 shall be disbursed
immediately to SDDI The remainder of the funds shall be used to pay
___________ (this line was left blank in the LOI) upon presentation of
an estoppel or payoff letter and legal fees to Lawton R Jackson Esq
[RR 4-5 TFB Ex 3]
Respondent admitted that he prepared this version of the LOI from an earlier
version and inserted the language referring to his legal fees [TR 193] Respondent
also testified that these legal fees were not owed by Unishred but were owed by his
client SDDI pursuant to an agreement he had with SDDI to be paid $30000 for
work he had done for SDDI since 2007 [TR 91 94-95] Respondent admitted he
had no documentation from Unishred that authorized him to take the fee owed to
him by SDDI from the escrow deposit [TR 95 lines 12-15] Scott Boynton testified
he did not know the amount of respondents legal fees that were owed by SDDI and
that Unishred never gave consent to respondent to take any legal fees from the
escrow deposit [RR 5 TR 31]
In the days following the June 15 2009 LOI Scott Boynton made many calls
to Carol Brown regarding the assignment of the Memorial accounts to Unishred
[RR 5] Scott Boynton testified that the calls were made to Brown in an effort to
see if Memorial had done what was necessary concerning the assignment of its
account and despite Browns assurances the assignment did not come forth [TR
34] Since the process was dragging on Scott Boynton prepared a letter dated June
7
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 13: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
16 2009 for Brown to sign and send to Memorial requesting Memorials consent to
the assignment [TR 71-74] A copy of this letter was entered into evidence as
respondents Exhibit A [TR 74] The letter dated June 16 2009 was addressed to
Dianne Martin Memorial Healthcare Systemrsquos Director of Commodity Contracting
It stated
I wanted to confirm with you that I will be selling certain assets of my
company to UNISHRED FLORIDA LLC I would appreciate MHSs
consent to transfer my right title and interest in my agreement with
MHS to UNISHRED FL LLC
This letter is what respondent refers to in his initial brief as a letter of
assignment [IB 16] and an assignment of the Memorial Hospital Contract [IB
13] Scott Boynton testified it was learned that Memorial would not assign the
contract to Unishred or anyone else who bought SDDI [TR 89] Respondent
admits in his initial brief that it was conclusively established that Memorial did not
accept the assignment and that the escrow deposit was therefore refundable [IB
20] Respondent also admits in his initial brief that as of the date respondent wired
funds to SDD and shortly thereafter (respondent) began to take a portion of the
(escrow) deposit in fees as set forth in the (June 15) LOI [IB 18] There is no
dispute that $12251 was to be disbursed immediately to SDDI due to their
immediate cash needs pursuant to the June 15 LOI and this was done with
8
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 14: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
9
Unishreds knowledge and approval Unishred however was not aware that
respondent also immediately began taking money from the deposit for himself
Respondent admits he did not tell Unishred that he had taken $30000 from the
escrow deposit until September 13 2009 [TR 115]
Meanwhile after the June 15 LOI Unishred engaged legal counsel Gunster
Yoakley and Stewart PA (Gunster) who began working with respondent to
prepare a second letter of intent to encompass all of SDDIs accounts including
those on the west coast of Florida This second LOI was dated June 23 2009 and
was signed by Carol Brown for SDDI
The June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with respondents involvement At the
June 4 2012 hearing respondent admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney
Marybeth Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23
2009 LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent [TR 99 lines 18-22] The
e-mail and attached draft of the June 23 2009 LOI were admitted into evidence as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99] The final version of the June 23 LOI signed by Carol Brown
for SDDI was admitted into evidence as TFB Ex 4 [TR 34-35] Both the draft
LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of the June 23 2009 LOI
contained the following identical provision in Paragraph 2 as follows
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 15: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Prior Transaction On June 15 2009 Buyer purchased from Seller the
Memorial Healthcare Systems South Broward Hospital District
shredding account in exchange for the payment of $50000 and an
agreement from Carol Brown and SDDI not to pursue that account for
a period of five (5) years Approximately $12500 of the $50000
was used to fund certain of Sellerrsquos operating expenses and the
remaining $37500 (the ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held
and will continue to be held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal
counsel It will be combined with the $100000 cash payment
discussed in paragraph 1(a) above and used to satisfy in whole or in
part Sellerrsquos creditors and to deliver the Assets free and clear of all
liens [Bold font added for emphasis]
The Report of Referee noted this provision stating
This second LOI dated June 23 2009 and received in evidence as
Exhibit 4 specifically references the initial payment of $50000 for
the Memorial Healthcare account by Unishred the authorization for
SDDI to use approximately $12500 for operating expenses and the
remaining balance of $37500 currently being held and will continue
to be held in an escrow account of Sellers legal counsel
Respondent in working with Gunster never mentioned having taken
any of these funds [RR 5-6]
In his testimony respondent admitted that the representation in the LOI that
he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14
p 103 lines 2-3]
In the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [IR
26] the referee found
Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds legal counsel in further
negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in fact been spending the
refundable deposit which should have been held in escrow A second
10
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 16: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by Unishreds counsel and
modified by Respondent specifically represented that Respondent was
holding and continuing to hold $37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his
escrow account Respondent did nothing to correct this statement in
the letter by disclosing he had been spending these funds all along [SJ
Order p 5]
The June 23 2009 LOI contained a deadline of August 1 2009 to complete
the deal [TR 36] The Report of Referee states
Unishred became aware Memorial did not agree to assign the accounts
to Unishred and as a result requested the return of the refundable
deposit for the purchase of SDDI (See Exhibit 5 in evidence)
Respondent did not reply to Unishreds e-mails demanding a refund
Marybeth Bosco Esq of Gunster e-mailed Respondent on
September 1 2009 demanding the return of the deposit Scott Boynton
testified they ultimately reached Respondent on the phone and
Respondent explained he spent the money as he needed it for living
expenses On September 14 2009 Respondent returned $7750 to
Unishred [RR 6]
TFB Ex 5 referenced at RR 6 was a composite exhibit of various e-mails
sent to respondent requesting him to return the escrow deposit [TR 40] Boynton
in his testimony identified an e-mail sent to respondent from Fred Self of Unishred
on August 14 2009 providing respondent with wiring instructions to return the
deposit because the LOI had expired and the Memorial assignment had not been
obtained Boynton testified that respondent did not respond to that e-mail [TR 41]
Boynton testified a second e-mail was sent from Fred Self to respondent on August
17 2009 because respondent had not returned the money Respondent did not
11
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 17: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
respond to that e-mail either [TR 41-42] On August 21 2009 Boynton sent a third
request by e-mail to respondent to refund the escrow deposit [TR 42] Respondent
did not respond to that request either [TR 44] Boynton testified at that point he
