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“THE DYNAMIC OF NEGOTIATION IN THE FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT 1996”
Study Case: The Mindanao Conflict
As complement of condition of bachelor degree in Sarjana Ilmu Politik (S.IP) in the International Relations Department, Social Political Science Faculty, Muhammadiyah
University Yogyakarta
UNDERGRADUATE THESIS
By:Diana Fatmawati
20040510136
Advisor: Surwandono, S.Sos, M.Si
INTERNATIONAL CLASS ofSOCIAL POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA
2008
1
AUTHENTICATION PAGE
“The Dynamic of Negotiation in the Final Peace Agreement 1996” Study Case: The Mindanao Conflict
By:Diana Fatmawati
20040510136
This undergraduate thesis has been examined and endorsed by the Board of Examiners from the International Relations Department, Social Political Science
Faculty, Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta
OnDay/Date: Thursday, July 10th, 2008
Time: 11.00 amPlace: The Laboratory of International Relations A
Acknowledged by,Adviser / Chief of Examiner
Surwandono, S.Sos, M.Si
Examiner I Examiner II
Dr. Bambang Cipto, MA Sugeng Riyanto, S.IP,M.Si
2
PAGE OF DEVOTE
For the Greatest parents in the world, Papito “Zainal Abidin”, Mimi
“Mir’Atul Khoiriyah” There is no enough word to represent my grateful
to you, for all of your struggle and love
I do hope that I can realize your dream to be someone who can be proud
of, to make you happy Dunya wal Akhirah……ameen.
You mean the world to me
My sweet ones, Oni Zakkia and Firda Sonia
And for everyone who loves me
3
MOTTO
"Be nice and smile to everyone you meet. You don't know what they are going through, and they may need that smile. And treasure it."
- Christine M. Huppert –
4
PREFACE
This undergraduate thesis tried to discuss about the Dynamic of negotiation in
the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) 1996, between the Government Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Where actually,
the FPA 1996 was not yet ripe or ready to be signed, but on the contrary, it was
signed. The question was how. Based on the theory used, why then the GRP and the
MNLF agreed to conduct negotiation was because both the main actors of the
conflict, Nur Misuari (MNLF) and President Ramos (the GRP) at that time, were
experiencing declines and degradations politically and economically. So by that,
beside beneficial, it seems that there is no other way out to save their each other
condition and position except for having negotiations. Other than that, this
undergraduate thesis is also written in order to fulfill one of the requirements of
bachelor degree program in International Relations Department, Social Political
Science Faculty of Muhammadyah University Yogyakarta.
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THANKS TO
Alhamdulillah hirabbil’alamin, highest praise and thanks to Illahirobbi,
because of Him I can pass all these and finish the final duty which entitles “The
Dynamic of Negotiation in the Final Peace Agreement 1996” well.
My deepest appreciation goes to Ir. H. Dasron Hamid, M.Sc (The Head of
Muhammadyah University Yogyakarta), DR. Tulus Warsito (The Dean of Social
Political Science Faculty of UMY), Grace Lestariana W., S.IP, M.Si (The Head of
International Relations of UMY), Siti Muslikhati, S.IP, M.Si (The Secretary of
International Relations Department of UMY), Surwandono, S.Sos, M.Si (The
Advisor), Dr. Bambang Cipto, MA (The Examiner II), Sugeng Riyanto, S.IP, M.Si
(The Examiner III), and Mr. Djumari (The Student Service of International Relations
Department of UMY).
The grateful thanks to my family. My beloved parents who have been whole-
heartedly love me and totally struggle for my living and future, so that I can reach to
this level. There is no enough word to describe my thankful to you, and I pray to
Allah to love you both and make you happy till the end, amin. For my sweet sisters,
Oni Zakkia and Firda Sonia, my life have been colored by your laughs, tears, jokes,
and indulges, I love you forever and we’ll never be apart.
Huge thanks to my friends and community. The big family of International
Class Community especially all classmates in IC 2004, bu Dian, Mbak Ati, mbak
Atin, and mas Jati, thank you for the wonderful days, precious experiences and
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lessons, the laugh and sad that we’ve share together for almost 4 years, the support,
and motivation to improve myself. Thanks also to my girl, Susan, who have been
with me through the hard times and hard road to Pak Surwandono’s house, its worth
enough. May Allah always bless us in every way we take, amiin, keep the spirit. For
people in my boarding house, Ibu Kos, Nani, Dewi, Arum, sometimes Lalang and
Mbak Ketut, and my lovely sister Oni, thank you for the support and motivation, and
sorry for the noise I made during I type or scream or printing in the middle of the
night, hehe. For all my friends as well as partner in “World Eyes”, Mas Angga, Iput,
Mbak Tri, Rendy, Mas putra, Mas Reza, Mas Murry, Pak Ipung, and Pak Tegar,
Thank you for the support and understanding, you are rock, guys! And then for all the
“Indonesia Islam” friends in Mig33, Teh Fa, Arini, Ernis, Aini, mbak Endang,
Puspita, Jiunk, Imam, Kid, teh Yo, mbak Pis, Umar, thank you for the support
especially to teh Fa and arin, thanks for the sincere companion, motivation, and
advices. And all friends who intentionally or not, got involve with the process of this
thesis. Thank you for the support, assistance, and the prayer. Last but not least, I want
to thank my past, because of it I can reach to this level and be thankful, and thank to
my future, here I go, and I am coming for you. Finally, it is highly expected that this
thesis would bring benefit and advantages to the reader especially to the International
Relations students.
