Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel

Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland

after Brexit

Katy Hayward, David Phinnemore and Milena Komarova, with Conor Campbell and James Greer

Queen’s University Belfast & The UK in a Changing Europe

May 2020

The UK in a Changing Europe is an impartial and independent organisation created to make the findings of academic research easily available to the widest possible audience.

Queen’s University Belfast & The UK in a Changing Europe

Contents

Executive Summary 6 Theuniquepost-BrexitpositionofNI 6 BuildingonfromtheArticle50process 6 RepresentingNorthernIreland’spositionintheUK 7 RepresentingNorthernIreland’spositiontotheEU 7 GoverningEUinfluenceinNorthernIreland 8 KeyRecommendationsforNI/UKlevel 8 KeyRecommendationsforNItoEUlevel 9

Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit 11

Acknowledgements 12

List of Abbreviations 13

Introduction 15 NorthernIrelandaftertheUK’sWithdrawalfromtheEU 15 Thepurposeofthisresearch 15 Howwegottothispoint 16 TheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland 17 WhattheProtocoldoes 17 Democraticconsentmechanism 18 North/Southcooperation 18 DirectmonitoringanddirecteffectoftheEUonNorthernIrelandafterBrexit 19 WhattheProtocolmeans 19

1. Using Northern Ireland’s existing governance mechanisms after Brexit 21 The1998AgreementArchitecture 21 StrandOne 22 TheNorthernIrelandAssembly 22 LegislativepowersoftheAssembly 22 TheimplementationoftheProtocolandtheWithdrawalAgreementAct(2020) 23 Recommendations 24 TheNorthernIrelandExecutive 24 Recommendations 25 AssemblyCommittees 25 Recommendations 27

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StrandTwo 27 TheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil(NSMC) 27 Recommendations 28 ImplementationBodies 26 Recommendations 29 TheNorth/SouthInter-ParliamentaryAssociation(NSIPA) 29 Recommendations 29 StrandThree 29 TheBritish-IrishCouncil(BIC) 29 Recommendations 30 British-IrishIntergovernmentalConference(BIIGC) 30 Recommendations 31 RightsandEqualityBodies 31 AdditionalInstitutions 32 British-IrishParliamentaryAssembly(BIPA) 32 Recommendations 32 UnimplementedB/GFAInstitutions 32 Recommendations 33 HighLevelCivilServiceMeetings 33 Recommendations 34 LocalGovernment 34 Theimportanceoflocaladministration 34 LocalGovernmentAssociation 35 Localgovernmentnetworks 35 Recommendations 35

2. Northern Ireland’s position in the post-Brexit governance of the UK 36 WhattheProtocolmeansforNI’sStatus 36 TheRoleofWestminster 37 Parliament 37 Recommendations 38 IntergovernmentalDynamicswithintheUK 39 CommonFrameworks 39 TheJointMinisterialCommittee 41 TheJMC(EN) 41 NorthernIreland’sdisadvantagewithoutasittingAssembly 41 ChallengestotheworkoftheJMCafterBrexit 42 Recommendations 42 UKIntergovernmentalRelations 42 CapacityintheCivilService 43

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Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit

3. Using new governance mechanisms after Brexit 45 TheBodiesoftheWithdrawalAgreement 45 TheJointCommittee 45 TheoperationoftheJointCommittee 45 TheremitoftheJointCommittee 46 Themonitoring/reviewroleoftheJointCommittee 47 Recommendations 48 TheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland 49 TheoperationoftheSpecialisedCommittees 49 Recommendations 49 TheremitoftheSpecialisedCommitteeonissuesrelatedtothe

implementationoftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland 50 Recommendations 50 JointConsultativeWorkingGroup 51 TheoperationoftheJCWG 51 ThepotentialvalueoftheJCWG 51 Recommendations 51 ArbitrationPanelandtheCJEU 52

4. Influencing the EU from the outside 53 NorthernIreland’sRelationshipwiththeEUPost-Brexit 53 Adynamicarrangement 53 DirectInputintotheEUasaNon-MemberState 54 InstitutionalarrangementsintheEEA 54 Thedecision-shapingprocess 55 ParticipationinEUAgencies 57 Makingthemostoflimitedbutdirectinfluence 57 ThepotentialfordirectinfluenceontheEUfromNorthernIreland 58 Recommendations 58 MeansofIndirectInfluenceforNon-MemberStates 60 TheworkofregionalofficesinBrussels 60 Lobbying 62 PotentialforNorthernIrelandtohaveindirectinfluenceattheEUlevel 63 Recommendations 645. Building on from Northern Ireland’s experience to date 65 LessonsfromtheArticle50ProcessandDysfunctionalDevolution 65 CooperationamongNorthernIreland’ssocialpartners 65 LessonsforNIRelatingtoUKEngagement 66 Accessdoesnotequatetoinfluence 66 Variousroutesofinfluence 67

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LessonsRelatingtoEUEngagement 68 Directinfluence 68 TheDublinconnection 68 Indirectinfluence 69 DifferentApproachestoEngagementfromNI 69 Proactiveengagement 69 Acceptinginvitations 70 ConstraintsonInfluence-Seeking 70 Findingwaystogetontheradar 70 Politicalsensitivities 71 Lackofcapacity 71 Theneedforclear,accessibleinformation 72 FormulatingtheNorthernIrelandPosition 72 Theneedforinclusivityanddiversity 72 SocialPartnerCoalition 73 Recommendations 74

6. The post-Brexit governance of Northern Ireland: Recommendations 75 RecommendationsfortheLevelsofthe3Strands 75 StrandI 75 StrandII 76 StrandIII 77 UKlevel 78 RecommendationsforEU-LevelRepresentation 79 Newgovernancemechanisms 79 SeekingdirectinfluenceatEUlevel 81 MeansofindirectinfluenceforNorthernIrelandatEUlevel 82 Expandingtheinput 83

Bibliography 84

Annex 1: Governance of key policy areas: illustrating the challenge 93 EnvironmentalGovernance 93 NI-specificcontext 93 UK-widedimensions 93 Cross-borderdimensions 94 EU-leveldimensions 94 PolicingandJustice 95 NI-specificcontext 95 UK-widedimensions 95 Cross-borderdimensions 95 EUdimensions 96

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Agriculture/Fisheries 97 NI-specificdimensions 97 UK-widedimensions 98 Cross-borderdimensions 98 EUdimensions 99

Annex 2: EU Agencies relevant to post-Brexit NI under the Protocol 100 ModelsforNon-MemberStates 100 TheRoleofEUAgenciesinKeyAreasofRegulation 101 Chemicalsandrelatedproducts 101 AgricultureandFisheries 101 Electricity 101 Environment 102 Transport 102 Communications 103

Annex 3: Online survey to stakeholders 104 SampleQuestionsfromtheOnlineSurvey(distributedandcollectedMay2019) 104

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Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit

Executive SummaryFromtheresearchreportAnticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit by Katy Hayward, David Phinnemore andMilenaKomarova(Queen’sUniversityBelfast)(May2020)

Theuniquepost-BrexitpositionofNI• NorthernIrelandisuniqueintermsofitshistory,itsconstitutionalposition,andthe(contested)

natureofitsgeographicalborders.The1998Belfast/GoodFridayAgreementbothformalisedandcreateddistinctivemultilevelgovernancearrangementsfortheregion.Asaresult,theeffectsofBrexitonitsfuturegovernance,economyandresidentsareparticularlyconsequential.

• TheProtocolonNorthernIreland/IrelandintheWithdrawalAgreementaddstothecomplexityofthegovernanceconditionsforNorthernIrelandby:(i)puttingNorthernIrelandinadifferentregulatoryzonefromtherestoftheUKand(ii)ensuringthatdifferentcustomsandVATprocedureswillberequiredfromtherestoftheUKcometheendofthetransitionperiod.

• Thismeansthat,distinctively,theregioncontinuestobeboundsimultaneouslybythepoliticalprinciples, governance structures and legal frameworksof: (i)UKdevolution, (ii) cross-bordercooperationontheislandofIreland,and,tosomesignificantextent,(iii)theEUsinglemarket.

• TheUK’sfuturerelationshipwiththeEUwillhaveadistinctimpactonNorthernIrelandbecausewhatitnegotiatesatthat levelwillhavedirect implicationsforNorthernIreland’srelationshipwiththerestoftheUKinternalmarket.

• Atthesametime,whattheUKnegotiateswiththeEUaboutothermatters(e.g.security,data-sharing)will alsouniquely impactNorthern Irelandgiven thenature and challengesof cross-bordercooperationontheislandofIreland.

• This reportaddresses thechallengesandopportunities forgoverningNorthern Ireland in thiscontext,including:(i)thestructuresforintergovernmentalengagementandrelationshipswithintheUK,(ii)thebodiesforimplementingtheProtocolintheWithdrawalAgreement,and(iii)NIdirectrepresentationwithinEUstructures,Agencies,Programmesandotherassociatedbodies.

BuildingonfromtheArticle50process• ThenegotiationsoftheUK’swithdrawalfromtheEUbecameasubjectofpoliticaltensionwithin

NorthernIreland,withunionistpartiesdisagreeingwithnationalistandotherpartiesovertheprocessandtheprioritiesforNorthernIreland.

• ThelackoffunctioninglocalgovernmentduringmostoftheArticle50processdisadvantagedthebalancedrepresentationofNorthernIreland’s(NI)interestsvis-à-vistheUKandEUnegotiations.NowthemostneedstobemadeofthefactthatNI’sinstitutionsareupandrunningagain–notleastasameansofgettingconsensus-basedrepresentationofNorthernIreland’sinterests.

• IntheabsenceofaStormontExecutiveandAssembly,therewasmoredirectcontactbetweenpolicymakers/officials and stakeholders in NI than usual, including in NI, London, Dublin andBrussels.Therewerealsomoreinformalchannelsforcommunicationandinformation-sharingbetweenthesegroups.

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• TheArticle50process(combinedwiththerisksofNoDealandtheabsenceofStormont)sawastrengtheningofcoordinationandconfidenceinpublicandpolicyengagementbycivicactorswithinNorthern Irelandatregional,UK-central,andEU levels.Thesegroupsandrelationshipsrepresentnewandcrucialformsofknowledge,experienceandexpertisetobedrawnuponinthefutureofNorthernIreland’sgovernance.

RepresentingNorthernIreland’spositionintheUK• ThepositionthatNorthernIrelandwillbeinafterBrexit(i.e.underregulationscomingfromthe

UKandfromtheEU)raisesuniquechallengesforitsdevolvedinstitutions.ThisposesaneedforNorthernIreland’srepresentationwithintheUKtobeenhancedandeffective.

• TheNI Assemblywithheld its legislative consent to the powers taken by theUK governmentin theWithdrawalAgreementAct (2020) inorder for it tobeable to legislate inareaswithindevolvedcompetencethroughtheuseofstatutoryinstruments.ThismeansthattherewillbevirtuallynochanceofNIMPsshapingthelegislationthataffectsNorthernIrelandvis-à-vistheimplementationoftheProtocol,letalonebeingabletoannulthatlegislationiftheyobjecttoit.

• In the New Decade, New Approach (NDNA) document, the UK Government states it would‘welcomecloseengagementwitharestoredExecutiveonNorthernIreland’sprioritiesinthenextphase[ofBrexit]’.ItalsopromisestoconsultwiththeExecutiveonitsfuturetradepolicy.Thereisasyetnoclarityonwhatsuchengagementwillentail.

• TherearealsobroadchallengesforintergovernmentalcoordinationwithintheUnitedKingdomatthemoment,withalldevolvedgovernmentsseekingthemeansofmoreeffectiveinputintotheformulationofWestminstergovernmentpolicy.

RepresentingNorthernIreland’spositiontotheEU• ThegovernancemechanismscontainedwithintheWithdrawalAgreement includebodiesthat

willoverseetheimplementationoftheProtocolandwillthushaveacrucialparttoplayinthepost-BrexitgovernanceofNI,e.g.theJointCommittee,theSpecialisedCommitteesonNI/IRL,andtheJointConsultativeWorkingGroup(JCWG).

• NorthernIreland’sdirectinputtothesebodieswillbequitelimited.TheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncilandtheB/GFAStrandIIImplementationBodieswillbeabletofeedintotheSpecialisedCommittee.

• The UK government committed in NDNA to ‘ensure that representatives from the NorthernIrelandExecutiveareinvitedtobepartoftheUKdelegation’inmeetingsoftheJointCommitteeandtheSpecialisedCommittee.ItspecifiesthattheseinvitationswillhappenonlyininstanceswheretheCommitteeconcernedisdiscussingNorthernIreland-specificmattersandwhichare‘alsoattendedbytheIrishGovernmentaspartoftheEuropeanUnion’sdelegation’.

• Other,lessformalmeansofinfluence,includingrelationshipswithEUagenciesandparticipationinEUProgrammesarealso importantbut lessthan likelyfortheUKpost-transition.EvenEEAstatescannothavefullmembershipof,nordirectlyinfluence,thedecisionstakenbyEUagencies.

• LobbyingofEUinstitutions,usingregionalandnationalofficesinBrusselsandinformalnetworkinghavebeenproven invaluableduringtheArticle50processandshouldbefullydevelopedandfurtherutilisedaftertheendofthetransitionperiod.

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• ManyorganisationsinNorthernIrelandhaveplentifulexperienceofengagingwithspecificEUcommitteesand somehave long-standing linkswithotherbodies centreduponandactive inBrussels.Theserelationshipswillneedtobefosteredandnurtured,ratherthandiminished,post-Brexit.

• However,asasub-nationalregion,NorthernIreland’srepresentationvis-à-vistheEUwillcomeprimarilythroughtheUKgovernment.Ultimately,thefutureofNorthernIreland’srelationshipwithEUinstitutionswillthereforebeshapedbywhatWestminsterispreparedtoallowdefactointhepracticalimplementationoftheProtocolandfuturerelationshipagreements.

GoverningEUinfluenceinNorthernIreland• NorthernIrelandwillbeassumedtoadoptEUlegislationinrelationtotheProtocolannexeson

thebasisofadynamicarrangement.

• TheprocessproposedintheProtocolfor‘affordingorwithholdingconsent’fromNorthernIrelandallowsNIMLAstovoteonwhethertoopt-outofalignmentwiththeEU.Thisisarathercrudetoolthatoffersaget-outclauseratherthanbeingameansofgivinglegitimacytotheconsequencesoftheProtocolonNorthernIrelandinthemediumtolongterm.

• TheNIExecutivenolongerhasaBrexitsub-committeeandneedstodevelopamorecoherentcommitteestructurearisingfromtheuniquechallengesofBrexit.TheNIAssemblyalsoneedstoimprovethescrutinyworkofcommittees.

KeyRecommendationsforNI/UKlevel• The UK government should increase the frequency and importance ofmeetings of the Joint

MinisterialCommittee.

• TheNIExecutiveshouldbeconsultedbytheUKgovernmentinadvanceofallissuesrelevanttoNIfordecisionsaspartofthewrittenprocedureprovidedforintheRulesofProcedurefortheUK-EUJointCommittee.

• The NI Executive should act on establishing a consultative forum to engage civil societyrepresentatives in (a) assessing the implementation of the Protocol, (b) drawing attention toissuesofconcernabouttheProtocol,and(c)requestingchangestotheoperationoftheProtocol.

• Aconsultativeforumwillbeanimportantcontributiontowardsthepublicconsultationthatwillberequiredpriortothe‘democraticconsent’votetobeheldbyMLAsontheapplicationoftheProtocolonNorthernIreland/Irelandwithinfouryearsoftheendofthetransitionperiod.

• Tomakebestuseofthefactthat(a)theNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil(NSMC)isapre-existingbodyused tofinding commongroundand commondecisionsonanorth/southbasis and (b)ithasadirectroutetotheSpecialisedCommittee,theNSMCshouldbegivenaformalroletomonitortheimplementationandtheimpactoftheProtocol.Thisshouldbespecificallybutnotexclusivelyinrelationtothemaintenanceofnorth/southcooperation(Article11Protocol).

• TheNSMCshouldalsohavetheabilitytodrawtheurgentattentionoftheUKgovernmentandtheEuropeanCommissiontojointNIExecutiveandIrishgovernmentconcernsaboutthreatstotheB/GFAortonorth/southcooperationthatmayrequireajointUKandEUapproachtoaddress.

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KeyRecommendationsforNItoEUlevel• TheJointCommittee,SpecialisedCommitteeandJCWGshouldprovideregulardetailedreports

onProtocol’simplementationtotheNSMC,NSIPAandBritish-IrishParliamentaryAssemblyandanyfutureNIorcross-borderconsultativeforum.

• TheUK-EUfuturerelationshipagreementshouldcontainexplicitprovisionsrequiringtheEUtoconsultwith theUKwhendrafting legislationthatwill likelybeconsidered ‘Protocol relevant’bytheUK-EUJointCommitteeand/orSpecialisedCommittee.ThiswouldmeantheEuropeanCommission‘informallyseekingadvice’fromexpertsonandfromNorthernIreland.

• NorthernIrelandshouldberepresented,withspeakingrights,inallmeetingsoftheSpecialisedCommitteebyrelevantseniorofficialsfromtheNorthernIrelandCivilService.

• Theaccessof ‘experts’ to the JCWGshouldnotbe limited to ‘officials’butbe specifiedmorepreciselyintermsofinterestgroups.Suchgroupsmustbeinclusiveofhumanrightsbodies.Itisalsorecommendedthatseniorrepresentativesofprofessional/umbrellabodiesfortherespectivesectorsareidentifiedas‘theexperts’toappearinfrontoftheJCWG.

• TheprincipleofUKparticipationinCommissioncommitteesandexpertgroupscouldbeextendedbeyondthetransitionperiodwithregardtoNIandobligationsundertheProtocol.

• TheNIExecutiveshouldrecognisetechnicalexpertiseasameansofenhancingreputationand‘decision-shaping’capacityinBrussels,asidefrompoliticalanddiplomaticroutes.

• PriorityshouldbegiventoequippingandpreparingtheOfficeoftheNIExecutiveinBrusselsforanewand,ifanything,moreimportantrolepost-Brexit.

• AdiplomaticEU‘presence’shouldbere-establishedinNorthernIrelandnotonlytocontributetotheProtocol’simplementationbuttoaidunderstandingandappropriatesensitivityatEUlevel.

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Anticipating and Meeting New

Multilevel Governance Challenges in

Northern Ireland after Brexit

Katy Hayward, David Phinnemore and Milena Komarova1

May 2020

1 WithConorCampbellandJamesGreer. Author for correspondence:KatyHayward,SchoolofSocialSciences,EducationandSocialWork,Queen’sUniversityBelfast,

Belfast,BT71LP,N.Ireland;k.hayward@qub.ac.uk.

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Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit

Acknowledgements

The researchbehind this report tookplaceover thecourseof18months,beginning inDecember2018.Wearegrateful forthefundingfromvarioussourcesthatmadethisresearchpossible, fromsupportforresearchassistancetoprovisionforhostingworkgroups.Thesesources includeTheUKinaChangingEuropeprojectfundedbytheEconomicandSocialResearchCouncil(ESRC),theESRCImpactAcceleratorFundheldbyQueen’sUniversityBelfast,andtheDepartmentfortheEconomy.Wewouldliketoexpressourappreciationforthisfunding.Itenabledustoconductanambitiousscopeofresearchinashortperiodoftime,involvingthecollectionofnewempiricaldatafromawiderangeofstakeholders.

Wewouldliketothankthosestakeholdersfortheirtimeaswellthosecolleaguesfromacademiaandbeyondwithwhomwehavebeenabletoengagesoproductivelyindiscussingourfindings.Thedatacollection included interviews, online surveys and day-longworkshops. This entailed considerablecommitmentfromthoseweapproachedforengagementintheproject.Weareverygratefultoallwhogaveoftheirtimeinordertoshareinvaluableinsightswithus.WeareobligedtoBillyVaughanandNiallRobbfortheirorganisationalassistance.

AmongourNorthernIrelandparticipantsweretherepresentativesofthesectorsmostdirectlyaffectedbytheimplementationoftheWithdrawalAgreementProtocol(e.g.transport,agri-food,hospitality,immigrant communities). The group further included representatives from devolved departmentsandagencies,cross-borderbodies,privatesectorrepresentation,civicsocietyumbrellaorganisations,tradeunions,humanrightsorganisations,andlocalauthorities.Theirwillingnesstogiveconsiderabletimetoshare their insightandexperiencewithus,aswellas toengage instakeholderworkgroupdiscussions about past and future challenges/opportunities, was invaluable. We are immenselygratefultoallinvolved.

Interviewswithnon-EUmemberstatesandregionsacrossEuropeformedavitalpartofthisresearch.Wearepleasedtothanktherepresentativesoftheembassies,diplomaticmissions,executiveoffices,non-member states’ permanent delegations, representations and secretariats, most of whomweinterviewedinBrussels.

WeareveryappreciativeofthewiderangeofofficialsinBelfast,London,DublinandBrusselswhohavebeenveryhelpfulduringaperiodofintensepressureandhardwork.Wehopewehavedonejusticetothetrusttheyhaveplacedinus.Wewishaswelltoacknowledgethevaluablediscussionswehavehadwithotherexperts,notleastofwhomPaulMcGrade.

Finally,wewouldliketothankthestaffintheCommunicationsOfficeatQueen’sandQueen’sPolicyEngagementfortheirassistancethroughouttheproject,especiallyZaraMcBreartyandKevinFearon.AndwearegratefultoAnandMenonandthewholeteaminTheUKinaChangingEuropefortheirconstantsupportandenthusiasm,whichhashelpedensurethatthisreportseesthelightofday.

We hope that the findings and recommendations from this research will make a constructivecontributiontoNorthernIreland’sfutureasauniquelypositioned,still-fragileregionasthelandscapeofUK-EUrelationsistransformed.

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Thisreportistheproductofresearchthathashadtorespondquiterapidlytochangingconditionsandevolvinganalysis.Weareverygratefultoallthosewhohavesharedtheirwisdomandinsightswithus,bothconfidentiallyandintheformalsessions,overthecourseofthisperiod.Nevertheless,this remains the product of analysis conducted at a specific time, most substantially before thecoronavirus pandemic. We acknowledge, therefore, that there will be limitations to our analysisandtakeresponsibilityasauthorsforerrorsorsubstantiveomissionsinthereport.Theanalysisandrecommendationscontainedinthisreportarethoseofthenamedauthorsalone.

All information was correct to the best of the authors’ knowledge at the time of going to print but is subject to change.

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Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit

List of Abbreviations

ACER AgencyfortheCooperationofEnergyRegulators

AMS Andorra,MonacoandSanMarino

BEREC BodyofEuropeanRegulatorsofElectronicCommunications

B/GFA 1998Belfast/GoodFridayAgreement

BIC British-IrishCouncil

BIIGC British-IrishIntergovernmentalConference

BIPA British-IrishParliamentaryAssembly

CBI ConfederationofBritishIndustry

COSAC ConferenceoftheCommitteesoftheNationalParliamentsoftheEuropeanUnionMemberStates

CCBS CentreforCrossBorderStudies

CJEU CourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion

DAERA DepartmentforAgriculture,theEnvironmentandRuralAffairs(NI)

DEFRA DepartmentforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs

EASA EuropeanAviationSafetyAgency

ECHA EuropeanChemicalsAgency

ECHR EuropeanConventiononHumanRights

EEA EuropeanEconomicArea

EESC EuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee

EEA-EFTAstates Iceland,Liechtenstein,Norway

EFTA EuropeanFreeTradeAssociation

EMA EuropeanMedicinesAgency

EP EuropeanParliament

FCO ForeignandCommonwealthOffice

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HMRC HerMajesty’sRevenueandCustoms

ICBAN IrishCentralBorderAreaNetwork

IfG InstituteforGovernment

JCWG JointConsultativeWorkingGroup

JMC JointMinisterialCommittee(UK)

MEP MemberoftheEuropeanParliament

MLA MemberoftheLegislativeAssembly(Stormont)

MP MemberofParliament

NCA NationalCrimeAgency

NDNA New Decade, New Approachdocument(2020)

NGO Non-governmentalorganisation

NI NorthernIreland

NIAC NorthernIrelandAffairsCommittee(HouseofCommons)

NI/IRL NorthernIreland/Ireland

NILGA NorthernIrelandLocalGovernmentAssociation

NRA NationalRegulatoryAuthorities

NSIPA North–SouthInter-ParliamentaryAssociation

NSMC NorthSouthMinisterialCouncil

PACAC PublicAdministrationandConstitutionalAffairsCommittee(Commons)

PSNI PoliceServiceofNorthernIreland

SEUPB SpecialEUProgrammesBody

SI StatutoryInstrument

TEO TheExecutiveOffice(NI)

UFU UlsterFarmers’Union

WA WithdrawalAgreement(October2019,unlessotherwisestated)

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Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit

Introduction

Northern Ireland after the UK’s Withdrawal from the EU

Thepurposeofthisresearch

The1998GoodFriday (Belfast)AgreementdidnotdetermineNorthern Ireland’s futurebut left itopenforcontinuedpoliticalcontestation.Itisthissenseofbeing‘unsettled’thathasmadetheBrexitprocessparticularlyconsequential for the region.Nowsubject touniqueandcomplexgovernancearrangements,NorthernIrelandhasbeenplacedinadistinctpositionvis-à-visboththeUKandtheEU.Ithastomanageacloserelationshipwitheachoftheseatthesametimeasthetwoaresetondifferenttrajectories.

This reportconsiders theconsequencesof thedecisions thathavebeenmaderegardingNorthernIreland’suniquepositionspecificallyas itrelatestotheUK’swithdrawalfromtheEU. Inparticular,wefocusontheimplicationsforthegovernanceofNorthernIrelandandonwhatmightbedonetoensure that theobjectivesbehind theseuniquearrangements (aboveallelse, toprotect the1998Agreement) are realised.Whilst conscious of theweighty academic literature and debate around‘governance’(seeBevirandRhodes2003,2016),weusethetermmerelytoindicatethewiderangeofprocessesbywhichNorthernIrelandisgoverned–laws,networks,systemsandpolicies–aswellas the institutions, agencies andgovernmentper se.2 The scopeand complexityof this analysis isappropriateforsuchacomplicatedplaceasNorthernIreland.

OurmainresearchtaskwastoconsiderhowanynewgovernancearrangementsthatmaybeputinplaceforNorthernIrelandafterBrexitcanoperateeffectivelyandensuremaximalrepresentationandimpactinpromotingtheinterestsoftheregion.Wealsofoundourselvesconsideringhowthenewpost-Brexitconditionswillaffecttheoperationofexistinggovernancearrangementsfortheregionacross the three strandsof theAgreement:withinNorthern Ireland,north/southon the islandofIreland,andeast/westbetweenBritainandIreland.Theprojectincludeddeskresearchandempiricalresearch,includinginterviewsandanonlinesurvey.3Italsoinvolvedextensiveengagementactivities,comprising four days of workgroups, including input from c.100 stakeholders,4 and an expert-practitionerseminar.

2 ThisisausefulconceptparticularlygiventhecomplexityofwhatconstitutestheconditionsfororderedruleandcollectivebehaviourinNorthernIreland.Formoreonthemulti-levelgovernanceofNorthernIreland,werecommend,inter alia,BacheandFlinders(2004),BirrellandGormley-Heenan(2015)andMurphy(2011).

3 Theresearchinvolvedsemi-structuredinterviews,conductedinBrusselswithrepresentativesthatincludedthosefromtheEmbassyofSanMarino,EmbassyofthePrincipalityofLiechtenstein,MissionofSwitzerlandtotheEU,NorthNorwayEuro-peanOffice,NIExecutiveOffice,OsloRegionalOffice,PermanentDelegationofTurkeytotheEU,RepresentationoftheFreeStateofBavariatotheEU,andtheSecretariatofEFTA.

4 StakeholdersrepresentedthesectorsmostdirectlyaffectedbytheimplementationoftheWAProtocol(e.g.transport,agri-food,hospitality,immigrantcommunities).TheresearchincludedcivilservantsfromkeydepartmentsandagenciesinNorthernIrelandwhowouldbeengagedintheoperationoftheProtocol,cross-borderbodiesincludingImplementationBod-ies,privatesectorrepresentationacrossawiderangeofindustriesandacrosstheregion,civicsocietyumbrellaorganisationsincludinginhumanrights,tradeunionsandthevoluntarysector,andlocalauthorities.BeforetheworkshopswereconductedweinvitedthemainpoliticalpartiesinNItocommentonandengageinprojectactivitiesbutthisinvitationwasnottakenupbyanyparty.

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ThecontextforourprojectandanalysischangedwithinmonthsofitcommencinginDecember2018.Whentheprojectcommenced,theexpectationwasthatthecontextforpost-BrexitgovernancewouldbetheWithdrawalAgreementnegotiatedbyPrimeMinisterMayinNovember2018andtheUK’sexitfromtheEUon29March2019.However,2019sawthreeextensionstothedateofwithdrawal,anewPrimeMinster,anewWithdrawalAgreement(specificallynewintermsoftheNI/IRLProtocol),aGeneralElection,and,earlyin2020,therestorationofStormontandaGeneralElectioninIreland.Allthishasmeantthatwehavecontinuedtoreviseandupdateouranalysisandfindings.Weproducedfour interimreportsforthisprojectcoveringthemainthemesofthisresearch:the implicationsoftheProtocol,multi-governancewithinNorthernIreland,pathwaysofinfluencefornonEU-memberstates/regions,andanoptionspaper.Thisfinal report fully reflectsfindings fromall these strandsoftheresearch.ItalsoincludesourcontinuingscrutinyoftheunfoldingofpoliticaleventsandtheirimpactonthefutureofNorthernIrelandgovernance.

How we got to this point

The complexityofNorthern Ireland’s administrativeaswell as socio-political conditionshad tobeacknowledgedbybothsidesintheBrexitnegotiations.TheUK-EUJoint Report(8December2017)affirmedtheUK’scommitmentstoavoidingahardborderontheislandofIreland,protectingnorth/southcooperationandupholdingtheBelfast/GoodFridayAgreementinallitsparts.ThefirstversionoftheWithdrawalAgreementreachedinNovember2018containedaProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland,knownasthe‘backstop,’withspecificsolutionsformeetingthesecommitments.Thesewouldonlyapply, ifthestill-to-benegotiatedUKrelationshipfailedtodeliveronthesecommitmentsandthenonlytemporarily–unlessanduntiltheUK-EUrelationshipdiddeliver.The‘backstop’envisagedthewholeoftheUKinasinglecustomsterritorywiththeEU.NorthernIrelandwasalsotobeintheEU’ssinglemarketforgoodsinordertoavoidbarrierstotradeontheislandofIreland.Notably,theUKgovernment (in its January2019WhitePaper)5committedto followingthesameEUrules thatNorthernIrelandwouldhavetofollow.

WheninJuly2019BorisJohnsonreplacedTheresaMayasleaderoftheConservativeParty,heruledouttheUK-EUcustomsunionscenariothatthe‘backstop’hadbeenfoundedon.Thisnecessitatedabroadening-outofwhattheUKgovernmentwaspreparedtoacceptforNorthernIrelandand,withit, different arrangements and rules for the region compared toBritain. This resulted in a revisedProtocolinthesecondversionoftheWithdrawalAgreementannouncedon17October2019.AlthoughNorthern Ireland is formally part of the customs territoryof theUnitedKingdom, theProtocol ofOctober2019will see theEU’s ruleson customsapplying in the region. Furthermore, inorder toavoidtheneedforregulatorychecksattheIrishborder,NorthernIrelandwillstillhavetostayinlinewithEUsinglemarketrulesforgoods,aspreviouslydetailedinthe‘backstop’.Thiswillapplytoareassuchastechnicalregulationofgoods,agriculturalandenvironmentalproductionandregulation,stateaid.Thereisalsocontinuedregulatoryalignmenttomaintainotherareasofnorth/southcooperationbetweenNorthernIrelandandtheRepublicofIreland,includingtheSingleElectricityMarket.

BrexitmeansafundamentalchangeinthesystemofgovernanceintheUK.Law,policyandpracticeincentralUKgovernmentarebeingadjustedtoexcludetheinstitutionsandprocessesoftheEU.However,

5 ‘UKGovernmentcommitmentstoNorthernIrelandanditsintegralplaceintheUnitedKingdom’,9January2019.Availablefrom:https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-government-commitments-to-northern-ireland-and-its-integral-place-in-the-united-kingdom(accessed8May2020).

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theProtocolmeansthatNorthernIrelandwillcontinuetohavecloseeconomic,administrativeandlegaltieswiththeEU.Morespecifically,itwillcontinuetohavecloseintegrationwithIreland,notleastforthemaintenanceofcontinuedcross-bordercooperationinareasofcommonconcernandinterest.

Anumberofauthors fromdifferentareasofexpertisehavecomprehensively setout someof theissues in relation to the interpretation and implementationof the Protocol (for exampleConnelly2020;Jerzewska2020;Sargeantetal.2020;Weatherill2020a).Welookspecificallyatthematterofgovernance.TherearethreekeyproblemsthatarisefromtheProtocolinrelationtogovernanceforNorthernIreland,andwhichneedtobeaddressed:

(i) theimplementationoftheProtocol(inallitsdimensions,includingcross-border);(ii) thelonger-termimplicationsoftheProtocol,especiallyastherestoftheUKdiverges

fromtheEU;(iii) theoperationalisationofde factopartialsinglemarketEUmembershipforasmall

regionintegratedintheUKbutlegally,politicallyandeconomicallyoutsidetheEU.