went to Gunster attorney Bosko who then sent an e-mail demand for the refund to
respondent on September 1 2009 which included proof that the Memorial account
would not be assigned to Unishred [TR 44-45] Boynton testified he and Self
finally got in contact with respondent by telephone after the September 1 2009 e-
mail Boynton testified at TR p 45 line 7 to p 46 line 3
Q hellipwhat happened after Gunster Yoakley sent -- Mary Beth Bosko
sent this email Did Mr Jackson -- Did you hear from Mr
Jackson
A We kept trying to contact him We finally got in contact with him
and Fred Self and I got on a telephone call with him
Q Was this after this September 1st email
A Yes it was
Q And can you tell us about that conversation
A Yeah I mean in the conversation Lawton said you know that he
had spent the money and he needed the money to meet living
expenses And it was really -- it was more of a pity story than
anything It wasnt I was justified in doing this because of an
agreement or anything It was you know I needed the money
and I spent it and you know too bad kind of deal which was --
I was just in shock I mean --
Q Was that the first time that you became aware that Mr Jackson had
taken that money
A Yes
12
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 18: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Respondent admitted receiving all of the e-mails [TR 113-114] He also
admitted that he did not notify Unishred that he took $30000 from the escrow
deposit until September 13 2009 and that he owes Unishred the $30000 [TR
115]
The Report of Referee found that respondent by his testimony admitted the
escrow deposit was refundable if the assignment was not approved by Memorial
and that the deposit should have been refunded including $30000 he personally
took when Memorial did not approve the assignment of the accounts [RR 7 See
also TR 92-94]
The Report of Referee also found that respondent admitted he used the funds
for his own use and enjoyment and that his use of the funds was not related to the
Unishred transaction [RR 7 See also TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
The Referee further determined that the $50000 escrow deposit was wired
into respondents personal account and not a trust or escrow account Respondent
admitted he commingled the funds with his own money in the account [RR 7 See
also TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
The Report of Referee also noted the testimony of Branch Staff Auditor Carl
Totaro who performed an audit with respondents bank account records Mr
Totaro testified that respondent commingled funds and deposited the $50000
13
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 19: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
14
Unishred deposit in a personal account that was not a trust account Of the initial
$50000 deposit $12251 was paid to SDDI pursuant to the terms of the LOI
$7750 was returned to Unishred and the remainder of the deposit was spent by
respondent on personal expenses until January 2010 when the remainder of the
deposit was completely depleted [RR 8] Mr Totaro prepared an affidavit with
exhibits concerning his audit which was admitted into evidence at the June 4 2012
hearing as TFB Ex 10 [TR 123 125-126]
Mr Totaro further testified as follows The $50000 deposit was transferred
to the account ending in 8565 titled Lawton Reid Jackson account that contained a
prior balance of $5726 before the transfer [TR 138] Respondent commingled the
escrow funds into his own personal account [TR 139] Within a couple of days
after receiving the deposit he disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then
disbursed the rest to himself eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on
September 14 2009 [TR 139-140] After receiving the escrow deposit
respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR 145] Respondent
wrote a check on July 3 2009 for $30000 [TR 143-144] That money was moved
by respondent to open another bank account on the same date [TR 132] Prior to
this $30000 transfer respondent had spent $583332 in various transactions [TR
145] After the $30000 was transferred respondent continued spending the money
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 20: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
before eventually refunding the $7750 back to Unishred [TR 145-146] On
June 22 2009 the date before the June 23 LOI that represented respondent was
holding $37500 of the escrow deposit the undisbursed balance in respondents
account was actually $32528631 On June 24 2009 the day after the LOI the
balance was $3239214 [TR 147] On August 14 2009 the date of the first email
sent by Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents
account was $1891628 On August 21 2009 the date of the third email sent by
Unishred to respondent requesting the refund the balance in respondents account
was $1730645 [ TR 153] On September 1 2009 the date Gunster Attorney
Bosko sent the e-mail to respondent demanding the refund the balance in
respondents account was $1553621 On September 14 2009 the date respondent
returned $7750 to Unishred the balance in respondents account prior to the
transfer of those funds was $1008111 [TR 154] Both accounts where respondent
had placed the proceeds from the $50000 became overdrawn one on January 20
2010 and the second on March 31 2010 meaning that anything that might have
been left from the $50000 escrow deposit was gone [TR 154-155] The audit
1 All quoted balances that follow include $726 of respondentrsquos own money still
contained in his account [TR 147-148]
15
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 21: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
determined that respondent misappropriated $30000 of the funds for his own
personal use [TR 156-157]
Scott Boynton testified that after Unishred discovered respondent had taken
the money respondent advised Boynton that it would not do Unishred any good to
complain to the Bar because if respondent lost his license to practice law Unishred
would never get the money back [SJ Order p 8 TR 48] Respondent told
Unishred he could help them recover their funds by representing Unishred in a
lawsuit against his former client SDDI to collect the $12250 provided to SDDI
from the $50000 escrow deposit that had been reduced to a promissory note
Respondent promised to apply any recovery in attorney fees to the amount he owed
Unishred Unishred retained respondent in a Contingency Fee Agreement (TFB
Ex 6) and paid the filing costs for this lawsuit [RR 6-7] Respondent admitted he
never obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116] For
purposes of finding respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-19
the Referee found that the promissory note which formed the basis of the lawsuit
filed by respondent against his former client was clearly the same matter or was
substantially similar to the matter that had involved materially adverse interests
between SDDI and Unishred at the time respondent had represented SDDI [SJ
16
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 22: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Order p 9] Scott Boynton testified as of the date of the June 4 2012 hearing
Unishred has not recovered any funds from Respondent other than the $7750
returned on September 14 2009 [RR 7 TR 51-52]
Pursuant to the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of violating
the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar that were charged in the Barrsquos
complaint 3-42 [Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the
rules governing The Florida Bar is a cause for discipline] 3-43 [hellipThe
commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and
justice whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an
attorney or otherwise whether committed within or outside the state of Florida and
whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor may constitute a cause for
discipline] 4-115 [ A lawyer shall comply with The Florida Bar Rules Regulating
Trust Accounts] 4-84(a) [A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so
through the acts of another] 4-84(c) [A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentationhellip] 4-84(d) [A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice] 5-11(a)(1) [A lawyer shall hold in trust separate
from the lawyers own property funds and property of clients or third persons that
17