Diana Fatmawati
July, 28, 2009
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TABLE OF CON TENT
PAGE
AUTHENTICATION PAGE…………………………………………………. ii
PAGE OF DEVOTE……………………………………………………………. iii
MOTTO………………………………………………………………………… iv
PREFACE………………………………………………………………………. v
THANKS TO…………………………………………………………………… vi
TABLE OF CONTENT………………………………………………………… viii
LIST OF CHART……………………………………………………………….. xi
LIST OF PICTURE……………………………………………………………... xi
CHAPTER I
PREFACE ……………………………………………………………………… 1
A. Background……..……………………………………………………….. 2
B. Research Question……....………………………………………………. 6
C. Theoretical Framework………………………………………………….. 7
D. Hypotheses……………………………………………………….……... 9
E. Method to Collect Data……..……………………………………… ….. 10
F. Scope of the Research………..…………………………………………. 11
G. Systematical Writing……………………………………………………. 11
8
CHAPTER II
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MINDANAO……………………………. 13
A. The Geographic Situation of Mindanao Island……………………….. 13
B. The History of Mindanao Conflict…………………………………… 15
C. The Dynamic of Negotiation in the Mindanao Conflict Resolution….. 22
CHAPTER III
THE OBSTACLES TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATION…………………. 34
A. Experiences of Negotiation as a Trap………………………………. 34
B. The Complexity of Conflict………………………………………… 37
C. The Stronger The Hawkish Group………………………………….. 45
CHAPTER IV
FACTORS THAT CAUSED THE NEGOTIATION
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND THE MNLF TOOK PLACE………………………………………. 51
1. Mutually Hurting Stalemate…………….…………………………. 52
2. Mutually Enticing Opportunity…………….……………………… 60
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………… 67
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………… 71
9
ATTACHMENT
1. Map of the Philippines and Mindanao Island
3. The Tripoli Agreement 1976
4. Jeddah Accord
5. Republic Act 6734
6. The Final Peace Agreement 1996
7. Division of Region in the Mindanao Island
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LIST OF CHART
Graphic 1: The comparison of the Hawkish than the Dovein the Mindanao Conflict……………………………………........... 4
Graphic 2: Matrix of Research about Conflict and Negotiation:Conflict Perspective in the South East Asia and the Philippines…... 44
Table 1: Financial Resources of the Bangsa Moro liberation Groups……..... 40
Table 2: Basis Region of the MILF………………………………………..... 55
Table 3: Basis Region of the Abu Sayyaf…………………………………… 55
Table 4: Net Satisfaction Ratings of Presidents Philippines May 1986 to June 2007…………………………………………….. 62
LIST OF PICTURE
Picture 1: The Map of the Philippines
Picture 2: The Map of the Mindanao Island
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CHAPTER I
PREFACE
In the world history, there have been many stories about separatism, such as
the Soviet Union (which after its collapsed in 1985 split into 15 States), Pakistan ( in
1971 spilt into Bangladesh and The Islamic Republic of Pakistan), Czechoslovakia
(into Czech Republic and Slovakia, Indonesia with East Timor , and Thailand with its
Pattani movement.
Separatism emerged for several reasons; among others are different ideology,
disappointment, provocation, and rejection. What were been so interested in a case of
separatism were the dynamics of the conflict and the politics circled it. Mindanao
conflict was one of a unique separatism conflicts that ever happened. It was a
combination of a religious-sentiment (primordial) conflict and politics-interest
(constructivist) conflict.1 One of the things that were very interesting in this case was
the fact that the Final Peace Agreement 1996 was finally signed, when there were too
many conflicts happened, when both conflicting parties simultaneously defending
their each others ego and refused peace so that couldn’t possible to find opportunity
to ran any negotiation. The question was why?
1Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report. Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (unpublished)
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A. Background
Mindanao conflict, is a unique conflict which firstly caused by the
unwillingness of its society to be integrated into the Philippines exclusive territory,
which then developed to be an armed conflict that spent enormous victims, and then
to be a conflict of political interest among the elites actors.
The conflict was started in the time of Spain colonization in 1521. The Spain
was use military forces in order to conquer the Mindanao Island, but the Spain was
never gain anything there except the foot stand. The Mindanao society rebel the
colonization of Spain time by time for more than 350 years. In 1898, the Spain
colonization was ended by the United States through the “Paris Agreement”. But it
was not better the condition of the Mindanao society; on the contrary, the second
wave of colonization in the Mindanao was taken over by the United State. Different
from the previous Spain colonization, the US regime was not use military forces in
order to conquer the Mindanao Island, but it used softer way through political
concessions and political penetrations. The colonization of the US took place for 47
years which then ended by the establishment of the Philippines commonwealth in
1935. The policy of the new Philippines government which would include the
Mindanao Island to be one of the Philippines exclusive territories and the betrayal of
the US toward the Mindanao society, emerging the case fire coming from the
Mindanaoan youths and combatants. Rebellion and the demand for self- separation /
independence were continued to run.
The bloodiest era of the conflict was in the time of Marcos administration,
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where there were many killing and torturing. These phenomena then led the elites
Sultanate, combatants, and youths of the Mindanao to create a legal political
Organization in order to increase the level of rebellion and to gain attention as well as
support from the International Community. Several political Organization were then
established, but along with the development, the MNLF was the one that known as
the official representative of the Mindanao society especially the Muslims.
The MNLF then increased the struggle to realize the independence of
Mindanao by armed conflict with the Philippines army, and conflict
Internationalization. The result of the Internationalization was the attention coming
from the International Islamic of Conference (OIC) and several Muslim States like
Libya, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These International actors then proposed peace way
to the both conflicting parties (the Philippines government / GRP and the MNLF as
the representative of Muslim Mindanao).
As the result, in 1976, the Tripoli Agreement was signed by the GRP and the
MNLF agreeing two points, which are; the establishment of autonomous government
in the Southern part of Mindanao under the authority of the Philippines, and the
agreement pertained to the 13 Muslim autonomous regions in the southern
Philippines.
Conflict between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF was
reduced after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. In theory, after a signing of an
Agreement, the condition exist should be better for the two parties conflicting. But
seem unlike that way to this time case. The signing of the Tripoli Agreement was on
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the contrary emerging many disappointments and protests from various parties. In
fact, in this Mindanao conflict, there were more the parties that reject the peace and
negotiation, known as the “Hawkish groups” than the parties that wanted peace and
negotiation, known as the “Dove groups”. The groups that wanted peace and
negotiation to be conducted were only for example the MNLF, the Philippines
government, the OIC, and several Muslim countries that were being the mediator.