Furthermore,thesechallengesneedtobeaddressedinawaythatisurgent(ingoodtimebeforetheendof thetransitionperiod,currentlyduetofinishon31December2020),sustainable,clearandinclusive.

The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland

WhattheProtocoldoes

TheAgreementontheWithdrawaloftheUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandfromtheEuropeanUnionconcludedon17October2019andsignedbytheEUandtheUKon24January2020 contains specific provisions for Northern Ireland. The Protocol on Ireland/Northern IrelandattachedtotheWithdrawalAgreementsetsoutarangeofprovisionsdedicatedtoNorthernIrelandwhichwillenterintoforcewiththeUK’swithdrawal.TheProtocolisalegally-bindingagreementthatgivesNorthernIrelandaveryuniquepositionwithintheUKandvis-à-vistheEU.ItisalsoapotentiallydynamicdocumentinthatitsetskeyparametersforNorthernIreland’songoingrelationshipwiththeEU.Thisisnomeretokenism;therelationshipwillbesubstantive,withNorthernIrelandsettofollowEUregulationsongoodsandtheUnionCustomsCode.

ThePoliticalDeclarationthataccompaniedtheWithdrawalAgreementshowsthattheUKisnotseekinga‘close’partnershipwiththeEU,anditisabletodosoinawaythatmeetsitscommitmentsoftheJointReportaslongasNorthernIrelandisinadistinctivearrangementwiththeEU.Thenegotiatingmandates of the EU andUK for the future relationship indicate that the trajectory is for growingdistancebetweenthetwo–whichinturnwouldhighlightthedistinctivepositionofNorthernIreland.Indeed,itgivesitauniqueinternationalpositiontoo,inthatitsstatusasprovidedforintheProtocolwillhavetobeacceptedwithintheWorldTradeOrganisation,possiblycitingArticle21ofGATT,i.e.exemptionfromusualrulesonthegroundsofanexceptionalsecuritysituation(Henig2019).

ThearrangementsforthetransitionperiodafterwithdrawalessentiallyinvolvetheUKcontinuingtoimplementitspreviousobligationsasamemberstatebutwithoutinvolvementintheEU’sinstitutions.Post-transition,theUKasawholeishopingtohavefarfewerobligationstotheEU,anditwillhavenodirect role indecisionson theadoptionofnewEU legislationor amendments. Althoughnew

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governance arrangements will be put in place to ensure the implementation of the WithdrawalAgreement,thereisstillmuchtobedecidedintermsofhowtoensuretheireffectiveoperationandminimisetheriskofexacerbateddemocraticdeficit.

Democraticconsentmechanism

Perhaps the most significant addition to the Protocol agreed in October 2019 compared to its‘backstop’predecessorisondemocraticconsentinNorthernIreland.ItistheresponsibilityoftheUKtoprovidetheopportunityfordemocraticconsentinNItothecontinuedapplicationofArticles5-10(i.e.customs,movementofgoods,protectionofUKinternalmarket,technicalregulations,VATandexcise,SEM,andStateaid).Thiscomeswithin2monthsoftheendoftherelevantperiod(inthefirstinstance,fouryearsaftertheendofthetransitionperiod,i.e.November/December2024ifthereisnoextensiontothetransitionperiod).AndtheUnionshouldbenotifiedoftheoutcomebytheendoftheperiod.IfamajorityofMLAsvotetoleave,thenthereisa2yearcoolingoffperiod(i.e.theearliestNIalignmentcouldendwouldbeendDecember2026).Inthisinstance,theJointCommitteeistomakerecommendationstotheEUandUKonthenecessarymeasures,‘takingintoaccounttheobligationsofthepartiestothe1998Agreement’.TheJointCommittee‘mayseekanopinion’fromtheinstitutionsestablishedbythe1998Agreement.

TheUKgovernmenthaspublishedaunilateraldeclarationtoexplainhowthemeasuresfor‘democraticconsent’aretowork.ThisdescribestheprocessofallowingMLAstheprivilegeof‘affordingorwithholdingconsent’.Thisistobedonevia‘athoroughprocessofpublicconsultation’ledbytheNIExecutive,andwill includecross-communityconsultation.Theaimofthat is ‘toachievebroadconsensusacrossallcommunitiestotheextentpossible’.ThisprocessofpublicconsultationwillbesupportedbytheUKGovernment.Itwouldincludebusinesses,civilsocietygroups,representativeorganisations,andtradeunions.TheunilateraldeclarationoftheUKstatesthattheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil (NSMC)andBritish-Irish IntergovernmentalConference (BIIGC) ‘shouldbe involved inanyconsultation’.TheAssemblyshouldbeprovidedwithexplanatorymaterialsforvotingonthemotionputforward,namelythatArticles5-10oftheProtocolwillcontinuetoapplyinNorthernIreland.

TheoutcomeoftheMLAs’voteistobejudgedbythecriterionof‘cross-communityconsent’.Thisisdefined(aspertherulesoftheNIAssemblyitself)asbeingeither50%overalland50%fromunionistandnationalistMLAs,orelse60%overalland40%ofeachofunionistandnationalistMLAs.Ifthereisnotcross-communityconsent,anindependentreviewwillbecommissionedbytheUKgovernment,toconcludewithin twoyearsof thevote. Itwill ‘includecloseconsultation’with thesamegroupsmentionedabove,pluspoliticalparties.Theindependentreviewwouldbeon:(a)onthefunctioningoftheProtocoland(b)theimplicationsofanydecisiontocontinueorterminatealignmentonsocial,economicandpolitical life inNI. According to theExplainerproducedby thegovernmenton theProtocol’sdemocraticconsentmechanism,this independentreviewcouldhaveregardto ‘anynewarrangementsthatcouldcommandcross-communitysupport’.

North/Southcooperation

AnotherimportantpartoftheProtocolasfarasgovernanceisconcernedisthematterofnorth/southcooperation.ThePreamblerefersto‘amappingexercisewhichshowsthatNorth-SouthcooperationreliestoasignificantextentonacommonUnionlegalandpolicyframework’andthusneedsprotection

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inaninternationalagreementbetweentheUKandEU.Article11oftheProtocolseekstodothis.Itstatesthat:

thisProtocolshallbeimplementedandappliedsoastomaintainthenecessaryconditionsforcontinuedNorth-Southcooperation,includingintheareasofenvironment,health,agriculture,transport, education and tourism, as well as in the areas of energy, telecommunications,broadcasting,inlandfisheries,justiceandsecurity,highereducationandsport.

Itadds:In full respect of Union law, the United Kingdom and Irelandmay continue tomake newarrangementsthatbuildontheprovisionsof the1998Agreement inotherareasofNorth-SouthcooperationontheislandofIreland.

Thismeansthatnorth/southcooperationcanbeexpandedifitisconsiderednecessarybyboththeUKandIrishgovernments.

DirectmonitoringanddirecteffectoftheEUonNorthernIrelandafterBrexit

TheUnitedKingdomisresponsiblefor‘implementingandapplyingtheprovisionsofUnion[EU]lawmadeapplicablebythisProtocol’inNorthernIreland(Art12(1)).Notwithstandingthis,accordingtoArticle12(2)oftheProtocol,EUrepresentativeshave:

therighttobepresentduringanyactivitiesoftheauthoritiesoftheUnitedKingdomrelatedto the implementation and applicationof provisionsofUnion lawmade applicable by thisProtocol, as well as activities related to the implementation and application of Article 5[Customs, movement of goods], and the United Kingdom shall provide, upon request, allrelevantinformationrelatingtosuchactivities.

Itgoeson:TheUnitedKingdomshallfacilitatesuchpresenceofUnionrepresentativesandshallprovidethemwiththeinformationrequested.WheretheUnionrepresentativerequeststheauthoritiesoftheUnitedKingdomtocarryoutcontrolmeasuresinindividualcasesfordulystatedreasons,theauthoritiesoftheUnitedKingdomshallcarryoutthosecontrolmeasures.

Tofacilitatethis,theEUandtheUK‘shallexchangeinformationontheapplicationofArticle5(1)and(2)onamonthlybasis’(Article12(3)).

This indicates a close and proactive role for EU representatives in the implementation of the Protocol in Northern Ireland. The Protocol also ensures close cooperationbetweenUK authorities and theEuropeanCommissiontomonitorcompliancewithstateaidandcompetitionlawinNorthernIreland.

TheProtocolmeanstherewillbeongoingjurisdictionfortheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(CJEU)overUKactionswithregardtoEUlawinNorthernIrelandandrelevantEUlawwillcontinuetohavedirecteffectinNorthernIreland(Curtisetal.2019:53).

WhattheProtocolmeans

Article13(8)oftheProtocolallowsthatitcouldbesupersededinwholeorinpartbyasubsequentagreementbetweentheUnionandtheUnitedKingdom.However,the‘thinner’thefuturerelationship

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betweentheUKandtheEU,thelesslikelyitisthatfutureUK-EUagreementswillsupersedemuchoftheProtocol(Curtisetal.2019:55).Whatismore,evenifthedemocraticmechanismintheProtocolseesNorthernIreland’sMLAswithholdingtheirconsent,thismeansthatonlyArticles5-10willceasetoapplywithinthesubsequenttwoyears.Assuch, theProtocolcanbeexpectedtodeterminetheconditions ofNorthern Ireland’s economic, regulatory, rights, etc. environment for the foreseeablefuture.6

TheProtocol,therefore,meansthatNorthernIreland,althoughoutsidetheEUandan integralpartof theUK,will continue tohavesubstantialobligations towards theEU.Asyet,however, thereareverylimitedarrangementsformanagingthetwoimplicationsthattheProtocolhasforgovernance,i.e.‘downloading’relevantEUlegislationintoNorthernIrelandlawand‘uploading’viewsfromNorthernIrelandintothecreationofthatlegislation.

The New Decade, New Approach (NDNA)documentannouncedbytheBritishandIrishGovernmentson 9 January 2020, and endorsedby theNorthern Irelandpolitical parties on 10 January, saw therestoration of theNorthern Ireland devolved institutions. As such, it bears direct relevance to theoperationofthenewgovernancemechanismssetupthroughtheWithdrawalAgreement.ThismeansthatNorthernIreland’sinterestsnowhaveabetterchancetoberepresentedwithintheUKandfurtherafield.However,theNIExecutivefacesanenormoustasklistandsetofchallenges,notleastofwhichisthatoffindingitsfeetinanenvironmentthatisconsiderablydifferentaftera3-yearhiatus.

Theendofthetransitionperiodbringswith itevengreaterchallenges,especiallycomingontopoftheshockofthecoronaviruspandemicandtheweaknessesthatthishasexposedincommunicationandcoordinationofhigh-levelgovernmentdecisions,bothintra-UKandnorth/southontheislandofIreland(Colfer2020;WincottandWager2020).

LegislationthatwillcontinuetodirectlyaffectNorthernIreland(vis-à-vistherestoftheUKaswellastheEU)willbedecidedattheUK-EUlevelthroughboththeimplementationoftheProtocolandthefuturerelationship.Inarealway,NorthernIrelandisatriskofbeingsubjecttolegislationcomingfrombothBrusselsandLondonwithouthavingfullsightorscrutinyofit,letaloneachancetoshape/annulthosedecisions.ThereisnoautomaticmeansbywhichNorthernIreland’sdevolvedinstitutionswilleitherbeabletoeffectivelyscrutiniseandshapeEUlawtheyneedto‘download’orbeableto‘upload’viewsintotheEU.Thisreportexploressomeoptionsinthisregard.

Insum,fromDay1aftertheendofthetransitionperiod,NorthernIrelandwillhavespecificarrangementstomanageandtogovern,i.e.differenttotherestoftheUK.Theunprecedentednatureofthispositionbringswithitconsiderablechallenges,particularlyinaneconomicandintergovernmentalenvironmentsoradicallyaffectedbytheexperienceofthecoronaviruspandemic.Nevertheless,theseexceptionalcircumstancesandspecificsolutionsbringsomeopportunitiesforbettergovernancefortheregion.WearguethatthereisneedforcontinuedflexibilityandimaginationfromtheEUaswellasfromtheUKinaccommodatingNorthernIreland’suniqueneedsandinterestsintothepost-Brexitera,andwemakesomemodestrecommendationsastowhatthismightlooklikeinpracticeatalllevelsofgovernance.Theserecommendationsareinsertedthroughoutthereportaswecovereach‘level’ofgovernance.Theyarefurtherconsolidatedinaseparatesectionattheconclusionofthereport.

6 BywayofillustratingthecomplexityofthegovernancechallengeforNorthernIrelandafterBrexitandundertheProtocol,Annex1outlinesthemultileveldimensionsofasetofmajorpolicyareaswhicharedevolvedinNorthernIrelandandwhicharedirectlyrelevanttotheimplementationoftheProtocol.

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Anticipating and Meeting New Multilevel Governance Challenges in Northern Ireland after Brexit

1. Using Northern Ireland’s existing governance mechanisms after Brexit

The 1998 Agreement Architecture

Thepresent-daygovernanceofNorthernIrelandisrootedinacomplexhistoryofbothdevolvedanddirectrule.Whatmakesitsgovernancearrangementsuniqueisthearchitectureestablishedasaresultofthe1998Belfast/GoodFridayAgreement.

The1998Belfast/GoodFridayAgreement(B/GFA)establishesthreestrandsofinstitutionalgovernancewhichformalise,first,power-sharingarrangementsbetweenunionistsandnationalists inNorthernIreland(StrandI);second,extensivenorth/southcooperationontheislandofIreland(StrandII);andthird,east/westcooperationbetweengovernments(StrandIII).ThroughStrandsIIandIII,theB/GFAalsocreateddifferentstatutoryforathatinvolveallofthegovernmentadministrationsintheBritishIslesinmulti-levelgovernancemechanisms.

ThedevolutionofvariouscompetencesdowntoNorthernIrelandhasbeencrucialingivingitalevelof governance autonomy. At the same time, it has created the legislative space for cross-borderarrangementswith theRepublic of Irelandwithout affecting the constitutional status ofNorthernIreland.ThesewillbetestedbythefactthatthelegislativespacesforIreland,NorthernIrelandandGreatBritainwillbequitedifferenttoeachotherinkeywaysaftertheendofthetransitionperiod.

Figure 1. Overview of multilevel governance for Northern Ireland

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Strand One

TheNorthernIrelandAssembly

Thereare90MembersoftheLegislativeAssembly(MLAs),fiveelectedfromeachofthe18multi-memberconstituencies inNorthern Ireland.ElectionsareconductedundertheSingleTransferableVote(STV)systemofproportionalrepresentation,andareusuallyheldeveryfiveyears.Membersmustdesignatethemselvesas‘nationalist’,‘unionist’or‘other’.Thesedesignationsarekeytodeterminingcross-communitysupportforimportantvotes,suchasintheelectionofthespeakerandchangetostandingorders.

ThenextAssemblyelectionisduetobeheldonorbefore5May2022.Thismeansthatthe90MLAswhowillbeeligibletovoteinthedemocraticconsentmechanismonArticles5-10oftheProtocolwillincludethosewhoarenotcurrentlyintheNIAssembly.

MostdecisionsoftheAssemblyaretakenbyasimplemajorityvote.However,some‘keydecisions’musthave cross-community support (althoughwhat constitutes a ‘keydecision’ is notdefinedbytheB/GFA). There are two formsof cross-community support:parallel consent, where more than 50%ofMLAsagreetothemotion,includingmorethan50%ofeachnationalistsandunionists;anda weighted majority,requiringthesupportof60%ofthosevoting,including40%ofnationalistsand40%unionists.Thesedefinitionsofcross-communityconsentareusedinthevotethatwillbeheldforNorthernIreland’sMLAsasthemechanismfordemocraticconsentenabledintheProtocol.

LegislativepowersoftheAssembly

Distinctively,theNorthernIrelanddevolutionsettlement(asconstitutedundertheNorthernIrelandAct1998)definesthreecategoriesoflegislativepowersfortheNorthernIrelandAssembly:transferred,reservedandexcepted.

Transferred mattersarethoseonwhichtheAssemblycanmakeprimaryandsecondarylegislation.Theseinclude:healthandsocialservices;education,employmentandskills;agriculture;socialsecurity,pensions and child support; housing; economic development; local government; environmentalissues, including planning; transport; culture and sport; the Northern Ireland Civil Service; equalopportunities;andjustice,prisonsandpolicing.

ManyofthesetransferredmatterswouldberelevanttoArticle11oftheProtocol,whichcommitstheUKandEUtomaintainingthenecessaryconditionsfornorth/southcooperation,e.g.environment,health,agricultureandeducation.

Reserved matterscanalsobelegislatedonbytheAssemblybutonlywiththeconsentoftheSecretaryofStateforNorthernIreland.Thesearematterssuchas:firearmsandexplosives;financialservicesand pensions regulation; broadcasting; import and export controls; navigation and civil aviation;internationaltradeandfinancialmarkets;telecommunicationsandpostage;theforeshoreandseabed;disqualificationfromAssemblymembership;consumersafety;intellectualproperty.

Someofthesemattersrelatetoareasofnorth/southcooperationthatneedtobemaintainedafterBrexit,e.g.telecommunicationsandbroadcasting.Othersrelatetowhatwillbenegotiatedbetween

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theEUandUK,e.g.import/exportcontrols,aviation,andintellectualproperty.Westminsterretainsthesovereignpowers to legislate forNorthern Irelandonnon-devolvedmattersaswellas for thepurposeofensuringthattheUK’s‘internationalobligationsaremetinrespectofNorthernIreland.’(Paragraph33ofStrandI)(HarveyandHolder2017).TheAssemblymayrequestthatareservedmatterbecomestransferred.Thishappenedin2010whenpowersoverpolicingandjusticeweredevolved,followingtheHillsboroughAgreement.

Excepted mattersaresubjectsreservedtoWestminsterandcanonlybetransferredunderprimarylegislation. These include defence, international trade, foreign affairs, national security, UK-widetaxation,nationality,immigrationandasylum,currencyandtheconstitution.ThisiswhytheUK-EUnegotiationsonthefuturerelationship,whichfocusontradeandsecurityarebeinghandledasaUKstateconcernratherthanoneinwhichdevolvedlegislaturesshouldhavesomesway.However,theProtocolmeansthatwhattheUKnegotiatesintheseareaswillnotonlyaffectNorthernIrelandvis-à-visitsrelationshipwithotherexternalstatesbutalsoinrelationtotherestoftheUK.

ItisalsoworthnotingthatwhentheFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinisterwrote to Prime Minister MaysettingouttheirprioritiesthroughBrexittherewasthepotentialforcleartensionbetweenUKandNorthernIrelandwhenitcomestoimmigrationpolicy.NorthernIrelandwantspolicies‘sufficientlyflexible to allow access to unskilled labour’. This is an areawherewe could seeNorthern IrelandpushingforsomederogationsfromUK-widerules,e.g.onthesalarythresholdforlegalimmigration.

The implementation of the Protocol and the Withdrawal Agreement Act (2020)

TheimplementationoftheProtocolwillinvolvepowersgiventotheUKalone,powerstoStormontalone,andpowerstobothactingtogether.TheworkingassumptionislikelytobethattheUKactsaloneunless: (i) Stormont tries toact, (ii) theUK thinks it isnot indevolvedcompetences,or (iii)Stormontisadvisedthatitisnotsolelyinitscompetence.Inwhichcases,theyhavetoacttogether.Yet,itisnoteasytoknowwhen(andhow)theUKactswiththedevolvedlegislatures.

ItisworthnotingthattheWAActwasdraftedbeforetherestorationoftheNIExecutiveandAssembly.ItispossibletoarguethattheNIAneedstoensureithastheopportunitytoscrutiniseanysecondarylegislationthatwillaffectitsplacein,andaccessto,theUKinternalmarket.AccordingtoaletterfromLordDuncan(16January2020)topeers,thegovernmenthascommittedthatitwillnotnormallyusethemainpowerinClause21inareasofdevolvedcompetencewithouttheagreementoftherelevantdevolved administration. Clause 22 contains provision allowing for regulations to implement theProtocoltobemadebyaMinisterandadevolvedauthorityactingjointly.Thisisstilltobespelledout.

It isalreadyverydifficult for theAssembly todoanymeaningful scrutinyofstatutory instruments(SIs).AninitialstepfortheNIAistoscreenSIsandthentodeterminewhichcommitteeswouldlookatthem.Thisrequirescapacityandtime–bothofwhichwillbelikelytobeinshortsupplyunlesssetasapriorityatthisstage.

AkeyquestioniswhethertheNIExecutivewillhave:(a)earlysightof,or(b)anopportunitytoinputinto theSIs thatwilldirectlyaffectNI.Whether thishappensornot isan intergovernmental issueratherthanalegislativeone.IftheExecutiveisgivensightofSIsanditsviewssought,itwillbeuptotheExecutiveastowhetherthisprocessandthedetailsarereportedtotheNIAssembly.

MeaningfulscrutinyofUKSIsbytheNIAwouldbelargelydependenton:(a)aspecialtimetablethat

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allowedenoughtimeforscrutinybytheNIA,and(b)whethertheNIAhadsufficientdedicatedresourcestoexaminetheSIstoworkoutthepotentialissuesofsalience.ThesiftingprocedurefornegativeSIsmadeunder theWithdrawalAct2018hassomepotentialhere,withspecificalerts relatingto theProtocolorjointUK/devolvedcompetence.Attheveryleast,informalcollaborationtheWestminsterofficialscouldsharewhattheyreceivewiththeirequivalentsintheNIAalthoughthiswouldbehardtoensureonasystematicbasis.

Recommendations• NIExecutiveministersshouldnotifytheNIAwithinoneworkingdayofregulationsbeinglaid

beforetheUKParliamentwhereUKMinistersareactingaloneindevolvedareaswithinthelegislativecompetenceoftheNIAortheexecutivecompetenceoftheNIExecutiveMinisters.Anexplanatorymemorandumastothepurposeandimplicationsoftheaboveregulationshouldbeattachedtothatnotification.

• TheNIAStandingOrdersshouldbeamendedtoassigntoacommitteethefunctionofrecommendingtheappropriateprocedureforthesiftingprocess.Feedingintothis,relevantcommitteesshouldoutlineinadvance,throughasetofscrutinystandards,theprecisecriteriawhichshouldbeappliedtothescrutinyofSIs.ItcouldbepossibletohavespecificcriteriathatcapturethesortofissuesthatarelikelytoariseinthecontextofSIsmadeunderpowersintheWAAct(2020).

• Thereneedstobeenoughtime/flexibilityintheNIAcommitteetimetabletoscrutiniseregulations.Anearlywarningsystemmaybeneeded,andcouldbeagreedwiththeNIExecutive,toassistinmanagingthescrutinyofallsubordinatelegislation.

TheNorthernIrelandExecutive

WhilsttheFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinistertogetherformtheofficialheadshipoftheExecutive,itshouldberecalledthatpower-sharingcharacterisesthenatureoftheExecutiveitself.TheExecutivecomprisestheFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinister(nominatedbythetwolargestpartiesintheAssembly) and eight departmental ministers.7 The Northern Ireland Executive takes decisions onmatterswithin individualdepartmentalareas, including thosewhichcutacross theresponsibilitiesofmorethanoneDepartment.TheExecutivealsoagreesproposalsfornewlegislation,developstheProgrammesforGovernmentandagreesbudgetwhichmustbeapprovedbytheAssembly.

ThecurrentDepartmentsinclude:Agriculture,Environment&RuralAffairs,Infrastructure,Economy,Education, Finance, Health, Justice, Executive Office, and Communities. Executive Ministers arenominatedby political parties in numbers proportional to the respectiveparty’s share of seats intheAssembly(underthed’Hondtformula).TheonlyexceptionistheMinisterforJustice,appointedthroughacross-communityvoteintheAssembly.AnunusualfeatureofthedevolutionsettlementinNorthernIreland,notedbyTorrance(2020:9)isthat‘statutorypowersarevestedinindividuallyconstitutedExecutivedepartmentsledbytheirownpermanentsecretary.’

7 ThenumberofNorthernIrelandgovernmentdepartmentswasreducedfrom12to9in2016.

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InexaminingthechallengestotheworkoftheExecutive,SargeantandRutter(2019:43)critiquedthestructureofdepartmentsthemselveswhichisseenasreinforcing‘siloisation’andexistingcompetitionintheExecutive,whichultimatelyhasadetrimentalimpactondecision-making.8Inparticular,theynotethattheuniqueroleoftheExecutiveOffice(incoveringcomplexissuesthataretoosensitiveforindividualdepartmentsandinbeingoverlyconcernedaboutthespecialadviserstotheFirstanddeputyFirstMinisters)meansthatithasfailedtodevelop‘acentralpolicyagendaordriveeffectiveimplementationacrossotherdepartments’.

According to the New Decade, New Approach document, Brexit (and ensuring the best possibleoutcomefromitforcitizensandtheNIeconomy)istopoftheExecutive’spriorities.

Recommendations

• TheNIExecutiveshouldbeconsultedbytheUKgovernmentinadvanceofallissuesrelevanttoNIfordecisionsaspartofthewrittenprocedureprovidedforintheRulesofProcedurefortheJointCommittee.9

• TheNIExecutiveshouldactonestablishingaconsultativeforumtoengagecivilsocietyrepresentativesin(a)assessingtheimplementationoftheProtocol,(b)drawingattentiontoissuesofconcernabouttheProtocol,and(c)requestingchangestotheoperationoftheProtocol.10

AssemblyCommittees

ThelegislativeandscrutinyfunctionsoftheAssemblyarecomplementedbytheworkofAssemblyCommittees. Committees are groups of 11 MLAs, from different political parties, specialising inaparticularareaofgovernmentorcarryingout specific functions.Committeepowersderive fromthe1998B/GFA, fromtheNorthern IrelandAct (1998),and fromStandingOrders (theproceduralrulesgoverninghowtheAssemblyworks).CommitteesassisttheAssemblyinitslegislativeworkbyexamining Bills at Committee Stage and further have the power to investigate issues, to send forpersonsandpapers,andtointroducelegislationtotheAssembly.MinistersoftheNorthernIrelandExecutivemustconsultCommitteesonnewpolicies.

8 Specifically,theysuggestthefactthatpowersarevestedbystatuteinindividualdepartments‘reinforcesthetendencyfordepartmentstoactasindividualfiefdomsandmakescross-cuttingworking’verydifficult.OtherflawsinthecultureofthedepartmentsrunbytheNIExecutiveidentifiedbySargeantandRutter(2019)include:ministersstillhavingtocopewithdivisivelegacyissues;decision-makingprocessesbeingslowandnotguidedbycollectivepriorities;ministersavoidingdifficultlong-termdecisions;lackofavalue-for-moneyculture;andthesmallscaleoftheregionallowingministerstomicro-manage.

9 ‘WrittendocumentsonwhichthedeliberationsoftheJointCommitteearebasedshallbenumberedandcirculatedtotheUnionandtheUnitedKingdombytheSecretariatasdocumentsoftheJointCommittee’(Rule5,AnnexVIII,WA).

10 Seefurtherdiscussionunderthe‘UnimplementedB/GFAbodies’sectionofthisreport.

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TheAssemblyhasfourmaintypesofcommittee:11

• StatutoryCommittees(whichadvise,assistandscrutiniseMinistersandtheirDepartments);

• StandingCommittees(thatundertakespecificroles,mostlyconcernedwithrunningtheAssembly);

• JointCommittees(consideringmattersofinteresttomorethanonecommittee);

• AdHocCommittees(setupforalimitedtimetodealwithaparticularissue).

CommitteesoftheAssemblytakedecisionsbyasimplemajorityvote(Torrance2020:10).Thisbeliestherathercomplicatedarrangementsforallocationofcommitteechairs,whichisdonebyappointmentbypartywhips(ratherthanelectedbyMLAs)andwiththeintentionofensuringthatchairpersonsarenormallyfromadifferentcommunitytorespectivedepartmentministers.Thishasresultedinwhatarefrequentlyuncooperativerelationshipsbetweenministersandindividualcommittees.TherecentInstituteforGovernmentreportconcludedthattherearemultiplestructuralandculturalchallengestothequalityofcommitteescrutinyworkintheNIAssembly(SargeantandRutter2019).Italsonoticedabroadercommitteereluctancetoengageinhighlypoliticallycontroversialmatters,leavingseriousgapsincommitteescrutinyandanalysis.Forinstance,‘intheperiodbetweenthe2016referendumandthefalloftheexecutivetherewereonlytwoevidencesessionsfocusedonBrexit–onebytheCommitteeonAgriculture,EnvironmentandRuralAffairsandonebytheJusticeCommittee’(SargeantandRutter2019:46).

SargeantandRutter(2019:59)arguethattheprocessofcommitteescrutinyshouldbeenhanced,including in termsof improvingaccess toa sufficientnumberofcommitteespecialists toworkonresearchandpolicy.Theyalsoadviseconsidering‘whethertopermitsomecommitteemeetingstobeheldinprivate’intheinterestofpromotingbettercross-communityworking.ThiswouldseemtohaveparticularresonancewhenitcomestotheworkofcommitteesregardingtheProtocol.Overall,theneedforamorecoherentcommitteestructureintheNorthernIrelandAssemblywasalsostressedbytheparticipantsinourresearchproject.SomeprofferedsuggestionsforestablishingnewAssemblycommittees,followingtheexampleoftheWestminsterandtheEUSelectCommittees’structureandwork.

Indeed, theNew Decade, New Approach Agreement of January 2020 saw the establishment of aBrexit sub-committee [suspended May 2020].This ischairedby theFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinisterwithrepresentativesfromallpartiesintheExecutivetakingpart[paragraph3.5].12TheSub-Committeeisto‘considerBrexit-relatedissues’as‘amatterofurgency’,andinitiate‘anassessmentof the impact of Brexit’ on the institutions and relationships along the three strands of the 1998Agreement,i.e.devolved,north/southandeast/west.Theworkofthecommitteeistobescrutinisedby theAssembly,althoughhowthiswillhappen isyet tobedetermined.Enormouspressuresareplacedonthissub-committeebythepoliticaldifferenceswithintheExecutivebothaboutBrexititselfandabouttheProtocol.ThisisfurtherexacerbatedbythedifferencesininformationcomingfromtheUKgovernmentandEUcommissionregardingtheimplementationoftheProtocol.

11 Committeesformedduringthe2017-2022Mandateinclude:StatutoryCommittees:Agriculture,EnvironmentandRuralAffairs;Communities;Economy;Education;ExecutiveOffice;Finance;Health;Infrastructure;andJustice.StandingCommittees:AssemblyandExecutiveReview;Audit;BusinessCommittee;Chairpersons’LiaisonGroup;Procedures;PublicAccounts;StandardsandPrivileges.

12 ThismeansthatifapartychoosestogointoOpposition,astheNDNA documentallowsfor,itwouldloseitsseatontheSub-Committee.

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Recommendations

• The CommitteefortheExecutiveOfficeshouldbeformallyconsultedbytheUKGovernmentpriortoitmakingsubmissionsfortheprovisionalagendaoftheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland.

• The CommitteefortheExecutiveOfficeshouldreceivefullminutesofallJCWG/SpecialisedCommitteemeetingsandallJointCommitteemeetingswheremattersdirectlyaffectingNorthernIrelandarediscussed,evenwheretheseminutesarenotmadepublic.

• TheHouseofCommonsandNIAssemblycouldestablishajointstandingcommitteetoreviewimplementationoftheProtocol.

• Awiderangeofspecialistsshouldbedrawnonbythecommittees,particularlyrelatingtothescopeoftheProtocol.

• ItshouldbeensuredthatthechairsofallNIAssemblycommitteesrelevanttotheworkingsoftheProtocol(e.g.AgricultureandEnvironment)receiveregularbriefingsfromtheUKdelegationtotheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland.

Strand Two

TheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil(NSMC)

The North SouthMinisterial Council (NSMC) is the intergovernmental body tasked with agreeingcommon policies and approaches in each of the six areas of north/south cooperation (includingfood safety, trade andbusiness development, EUprogrammesand tourismpromotion). Thebodyis supported by a joint secretariatandstaffedbypersonnelfromtheIrishCivilServiceandNorthernIrelandCivilService(whichisseparatefromtheHomeCivilService).

TheNSMCisintendedtoexchangeinformation,developconsultation,cooperationandactionwithinthe islandof Ireland.Thegoalhere,accordingtothetextoftheB/GFA, is to ‘reachagreementontheadoptionofcommonpolicies’whererelevant,oralternativelytodecideonpoliciesforseparateimplementation. This includes through ‘implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis’on ‘mattersofmutual interest’withinthecompetenceoftheNorthern IrelandExecutiveand IrishGovernment.BoththeNorthernIrelandExecutiveandtheIrishGovernmentcanproposeanymatterforconsiderationoractionbytheNSMC.

FromJanuary2017-January2019,theNSMCwasunabletomeetatministeriallevelduetotheabsenceofafunctioningNorthernIrelandAssemblyandExecutive.Thishadlimitingeffectsontheworkofthesixcross-border ImplementationBodiesoperating in theabovepolicyareasbecausedecisionsonpolicyandactiontobetakenforwardbythesebodiesaremadebytheNSMCthroughplenarymeetingsonly.

The 1998 Agreement provision for the North SouthMinisterial Council allows it ‘to consider theEuropean Union dimension of relevantmatters, including the implementation of EU policies and

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programmesandproposalsunderconsiderationintheEUframework.’Italsoallows‘ArrangementstobemadetoensurethattheviewsoftheCouncilaretakenintoaccountandrepresentedappropriatelyatrelevantEUmeetings’(StrandTwo,paragraph17).