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 23: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
are in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation All funds
including advances for fees costs and expenses shall be kept in a separate bank or
savings and loan association account maintained in the state where the lawyers
office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person and
clearly labeled and designated as a trust account ] 5-11(b) [Money or other
property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose including advances for fees
costs and expenses is held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose
Money and other property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not
subject to counterclaim or setoff for attorneys fees and a refusal to account for and
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion] 5-11(e)
[Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and upon request by the client or
third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property] and
4-19 [A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
18
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 24: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
in which that persons interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client gives informed consent] [SJ Order pp 3-9]
As set forth in the Order Re The Florida Bars Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment respondent stipulated to certain rule violations Rule 3-42 as it pertains
to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR 26 p 3] Rule 4-115 as
it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-
84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6]
Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order pp 7-8] The Referee
determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt of the rule violations
went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing to stipulate
The Referee determined the following five aggravating factors from the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were applicable 922(b) Dishonest or
selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i)
Substantial experience in the practice of law 922(j) Indifference to making
restitution [RR 19-21] The Referee found two applicable mitigating factors which
were stipulated to by the Bar 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and
932(e) Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b)
19
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 25: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make
restitution and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
In recommending disbarment the Referee reviewed applicable case law [RR
11-18] and applied the following Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions [RR 9-
10]
Standard 411 [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury]
Standard 511(f) [disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice] and Standard 71
[disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client the
public or the legal system]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Referee properly entered partial summary judgment finding respondent
guilty of the rule violations charged in the Complaint since the material facts are not
in dispute Respondent was provided a full evidentiary hearing on June 4 2012
pursuant to his motions to dissolve amend or stay the emergency suspension in the
20
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 26: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
related case SC12-636 The record from that hearing contains admissions by
respondent and other undisputed substantial and competent evidence to support the
guilty findings of the rule violations charged
The Refereersquos findings that respondent intentionally misappropriated $30000
from the escrow deposit and intentionally misled Unishred to believe that he was
holding the escrow deposit intact are clearly supported by the record not clearly
erroneous and should therefore be upheld Respondent completely disregarded his
role in the transaction as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred
and SDDI Respondent never had authority to take money for himself from the
escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money until after the fact
Respondent allowed the parties to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit
intact by failing to take steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had
participated in drafting The evidence is clear and convincing to support the finding
that respondents conduct was deliberate or knowing thus satisfying the element of
intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
The Refereersquos findings that respondent violated Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-
19 is clearly supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore
be upheld Respondent violated this rule by representing Unishred in a lawsuit
against his former client SDDI to collect on a promissory note for the $12251
21
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 27: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
advanced to SDDI by Unishred and which was paid from the escrow deposit in the
same transaction where respondent had previously represented SDDI The Referee
properly found that the representation of Unishred involved the same or
substantially similar matter that concerned respondents representation of SDDI
Respondent admitted that he failed to obtain a written waiver or permission from
his former client for the conflict
Disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for the intentional
misappropriation by respondent in this case The Refereersquos recommended sanction
of disbarment is supported by case law the Standards for Lawyer Discipline and the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors found in this case
The Referee has the discretion to award costs in favor of The Florida Bar
when the Bar is successful in whole or in part unless it is shown that the Barrsquos
costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly authenticated Respondent did
not meet this burden and the Referee properly awarded costs in this case to The
Florida Bar
ARGUMENT
On review the burden is on the party seeking review to demonstrate that a
Report of the Referee sought to be reviewed is erroneous unlawful or unjustified
R Regulating Fla Bar 3-77(c)(5) A Refereersquos findings of fact regarding guilt
22
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 28: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
23
normally carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record The Florida Bar v Senton 882 So 2d
997 1001 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar v Vining 761 So 2d 1044 1047 (Fla
2000) This Courtrsquos scope of review of a Refereersquos recommended sanction is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v Carlon 820 So
2d 891 899 (Fla 2002) However generally speaking the Court will not second-
guess the Referees recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions See
The Florida Bar v Temmer 753 So 2d 555 558 (Fla1999)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 29: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
ISSUE I
THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN
DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE
RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
24
Respondent argues for de novo review by this Court by reason of the partial
summary judgment entered by the Referee in this case The Referee has the
authority to enter summary judgment in Bar disciplinary proceedings when there is
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law A Referees order granting summary relief is reviewed de novo by the Court
The Florida Bar v Adorno 60 So 3d 1016 1024 (Fla 2011) citing The Florida
Bar v Gold 937 So 2d 652 655 (Fla 2006) Appellate courts review summary
judgment orders de novo with all facts and inferences to be resolved in favor of the
party opposing the summary judgment The Florida Bar v Cosnow 797 So 2d
1255 1258 (Fla 2001)
In this case the material facts are not in dispute [SJ Order p 9]
Respondent admitted sending the June 15 2009 e-mail to Unishred
containing the instructions for wiring the $50000 into his bank account
Respondent stated in the e-mail that the deposit was refundable and subject to
confirmation of the transfer of the account by Memorial Respondent testified [TR