While at that time, the groups that being disappointed by and rejected the Tripoli
Agreement were, the Philippines military, the Christian Pilipino society, the MILF,
and Abu Sayyaf group.
What happened in Mindanao conflict was a situation as follows. Accords,
peace talks, and negotiation were carried out when there were still many parties
refused the peace. Hardly possible situation.
Graphic 1
Resource: processed from various resources
The Philippines Military were disappointed by and the rejected the Tripoli
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Agreement because according to them, conducting negotiation with a separatist
movement was meaning a legitimating toward its existence. What have been done by
the GRP these time (settle the conflict by armed forces) were what should be did by a
State, for a state have right-to-force toward such kind of separatist movement in its
exclusive territory. So it would be better to just eliminate (militarily) the separatist
groups and slaughter its entire member. The Christian Philippino society were
disappointed by the signing of the Tripoli Agreement because first, the agreement
toward the establishment of Mindanao autonomous region would transfer the
existence of Christian society which was at that time already dominate the Mindanao
population. Second, they considered that Bangsa Moro were abject and inferior which
inadvisability to be struggled but should be just finished. While the MILF and Abu
Sayyaf groups were separated themselves from the membership of MNLF because
once again, they disappointed by the results of the Tripoli Agreement which was not
even closer to what they have demanded that was to create an Independent State.
Moreover, there were plebiscite ran by President Marcos to re-determined which of
the 13 areas mentioned in the Tripoli Agreement would be joined the Mindanao
autonomous region. The 10 over 13 regions agreed to join the Mindanao autonomous
region made the armed conflict came back on fire, for the Bangsa Moro considered
that the government of the Philippines has betrayed the content of the Tripoli
Agreement 1976 that has been agreed.
There were too many resistance and objections after the signing of the Tripoli
Agreement 1976, armed conflict even remain occurred, so that seemed mostly
16
impossible to have any negotiation in the front. But then suddenly, there were accords
and informal meetings ran by the GRP and the MNLF with the OIC and the Muslim
countries as the mediator. First were the Jeddah accord in 1987, and then the 20th
ICFM meeting in Istanbul, and the OIC Summit meeting in December 1991 in
Senegal. Re-asking to self-separation by Nur Misuari even carried out during the
several times meeting such as the 3rd State Conference in Thaif, Saudi Arabia 1981
and the OIC meeting 1991, but it were refused by the forum.
After those meetings, in September 2nd 1996 the Final Peace Agreement was
signed by President Ramos and Nur Misuari in Manila, witnessed by the Indonesian
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and the OIC Secretary General Hamid Algabid. But what
would be the question is, how come the Final Peace Agreement 1996 was finally
signed in the middle of un-conducive situation, when there were more hawkish than
the doves, when the two parties conflicting were not ready yet to have any negotiation
because they were enjoying the armed conflicts and struggling their interests, when
the unripe time forced to be ripe?
B. Research Question
Based on the background explained above, then the research question would
be “why the Government of Republic of the Philippines and the MNLF took
negotiation process in the Final Peace Agreement 1996?”
C. Theoretical Framework
Based on the research question, the writer will explain the problem using the
17
theory of ripeness by William Zartman. According to this Theory, there are
essentially two approaches to the study and practice of negotiation (and its facilitated
form, mediation).One, of longest standing, holds that the key to a successful
resolution of conflict lies in the substance of the proposals for a solution. Parties
resolve their conflict by finding an acceptable agreement—more or less a midpoint—
between their positions, either along a flat front through compromise or, as more
recent studies have highlighted, along a front made convex through the search for
positive-sum solutions or encompassing formulas.2
The other holds that the key to successful conflict resolution lies in the timing
of efforts for resolution. Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do
so—when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are
blocked and the parties find themselves in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.
At that point they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long
time and that only now appears attractive.3
Referring to the first school, the conflicting parties (the GRP and the MNLF)
were tried to look for a resolution in the form of an agreement to negotiate their
position and interest. The focus of the resolution was lie on the substance of the
Agreement proposal. This negotiation process could be through compromises effort
like the giving of political concession to the MNLF or other positive-sum solutions
effort. They tried to find the mid-point material which could be accepted by the both
2 http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9897&page=225 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:49)3 Ibid.,
18
parties, since it is impossible to find such very-right solution to fulfill the both
parties’ interests.
Referring to the second school, the final decision to conduct negotiation was
then caused by inconvenient and declines experienced by each of the conflicting
parties. AS quoted in Zartman’s book, the declines of the both conflicting parties
were described in a situation of a “mutually hurting stalemate”, and the beneficial
situation resulted by both main actors after the willing of negotiation was described in
a “mutually enticing opportunity”.
…a ripe moment is depicted as a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS), which is characterized by a deadlock. The parties are locked into a situation because of an impeding catastrophe. In this situation, the disputing parties come to recognize, through a cost-benefit calculation, the sharp increase in costs of further escalation, which limits the use of unilateral strategies and enhances the prospect of a negotiated settlement as the only way out of an escalating situation.4
Another way to conceptualize a ripe moment is as a mutually enticing opportunity (MEO), which is distinguished from an MHS by its emphasis on future gains rather than on costs. During a ripe moment, the parties begin to negotiate because they expect to achieve certain goals using alternative strategies instead of conflict.5
The both conflicting parties were experiencing very difficult situations where
they could not reach their interest, usually unilaterally, if they did not run the
negotiation process. So, they then choose to conduct negotiation for it is the most
attractive way out to gain back their interests and possibly gain other additional
benefits.
4 Zartman,William., & Faure, Guy Oliver. (2005). Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts. Cambridge University Press ( page 272)
5 Ibid.,
19
Actually, according to the type of the conflict (separatism conflict), condition
happened in Mindanao, and the contrast interests of the each parties (integration and
independency); it is impossible to find a perfect solution where each of the parties
could satisfy their whole interests, because in this conflict, the goals of one party
were blocked by the goals of other party.