In theory, theviewsof theNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil reflectanagreedposition fromtheNIExecutive.ThiscouldbeusefulwhenitcomestorepresentationofconcernstothebodiesestablishedbytheWithdrawalAgreement(seebelow).Indeed,

Recommendations

• Tomakebestuseofthefactthat(a)theNSMCisapre-existingbodyusedtofindingcommongroundandcommondecisionsonanorth/southbasis,and(b)ithasadirectroutetotheSpecialisedCommittee,theNSMCshouldbegivenaformalroletomonitortheimplementationandtheimpactoftheProtocol.Thisshouldbespecificallybutnotexclusivelyinrelationtothemaintenanceofnorth/southcooperation(Article11,Protocol).

• Accordingtothe1998Agreement,itshouldbeensuredthattheviewsoftheNSMCare‘takenintoaccountandrepresentedappropriatelyatrelevantEUmeetings’.Thus,atminimum,theNSMCshouldalsohavetheabilitytodrawtheurgentattentionoftheUKgovernmentandtheEuropeanCommission(aspertheJointCommittee)tojointNIExecutiveandIrishgovernmentconcernsaboutthreatstotheB/GFAortonorth/southcooperationthatmayrequireajointUKandEUapproachtoaddress.

• TheNorthSouthJointSecretariatcouldberemodelledtoensureadequaterepresentationinareasofnorth/southcooperation(notimplementation).ThisisbecausetheywillbeaffectedbytheProtocolbutwillnotbecoveredintheB/GFAbodies,e.g.inhealth,tourism,education,agriculture.

ImplementationBodies

Thesix‘ImplementationBodies’workingonanall-islandbasisarecorefeaturesofthe1998Agreementanddemonstratetheintegralroleplayedbycross-borderpoliticalcooperationinthegovernanceofNorthernIreland.PowerswithlegislativeauthorityhavebeentransferredfromtheGovernmentstotheNorth/SouthImplementationbodies.

Inaddition,StrandTwooftheAgreementoutlinedarangeofareasforpossiblecross-bordercooperationthatinclude(non-coincidentally)thosenowmostexposedtochangeasaresultofBrexit.Theseincludeagriculture,environment,(inland)fisheries,health,socialsecurity/socialwelfare,transport,tourism,andurbanand ruraldevelopment. In addition, thereareareasof all-island cooperation thathavebeenidentifiedbytheNSMCasonesforprotectionthroughtheUK’swithdrawal,includingeducation/highereducation,justiceandsecurity,telecommunications,andsport.

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Recommendations

• TheSpecialisedCommitteefortheProtocolistoexamineproposalsregardingtheimplementationandapplicationoftheProtocolfromthesixNorthSouthImplementationBodies.Howthesebodiesidentify,compileandrelaysuchproposalsneedstobeformalised.ThisissomethingthatcouldbecoordinatedbytheNSMCJointSecretariat.

• TheImplementationBodiesalsoshouldbeequippedtoraiseconcerns(i.e.amberalertorredalert)withtheSpecialisedCommitteeonadirectandurgentbasis,notjusttoofferproposals.

TheNorth/SouthInter-ParliamentaryAssociation(NSIPA)

TheestablishmentofaNorth–Southinter-parliamentaryforumwasenvisagedintheB/GFAandtheStAndrew’sAgreement,buttheNSIPAonlyheld itsfirstmeeting intheSeanadChamber,LeinsterHouse,on12October2012.Fortheensuingfouryears,thebodyprovidedaforumforregularformaldiscussionsbetweenMembersoftheNorthernIrelandAssemblyandMembersoftheHousesoftheOireachtasonissuesofmutualinterestandconcern.

IthastendedtomeettwiceyearlyonarotationalbasisbetweentheHousesoftheOireachtasandtheNorthernIrelandAssemblyanditsmembershipisdrawninequalnumbersfrombothparliaments.Itcomprises48membersplustwoJointChairs.DuetotheabsenceofasittingNIAssembly,thelast plenaryoftheNSIPAwas(atthetimeofwriting)December2016.

Recommendations

• AstandingitemontheagendaofNSIPAplenarymeetingsshouldbeBrexitandtheimplementationoftheProtocol.

• StandingcommitteesoftheNorth/SouthInter-ParliamentaryAssociationandBritish-IrishParliamentaryAssemblyontheProtocolimplementationcouldbeestablishedtomonitortheProtocol’simplementation.

Strand Three

TheBritish-IrishCouncil(BIC)

UnderStrandIII,theB/GFAalsoestablishedtheBritish-IrishCouncilasanEast–WestcounterparttotheNSMC,withasecretariatbased(since2012)inEdinburgh.Itspurposeistoexchangeinformation,discuss,consultandusebestendeavourstoreachagreementonmattersofmutualinterest.

ThisbodyiscomprisedofrepresentativesoftheUKGovernment,IrishGovernment,NorthernIrelandExecutive,ScottishGovernment,WelshGovernment,IsleofManGovernment,StatesofJerseyandtheStatesofGuernsey.TheBICmeetstwiceayearinheads-of-governmentplenarymeetingsandissupportedbyworkstreamsonmattersofcommoninterest.

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Inaddition to themeetingsof seniorpoliticians, theBICoperates through twelve task groups:oncollaborativespatialplanning,creativeindustries,demography,digitalinclusion,earlyyears,energy,environment,housing,minoritylanguages,misuseofdrugs,socialinclusionandtransport.Thesetaskgroupsareestablishedthroughdirectrequestsofpoliticiansandagendasaresetbypoliticiansandofficials.

Recommendations

• GiventhesignificanceofBrexittotheenvironmentinwhichtheBICwillbeworking,theBICshouldalsohavetheProtocol(specificallythepreamblepriorities)setasastandingitemontheagendaoftheplenarymeetings.ItcouldalsohaveanewtaskgroupfocusedontheimplementationoftheProtocol.

• TheremitoftheBritish-IrishCouncilcouldbeexpandedtoincludeareaspreviouslycoordinatedatEUlevel,e.g.criminaljusticecooperation.

British-IrishIntergovernmentalConference(BIIGC)

AthirdbodyestablishedunderStrandIIIoftheB/GFAistheBritish-IrishIntergovernmentalConferencewhich subsumed the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and Intergovernmental Conference asestablishedunderthe1985Anglo-IrishAgreement.NodoubtthemostsignificantcomponentofthisbodyintermsofensuringastrongchannelofcommunicationbetweenthetwogovernmentsistheJointSecretariat,withBritishandIrishofficesbasedinBelfast.TheConferenceitselfislimitedtoconsideringnon-devolvedmatters,suchassecurity,and–stillapressingobligation–the‘implementationofexistingagreements’(NIAC2018:40).TheBIIGCthuseffectivelyformalisesthescopeforcoordinationwiththeIrishGovernmentonareasofbilateralcooperationandonreservedandexceptedmatters.Itmetregularlybetween1999and2007,afterwhichtime,althoughtheJointSecretariatremainedactive,theBIIGCwassomewhatinabeyanceforadecade.TheBIIGCwasreconvenedamidthetempestofthewithdrawalnegotiationsinJuly2018.Afterthismeeting,ajointcommuniquéwasissuedinwhich:

The Conference agreed that this level of bilateral co-operation needed to be maintainedand,wherepossible,strengthenedfollowingthedepartureoftheUnitedKingdomfromtheEuropeanUnion.OfficialswereaskedtotakeforwardworkinthisareawithaviewtocomingforwardwithproposalsforfutureEast-Westcooperation,includingatCabinetandMinisteriallevel,forconsiderationbytheIrishandUKGovernmentsatafuturemeeting. 13

The value of strengthening the British-Irish relationship after Brexit was affirmed in the JointCommuniqués issued after subsequent meetings in November 2018 and May 2019.14 However, progressstillhastobemadeinidentifyingtheparticularstructuresandarrangementsthatcouldbedeveloped;thiswillpresumablyonlybepossibleoncethefutureUK-EUrelationship ismoreclear.RegularmeetingsoftheBIIGCwillremainelementaltosecuringgoodBritish-Irishrelationsand,thus,governanceatStrandIIIintheinterestsofNorthernIreland.

13 Availablefrom:https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-communique-of-the-british-irish-intergovernmental-confer-ence-25-july-2018(accessed8May2020).

14 TheJointCommuniquéfromtheMay2019meetingconfirmsthataftertheNovembermeeting,‘officialshadbeentaskedtoworktogethertoidentifyandexploreareasofmutualinterest,withaviewtodevelopingasharedbilateralworkplan.Ministersreviewedtheprogressmadebyofficialstodateandrequestedfurtherproposalsfornew,reinvigoratedandregularopportunitiesforfutureco-operation’.See:https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2019/may/joint-communique-of-the-british-irish-intergovernmental-conference.php(accessed8May2020).

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Recommendations

• TheBIIGCshouldcontinuetomeetregularlyandthebilateralworkplanbedevelopedthatenablesacoordinatedapproachtonewareasforcooperationinlightofthechangedenvironmentoftheUK-EUrelationshipandinparticularthechallengesforNorthernIrelandoutsidemattersofdevolvedcompetence.

RightsandEqualityBodies

The B/GFA obliges theUK to incorporate the European Convention onHumanRights (ECHR) intoNorthernIrelandlaw.ItalsorequirestheUKtoprovideeffectivemethodsofnationalenforcementthroughtheHumanRightsAct1998.InthePoliticalDeclarationontheFutureRelationship(October2019),theUKcommittedto‘continuedadherenceandgivingeffect’totheECHR.Itwasagreed:

The future relationship should incorporate the United Kingdom’s continued commitmentto respect the frameworkof theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights (ECHR),while theUnionanditsMemberStateswillremainboundbytheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion,whichreaffirmstherightsastheyresultinparticularfromtheECHR(I.A.7).

However,inDecember2019theUKthreatenedtolimittheapplicationoftheECHRinNIlaw(overthe issueof independent investigations intokillingsbytheSecurityForcesduringtheTroubles). InFebruary2020,UKgovernmentsourcesbriefedthattheUKwouldnolongeragreetobeboundbytheEHCRwithinthefutureUK-EUagreement.FuturecompliancewiththeECHRandB/GFAisthereforeundersignificantthreatintheBrexitprocess.15

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and Equality Commission for Northern Irelandwereestablishedin1999and1998respectively.The1998AgreementstatedthattheHumanRightsCommission‘willbeinvitedtoconsultandtoadviseonthescopefordefining[…]rightssupplementaryto those in the EuropeanConventiononHumanRights, to reflect the particular circumstances ofNorthernIreland’.Itwasanticipatedthatthesewouldtogetherconstitute‘aBillofRightsforNorthernIreland.’However,aBillofRightsforNorthernIrelandhasnotyetcometopass(althoughitisagaincommittedtoinNDNA);norhasadedicatedDepartmentofEquality,theestablishmentofwhichwasalso recommendedby theAgreement. This leaves a gapwithinNorthern Irelandgovernance thatmaybecomeincreasinglysignificant ifthere isafailurebytheUKtoadheretotheECHR. ItwouldbeinaccordancewiththeB/GFAandthePoliticalDeclarationfortheUKtomakea legally-bindingagreement,aspartofthefutureUK-EUrelationship,tocontinuetobeapartytotheECHRandprovideeffectivemethodsofdomesticenforcementinNorthernIreland.

AnotherpointofrelevanceisthattheUKhasagreed,underArticle2oftheProtocol,thatnoneofthecivilandindividualrightsprotectedbytheB/GFAthatareenhancedorunderpinnedbyEUlawcanbediminished.ThismeansthatNorthernIrelandwillcontinuetoimplementsixEUequalitydirectives,includinginnon-discriminationonthegroundsofethnicity, inaccesstogoodsandservices,andinequaltreatmentinemployment.AmendmentsandreplacementstothesedirectiveswillautomaticallyapplyinNorthernIreland.RelevantnewactswillneedtobeadoptedbytheJointCommittee.Insuchways,therightsofallcitizensinNorthernIrelandareanot-insignificantpartoftheregion’suniquerelationshipwiththeEUpost-Brexit.

15 TheECHRisfurtherembeddedintheGFAtosafeguardtheworkofthedemocraticinstitutionsinNorthernIreland.Therefore,anyplanstowithdrawfromorrepealtheseprotectionshasthepotentialtounderminetheequivalenceofarightsregimebetweenbothjurisdictionsinIreland,aswellastheabilityforstructurednorth/southcooperation(CCBS2018).

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TheB/GFAmandatedtheestablishmentofmechanismstoensurestrongcooperationbetweenthehumanrights institutions ineach jurisdictiononthe island.Specifically, it ledtotheestablishmentof a Joint Committeewith representatives of theHumanRights Commissions ofNorthern Irelandand Ireland. Under the terms of theWithdrawal Agreement, the Northern Ireland Human RightsCommission,theEqualityCommissionforNorthernIreland,andthe Joint Committee of the Human Rights Commissions of Northern Ireland and Ireland areofferedaconsultativeroleinrelationtotheworkoftheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland.

Additional Institutions

British-IrishParliamentaryAssembly(BIPA)

TheBritish-IrishParliamentaryAssembly(BIPA)wasnotestablishedaspartoftheB/GFAbutoriginatedin 1990 as an inter-parliamentary body linking the Houses of Parliament and the Houses of theOireachtas,withthemissiontopromotecooperationandbuildcloserelationshipsbetweenpoliticalrepresentatives in Britain and Ireland. In 2001 its membership expanded to include the ScottishParliament,theWelshAssembly,theNorthernIrelandAssembly,theHighCourtofTynwaldandtheStatesofGuernseyandJersey.TheBIPASecretariatisdrawnfromtheUKParliamentandtheHousesoftheOireachtas.

Membersengageinawiderangeofnon-legislativeparliamentaryactivities,throughbi-annualplenarymeetingsandongoingCommitteework.Thebody’sfourCommittees(SovereignMatters;EuropeanAffairs; Economic; Environmental and Social) meet regularly and take oral and written evidenceon specific issues, whilst regularly interactingwith the European Parliament. The Committee onSovereignMattershasproducedseveralreportsontheimplementationoftheBelfast/GoodFridayandStAndrewsAgreements, identifyingoutstanding issues and considering recommendations forfurtheraction.Committee reportsarepresented toplenaryBIPA sessionswhichusually commentonthemintheformofaresolution.FormalrepliesfromtheGovernmentsandtheExecutivestothecommittees’reportsarepublishedandconsideredinplenarysession.

Recommendations

• TheBIPAshouldcontinuetointeractwiththeEuropeanParliament;visitstoBrusselsshouldcontinuetobeanoptionforCommitteesifnotfortheAssemblyasawhole.ConsiderationshouldbegiventosendingreportsfromtheCommittees(especiallyCommitteeB)totheJointCommitteeand/ortheSpecialisedCommittee.TheBIPAsecretariatshouldbeabletofeedintotheAgendaoftheJointConsultativeWorkingGroup.

UnimplementedB/GFAInstitutions

There are a number of institutions provided for by the B/GFA butwhich have not yet been fullyimplemented.

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StrandIoftheAgreement,forinstance,providedfortheestablishmentofaconsultativeCivic Forum ‘compris[ing]representativesofthebusiness,tradeunionandvoluntarysectors,andsuchothersectorsasagreedbytheFirstMinisterandtheDeputyFirstMinister[to]actasaconsultativemechanismonsocial,economicandculturalissues’.TheForumwasformedinitiallyandconsistedofachairmanand60representativesfromacrossthedifferentsectors.Itoperatedbetween2000and2002,untilthedevolvedinstitutionsweresuspended,andwasnotrestartedwhendevolutionwasrestoredin2007.

Nevertheless, theneedforsomeformofcivic inputhascontinuedtoberecognised.Forexample,the Stormont House and Fresh Start Agreements suggested the creation of ‘a smaller 6-membercivicadvisorypaneltoconsidersocial,culturalandeconomicissuesandissuesrelevanttothedraftProgrammeforGovernment.ThispanelwouldadviseandreportbacktotheExecutive’(NIAC2018:44).TheNew Decade, New Approachdocument(NDNA2020:23[para3.8])furthermoreoutlinesthepoliticalparties’recognitionof‘thevalueofstructuredandflexibleengagementwithcivicsocietytoassisttheGovernmenttosolvecomplexpolicyissues.’TothisendtheStormontpartieshaveagreed‘thattheexistingCompactCivicAdvisoryPanelshouldbereformedtoincludearenewedmembershipappointedwithin6monthsbywayofaPublicAppointmentsprocess’.

Theprinciplesof consultation, civic engagementand consensus-building arealso contained in theNDNA document.ItproposesoneCitizensAssemblyperyear,plus1-2issuesperyeartobeconsideredvia‘civicengagement’opensthepotentialforwiderengagementonBrexit-relatedmatters.TheNDNAdidnotpromisetore-establishthecivicforum,whichindicatesthatthereisstillpoliticalresistancetoitsconstitution.

Thescopeforacivicforumonacross-borderbasis isalsoanoutstandingneed.StrandIIoftheB/GFArecommendedthat ‘[c]onsideration[should]begiventotheestablishmentofan independentconsultativeforumappointedbythetwo[NorthernIrelandandRepublicofIreland]Administrations,representative of civil society.’ The 2006 St Andrew’s Agreement restated this recommendation,stressingthat ‘theNorthern IrelandExecutivewouldsupporttheestablishmentofan independentNorth/South consultative forum’.Butsuchaforumhasneverbeenformallyestablished,despitebeingagreedtobytheNSMCalmosttwodecadesago(NSMC2002:14).

Recommendations

• ConsiderationshouldbegiventoestablishingandgettingoffthegroundaNorthSouthCivicForumsuchasrecommendedbutnotimplementedundertheB/GFAandtheSt.AndrewsAgreement.Thebodyshouldfocusspecificallyongettingstakeholderengagementinmanagingtransition.Thiscouldbearoutethroughwhichcross-borderbodiesorprojectsidentifiedthroughtheNorth-SouthCooperationMappingExercisecouldbeincorporated.

High Level Civil Service Meetings

TheimperativeforcloseandgoodcommunicationbetweencivilservantsinBelfast,DublinandLondonhasbecomequiteevidentthroughtheArticle50process.InadditiontothefrequentmeetingsoftheJointSecretariatoftheBritish-IrishIntergovernmentalConference,theinitiativetoenablemeetingsbetweenPermanentSecretariesfrombothgovernmentsholdparticularvaluenowgiventheabsence

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of regularmeetings for officials andministers at EU levels. Secondly, regularmeetings betweenofficialsfromTheExecutiveOffice(NI)and,atfirst,theDepartmentforExitingtheEUandnowtheCabinetOfficefocusedonmanagingBrexitisanecessaryup-stepincommunication.Theeffectivenessandvalueofsucheast-westmeetingsremainreliantonthequalityofinformationsharedwithintherespectivecivilservices,includingontheprogressionofUK-EUnegotiations.

Recommendations

• Closeandtrustedcommunicationbetweenseniorcivilservantsisvital.Itwouldbeworthexploringmeansofensuringtrilateral(Belfast/Dublin/London)communicationaswellasbilateral(east/westornorth/south)andquadrilateral(amongtheregionsandnationsof theUK).

Local Government

Theimportanceoflocaladministration

IntheabsenceofafunctioninglocaldevolvedgovernmentbetweenJanuary2017andJanuary2020,theworkoflocalauthoritieswascrucialtotheday-to-daylocalgovernanceofNorthernIreland.Inthisrespect,theroleoflocalpoliticiansinmakingpracticaldecisionsaroundgovernanceissues,particularlyintheabsenceofafunctioningExecutive,iswidelyacknowledged.However,localcouncillorsareoftenthemselvesuncertainoftheroletheycanplayandtheextentoftheirinfluence.

FollowingtheReviewofPublicAdministration,NorthernIreland’slocalcouncilswerereducedfrom26to11in2015.Thisoccurredatthesametimeastheresponsibilitiesofindividualcouncilsincreased,withpowersrelatingtoplanning,economicdevelopmentandthepublicrealmbeingtransferredfromcentral to localgovernment.However, ‘Northern Ireland’s localauthoritiesstillhave fewerpowersandresourcesthantheircounterpartsinEngland,ScotlandandWales.[C]urrently,NorthernIreland’slocalgovernmenthas4%ofNorthernIreland’soverallfunding,comparedto27%forbothWalesandScotland’(NIAC2018:41).

Localauthorities inNorthern Irelandplayacritical role in the implementationandoversightofanenormousspectrumofEUregulationsgoverningeverythingfromenvironmentalprotectiontoplanningandbuildingcontrols,employmentrights,and,healthandsafety.Moreover,asignificantproportionofEUStructural,CohesionandPeaceFundsaredisbursedthroughorbylocalauthoritiesinNorthernIreland, in conjunction with a range of government departments, social economy organisations,enterprisepartnersandcross-borderagencies.Furthermore,EUfundingforavarietyofcrossbordercollaborationandserviceshasbeendirectlyrelevanttocouncilsneartheborder.

In2018,theNorthernIrelandAffairsCommitteerecommendedan‘increasedroleforlocalgovernment[to]improvedemocracyandmakegovernanceinNorthernIrelandmorerobustinthefuture’(NIAC2018:43).TheserecommendationschimewiththeanalysisoftheInstituteforGovernmentreportwhichsuggestedthat issuesthatwouldfall to localgovernment inotherpartsoftheUKrestwithministersorcivilservantsinStormont(SargeantandRutter2019:56).

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LocalGovernmentAssociation

TheNorthern Ireland Local Government Association (NILGA)which is the representative body forthe11 localauthorities inNorthern Ireland,working inpartnershipwithotherkeyregionalbodiesandstakeholders,isamemberoftheLocalGovernmentGroupofAssociationsintheUK,ROIandinEuropeandhasongoingliaisonswiththeEUCommitteeoftheRegions.

Furthermore,NILGAcoordinatestheCentral-LocalGovernmentPoliticalForumwhichaimstoassistpolicydeliberationsintheabsenceoffunctioninglocalgovernment,representingNorthernIrelandattheBrexitDeliveryBoardoftheMinistryforHousing,CommunitiesandLocalGovernment.

Localgovernmentnetworks

Therearealsomainlocal-authority-ledcross-bordernetworksanddevelopmentorganisationsmadeup of elected members from all political parties and senior officials from all border region localauthoritiesinbothjurisdictions.ThisincludestheEastBorderRegion(EBR)andtheIrishCentralBorderAreaNetwork(ICBAN).ThesebodiesadministerInterregfunding,amongothers,leadingonaseriesofinfrastructuralandlocaldevelopmentcross-borderprojects.

IntheNorth-Westregion,recentdevelopmentandcross-borderplanshavebeenprogressedonanactive basis by coordination betweenDerry Strabane Council andDonegal County Council. Cross-border cooperation in this sub-region is alsodeveloped through theNorthWest StrategicGrowthPartnership. Thiswas established in 2016 through theNorth SouthMinisterial Council andbringstogetherseniorGovernmentofficialsfromallGovernmentdepartmentsintheRepublicofIrelandandNorthernIrelandtomeetwithDonegalCountyCouncilandDerryCityandStrabaneDistrictCouncil.The intention is todeliveron the strategicprioritiesaimedatbringingabout theNorthWestCityRegion.ThisisfurtherrecognisedintheNDNA(2020).

Localauthoritiesonbothsidesof theborderarealready innetworksandsomealreadyholdcivicforums.LocalcouncilsintheborderregionhaveworkedcollaborativelyinresponsetothechallengesarisingfromBrexit.Thisshouldbedrawnuponintwowayspost-Brexit:(a)utilisingtheforumsforlocalengagementandcross-bordercollaboration,and(b)usingtheirexperienceofbeing‘frontline’whenitcomestomattersthatwillbeaffectedbyBrexit,e.g.accesstolabour.

Recommendations

• TheJointConsultativeWorkingGroupshouldhaveastreamofinputfromlocalauthoritiesonbothsidesoftheIrishborder.

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2. Northern Ireland’s position in the post-Brexit governance of the UK

What the Protocol means for NI’s Status

Article1oftheProtocolstatesthatitis‘withoutprejudicetotheprovisionsofthe1998AgreementregardingtheconstitutionalstatusofNorthernIrelandandtheprincipleofconsent’.Italsoconfirmsthatit‘respectstheessentialStatefunctionsandterritorial integrityoftheUnitedKingdom’.Quiteclearly,theProtocoldoesnotaffecttheconstitutionalstatusofNorthernIreland.

Nonetheless,therehavebeenconcernsraisedabouttheProtocolfromallpartiesinNorthernIrelandandfromthebusinesscommunityrelatingtoitsimplicationsforNorthernIreland’spositionwithintheUK’sinternalmarket.Inresponsetoconcernsfromunionistsinparticularaboutthepreviousversionof the Protocol, the UK Government had issued ‘additional unilateral commitments’ to NorthernIrelandinJanuary2019.16ItissuednosimilardocumentinrelationtothefinalversionoftheProtocol.However, in New Decade New Approach(2020),theGovernmentarticulatesitsabsolutecommitment‘toensuringthatNorthernIrelandremainsanintegralpartoftheUKinternalmarket,inlinewiththeclearguaranteeintheProtocolthatNorthernIrelandremainsinthecustomsterritoryoftheUnitedKingdom’[AnnexA:10].

Thebusiness communityandall parties inNorthern Irelandhave requested that theGovernmentseekstofleshouttheProtocol’sguaranteeofunfetteredaccess fromtheregion intoGreatBritainafterBrexit.TheNDNAcommitstheGovernmenttolegislateforthisandtoensurethatitisinforceby1January2021,i.e.bytheendofthetransitionperiod.TheGovernmentcommits,too,tonegotiatingwiththeEU‘additionalflexibilitiesandsensiblepracticalmeasuresacrossallaspectsoftheProtocol’.ThispicksuponthelanguagethatwehavelongseeninthenegotiationsovertheplaceofNorthernIreland inBrexit (i.e. thequest forwhattheEUreferredtoas ‘flexibleand imaginativesolutions’).However, there is a risk that thiswill be seenas theUKpushing for stretch from the EUwhen itcomestotheUKimplementinginrespectofNorthernIrelanditsobligationsundertheProtocol.Thisisparticularlybecausethisparagraphnotesthatthesemeasuresareto‘maximisethefreeflowoftrade’.

Finallyon this, theGovernmentpromises to ‘engagespecificallywith theExecutiveon theuniquecircumstances of Northern Ireland and the Protocol’ [Annex A:12] but there is no detail on this.ThereisahugeamountoftheProtocolthatreflectstheuniquepositionofNorthernIreland(rightsprotections, north/south cooperation, single electricitymarket, common travel area) that the UKGovernmentcouldbepushingforflexibilityfromtheEUonthatwouldbeintheinterestsofNorthernIreland.

16 ThedocumentalsounilaterallycommittedtheUKgovernmenttootherthingsthatwouldbeconsideredusefulforthisver-sionoftheProtocol,includingtherequirementforconsentfromtheNIAssemblypriortonewareasoflawapplyingtotheProtocol,arolefortheNIExecutivethroughtheUK’smembershipofalltheProtocol’sbodies,andaguaranteethattheUKwillensurethatallengagementanddialogueunderthegovernancearrangementsapplyingtotheWAwillbeconsistentwiththeB/GFA,withnochangetotheroleoftheUKorIrishGovernments.

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It is imperative that theUK implements theProtocolon Ireland/Northern Ireland.This isnotonlybecauseitispartofthelegallybindingWithdrawalAgreement,itisalsotoassuretheEUandotherpotentialnegotiatingpartnersofitsreliability.Furthermore,theB/GFAsetsouttherequirementthatWestminstermust legislatetoensurethattheUK’s internationalobligationswithrespecttoNIaremet.17ThereareconcernsabouttheProtocolfromallpartiesinNorthernIreland;theseneedtobeaddressedthroughthedetailandmeasuresofitsimplementation,notbyitsnon-implementation.

The Role of Westminster

Parliament

The House of Lords EU Committee (2019) pointed to the important role to be played by the UKParliament in goodgovernanceafterBrexit vis-à-vis theUK’s relationshipwith theEU. ThiswouldcomeincontinuingtoscrutiniseEUlegislativeproposals;engagingwithandexaminingtheworkoftheWAandPoliticalDeclaration’sgovernanceandinstitutionalmechanisms;monitoringandscrutinisingthe negotiations on the futureUK-EU relationship; and engaging in enhanced inter-parliamentarydialoguewith theEuropeanParliament,EUMemberStatenationalparliaments,and thedevolvedlegislatures(2019:3).

Delegated powers and the Withdrawal Agreement Act (2020)

ThebreadthofUKExecutivepowerovertheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIrelandisextraordinary.TheProtocolmay requireamendments todomestic lawasEU legislationdevelops. Thiswill be inperpetuityforNorthernIreland.TheWAActwillbethemeansbywhichsuchamendmentswilloccur,primarilythroughtheuseofdelegatedpowers,i.e.thosewhichenableMinisterstoactwithouttheneedforfuturebills.ThepowersarelimitedtothetermsoftheWAitselfbuttheDelegatedPowersandRegulatoryReformCommitteereport(2018)raisesthepointthatthepowercanstillbeusedtodoothersignificantthings(aslongasitisnotinconsistentwiththeWA).

TheWAActcontainspowerstoimplementtheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIrelandthroughStatutoryInstruments (SIs).MostSIscomeunder thenegativeprocedure, inwhichonceanSI is laidbeforeParliament,membershaveasetperiodoftimetoput forwardamotiontoannul it. If there isnomotiontoannulit,anSIautomaticallybecomeslawaftertheperiodends.OtherSIscomeundertheaffirmativeprocedure,whichmeansanSIhastobeapprovedbybothUKParliamentHousesbeforebecominglaw.Effectivescrutinyofthisprocedure,evenwithinParliament,isdifficult.Itrequirestimeandcapacity.

Thepowerstopasssecondary legislation(i.e. throughSIs) intheWAActunderClauses21and22(whicharespecificallyaboutNorthernIreland)areintendedto(i)implementtheProtocoland(ii)toensureunfetteredaccessforNIbusinessesintotheBritishmarket.Forthemostparttheywillusenegativeprocedure. Allregulationsmadeunderclause41(consequentialandtransitionprovision)wouldbesubjecttothenegativeprocedure.

17 TheoneknownprecedentforsuchasituationrelatestothetranspositioninNIlawoftheEUGenderDirective(2004/13/EC)in2007whenUKMinistersintervenedforthemattertobelegislatedforinWestminster (HarveyandHolder2017).

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The fact that there are only 18 NIMPs and the government (which will be putting forward thislegislation)hassuchalargemajority isaconsiderationandshowsthatit isextremelyunlikelythat–even ifallNIMPsweretoobjecttothem–anysuchSIsdealingwithNorthern Irelandcouldbeannulled.Andwhenitcomestochallenging/annullinganSI,NIcannotactaloneifthisisnotwithindevolvedcompetence.Forthemostpart,itwillbeinthehandsofNIMPsinWestminster.

Recommendations

Engagement with Stormont

• Securingthecommitmentandmeansbywhich itcanshapesecondary legislationrelatingtotheWAwouldbeamajoraskfromtheNIA,butitcouldbearguedforonthegroundsoftheexceptionalsignificanceoftheWithdrawalAgreementActforNI.

• The NI Assembly should be consulted on any decision about a potential extension of thetransitionperiod.

• Intheory,thereissomescopefortheProtocolandtheWAtobeamendedbytheJointCommitteetoaddressdeficienciesorunforeseensituations,withthemutualconsentoftheUKandtheEU.18 Theidentificationofsuchproblems–andsolutions–shouldinvolvetheNIdevolvedinstitutionsandwiderstakeholders.

• TheUKgovernmentshouldsystematicallyconsulttheNIExecutiveonpositionstobeadoptedatallWithdrawalAgreementinstitutionsthatareofrelevancetoNorthernIreland.

• ThereshouldbeanAnnualReportpreparedfortheNIAssemblybytheNIExecutiveandtheUKGovernmentontheimplementationoftheProtocol.

• UpdatesofexistinglawscoveredbytheProtocolwillhappenautomatically.TheUKGovernmentshouldconsult theNIAssemblyonadoptionofnewareasofEU lawapplicable in theareascoveredbytheProtocol(aspertheWhitePaper,January2019).

Procedures

• ThereshouldbeanannualdebateintheHouseofCommonsandtheHouseofLordsontheimplementationofProtocol.

• HouseofCommonsNorthernIrelandAffairsCommitteetoreceiveoralandwrittenreportsfromtheUKGovernmentonallissuesrelevanttoNIfollowingeachmeetingoftheJointCommitteeand written summaries of all meetings of the Specialised Committee on Ireland/NorthernIreland.

18 Article64.5.doftheWithdrawalAgreementstatesthattheJointCommitteemay:‘untiltheendofthefourthyearfollowingtheendofthetransitionperiod,adoptdecisionsamendingthisAgreement,provided that such amendmentsarenecessarytocorrecterrors,toaddressomissionsorotherdeficiencies,ortoaddress situations unforeseenwhenthisAgreementwassigned,andprovidedthatsuchdecisionsmaynotamendtheessentialelementsofthisAgreement’[emphasisadded].