p 92 line 25 to p 93 line 11 and p 93 lines 23-25]
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 30: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Q And you told Unishred in that email that the deposit was refundable correct
A It says that in the email yes
Q And you also said in that email that it was subject to confirmation
of the transfer of the account by Memorial correct
A Yes
Q In fact you even stated that in your motion So you dont deny that
that deposit was subject to confirmation of the transfer of the
account by Memorial correct
A I have never denied that
Q You agree that the deposit was refundable if the re was no approval
by Memorial Hospital
A Thats what the email says
Respondent admitted receiving the $50000 wired by Unishred into his
account and that he agreed to hold the money in escrow Respondent testified [TR
p 91 lines 13-18]
Q Now Unishred wired the sum of $50000 to you on June 15th
2009 correct
A Correct
Q And you agreed to hold that $50000 in escrow correct
A Correct
Respondent admitted there was no approval by Memorial to transfer the
account to Unishred and the transfer of the account never happened Respondent
testified [TR p 94 lines 1-6]
Q Was there an approval by Memorial Hospital to transfer that
account
A There was not
Q So -- And the transfer of the account never happened did it
25
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 31: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
A It did not
Respondent admitted that the escrow deposit should have been refunded
including the $30000 he took Respondent testified [TR p 94 li nes 13-23]
Q So Memorial did not accept the transfer correct
A I dont know what the -- I think that consent is the correct word or
whatever it is but no the account was never transferred
Q The deposit should have been refunded correct
A According to the understanding yes absolutely
Q And that includes the $30000 that you took correct
A Yes it does
Respondent admitted Unishred owed him no money for legal fees and that he
took $30000 from the escrow deposit without any authorization from Unishred
Respondent testified as follows
At TR p 91 lines 10-12
Q And Unishred did not owe you any money for any legal fees did
they
A No
At TR p 94 line 24 to p 95 line 15
Q And this $30000 that you took you believe that that was money
that SDD owed you for legal work that you had done for them
since 2007 correct
A That $30000 figure doesnt represent the entirety of the fees they
owed me It was a figure that we came up with It was what
could be assessed against this transaction to pay off the majority
of what they owed me
Q So this agreement to take $30000 was between you and SDD
Secure Destruction -- Secure Document Destruction
26
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 32: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
A Secure Destruction maybe Yes thats correct
Q And you have no documentation that Unishred gave you authority
to take $30000 from the escrow account do you
A No
Respondent admitted using the $30000 for his own use and enjoyment and
that his use of the funds was not related to the Unishred transaction Respondent
testified [TR p 107 line 22 to p 108 line 15]
Q Okay Mr Jackson you admit that you transferred in fact you say
clearly respondent transferred the funds for his own use and
enjoyment correct
A I dont deny that
Q You dont deny that Okay So you were using that money for your
own personal purposes correct
A Again I dont deny that
Q And describe what you mean by personal purposes
A I dont recall what -- I mean youve got copies of checks I dont
recall specifically if I paid bills I dont know There were a
couple of checks for cash I dont recall specifically what I used
it for but I mean --
Q Okay It wasnt related to the Unishred transaction
A No it was not
Respondent admitted the June 23 2009 LOI was prepared with his
involvement He admitted sending an e-mail to Unishreds attorney Marybeth
Bosko at Gunster on June 23 2009 which attached a draft of the June 23 2009
LOI containing revisions made to it by respondent Respondent testified [TR p97
line 14 to p 98 line 9]
27
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 33: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Q Okay So let me hand you whats been marked as Exhibit H Mr
Jackson would you agree that this is an email that you sent to
Mary Beth Bosko dated June 23rd 2009 at 1125 am
A I think its actually -- to be technical its a -- looks to be from
somebody named Alicia Parcensia (phoenetic) but it references
an email that I sent to Mary Beth Bosko yes
Q Well its possible that this was printed --
A Yes right
Q -- off of Alicia Parcensias computer but who is that email from
A The email that it references is from me to Mary Beth Bosko
Q And is that an email that you sent to Mary Beth Bosko
A I assume so yes
Q And you had some attachments to that email correct
A Yes
The e-mail and attachments were admitted into evidence without objection as
TFB Ex 7 [TR 99]
Respondent then testified [TR p99 lines 10-22]
Q Now Mr Jackson what are the two attachments on that exhibit
that email that weve identified as Exhibit Seven
A Unishred letter of intent_V2 And letter of intent_V2A
Q And those attachments are part of that exhibit correct
A This exhibit yes
Q Okay So those are the attachments that you sent to Mary Beth
Bosko with some minor revisions and those attachments are the
result of your minor revisions correct
A Im assuming so
Both the draft LOI [contained in TFB Ex 7] and the final signed version of
the June 23 2009 LOI version [TFB Ex 4] contained the identical provision in
Paragraph 2 which stated in pertinent part
28
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 34: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Approximately $12500 of the $50000 was used to fund certain of
Sellers operating expenses and the remaining $37500 (the
ldquoMemorial Fundrdquo) is currently being held and will continue to be
held in an escrow account of Sellerrsquos legal counsel It will be
combined with the $100000 cash payment discussed in paragraph 1(a)
above and used to satisfy in whole or in part Sellerrsquos creditors and to
deliver the Assets free and clear of all liens (Bold font added for
emphasis)
Respondent read this provision from the draft LOI into the record [TR p
101 line 11 to p 102 line 1] He then admitted in his testimony that the
representation he was holding $37500 in an escrow account was not true
Respondent testified at TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 103 lines 2-3
Q But where it says the remaining $37500 to quote Memorial fund
is currently being held and will continue to be held in escrow
account of sellers legal counsel well you were the sellers legal
counsel correct
A Yes
Q Was that $37500 currently being held on June 22nd 2009 in your
escrow account
A No it was not Q But that wasnt true
A No That is correct I answered that
In his initial brief respondent also admits he was aware of the draft nature
of the document and did not correct the misstatement [IB 23]
Respondent admitted receiving the e-mails from Unishred and their Gunster
lawyer demanding the refund of the escrow deposit beginning August 14 2009 yet
29
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 35: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
he waited until September 14 2009 to return only $7750 Respondent further
admitted that the $7750 returned to Unishred did not include the $30000 that he
took and still owed to Unishred Respondent also admitted that he did not notify
Unishred that he had taken the $30000 until September 13 2009 Respondent
testified [TR p113 line 19 to p 115 line 23]
Q Let me show you whats been marked as Exhibit Five mdash the Bars
Exhibit Five Those are the emails that Mr Boynton testified
sending you earlier asking for the refund
A Uh-huh yes
Q You dont deny receiving any of those emails do you
A No I do not
Q Okay So you dont deny that you received an email on
August 14th 2009 requesting that the escrow deposit be
returned
A No I do not
Q And you dont deny receiving an email on August 17th 2009
again essentially requesting a refund of the money
A No I do not
Q And you got wiring instructions to do that
A Yes
Q And you dont deny receiving the email from Mary Beth Bosko on
September 1st 2009 correct
A Correct Let me -- No That is correct And I might add that I asked
Mary Beth to provide the document that she references in this