So then at this point, they take the alternative that actually have been in the air
suggested and effort by the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) and other
Muslim countries in order to conduct peace agreement and negotiation. Moreover, 20
years (after the Tripoli Agreement 1976) were a long and enough time to prepare a
suitable drafts and substance for a Final Peace Agreement. In addition, the both
parties would gain benefits from the signing of the agreement.
D. Hypotheses
The Final Peace Agreement was finally signed by the government of the
Philippines and the MNLF because there were mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS),
and the mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO).
The MHS was a condition where the actor of the each conflicting parties,
President Ramos and Nur Misuari, were experiencing difficult situation, decline
position, and International pressure, which finally lead them to the option of
negotiation. While the MEO were a consequences situation if the both conflicting
parties were engage to conduct negotiation. It is a situation where the each party,
Ramos and Misuari, would regain their position and support, as well as financial and
20
political assistance from the International community after they sign the peace
Agreement.
E. Method to Collect Data
In this writing, the writer uses several ways to collect the data in order to
discuss the problem, they are as follows:
• Media research, collecting the data from media likes the internet in
order to find references and sources to accomplish the explanation of
the problem.
• Library research, this method used to study the relevant sources in
order to discuss the problem (secondary data).
• Data analysis, the data gained from the internet and the library
(books), were checked for the relevancy in order to be used as the
sources in the final paper arrangement.
• Proving hypothesis, derived from the meaning of the title, the
discussion of the problem, and the data analysis.
F. Scope of the Research
In this writing, also according to the theme that would be discussed, the writer
will limit the scope of the discussion started from the beginning of the Mindanao
conflict until the signing of the Final Peace Agreement 1996. This time limitation
21
used in order to ease the observation of the problem as well as to avoid the
complexity of the further analysis.
G. Systematical Writing
The systematical writing was meant to answer the research question and
hypotheses that were explained, these would be as follows:
In the first chapter, the writer would discuss about the preface of the topic. It
would consist of background of the Mindanao conflict, the research question,
theoretical framework, hypotheses, method to collect data, the scope of the research,
and the systematical writing.
The second chapter would discuss about the general description of Mindanao
Island. Including its geographical situation, it history of conflict, and the dynamic of
the conflict resolution.
In chapter three, the writer would go deeper by discussing about the obstacles
to conduct negotiation. Where the worst of the conflict situation, made the going of a
new further negotiation to be impossible. Started with the experiences of the both
conflicting parties on finding that the negotiation which have been conducted was
only resulted a trap, the complexity of the conflict, and the fact that there were more
the hawkish than the dove group.
Chapter four would be the answer of the research question. It would consist of the
discussion of a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually enticing opportunity, which
caused the negotiation process to be conducted.
22
The last chapter, chapter five, would be the conclusion of the entire topic.
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CHAPTER II
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MINDANAO
A. Geographic Situation of Mindanao Island
Mindanao Island is located in the most Southern part of the Philippines
archipelagos. It is the second largest Islands in the Philippines after the Luzon Island.
Mindanao Island land reaches to 102,043 square kilometers, it occupies one-third of
the Philippines' total land area.6 Mindanao is surrounded by seas and near to Borneo
Island, Indonesia. This key geographic location underscores its potential to be a major
transshipment point and center of trade in the region.7 Mindanao Island is prone to
earthquakes and a mountainous island; it is the home to Mount Apo, the highest
mountain in the country.8
The Mindanao Island located outside the Typhoon belt. It have fair tropical
climate spread to all over the area which potential to the growing of various tropical
plants, fruits, and other mineral resources. An article reported:
Its rich soil accounts for bountiful harvests of a variety of farm products. It grows most of the Philippines' major crops such as rubber (100% of national production), pineapple (91%), and cacao (90%) as well as banana, coffee, corn and coconut (over 50%). The island also produces exotic fruits like pomelo, mangosteen and durian. Mindanao is likewise endowed with rich mineral resources. Its metallic deposits include lead, zinc, ore, iron, copper, chromite, magnetite and gold. Gold mined in Mindanao accounts for nearly half of the national gold reserves. Its non-metallic mineral resources
6 http://www.medco.gov.ph/medcoweb/mindanao.asp (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:50)7 ibid., 8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindanao (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53)
24
include marble, salt, sand, gravel, silica, clay, and limestone.9
The population of Mindanao reaches to 18.1 million people or a quarter of the
Philippines' total population, based on the 2000 census.10 This island has the most
varied populations as a result of the previous colonization and the huge migration
coming from Luzon and Visayas. Among the residents of Mindanao there are tribal
indigenous known as Lumad, the Muslim Mindanao, and the Christian Filipino.
Religiously, Mindanao share three major religions embraced by its society.
Roman Catholic 83%, Protestant 9%, Muslim 5%, Buddhist 3%, and others.11
Islam was the first religion to enter Mindanao Island (in the 13th century) and
embraced by the Mindanao society. Then in the 16th century, Christianization was
started to spread along with the colonization of the Spain, continued by the American,
and the migration of the Christian Filipinos into Mindanao.
As a coastal island that have tropical climate evenly, most of the Mindanao
society have living as fishermen, farmer, and work in forestry sector. About 2.000
species of fish12 are available in the coasts of Mindanao. Tropical climate that spread
evenly to the entire region makes it very potential to the production of crops, rice, and
other tropical plains and fruits that can contributes enormous income to the country.