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Intergovernmental Dynamics within the UK

TheUnited Kingdom is an ‘asymmetrical, devolved state,with specific settlements for each of itsconstituentnations’(Keating2018a:13).Withinthissystem,‘foundationalissuesaboutsovereignty’have been largely avoided, partly because the EU has provided a common policy framework andreference point which has compensated for the lack of UK-wide provisions (Keating 2018a: 13).Ultimately,thedevolutionsettlementshavereflected‘athree-sidedrelationship,inwhichmanykeypowersareexercisedneitherinWestminster,norinEdinburgh,CardiffandBelfast,butinBrussels’(House of Lords 2017: 9/10); ‘The EU has, in effect, been the glue holding together the UnitedKingdom’ssinglemarket’(HouseofLords2017:10).

Asidefromthis,intergovernmentalrelationshipswithintheUKhavebeeninformallystructured,andareunderpinnedbyMemorandaofUnderstandingandbilateralconcordatsbetweentheUKandeachdevolvedgovernment.TheemancipationfromEUlawthatBrexitrequiresis,therefore,adifficulttask,particularlywhere‘complexoverlappingcentral,devolvedandsharedcompetenciesareconcerned’(HouseofLords2017:12).

AchallengeregardingNorthernIreland’sfuturegovernancearrangementsstemsfromthe‘repatriation’ofcompetencestothedevolvedregions.Clause11oftheEUWithdrawalAct2018stipulatedthatcontroloverareaswhereEUanddevolvedlawoverlapwouldbepassedtothedevolvedinstitutions.However, UKministers canmake regulations that ‘freeze’ the ability of devolved governments tochangethelawinsomeareas.InsuchcasesWestminsterwillretaincontrolpendingagreementonwhatwillreplaceEUlaw(IfG2018).

‘Many of the concerns expressed by devolved institutions in relation to the European Union(Withdrawal)Billwereaddressedthroughamendments.Evenso,theBilleventuallypassedintolawwithoutthelegislativeconsentoftheScottishParliament’(PACAC2018:4).TheScottishGovernmentinparticularhasworriedthatpolicyareascoveredbythenewministerialregulationsunderClause11wouldbe treatedbyUKministersas ‘reserved’ rather thandevolved,even if these regulationsare meant to be temporary in nature. Similarly, the Welsh Assembly (2019a, b) has expressedconcernswithestablishingagooddegreeofscrutinyoverthedevelopmentof legislativeandnon-legislativecommonframeworks,aswellasovertherepresentationofWelshinterestsinanyfutureUKinternationalnegotiations.Andwhenitwasrestored,thefirstsubstantivedebateoftheNorthernIrelandAssembly(takingplaceon20January2020)concludedwithunanimouslyagreeingamotiontodenyconsenttothepassingoftheWithdrawalAgreementBillbytheUKParliament.

CommonFrameworks

The UK Government initially published a list of 153 areas where EU and devolved law currentlyintersect, in someofwhichnewUK-wide frameworks (legislative andnon-legislative)would likelyberequiredafterBrexitinordertopreventundesirabledegreesofinternalUKregulatoryandpolicydivergence.19ARevisedFrameworksAnalysisbytheCabinetOffice(2019:4-5) shows‘anincreasein

19 ‘Oneofthekeyreasonsthesenewagreementsarenecessaryistoensurethefunctioningofthe‘UKinternalmarket’,byavoidingnewbarrierstodoingbusinessacrosstheUKandunfaircompetitionbetweenbusinessesbasedindifferentpartsoftheUK.FrameworkswillalsobeimportantenablersfortheUKgovernmentastheypursuenewinternationalagreementsandtradedeals’(Thimont-Jacketal.2018:3).

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thenumberofpolicyareas’(from153to160)‘andsomechangeinthenumberofpolicyareasineachcategory’,asfollows:

• Can be immediately devolved: 63 areas (increased from 49), comprising aspects oftransport,environmentalandenergypolicy;

• Non-legislative common frameworks: requiredin78areas(reducedfrom82)i.e.voluntaryarrangement between central and devolved governments to cooperate in these areaswhichwillnotbeenforcedinlaw.Theseincludeaspectsofjusticeandpolicing.‘Insomeof these areas, consistent fixes to retained EU law (made using secondary legislation)willcreateaunifiedbodyofUKlawalongsidethenon-legislativeframeworkagreement’(CabinetOffice2019:22);

• Binding ‘legislative common frameworks’:maybeneededforagroupof21areas(reducedfrom24),inwholeorinpart,inorder‘topreservethefunctioningoftheUKinternalmarketortoensuretheGovernmentcanimplementtradeandotherinternationalagreements’Thimont-Jack et al. 2018: 2). These include policy areas such as agricultural support,animalwelfareandfisheriesmanagementandsupport,within the responsibilityof theDepartmentfortheEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs(DEFRA);

• Reserved policy areas: confinedto4policyareas, includingStateAid (althoughseeourdiscussionfurtherbelowregardingtheProtocolonIreland/NortherIrelandarrangementswithrespecttoStateAid/Agriculturalsubsidiesuntiltheendofthetransitionperiod),FoodGeographicalIndications,ElementsofProductSafetyandStandardsRelatingtoExplosiveAtmospheresandDataSharing(Eurodac).Theseareasremainsubjecttoongoingdiscussionwiththedevolvedadministrations.20

Oftheabovelist,157devolvedpolicyareasapplytoNorthernIreland,mostofwhichfallunderrelevantSectionsandAnnexesoftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland(WA).

Oftheabovelist,157devolvedpolicyareasapplytoNorthernIreland,mostofwhichfallunderrelevantSectionsandAnnexesoftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland(WA).

All thissuggeststhatthedisentanglementfromEUlawwhich isassociatedwithBrexitwill requirethestrengtheningofinternalUK-widegovernancemechanismsforpolicycoordinationbetweentheconstituentregionsoftheUK.Onerelevanttothistasklevelofgovernanceconcernstheinstitutionsofintergovernmentalrelationships.

20 Twopolicyareasappeartwiceinthisanalysis,albeitindifferentcategories(CabinetOffice2019).

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The Joint Ministerial Committee

TheJMC(EN)

A Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) between the devolved Governments/Executives and the UKGovernmentisconvenedonanad hocbasis.ThestructureoftheJMCanditstermsofreferencewereestablishedonthebasisoftheUK’smembershipoftheEU.Assuch,ithasbeenstronglyrecommendedthatthefourgovernmentsshouldurgentlyreviewhowtheJMC’sstructureandprinciplesofoperationmaybereformed(PACAC2018;Thimont-Jacketal.2018).

Todate, the fourgovernments’positionvis-à-visBrexitnegotiationshasbeen representedat JMClevel through a Joint Ministerial Committee (European Negotiations) (JMC-EN),establishedaftertheprecedentoftheJointMinisterialCommittee(Europe)(JMC-E),whichmeetsregularlytodiscusstheUK line in EUnegotiationswheredevolved competences are involved. The JMC-ENdoesnot takedecisionsbutmerelyconsultsthedevolvedadministrations(Keating2018a:16).

TheJMC(EN)hasagreedthreebroadprinciplesinrelationtotheproposedestablishmentofUK-wideframeworksinthedevolvedpolicyareascurrentlymanagedatEUlevel:

• ThattheywillbeemployedtofulfilfunctionsrelatedtotheUK’sinternalmarket,internationalobligations,internationalagreementsandtradedeals,cross-borderjusticeissues,themanagementofcommonresources,andsecurity;

• Theywouldrespectthedevolutionsettlementsandthedemocraticaccountabilityofthedevolvedlegislatures;and

• TheywillrecognisetheeconomicandsociallinkagesbetweenNorthernIrelandandIreland,whilstadheringtotheBelfast/GoodFridayAgreement(McEwenetal.2018).

NorthernIreland’sdisadvantagewithoutasittingAssembly

Inourworkgroups for thisprojectandwider research,wehave foundgeneral consensus that theJMC(EN)didnotworkwell–andcertainlynotashadbeenanticipatedat thestart.ThedevolvedadministrationsperceivetheretobetoolittlesharingofinformationbytheUKgovernmentandanoutstandingneedforbetterprioritisationofissuesastheycomeforquadrilateralconsideration.21Itwasalsorecognisedthat,duringtheabsenceofdevolvedgovernment,NorthernIreland’srepresentationthrough civil servants at such committeeswas limited to the feeding of information, rather thannegotiation.ThiswasseenasadisadvantagetoNorthernIreland,althoughtheJMC(EN)wasneverconceivedofasadecision-makingbodyperse.

21 AgoodreportofinvestigationintotheworkingsoftheJMCandlimitationsoftheJMC(EN)waspublishedearlyonintheBrexitprocessbytheHouseofLordsEUCommittee(2017)andanumberofitsconclusionsremainvalid(https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/9/910.htm).

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ChallengestotheworkoftheJMCafterBrexit

ThereareseveralkeychallengestotheworkoftheJMCafterBrexit,giventhepressureplacedonintergovernmentalrelationsbytheprocess.

• Reachingagreementonnewframeworks(toreplaceEUlegislationapplicabletothedevolvedpolicyareascurrentlymanagedatEUlevel);

• ‘[D]etermininghowdisagreementsordisputesaretobemanaged’inthefuture(IfG2018:5);

• Distributingnewfunding(toreplaceEUfunds)betweenthedevolvedregions/nations;

• CoordinatingUK-wideinputintointernationalnegotiations;and

• EstablishingnewregulatorsandpublicbodiesacrosstheUKtoreplacetheroleofEUagenciesmanagingtheimplementationoffunctionscurrentlyexercisedbytheEU.

ThesechallengesnodoubtrequirereformoftheJMC.22

Recommendations

• TheUKGovernmentshouldincreasethefrequencyandimportanceofmeetingsoftheJointMinisterialCommittee(JMC)tohelpcoordinateBrexitamongthedevolvedregionsandnations.

• NewthematiccommitteesshouldbeestablishedundertheJMC,includingoninternalandinternationaltradeandrelations,ensuringacoherentUKdomesticapproachwhilecloselyreflectingtheinterestsandpositionsofthedevolvedregions.

• ThefourgovernmentswithintheUKshouldestablishanewJMCsub-committeeoninternationaltrade.23

UK Intergovernmental Relations

Brexit propelled the already-present belief among the devolved governments and administrationsthattherewasaneedtoimprovearrangementsfortheconductofintergovernmentalrelationsacrosstheUK(ScottishGovernment2018).AreviewofintergovernmentalrelationswascommissionedbytheJointMinisterialCommittee(Plenary)on14March2018.On3July2019thethenMinisterforthe CabinetOffice and Chancellor of theDuchy of Lancaster David Lidington presented awrittenstatement in Parliamentwith details of draft principles for intergovernmental relations onwhich,heexplained,aworkinggroupofrepresentativesofall fourdevolvedadministrationscontinuedtoworkclosely.24TheprinciplesweretobepresentedforformaladoptiontoafutureJointMinisterialCommittee (Plenary)and, subject to thetimingof its re-establishment, toanewNorthern Ireland

22 TheNationalAssemblyofWales(2018)recommendedfundamentalreformtotheJMCtobecomeadecision-makingUKcouncil,withpropertransparencyandaccountabilityinitsoperation.

23 Asrecommendedbynumberofanalysts(IfG2018;McEwenetal2018).24 Availablefrom:https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/

Commons/2019-07-03/HCWS1687/(accessed8May2020).

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Executiveforitsendorsement.25Furtherworkonthereviewofintergovernmentalrelationsincludesagreeingajointplanofnextsteps,anddevelopingacleartimelineforworkonavoidingdisputesandondevelopinganindependentelementinanyfutureintergovernmentaldisputeresolution.

TheprinciplesbuilduponandsitalongsidetheexistingMemorandaofUnderstanding(MoU)betweenthegovernmentsandwillinformitsfuturedevelopment.Theyinclude:

• Maintainingpositiveandconstructiverelations,basedonmutualrespectfortheresponsibilitiesofgovernmentsacrosstheUKandtheirsharedroleinthegovernance oftheUK;

• Buildingandmaintainingtrust,basedoneffectivecommunication;

• Sharinginformationandrespectingconfidentiality;

• Promotingunderstandingof,andaccountabilityfor,theirinter-governmentalactivity;

• Resolvingdisputesaccordingtoaclearandagreedprocess.

TheScottishandWelshGovernmentssentajointlettertoDavidLidingtonon4July2019callingforimmediate steps to improve ‘the current ‘weakand ineffective’ government structures, guaranteerespect for devolved responsibilities and strengthen the dispute resolution process.’26 The letterexpressedtheviewthatlittleprogresshasbeenmadebythereview.

Capacity in the Civil Service

ThereisaneedtoassessUKgovernmentalandorganisationalcapacitytosustainengagementwithNorthern Ireland-specific issues through withdrawal. The ‘bandwidth’ available in Whitehall andtheUK government generally is amatterof concern given (i) the complexity of the futureUK-EUnegotiations,(ii)theadditionalcomplicationofotherFTAnegotiationand(iii)theuniquesituationforNorthernIrelandafterthetransitionperiodandundertheoperationoftheProtocol.Keytoquestionsofcapacityarerelationshipsbetweengovernmentdepartments,bothregionalandcentral,someofwhichhaveflourished(notablyDAERA-DEFRA)andothersofwhichhavebeenslowertodevelop.

ThegrowthofsuchlinksisshapedbytheneedforNorthernIreland-specificlegislationtobedevelopedin Whitehall as part of the withdrawal process. Greater understanding of Northern Ireland andinstitutionalmemoryisbeingdevelopedinWhitehallandgovernmentdepartments,andstakeholdersandworkshopparticipantsreportedincreasinglevelsoftrustandcommunicationthroughcivilservanttocivil servantcontactsbetweenWhitehallandtheNICS.However,churn inWhitehall,conflictingpriorities betweendepartments, and limited exchangeof informationbothwithinWhitehall itselfandwithdevolvedadministrations(notablyScotland)haveplacedconstraintsoneffectiveness.Theabsenceofplanningassumptionsforpost-BrexitUKhasmadeitdifficulttoproceedandhasledtofurtherinternaldivergence.

25 SeeUpdateoncommonframeworksandintergovernmentalrelations:Writtenstatement-HCWS1687.Availablefrom:https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2019-07-03/HCWS1687/(accessed8May2020).

26 SeeBrexitBriefNewsletter,July2019.TheNorthernIrelandAssembly.Availablefrom:http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assem-bly-business/brexit-brief/brexit-brief-newsletters/issue-11--july-2019/(accessed8May2020).

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The UK needs to undertake a proper assessment of trade implications arising from the Withdrawal Agreement and future UK-EU Agreement(s) that includes devolved administrations who would be instrumental in providing information, analysis and evidence. There is, however, a lack of clarityregardingtheextentandmeansofinvolvementofdevolvedadministrationsinfuturenegotiationswiththeEU,includinginareasbeyondtradeandsecurity.Despitetheabovediscussedprocessofreviewingintergovernmental relations,and theexpressdiscontentof theScottishandWelshadministrationswiththeprogressofreviewsofar,nopropermechanismshavebeenputinplaceasyettoallowavoicetothedevolvedadministrations.

AtpresenttherelationshipbetweentheUKandthedevolvedgovernmentsinthefieldofinternationalrelationsinparticularisdescribedinanon-bindingMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU),appendedtowhichareconcordatsbindinginhonoursonly.TheseestablisharrangementsfortheUKGovernmenttoconsultthedevolvedadministrationsinformulatingtheUK’spositionforinternationalnegotiations,onlyinsofarasnegotiationsconcerndevolvedmatters.Unsurprisingly,andparticularlyinthecontextofBrexit,therehasbeenconcernamongdevolvedadministrationwithestablishingahigherlevelofscrutinyandinfluenceoversignificantfutureUKinternationalagreements.27

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3. Using new governance mechanisms after Brexit

The Bodies of the Withdrawal Agreement

Three new bodies each comprised of representatives from the EU and UK will have importantresponsibilitiesregardingtheimplementationoftheProtocolonIreland/N.Ireland:

• TheJointCommittee;

• TheSpecialisedCommitteeonissuesrelatedtotheimplementationoftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland;

• TheJointConsultativeWorkingGroup.

TheRulesofProcedurefortheJointCommitteeandSpecialisedCommitteesaresetoutinAnnexVIIIoftheWithdrawalAgreement.

AsaHouseofLordsEuropeanUnionCommitteeReport(2019:3)noted,theeffectivenessofthesethreebodies‘willdependonthefrequencyoftheirmeetings,theflexibilityoftheirremit,seniorpoliticalrepresentationonboth sides, andamutual commitment toeffective communication, appropriatepowers,andfullaccountability’.

The Joint Committee

TheoperationoftheJointCommittee

ThebodywithoverallresponsibilityformanagingtheimplementationoftheWithdrawalAgreement(WA) is the JointCommittee. It alsohas specific responsibilities relating to theProtocol. The JointCommittee is co-chaired by European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and the UKChancelloroftheDuchyofLancaster,theRtHonMichaelGove.Itcanalsobechairedbyhigh-levelofficialsdesignatedtoactastheiralternates.

The Secretariat of the Joint CommitteeshallbecomposedofanofficialoftheEuropeanCommissionandanofficialoftheUKGovernment.Whereappropriateandbydecisionoftheco-chairs,expertsorothersmaybeinvitedtoattendmeetingsoftheJointCommitteeinordertoprovideinformationonaparticularsubject.TheJointCommitteeshallholditsmeetingsalternatelyinBrusselsandLondon,unless the co-chairsdecideotherwise. Itsfirstmeetingwasheldon30March2020. It is tomeetatleastonceayear,andattherequestoftheUnionortheUnitedKingdom.AccordingtoRulesofProcedurefortheJointCommittee(AnnexVIII),theprovisionalagendaforallmeetingsoftheJointCommitteearetoincludeitemsrequestedbytheUnionortheUnitedKingdom.

ThepurposeoftheJointCommittee(seeArticle164oftheWA)istogoverntheimplementationandapplicationoftheWA.Assetoutinparagraph3ofArticle166,theJointCommitteewillmakeallitsdecisionsandrecommendations‘bymutualconsent’oftheparties.Inotherwords,itcannotactiftheUnitedKingdomdoesnotagree.

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TheUKandtheEUareobligedtoimplementtheJointCommittee’sdecisions,whichwillhavethesamelegaleffectastheWithdrawalAgreementitself(seeArticle166).IntheabsenceofagreementonanissueattheJointCommittee,underArticle170,theissuewillthenbereferredtothearbitrationpanel,whosedecisionwillbefinalandbinding.AtnopointisthereanobligationfortheUKorEuropeanParliamentstodiscusssuchissues,andtheywillnotbeaskedorrequiredtoratifydecisionstakenbytheJointCommitteeasarule.

BoththeUKParliamentandtheEuropeanParliamentexpecttobeabletoundertakescrutinyoftheworkof the JointCommitteebut thiswillnotoperate in termsofdirectaccountability. Instead, itarisesfromthefactthatMinistersorotherswillattendtheJointCommitteewithamandatefromParliament. Secondly, a decision that constitutes an amendment to part of the treaty or replacespartofthetreatymadebytheJointCommitteewouldrequireratification(HouseofLordsDebate20March2019,c1436).

TheremitoftheJointCommittee

TheJointCommitteehasflexiblepowersandresponsibilitiesenablingittosupervise and facilitate the overallWA.Theseinclude:

• decidingonthetasksoftheSpecialisedCommitteesandsupervisingtheirwork;

• ‘preventingproblems’andresolvingdisputesthatemerge;

• considering‘anymatterofinterest’relatingtotheWA;

• establishingnewSpecialisedCommittees,orremovingcommitteesasrequired;

• issuinganannualreportonthefunctioningoftheWA.

IntheanalysisofCurtisetal.(2019),inrelationtotheIreland/NorthernIrelandProtocol,theJointCommitteehasresponsibilityto:

• CarryoutseveraltasksbeforetheendofthetransitionperiodthatincludeagreeingdefinitionsandcriteriaapplyingtocustomsprocessinginNorthernIreland[Art5(2)];

• Establishtheconditionsunderwhichcertain‘fisheryandaquacultureproducts’areexemptfromcustomsduties[Art5(3)];

• OverseeimplementationofthenewVATandexciseregime,includingtoregularly‘discusstheimplementation’oftheProtocol’sVATandExciseprovisions(Art8);

• SetuptheleveltowhichproductionofandtradeinagriculturalgoodsinNorthernIrelandwouldbeexemptedfromstateaidcontrols;

• DecidebytheendofthetransitionperiodonthecriteriafortheriskassessmentofgoodsenteringNorthernIrelandfromGreatBritainorfromoutsidetheEUwhichmaythenenterthesinglemarket;and

• MakerecommendationstotheUKandtheEUincasetheNorthernIrelandAssemblyfailstogive‘democraticconsent’fortheregiontocontinuetoabidebythearrangementsforcustoms,themovementofgoodsandaspectsofparticipationintheEUsinglemarket(undereitherthestandardorthealternativeprocessarrangedforintheProtocolatspecifiedpointsintime).

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Themonitoring/reviewroleoftheJointCommittee

Furthermore,theJointCommitteecarriesanextraordinaryresponsibilitywhenitcomestokeepingunderconstantreviewthreedynamicprocesses.28First,relatingtothemovementofgoodstoandfromNorthernIreland,accordingtoArticle6(2)oftheProtocol,itistoreviewthefacilitationoftradewithintheUnitedKingdom:

HavingregardtoNorthern Ireland’s integralplace in theUnitedKingdom’s internalmarket,the Union and the United Kingdom shall use their best endeavours to facilitate the tradebetween Northern Ireland and other parts of the United Kingdom, in accordance withapplicable legislationandtaking intoaccounttheir respectiveregulatoryregimesaswellastheimplementationthereof.TheJointCommitteeshallkeeptheapplicationofthisparagraphunderconstantreviewandshalladoptappropriaterecommendationswithaviewtoavoidingcontrolsattheportsandairportsofNorthernIrelandtotheextentpossible.

Secondly,ithasthecompetencetoreviewtheapplicationoftherulesrelatingtoVATandExciseassetoutintheProtocol(Article8):

TheJointCommitteemayreviewtheapplicationofthisArticle,takingintoaccountNorthernIreland’sintegralplaceintheUnitedKingdom’sinternalmarket,andmayadoptappropriatemeasuresasnecessary.

According to Curtis et al. (2019: 26), ‘such a review role suggests that the Joint Committee willoverseeimplementationofthenewVATandexciseregimebeforethetransitionperiodendsaswellasafterwards’.

Thirdly,relatingtocross-bordercooperationontheislandofIreland,accordingtoArticle11(2)oftheProtocol:

TheJointCommitteeshallkeepunderconstantreviewtheextenttowhichtheimplementationandapplicationofthisProtocolmaintainsthenecessaryconditionsforNorth-Southcooperation.TheJointCommitteemaymakeappropriaterecommendationstotheUnionandtheUnitedKingdominthisrespect,includingonarecommendationfromtheSpecialisedCommittee.

This means that the review role of the Joint Committee is potentially pivotal to the future governance of Northern Ireland, including in relation to its position vis-à-vis both Britain and Ireland.

AsubstantialcommitmentintheNew Decade, New ApproachdocumentcomesintheformoftheUKGovernment’scommitmentto‘ensurethatrepresentativesfromtheNorthernIrelandExecutiveareinvitedtobepartoftheUKdelegation’inmeetingsoftheUK-EUJointCommittee.TheseinvitationswillhappenonlyininstanceswheretheCommitteeconcernedisdiscussingNorthernIreland-specificmatters and which are ‘also attended by the Irish Government as part of the European Union’sdelegation’.

AllactionandfinaldecisionsrelatingtoissuesarisingfromtheimplementationoftheProtocolwillbeinthehandsoftheJointCommittee.

28 TheUKandEUmayalsorequesttheJointCommitteereviewssafeguardmeasures(Annex7[5]oftheProtocol).

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Recommendations

• ItisimperativethattheUKnotonlyadherestoitscommitmenttohaverepresentativesfromtheNIExecutivepresentatrelevantmeetingsoftheJointCommittee,butthatitensuresthatthemostismadeofthiscommitment.Forexample,thereneedstobeclosecommunicationbetweentheNIExecutiveandtheUKdelegationinformingapositionpriortothemeeting.

• TheUnitedKingdomshouldconsultwiththeNorthernIrelandExecutive(andotherdevolvedgovernments)aboutitemsthatshouldbeontheagendaforthemeetingsoftheJointCommittee.Thisshouldhappeninatimelymanner.

• GiventheimportanceoftheworkoftheJointCommitteefortheimplementationoftheProtocol,theUKandEUshould,wherereasonable,usetheirpowers(aspertheRulesofProcedure)todecidetomaketheagenda,oranypartthereof,publicbeforethebeginningofthemeeting.

If devolution is functioning:

• FirstMinisterandDeputyFirstMinistershouldattendallmeetingsoftheJointCommitteeheldataministeriallevelwherethosemeetingsdiscussNorthernIreland,andthenreportonallmeetingstoarelevantcommitteeoftheNIAssembly.

• TheNIExecutivecouldhavespeakingrightsfortheFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinisteratallrelevantmeetingsoftheJointCommittee.

• TheJointCommittee’sannualreportshouldbeconsideredbytheNIAssemblyaswellastheUKparliament.

• NIExecutiveshouldreceiveallUKgovernmentpapersrelatingtomeetingsoftheJointCommittee.TheExecutiveshouldalsobeconsultedbytheUKgovernmentinadvanceofallissuesofrelevancetoNItobediscussedbytheJointCommittee.

• NIExecutivecouldbeallowedtoadviseonwhichexpertsshouldaccompanytheFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinisterorseniorofficialstomeetings.

In the absence of devolution:

• RepresentationshouldasaminimumbeensuredthroughseniorofficialsfromtheNICS.WhentheJointCommitteemeetsatministeriallevel,representationforNIshouldbethroughtheSecretaryofStateforNI.

• TheNorthernIrelandOfficeshouldestablishconsultativesectoralforainwhichrelevantinterestsfromNorthernIrelandcanberepresentedandtheNorthernIrelandvoiceestablishedfortheSecretaryofStatetorepresentatmeetingsoftheJointCommittee.

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The Specialised Committee on Ireland/Northern Ireland

TheoperationoftheSpecialisedCommittees

TheJointCommitteeissupportedbysixSpecialisedCommitteesco-chairedbyrepresentativesoftheEUandUK.TheassumptionisthatthosesittingontheSpecialisedCommitteeswillbeseniorofficialsratherthanelectedrepresentatives.ItisstandardpracticeinEUrelationswithnon-memberstatesthatinbodiessubordinatetothemaindecisionmakingbody–heretheJointCommittee–theCommissionrepresentstheEUandseniorgovernmentofficials(notministers)representthenon-memberstate.ThereisaSpecialisedCommitteeonissuesrelatedtotheimplementationoftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland.Theotherfivecommittees,manywithdirectrelevanceforIreland/NorthernIreland,are:

• Committeeoncitizens’rights;• Committeeontheotherseparationprovisions;• CommitteeonissuesrelatedtotheSovereignBaseAreasinCyprus;• CommitteeonissuesrelatedtotheimplementationoftheProtocolonGibraltar;• Committeeonthefinancialprovisions.

AccordingtoArticle165of theWithdrawalAgreement,unless theco-chairsdecideotherwise, theSpecialised Committees shall meet at least once a year but additional meetings may be held attherequestoftheEU,theUKoroftheJointCommittee.ThemeetingscheduleandagendaoftheSpecialisedCommitteesshallbesetbymutualconsent.

According to Art.165(3), ‘The Union and the United Kingdom shall ensure that their respectiverepresentativeson theSpecialisedCommitteeshave theappropriateexpertisewith respect to theissuesunderdiscussion’.IntheNew Decade, New Approachdocument,theUKcommittedtoallowingrepresentatives,presumablyofficialsfromtheNICivilService,toattendtheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland(whichisabodycomposedofofficialsoverseeingtheoperationoftheProtocol) [AnnexA:9].Asper the JointCommittee, these invitationswill happenonly in instanceswhere theCommittee concerned is discussingNorthern Ireland-specificmatters andwhich is alsoattendedbyIrishdelegates.

TheSpecialisedCommitteemayalsoreceiveproposalsfromtheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncilandsixNorthSouthImplementationBodiesandfromtheNorthernIrelandHumanRightsCommission,theEqualityCommissionforNorthernIreland,andtheJointCommitteeofrepresentativesoftheHumanRightsCommissionsofNorthernIrelandandIreland.Inthisway,theNorthernIrelandExecutivewillnothaveadirectinputintotheworkoftheSpecialisedCommitteeexceptwhereinvitedtobepartoftheUK’sdelegationorwhencomethroughtheNSMC.

Recommendations

• TheUKshouldconsiderincludingrepresentativesfromNorthernIrelandindelegationstootherSpecialisedCommitteeswhentheyarediscussingmattersofdirectrelevancetoNorthernIreland,e.g.whentheSpecialisedCommitteeoncitizens’rightsisdiscussingfrontierworkers.

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TheremitoftheSpecialisedCommitteeonissuesrelatedtotheimplementationoftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland

From the entry into force of theWithdrawal Agreement, the Specialised Committee on Ireland/NorthernIrelandwillberesponsiblefor:

• facilitatingtheimplementationandapplicationoftheProtocol;

• examiningproposalsregardingtheimplementationandapplicationoftheProtocolfromtheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil(NSMC)anditssixNorthSouthImplementationbodies,whichcoveraspectsofpolicyandgovernancerelatingtotransport,agriculture,education,health,environment,andtourism.TheseincludeWaterwaysIreland,theFoodSafetyPromotionBoard,SEUPBandInterTradeIreland;

• considering‘anymatterofrelevance’broughttoitsattentionbydesignatedbodiesrelatingtotheimplementationoftheProtocol’shumanrightsprovisions;

• abroaderpowertodiscuss‘anypoint…ofrelevance’totheProtocolthat‘givesrisetoadifficulty’,asraisedbyeithertheUKorEU;

• makingrecommendationstotheJointCommitteeasregardsthefunctioningoftheProtocol.

With regularmeetings, theSpecialisedCommitteewill be themainvehicle forworkanddialoguerelating to Ireland/Northern Ireland after Brexit. The nature of its work ensures the respectivedelegationsareanticipatedtocontainmostlyexpertsratherthanpoliticalrepresentation.

The Withdrawal Agreement (Art.165[4]) notes that ‘The creation or existence of a specialisedcommitteeshallnotpreventtheUnionortheUnitedKingdomfrombringinganymatterdirectlytotheJointCommittee.’ItisimportantthattheexistenceoftheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland isnotallowedtoslowdownamatter that requiresahigh-leveldecisionbymutualconsent,ratherthanarecommendation.OnemightexpectthatsuchanissuearisesfromadirectconcernfromIreland.

Recommendations

• Assumingthelevelofrepresentationisofficials,NorthernIrelandshouldberepresented,withspeakingrights,inallmeetingsoftheSpecialisedCommitteebyrelevantseniorofficialsfromtheNorthernIrelandCivilService.

• Itwouldbeusefulifaseriesofthemed/sectoralgroupscouldbeestablishedundertheSpecialisedCommitteeinordertofocusexpertiseonthedifferentpartsandimplicationsoftheProtocol.ThiswouldenablebetterscopefordirectrepresentationfromNorthernIrelandstakeholdersandexperts.

• ThereshouldbemandatorycommunicationofCommissionproposalsrelevanttothefunctioningoftheProtocoltotheSpecialisedCommittee.

• Expertsorotherpersonscanbeinvitedtoprovideinformationonspecificsubjects.TheNIExecutiveshouldbepermittedtodeterminewhichexpertsandotherpersonswithsubjectexpertiseshouldaccompanyseniorofficialstomeetings.

• NIAssemblyshouldreceivereportsfromUKgovernmentandNIExecutiveonallmeetingsofSpecialisedCommittee.

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Joint Consultative Working Group

TheoperationoftheJCWG

ReportingtotheSpecialisedCommitteeonissuesrelatedtotheimplementationoftheProtocolistheJointConsultativeWorkingGroup(JCWG).Theworkinggroupcomesintobeingonexitday,buttheprovisionthatitmeets‘atleastonceamonth’doesnotcomeintoforceuntiltheProtocolisenacted(Curtisetal.2019:54).TheJCWGexchangesinformationandactsasaforumformutualconsultationinrespectoftheProtocolbetweentheUKandtheEU.Thefocusison‘planned,on-goingandfinalrelevantimplementationmeasures’relatingtochangesinEUorUKactscoveredbytheProtocol.

TheworkinggroupshallbecomposedofrepresentativesoftheEUandtheUnitedKingdomandshallcarryoutitsfunctionsunderthesupervisionoftheSpecialisedCommittee,towhichitshallreport.AswiththeotherProtocolbodiesandcommittees,themake-upoftheUKdelegationpotentiallyincludesrolesforNorthernIrelandofficialsand/orrepresentatives.

Theworkinggroupshallbeco-chairedbytheEUandtheUnitedKingdom,andshallmeetatleastonceamonth,unlessotherwisedecidedbytheEUandtheUnitedKingdombymutualconsent.

ThepotentialvalueoftheJCWG

The JCWGwill be an important body for ensuring the interests ofNorthern Ireland feature in EUconsultative fora. Itwillmeetmore frequently thaneither the JointCommitteeor theSpecialisedCommitteeandsohaspotentialforprovidingofficialsfromNorthernIrelandwithvaluableopportunitiestodevelopnetworksofcontactswithEUofficials.ThiscansupplementotherinformalmechanismsforensuringNorthernIrelandinterestsarefedaseffectivelyaspossibleintoEUdecision-makingprocess.