where she says the email string from Jacqueline Ryan mdash
because at that point in time we had nothing from Memorial to
indicate that they would not agree to the consent and I asked her
to provide that and she didnt
Q Okay And that was September 1st 2009
A Yes
Q So you had all the information that you claimed that you needed
A As of September 1st 2009 correct
30
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 36: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Q And its your testimony today that you did not notify Mr Boynton
or Unishred that you had taken that money until
September 13th 2009 correct
A I believe thats the date yes Sometime after September 1st
Q Well you said specifically September 13th
A My recollection -- and Im going based on what I -- The wire that I
sent back was on the 14th correct So the conversation that I
had with Fred was the day before that wire and that is my
recollection is that the wire occurred on the 14th
Q Okay And thats -- On the 14th is when you returned $7750 is that
correct
A Correct yes
Q And in your mind that was 50000 minus the 12200 -- the money
that went to SDDI less the money that you took the $30000
A The 12251 and the 30 yes
Q So the $7750 did not include any of the$30000 that you took
A Correct
Q So you owe Unishred $30000 correct
A Yes
Respondent admitted that the $50000 escrow deposit was deposited into his
personal checking account and commingled with his personal money Respondent
testified [TR p 112 line 23 to p 113 line 6]
Q Now you had a little bit of your own money in the first account that
you took the $50000 that was deposited in that 8565 account
You had your own money in that account correct
A It was my personal checking account yes
Q So you dont deny that you commingled those funds do you
A No I do not
Respondent admits he agreed to represent Unishred in a lawsuit against
SDDI for SDDIs failure to pay back the $12251 to Unishred pursuant to the
31
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 37: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
promissory note [IB 25] Respondent also admitted he never obtained a waiver or
written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to represent Unishred in this lawsuit
against SDDI [SJ Order p 9 TR 116]
The findings of the Bars auditor were undisputed by respondent Among the
findings Within a couple of days after receiving the $50000 deposit respondent
disbursed the agreed upon $12251 to SDDI and then disbursed the rest to himself
eventually refunding $7750 back to Unishred on September 14 2009 [TR 139-
140] After receiving the money respondent spent the money in a multitude of
transactions [TR 145] Respondent continued spending down the money despite
the representation in the June 23 2009 LOI that he was holding the money intact
and despite his receipt of the various e-mails from Unishred beginning August 14
2009 demanding a refund Furthermore respondent continued spending the money
even after he received the e-mailed demand from the Gunster attorney on
September 1 2009 [TR 147-154]
As noted in the SJ Order [IR 26] respondent was found guilty of the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar as charged in the complaint 3-42 3-
43 4-115 4-84(a) 4-84(c) 4-84(d)5-11(a)(1) 5-1l(b)5-11(e) and 4-19 [SJ
Order pp 3-9]
32
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 38: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
As set forth in the SJ Order respondent stipulated to certain rule violations
Rule 3-42 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e) [SJ Order IR
26 p 3] Rule 4-115 a s it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and 5-11(e)
[SJ Order p 4] Rule 4-84(d) as it pertains to violations of Rules 5-11(a)(1) and
5-11(e) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(a)(1) [SJ Order p 6] Rule 5-11(e) [SJ Order
pp 7-8] The Referee determined as stated in the SJ Order that respondentrsquos guilt
of the rule violations went beyond the limitations to which respondent was willing
to stipulate
The undisputed facts and admissions by respondent support the Referees
findings in the SJ Order [IR 26] In the order the Referee examined each of the
rule violations set forth in the Bar complaint and applied the undisputed facts and
admissions in determining respondents guilt The Bar submits that the factual
findings and findings of rule violations by the Referee should be approved
ISSUE II
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT
INTENTIONALLY MISAPPROPRIATED $30000 FROM THE
ESCROW DEPOSIT AND INTENTIONALLY MISLED
UNISHRED THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE ESCROW DEPOSIT
INTACT WHEN HE WAS NOT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
33
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 39: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
The Referee determined that respondent intentionally misappropriated
$30000 from the escrow deposit In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 applies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
In the Report of Referee of the June 4 2012 hearing the Referee states
Respondent did not have a trust account at the time he received the
$50000 fund transfer from Unishred and he then proceeded to
misappropriate it [FES RR p 11]
Respondent argues that he did not intentionally misappropriate the money
because the June 15 LOI gave him authority to take $30000 from the escrow
account as his fee a nd he mistakenly believed the June 16 2009 letter to Memorial
[Respondents Exhibit A] constituted a valid assignment until it was later
demonstrated otherwise by Gunsters attorney in the September 1 2009 email
Despite there being no confirmation from Memorial approving the transfer as
required by the June 15 LOI and despite the fact that the amount of respondents
fees were not set forth in the LOI respondent argues that the June 15 LOI provided
a valid contractual basis for him to take $30000 from the deposit he was holding in
escrow
34
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 40: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
As to the false representation made in the June 23 LOI respondent argues in
his initial brief at IB 24
While Respondent failed to change the language drafted by counsel for
UNI regarding the escrowed funds it was an oversight in a document
which had not been finalized nor even agreed to in whole It was not
an intentionally misleading statement by Respondent It was not an
inducement nor did it cause any action or harm At worst it was an
act of omission rather than commission
Respondents arguments completely disregard his role in the transaction as a
lawyer acting as an escrow agent with a fiduciary duty to both Unishred and SDDI
As the escrow agent it was respondents duty to disburse the escrowed funds in
strict accordance with the parties agreement The Florida Bar v Joy 679 So 2d
1165 (Fla 1996) Respondent never had authority from Unishred to take money for
himself from the escrow deposit and never told Unishred he was taking the money
until after the fact Respondent admitted that the provision in the June 23 LOI
which stated he was holding $37500 of the deposit intact in an escrow account was
not true [TR p 102 lines 6-14 p 102 line 21 to p 103 line 3] In his ini tial brief
respondent admits he was aware of the draft nature of the document and did not
correct the misstatement [IB 23] Respondent induced the parties into falsely
believing he was holding intact $37500 from the escrow deposit by failing to take
steps to correct the language in the June 23 LOI that he had participated in drafting
35
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 41: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
36
Failing to correct the language in the June 23 LOI enabled respondent to continue
spending the money without Unishreds knowledge and to Unishreds great financial
injury
There is no basis for respondentrsquos claim of mistake or negligence
Respondent admits that by September 1 2009 he knew the assignment was never
approved by Memorial yet he only returned $7750 to Unishred and continued to
misappropriate the rest of the money until those funds were completely depleted
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondents actions
were solely motivated by his own personal financial interest and were in total
disregard of his fiduciary duty to Unishred Respondent improperly acted against