One of articles about Mindanao’s economy said that:
If wisely harnessed, Mindanao's rich agricultural resources can serve as the Philippines' foundation for sustainable growth. Mindanao's
9 ibid.,10ibid., 11http://www.filipinomissions.org/filipino_facts.htm (accessed on: May, 29 2008 / 18:23)12 http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/philippines/GEOGRAPHY.html (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 /
15:55)
25
economy grew at an average of 3% in 1995-1997. This dipped to 0.5 % in 1998 due to the Asian financial crisis but improved to nearly 2% in 1999. Its Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in 2000 grew a noteworthy 4.95%, higher than the national growth rate of 4.01%. This was due to the bullish performance of its agriculture sector (5.84%) and industry sector (5.09%).13
In order to ease the control, the country of the Philippines is divided into 15
regions. These 15 regions will then be divided into provinces, cities, and finally the
Barangays (the smallest political unit).14 In the Mindanao Island itself, the political
division is divided into six administrative regions, which then subdivided into 25
provinces. These regions are Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX) formerly Western
Mindanao, Northern Mindanao (Region X), Davao Region (Region XI) formerly
Southern Mindanao, SOCCSKSARGEN (Region XII) formerly Central Mindanao,
Caraga (Region XIII) located in the northwestern part of Mindanao, and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) a special region which covers
the territories predominantly populated by Muslims.15
B. The History of Mindanao Conflict
Mindanao conflict was started in the time of Spain colonization in 1521. Its
objectives were to conquer and spread Christianization in the Mindanao Island which
was already Muslim in Majority. In the effort to achieve those goals, the Spain
regime often to used military oppressions and cruelty. There were torturing and
killings in everyday lives. During its colonization era, the Spain were actually 13 http://www.medco.gov.ph/medcoweb/mindanao.asp (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:54)14 http://www.filipinomissions.org/filipino_facts.htm (accessed on: May, 29 2008 / 18:24)15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindanao (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53)
26
achieved nothing except the foot stand. Spain were never won the trust moreover the
heart of Mindanao society. For those cruelties and violence, the Mindanao society,
also known as the Bangsa Moro, conducted rebellion. The colonization of Spain took
place for more than 350 years, and for that long as well, the Mindanao society
rebelled it.
In the 1898, the Spain colonization was ended by the United States through
the “Paris Agreement”. The agreement was the result of the Spain’s defeat over the
United States in the “Perang Pantai Manila” (also in 1898) which was asked for the
Spain to cede all of its colonial territories, including the Mindanao Island, to the
United States. But then the end of the Spain colonization did not better the condition
in the Mindanao for the next colonization was taken over by the United States. Then
there was occurred the second wave of colonization which was took place for 47
years.
The United States colonization was seemed different from the previous Spain
colonization, but obviously same in the objectives. The US did not use military power
and violations, or perhaps less use it, to won the heart and sympathy of the Mindanao
society, but rather used softer and peaceful way in achieved the objectives. Its
strategies to won the attention and trust of the Mindanao society were in the form of
political penetration in the Mindanao sultanates. The US political lobby was
succeeding proven by a signed agreement between the US and the Mindanao
Sultanates called “Kiram Bates” in 1899. The agreement contented statement that the
US would not intervening matters in the Sultans’ governance. But on the 2nd of
27
March 1904, the agreement was canceled by the President Franklin Roosevelt,
unilaterally. The second US strategy to gain attention from the Mindanao society was
in the form of education. The US to be successful to convinced the Sultans and elites
of Mindanao to sent their children to the schools in the US and Manila, in objective to
changed the point of view and life style of the Mindanaoan young generations which
was hoped later to be the “counterpart” for the Mindanao rebellion itself.
In 1935 the Philippines commonwealth was established with Molina as the
chosen President. Molina then declared that the Sultans in Mindanao were no longer
having any position in the new governance, and the International law would be
implemented for the entire society without an exception to any religion. Heard to this,
the Mindanao society were angry and refused to be joined in to the Philippines
territory. Conflict came back to happen when the Muslim Mindanao found out that in
fact the US were unilaterally support the integration of the Mindanao Island to be part
of the Philippines territory. Since that time, the rebellion coming from the Mindanao
society especially the Muslim toward the new policy and the new Philippines
government were took place. Sets of resistances were conducted started from the re-
questioning the reason of why the Philippines included the Mindanao Island in to its
exclusive territory, until the extreme actions to separatism.
During the Marcos era around 1968-1972, there were enormous numbers of
ruinations and victim so that known to be the most repressive era in the Mindanao
conflict. His “Martial Law” resulted the killing of over 20.500 people, 70.000
imprisonments, and the disappearance of 759 reported, thousands of tortured and
28
lived under the poverty line.16 There was also mass slaughter of Mindanao society
done by Illagas ethnic under the order of the President Marcos himself. And the most
traumatic incident for the Mindanao society were the “jabiddah massacre”, where the
Philippines government massacring around 60 Muslims that considered betraying for
they refuse to infiltrate Sabah in the “operasi merdeka” in 1968. During that time, the
government of the Philippines also sent huge numbers of Christian citizens from the
Luzon, visayas, as well as Manila in to the Mindanao Island in order to took over the
population domination so that the Mindanao society being in minority. Along with
the huge migration that kept ran, the GRP kept on its actions to progressively
marginalized the Mindanao society so that the Mindanao society lived in the
oppressive misery and social stress. But then this matter in turn motivates the young
Muslim Moros to launched rebellion toward the Government of the Philippines.
In 1968, MIM (Mindanao Independent Movement) was established by Datu
Udtog matalam, as the first political organization that demand for separation over the
control of the Philippines. But in the development, the MNLF( Moro National
Liberation Front) led by Nur Misuari, a Muslim activist and professor in the
University of Philippines, was the one that finally known as the official representative
of the Bangsa Moro / Muslim Mindanao. The MNLF then not only became a political
organization but also an organization with military power. Longer, this organization
developed to be a strong unit that gains military and financial support from several
Muslim countries in the world. Countries that played a role in the development of the
16 http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53)
29
MNLF were such as Libya (for its “top 90” and “top 300” military assistances in
1971), Malaysia, Syria, and Pakistan.
The conflict between the GRP and the MNLF then changed to be an armed
conflict that devoured enormous numbers victims. Reported that the GRP spent 40%
of its annual budget (more than 73 million pesos) per year to handle the separatist
movement in Mindanao.17 At the same time, Nur Misuari kept his effort to
progressively internationalize the conflict in order to gain attention and support from
the International community. As the result, in 1972 the OIC (Organization of the
Islamic Conference) gave attention to the Muslim minority problem in the Southern
Philippines by the creation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission which was
then changed to be the Ministerial Committee of Six in the join of Indonesia and
Bangladesh. This commission was tasked to investigate the issue and violence done
by the GRP toward the Muslim Mindanao.
