“arab spring” & beyond: perspectives on the mena...

“Arab Spring” & Beyond: Perspectives on the MENA Region • Presentation for the World Strategy Forum 2011

• Seoul, Korea 14-15 June 2011

Dr. Nasser Saidi, Chief Economist & Head of External Relations, DIFC Authority 14th June 2011

Agenda

• MENA Instability & Spillovers

• Regional & Global Implications of the Arab

Firestorm

• Addressing MENA Vulnerabilities

• Policy Agendas for Transformation & Stabilisation:

Domestic, Regional, International

MENA Regional Developments

• Period of momentous change, challenges and opportunity that can lead

to a historical shift in growth & development patterns

• Prior to recent events the pace of economic activity was set to continue

to recover in the MENA & GCC region after the Great Recession &

Great Financial Crisis

• MENA Growth is expected at 4.1% in 2011 compared to 3.8% in 2010.

• Sharp divergence of growth prospects between MENA Oil Exporters and

Oil Importers

• Oil Markets & Financial markets have factored in higher risks emerging

from recent developments

• Management of Transition periods will be critical to final outcomes

• EU-US-China-Korea-GCC have Strategic interest in smooth transitions

& avoidance of „failed States‟: policy action required

World: Economic Growth Outlook

Source: IMF WEO (Apr 2011), DIFC Economics

Arab World: Divergent Growth Patterns, Rising Inflation

Source: IIF Regional Overview May 2011

Oil Exporters: Recent Fiscal Policy Measures

Source: IMF REO, April 2011

Fiscal Policy Measures Announced Since 2010

Source: IMF REO, April 2011

MENA Regional Turmoil => Increased Divergence

Divergence to increase b/n oil exporters, oil importers & labor exporters

• GCC growth - boosted by high oil output & prices; Bahrain‟s protests will impact growth in

2011 while in KSA, growth will be boosted by the populist fiscal measures.

• Downside risk remains that private sector activity will be subdued/crowded out.

Source: IIF May 2011

Reactions to Turmoil: Equity Markets

Index, Nov 1, 2010 = 100; Nov 1, 2010 – 31 May 2011

Source: Bloomberg

Note: 1/10 – Tunisia; 1/24 – Egypt; 2/15 - Libya

MENA Oil Importers MENA Oil Exporters

Reactions to Turmoil: Higher CDS spreads

Source: Bloomberg

Note: 1/10 – Tunisia; 1/24 – Egypt; 2/15 - Libya

MENA Oil Importers MENA Oil Exporters

CDS spreads (in bps) Oct 26, 2010 – May 31, 2011

Reactions to Turmoil: FDI, Tourism & Borrowing Costs

Source: IMF – “Middle East and Central Asia –

REO”, April 2011, DIFC, Dubai

Sovereign Spreads (Basis points)

Tourism Receipts (Percent of GDP)

Food Prices & Political Instability

• Food price inflation increases likelihood of civil conflict and civil strife

• Food price inflation can have severe socio-economic & political effects in

emerging countries, well illustrated in recent events in rioting,

demonstrations & political changes in MENA countries.

e.g. In Egypt, food represents 40% of household budgets & food price

inflation hit 20% resulting in near 10% decline in purchasing power.

• Higher Fuel & Food prices will add import cost of some 3% of GDP for

Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, & Tunisia

• “Inflation targeting” cannot neglect food price inflation: Inflation cannot be

dealt purely through monetary policy.

• Macroeconomic policies cannot be shaped in isolation from measures

to ensure social safety nets are in place and that the poorest people are

protected.

Agenda


• Regional & Global Implications of the Arab

Firestorm




Higher Oil Prices can Derail Economies

• Three of the past five global recessions have been triggered by a Middle East

geopolitical shock that propelled oil prices skyward!

• Higher Oil prices leading to:

(a) Rise in commodity & food price inflation, exacerbating effects of diarrheal

monetary policies in advanced economies (US, EU)

(b) Larger Budget & Trade deficits can derail fragile jobless recovery in US, EU

• In the short term, oil prices could spike due to: the fear premium of political

contagion, possible effects on oil production and transportation networks, a surge

in precautionary stockpiling of oil and other factors.

• This could, in the worst case scenario lead to stagflation, a combination of

rising inflation and recession. It will certainly increase inflation and reduce growth

in energy- and commodity-importing countries.

• In the medium term, it is likely that new governments in oil producing nations

would seek to maintain oil production and export earnings, suggesting an eventual

return to equilibrium.