Given the loosely definednature the Joint ConsultativeWorkingGroup (JCWG), there is a lack ofclarityregardinghowitwouldactuallywork,especiallygiventhattherulesofprocedureforthisbodywereyettobedefined.ThisneedstobedonecarefullytoavoidtensionswithsomeoftheexistingbodiescreatedundertheB/GFAoverwhohasjurisdictionovercertainissues.AndalthoughtheJCWGprovidespotentialroutesforinfluencewiththeEU,itisstillonlyconsultationasathirdstate.Therearesomemeanstoensureitfunctionsaswellaspossible,fromNorthernIreland’spointofview.

Recommendations

• ThereshouldasaruleberepresentationfromrelevantB/GFAStrandIIandStrandIIIbodiesatJCWGmeetings.

• Asecretariat,orperhapsarapporteur,couldbeestablishedtotryandfilteroutsomeofthemorepoliticisedorinconsequentialcontributionsabodysuchastheJCWGislikelytoattract.Suchapositionwouldhavetobeentirelyapoliticalandtechnical,andwouldberesponsibleforinvestigatingsubmissionstotheJCWGfortheirvalidityandrelevancetothebody’sremit.29

29 OnemodelrecommendedforthisbodywastheDutchmodelofrapporteursonBrexit,whoperformasimilarfunction.

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• TheJCWGcouldadoptasocialpartnershipapproach,asanabsenceofcivilsocietyrepresentativesfromthebodycouldpotentiallyhaveseriousrepercussionsforitslegitimacy.30

• Theaccessof‘experts’totheJCWGshouldnotbelimitedto‘officials’butbespecifiedmorepreciselyintermsofinterestgroups.Suchgroupsmustbeinclusiveofhumanrightsbodies.Itisalsorecommendedthatseniorrepresentativesofprofessional/umbrellabodiesfortherespectivesectorsareidentifiedas‘theexperts’toappearinfrontofJCWG.

• TheJointCommittee,SpecialisedCommitteeandJCWGshouldprovideregulardetailedreportsonProtocol’simplementationtotheNSMC,North/SouthInter-ParliamentaryAssociationandBritish-IrishParliamentaryAssemblyandanyNIorcross-borderforumforsocialdialogue.RepresentativesoftheJointConsultativeWorkingGrouparetocomefromtheUKandtheEU.Iftherulesfollowthoseofothercommittees,therepresentativesfrombothsideswillhave‘appropriateexpertisewithrespecttotheissuesunderdiscussion’.

• Participationinmeetingsshouldnotbelimitedtoofficials.ToensureeffectiverepresentationofsectoralexpertisefromNorthernIrelandparticipantsshouldincluderepresentativesofrelevanttradeandprofessionalbodiesandinterestgroups.

• EffectiveoversightoftheJCWGshouldbeestablished,withUKrepresentativesreportingorallyandinwritingtotherelevantcommitteeoftheNIAssembly.

• MechanismsshouldbeestablishedwithinNorthernIrelandtoensurethatrelevanttradeandprofessionalbodiesandinterestgroupsareconsultedbyofficialsfromNorthernIrelandattendingmeetingsoftheJCWG.

Arbitration Panel and the CJEU

Reachingconsensusondisputesarising fromtheWA isacore functionof the JointCommittee. If,however, consensus is not possible an arbitration process is codified within theWA. ArbitrationcommencesifafterthreemonthsnoresolutiontoadisputesenttotheJointCommitteehasbeenreachedbyconsensus.TheEUorUKmustformallylodgethespecificcomplaintwiththeotherpartyand the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Then, under an arbitrationprocedure, the Joint Committee would be required to establish an arbitration panel. Nomineeswould‘possessthequalificationsrequiredforappointmenttothehighestjudicialoffice’,andpossessspecialistknowledgeorexperienceofEUandinternationallaw.

Thepanelwouldusuallybeexpectedtoissueabindingdecisionwithintwelvemonths.Ifeitherpartyfailstocomplywitharulingofthearbitrationpanel,thenafterthereasonableperiodoftimetheotherpartymayrequestthearbitrationpaneltoimposealumpsumorpenaltypaymentasatemporaryremedytoenforcecompliance.Ifthepartyinbreachfailstopay,ortoabidebythepanel’sdecision,afterafurthersixmonthsthentheotherpartymaysuspendobligationsarisingfromtheWA,otherthanthoserelatedtocitizens’rights.InmatterswherethearbitrationpanelrequiresaninterpretationofEUlawthepanelmustaskfortheCourtofEuropeanJustice’srulingonthematter.

30 OnemodelrecommendedforthisbodywastheDutchmodelofrapporteursonBrexit,whoperformasimilarfunction.

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4. Influencing the EU from the outside

Northern Ireland’s Relationship with the EU Post-Brexit

Adynamicarrangement

EU agreements with non-member states provide for two main approaches to the adoption andimplementation of EU legislation: static and dynamic. In dynamic arrangements, the adoptionof relevant new or amended EU legislation (the acquis) is automatic. In exchange, institutionalarrangementsareputinplacetoensureadegreeof‘decision-shaping’influenceforthenon-memberstate over the new or amended acquis.

ThebestexampleofadynamicarrangementcanbefoundintheEuropeanEconomicArea(EEA).TheEEAAgreementinvolvesacomplextwo-pillarsystembetweentheEUandthethreememberstatesoftheEuropeanFreeTradeAssociation(EFTA)thatparticipateintheEEA,namelyIceland,LiechtensteinandNorway.IntheseEEA-EFTAstates,commonrulesarecontinuouslyupdatedbyincorporatingnewEEA-relevantEUlegislationintotheEEAAgreement.

Instatic arrangements,theEUacquis isonlyadoptedatcertainpredefinedpointsoftime,e.g.atthetimeofanagreement’sentryintoforce,andsubsequentlybyjointagreementoftheEUandthenon-memberstateconcerned.Thenon-memberstategenerallyhaslittleornoabilitytoshapetherelevantlegislation,buthassomecontroloverwhichaspectsoftheEUacquis theyarewillingtoimplement.

StateswithessentiallystaticarrangementswiththeEUincludeAndorra,MonacoandSanMarino(theso-called‘AMS’states)andstatesthatarepartoftheEU’sEasternPartnership(e.g.Ukraine,GeorgiaandMoldova).Somestatescanhaveprimarilystaticarrangementswith theEU,butwithdynamicadaptionprovidedforincertainareas.Forexample,theEU-TurkeyCustomsUnioncontainsdynamicaspects,giventhatTurkeymustmaintainalignmentwiththeEU’scommonexternal tariff.TheEU-SwissrelationshipalsoincludesdynamicadoptionofaspectsoftheEUacquisrelatingtoSchengenandair transport.TheAMSstatesarealso required tomaintainalignmentwithaspectsof theEUacquis,mostnotablyregardinguseoftheEuro.

Dynamicarrangementsgenerallyprovideforagreaterdegreeofdecision-shaping.IfastateisrequiredtoadoptautomaticallyaspectsoftheEUacquis,theEUconsidersitappropriateforthatstatetohavesomelimitedinfluenceoverthatlegislation.NorthernIreland,accordingtothetermsoftheProtocol,issetforsomedynamicalignmentwiththeEU.Itssmallsizeanduniquecircumstancesalsomeanthatitcouldaimforexemptionsfromcertainlegislation.However,itismorelikelytohaveeffectbynotlookingforexemptionsasarulebutinsteadseekingtohavedecision-shapinginfluencesimilartothatthatotherdynamicstateshave.Thisbyrightswouldmeanadecision-shapingrolewiththeEU.Butitisconstrainedbythreekeypoints:

(i) itisasub-nationalregion,withlimitedresourcesandcapacity;

(ii) itsrepresentationvis-à-vistheEUwillcomeprimarilythroughtheUKgovernment,notdirectly;

(iii) theUKasawholewillhaveadifferenttraderelationshipwiththeEUpost-transition,comparedtoNI,andthismaymeanthatitistheUK-wideratherthantheregionalintereststhatpredominateinthefuturescopefordecision-shaping.

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Inthissection,weconsidertheoptionsopentoNorthernIreland,drawingonexperienceandlessonsfromothernon-memberstateswhohavecloseandparticularlydynamicalignmentwiththeEU.

Direct Input into the EU as a Non-Member State

InstitutionalarrangementsintheEEA

DuringthetransitionperiodUKrepresentatives,orexpertsdesignatedbytheUK,may,uponinvitation,exceptionallyattendmeetingsofEUbodies.Thisexceptionalallowanceforanon-memberstatewillbemadewhentheEUdecides‘thepresenceoftheUnitedKingdomisnecessaryandintheinterestoftheUnion,inparticularfortheeffectiveimplementationofUnionlawduringthetransitionperiod’(WAArt128[5]).31 Thisconditionwillendattheendofthetransitionperiod.Fromthatpointon,theUKwillhavenoautomaticrighttoparticipationorattendanceinEUbodiesandinstitutionsotherthanthoseestablishedbytheWithdrawalAgreement(seeprevioussection).

Non-memberstateswiththeclosestrelationshiptotheEUarethosethatareintheEuropeanEconomicArea(EEA)buteventhethreeEEA-EFTAstatesdonothavedirectaccesstotheEU’scentrallegislativebodies.32However,theyaredeeplyaffectedbyEUdecisions.Thehomogeneity principleoftheEEAseesthedynamicincorporationofrelevantnewacquisintotheEEAAgreementandthustobeappliedby theEEAmembers. It also requires that interpretationof thisacquis beasuniformaspossible.The two-pillar systemfacilitatesthishomogeneitybycreatingbodiesamongtheEEA-EFTAstatesthatessentiallymirrorrelevantEUinstitutions.

TherearefoursharedEEAbodies.TheEEA Councilmeetstwiceayearatministeriallevelandprovidesthe political impetus for the development of the EEA.33 The EEA Joint Committee is attended byofficials. Itmeetsapproximately tentimesayearand is responsible for theongoingmanagementoftheEEA,aswellasdecidingabouttheincorporationofneworamendedEUlegislationintotheEEAagreement.34 The EEA Joint Parliamentary CommitteecontainsmembersofboththeEuropeanParliament(EP)andtheparliamentsoftheEEA-EFTAstates.Finally,theEEA Consultative Committee containsrepresentativesfromthe‘socialpartners’oftheEUandEEA-EFTAstates.35Itispossible,atleast theoretically, forsocialpartners in theEEA-EFTAstates tousethis routetoattempttoshapedecision-makingintheEU.

31 ThearrangementsprovidedforinArticle128(5)WAtoapplyinthetransitionperiod:‘representativesorexpertsoftheUnitedKingdom,orexpertsdesignatedbytheUnitedKingdom,may,uponinvitation,exceptionallyattendmeetingsorpartsofmeetingsofthecommitteesreferredtoinArticle3(2)ofRegulation(EU)No182/2011,meetingsorpartsofmeetingsofCommissionexpertgroups,meetingsorpartsofmeetingsofothersimilarentities,andmeetingsorpartsofmeetingsofbodies,officesoragencies,whereandwhenrepresentativesorexpertsoftheMemberStatesorexpertsdesignatedbyMemberStatestakepart’.

32 AnexceptionconcernsJusticeandHomeAffairs,wheretheEEA-EFTAstates(andSwitzerland)havesecuredparticipationrightsintheEU’sCouncilofMinisters.

33 InadditiontoassessingtheoverallfunctioningoftheEEAAgreement,itprovidesaforumforbroaderpoliticaldialogue.Itsrelevanceisformalandisgenerallylimitedbythebrevityandlowpoliticalprofileofmeetings.

34 TheJointCommitteehasthepowertocreatesubcommitteesorworkinggroupstoassistit.Inpractice,thesesubcommitteesfunctionasasinglecommittee,withseveralworkinggroupsbeneaththem,whichareresponsibleforprocessingtheEUlegislationwhichisduetobeincorporatedintotheEEAAgreement.

35 TheJointCommitteehasthepowertocreatesubcommitteesorworkinggroupstoassistit.Inpractice,thesesubcommitteesfunctionasasinglecommittee,withseveralworkinggroupsbeneaththem,whichareresponsibleforprocessingtheEUlegislationwhichisduetobeincorporatedintotheEEAAgreement.

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Overall,however,thereisnoescapingthefactthat,despitehavingtheclosestrelationshipwiththeEU of any non-member states, the EEA-EFTA states have no formal access to EU decision-making processes. Moreover,eventhoughtheEEA-EFTAstateshaveawide-ranginginstitutionalrelationshipwith the EU, it doesnotmean that the institutions, particularly themorehigh-profile – relativelyspeakingatleast–workeffectively.Somebodiesthatcouldpotentiallybeusedfordecision-shaping(suchastheEEAJointParliamentaryCommittee)areunderminedbythefactthatnotmanyMEPsturnuptoitsmeetings.Withinthewiderangeofformalmechanismsprovidedfordecision-shapingbytheEEAstates,Frommelt(2017:63-4)maintainsthatexpertgroupsandcomitologycommitteesaretwoofthemostimportantbodiesfor decision-shaping.

Thedecision-shapingprocess

If theEEAstatesare to influencethecontentof the legislationthatapplies to theEEA, theyneedto engage in theprocessbywhich it is drafted. This hasbecomeknownas the ‘decision-shaping’ process.ThisisdefinedbytheEFTASecretariatas‘theprocessofcontributingtoandinfluencingpolicyproposalsupuntiltheyareformallyadopted’bytheEU(EFTASecretariat2009:20).

TheEEAAgreementcontainsexplicitprovisionsrequiringtheEUtoconsultwiththeEEA-EFTAstateswhendrafting legislation thatwill likelybeconsidered ‘EEA relevant’by theEEA JointCommittee.Assoonasnewlegislation isbeingdrawnup,theEuropeanCommission ‘informallyseek[s]advicefromexpertsoftheEFTAstatesinthesamewayasitseeksadvicefromexpertsoftheECmemberstatesfortheelaborationofitsproposals’(Article99EEA).TheEuropeanCommissionalso‘ensure[s]expertsoftheEFTAstatesaswideaparticipationaspossibleaccordingtotheareasconcerned,inthepreparatorystageofdraftmeasurestobetobesubmittedsubsequently tothecommitteeswhichassisttheECCommissionintheexerciseofitsexecutivepowers’(Article100EEA).

Thereare severaldifferentgroups, committeesand routes throughwhich theEEA-EFTAstatesareconsultedbytheEU,andmanyoftheseareascanbeusedbytheEEA-EFTAstatestotrytoshapedecision-makingintheEU.

Expert groups: EEA-EFTA states participate inmany of the 750+ expert groups established by theCommissiontoassistinthedraftingofnewlegislation.Thesegroupscompriseindependentexpertswhoprovideinputbasedontheirareasofexpertise,beitjudicial,ethical,scientificetc.Astheexperts are not official government representatives, their positions are theoretically meant to be independent of those of their respective states, but often there is significant overlap between their positions and those of their governments.Theseexpertgroups–EEA-EFTAstatestakepartinmorethan300–areadvisoryanddonottakedecisionsorvote,andeveryonewhoparticipateshasthesameformalstatus.

‘Participation inexpertgroupsprovidesseveralbenefits for theEEA-EFTAStates. Itgivesaccess toimportantinformationfromtheCommissionandmakesitpossibletoclarifyandcommunicatenationalpositionsatanearlystage.ItalsoprovidesakeychanneltoinfluenceandcontributetoemergingEUpoliciesandlegislation.’(EFTASecretariat2009:22).

Secondment of experts: EEA-EFTA and other states also second national experts to the EuropeanCommissionandotherEUinstitutions.Theseexpertsarestaffemployedbyapublicadministrationor an international governmentorganisation, and theEUuses their expertise in aparticularfield.

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Secondment can be for between six months and four years, and during their secondment theseexpertsworkundertheinstructionsofEUofficialsandare‘governedbyrulesthathelpavoidtheriskofanyconflictsofinterest’(Frommelt2017:59).

Seconded national experts (whomake up approximately 10% of the Commission’s administrativestaff)mainlyseethemselvesasrepresentativesoftheirstategovernments,andthereforeprimarilyadvocate theirhomecountries’ interests.For theEEA-EFTAstates, themost important functionofthesecondedexperts isnotactuallyto influenceEUlegislationintheirfavour,butratherestablishprofessionalnetworksandgatherinformationthattheythentakebacktotheirhomecountries.36

Submitting comments: EEA-EFTA states also submit comments and written contributions to theEuropean Commission in order to express their views on a specific legislative proposal or policyinitiative.Between2001and2016, theEEA-EFTAstatessent159 jointcomments to theEU.ManyoftheEEA-EFTAstatesalsosubmitcommentsandwrittencontributionsindividually.Forcommentstohaveinfluence,theyneedtobesubmittedbeforetheadoptionofa legislativeproposal,orelsesoonthereafterandideallybeforeadraftreportisdiscussedbyacommitteeintheEP.Additionally,commentscanbesubmittedbeforetheCouncilhasagreedonacommonposition.

Committees: In addition, the EEA-EFTA states can also exercise influence in various Commissioncommittees.Theirinfluenceincomitologycommitteesandexpertgroupshasbeendescribedasthe‘twomostimportantelementsofdecision-shaping’(Frommelt2017:63-4).Therearetwomaintypesofcommittee inwhichtheEEAAgreementprovides forparticipation:programmecommitteesandcomitologycommittees.

ProgrammecommitteesareresponsibleforthedevelopmentandmanagementoftheEUprogrammes,andtheEEA-EFTAstatesparticipatein16suchprogrammes.Participationinprogrammecommitteescan provide very important routes to decision shaping, with certain sub-national representationsmakingparticularuseofthem.TheEuropeanCommissionisresponsiblefortheimplementationofdetailedtechnicalmeasuresforcertainlegislativeacts,andtheyareassistedinthistaskby‘comitology’committees.ThesecommitteeswereestablishedtoallowtheCounciltosupervisetheimplementationwork(althoughtheirabilityandwillingnesstodosohasbeendebated),andtheyhavethepowertoapproveorrejectthemeasuresproposedbytheCommission.TheEEA-EFTAstatesonlyhaveobserverstatusonthesecommittees,sonovotingrights.37

Agencies:EEA-EFTAstatesalsoparticipateinsomeEUagencies.Wheretheydo,theynormallyhaveaseatonthemanagementboard,andinsomeinstancesontheagency’sBoardofAppeal.ParticipationinvolvestheEEA-EFTAstatescontributingtotheagency’sbudgetandensuringtheirrelevantnationallaws correspond to EU law. Most of these agencies are decentralised agencies (also known asregulatoryagencies),andtheyregulateanumberofhighlysensitiveareassuchaspolicecooperation,diseasecontrol,aviationsafetyetc.ParticipationinanEUagencyusuallyprovidesaccesstocertaincommitteesorotherbodiesoftheagencies,butnorighttovote.Thisisfurtherdiscussedbelow.

36 InMarch2017therewere49EFTAstateexpertssecondedtotheEuropeanCommission,mostofwhomwereworkingonEUprogrammes.

37 Jonsdottir(2011:43-4)foundthat,whilstalmosttwothirdsofthecomitologycommitteeswereavailabletotheEEA-EFTAstates,theirengagementwiththesecommitteeswaslessthantheywereentitledto.

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ParticipationinEUAgencies

EUagenciesarenotformallyamongthepoliticalinstitutionsoftheEU.Nevertheless,theyformanimportantpartofitsinstitutionallandscape.ManyofthemhelptopreparecrucialdecisionsfortheEUCommission,‘carryoutspecificlegal,technicalorscientifictasks’,help‘toimplementEUpolicies,supervisetheapplicationofEUlaw’,‘providein-depthexpertisetoimprovepolicy-making’,andsomemayeventakebindingdecisions(vonOrdanzaandBorrett2018:5).Assuch,theyareimportantmeansofinfluence,includingfornon-memberstates.

TherearetwotypesofEUagency:6executiveand36regulatoryagencies.ExecutiveagencieshelpmanageEUprogrammesandareunderthefullcontroloftheCommission.Itistheregulatoryagencies,however,thathaveanimportantroleinsupportingandregulatingtheEUsinglemarketaswellasincoordinatingbetweenthememberstatesinspecificpolicyareas.Thedecision-makingpowersoftheregulatoryagenciesareimportantbutlimitedintheirtechnicalorpreparatorynature.FinaldecisionsaretakenbytheCommission.

The cooperationof EU agencieswith third countries tends to be limited to exchanges of technicalexpertise,andtoinformationandstaffexchanges.AnyagreementswiththirdcountriesaretypicallyMemorandaofUnderstanding(MoU).Thesearenotlegallybindingandcanbeterminatedbyeitherpartywithlittlenotice.Itisimportanttonote,thatthereisnoprecedentforanon-memberstatetohaveadirectsayinthedecision-makingprocessofanEUagencyviaanyformofvotingrightswithinthem.

TheUK’swithdrawalfromtheEUmeansthatithasceasedtobeamemberoftheseagencies.TheUKGovernmenthasexpressedaninterestincontinuingitsmembershipinandcooperationwithsomeoftheEUagencies,thoughithasbeennotedthat‘thetermsofsuchengagementareill-defined’(HouseofLords2019:24).RegulatoryagenciesinparticularremainrelevanttoNorthernIreland’srelationshipwiththeEUafterBrexit.This isbecauseundertheProtocol,theUKinrespectofNorthernIrelandwillbesubjecttotherelevantdecisionsandauthorityoftheEUagenciesinthoseareasoftheacquiscoveredbytheProtocol.

AworstcasescenarioforNorthernIrelandisoutlinedbyvonOndarzaandBorrett(2018:27),whosuggestthateven‘aftertheUKhasconcludedageneralframeworkfortherelationshiptotheEU,itwillbothhavetoduplicatethefunctionscurrentlyfulfilledbythe36EUagenciesandnegotiateanindividualcooperationarrangementwithmostofthem’.ThisrisksenormouslagforNorthernIreland,whichwillbedirectlyaffectedbytheworkofEUAgenciesinseveralkeymarketsectors.[SeeAnnex2].

Makingthemostoflimitedbutdirectinfluence

There is a ‘broadconsensus that thegreatest influencecanbeachievedat theearly stagesofEUpolicy-making.Thisapplies inparticulartothedraftingofanEUactbytheEuropeanCommission.AftertheEuropeanCommissionhassubmittedtheproposalofanEUacttotheEUlegislators,thepossibilitiesfortheEEA-EFTAstatestoinfluenceitscontentdiminish’(Frommelt2017:67).InfluenceatthelaterstageofEPandCouncilengagementinEUdecision-makingisalsoimportant,althoughopportunitiestoinfluencetheCouncilarelimited,especiallywhencomparedtotheEP.ThefactthattheEEA-EFTAstatesdedicateresourcestolobbyingtheEPreflectstheincreasedrolethattheEPhasinEUdecision-making,somethingthathasnotbeenreflectedinanyadjustmenttotheinstitutionalarrangementsprovidedforintheEEAAgreement.

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However,eachoftheEEA-EFTAstatesisrelativelysmallincomparisontomanyifnotmostoralloftheEUmember-states.Theydonothavetheresourcestoparticipateinallofthecommitteesandagenciestheyareentitledtoattend,andthereforemustprioritisetheirparticipation.38 Furthermore,ensuringtheEUtakestheopinionsofnon-memberstatesseriouslygenerallydependsonthelevelofexpertisethattherepresentativesofthosestatesbringtomeetings.39

ThepotentialfordirectinfluenceontheEUfromNorthernIreland

Sub-nationalregionshaveadoubledisadvantage:sizeandprofile.PoorpoliticalrelationsbetweentheparentstateandtheEUcangreatlyhinderdiplomaticrelationsforofficesbasedinBrussels.However,itshouldberememberedthatNorthernIrelandisinalegallyuniqueposition(thanksinparttotheB/GFA)anditsclosenesstoIrelandasamemberstateoffersthescopeforaclosenesstoinfluencingtheEUthatisexceptional.ItispossibleforNorthernIrelandtopreparefordirectinfluence,recognisingthatthiswillcomeindifferentformsandthatnowitissomewhatinthegiftoftheEUtooffer.

Toprepare for thisasbestaspossible,Northern Irelandwillneed toconcentrateon three things.First,what the UK needs to ask for Northern Ireland at the EU level will have to be different and more ambitious to what it asks for itselfintermsofchannelsofinfluence.Second,Northern Ireland will need to be proactive in monitoring the legislative agenda of the EUbecauseitwillbeseekingadecision-shapingrole.Thiswillneedresourcesandaccesstorelevantplatforms.Finally,itshouldberecognisedthatdecision-shaping at the EU level tends to be much more effective through engagement in technical matters,asopposedtooverheavilypoliticisedissues.Inrelationtothis,andtakinglessonsfromexperiencesoftheArticle50process,NorthernIrelandbodiesseekinginfluenceintheEUshouldseektoestablishareputationashavingsomethingtooffer,e.g.publishingreportsinareasofexpertiseasanessentialtoolforlobbying.This will require growth in Northern Ireland’s local base of (technical) expertise;todate,givenitssize,NorthernIrelandhasreliedalotonexpertisefromelsewhereintheUKor,tosomedegree,inIreland.Thisisamedium-termchallengefortheregionthatcouldbringlong-termbenefitintermsofinformalinfluence.

Recommendations

Make the most of the unique status and multilevel governance of the B/GFA

• Institutions of the B/GFA, including the Northern Ireland Executive, the North

• South Ministerial Council, and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, should be enabled to make written statements to the European Commission prior to the adoption of legislative proposals that will directly affect the operation of the Protocol, e.g. relating to the regulation of goods or telecommunications.

38 LiechtensteinhasbyfartheleastresourcesofthethreeEEA-EFTAstates,andsoprioritisesitsparticipationincommitteesandexpertgroupsbythreelevelsofpriority–onebeingthehighest,threebeingthelowest.AsofJanuary2017,Liechtensteinhadidentified57bodiesaspriorityone,111asprioritytwo,and119asprioritythree.ThisgivessomeindicationofthescaleandcomplexityofthetaskfacingNorthernIrelandeveninmappingout,letaloneprioritising,potentialaccesstosuchgroups.

39 ‘ItislikelythattheextenttowhichtheEFTAstatesaretakennoteofdependsontheirdegreeofexpertiseonthesubjectand

theextenttowhichtheyhaveaclearinterestinthearea’(Jonsdottir2013:41).

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• It is necessary to clarify the role EU ‘single market’ agencies will play with regards to Northern Ireland. If the UK is not represented in the decision-making process of the agencies to which Northern Ireland may be bound, then special arrangements should be made for representation from Northern Ireland in regulatory EU agencies that are relevant to the areas of Protocol.

• The Committee of the Regions has been excellent formal platform for Northern Ireland representation of local government and a case should be made for continued representation on it.

• Representation of the Northern Ireland position to the EU via Dublin, although acknowledged as potentially politically sensitive, is espoused by business at both formal and informal levels.

• Representation through EU funding Programmes, which Northern Ireland has traditionally benefitted from through the work of the SEUPB, has ensured a high degree of both formal and informal access and should be built upon. This gives NI a unique formal and direct connection to EU programmes.

Work with the European Parliament

• ArrangementsshouldbemadeforeffectiveparliamentaryscrutinyoftheJointCommittee.ThisshouldbeaUK-EUJointParliamentaryCommittee,whichcouldcontainmembersoftheNIExecutive,UKparliament,andEP.

• TheNIAssemblyandEuropeanParliamentcouldestablishadhocjointcommitteetoreviewimplementationoftheProtocol.

• AUK-EUParliamentaryCommitteecouldbeestablishedeitheraspartoftheimplementationoftheWAoraspartofthefuturerelationshiptoregularlyconsidertheimplementationoftheProtocol.ItcouldalsoestablishaCOSAC-typearrangementinvolvingNIAssemblyandOireachtastoregularlyreviewimplementationoftheProtocol.

• TherecouldbeanannualdebateintheEuropeanParliamentontheProtocol.

Agencies and committees

• BywayofacomplementtotheJCWGandinlinewithproposedarrangementsinthedraftWithdrawalAgreementofFebruary2018,theprincipleofUKparticipationinCommissionCommitteesandexpertgroupscouldbeextendedbeyondthetransitionperiodwithregardtoNorthernIrelandandobligationsundertheProtocol.

• AccessshouldbemaintainedforNIcivilservantstotheagenciesandbodieswhichtheUKhasaccesstoduringthetransitionperiod.Throughthesebodies,NIcivilservantscouldexerciseadegreeofinfluence,ashasbeenseeninEEA/Swissrepresentationinsimilarbodies.NotethataccesstocertainEUcommitteesisonlypermittedifyouarealignedinthatareaoftheacquis, sothiswillbedifferentforNIcomparedtotheUKasawhole.

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Invest in and use technical expertise

• TheUK-EUfuturerelationshipagreementshouldcontainexplicitprovisionsrequiringtheEUtoconsultwiththeUKwhendraftinglegislationthatwilllikelybeconsidered‘Protocolrelevant’bytheUK-EUJointCommitteeand/orSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland.ThiswouldmeantheEuropeanCommission‘informallyseekingadvice’fromexpertsonandfromNorthernIreland(includingUKandIreland).

• TheUK-EUagreementshouldalsoensureexpertsfromNorthernIreland‘aswideaparticipationaspossible’inthepreparatorystageofdraftmeasuresrelevanttotheProtocolbeforetheygotoEUcommittees.

• TheUKandIrelandshouldmakeacaseforNorthernIrelandexpertstobeincludedinrelevantadvisoryexpertgroupsandtohaveobserverstatusoncertaincommittees.

• The practice of secondment of experts from Northern Ireland to EU institutions should becontinuedandsupported.

• Theprocessofprioritisationandbestuseofexpertiseshouldbeonethat ismanagedbytheNorthernIrelandExecutive.

‘Strand IV’

• Considerationshouldbegiven to theestablishmentofa ‘Strand IV’of theB/GFA.ThiscouldinvolveaBritish-Irish Forum forExternalRelationsor such like. It canbeused to coordinateprioritisedpositionsfromStrandsIIandIIIwhenitcomestoinformingthepositionoftheUKandIreland.Itcouldalsooverseetheprotectionandoperationofthe1998Agreementinlightofchangestotheexternalenvironment,e.g.US-UKFTA,UK-EUSecuritypartnership.

• Tofacilitateallthis,theNIExecutiveshouldreceivefromtheUKgovernmentallrelevantpapersandbeformallyconsultedinadvanceontheagendaforandpositionstobetakenatmeetings.TheExecutiveshouldalsobeformallyconsultedonissuesofrelevanceaspartofthewrittenprocedureprovidedforintheRulesofProcedurefortheJointandSpecialisedCommittees.

Means of Indirect Influence for Non-Member States

TheworkofregionalofficesinBrussels

A well-staffed, visible presence inBrussels,andareputationforexpertiseonspecialisedissues,aretwoofthestrongestfactorsinensuringthattheEUisreceptivetoaregionaloffice’srepresentations.ABrussels-basedofficecanenablearegiontogainareputationincertainareasoftechnicalexpertise.40

Corefunctionsfortheseofficesincludeincreasingtheprofileoftheregion,explainingitsuniqueneeds,andgatheringinformationforofficials,policy-makersandstakeholders ‘backhome’,particularlyonupcomingEUlegislation.

40 SomeoftheofficesinterviewedforthisresearchhadmanagedtoachieveasituationinwhichtheCommissionactuallyconsultedthemwhenconsideringspecialisedlegislation.

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AttemptingtoinfluenceEUlegislationisanotheressentialrolefornon-memberstateofficesbasedinBrussels.Manynon-member-stateoffices inBrussels send lettersandcommentsdirectly to theCommission, but their ability to do so depends on the capacity of the office. Non–member-stateoffices inBrusselsalsoengagewithMEPs.Somehavestaffdedicatedtotheserelationships;someorganisetripsforwillingMEPstotheirregion.Akeypurpose istosecure ‘friends’ forwhenissuescomebeforetheEP.41OtherofficesaremoreselectiveandprioritiseinteractingwithMEPsonlywhenlegislationparticularlyrelevanttotheirstateisontheagenda.This requires effective monitoring of the legislative agenda.

Afewnon-member-stateofficesdonotactivelylobbytheMEPs,andthisisoftenduetocapacity.Many of the offices of non-member-states in Brussels suffer with capacity issues, and struggle to monitor effectively the legislative pipeline of the EU.Someofficeswithacomparativelyhighlevelofformalaccesstodecision-shapingopportunitiesareunabletotakesignificantadvantageoftheopportunitiespresentedtothemsimplybecauseofagenerallackofpersonnel.Conversely,itispossibleforanofficewithlessformaldecision-shapingopportunitiestolobbymoreeffectivelygiventhegreaterresourcesatitsdisposal.Insomecases,officeswithlimitedresourcesmayrelyonotherroutesthroughwhichtoapproachtheEUinstitutions,e.g.theEFTASecretariatforEEAmatters.

Informal networking is an essential aspect of the effectiveness of EU decision-shaping.Non-memberstateoffices inBrussels frequentlyhosteventsbothontheirpremisesandaroundBrussels,whichhelpdevelopgoodprofessionalandpersonal relationshipswith individualsassociatedwith theEUinstitutions.Eventscanbeorganisedwithadiverserangeofinterestgroupsandstates.

Sustained and frequent interactionisimportantfordevelopingrelationships.Consistencyappearstoboostanoffice’sprofileamongEUpersonnel,andgraduallyinformalnetworkscandevelopthroughpresenceinformalbodies.Byreturningthesameindividualstomeetingsitispossibletodeveloparapport,andfortherepresentativesofEUinstitutionstodeveloptrustwiththoseindividuals.42 This isparticularlythecasewheretheindividualcandemonstrateexpertiseandcanprovideconstructiveinputsintodiscussions.