After having several times of meeting between the GRP and the MNLF with
the OIC and several Muslim, then in December 23rd 1976, the Tripoli Agreement
was signed in Tripoli, Libya. This agreement result two essentials: First, the
establishment of autonomous government in the Southern part of Mindanao under the
authority of the Philippines. Second, the agreement pertained to the 13 areas of
Muslim autonomous regions in the southern Philippines, these areas were; Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato,
Manguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Dovao del Sur,
17 http://www.davaonews.com/LandRaped.pdf (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:59)
30
South Cotabato, Palawan, and all of the cities and villages around the areas.18
The conflict was reduced after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. But in
1970, internal conflict inside the MNLF body on the contrary increased so that result
fraction. It was because there were two congress members and also elites of
Mindanao Sultanate at the same time, Rashid Lucman and Salipada K. Pendatun,
cooperate and declared the the establishment of BMLO (Bangsa Moro Liberation
Organization), which in fact in the development couldn’t compete the fame and the
position of the MNLF as the leader of the Bangsa Moro. Then internal conflict came
to occure again, signed by the establishment of the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation
Front) led by Salamat Hashim. The MILF was established for its dissapointment
toward the MNLF which tend to be over obeyed to the Philippines policy and less
represented the Bangsa Moro aspiration. Previously, the BMLO was conspirated with
Salamat Hashim in order to took over the MNLF chairman position from Misuari. It
was succeed anyway, but then the election in 1977 resulted the second winning of
Misuari for he gained the maximum voices from the internal members of the
organization. Salamat Hashim was fired for then established the MILF.
Fractionalization in the MNLF body was increased by the emergence of Abu Sayyaf
group led by Abdurrazzak Jailani, which prefer to use violation and kidnapping in the
effort to achieve its objective.
The more fierce armed conflict returned, and this time it was between the
18Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (Unpublished)
31
GRP and the Bangsa Moro rebel groups such as the MNLF, MILF, also the Abu
Sayyaf group. The armed conflict happened after President Marcos conducted
plebicite in order to re-determined of which of the 13 areas menationed in the Tripoli
Agreement would be joined the Mindanao autonomous region. And the result was
unfortunatable for it was only 10 from 13 areas, agreed to joined the Mindanao
autonomous region. This matter reappeared the sentiment and increased the blood
preasure of the Bangsamoro combatant. The GRP considered to betrayed the content
of the Tripoli Agreement that has been agreed. Hence, the military fight and rebelion
coming from the Bangsa Moro rebel groups were re-occured.
Viewing to that condition, then a more comprehensive agreement was
arranged. This agreement later called the Final Peace Agreement. The OIC together
with Muslim countries such as Indonesia and Libya brought the GRP and the MNLF
in to the negotiation table once again. In the process, this final agreement was
prepared longer and riper whether by the Philippines government, the OIC, as well as
the Ministerial Committee of Six. The range time to prepare the more comprehensive
drafts for the agreement was 20 years after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement
1976, so that hoped to minimize the mistakes and deviations happen in the Tripoli
Agreement implementation in order not to be repeated.
After through several preparations steps, several accords then carried out. The
first accord called the Jeddah accord; it was carried out on January 3 1987 in Jeddah.
This accord produced the giving of full autonomy to the five big provinces which
were Sulu, Basilan, Manguindanao, Tawi-tawi, and Palawan. By that, then the
32
peaceful way reopened. Afterwards, another accord that played significant role called
the 20th ICFM meeting in Istanbul and the OIC Summit meeting in December 1991 in
Senegal which asked for the Philippines Government and the MNLF to continue their
peace. In the meeting, Nur Misuari once again proposed to self-separation from the
Philippines exclusive territory, but it was refused by the forum for the Philippines
government after President Marcos considered to having more appreciative and
serious intention in settling the Mindanao conflict.
On April 1993 and December 1995 President Ramos and Nur Misuari met in
Jakarta. After that meeting, the Final Peace Agreement was seemed to get closer to
the realization, signed by the giving of political consessions to the Mindanao
Autonomous Region and the integration of 7.000 Bangsa Moro combatants in to the
Philippines armed forces by the government of the Philippines. And finally, on
Monday, September 2nd 1996, the Final Peace Agreement was signed by President
Fidel Ramos and the chairman of the MNLF, Nur Misuari. The singing took place in
Manila witnessed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and the OIC
Secretary General Hamid Algabid.
C. The Dynamic of Negotiation in the Mindanao Conflict Resolution
The Mindanao conflict remains happened; it killed more people and causing
enormous lost day by day. On the other hand, various kinds of peace way have been
proposed by the International Communities in order to resolve the conflict. The first
action to get closer to the peace negotiation was the establishment of Quadripartite
33
Ministerial Commission initiated by the OIC in 1973 which member by Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia. 19 The Commission then changes its name to be the
Ministerial Committee of Six after the joining of Indonesia and Bangladesh. This
Committee was tasked to investigate the case of Mindanao conflict and the violations
done by the GRP toward the Mindanao society.
In 1975, the first domestic formal meeting between the GRP and the MNLF
were occurred in Jeddah in the mediator of the OIC. The talks discussed about the
Mindanao conflict resolution, but it was failed because there were many complexities
and disproportionate demands coming from Nur Misuari. Nur Misuari wanted a
creation of Mindanao Autonomous Region that will have a separate government and
army to be the result of the talks, while according to the Indonesian Foreign Minister
at that time, Dr. Adam Malik, it would not be acceptable by any “reputable”
sovereign government.20 In other words, the demands of the both conflicting parties
(the GRP and the MNLF) would not be meeting.