Unishreds rights to the escrow deposit by misappropriating the money while
leading Unishred to falsely believe he was holding the escrow deposit intact
The Referee considered respondents arguments and found them to be
without merit In the SJ Order the Referee found respondent acted intentionally and
in violation of Rule Regulating Fla Bar 4-84(c) with respect to both the
misappropriation of the funds and the misrepresentation in the June 23 LOI as
follows [SJ Order pp 4-6]
The Respondent admits he deposited funds for the purchase by
Unishred of SDDI into his personal account and not a trust account
This act was contrary to the representation made in the letter of intent
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 42: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
37
dated June 15 2009 which represented the funds would be held in
escrow pending certain disbursements and customer approvals The
Respondent admits the deposit was refundable and contingent on the
assignment of the Memorial Health System account Respondent
contends he assumed the assignment of the Memorial Health account
would go through (T 93) Respondent acknowledged the transfer of
the Memorial Health account did not go through (T 94) Respondent
used the refundable deposit proceeds for his own personal use and
enjoyment (T 107-108) Respondent did not disclose to Unishreds
legal counsel in further negotiations for the sale of SDDI that he had in
fact been spending the refundable deposit which should have been held
in escrow A second letter of intent dated June 23 2009 drafted by
Unishreds counsel and modified by Respondent specifically
represented that Respondent was holding and continuing to hold
$37500 (the Memorial Fund) in his escrow account Respondent did
nothing to correct this statement in the letter by disclosing he had been
spending these funds all along Respondent argues it was reasonable
for him to assume the assignment was complete and he did not have
the requisite intent to violate this Rule This defies all logic when
reviewing the very nature of this transaction Unishreds primary
motivation in purchasing the east coast business of SDDI was in
securing the Memorial Health account All parties including
Respondent acknowledge the deposit was refundable and contingent
on the assignment Respondent never secured any documentation the
assignment was complete rather he immediately utilized $30000 to
open a new bank account (not a trust account) and began spending the
money for his own personal use At the end of the day when Unishred
realized the purchase would not go through and demanded the refund
of their deposit Respondent admitted he spent the money and needed
it to meet living expenses (T 45) Clearly this is a violation of this
Rule
The referee further states in the SJ Order in pertinent part [IR 26 pp 9-10]
The facts in this matter are essentially not in dispute Respondent
offers in defense he had no intent and this was a mistake However the
Referee is not persuaded by this argument Pursuant to The Florida Bar
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 43: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
v Fredericks 731 So2d 1249 (Fla 1999) the Supreme Court of
Florida held in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be
shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing Id at 1252 hellip
Clearly Respondent knew he should have held the funds for the
purchase of SDDI by Unishred in a trust account He did not and
instead deposited the funds in a personal bank account He then
utilized $30000 to open a new bank account and began spending the
money for his own use and enjoyment without any confirmation the
Memorial Health account was assigned and without any approval for
doing so If this conduct is not deliberate and knowing it is
unfathomable to imagine what ishellip
It is clear from the Referees findings in the SJ Order that the undisputed
facts respondents admissions and respondents arguments were carefully
considered The respondents arguments were clearly rejected by the Referee The
evidence clearly supports the finding that respondents conduct was deliberate or
knowing thus satisfying the element of intent pursuant to The Florida Bar v
Fredericks 731 So 2d 1249 (Fla 1999)
38
ISSUE III
THE REFEREErsquoS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED
RULE REGULATING FLORIDA BAR 4-19 IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UPHELD
The facts underlying this rule violation are not in dispute In his initial brief
respondent acknowledges the nexus that the sums due under the promissory note
originated from the failed transaction with Unishred [IB 25-26] Whether an
attorney has a conflict of interest depends upon the specific facts of each case The
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 44: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
Florida Bar v Dunagan 731 So 2d 1237 (Fla 1999) Here the Referee applied the
specific facts of this case and properly determined there was a conflict with the
former client in violation of Rule 4-19(a) In finding respondent guilty of Rule 4-
19(a) the Referee did not accept r espondents argument also set forth in his initial
brief that the legal issue of the promissory note (breach of note) was unrelated to
the legal issues of the prior representation (sale of assets etc) [IB 26] The Referee
stated in the SJ Order [pp 8-9]
After it was discovered by Unishred that Respondent had spent the
refundable deposit for the Purchase of SDDI Respondent advised
Scott Boynton of Unishred that if they went to TFB it would not do
them any good because if he lost his license to practice law they would
never get their money back (T 48) Respondent then proposed to
Unishred representing them in a lawsuit against his client SDDI to
recover the $12250 which was immediately disbursed by Respondent
from the initial $50000 deposit to cover SDDI operating expenses
Respondent advised Unishred he would apply his attorneys fees
earned in this lawsuit to the repayment of the $30000 he had spent
from the refundable deposit which he should have held in escrow
Respondent claims he spoke with someone whose name he cannot
remember from TFBs ethics hotline who advised him this was
acceptable if it did not pertain to confidential client information and he
asserts in further defense this lawsuit involved collection of a debt that
occurred post facto (T 116-117) Respondent admitted he never
obtained a waiver or written permission from SDDI or Carol Brown to
represent Unishred in this lawsuit against SDDI The promissory note
which formed the basis of the lawsuit against SDDI by Unishred and
filed by Respondent stemmed from the very transaction in which
Respondent represented SDDI The agreement to apply attorneys fees
from this lawsuit against SDDI to repay the $30000 Respondent took
from Unishred stemmed again from the original representation by
39
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 45: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Respondent of SDDI Clearly this is the same or a substantially related
matter in which that persons interests Unishred are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client SDDI and the former
client SDDI did not give informed consent
In The Florida Bar v Scott 39 So 3d 309 (Fla 2010) the attorney was
guilty of Rule 4-19(a) for representing various clients in separate matters because
the clients were directly adverse to each other by reason of having claims to the
same pool of money Similarly in the instant case respondent represented adverse
parties concerning the same ldquopool of moneyrdquo that was part of the original escrow
deposit for the transaction between Unishred and SDDI
The Referees determination that respondent violated Rule 4-19(a) is clearly
supported by the record is not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld
40
ISSUE IV
THE CASE LAW STANDARDS AND AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORT A DISBARMENT WHEN
RESPONDENTrsquoS CONDUCT INVOLVES MISAPPROPRIATION
OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST ABSENT EXTENUATING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT
PRESENT IN THIS CASE
While a Refereersquos findings of fact should be upheld unless clearly erroneous
or without support in the record this Courtrsquos scope of review is broader when it
reviews a Refereersquos recommendation for discipline because this Court has the