Many non-member-state offices in Brussels try to develop relationships with individual member states.Onewell-staffedmissionhighlightedininterviewhowdecentrelationswithindividualmemberstatesallowedthemsomelimitedindirectdegreeofdecision-shaping influenceintheCouncil, theEUinstitutiontypicallyseenasmostinaccessibletonon-EUstates.Thisparticularofficehasmultipleembassiesacrossthememberstates,allworkingtowardsasetobjectivesetbythenationalgovernment.Forofficeswithmore limitedresources,developingcloserelationshipswith therepresentativesofmemberstatesischallenging.However,wherepolicyinterestsconverge,opportunitiesexisttoshareinformationandpositions,andusetheirrespectiveinstitutionalrelationshipswiththeEUtopromoteissues.

41 A2018surveyof230MEPs,institutionstaffand‘opinionformers’foundthat60%ofrespondentsconsideredpersonalcontacts‘veryinfluential’andanother33%consideredthemtobe‘fairlyinfluential’inprovidinginformationformakinginformeddecisions(ComRes/Burson-Marsteller2018:6).

42 Forexample,ifanon-member-stateconsistentlysendsthesamerepresentativetoacommitteeinwhichtheyhavearighttoattendbutholdlimitedformalinfluence,itmaybepossibleforthatindividualtodevelopprofessionalrelationshipswiththeothercommitteemembersandtoexerciseadegreeofdecision-shapinginformallyoutsideofthemeeting.

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Lobbying

Direct lobbying of the EU institutionscangiveEUnon-member-statesaccesstoinstitutionstowhichtheyaregenerallynotaffordedformalaccess.Effective access to EU institutions is attributed to frequency of interactions, early participation and alliances with friends.EEAstateshavefoundthatwaitinguntiltheformalEEAprocessistoolate–theyneedtoparticipateearlyindecision-shaping(Gullberg2015:1544).Lobbyinginstitutionsisanessentialpartofthis.Lobbyingtendstobemosteffectiveatanearlystageinthelegislativeprocess,especiallyduringtheCommissiondraftingprocess.43

TherearealargenumberoflobbyistswhoattempttoinfluencetheEU.44LobbyistsfocustheiractivitiesontheEPandtheCommission.Generally,accesstotheCouncilandtheEuropeanCouncilislimited,althoughsomescopedoesexistfor largebodies.45TheEPisaccessibleduetothepublicnatureofmanyof itsproceedingsandis importantbecauseof its increasingroleinEUdecision-making.TheCommissionisimportantbecauseitinitiateslegislationanddevelopslegislativeandpolicyproposals.ForalmostallpiecesofEUsecondary legislation, theCommissionhasexclusiverightsof initiative.Additionally, the Commission is the EU’s competition regulator and the EU’s negotiator of tradeagreementswiththirdstates.OpportunitiestointeractwiththeCommissionexistbecauseitiseagertointeractwithlobbyistsasameansofacquiring‘resourcesthatareindispensableinordertofulfilitsinstitutionalrole.’(Bouwen2009:22).46

One study on lobbying in the EU found that third-country governments tend to have a low levelofeffectiveness in this regard: ‘governmentsoutside theEUcannotbe reliedupon toarticulateacase effectively’ (Burson-Marsteller 2005: 8). That said, national distinctions generally dissolve indiscussionsofatechnicalnature,althoughtheytendtoreturnwhenmattersbecomemorepolitical.Andpoliticalcontextmatters:themorefractiousrelationsarebetweenthethirdstateandtheEU,themoredifficultengagementwiththeCommissionandotherEUinstitutionsbecomes.

Transnational European associations and other representative bodiesareofteneffectivevehiclesforlobbyingandprovideopportunities forsandother interests inbothEUmemberandnon-memberstates to be represented (Gullberg 2015: 1539). However, these bodies are only effective wheninterestsalignwiththoseofothermembersandparticipants.InfluenceinBrusselscanoftendependonthesizeofanorganisation,itseconomicsignificance,andexperience:smallergroupscanorganisetogethertoenhancetheirprofileinallthreerespects.

Even the larger andwell-resourced regions canmiss opportunities for influence by poor lobbyingpractices,suchas:providinginappropriatebriefingmaterials;beingtooearlyortoolatewiththeirlobbying; failing to understand EU processes and procedures; and approaching thewrong person

43 However,someEEA-EFTAstatesuseopportunitiestoseekexemptionsoncelegislationisactuallyadopted,althoughthismethodisonlymoderatelyeffectiveinensuringthatunfavourablelegislationisnotimposed.Exemptionscannormallyonlybesecuredifthelegislationhasnoreasonablefunctioninthestateconcernedowingtoitssmallsizeorgeographicallocation.Exemptionsarenotseenasavailabletolargerstates.

44 In2015,therewere138,000individualsinvolvedinlobbyingtheEUaspartoftheirjob,and95,000involvedinlobbyingtheEUasafull-timejob.

45 Asnon-memberstates,SwitzerlandandNorwayspendbyfarthegreatestamountofmoneyonlobbyingEUinstitutions.Thishassecuredaccessandinfluence,particularlyregardingtheCommissionand,toalesserextent,theEP;accesstotheCouncilhasbeenlessreadilyachieved.

46 Forexample,theCommissionoccasionallyapproachesNorwegianregionalrepresentativesoncertainissuesforwhichtheyaredeemedexperts.

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(ComRes/Burson-Marsteller2018).In instances of sub-national governments seeking to influence EU legislation and policy, strong message discipline is important.47While regional representatives arenotgenerallyrequiredtopushtheexactsamemessageasthenationalgovernment, it isgenerallyrecognisedthatitismorebeneficialtohaveadegreeofcoordination.

PotentialforNorthernIrelandtohaveindirectinfluenceattheEUlevel

NorthernIrelandisaregionwithauniqueprofileandonewhichhasbeenshownflexibilityalreadythroughBrexitandindeedthroughoutitsEUmembership(Murphy2014;Murphy2018;HaywardandMurphy2018).TheNorthern IrelandTaskForceestablishedbyCommissionPresidentBarrosowasintendedtoensurethatNorthernIrelandmadethemostofitsEUmembershipandbuiltcloserlinkswithotherregionsandbodiesintheEU(HaywardandMurphy2012).Thisshouldhavealastinglegacy.ManyorganisationsinNorthernIrelandhaveexperienceofengagingwithspecificEUcommittees(forexample,ongoingliaisonwiththeCommitteeoftheRegionsortheEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee[EESC]).AndawiderangeofNorthernIrelandorganisationshavelong-standinglinkswithotherbodiescentreduponandactiveinBrussels.48Makingthemostofsuchlinkswillbevital.

TheEuropeanCommissionOfficeinBelfastplayedavitalliaisonfunctioninenablingcommunicationbetweenNorthern Ireland and the European Commission. Crucially, it also helped to ensure thatlevelsofawarenessandunderstandingabout the situation inNorthern Irelandweregoodanduptodate, includingduringtheUKexitnegotiations.Thishasnowformallycloseddownandthereisnopermanentpresence in the regionaspartof theEUDelegationof theEuropeanUnion to theUnitedKingdom.ThisconstitutesasignificantlossfortheindirectrepresentationofNorthernIrelandintereststoBrussels.

The NI Executive Office in Brussels NorthernIrelandalsohastheadvantageofalreadyhavingastrongregionalofficeinBrussels,withsignificantnetworksandexperienceofitsown.EffectivenessininfluencingdecisionsattheEUlevelforsmallerstatesandnon-EUstatesisgenerallyaresultoffrequentinteractions,earlyparticipationandcarefulalliances.TheOfficeoftheNorthernIrelandExecutiveinBrusselsneedstobeequippedtomakeearlyrepresentationstotheCommissionwhenlegislationisbeingdrafted.Becausecapacitywillbeanissue(itcannotfloodBrusselswithpersonnel),prioritisationfromtheNIExecutivefortheworkofitsOfficewillbeessential,e.g.targetingofspecificissuesandestablishingareputationforexpertiseincertainareas.Given itssmall size,consistency inpersonnel isparticularly importantasameansofbuildingrelationshipsandtrust. It isalsoimportanttodevelopstrongpersonalandprofessionalrelationshipswithEUstaffoutsideoftheformalinstitutionalframeworks.

47 Oneofficewithalargestaffandlimitedregionalrepresentation(andawiderangeofofficesbasedinotherEuropeancapitals)toldusthatitconsidersmessagedisciplineandcoordinationoneofthemostimportantaspectsoftheirlobbyingsuccess.

48 Forexample,onestakeholderreportedproductiveengagementwiththeCommissionoftheBishops’ConferencesoftheEU(COMECE).Thesehavethepotentialtoenableongoinglobbying/decision-shaping/information-sharingfunctionsforNorthernIrelandbodiesafterBrexit.Similarly,anotherparticipantpointedoutthatBelfastwasamemberofaseriesofinformalcitynetworkswithinandbeyondtheEU(suchasthe100resilientcities,Eurocities,theglobalnetworkofmayors,etc.).Theserelationships,itwassuggested,shouldnowbeactivelymappedandbecomeanintegralpartofthecity’sstrategyafterBrexit.ParticipantsalsopointedoutthatbusinessorganisationssuchastheCBIandIBECalreadyhaveanofficeinBrusselswhichcouldandshouldbefurtherutilised.

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TheNIExecutivewillalsohavetotakecaretodevelopandenhancerelationshipswithotherregionsandstates,especiallynon-memberstates,astheymaybemoreopentocollaboratingonlegislativeissuesatEUlevel.TheNIOfficewillhavetobepreparedforscenariosinwhichrelationsbetweentheUKandEU(and,indeed,IrelandandEU)arebetterandareworse.Evenifpoliticalrelationsareunderstrain,itwillneedtobeinsuchapositionthatitsstaffandexpertsarestilltrustedandcommunicatedwith.Diplomacywillbeessential.EvenifthereareoverttensionsintheUK-EUrelationship,NorthernIrelandwillhavetobecarefulnottolobbycontrarytotheUK’sinterestsbutyetstillbeabletosetoutitsownstall,givenitsuniquepositionwithinthatrelationship.Aclearsetofitsownprioritieswillthusbeessential.Overall,however,thereisnoescapingthefactthatwhatwillmakethebiggestnegativeorpositiveeffectwillbetheUK’sgeneralapproachtotheEUandwhethertheconditionsforclosepartnership,trustandgoodwillarefostered.

Recommendations

• PriorityshouldbegiventoequippingandpreparingtheOfficeoftheNIExecutiveinBrusselsforanewand,ifanything,moreimportantroleundertheProtocol.

• NorthernIrelandneedstobeselectiveandrealisticinitseffortstoshapeEUpolicy.Itwillneedtohave:strongmessagediscipline(includingwiththerestoftheUK),agoodunderstandingofEUprocesses,appropriatebriefingmaterials,agoodsenseastotherighttimetolobby,informationastowhomtoapproach,andgoodrelationshipswithpersonnelinBrusselsthatextendbeyondEUbodies(includingothersub-nationalregions).

• Continuedparticipation/membershipinEuropean-widesectoralorthematicbodiesandfederationsisanimportantrouteofrepresentationofNorthernIreland’sinterestsattheEUlevel,includingfromoutsideNIpublicinstitutions(e.g.theUFUasamemberoftheFarmingUnionsofEurope,orPSNImembershipofpoliceassociations).

• AdiplomaticEU‘presence’shouldbere-establishedinNorthernIreland.Thisneednotnecessarilyhaveapublic-facingofficebutitshouldbetherenotonlytocontribute,asappropriate,totheimplementationoftheProtocolbutalsotofilltheliaison/communicationgapleftbythelossoftheCommissionOfficeinBelfast.ThiswillaidunderstandingandappropriatesensitivityatEUlevel.Moreover,thefactthatitisinBelfastisaconstructively‘neutral’locationforNIliaison,ratherthanrelyingsolelyonpresenceinLondonandDublin.

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5. Building on from Northern Ireland’s experience to date

Lessons from the Article 50 Process and Dysfunctional Devolution

ThematterofhowNorthernIreland’sviewsarerepresentedanditsintereststakenonboardintheperiodaftertransitionisoneofconcerntoawiderangeofactorsintheregion.ItisthereforepertinenttotakelessonsfromthewaysinwhichtheArticle50processwasexperiencedinNorthernIreland.Thissectiondrawsonresearchwithc.100stakeholdersacrossawiderangeofsectors inNorthernIreland.Itbringsforwardanalysisfromtheexperiencesfromthatprocesstomakerecommendationsaboutwhatneedstobedoneforthepost-transitionphasetoensuregoodgovernancefortheregion.

CooperationamongNorthernIreland’ssocialpartners

It is clear that theprocessof theUK’swithdrawalhashada stimulatingeffecton theoptions forengagementbetweencivilsociety–broadlydefined–anddifferentlevelsofgovernanceforNorthernIreland. This is interesting because it has come in the context of a lack of formal representativedevolvedgovernancefortheregion.ItisundeniablythecasethatsuchengagementhasarisenfromconcernaboutthepotentialnegativeeffectsofBrexitonNorthernIreland,ratherthaninrelationtofutureopportunities.

Partly because of the lack of functioning devolved institutions, engagement and communicationwithandamongcivilservantsinNorthernIrelandincreasedintheperiod2017-2020.Forthepublicsector more generally and for local government, engagement with particular NI departments aswellasdepartments intheotherdevolvedregionshasbeen important.Forexample,ahealthcarerespondentmentioned theDepartmentofHealth inNorthern Ireland, theEUExitplanners in theDepartmentofHealthandSocialCareEngland,andtheDepartmentsofHealthinScotlandandWales.TheeffectivenessoftheserelationshipshasbeenenhancedbyagrowthofgenerallyinformalsocialpartnernetworkswithinandacrosssectorsaffectedbyBrexit.

AnimportantdevelopmentintheArticle50process–engenderedinpartbytheurgencyandintensityofBrexit-relatedconcernsandbytheabsenceoffunctioningpoliticalinstitutionsintheregion–hasbeentheemergenceofamorestructuredengagementbetweenthekeysocialpartnersinNorthernIreland (including trade unions, business lobby, the voluntary and community sector). Such asocialpartnershipapproachwas seenby stakeholdersas ‘positive’, ‘novel’and ‘important’,andasdemonstratingbroadagreementregardingthenegativeeffectsofBrexitonNorthernIreland.

InformalalliancesamongbusinessorganisationshavebecomeastrongfeatureofNorthernIreland’srepresentationandweredescribedas‘extremelyhelpful’forandbeyondBrexit-relatedengagements.These informalalliances includeboth ‘adhocbusinessgroupings’amongsmallerbodiesand long-standingassociations,suchastheNorthernIrelandandtheBritishRetailConsortia,theConfederationofBritishIndustry,andtheNorthernIrelandChamberofCommerce.

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Indeed,weaskedtherespondentstoouronlinesurveyiftheywereawareofnewnetworksorinitiativesrelevanttotheBrexit-relatedprioritiesoftheirorganisation/institutionwhichmayhaveemergedorbeensetupsincethe2016Referendum.Awiderangeofexampleswereoffered,includingeverythingfromtheCentral-LocalGovernmentPoliticalForumcoordinatedbyNILGA;theMinistryforHousing,CommunitiesandLocalGovernmentBrexitDeliveryBoard;informalnewinter-churchnetworks;theBorderCorridorGroupcomprising11LocalAuthorities;theInter-ParliamentaryForumonBrexit;astrengtheningofOrganisedCrimeTaskForce(OCTF)partnerships;andtheBrexitCommitteeatBelfastCityCouncillevelusingdirectestablishedrelationshipswithEuropeancities.ManyoftheseinitiativesenjoydirectconnectionstodepartmentsorinstitutionsintheUKand/orIreland.

Thismaybelookeduponasanimportant indicatorofthereadinessandabilityofcivilsocietyandbusinessintheregion,shoulditbecalledupon,toprovideadviceforandbeengagedinthemechanismsforgovernanceandconsultationprovidedforintheWithdrawalAgreement.

Lessons for NI Relating to UK Engagement

Accessdoesnotequatetoinfluence

No one is under any illusion as to the importance of Northern Ireland in the UK government’sconsiderationsofitsfuturerelationshipwiththeEUcomparedtootherpressingconcernsthathavemoreimmediateimpactontheeconomicinterestsoftheUKasawhole,nottomentionpartypoliticalelectoralprospects.

Mostofour stakeholdersperceived therecontinues tobea lackofknowledgeandunderstandingofNorthern Ireland’sdistinctcircumstancesamongmany in thepoliticalestablishment inLondon.ParticipantsrepeatedlyexpressedasenseoffrustrationwiththeirexperienceofexplainingNorthernIreland’s position to the UK government who was perceived as ‘unreceptive’. These views wereindeedconfirmedbyarecentInstituteforGovernmentReportsuggestingthat‘[i]nWestminsterandWhitehall,theNI-specificimplicationsofpoliciesorissuesarerarelyconsidered,theNorthernIrelandOffice(NIO)ismarginalised,andthereisapoorgeneralunderstandingoflocalissues’(SargeantandRutter2019:7).

Inthiscontext,directengagementwithWestminsterandWhitehallentailedaneducation/awareness-raisingprocessfirst,andthenaninformation-sharingandlobbyingprocesssecond.Duringthelonghiatusinthefunctioningofthedevolvedadministration,thisbecameparticularlyimportant.Itincludedsubmissions toandappearancesbeforecommittee inquiries,participation incentraldepartmentalworkgroups, and the canvassing of MPs, Peers, government ministers and civil servants, amongothers.49Ultimately, a rangeof lobbying techniqueswereusedby the attendees,whowereoftenuncertainwhich(ifany)hadbeeneffective.

49 SuchinquiriesinitiatedbyWestminsterCommitteesincludedtheHouseofLordsEUCommitteeand,fromtheHouseofCommons,theNorthernIrelandAffairsCommittee[NIAC],theAllPartyPoliticalGrouponPostBrexitFunding[APPG],andtheExitingtheEUCommittee.

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Mostparticipantsstressedthatbeingabletotalktolegislatorsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheyarewillingtoamendlegislation/policyaccordingly.Thereweremixedexperiencesofengagingwithofficials in London. SomestakeholdersdescribedBritishofficialswhohadvisitedNorthern Irelandas ‘listening to but not hearing’. That said, somedepartments inWestminsterwere seen to haveperformedwell,withtheestablishmentofengagementinitiatives(suchastheFutureFoodFarmingandForestryatDEFRAortheEUExitseminarsfromtheDepartmentforBusiness,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy)consideredpositivedevelopments.

OnebusinessrespondentnotedasignificantdifferenceintheapproachoftheUKcomparedtotheIrishgovernmenttostakeholderengagement:

[T]heBrexitStakeholderForumthathasbeensetupintheRepublichasbeenveryusefulandwouldhopethatitcontinuesafterWithdrawaluntiltheconclusionofthefuturetradetalksataminimum.SimilarengagementataUKlevelhasbeenlessforthcoming.WhilewehavemetwithrelevantDepartmentsandpartakeninUKgovernmentbriefings,thesearenotatthesamelevelasthoseexperiencedwiththeIrishgovernment.EngagementatthepreviouslydescribedlevelintheUKisquiteclosedwithmanyinterestgroupsexcludedfromtheconversation.

CorrectingthisimbalancecouldbeconsideredusefultotheUKinthetransitionperiod,includingasitnegotiatesitsfuturerelationshipwiththeEU,evenifonlytoinformifnottoconsult.

Variousroutesofinfluence

Input into the Article 50 negotiations was most particularly channelled through UK governmentdepartments by public sector actors. As would be expected, levels of engagement with differentgovernmentdepartmentsvariedaccordingtothenatureoftheworkofthestakeholder(e.g.regulatoryactorsengagedmostwiththeDepartmentforBusiness,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy;humanrightswiththeNIOandCabinetOffice).

Thepeculiarconditionsof2017-2020(e.g.theconfidenceandsupplyarrangementbetweentheDUPandtheConservativegovernment,thelackofasittingNIExecutiveandAssembly,theheateddebatesurroundingthe‘backstop’)helpedgiverisetoasituationinwhichsomecivicactorsinNorthernIreland(includingsomeofourresearchparticipants)hadaccesstoveryseniorlevelsoftheUKgovernment.Thiswasrecognisedasbeingexceptionalandprobablyunsustainableinthelongerterm.

In the absence of a devolved Executive, participants expressed appreciation for the expansion ofthe channels for representing Northern Ireland’s position at the UK central level. These includeddepartmentaldevolvedworkinggroupsand ‘ministerialquadrilaterals’, includingadevolvedforumforeconomyandtradeconvenedbyDEFRA.

Interestingly,Dublinhasbeena locus forengagement fromNorthern IrelandwithUKgovernmentministersandofficials,primarilyfacilitatedthroughtheBritishEmbassythere.AnumberofrespondentsmentionedAmbassadorialstaffinDublin.Suchengagementisperhapsreflectiveofthecross-bordernatureofthemarketeconomyandtheassociatedwillingnessandinterestofthebusinesssectortoworkonanall-islandbasis,whichextendstoutilisingUKrepresentationinIreland.

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Lessons Relating to EU Engagement

DirectinfluenceParticipantsreportedfarmoredirectengagementwithvariousforumsforrepresentationanddecision-makingattheEUlevelduringtheArticle50processthanmighthavebeenexpected.ThisincludedwithMEPs(includingnon-UKandIrishMEPs),ECofficials,theArticle50Taskforce,andvariouscommittees.DuringtheArticle50negotiations,someoftheparticipantsenjoyedveryhighlevelsofaccesstothemostseniorindividualsinvolvedinthenegotiationsontheEUside,buttheyexpectedsuchchannelstobemorelimitedinthefuture,notleastgiventhesensitivitiesaroundtheUK-EUfuturerelationshipandthefactthatNorthernIrelandaspartoftheUKisnowoutsidetheEU.

Nonetheless,itwasclearthattherewasanestablishedcultureofcommunicationbetweenNorthernIreland,BrusselsandDublinthatcameintoitsown(albeitnotwithouttensions)duringtheArticle50 negotiations. Long-term engagement through regular networking events and ‘longstandingrelationships’withEUofficialsandMEPswasseenashavingbeen‘invaluable’inpromotingNorthernIreland’svoicesincetheEUreferendum.Theterm‘coffeecupdiplomacy’wasusedtodescribethiskindofengagement.

Brussels was also considered by our research participants to be generally sympathetic towardsandwell-informedonNorthern Ireland issues. This is in part related to the fact – particularly forborderregionactors–thatsomestakeholdersenjoy‘longstandingrelationshipswithEUofficialsandMEPs’andhaveengageddirectlywithBrusselsinthepast(e.g.holdingregularnetworkingeventsinBrussels).Some,however,consideredtheirinformalaccesstoBrusselslimitedunlesstheissuewasofparticularinteresttothem.MEPsinBrusselswerefrequentlybroughtupaspotentiallyeffectiveroutesofinfluence,andtheCommissionwasconsideredreceptivetoexpertise.

TherehasalsobeenmorecontactwiththeOfficeoftheNIExecutiveinBrusselsthanwasthecasepriortotheBrexitreferendum.ThisisalsotrueintermsofcontactwiththePermanentRepresentativesof the Irish government and the offices of other devolved UK regions in Brussels. The EuropeanCommission’sOfficeinBelfastisafrequentportofcallfortheVoluntaryandCommunitySector.

TheDublinconnection

Dublin was considered to be ‘on the same page’ inmanywayswhen it came to appreciation ofthe importanceof theB/GFAand theunique circumstancesof the islandof Ireland.AnumberofrespondentsfromvarioussectorsinNorthernIrelandcreditedgooddirectengagementwiththeIrishgovernmentandwithitsindividualdepartmentsandinitiativesforgivingasenseof‘beingheard’intheArticle50process.TheseincludesuchbodiesastheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade,theBrexitworkinggroupinIreland’sDepartmentofHealth,andtheAll-IslandCivicDialogueonBrexit.

OneparticipantdescribedtheAll-IslandCivicDialogueas‘ausefulforuminwhichaninclusiverangeofNorth/Southissuesareconsideredwithrepresentativesfromacrossbusinesstradeunions,civicsocietyandpoliticsontheisland’.FrequentBrexitstakeholderforumsorganisedbytheIrishgovernmentonChatham-House-ruleswerealsoconsideredpositiveinitiativesbyanumberofrespondents.Finally,inrelationtoDublin,goodpersonalcontactsandrelationshipsoftrust(includingthroughtheJointSecretariat in Belfast) built with Irish officials (rather than politicians) were considered useful forsmallerorganisationsinparticular.

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TheefficacyoftheStrandIIandIIIinstitutionshadclearlybeenaffectedbythelackofasittingAssemblyandanExecutive.However,althoughtheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncilhadnotmetinplenarysincethecollapseofStormont,somestakeholdersfoundtheNSMCsecretariatveryusefuloutsideofformalmeetings.TheimportanceofcertainbodiesundertheAgreement,itwascommented,hadgrownintheabsenceofaworkinggovernmentinNorthernIreland.

Indirectinfluence

Suchrepresentation isnotalwaysdirect.Engagementwith ‘Brussels’viatheUK(e.g.theNIO)andIrishgovernmentdepartmentswasmentionedequallyoften.TheEuropeanCommission’sOfficeinBelfast was also valued by stakeholders in Northern Ireland and commended for enabling two-waycommunicationbetweenNorthernIrelandandtheEUatatimeoftensioninUK-EUrelations.Thiswasparticularly appreciatedby those in thevoluntary sector.Mentionwasalsomadeof theEuropeanParliamentLiaisonOfficeinLondoninasimilarregard.

RespondentsfromthebusinesssectorstronglyemphasisedtheimportanceofbusinessallianceswhenengagingatEUlevel,includingboththroughlongstandingnetworksandad hocformations.Similarly,formany,thebodiesrepresentingthebusinesssectorattheUKlevelarealsothosebestengagedwithintermsofrepresentationattheEUlevel.Arepresentativeofa‘foodchain’organisationstatedthatthe‘CBI,BritishRetailConsortium,NIChamberofCommerce[are]takingourviewstoBrussels’,whileanotherrespondentsuggestedthat‘[a]recent[ly]combinedbusinesscommunitygroupwithover20groupsdidgiveusavoice’.Businesssectoralliancesandnetworksweredescribedbybusinessbodiesas‘extremelyuseful’forBrexit-relatedengagementatEUandUKlevel.

Indeed,anumberof informalnewnetworksamongorganisationsandbodiesfromvarioussectorsontheislandofIrelandwerefurthercitedashavingbeenparticularlyvaluableformsofengagement,inamannerakin to socialpartnership. This kindofengagement, itwas suggested,hasbeen ‘lessforthcoming’ataUK level–possiblyaconsequenceof the typeofchallenges facing the islandofIrelandinrelationtotheIrishborder,andwhichmaychangeasthechallengewithimplementationoftheProtocolbecomestheIrishseaborder.

Different Approaches to Engagement from NI

Proactiveengagement

WhenitcomestoseekinginfluenceatboththeUKandEUlevelsduringtheArticle50process,themajorityofstakeholdersdescribedeitheramainlyproactiveapproachoramixtureofbeingproactiveandrelyingon invitations forengagement fromothers.Beingproactive in looking forengagementopportunitiesatboththeUKandEUlevels–asopposedtorelyingoninvitations–wasperceivedasawaytogainmostinfluence.Aproactiveapproachwasmorecommonlyclaimedbyprivatesectorrespondents.Asonerepresentativeofabusinessorganisationexplained:

In our experience these [forms of engagement] aren’t mutually exclusive and one form…begetstheother.However,Iwouldsaythatitisthroughourproactiveengagementthatwehavehadmostinfluence.

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Thiswasnotconfinedtotheprivatesector,however.Respondingtotheneedforinformationaswelltheperceivedneedtoinfluencedecisionsbeingmade,NorthernIrelandactorsusedopportunitiestowriteandpublishreportsintheirrespectiveareasofexpertise(e.g.arespondentfromahumanrightsbodycommissionedresearchandusedthat‘inlobbyingtheUKgovernmenttoensurethatthewiderhumanrightsandequalitydiscussionswerewidenedto listentotheviewsofwidercivicsociety’).Publishingpapersandreports‘onmattersofconcernforourorganisationandstakeholders’wasseenasavitalmeansofactionbythoseinthevoluntaryandcommunitysectorinNorthernIrelandwhenseekingtoengagedirectly‘withdecision-makersacrosstheislandofIreland,theUKandintherestoftheEU’.

OtherstookituponthemselvestoarrangedelegationstoandmeetingsinBrusselsandLondon(e.g.theIrishCouncilofChurchesorganisedanInterChurchdelegationtotheEuropeanCommissionandParliament).Stillotherslobbiedfora‘seatatthetable’whentheyrealisedNorthernIrelandwasbeingexcludedfromkeydiscussions(e.g.alocalauthoritylobbiedforinclusionontheMinistryofHousing,CommunitiesandLocalGovernment’sBrexitDeliveryBoard).

Acceptinginvitations

Asmallportionofthestakeholdersconsultedsaidthattheymainlyreliedoninvitationsforengagementratherthantakingtheinitiativethemselves;thisappearstobetruemoreofthirdsectorthanprivatesectorgroups.Thisapproachbroughtbenefitstoo,althoughitreliedonthebodiesbeingknowninthefirstplace–somethingthatisharderforsmaller,morespecialisedorganisations.Invitationsforengagement came from government departments, professional bodies and national networks. Allstakeholdersconsulted,withoutexception,reportedthattheyrespondedpositivelytoeveryinvitationfor engagement where possible. However, some stakeholders experienced several difficulties ininitiatingorrespondingtoinvitationsforengagement(seebelow).ManyrespondentsnotedthattheyareawareofnewinitiativesrelevanttotheirBrexit-relatedprioritiesatregional,UK,IrelandandEUlevels.Whethertheyhadbeenabletoparticipateinsuchinitiativesdependedoncapacityratherthanonwillingnessorinterest.

Constraints on Influence-Seeking

Findingwaystogetontheradar

If Northern Ireland is tomake themost of its potential for influence and engagement atUK andEUlevels,lessonsneedtobetakenfromtheexperienceofsocialpartnersintheArticle50processregardingwhatpreventedthemfromtakingupopportunitiestohavesuchinfluence.

Theprimarydifficultytobeovercomebysomesocialpartners,especiallycomingfromNorthernIreland–asmallregionontheperipheryoftheUKandtheEU–wassimplyreceivinganinitialinvitation.Onerespondentfromabusinessmembershiporganisationdescribedthechallengeandthenastrategyforovercomingthisdifficulty:

themaindifficultyisgettingtheinitialmeetingorinvitation.Asanorganisation,wewouldnothavebeenaswell-knownasotherbusinessgroupsogettingthefirstrunofmeetingswasa

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challenge.However,wefoundthatwhenyouhavesomethingconcretetooffertothedebate,politiciansaremorelikelygoingtowanttomeetwithyouandfurthermorearemorelikelytoinviteyoubacksothatyourideascanbeheardbytheircolleagues.

Thework of the likes of the Joint British-Irish Secretariat, theBritish Embassy inDublin, the IrishEmbassy in London the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the European CommissionOfficeinBelfast,aswellaspoliticalparties,wasinvaluableincorrectingthisomission,meaningthattherewasagoodarrayofsocialpartnersknowninWestminster/WhitehallandBrusselsbytheendoftheArticle50process.However,manyofthesedependonpersonalrelationshipsandneedtobesustained, particularly given theoverhaul of civil service in theUKand the regularityof changingpersonnel in relevantpositions in thediplomatic service.Care shouldbe taken to formalise theseconnectionstobeorganisation-ratherthanperson-based.

Politicalsensitivities

Althoughallstakeholders–itwasclearfromworkshopdiscussions–areveryawareofthepoliticalsensitivitiesaroundBrexitandNorthernIreland’spositionintheprocess,theonlyonetociteitasafactorthathinderedengagementwasarespondentworkingintheareaoflawenforcement:

ThecontinuingseeminglyendlesssensitivityaroundtheIrishlandborderwhichattimeshasmeantdifferentagenciesworkinginsilostoaddresstheirspecificremits[is]frustratingbecauseinthefieldoflawenforcementthereareobviouslymanyoverlappingpriorities.

Thatsaid,theabsenceofasittingNIExecutivefor3yearsduring2017-2020createdunusualconditionsinNorthern Ireland.Politicalsensitivitiesarecloselyconnectedtothepower-sharingwithintheNIExecutiveand informalevidencewouldsuggest that thesehave increasedsince theExecutivewasreconvened,asonemightexpect.

Lackofcapacity

A number of respondents mentioned ‘resources’ as being the main difficulty in their attemptsat engagement. Lack of resources was seen as an obstacle either directly (e.g. inability tocover associated travel expenses to the degree necessary for direct engagement) or indirectly(e.g.throughinsufficientfundstohireadditionalstaffworkingontheimplicationsofBrexitfortheorganisation).Addedtothis,eitherbecauseofotherday-to-dayworkortightdeadlinesforresponses/meetings,anumberofourresearchparticipantscitedalackoftimeasthereasonwhytheywerenotabletoengageinsuchopportunitiesastheywouldhaveliked.

Separatebutperhapsnotunrelatedtotheabove,wasthequestionoflimitedorganisationalcapacity,mentionedasadifficultybyafewrespondents(e.g.‘UnderstaffedforpeoplewhowouldunderstandthedetailofBrexit’).ArespondentfromthePublicSectorsuggestedthattheirdifficultywasthelackofappropriateorganisationalstructuretofeedinformationbackinto.