On July 1975, the 6th Islamic Conference was held in Jeddah which decided to
maximize the use of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission toward the issue of
negotiation between the GRP and the MNLF until reached to the final decision. This
Committee then tasked to prepare the negotiation as well as lobbying the GRP and
the MNLF. 21
In December 21, 1976, The Tripoli Agreement was signed by Nur Misuari 19 Ibid., page 4920http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53)21Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (page 50) (unpublished)
34
and the Philippines representative Zamello Z Barbero, witnessed by the OIC
representative and several Muslim Countries. The Agreement was signed in Libya, a
place that actually far away from word neutral, because Libya was one the central
supports of the Mindanao rebellion to the Philippines. In the lobbying process
previously, the GRP was more tend to be passive compare to the MNLF and the
mediator (the OIC and several Muslim Countries) because at that time the GRP was
facing significant economic contraction after the booming of the oil. 22
After the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, the conflict was reduced, but it
rose again when President Marcos conducted plebiscite over the 13 regions which
were already mentioned in the Tripoli Agreement. Marcos was considered to betray
the content of the Tripoli Agreement that has been agreed by both parties. Nur
Misuari then expressed this disappointment to the OIC in the 8th Islamic Conference
in May 1977.
In 1979, Nur Misuari flew to Iran with his several delegations asked for
assistant to tighter monitoring and takes an action toward the inconsistency of the
GRP in implementing the content of the Tripoli Agreement 1976. Knowing the GRP
deviation, Iran and Saudi Arabia then aggressively take an action to embargo their oil
export to the Philippines.
On the other hand, internal conflict in the MNLF body came to arise. The
result of the Tripoli Agreement that disappointed many sides of the Bangsa Moro and
the plebiscite done by Marcos caused the decreasing of popularity of the MNLF, 22 Ibid.,
35
while increasing the popularity of the MILF which was more religious and more
struggling for an Islamic Independent State. The decline of the MNLF popularity
proven by the declined of Nur Misuari’s chairmanship in the provisional government
that created to serve the Regional Assembly and Executive Council for the
Autonomous Region 9 and 12, and the absent of the MNLF supporters in the regional
election assembly.
Nur Misuari then continued to bring out the resolution of a Mindanao
independent State to the OIC along with the 3rd Summit Conference in Thaif, Saudi
Arabia in January, and to the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission in Jeddah, in
May 1981. The Misuari’s proposal was rejected by the forum in the both meetings,
the OIC then insists the MNLF to stay in its position to continue the peace process
and stop the armed rebellion. Being pressed Internationally, Misuari then agreed to
continue the diplomatic and politics process.
During 1981 until around 1986, the situation in Mindanao was colored by
several things. President Marcos launched strategy to compete the conflict
Internationalization by Misuari:
May (1988, 60) and Madale (1984, 184) argue that Marcos adopted a two-fold strategy: 1) provision of regional economic programs and concessions on selected religious and social matters (as the government believes the root causes are relative economic and social deprivation); 2) use of conventional military force to quell the insurgency.23
The strategy was ran side by side, if the level of Mindanao’s rebellion was
23 http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf ( accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53)
36
increased, then the economic betterment coming to that area will go slow, but if the
level of the rebellion was decreased, then the economic betterment will come faster.
But then in the real, the Muslim Mindanao only experienced little of the economic
betterment; most of the benefits were enjoyed by the Christian society.
Other than that, Marcos also did tricks in order to weaken the position of the
MNLF and to break down the unity of Bangsa Moro. Marcos declared that the MNLF
was an ally of communist party; this was aimed to discrediting the image of the
MNLF among the Islamic world and also ASEAN. Unfortunately, this was worked,
supported by the action of Marcos which always proposing peace choices for the
Muslim issue by the establishment of peace panel, member by Muslim people. 24
In 1986, Presidential election chooses Corazon Aquino as the new President
replacing the Marcos administration. In her reconciliation campaign, Aquino used
softer and more peaceful way to resolve the Mindanao conflict. She promised to pay
more attention to the development of Mindanao Autonomous region. She proved it by
holding meeting and negotiation with Nur Misuari. After several times of contact,
Aquino met Misuari who just came back from self-exile in the Middle East In
September 5th 1986. But the meeting was seemed unsmooth:
However, even before talks begin, the MILF and MNLF-RG state they will not participate or honor any deal made. They launch armed attacks against military and civilian installations and army personnel and clashes are reported between the MNLF and the MILF. Talks between the government and the MNLF in Jolo in September result in a ceasefire and an amnesty program. Attempts to unite the various
24Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (page 55) (unpublished)
37
Moro factions fail. By late 1986, it is clear that elements in the military and the government do not support the negotiations.25
In January 3rd 1987, the GRP sent a team to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to convince
the MNLF that the new Aquino administration was willing to conduct any kinds of
negotiation except for self-independence. The MNLF then agreed, and in January 4th
1987, the Jeddah accord was signed by the GRP and the MNLF. This accord
discussed about the giving of full autonomy to all of Mindanao areas including
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan. At that time, Misuari proposed another 24
demands to the GRP, but the GRP refused it and make another opposition proposal.
On the other hand, a division inside the MLNF body reoccurred by the
establishment of a radical movement (which later called Abu Sayyaf) by one of the
member of MNLF, Abdul Razaq Jaljalani, that disappointed by Nur misuari’s
leadership. Many members of the MNLF also changed their support away from the
MNLF to the other groups such as the MILF and Abu Sayyaf. They were
disappointed for the demand of Misuari in the Jeddah accord was once again,
minimized, from the demand to Independent State to the only autonomous region.
The weak of the MNLF support and fame, made the GRP less response the
demands of the MNLF in Jeddah accord because it considered being too much.
Knowing the ignorance of the GRP, the MNLF was threat to conduct armed attack to
the GRP. The OIC then insist the both parties to re-conducting negotiation. And after
several times of intensive approaches, the Jeddah accord was resigned in January 4th
25http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53)
38
1987 that proposed the giving of autonomy to all of Mindanao areas including
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan under the authority of the Philippines State.
On August 1st 1989, President Aquino signed Republic Act 6734 about the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Many parties rejected this act.
Meanwhile, the implementation of the ARMM should first through a plebiscite again
just like the previsions President Marcos era. Founding out that plebiscite would be
conducted again, the MNLF take an action in the form of boycotting it. They
declared to remain consistent on the contents of the Tripoli Agreement 1976. But on
the contrary, action of boycotting by the MNLF caused the worst plebiscite result to
the MNLF itself. If the previous plebiscite done by Marcos resulting 10 over 13
regions, this time plebiscite only result 4 over 13 regions.