ultimate responsibility of determining the appropriate sanction The Florida Bar v
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 46: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Rue 643 So 2d 1080 (Fla 1994) The Florida Bar v Grief 701 So 2d 555 (Fla
1997) In The Florida Bar v Pahules 233 So 2d 130 (Fla 1970) this Court held
three purposes must be held in mind when deciding the appropriate sanction for an
attorneyrsquos misconduct 1) the judgment must be fair to society 2) the judgment
must be fair to the attorney and 3) the judgment must be severe enough to deter
others attorneys from similar conduct This Court has further stated a refereersquos
recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing case law or the
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions The Florida Bar v Sweeney 730 So 2d
1269 (Fla 1998) The Florida Bar v Lecznar 690 So 2d 1284 (Fla 1997) In the
instant case the Referee found support for her disbarment recommendation in
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Prior to recommending disbarment the Referee considered the following
case law The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) The Florida Bar
v Travis 765 So 2d 689 (Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542
(Fla 1996) The Florida Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) and The
Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 ( Fla 2002) [RR11-15]
In The Florida Bar v Spear 887 So 2d 1242 (Fla 2004) this Court rejected
the referees suspension recommendation and disbarred the attorney In that case
Spear received an $85000 refund of a deposit made by his client pursuant to an
41
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 47: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
42
unsuccessful attempt to purchase a daycare center Spear failed to inform the client
the money was returned used it for other purposes and had to obtain a loan to pay
back the client The Court found that the funds were converted for an unauthorized
use and determined Standard 411 was applicable for the intentional
misappropriation Similarly in The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) the attorney was disbarred for intentionally deceiving his client into leaving
money in the attorneyrsquos trust account thereby facilitating the misappropriation In
the instant case respondent misled Unishred with the June 23 LOI by failing to
correct the false statement that he was holding the escrow deposit intact when in
truth he was spending the escrowed funds
This Court has held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate
discipline for misuse of funds held in trust however this presumption can be
rebutted by mitigating circumstances The Florida Bar v Travis 765 So 2d 689
(Fla 2000) The Florida Bar v Tillman 682 So 2d 542 (Fla 1996) The Florida
Bar v Shanzer 572 So 2d 1382 (Fla 1991) In the Shanzer case at page 1383 this
Court stated that in the overwhelming number of recent cases it has disbarred
attorneys for misappropriation of trust funds notwithstanding the mitigating
evidence presented In the Travis case the presumption of disbarment was not
overcome and the attorney was disbarred despite having five mitigating factors
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 48: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
including the two factors of no prior discipline and cooperation that were applied to
the instant respondent Despite the substantial evidence of Mr Travisrsquo contribution
to the community and his otherwise exemplary record this Court held that the
attorneyrsquos good works do not overcome the pattern of conduct in which he
intentionally misappropriated client funds The case law clearly supports
disbarment in the instant case
The Referee considered the following standards to be applicable
Standard 411 provides for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury
Respondents claim that there is no evidence of intent is in derogation of the
Referees findings to the contrary and the Bar has already addressed this argument
above in Issue II of this brief In applying Standard 411 of the Standards for
Lawyer Discipline the Referee stated at RR 9-10
I find 411 a pplies as it is clear Respondent intentionally and knowingly converted the refundable deposit entrusted to him by Unishred without their knowledge or consent
Standard 511(f) provides for disbarment when a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice The Referee found
that 511(f) applies to respondents behavior [RR 10] Respondent incorrectly
43
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 49: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
44
argues that 511(f) should not apply because it deals with criminal actions or
activity that rises to the level of criminal behavior To the contrary that standard
also applies ldquoin cases with conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or
misrepresentationrdquo For example in The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686
(Fla 2010) Standards 511(f) and 71 were both applied in disbarring a suspended
lawyer for misrepresenting her status as a member in good standing of The Florida
Bar by presenting her Florida Bar identification card to jail officials in order to gain
access to an inmate
Standard 71 provides disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client the public or the legal system The Referee found
Standard 71 applicable because respondent failed to hold the refundable deposit in
escrow which he was obligated to do and instead almost immediately began
spending the deposit for his own personal use and enjoyment [RR 10] Respondent
incorrectly argues 71 does not apply in situations other than those specified in the
preamble to Standard 70 ie false or misleading communication about the lawyers
services improper communication of fields of practice etc In the instant case
respondent provided false information concerning his services with respect to his
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 50: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
45
holding the escrow deposit See The Florida Bar v Cox 794 So 2d 1278 (Fla
2001) where Standard 71 was applied for knowingly presenting false evidence and
The Florida Bar v Bitterman 33 So 3d 686 687 (Fla 2010) discussed herein
above with respect to Standard 511(f)
The Referee found five aggravating factors and two mitigating factors The
aggravating factors were 922(b) Dishonest or selfish motive 922(c) A pattern of
misconduct 922(d) Multiple offenses 922(i) Substantial experience in the
practice of law and 922(j) Indifference to making restitution (RR 19-21) The
mitigating factors were 932(a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record and (e) Full
and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings
The Referee rejected respondents arguments for applying 932(b) Absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive 932(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution
and 932(l) Remorse [RR 21-22]
A Referees findings in aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record The Florida Bar v Ticktin 14 So 3d 928 (Fla 2009) The Florida Bar v
Arcia 848 So 2d 296 (Fla 2003) The respondent has not met this burden The
Report of Referee details the reasons for determining the aggravating and
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 51: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
mitigating factors as well as the reasons for rejecting respondents arguments to
apply other mitigating factors [RR 19-22]
The Referee found dishonest or selfish motive because respondent spent the
misappropriated funds on his own personal use and enjoyment never obtained
Unishreds consent to take the money and never disclosed that he had been spending
the money while he was negotiating with the Gunster lawyer despite the
representation made in the June 23 LOI that he was holding the money in an escrow
account The Referee rejected respondents argument that the June 15 LOI
disclosed that respondent was taking $30000 from the escrow account [RR 19]
For the same reasons the Referee rejected absence of a dishonest or selfish motive
as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee found a pattern of misconduct because respondent spent
Unishreds funds over the course of several months continued to make withdrawals
for personal expenditures between September 1st and 14th 2009 after he received