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Theneedforclear,accessibleinformation

ManystakeholderscomplainedabouttheproblemscausedbyagenerallackofclaritycomingfromgovernmentdepartmentsinrelationtoBrexit–somethingnotexclusivelyexperiencedinNorthernIrelandofcourse,butexacerbatedbytheparticularuncertaintiesfeltherewithregardtothefutureoftheIrishborder.Thelackofinformationwasstatedasadifficultybyrespondentsfromarangeofsectors.OneusedtheexampleofabriefingontheEUSettlementSchemebytheHomeOfficeinwhichcomplicateddatawaspresentedwithnocirculationoftheslides(evenforthosedialling-intosuchmeetings).Thesenseof theprofound importanceandcomplexityof the informationbeingshareddissuadedsomebodiesfromfurtherengagement,despitetheirdirectexpertiseandresponsibilityfortheon-the-groundimplementationofschemesrelatingtothisinformation.

More broadly and fundamentally, however, stakeholders cited the uncertainty surrounding theoutcomeoftheArticle50process(including‘NoDeal’)asmakingitverydifficulttoengageastheymighthavewished,simplybecausetheywereunsureastotheparametersofwhattheywerebeingaskedtodiscuss.

Formulating the Northern Ireland Position

Theneedforinclusivityanddiversity

BeforeNorthernIrelandcanhaveanyclear‘voice’inBrusselsor,indeed,inLondon,thereisaneedtobesureastohowthatvoiceisconstructedandformulated.ParticipantsinourresearchrepeatedlynotedthecomplexitiesofdiscussingandformulatingoneclearvoiceonbehalfofNorthernIreland,particularlygiventhepoliticalsensitivitiesanddifferenceswithregardstoBrexit.Indeed,participantswereoftheopinionthatduetothepoliticallycontentiousnatureofBrexit, functioningdevolutioncomplicates the challenge of formulating a clear Northern Ireland position. That said, as MichelBarniernotedinhisspeechatQueen’sUniversityBelfast(20January2020),50 whilst he had to meet theNorthernIrelandpoliticalpartiesseparatelyduringtheArticle50negotiations,nowhecanmeettheDUPandSinnFéin inthesameroom,asFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinister,andtheyarearticulatingcommonconcernsforNorthernIreland.

When it comes to articulating common ambitions for Northern Ireland post-Brexit, theremay beproblemsahead.ThisiswhyitisimportanttoincludeawiderangeofactorsinformulatingtheviewfromNorthern Ireland. In all these discussions, the necessity of political oversight and legitimacyto decisionmakingwaswidely acknowledged. And one thing that cannot go unrecognised is theimportanceofastrongevidence-basetosupportNorthernIreland’sposition-making.Tothisend,andbuildingontherecentwideningofpolicyengagementacrossNorthernIreland,SargeantandRutter(2019)suggestdevelopinggreaterindependentthink-tank activityinNorthernIreland.

50 Availablefrom:https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_133(accessed8May2020).

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SocialPartnerCoalition

Social Dialogue

Most participants in our research stressed the importance of a coalition of social partners in thedevelopmentofaclearNorthernIrelandposition.Ourresearchparticipantsstronglysuggestedthatthisdimensionofgovernanceshouldbegivendueregardinanynewpost-Brexitdispensation.Severalsuggestionswereraisedastohowthismightbeformalised.OnethingthatisclearisthatNorthernIrelandhasalotofexperienceinsocialpartnershipandcivicengagementvis-à-visthepeaceprocess.However, this has tended not to include business-civic collaborations. And these initiatives havefalteredwithoutcross-communitypoliticalsupport.

Oneoptionistoformaliseanad hoc social partner network (includingtradeunions,voluntaryandcommunity sector organisations, andbusiness bodies etc.), a versionofwhichhasbeen gatheredtogethertoraisecross-sectoralconcernsarisingfromBrexittopolicyaudiencesintheUnitedStates.51

TheEEAConsultative Committee contains representatives fromthe ‘socialpartners’of theEUandEFTAstates.ThiscouldbeamodelonwhichsocialrepresentationcouldbeorganisedforNorthernIrelandinterests.AnotherpossiblemodelisseenintheCivil Society PlatformsusedintheUkraine-EUAssociationAgreement(AA),whichprovideapermanentforumfortheexchangingofviewsbetweencivilsocietyrepresentativesandtheAAinstitutions.52

Theunimplemented institutionsunder theB/GFA relateparticularly to the civil societydimensionofgovernanceon the islandof Ireland– something thathasasyetunrealisedpotential forgivingdeeperandwider scope to thegovernanceofNI.For instance, the ideaof ‘resurrecting’ theCivic Forumisoftenreturnedto,anditwasamongourresearchparticipants.53 ArelatedsuggestionfocusedontheexampleoftheCitizens’ Assembly for Northern Ireland convenedinOctober/November2018withwhichtheDepartmentofHealthwassaidtohaveengaged.54 However, whilst this example has demonstratedthatCitizensAssembliescanworkproductively,adifficultywasseenwithtakingforwardanyagreeddecisionsandproposalsintheabsenceofafunctioninggovernment.

Specifically, the establishment of a Forum for Social Dialogue consisting of four pillars – Unions,Employers,CommunityandVoluntarysector,andtheAgriculturalsector–wassuggestedbyaresearchparticipantandworkshopdiscussions indicatedsupportforsuchaninitiative.While inclusivitywasseenasthemainstrengthofsuchaforum,difficultieswereanticipatedwithpoliticalsupportandwithreachinganagreementaroundtheForum’spreciseroleandremit.

51 Seeforexample,thelettertoSpeakerNancyPelosi(September2019),https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/2019/09/nancy-pelosi-letter.pdf(accessed8May2020).

52 EasternPartnershipCountrieshaveaCivilSocietyPlatform,whichcanmakerecommendationstotheAssociationCouncil,andtheAssociationCommitteeandtheParliamentaryAssociationCommitteeareobligedtoorganiseregularcontactswiththeCivilSocietyPlatformtoobtaintheirviewsontheprogressoftheAssociationAgreement.

53 Thiswasseenasapossibleextensionofthedemocraticprocess,andadevelopmentofaregionalvoiceoutsidethepoliticalsphere,throughawiderandmoreinclusivedialogue,allowingforagreaterfocusonrights.ItwasnotedthataneventualrevivaloftheCivicForum,however,shouldgohand-in-handwithacloserreviewofitsstructure,anditsoperationshouldbemademorethematic.

54 TheNorthernIrelandAffairsCommittee(NIAC)suggestedthatCitizens’Assembliesshouldbeconsideredasanalternativemechanismforcivicengagementwhich‘couldassistwithaddressingfuturepoliticaldeadlocktherebysupportinginstitutionalstability’(NIAC2018:45).

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OurresearchparticipantssawvalueinsocialpartnershipsnotjustinformulatingclearNI-positionsbutalsoinrepresentingtheregionalvoiceattheUKcentrallevelandattheEUleveltoo.Experiencewithsocialpartnerships fromtheRepublicof Irelandwas regardedasamodel thatcouldbebuiltupon,requiringtheUKgovernmenttoformallyconsultwithsocialpartnersintheregion.ExamplesofsocialdialoguebodiesandsocialpartnershipsinScotlandandWaleswerediscussedandseenasanopportunityforlearning.

Role for business

TheroleofbusinessininformingpublicdebateinthecontextofBrexit–bothlocallyandnationally–wasalso seenas crucial. In this respect, thenecessityoffinding stable structures thatwill bestexpressthisrolewhilegoingbeyondamoretraditionalmodeoflobbying,wasdiscussed.ArecentlylaunchedalliancebetweentheChamberofTradeandCommerce,RetailNIandtheHospitalityservicesinNorthernIrelandwaspointedoutasaninstanceofstrengtheningthevoiceofregionalbusinessnetworks.BusinessAlliancehasalsobeenrevivedasameansofofferingacommon,highlevelandwell-respectedvoice forNorthern Ireland’sprivate sectorat a criticaltime.At the sametime, thenecessitytofindaformalisedwayofrepresentingdifferentbusinesssectorswasacknowledged.OnesuggestionwastheestablishmentofaBusiness Assembly involvingbusinesslobbyists,peoplefrombusinesses,withregularrenewalofmembershipstructure.

Astute and multi-layered active engagement was described by a representative of a businessmembershiporganisationinresponsetoouronlinesurvey:

Wemainly represent the interests of ourmembers through direct canvassing ofMPs andMinisters of ourmembers’ concerns.Wehave accepted invitations and spoken in front ofrelevantCommonsandLordscommittees.Wehavehostedcrosspartybriefingsandspokeat informalPartyforaon issuesrelatingtoBrexit.Throughthisworkwehaveestablishedanetworkofcontactsfromacrosspartiesandhouseswhoweregularlyliaisewithregardingourmembers’prioritiesandconcerns.WeworkcloselywiththeUKEmbassyteaminDublinwhohavehelpedconnectusintothecivilservicesystemintheUKdealingdirectlywiththoseworking…onBrexitinvariousdepartmentsacrossgovernment.WealsoworkwithrepresentativesoftheWelsh and Scottish governments on sector specific andbroaderBrexit issues.Wealsoengagewithotherbusinessorganisationsandthink-tanksintheUK.

Thegeneralopinion that informalmechanismsof influenceand representationwere ‘better’ thantheformalonesprevailedamongparticipants.ItwasagreedthatNorthernIrelandalreadyhadgoodestablishednetworks,seenbysomeassuperiortothoseoftheUKasawhole(inpartbecauseofNorthernIreland’suniqueconnectionstoIreland).

Recommendations

• TheNIExecutiveshouldestablishthematicworkinggroupscomprisingcivilsocietyrepresentativesinanadvisoryrole.

• Cross-borderforumsforlocalauthorities(e.g.ICBAN)shouldbeusedforconsultationandstress-testingspecificcross-borderimplicationsoftheProtocol.

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6. The post-Brexit governance of Northern Ireland: Recommendations

Recommendations for the Levels of the 3 Strands

StrandI

Scrutiny of secondary legislation

1. NIExecutiveministersshouldnotifytheNIAssembly(NIA)withinoneworkingdayofregulationsbeing laidbeforetheUKParliamentwhereUKMinistersareactingalone indevolvedareaswithinthelegislativecompetenceoftheNIAortheexecutivecompetenceoftheNIExecutiveMinisters.

2. The NIA Standing Orders should be amended to assign to a committee the function ofrecommendingtheappropriateprocedureforthesiftingprocess.Feedingintothis,relevantcommitteesshouldoutlineinadvance,throughasetofscrutinystandards,theprecisecriteriawhichshouldbeappliedtothescrutinyofStatutoryInstruments(SIs).ItcouldbepossibletohavespecificcriteriathatcapturethesortofissuesthatarelikelytoariseinthecontextofSIsmadeunderpowersintheWithdrawalAgreementAct(2020).

3. There needs to be enough time/flexibility in the NIA committee timetable to scrutiniseregulations. An early warning system may be needed, and could be agreed with the NIExecutive,toassistinmanagingthescrutinyofallsubordinatelegislation.

The NI Executive

4. TheNIExecutiveshouldbeconsultedbytheUKgovernmentinadvanceofallissuesrelevanttoNIfordecisionsaspartofthewrittenprocedureprovidedforintheRulesofProcedurefortheJointCommittee.

5. The NI Executive should act on establishing a consultative forum to engage civil societyrepresentatives in (a) assessing the implementation of the Protocol, (b) drawing attentiontoissuesofconcernabouttheProtocol,and(c)requestingchangestotheoperationoftheProtocol.

Assembly Committees

6. TheCommitteefortheExecutiveOfficeshouldbeformallyconsultedbytheUKGovernmentprior to itmaking submissions for theprovisional agendaof theSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland.

7. TheCommitteefortheExecutiveOfficeshouldreceivefullminutesofall JointConsultativeWorkingGroup (JCWG)/Specialised Committeemeetings and all Joint CommitteemeetingswheremattersdirectlyaffectingNorthern Irelandarediscussed,evenwheretheseminutesarenotmadepublic.

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8. TheHouseofCommonsandNIAssemblycouldestablishajointstandingcommitteetoreviewimplementationoftheProtocol.

9. Awiderangeofspecialistsshouldbedrawnonbythecommittees,particularlyrelatingtothescopeoftheProtocol.

10.ItshouldbeensuredthatthechairsofallNIAssemblycommitteesrelevanttotheworkingsof the Protocol (e.g. Agriculture and Environment) receive regular briefings from the UKdelegationtotheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland.

StrandII

North South Ministerial Council

11.Tomakebestuseofthefactthat(a)theNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil(NSMC)isapre-existingbodyusedtofindingcommongroundandcommondecisionsonanorth/southbasis,and(b)ithasadirectroutetotheSpecialisedCommittee,theNSMCshouldbegivenaformalroletomonitortheimplementationandtheimpactoftheProtocol.Thisshouldbespecificallybutnotexclusivelyinrelationtothemaintenanceofnorth/southcooperation(Article11Protocol).

12.Accordingtothe1998Agreement,itshouldbeensuredthattheviewsoftheNSMCare‘takeninto account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings’. The NSMC shouldalsohavetheabilitytodrawtheurgentattentionoftheUKgovernmentandtheEuropeanCommission(aspertheJointCommittee)tojointNIExecutiveandIrishgovernmentconcernsaboutthreatstotheBelfast/GoodFridayAgreement(B/GFA)ortonorth/southcooperationthatmayrequireajointUKandEUapproachtoaddress.

13.TheNorthSouthJointSecretariatcouldberemodelledtoensureadequaterepresentationinareasofnorth/southcooperation(notimplementation).ThisisbecausetheywillbeaffectedbytheProtocolbutwillnotbecoveredintheB/GFAbodies,e.g.inhealth,tourism,education,agriculture.

Implementation Bodies

14.The Specialised Committee for the Protocol is to examine proposals regarding theimplementation and application of the Protocol from the six North South Implementationbodies.Howthesebodiesidentify,compileandrelaysuchproposalsneedstobeformalised.ThisissomethingthatcouldbecoordinatedbytheNSMCJointSecretariat.

15.TheImplementationBodiesalsoshouldbeequippedtoraiseconcerns(i.e.amberalertorredalert)withtheSpecialisedCommitteeonadirectandurgentbasis,notjusttoofferproposals.

North/South Inter-Parliamentary Association

16.A standing item on the agenda of North/South Inter-Parliamentary Association plenarymeetingsshouldbeBrexitandtheimplementationoftheProtocol.

17.Standing committees of the North/South Inter-Parliamentary Association and British-IrishParliamentaryAssemblyontheProtocolimplementationcouldbeestablishedtomonitortheProtocol’simplementation.

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StrandIII

British-Irish Council

18.GiventhesignificanceofBrexittotheenvironmentinwhichtheBritish-IrishCouncil(BIC)willbeworking,itshouldhavetheProtocol(specificallythepreamblepriorities)setasastandingitemontheagendaoftheplenarymeetings.TheBICcouldalsohaveanewtaskgroupfocusedontheimplementationoftheProtocol.

19.TheremitoftheBritish-IrishCouncilcouldbeexpandedtoincludeareaspreviouslycoordinatedatEUlevel,e.g.criminaljusticecooperation.

British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference

20. TheBritish-Irish IntergovernmentalConference should continue tomeet regularly and thebilateral work plan be developed that enables a coordinated approach to new areas forcooperationinlightofthechangedenvironmentoftheUK-EUrelationshipandinparticularthechallengesforNorthernIrelandoutsidemattersofdevolvedcompetence.

British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly

21.TheBritish-IrishParliamentaryAssembly(BIPA)shouldcontinuetointeractwiththeEuropeanParliament;visitstoBrusselsshouldcontinuetobeanoptionforCommitteesifnotfortheAssemblyasawhole.ConsiderationshouldbegiventosendingreportsfromtheCommittees(especiallyCommitteeB)totheJointCommitteeand/ortheSpecialisedCommittee.TheBIPAsecretariatshouldbeabletofeedintotheagendaoftheJointConsultativeWorkingGroup.

Other routes

22.ConsiderationshouldbegiventoestablishingandgettingoffthegroundaNorthSouthCivicForumsuchas recommendedbutnot implementedunder theB/GFAand the St.AndrewsAgreement.Thebodyshouldfocusspecificallyongettingstakeholderengagementinmanagingtransition. This could be a route throughwhich cross-border bodies or projects identifiedthroughtheNorth-SouthCooperationMappingExercisecouldbeincorporated.

23.Close and trusted communication between senior civil servants is vital. Itwould beworthexploring means of ensuring trilateral (Belfast/Dublin/London) communication as well asbilateral(east/westornorth/south)andquadrilateral(amongtheregionsandnationsoftheUK).

24.TheJointConsultativeWorkingGroupshouldhaveastreamofinputfromlocalauthoritiesonbothsidesoftheIrishborder.

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UKlevel

Engagement with Stormont

25.SecuringthecommitmentandmeansbywhichitcanshapesecondarylegislationrelatingtotheWithdrawalAgreement(WA)wouldbeamajoraskfromtheNIAssembly,butitcouldbearguedonthegroundsoftheexceptionalsignificanceoftheWAActforNorthernIreland.

26.The NI Assembly should be consulted on any decision about a potential extension of thetransitionperiod.

27.In theory, there is some scope for the Protocol and theWA to be amended by the JointCommitteetoaddressdeficienciesorunforeseensituations,withthemutualconsentoftheUKandtheEU.Theidentificationofsuchproblems–andsolutions–should involvetheNIdevolvedinstitutionsandwiderstakeholders.

28.TheUKgovernmentshouldsystematicallyconsulttheNIExecutiveonpositionstobeadoptedatallWithdrawalAgreementinstitutionsthatareofrelevancetoNorthernIreland.

29.ThereshouldbeanAnnualReportpreparedfortheNIAssemblybytheNIExecutiveandUKGovernmentontheimplementationoftheProtocol.

30.UpdatesofexistinglawscoveredbytheProtocolwillhappenautomatically.TheUKGovernmentshouldconsulttheNIAssemblyonadoptionofnewareasofEUlawapplicableintheareascoveredbytheProtocol.

Westminster procedures

31.ThereshouldbeanannualdebateintheHouseofCommonsandtheHouseofLordsontheimplementationofProtocol.

32.TheHouseofCommonsNorthernIrelandAffairsCommitteeshouldreceiveoralandwrittenreportsfromtheUKGovernmentonallissuesrelevanttoNIfollowingeachmeetingoftheJointCommitteeandwrittensummariesofallmeetingsoftheSpecialisedCommitteeonIreland/NorthernIreland.

Joint Ministerial Committee

33.TheUKGovernmentshouldincreasethefrequencyandimportanceofmeetingsoftheJointMinisterialCommittee(JMC)tohelpcoordinateBrexitamongthedevolvedregionsandnations.

34.New thematic committees shouldbeestablishedunder the JMC, includingon internal andinternational trade and relations, ensuring a coherentUKdomestic approachwhile closelyreflectingtheinterestsandpositionsofthedevolvedregions.

35.ThefourgovernmentswithintheUKshouldestablishanewJMCsub-committeeoninternationaltrade.

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Recommendations for EU-Level Representation

Newgovernancemechanisms

UK-EU Joint Committee

36.ItisimperativethattheUKnotonlyadherestoitscommitmenttohaverepresentativesfromtheNIExecutivepresentatrelevantmeetingsoftheJointCommittee,butthatitensuresthatthemostismadeofthiscommitment.Forexample,thereneedstobeclosecommunicationbetweentheNIExecutiveandtheUKdelegationinformingapositionpriortothemeeting.

37.TheUnitedKingdomshouldconsultwiththeNorthernIrelandExecutive(andotherdevolvedgovernments) about items that should be on the agenda for the meetings of the JointCommittee.Thisshouldhappeninatimelymanner.

38.Given the importance of the work of the Joint Committee for the implementation of theProtocol, theUK and EU should,where reasonable, use their powers (as per the Rules ofProcedure)todecidetomaketheagenda,oranypartthereof,publicbeforethebeginningofthemeeting.

If devolution is functioning:

39.FirstMinisterandDeputyFirstMinistershouldattendallmeetingsoftheJointCommitteeheldataministeriallevelwherethosemeetingsdiscussNorthernIreland,andthenreportonallmeetingstoarelevantcommitteeoftheNIAssembly.

40.TheNIExecutivecouldhavespeakingrightsfortheFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinisteratallrelevantmeetingsoftheJointCommittee

41.TheJointCommittee’sannualreportshouldbeconsideredbytheNIAssemblyaswellastheUKparliament.

42.NI Executive should receive all UK government papers relating to meetings of the JointCommittee.TheExecutiveshouldalsobeconsultedbytheUKgovernmentinadvanceofallissuesofrelevancetoNItobediscussedbytheJointCommittee.

43.NIExecutivecouldbeallowedtoadviseonwhichexpertsshouldaccompanytheFirstMinisteranddeputyFirstMinisterorseniorofficialstomeetings.

In the absence of devolution:

44.Representation should as aminimumbe ensured through senior officials from theNI CivilService.WhentheJointCommitteemeetsatministeriallevel,representationforNIshouldbethroughtheSecretaryofStateforNI.

45.The Northern Ireland Office should establish consultative sectoral fora in which relevantinterestsfromNorthernIrelandcanberepresentedandtheNorthernIrelandvoiceestablishedfortheSecretaryofStatetorepresentatmeetingsoftheJointCommittee.

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Specialised Committee

46.TheUKshouldconsiderincludingrepresentativesfromNorthernIrelandindelegationstootherSpecialised Committeeswhen they are discussingmatters of direct relevance to NorthernIreland,e.g.whentheSpecialisedCommitteeoncitizens’rightsisdiscussingfrontierworkers.

47.Assumingthelevelofrepresentationisofficials,NorthernIrelandshouldberepresented,withspeakingrights,inallmeetingsoftheSpecialisedCommitteebyrelevantseniorofficialsfromtheNorthernIrelandCivilService.

48.It would be useful if a series of themed/sectoral groups could be established under theSpecialisedCommitteeinordertofocusexpertiseonthedifferentpartsandimplicationsoftheProtocol.ThiswouldenablebetterscopefordirectrepresentationfromNorthernIrelandstakeholdersandexperts.

49.There should be mandatory communication of Commission proposals relevant to thefunctioningoftheProtocoltotheSpecialisedCommittee.

50.Expertsorotherpersonscanbe invitedtoprovide informationonspecificsubjects.TheNIExecutiveshouldbepermitted todeterminewhichexpertsandotherpersonswith subjectexpertiseshouldaccompanyseniorofficialstomeetings

51.NIAssemblyshouldreceivereportsfromUKgovernmentandNIExecutiveonallmeetingsofSpecialisedCommittee.

Joint Consultative Working Group

52.ThereshouldasaruleberepresentationfromrelevantBelfast/GoodFridayAgrementStrandIIandStrandIIIbodiesatJointConsultativeWorkingGroup(JCWG)meetings.

53.Asecretariat,orperhapsarapporteur,couldbeestablishedtotryandfilteroutsomeofthemorepoliticisedorinconsequentialcontributionsabodysuchastheJCWGislikelytoattract.Suchapositionwouldhavetobeentirelyapoliticalandtechnical,andwouldberesponsibleforinvestigatingsubmissionstotheJCWGfortheirvalidityandrelevancetothebody’sremit.

54.The JCWG could adopt a social partnership approach, as an absence of civil societyrepresentativesfromthebodycouldpotentiallyhaveseriousrepercussionsforitslegitimacy.

55.Theaccessof‘experts’totheJCWGshouldnotbelimitedto‘officials’butbespecifiedmorepreciselyintermsofinterestgroups.Suchgroupsmustbeinclusiveofhumanrightsbodies.It isalso recommendedthatsenior representativesofprofessional/umbrellabodies for therespectivesectorsareidentifiedas‘theexperts’toappearinfrontofJCWG.

56.TheJointCommittee,SpecialisedCommitteeandJCWGshouldprovideregulardetailedreportsonProtocol’simplementationtotheNSMC,North/SouthInter-ParliamentaryAssociationandBritish-IrishParliamentaryAssemblyandanyNIorcross-borderforumforsocialdialogue.

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SeekingdirectinfluenceatEUlevel

Make the most of the unique status and multilevel governance of the B/GFA

57.InstitutionsoftheBelfast/GoodFridayAgreement,includingtheNorthernIrelandExecutive,theNorthSouthMinisterialCouncil,andtheBritish-IrishIntergovernmentalConference,shouldbeenabledtomakewrittenstatementstotheEuropeanCommissionpriortotheadoptionoflegislativeproposalsthatwilldirectlyaffecttheoperationoftheProtocol,e.g.relatingtotheregulationofgoodsortelecommunications.

58.ItisnecessarytoclarifytheroleEU‘singlemarket’agencieswillplaywithregardstoNorthernIreland.IftheUKisnotrepresentedinthedecision-makingprocessoftheagenciestowhichNorthernIrelandmaybebound,thenspecialarrangementsshouldbemadeforrepresentationfromNorthernIrelandinregulatoryEUagenciesthatarerelevanttotheareasofProtocol.

59.The Committee of the Regions has been excellent formal platform for Northern Irelandrepresentationoflocalgovernmentandacaseshouldbemadeforcontinuedrepresentationonit.

60.RepresentationoftheNorthernIrelandpositiontotheEUviaDublin,althoughacknowledgedaspotentiallypoliticallysensitive,isespousedbybusinessatbothformalandinformallevels.

61.Representation through EU funding Programmes, which Northern Ireland has traditionallybenefittedfromthroughtheworkoftheSpeacialEUProgrammesBody(SEUPB),hasensuredahighdegreeofbothformalandinformalaccessandshouldbebuiltupon.ThisgivesNIauniqueformalanddirectconnectiontoEUprogrammes.

Work with the European Parliament

62.Arrangementsshouldbemade foreffectiveparliamentaryscrutinyof the JointCommittee.ThisshouldbeaUK-EUJointParliamentaryCommittee,whichcouldcontainmembersoftheNIExecutive,UKparliament,andEuropeanParliament.

63.TheNIAssemblyandEuropeanParliamentcouldestablishad hocjointcommitteetoreviewimplementationoftheProtocol.

64.AUK-EUParliamentaryCommitteecouldbeestablishedeitheraspartoftheimplementationoftheWAoraspartofthefuturerelationshiptoregularlyconsidertheimplementationoftheProtocol.ItcouldalsoestablishaCOSAC-typearrangement[ConferenceoftheCommitteesoftheNationalParliamentsoftheEuropeanUnionMemberStates]involvingNIAssemblyandOireachtastoregularlyreviewimplementationoftheProtocol.

65.TherecouldbeanannualdebateintheEuropeanParliamentontheProtocol.

Agencies and committees

66.Bywayof a complement to the JointConsultativeWorkingGroup (JCWG)and in linewithproposedarrangementsinthedraftWithdrawalAgreementofFebruary2018,theprincipleofUKparticipationinCommissionCommitteesandexpertgroupscouldbeextendedbeyondthetransitionperiodwithregardtoNorthernIrelandandobligationsundertheProtocol.

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67.AccessshouldbemaintainedforNIcivilservantstotheagenciesandbodieswhichtheUKhasaccesstoduringthetransitionperiod.Throughthesebodies,NIcivilservantscouldexerciseadegreeofinfluence,ashasbeenseeninEuropeanEconomicArea/Swissrepresentationinsimilarbodies.NotethataccesstocertainEUcommitteesisonlypermittedifyouarealignedinthatareaoftheacquis,sothiswillbedifferentforNorthernIrelandcomparedtotheUKasawhole.

Invest in and use technical expertise

68.TheUK-EUfuturerelationshipagreementshouldcontainexplicitprovisionsrequiringtheEUtoconsultwiththeUKwhendraftinglegislationthatwilllikelybeconsidered‘Protocolrelevant’by theUK-EU Joint Committee and/or Specialised Committee on Ireland/Northern Ireland.ThiswouldmeantheEuropeanCommission‘informallyseekingadvice’fromexpertsonandfromNorthernIreland(includingUKandIreland).

69.TheUK-EUagreementshouldalsoensureexpertsfromNorthernIreland‘aswideaparticipationaspossible’inthepreparatorystageofdraftmeasuresrelevanttotheProtocolbeforetheygotoEUcommittees.

70.TheUKandIrelandshouldmakeacaseforNorthernIrelandexpertstobeincludedinrelevantadvisoryexpertgroupsandtohaveobserverstatusoncertaincommittees.

71.Thepracticeof secondmentof experts fromNorthern Ireland to EU institutions shouldbecontinuedandsupported.

72.TheprocessofprioritisationandbestuseofexpertiseshouldbeonethatismanagedbytheNorthernIrelandExecutive.

‘Strand IV’

73.Considerationshouldbegiventotheestablishmentofa‘StrandIV’oftheBelfast/GoodFridayAgreement.ThiscouldinvolveaBritish-IrishForumforExternalRelationsorsomesuch.ItcanbeusedtocoordinateprioritisedpositionsfromStrandsIIandIIIwhenitcomestoinformingthepositionoftheUKandIrelandonEUproposals.Itcouldalsooverseetheprotectionandoperationofthe1998Agreementinlightofchangestotheexternalenvironment,e.g.aUS-UKFreeTradeAgreementoraUK-EUSecuritypartnership.

74.Tofacilitateallthis,theNIExecutiveshouldreceivefromtheUKgovernmentallrelevantpapersandbeformallyconsultedinadvanceontheagendaforandpositionstobetakenatmeetings.TheExecutiveshouldalsobeformallyconsultedonissuesofrelevanceaspartofthewrittenprocedureprovidedforintheRulesofProcedurefortheJointandSpecialisedCommittees.

MeansofindirectinfluenceforNorthernIrelandatEUlevel

75.PriorityshouldbegiventoequippingandpreparingtheOfficeoftheNIExecutiveinBrusselsforanewand,ifanything,moreimportantroleundertheProtocol.

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76.NorthernIrelandneedstobeselectiveandrealisticinitseffortstoshapeEUpolicy.Itwillneedtohave:strongmessagediscipline(includingwiththerestoftheUK),agoodunderstandingofEUprocesses,appropriatebriefingmaterials,agoodsenseastotherighttimeto lobby,informationastowhomtoapproach,andgoodrelationshipswithpersonnelinBrusselsthatextendbeyondEUbodies(includingothersub-nationalregions).

77.Continued participation/membership in European-wide sectoral or thematic bodies andfederationsisanimportantrouteofrepresentationofNorthernIreland’sinterestsattheEUlevel,includingfromoutsideNIpublicinstitutions(e.g.businessalliances,technicalexperts,non-governmentalbodies).

78.A diplomatic EU ‘presence’ should be re-established in Northern Ireland. This need notnecessarily have a public-facing office but it should be there not only to contribute, asappropriate,totheimplementationoftheProtocolbutalsotofilltheliaison/communicationgap left by the loss of the Commission Office in Belfast. This will aid understanding andappropriatesensitivityatEUlevel

Expandingtheinput

79.The NI Executive should establish thematic working groups comprising civil societyrepresentativesinanadvisoryrole.

80.Pre-existing cross-border forums for local authorities should be used for consultation andstress-testingspecificcross-borderimplicationsoftheProtocol.

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WorldBank(2014)‘EvaluationoftheEU-TurkeyCustomsUnion’.Availablefrom:http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/turkey/tr-eu-customs-union-eng.pdf (accessed8May2020).

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Annex 1: Governance of key policy areas: illustrating the challenge

Bywayof illustratingthecomplexityof thegovernancechallengeforNorthern IrelandafterBrexitandundertheProtocol,thisAnnexbrieflyoutlinesasetofmajorpolicyareaswhicharedevolvedinNorthernIrelandandwhich–intheirentiretyorinpart–aredirectlyrelevantto:

(i) theimplementationoftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIrelandundertheWA,(ii) tothefuturemaintenanceofcross-bordercooperationwiththeRepublicofIreland,and(iii) topotentialdivergenceacrosstheconstituentpartsoftheUnitedKingdom.Eachtopiclooks

attheNorthernIreland-specific,theUK-wide,thecross-borderandtheEUdimensionsofthepolicyareas.

Environmental Governance

NI-specificcontext

EnvironmentalgovernancefallsundertheremitoftheNIDepartmentofAgriculture,EnvironmentandRuralAffairs(DAERA)aswellas itsnamesakeStatutoryCommitteeoftheNIAssembly.Duringthethreeyearsofnofunctioning localdevolvedgovernment,civilservants inDAERAcontinuedtoconvenestakeholderworkinggroups(onfisheries,ruralaffairs,environment,agricultureetc.)setupafterthe2016referendum.

Northern Ireland is seenas laggingbehindtheUK (andmostof theEU) in termsof thequalityofitsenvironmentalgovernance(Graveyetal.2018).Theregionlacksanindependentenvironmentalagency,alocalAssemblyEnvironmentalAuditCommittee,andaspecificenvironmentaltribunal(orenvironmentalexperts)withinthejudiciaryandprosecutionservices.Graveyetal.(2018)recommendthattofurtheralignNorthernIrelandwithbestpracticeinenvironmentalgovernance,anindependentenvironmentagencyshouldbeestablishedasamatterofurgencyandthataseparateenvironmentcommissionershouldbeappointedtoparticipateinaUK-wideenvironmentalwatchdog.