Oil Price & Unrest in the MENA region

Source: Bloomberg

Maritime chokepoints critical to petroleum markets

Source: EIA

Note: Circles represent millions of barrels per day transported through each chokepoint. Arrows represent common

petroleum maritime routes

Maritime transit chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes. Because about one half of the

world's crude oil supply is moved by tankers on maritime shipping routes, world oil transit chokepoints are a critical part

of global energy security.

Other Impacts of MENA Turmoil

• Risk aversion rising: higher short-term economic and financial volatility,

and likelihood of a correction in price of risky assets

• Sovereign Asset Freezes: increases perceived riskiness of advanced

economy assets

• Lower MENA growth resulting in lower growth of EU exports to MENA

• Energy transport infrastructure security & energy supply vulnerability:

• Oil chokepoints are critical part of global energy security, whose

blockage leads to a substantial disruption in energy markets.

• Straits of Hormuz, Suez, Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca are world‟s

biggest maritime chokepoints critical for petroleum markets with

strategic geopolitical importance.

Wider Implications of the “Jasmine Revolution”

• Spill over into GCC & oil producers, Africa, Central Asia

• Arab uprisings will likely result in a change in strategic alliances affecting

traditional role & influence of US and Europe whose political capital &

moral authority have been damaged by Iraq, Afghanistan wars & support of

Israel.

• China and Turkey likely to be strategic gainers

Turkey‟s strategic outlook is gradually shifting towards the ME, while

accession to the EU has not resulted in major developments

MENA - China trade increased close to 100 times over to $175bn in 2010

from $2.3bn in 1990 (Middle East countries account for almost 90% of the

trade)

Economic & Geostrategic landscape of MENA shifting toward more

regionalism (GCC inviting Morocco, Jordan) and East

Agenda


• Regional & Global Implications of the Arab Firestorm




Potent Mixes: Young Population & Youth

Unemployment

Source: UN Population Division, DIFCA Economics

Female Labour Force Participation Remains Key

Source: World Bank database, DIFCA Economics

• FLFPR lower in MENA than in countries with similar income/wealth levels

• Higher LFPR in MENA could raise GDP by about 20-25%!

MENA Vulnerabilities: Demographic, Political &

Economic

DEMOGRAPHIC

FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS ECONOMIC

FACTORS

Fraction of population

under 25

Voice & Accountability

Food Price Inflation

Youth Unemployment

rate

Political rights

GDP per capita

Age Dependency ratio

Corruption

Military Spending as a

percentage of GDP

Infant Mortality Rate Civil Liberties

Press Freedom

Source: DIFCA Economics

Agenda


• Regional & Global Implications of the Arab Firestorm




Policy agendas for transformation & stabilization:

domestic, regional, international

DOMESTIC

• Political Transformation

• Governance

• Social Safety Nets

• Educational

Transformation

• Women Empowerment

• Fiscal Transformation

• Economic

Diversification

• Job Creation

REGIONAL

• MENA Bank for

Development &

Reconstruction

• GCC Common

Market & Common

Currency

• Regional Economic

Integration

• Develop Local

Currency Financial

Markets

• Shift Economic Policy

Toward Asia & EMEs

INTERNATIONAL

• Resolve Israel-

Palestine Cancer

• Aid

• Trade

• Investment

• Economic Focus not

Military Engagement

Final thoughts I

• Period of Transformation for MENA: Transitions & their

Management will be critical to final outcomes

• International consequences: oil price surge, spill over to food

prices, increased energy insecurity & risk aversion in financial

markets.

• MENA regional turmoil spillovers: increased regional divergence,

plunge in equity markets, lower tourism & FDI and higher risk

premiums & borrowing costs.

• Not a “Berlin Wall” Moment but Arab countries will need to „own‟

their transformations and be “able to clean up their own backyard”

• Geostrategic implications will include change in global strategic

alliances with new players like China, Turkey and others gaining

importance.

Final Thoughts II

• Vulnerability indicators + underlying conditions => Firestorm

conditions are present in other countries e.g. Central Asia has a

similar set of crucial preconditions.

• MENA countries Need to address Demographic, Political & Economic

Vulnerability Factors: Need Growth to be both inclusive and has a

trickle-down, “pull up” effect.

• Foreign Policies relating to MENA Trade, Aid, Immigration, Arms &

Military intervention need to be fundamentally revised

• Addressing vulnerability underlines the importance of Job Creation,

lowering income inequality, greater inclusiveness and promoting

growth & development through institutional reform and improved

governance

• Set-up a MENA Bank for Reconstruction and Development not a

„Marshall Plan‟

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