antipoverty transfers and the post-2015 development agenda
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Armando Barrientos, Brooks World Poverty Institute, the University of Manchester, UK [email protected] Post-Graduate Conference 2014, School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford, October 31st 2014TRANSCRIPT
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Antipoverty transfers and the post-2015 development
agenda
Armando Barrientos, Brooks World Poverty Institute, the University of Manchester, UK
Post-Graduate Conference 2014, School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford,
October 31st 2014
Page 2 of 21
http://www.post2015hlp.org/the-report/
Is a zero extreme poverty rate target for 2030 achievable? What is the potential
contribution of antipoverty transfers?
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1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Global P0 Exc. China 40.5 39.1 38.1 37.2 36.6 34.3 33.6 31.5 27.8 25.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
Po
vert
y h
ead
cou
nt
rate
(%
)Global Poverty at US$1.25 (%)
WB data
-0.4 pps per year
- 1.0 pps per year
ambitious
pessimistic
optimistic
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Reasons to be cautious….
Stronger performance will be
required precisely in those regions
which have underperformed so far
Reaching zero targets will require unprecedented growth with redistribution
Table 2. Global poverty headcount projections for selected regions (millions)
Ravallion (2012) Optimistic Scenario
Hillebrand (2012) Market First Scenario
2015 2015 2050 Sub-Saharan Africa 397 395 205 South Asia 418 249 14 East Asia and Pacific 159 126 15 Latin America and the Caribbean
33 35 7.8
Data Source: (Hillebrand, 2011, Ravallion, 2012)
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The presentation:
The growth of antipoverty transfers in developing countries
Reach and diversity
Current practice
Programme focus: design, implementation, and impact
Sustainability
Institutionalisation
Financing and Politics
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Growth of large scale programmes providing income transfers to households
in poverty in the South
Social assistance: tax-financed programmes addressing poverty
Globally ~ 0.75 to 1 billion people reached
by transfers
Diversity in design
In middle income countries transfers
programmes reach a significant fraction of
the population
In low income countries progress has been slower
0.5
0.25
0.25
0.1
South Africa
Brazil
Mexico
Ethiopia
Fraction of households reached by social assistance
Fraction of households reached by social assistance
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What explains the growth in antipoverty transfers?
Crises and adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s led to structural deficits in
wellbeing and protection in developing countries
Democratisation and an expanding fiscal space have created favourable
conditions in which governments can address these structural deficits
Poverty research has developed knowledge and tools for innovative and
effective antipoverty transfer programmes
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Programme focus: Diversity in design and objectives
pure income transfers Social pensions, child grant, family allowances [South Africa’s Child
Support Grant and Older Person Grant]
income transfers and asset accumulation Human development [Mexico’s Oportunidades, Brazil’ Bolsa Família]
Infrastructure and asset protection [India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme]
integrated poverty eradication programmes [Chile’s Chile Solidario, BRAC’s CFPR-Targeting the Ultra Poor]
Resource: Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database version 5 – available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672090
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
cum
ula
tive
pro
gram
me
sta
rts
Cumulative series of flagship transfer programme starts by type
In Kind HD-CCT Employment Categorical-pension Categorical-Other
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The contribution of poverty research
Programme design and implementation informed by developments in poverty
research:
Depth and severity of poverty, not just headcount
...ranking of the poor (extreme - moderate poverty)
Poverty is multidimensional,
...duration matters (intergenerational persistence)
Focus on households (agency and productive capacity)
Information and incentives (conditions and co-responsibility)
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Implementation capacity varies across low and middle income countries
Village committee in Kalomo District in Zambia responsible for the implementation of the Social Transfer Pilot Programme
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Pension day in Lesotho
Katherine Vincent/2007
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Ensuring services provision for low income households in Uruguay
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Short run effect on poverty
17.36
36.13
45.63
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Poverty headcount Poverty gap Poverty gap squared
Difference in difference estimates of the poverty reduction effectiveness of Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico two years after its introduction
Poverty reduction (%) 1997-1999
Data source: Skoufias, E. 2005. Progresa and Its Impacts on the Welfare of Rural Households in Mexico, Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute
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Child labour outcomes from selected child-focused programmes
Bono desarrollo Humano (Ecuador)
CSG (S. Africa)
RPS (Nicaragua)
PRAF (Honduras)
Familias Accion (Colombia)
Oportunidades (Mexico)
PATH (Jamaica)
SCT (Malawi)
Tekopora (Paraguay)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
Re
du
ctio
n in
ch
ild la
bo
ur
(pe
rce
nta
ge p
oin
ts)
Value of transfers as percentage of total household income
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Institutionalisation
Transition from ‘development projects’ to ‘institution building’
Transition involves:
Legal status – budget, operations, entitlements
Strengthening implementation capacity
Institutional coordination within government
Domestic financing
Ministries of Social Development – social protection networks
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Financing
Most countries spend between 1% and 2 % of GDP in social assistance
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Au
stra
lia(O
ECD
)
Djib
ou
ti(S
SN)
Mal
awi(
SSN
)
New
Zea
lan
d(O
ECD
)
Ukr
ain
e(SS
N)
Un
ited
Kin
gdo
m(O
ECD
)
Bo
tsw
ana(
SSN
)
Irel
and
(OEC
D)
Ko
sovo
(SSN
)
St. V
ince
nt
and
th
e G
ren
adin
es(S
SN)
Arm
enia
(SSN
)
St. L
uci
a(SS
N)
Uzb
ekis
tan
(SSN
)
Mo
rocc
o(S
SN)
Cro
atia
(SSN
)
Nam
ibia
(SSI
)
Do
min
ican
Rep
ub
lic(S
SN)
Mo
ldo
va(S
SN)
Cze
ch R
epu
blic
(OEC
D)
Gre
nad
a(SS
N)
Bu
rkin
a Fa
so(S
SI)
Ger
man
y(O
ECD
)
Arg
enti
na(
SSN
)
Geo
rgia
(SSN
)
Bra
zil(
SSN
)
Serb
ia(S
SN)
Latv
ia(S
SN)
Gre
ece
(OEC
D)
Un
ited
Sta
tes(
OEC
D)
Bu
lgar
ia(S
SN)
Tan
zan
ia(S
SI)
Ban
glad
esh
(AD
B)
Net
her
lan
ds(
OEC
D)
Po
lan
d(O
ECD
)
Ecu
ado
r(SS
N)
Nic
arag
ua(
SSN
)
Vie
tnam
(SSN
)
Den
mar
k(O
ECD
)
El S
alva
do
r(SS
N)
St. K
itts
an
d N
evis
(SSN
)
Ben
in(S
SI)
Bel
giu
m(O
ECD
)
Cô
te d
'Ivo
ire(
SSI)
Mau
rita
nia
(SSI
)
Jam
aica
(SSN
)
Pe
ru(S
SN)
Ko
rea(
OEC
D)
Kyr
gyz
Rep
ub
lic(S
SN)
Ven
ezu
ela,
RB
(SSN
)
Hu
nga
ry(O
ECD
)
Swed
en(O
ECD
)
Co
ok
Isla
nd
s(A
DB
)
Luxe
mb
ou
rg(O
ECD
)
Uru
guay
(SSN
)
Nig
er(S
SI)
Par
agu
ay(S
SN)
Ind
on
esia
(AD
B)
Mal
div
es(A
DB
)
Zim
bab
we(
SSI)
Ph
ilip
pin
es(S
SN)
Cam
bo
dia
(AD
B)
Lao
(AD
B)
Mal
aysi
a(A
DB
)
Van
uat
u(A
DB
)
Ch
ad(S
SI)
Ton
ga(A
DB
)
Bh
uta
n(A
DB
)
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For many middle income countries, the issue is not larger budgets but fewer and more
effective programmes (Bangladesh has over 95 social protection programmes; while
Chile had 143 in 2002)
For low income countries, financing social assistance is a challenge because of their
low revenue collection capacity
International assistance has a limited role in supporting antipoverty transfers,
mainly to help overcome the large initial costs of new programmes
In low and middle income countries, consumption taxes and natural resource
revenues provide the fiscal space for the expansion of social assistance
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‘Narratives’ of social assistance financing in the South: Legitimacy
Chile’s return to democracy after seventeen years of dictatorship in 1990 was led by a centre-left
coalition of parties. The coalition was committed to expanding social expenditure, especially poverty
reduction. This was financed by a rise of two percent in the tax burden, distributed across rises in
corporate taxes, personal income taxation, and VAT.
In 1994, Bolivia was poised to privatise state-owned enterprises, especially in the energy sector. To
facilitate public consent, the government proposed to maintain one-half of the shares in the privatised
enterprises in a Special Fund. The returns from this Fund were to be used to finance a regular transfer to
the adult cohort (aged twenty-one or over in 1995). After further debate, the transfer became a non-
contributory pension, the Bono de Solidaridad, payable from the age of sixty-five. The government of Evo
Morales extended entitlement to the transfer to all Bolivians on reaching sixty years of age.
Non-contributory pension programmes introduced in Lesotho (2004) and Swaziland (2006) are
linked to revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
Antipoverty transfer programmes in Zambia, Uganda and Ethiopia are financed by bilateral aid,
through a Memorandum of Understanding between donors and the government. In Ghana, the initial
financing of the LEAP (Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty) Programme was linked to HIPC debt
cancellation, but bilateral donors also contributed.
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Conclusions
Rapid growth of social assistance in low and middle income countries
Diversity in programme design – path dependence and poverty perspectives
Programme design and objectives of transfer programmes informed by poverty research
Programmes show variation in effectiveness, but well designed and implemented antipoverty
programmes have the potential to reduce poverty and inequality
Sustainability depends on:
Institutionalisation
Shift to domestic financing
Antipoverty transfers, together with growth and service provision, will make an important
contribution to a zero extreme poverty target;
…this will require strengthening domestic political processes, financing, and capacity
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Social Assistance in Developing Countries
Cambridge University Press
September 2013
ISBN 9781107039025