the refund demand from Gunster misrepresented the funds were intact and being
held in escrow when negotiating the June 23 LOI and undertook representation of
Unishred against his former client SDDI in an effort to pay back money he
misappropriated [RR 19-20]
46
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 52: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
The Referee found multiple offenses as an aggravating factor Respondent
was found guilty of ten rule violations The auditor testified that after receiving the
escrow deposit respondent spent the money in a multitude of transactions [TR
145] The Referee applied this aggravator based on her findings for pattern of
misconduct and the authority of The Florida Bar v Barley 831 So 2d 163 (Fla
2002) [RR 20] In Barley this Court stated at page 170
Barley consistently withdrew Mr Emos trust funds from October
1997 until February 1998 without authorization We conclude that
every time Barley withdrew funds from Mr Emos trust account he
was committing another offense Therefore the referees findings of a
ldquopattern of misconductrdquo and ldquomultiple offensesrdquo as aggravating factors
are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and we
approve those findings
The Referee found substantial experience in the practice of law as an
aggravating factor since respondent has been practicing law for 23 years and had
been practicing law for 20 years at the time of the misconduct [RR 20]
The Referee found indifference to making restitution as an aggravating factor
because only $7750 of the money has been returned The Referee rejected
respondents argument that returning the $7750 constituted restitution The
Referee also found that more than three years after respondent took the money
Unishred has still received only the $7750 returned on September 14 2009 [RR
21] In applying this aggravator the Referee also considered respondents statement
47
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 53: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
to Unishred that going to The Florida Bar would not do them any good because if
he lost his license to practice law he would never be able to pay them back [RR
21] For the same reasons the Referee rejected timely good faith effort to make
restitution as a mitigating factor [RR 22]
The Referee failed to find remorse as a mitigator based on respondents
continual assertion that he was entitled to take the legal fee owed by SDDI from the
refundable deposit he was holding in escrow for the business transaction between
Unishred and SDDI The Referee found that respondents only admission of
culpability was for depositing the funds in his personal account rather than a trust or
escrow account [RR 22]
The Refereersquos disbarment recommendation is appropriate for respondentrsquos
misconduct No lesser sanction is appropriate in this case This Court should
approve the Refereersquos disbarment recommendation
48
ISSUE V
THE REFEREE HAS THE DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FLORIDA BAR WHEN THE BAR IS
SUCCESSFUL IN WHOLE OR IN PART UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE BARrsquoS COSTS WERE UNNECESSARY EXCESSIVE
OR IMPROPERLY AUTHENTICATED
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-76(q)(2) states the referee shall have
discretion to award costs and absent an abuse of discretion the refereersquos award
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 54: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
shall not be reversed Furthermore Rule 3-76(q)(3) states when the bar is
successful in whole or in part the referee may assess the barrsquos costs against the
respondent unless it is shown that the costs of the bar were unnecessary excessive
or improperly authenticated Respondent in his initial brief claims that the vast
majority of the costs could have been avoided with the offer of judgmentplea and
a simple hearing to determine discipline [IB 31] To the contrary respondent has
contested the proceeding throughout Respondent did not allege or provide any
evidence that the Barrsquos costs were unnecessary excessive or improperly
authenticated See The Florida Bar v Von Zamft 814 So 2d 385 389 (Fla 2002)
The Florida Bar v Williams 753 So 2d 1258 1264 (Fla 2000) Bar Counsel
provided a Statement to the Referee and respondent delineating the Barrsquos costs in
this matter together with a request for payment of same [IR 28 29] The Statement
executed by Bar Counsel included the taxable costs allowed under R Regulating
Fla Bar 3-76(q)(1) See The Florida Bar v Carson 737 So 2d 1069 1073 (Fla
1999) Therefore there was no abuse of discretion by the Referee in assessing
costs in favor of the Bar and this Court should approve the assessment of costs
against respondent
49
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 55: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
50
CONCLUSION
This Court should approve the Refereersquos Report in this case and respondent
should be disbarred and required to pay the Barrsquos costs in this matter because the
Bar provided competent substantial evidence to support the Refereersquos findings of
fact and guilt the Refereersquos recommendations as to discipline is consistent with
existing case law and The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions while
conforming to the purposes of lawyer discipline and the Referee did not abuse her
discretion in awarding costs to the Bar
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-
![Page 56: Answer Brief - Jackson · Reid Jackson, respondent, will be referred to as respondent, or as Mr. Jackson. References to the Report of Referee will be by the symbol RR followed by](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022051809/6013967f3e5ce1766d777f96/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by Certified Mail No
7011 2970 0003 0076 4625 Return Receipt Requested to Respondent Lawton
Reid Jackson whose record Bar address is PO Box 140592 Gainesville Florida
32614-0592 and to his record Bar e-mail address of lawtonjacksongmailcom
with a copy furnished to Staff Counsel of The Florida Bar at his designated e-mail
address of kmarvinflabarorg on this 24th
day of April 2013
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar
Lake Shore Plaza II
1300 Concord Terrace Suite 130
Sunrise Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No 545856
msoiferflabarorg
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this Brief is submitted in 14
point proportionately spaced Times New Roman font and that this brief has been
filed by e-mail in accord with the Courtrsquos order of October 1 2004 Undersigned
counsel does hereby further certify that the electronically filed version of this brief
has been scanned and found to be free of viruses by Norton AntiVirus for
Windows
Michael David Soifer Bar Counsel
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- TABLE OF CITATIONS
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
- THE FLORIDA BARrsquoS S吀䄀吀䔀䴀䔀一吀 伀䘀 吀䠀䔀 䌀䄀匀䔀 AND FACTS
- STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
- ARGUMENT
- ISSUE I
-
- THE REFEREE PROPERLY ENTERED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND SUPPORT THE GUILTY FINDINGS OF THE RULE VIOLATIONS CHARGED
-
- ISSUE II
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 䤊NTENTIONALLY MISAPPR伀倀刀䤀䄀吀䔀䐀 Ⰰ 䘀刀伀䴊 THE ESCROW DEPOSIT 䄀一䐀 䤀一吀䔀一吀䤀伀一䄀䰀䰀夀 䴀䤊SLED UNISHRED THAT H䔀 圀䄀匀 䠀伀䰀䐀䤀一䜀 吀䠀䔀 䔀匀䌊ROW DEPOSIT INTACT W䠀䔀一 䠀䔀 圀䄀匀 一伀吀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 䌊LEARLY SUPPORTED BY 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䄀刀䔀 一伀吀 䌊LEARLY
-
- ISSUE III
-
- THE REFEREErsquoS FINDI一䜀匀 吀䠀䄀吀 刀䔀匀倀伀一䐀䔀一吀 嘊IOLATED RULE REGULAT䤀一䜀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 㐀ⴀ㤊 IS CLEARLY SUPPORTE䐀 䈀夀 吀䠀䔀 刀䔀䌀伀刀䐀Ⰰ 䤀匀 上OT CLEARLY ERRONEOUSⰀ 䄀一䐀 匀䠀伀唀䰀䐀 吀䠀䔀刀䔀䘀伀刊E BE UPHELD
-
- ISSUE IV
-
- THE CASE LAW STAND䄀刀䐀匀Ⰰ 䄀一䐀 䄀䜀䜀刀䄀嘀䄀吀䤀一䜊 MITIGATING FACTORS 匀唀倀倀伀刀吀 䄀 䐀䤀匀䈀䄀刀䴀䔀一吊 WHEN RESPONDENTrsquoS C伀一䐀唀䌀吀 䤀一嘀伀䰀嘀䔀匀 䴀䤀匀䄀倊PROPRIATION OF FUNDS 䠀䔀䰀䐀 䤀一 吀刀唀匀吀 䄀䈀匀䔀一吊 EXTENUATING MITIGAT䤀一䜀 䌀䤀刀䌀唀䴀匀吀䄀一䌀䔀匀Ⰰ 圀䠊ICH WERE NOT PRESENT 䤀一 吀䠀䤀匀 䌀䄀匀䔀
-
- ISSUE V
-
- THE REFEREE HAS THE 䐀䤀匀䌀刀䔀吀䤀伀一 吀伀 䄀圀䄀刀䐀 COSTS IN FAVOR OF TH䔀 䘀䰀伀刀䤀䐀䄀 䈀䄀刀 圀䠀䔀一 吀䠊E BAR IS SUCCESSFUL 䤀一 圀䠀伀䰀䔀 伀刀 䤀一 倀䄀刀吀Ⰺ UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 吀䠀䄀吀 吀䠀䔀 䈀䄀删ᤀ匀 䌀伀匀吀匀 WERE UNNECESSARY EX䌀䔀匀匀䤀嘀䔀Ⰰ 伀刀 䤀䴀倀刀伀倀䔀刀䰊Y AUTHENTICATED
-
- CONCLUSION
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE AND ANTI-VIRUS SCAN
-