UK-widedimensions

Under the present Cabinet Office Framework Analysis, elements of environmental law fall underthe63Policyareaswherenofurtheractiontocreateacommonframeworkisrequired,andtheUKgovernmentanddevolvedadministrationswillcontinuetocooperate.Atthesametime,areassuchasMarineEnvironmentandNaturalEnvironmentandBiodiversityfallunderthegroupof78policyareaswhereCabinetOfficebelievesnewUK-widecommonrulesorwaysofworkingwillbeneededandmaybeimplementedthroughnon-legislativecommonframeworkagreements(e.g.aconcordat).

Gravey et al. (2018) recommend that, in anticipation of ‘repatriating’ devolved environmentalcompetences,commonUKenvironmentalframeworksmustbecreatedsuchthatcanflexiblyenablethecontinuationofbothEast–WestandNorth–SouthcooperationundertheumbrellaoftheB/GFA,inareassuchaswaterquality,wastemanagement,electricitygeneration,andanimalwelfare.

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Cross-border dimensions

Thetwojurisdictionsontheislandcooperateonenvironmentalissuesthroughtheworkofspecificcross-border agencies (e.g. the Loughs Agency), while the NI Environment Agency and the IrishEnvironmentProtectionAgencyimplementjointlyEUenvironmentaldirectives.55 Moreover, all-island environmentalstrategiesinvolvecitycouncils,governmentdepartmentsandagenciesonbothsidesoftheborder(e.g.All-IrelandPollinatorPlan).EnvironmentalNGOsfrombothjurisdictionstypicallyputtogetherjointbidsforEuropeanfunding.

TheNSMCmeetsregularlytodiscussandoverseejointeffortinenvironmentalprotection,pollution,waterqualitymanagement,managingsharedwaterresources,wastemanagement(includingtacklingwaste crime), and sharing information on funding and research opportunities in a cross-bordercontext.Duringtheperiodwithoutafunctioningdevolvedgovernment(January2017-January2020),however,theNSMCwasunabletomeetinplenaryform(e.g.withministers)and,therefore,unabletotakenewdecisionsinthisarea.

EU-leveldimensions

Environmentandenergyefficiency(inrelationtostateaid)isincludedinAnnex5oftheWA’sProtocolonIreland/NorthernIrelandasnecessaryforthecontinuedfreemovementsofgoods.This impliestheneedtocontinuetoparticipateintheEuropeanEnvironmentAgency(EEA)whichactsas‘ahubforenvironmentalknowledge-sharingandcapacitybuildingatEUlevel’and‘istaskedwithsupportingsustainabledevelopmentbyprovidingreliableinformationtopolicymakers’(vonOndarzaandBorrett2018:10).

TheUKcurrentlycontributestotheEuropeanEnvironmentAgency(EEA),whichgatherscomparablecross-nationaldata to informEUandnationalpolicydevelopmentand implementation. However,whilsttheUKgovernmenthasexpressedapreferencetoparticipateinsomeEUagenciesafterBrexit,ithasnotincludedtheEEAinthatlist.

IfavoidingahardborderontheislandofIrelandisalsorelevanttoenvironmentalgovernance,thenthismayrequiretheUK–atleastwithrespecttoNorthernIreland–toremainboundbytheEEAinordertofacilitateregulatoryalignmentinthisarea.Shouldthisbethecase,thenakeyquestionishowNorthernIrelandwillberepresentedinthedecision-makingprocessofthisandotherEUagenciestowhichitmaystillbebound[amatterthisreportattemptstoaddress].

55 Forexample,cooperationoninternationalwatercatchmentsfortheWaterFrameworkDirectiveandjointreportingundertheBirdsDirectiveandHabitatsDirective.

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Policing and Justice

NI-specificcontext

PolicingandJusticefallundertheremitoftheNIDepartmentofJusticeaswellastheJusticeStatutoryCommitteeoftheNIAssembly.PolicingandcriminaljusticehavebeendevolvedmattersinNorthernIrelandsince2010–asnegotiatedforthroughtheSt.Andrew’sAgreementof2006.NorthernIrelandhasdistinctivelegaltraditions,anditsownspecificconcernsinrelationtopolicing;thecontentioushistoryofwhichhasbeenjustascloselyintertwinedwithconflictasitsreform–aconditionforpost-conflictpoliticalagreement(CCBS2019).

LawenforcementisorganisedseparatelyineachofthelegalsystemsoftheUKandiscarriedoutbyregionalpoliceservicesineachregionaljurisdiction.Becauseofthelandborder,thePoliceServiceofNorthernIreland(PSNI)wouldberequired,afterBrexit,‘toprovidesignificantadditionalsupporttoUKGovernmentagenciesinvolvedinbordercontrol,suchasBorderForce,UKVisasandImmigration,ImmigrationEnforcementandUKRevenueandCustoms.Thiswouldnecessitateadditionalfunding,staffingand training at a significant cost (Marnoch2018). Indeed, itwas announced inDecember201856 that, after receiving £16.5m funding from the Treasury to address potential challenges toborderpolicingafterBrexit,thePSNIwastorecruitanextra308officersandstaffbyApril2020’(CCBS2019:16).

ThePSNIwillalsobe required toprovidesupport forbordercontrolunderTheCounterTerrorismandBorderSecurityAct(2019)whichintroducesanti-terrorchecks‘withinonemileoftheNorthernIrelandlandborder,includingattrainstationsconnectingthenorthandsouth’.

UK-widedimensions

TherehasbeenincreasingdivergenceinthewaypolicingisexercisedinEngland,Wales,ScotlandandNorthern Ireland.This isprimarilya resultofdevolution itself, rather thantheprocessofapplyingEUlaws(TierneyandRedmond,2018). RegionalservicesarecomplementedbyUK-wideagencies,suchastheNationalCrimeAgency(NCA).OtherpolicingunitsandbodiesthatoperateacrosstheUKinclude:theCriminalRecordsOffice,theNationalPoliceCoordinationCentre,theUKNationalCounterTerrorismPolicingHQ, and theNational Police Freedomof Information andData ProtectionUnit.Mostofthesebodieshaveprimarilycoordinatingfunctions,withtheNationalPoliceChiefs’CouncilbringingtheChiefConstablesofeachregionalservicetogethertohelpcoordinatepolicingoperations.

AnumberofaspectsofPoliceandCriminalJusticeCooperationareoutlinedintheCabinetOffice’s(2019)currentFrameworkAnalysisasfallingunderthegroupof78Policyareasexpectedtorequirecommonrulesorwaysofworking,andimplementthroughnon-legislativecommonframeworks.

Cross-border dimensions

ForhistoricalreasonsandbecauseofNorthernIreland’ssharedborderwiththeRepublicofIreland,andthefreemovementofindividualsstemmingfromtheCommonTravelArea,accesstoEUagenciesandalignmentwithEUlawhavebeenparticularlyimportantfortheexerciseofpolicingandcriminaljusticepowersintheregion.

56 BBCNews(19December2018)‘Brexit:PSNItorecruitanextra308officersafterfundingboost’.

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TheRepublicofIrelandrepealeditsdomesticlegislationprovidingfortheEuropeanConventiononExtraditionmeaning that extradition of individuals between the UK and Ireland came to dependheavilyontheEuropeanArrestWarrant.TheBrexitOmnibusBill57publishedbytheIrishGovernmentin February 2019 provided for the possibility of extradition between the UK and the Republic ofIrelandintheabsenceofcommonEUlegislationbyamendingapreviousextraditionAct,datingbackto1965.Commentatorsnote,however,thatsuchanarrangementwouldbe‘slowerandalotmorecumbersome’thanatpresent(Finn2019).

TheUKandIrelandhavealonghistoryofcooperationintacklingtherisksofterrorismandorganisedcrimegroupsoperatingonacross-borderbasis.ThePoliceServiceofNorthernIreland(PSNI)andUKsecurityservicesareinregularcontactwiththeircolleaguesinAnGardaSíochána.Thisrelationshipincludesinformationsharing,operationalpartnershipandmutualcapacitybuilding.TheNCA,HMRC,theMetropolitanPolice,andFCOCounterTerrorismandExtremismNetworkrepresentativeshaveanestablishedpresenceintheBritishEmbassyinDublin(ForeignAffairsCommittee2019:2).

North-SouthIntergovernmentalAgreementsonCo-operationonCriminalJusticeMatters(July2005andApril2010)haveprovidedastructuredframeworktoenhanceanddevelopmoreeffectiveall-islandcooperation,informationsharingandcoordinationinthisarea.TheOrganisedCrimeTaskForce–amulti-agencypartnershipbetweencentralandNIGovernmentDepartments, lawenforcement,thePolicingBoard,thebusinesscommunityandthecommunityatlarge–hascontinuedtoworkonacross-borderbasisinprovidinganoperationalresponsetoorganisedcrimeacrossbothjurisdictions.OurresearchsuggeststhattheexperienceandframingoftheBrexitwithdrawalprocesshasalreadyplacedpressureonthemorestrategicaspectsoftherelationshipbetweenthePSNIandtheGarda.Nonetheless,cooperationonissuessuchasorganisedcrimeandmundanecriminalityhascontinuedtobestrong(ProjectWorkgroups,Round1,April2019).

EUdimensions

TheLisbonTreaty2009madepolicingandcriminaljusticecooperationasharedEUcompetence,withboth theEuropeanParliamentand theEuropeanCouncil takinganequal role in thedevelopmentofnew legislationwhich isoverseenby theEuropeanCourtof Justice (ECJ).Cooperationbetweenmember states is guidedbya ‘toolkit’ofdifferentmechanismsaiming toprovidegreater securityacrosstheEU(IfG2018).Thoughbeingdevolvedcompetences,theexerciseofpolicingandcriminaljusticepowersintheUKdevolvedregionsiscloselylinkedtotheJusticeandHomeAffairs(JHA)pillaroftheEUtreatyarchitecture,withitstwodimensions–civiljustice,andpoliceandcriminaljustice(thelatternowincludingbordercontrols,immigrationandasylum).

TheUK’sparticipationinthefieldofpolicecooperationandjudicialcooperationincriminalmatterscoverscooperationbetweenmemberstateauthorities,informationanddataexchange,membershipinEUagencies,andproceduralharmonisationwithrespecttospecificcriminaloffences.In2014theUKoptedinto35EUpoliceandcriminaljusticemeasures.

Therearetwotypesofcooperationagreements–strategicandoperational–thatEuropolcanenterintowith non-EU countries. Strategic agreements extend to exchanging general intelligence, and

57 GeneralSchemeoftheMiscellaneousProvisions(WithdrawaloftheUnitedKingdomfromtheEuropeanUnionon29March2019)Bill2019

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strategicandtechnicalinformation.Operationalagreementsprovideforexchangeofinformation,suchaspersonaldata,andthehostingofLiaisonOfficersfromthirdcountriesatEuropol’sheadquarters.However,asOndarzaandBorrett(2018:19)warn,‘TheEuropolagreementsare…notlegallybindingandcanbeterminatedbyeitherpartywithlittlenotice’.

TheWAcoversarrangementsaroundthewindingdownofcurrentarrangementsinpoliceandjudicialcooperation in criminalmatters,otheradministrativeand judicialprocedures,and theuseofdataandinformationexchangedbeforetheendofthetransitionperiod.Itstipulatesthatanyproceduresintheseareas,begunbeforetheendofthetransitionperiod,shouldstillbecompletedaccordingtoexistingEUrules.

The Political Declaration Setting out the Framework on the Future Relationship between the EUandtheUKoutlinesasharedviewof the importanceofestablishing ‘abroad,comprehensiveandbalancedsecuritypartnership’comprisingof‘lawenforcementandjudicialcooperation’(paragraphs78and79).Itfurtherstipulatestheintentiontocontinuecooperationintheareasof:‘dataexchange;operationalcoordinationbetweenlawenforcementauthoritiesandjudicialcooperationincriminalmatters;andanti-moneylaunderingandcounterterrorismfinancing’(paragraph82).Thecontinuationofsuchcooperationwillsignificantlyfacilitatethecross-borderdimensionsofpolicingandjusticeontheislandofIreland,particularlyincross-jurisdictionalbodies.

Agriculture/Fisheries

NI-specificdimensions

AgricultureisamongthekeycompetenciescurrentlydevolvedwithintheUnitedKingdombutsubjecttoEUlaw.ThedevolutionstatutesforScotland,WalesandNorthernIrelanddevolvelargepartsofthecompetenciesinagriculturalsupport(farmerpayments)andregulation(e.g.sanitary,phytosanitaryand food standards). This policy area falls under the remit of theNI Department of Agriculture,EnvironmentandRuralAffairsanditsnamesakeStatutoryCommitteeintheNIAssembly.InNorthernIreland,agricultureismoresignificantthaninotherpartsoftheUKintermsofthehighdegreeofemploymentitcreatesanditssubstantialoveralleconomiccontribution.UnderthecurrentdevolvedpowersNorthernIrelandhascontroloveritsowncommercialfishingfleets58withinaUKwidesystem.

Despitethelackofaworkingdevolvedgovernment,publicopinionresearchinNorthernIreland,stillshowsthatthemostpopularlevelofdecision-makingfor‘agricultureandfisheries’isthedevolvedlevel,incontrasttotherestoftheUK(Menon2018:26).Additionally,researchshowsthatfarmingunionsinScotland,WalesandNorthernIreland‘wantpowersoversupportandruralpolicytocomebacktothedevolvedlevelwheremorecoherentpolicies,linkedtosupplychainsandtheruralenvironment,canbeforged’andare‘stronglyinfavourofcommonstandardsandregulatoryframeworksinordertoretainaccessacrosstheUKandavoidduplication’(Keating2018a:14).

58 AccordingtotheHouseofCommons,ExitingtheEUCommitteeFisheriesSectorReport(n.d.),theseemploy800outofthe12000fishermenintheUK(withafurther600jobsinFishProcessing).

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TheGovernmenthasexpresseditsintentiontomoveawayfromdirectsupporttoasystemof‘publicmoneyforpublicgoods’,59originallyenvisionedforEngland.However,concernshavebeenexpressedofthesuitabilityofsuchafundingsystemforNorthernIreland’(NIAC2018:3).

UK-widedimensions

Agriculturaltradeisareservedmatter.AnalystssuggestthattoavoiddisruptioninagriculturaltradewithintheUKandacrosstheinternationalborderontheislandofIrelandafterBrexit,furtherdivergenceinagriculturalsupportandregulation(beyondthealreadyexistingdivergencewithintheUK)shouldbeavoided,andthatsomedegreeofcontinuedinternalandexternalregulatoryharmonisationwillbeneeded(Keating,2018a).

UndertheEUWithdrawalAct(2018)agriculturecompetencesare‘repatriated’toWestminsteraspartof‘retainedEUlaw’andshouldbereleasedtothedevolvedregionspendinganynecessaryagreementof‘legislativecommonframeworks’(IfG2018).DivergenceinimplementingEUdirectiveswithrespecttothetwodevolvedagriculturalcompetencies-supportandregulation-isalreadythenormamongthedifferentregionsoftheUK.ThedifferentdevolvedregionsalsoreceivedifferentsharesofCAPfunding.Accordingtoestimates,between50-60%offarmincomeintheUKcomesfromCAPpayments.InNorthernIrelanditisthehighestat87%(inWales80%andinScotland75%)(Keating2018a:18).

TheUKGovernment’s analysis demonstrates that evenwhere legislation at the UK Levelmay beneeded inareas linked toagricultureandfisheries, thismayonlybe ‘inpart’. Legislationcouldbesupplementedwithotherformsofcooperationandnon-legislativeagreements(Thimont-Jacketal.2018).TheInstituteforGovernmenthasalsosuggestedthatthefourgovernmentswillalso‘needtoagreeanew funding framework toensureagricultural [CAP replacement] subsidiesareconsistentwiththeconstraintsofinternationalobligations(includingpotentialprovisionsinaUK–EUtradedeal)andavoidunderminingtheUKinternalmarket’(Thimont-Jacketal.2018:18).ThedecisiononhowtodivideagriculturalfundingbetweentheUKregionsafterBrexitcouldbeeithertoaddittotheexistingblockgrants,managing it throughtheBarnettformula,or tocreateanewring-fencedbudgetanduse‘needs-based’allocation(Thimont-Jacketal.2018).

Cross-border dimensions

Agricultureisoneoftheareasofcross-bordercooperationstipulatedintheGoodFridayAgreement.TheNSMCmeets regularly to discuss CommonAgricultural Policy issues, animal and plant healthpolicyandresearchandruraldevelopment.Agri-foodbusinessinparticular‘operate[s]onanall-islandbasis,withproducefrequentlycrossingthebordertobeprocessed,packagedorsold’(NIAC2018).ThismeansNorthernIrelandfarmbusinessesarereliantonthecontinuedeasymovementofgoodsandpeopleacrossborderstoanextentthatthoseinotherpartsoftheUKarenot.Todate,cross-borderregulatoryharmonisationhasbeenacoremeansoffacilitatingthegrowthanddepthofsupplychains.

59 i.e.payingfarmersforgoodsnotdeliveredbythemarket,particularlytodowithenvironmentalenhancement,includingcleanairandwater,beautifulsceneryandprotectionofrarespecies.

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EUdimensions

The Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol of the Withdrawal Agreement means that the region willstillneedtocomplytoEUstandardsintheproductionofcertaingoods,andinareasrelatedtotheenvironment, sanitary and phytosanitary standards (Weatherill 2020b). Annex 2 of the Protocolcontainsregulationsfortheproductionandplacementofagriculturalgoodsandfoodswithrespectto Northern Ireland, including required compliance with: European standards on pesticides andbiocides,Europeanfoodlawprinciples,theEuropeanFoodSafetyAuthority,Europeanstandardsonfoodhygiene,foodmarketingstandards,andstandardsonadditives,traces,andGMOs(geneticallymodifiedorganisms),amongothers.

Fisheries,particularlyinlandfisheries,arementionedintheProtocolaspartofthecommitmentto‘maintainthenecessaryconditionsforcontinuedNorth-Southcooperation’(Article11.1).FishandotheraquacultureproductsarealsoreferencedinArticle5oncustomsandthemovementofgoodswhereprovisionismadefortheJointCommitteeduringthetransitionperiodtodecidetheconditionsunderwhichUKvesselsregisteredinNorthernIrelandcanbeexemptedfromtariffsandquotasonbringingsuchproducts‘intothecustomsterritoryoftheUniondefinedinArticle4ofRegulation(EU)No952/2013’.Significantly,thatcustomsterritory,throughtheProtocol,includesNorthernIreland.Consequently,absentaJointCommitteedecisionorawiderUK-EUagreement,fishandaquacultureproductscaughtbyUKvesselsregisteredinNorthernIrelandwillbesubjecttotheprovisionsoftheunioncustomscodeonenteringNorthernIreland.

According to a NIAC report (2018) it is vital for Northern Ireland fishing industry to continue tohaveaccesstoEUmarketsforitsproductsanditispossiblethatthetrade-offforthisinthefuturenegotiationsmaybeEUStatescontinuedaccesstofishinNorthernIrelandwaters(HouseofCommonsExitingtheEUCommittee2018).

TheWAalsoincludesprovisionsinArticle10andAnnex5oftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIrelandonthecontinuedapplicationofEUstateaidrulestogoodsproducedinNorthernIrelandandenteringtheEUmarket.Alongside theseprovisions,Annex6 requires that the JointCommitteebefore theendof the transitionperioddetermine thepermissible levelsof agricultural subsidies available toproducersinNorthernIreland.ThesearetobeinformedbythedesignoftheUnitedKingdom’sfutureagriculturalsupportscheme,andbytheaverageannualtotalexpenditureincurredintheNorthernIrelandunderthecurrentCAPfinancinground.

AfreetradeagreementwiththeEU,wouldprobablyrequireadegreeofharmonisationofagriculturalsupport(even if theUKdoesnotsimplymirrorCAPrulesonpermissiblesubsidies).TheUKwouldalsohavetomeetEUstandardsinproduction,environmentandsanitaryandphytosanitarystandardswhichwouldapplyacrossthecountry(Keating2018a:12).InthecaseoftradeunderaWTOregime,newrulesforpermissiblestatesubsidiesforagricultureandonstandardswillneedtobetakenintoaccount,withvariableeffectsacross regions. Somesuggest sucha scenario is likely to ‘takemoreagricultural powers and authority away’ from the devolved regions, ‘not least because theWorldTradeorganisationwillnegotiateonlywiththeUKgovernmentastherelevantnegotiatingauthority’(SanfordandGormley-Heenan2020:120).

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Annex 2: EU Agencies relevant to post-Brexit NI under the Protocol

Models for Non-Member States

InordertounderstandhowtheBrexit-relateddisentanglementoftheUKfromthelegalorderoftheEUwillaffectthefutureUK-EUrelationship,itisimportanttoconsiderifandunderwhatconditionstheUKmight (at leastwith respect toNorthern Ireland) retainaccess tosomeof the36agencieswhichhelptheEUregulateitssinglemarketandcoordinatebetweenmemberstatesacrossdifferentpolicyareas.

TheEU’sregulatoryagencieshaveexistingarrangementsforcooperationwith,oreventheparticipationof,thirdcountries.TheUKgovernmenthasalreadyvoicedinterestinparticipatinginagenciesliketheEuropeanAviationSafetyAgency(EASA)andtheEuropeanChemicalsAgency(ECHA).

Atfirstsight,EUagenciesenjoyisahighdegreeofflexibilityintheirrelationshipswiththirdcountries.AsvonOndarzaandBorrett(2018)maintain,however,oncloserinspectionitisdifficulttoseehowtheUKmayfitintoexistingmodels.Onemodelofthird-countryrelationshipsisthatoftheEEA(the‘Norwegian’model).InthisEEA model,EEAmemberstatesfullyparticipateintheagencieslinkedtothesinglemarketbutunderstrictconditions:theadoptionofrelevantEUlaworregulatoryalignmentwith the EU, the acceptance of the CJEU remit, and financial contributions to the budget of theagencies–allofwhichwithoutvotingrights.

A secondmodel is the cooperation model, an example ofwhich is Canada’s relationshipwith EUagencies.This,however,islimitedtotheexchangeofinformationandbestpractice.AsvonOndarzaandBorrettnote,‘theonefringecaseistheEASA,whichisofparticularinteresttotheUK,wheretheCanadian,theUSandtheBrazilianaviationagenciesarepartofaCertificationManagementTeamstructurewiththeEASA’.ThisCertificationManagementTeamworksveryclosely,enabledbyenteringintoaprioragreementwiththeEUoncivilaviationsafety.This‘allowsforthemutualacceptanceofaircraftapprovals,decisionsandcertificates’(2018:25-26).

Finally,theSwiss model,isamixtureofthetwopreviousmodels.WhiletheEUhasbeenmoreflexibletowardsSwitzerland,allowingittochoosethesectorswithwhichtoalignitsnationallegislationandtheworkof itsassociatedagencies, this relationshipdoesnotstemfromtheagencies themselvesbut fromthe fact thatSwitzerlandalreadyaccepts the rulesof thesinglemarketor theSchengenagreementthroughitsbilateralagreementswiththeEU.Moreover,theextensionoftheSwissmodeltotheUKhasbeenruledoutbytheEUasposingarisktotheintegrityofitslegalorder.60

60 E.g.R.AtkinsandA.Barker,‘TheBrexiteffect:BrusselstriestoblunttheSwissmodel’,The Financial Times,2October2018,https://www.ft.com/content/574ce2e6-c49d-11e8-bc21-54264d1c4647

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The Role of EU Agencies in Key Areas of Regulation

Chemicalsandrelatedproducts

In2015chemicalsandrelatedproductswerethelargestcategoryofgoodstradedbetweentheUKandIreland(vonOndarzaandBorrett,2018).WithNorthernIrelandalignedtotheEUacquis in this field,thedecisionsoftheEuropeanChemicalsAgency(ECHA)andtheEuropeanMedicinesAgency(EMA)willbeverysignificant.

Chemicalsand relatedproductsarealsobroadlypresent ina largevarietyofgoodsandproducts,whichiswhytheECHAandtheEMAhaveabroadersignificanceforthefreemovementofgoods.OnlychemicalproductsthathavebeenregisteredandapprovedbytheECHAcancirculate inthesinglemarket.AsvonOndarzaandBorrett(2018)elaborate:‘TheECHAauthorisesthecirculationofchemicalproductsandverifiestheircompliancewithEUlaw,notablyintermsoflabellingrequirements’.And,foritspart,theEuropeanMedicinesAgencymakesrecommendationstotheEuropeanCommissiononmarketingauthorisationsforpharmaceuticals.Onceincirculation,itistheEMAwhichmonitorsthesideeffectsofthosedrugs(vonOrdanzaandBorrett2018:9).

AgricultureandFisheries

TheUKandIrelandareeachother’slargestexportmarketsforagriculturalandfoodproduce(HedermanandDurkin2018).Agri-foodisparticularlycriticaltotheeconomyofNorthernIrelandandtoitsruralcommunities(NIAC2018).ThesectoracrosstheentireislandofIrelandisvulnerabletotheimpactofBrexit.

TheEuropeanFoodSafetyAuthority(EFSA)andtheEuropeanFisheriesControlAgency(EFCA)playa central role in this sector. TheEFSA carriesout risk assessmentsand its scientificopinions formthebasis forEuropeanpoliciesand legislation in foodsafety,animalwelfareandplantprotection.TheEFCAensuresthecomplianceofMemberStateswiththeCommonFisheriesPolicyandhelpstocoordinatetheworkofnationalinspectionauthorities.

VariousprovisionsofEUlawregulatingtradeinfishandaquacultureproductsarepartoftheProtocolon Ireland/Northern Ireland, even if the terms under which fish and other aquaculture productscaughtbyvesselsregisteredinNorthernIrelandcanbeimportedintotheEUcustomsunionarestilltobenegotiated.

Electricity

Beingpartofanall-islandSingleElectricityMarket isofparticular importancetoNorthernIreland.Under the terms of theWA, the continued operation of the Single ElectricityMarket across theislandofIrelandisprovidedforunderArticle9oftheProtocolonIreland/NorthernIreland.Annex4outlineshowthedetailedprovisionsEUlawwhichgovernwholesaleelectricitymarketsaretoapplytoNorthernIrelandafterBrexit.

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CentraltotheregulationoftheEuropeanenergymarketistheAgencyfortheCooperationofEnergyRegulators(ACER).ACERcomplementsandcoordinatestheworkofnationalenergyregulators.It‘canissuenon-bindingopinionsandrecommendationstonationalenergyregulators,transmissionsystemoperators,andtheEUinstitutions’.61 ACERcanalsotakebindingdecisionsonspecificindividualandoncross-borderinfrastructureissues.

Environment

EUmembershiphasstronglyshapedenvironmentalpolicyacrosstheUK,withEUminimumstandardsforenvironmentalprotectionapplying toallof theUK’s constituent regions.Environmentalpolicy,however,hasevolveddifferentlyintheconstituentpartsoftheUKandhasbeenuniquelyshapedinNorthern Irelandwhich issaidtohave ‘apoorhistoryofenvironmentalgovernance’ (Graveyetal.2018:10).

Given their common EUmembership and the sharing of common environmental challenges dueto theirsharedgeography, thetwo jurisdictionsonthe islandof Irelandhavedevelopedextensivecooperationonenvironmentalissues,andenvironmentalpolicyisafocusoftheNSMC.

EU membership has implied participation in the European Environment Agency as ‘a hub forenvironmentalknowledge-sharingandcapacitybuildingatEUlevel’(vonOrdanzaandBorrett2018:10).Partofthisfunctionistoprovidereliableinformationtopolicymakers.Itis‘taskedwithsupportingsustainabledevelopmentbyprovidingreliableinformationtopolicymakers’

The European Environment Agency’s ‘task is to provide sound, independent information on theenvironment.TheAgencyaimstosupportsustainabledevelopmentbyhelpingtoachievesignificantandmeasurable improvement in Europe’s environment, through theprovisionoftimely, targeted,relevantandreliableinformationtopolicymakingagentsandthepublic’.62

Transport

TransportisoneofsixAreasofCo-operationbetweenNorthernIrelandandtheRepublicofIreland.CommonpoliciesandapproachesareagreedintheNorthSouthMinisterialCouncilbutimplementedseparately in each jurisdiction. Cooperation covers strategic transport planning in road and railinfrastructureandpublictransportservicesandroadandrailsafety

The European Railway Agency facilitates the development and implementation of EU transportpolicy,enhancestheinteroperabilityofrailwayinfrastructure,andpromotescommonsafetynorms.ItisfurtherresponsibleforissuingsingleEU-widesafetycertificatestorailwaycompaniesandmulti-countryvehicleauthorisations.

61 Seehttps://www.acer.europa.eu/en/The_agency/Mission_and_Objectives/Pages/Acts-of-the-agency.aspx(accessed8May2020).

62 Seehttps://www.eea.europa.eu/about-us(accessed8May2020).

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Communications

Althoughnotofficiallyoneofthesixareasofcross-bordercooperationundertheauspicesoftheNSMC,telecommunicationshasbeenthefocusofsignificanton-the-groundpracticalcooperationinitiativesontheislandofIreland.Forinstance,buildingonthepositivecommitmentoftheGovernmentsineachjurisdictiontosupportandimprovetheprovisionofbroadbandtelecommunicationsinfrastructure,local-authority ledcross-bordernetworks fromtheborder regionhaveactively lobbied for furthersupportfromtheGovernmentstofullyaddressthebroadbandrequirementsoftheregion(e.g.ICBAN2012).

Theagencywhichassists theCommissionandnational regulators in implementingEU laws in thefieldofelectroniccommunicationsistheBodyofEuropeanRegulatorsofElectronicCommunications(BEREC).BERECassiststheCommissionandthenationalregulatoryauthorities(NRAs)inimplementingtheEUregulatoryframeworkforelectroniccommunications.Infulfillingthisfunction,BERECissuesguidelines on several topics; reports on technicalmatters; keeps registers, lists or databases; anddeliversopinionson internalmarketprocedures fordraftnationalmeasuresonmarket regulation.Furthermore,‘itprovidesadviceonrequestandonitsowninitiativetotheEuropeaninstitutionsandcomplementsatEuropean leveltheregulatorytasksperformedatnational levelbytheNRAs’.1Assuch,thisbodyformsacrucialhubofcoordinationbetweenstateswhichneedtoimplementEUrulesandaccesstoitisonemeansofenablingmoreeffectivegovernanceinthispolicyarea.

ThisAnnexisnotintendedtobeacomprehensiveoverviewoftherangeofpolicyareasaffectedbyEUlaw(regulationsanddirectives)whichwillhaveadirectrelevancetoNorthernIrelandafterBrexit.However,itdoesgiveanindicationofthesignificanceandcomplexityofsomeoftheseareas,andwhyaccesstoEUagenciesandbodiesisamatterofconsiderabletechnicalconsequence.

1 Seehttps://berec.europa.eu/eng/about_berec/what_is_berec/(accessed8May2020).

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Annex 3: Online survey to stakeholders

Sample Questions from the Online Survey (distributed and collected May 2019)

With this short survey we aim to gather further information on your views and experiences with how the interests and concerns of your organisation/department are represented at each the UK and the EU level, in the transition to and after Brexit. The survey has 12 questions, most open-ended. Your responses will help us to make our workgroup sessions in June 2019, as useful and informative as possible for all participants.

This survey is confidential and your answers will remain anonymous. We will not quote anything you write. Because the survey is conducted online, we would still ask and advise you not to use it to share sensitive information.

Your responses need not be long. We have allocated around 150 words maximum for each. This should take you approximately 15 minutes. At the end of the survey we have provided you with an opportunity to add any further comments you may wish.

Q1.Whatspecificissuesandconcernshavebeenapriorityforyourorganisation/departmentintheprocessofBrexit?

Q2. Whenseekingchannelsof representation,which levelofcontacthasbeenthemostuseful toengagewith?(pleasetickallthatapply)

o London

o Dublin

o Belfast

o Brussels

Q3.Whatspecificchannelsofrepresentation in Londonhaveyoubeenabletouseinthisrespect?Pleasegiveexamplesoforganisations,networksoreventsyouhaveengagedwithandonwhatissues.

Q4. Which of those organisations, networks or events have been the most useful or have bestrepresentedtheconcernsandinterestsofyourorganisationinLondonsofar?

Q5.CanyoucontinuerelyingonthesamechannelsofrepresentationinLondonafterBrexitorcanyouseeanotherwayforyoutobebestrepresented?

Q6.Whatspecificchannelsofrepresentationin Brusselshaveyoubeenabletousesofar?Pleasegiveexamplesoforganizations,networksoreventsyouhaveengagedwithandonwhatissues.

Q7. Which of those organisations, networks or events have been the most useful or have bestrepresentedtheconcernsandinterestsofyourorganisationinBrusselssofar?

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Q8. CanyoucontinuerelyingonthesamechannelsofrepresentationinBrusselsafterBrexitorcanyouseeanotherwayforyoutobebestrepresented?

Q9.Would you say thaton thewhole youhave reliedon invitations forengagementorhaveyoumostlybeenproactiveinseekingopportunitiesforengagementandrepresentation?Canyoupleasegiveexamples?

Q10.Whathavebeenthemaindifficultiesforyourorganisation/department(e.g.resources,structure,staff,lackofinformation)ineitherinitiatingorrespondingtoinvitationsforsuchengagement?

Q11. Canyousuggestnewnetworksorinitiativesontheissues/concernsthatareapriorityforyourorganisationthathavebeensetupsincethe2016ReferendumonexitingtheEU?Haveyoubeenabletoengagewith/participateinthese?

Q12.Haveyouanyothercommentsregardingthewaysinwhichtheprioritiesandmainconcernsofyourorganisation/departmentarebeingrepresentedinthetransitiontoandafterBrexit?

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