…It is submitted to a plebiscite on November 9. The MNLF and right-wing Christian groups oppose the act while the OIC first condemns and then supports the act. The surrounding confusion and dispute leads to low voter turnout and only 4 of the 13 provinces and 9 cities support the Organic Act (May 1992, 401). Estimates indicate that the voting area is 28% Muslim and 66% Christian. The four non-contiguous provinces, Lanao del Sur, Magindanao, Tawi-tawi, and Sulu, comprise the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM remains in place until the 1996 accord.26
Twice of the conduction of plebiscite by the GRP caused the reoccurrence of
greater rebellions done by the MNLF toward the government of the Philippines. Sets
of armed attacks, killings, bombings, raids, gun battles, and other kinds of violations
were happened very often and victim thousands of civilians as well as army forces of
the GRP and also the MNLF.
26 Ibid.,
39
In March 1991, 13 Moro combatants were murdered by the GRP’s army for
destroying the electricity tower. Not so long after that, 30 Moro combatants were
found in death. These incidents were called the International amnesty to release that
there have been extreme human right violations in the Philippines done by the GRP
and the Bangsa Moro combatants. Knowing the worsened situation, the OIC then
replayed its role to mediate the peace negotiation between the GRP and the MNLF in
the OIC Summit in Senegal. But on the other hand, Nur Misuari on the contrary got
another agenda in this time OIC meeting. Misuari was proposed the MNLF to the
member of the OIC. By that, then the MNLF could indirectly be considered as an
independent State. But this proposal was denied by the OIC, and the OIC warns the
MNLF not to worsen the situation.
In 1992, the Philippines Presidential election result Fidel V. Ramos as the new
chosen President. He was the Minister of Defense under the Aquino administration
which was considered to be the more proactive side, compared to Aquino itself, in
settling the Mindanao conflict in the peace way. He proved it by establishing the
NUC (National Unification Commission) in September 1992, headed by Haydee
Yorac, a professor of University of the Philippines in order to task a political
negotiating for the Mindanao Conflict resolution. While armed attacks and violations
remain happened among the Mindanao rebellion groups and the Philippines armed
forces along the country, the new Ramos government continued their intention to
peace negotiation.
In 1993, a meeting that led to an agreement to resume peace talk between the
40
GRP and the MNLF was held in Jakarta on April 14 -16. Then, a disturbance was
reoccurred in the form of church bombing done by the Muslims and the Christian
societies. In December 1993, mosque-bombing in Mindanao was happened after the
church–bombing that cause the killing of 7 people and injured 151.
Sets of attacks and bank-raids in the Ipil Island that caused the die of 45
people and wounded 40 among them also done mostly by the Abu Sayyaf group. This
incident considered to be the worst, so that in consequences, the government of the
Philippines alleged those bombings and armed attacks were done not only by the Abu
Sayyaf group but also by the MNLF and the MILF. The MNLF denied that claim and
surprisingly declared that the MNLF would promise to together with the GRP to fight
against the MILF and other what so called the “lawless elements” in Mindanao. 27
Considered to be a threat - group that grow bigger time to time, In January 4th 1996,
the leader of Abu Sayyaf, Abdul Razaq Djaljalani, was reported to be the most
wanted criminal in the Philippines, the founder of the him (live or dead) would be
given huge amount of cash by the GRP.
January 7th 1996, the 4th round of peace talks between the GRP and the MNLF
will resume in Jakarta next month, while they still resolving the five major issue that
would be contented in Final Peace Agreement, these are;
…the timing of a plebiscite to set up the autonomous government; the geographic scope of autonomy; the number of MNLF forces to be integrated in the army and the national police; revenue-sharing in the autonomous area; and the establishment of a regional security
27Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (page 60) (unpublished)
41
force.28
On January 11th 1996, Nur Misuari opposed the resolution of ARRM and
asked for the “more meaningful autonomy”.29 Means that he wanted a special
autonomy for Southern Mindanao that gives wider and bigger authority to rule and
run the autonomous region. In March 5th, 1996, the talks between the GRP and the
MNLF in the mediation of the OIC were break down. The meeting was discussed
about the setting of Muslim provisional government. The government in Manila
wanted that the plebiscite have to run before the establishment of Provisional
Government, while the MNLF wanted that the establishment of the Provisional
Government has to set up under the Presidential edict avoiding the rejection over the
Christian society toward the Muslim Autonomous Region.
After sets of meeting and drafts - making were done by the OIC, the GRP, and
the MNLF, In June 23rd 1995, the OIC spokesmen stated that the agreement
regarding to the resolution of Mindanao conflict has reached to the 75 - 80%.30 At the
same time, the GRP has invited several investors to invest $80 million.31 This step
was aimed to rebuild the infrastructures that have been destroyed in the previous
conflict. Public hearings and consultations with the Mindanao society were held
monthly by the GRP. At the same month, there was a meeting between the GRP and
the MNLF facilitated by the OIC, its result to the establishment of Southern
28 Xinhua News Agency, 01/07/9629http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53)30Reuters, 06/23/9531ibid., 07/02/95
42
Philippines Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD).32
On August 1996, the GRP and the MNLF agreed to integrate 7500 MNLF
combatant in to the GRP’s military forces.33 Finally in September 2nd 1996, the Final
Peace Agreement was signed between the GRP and the MNLF witnessed by the OIC
Secretary General, Hamid algabid, and the Indonesian Prime Minister, Ali Alatas.
But the thing is, many controversies and rejections have come since the very
beginning of negotiations and agreements conducted. For example, two months after
the establishment of the SZOPAD, in August 1996, the Members of Congress of the
GRP were expressed their opposition toward the content of the agreement. They were
then asked for the Supreme Court to invalidate several particular contents and
proposed for editing, which was then supported by the Christian bishop. The other
example was the rejection of the MILF toward the Final Peace Agreement (FPA)
1996. The MILF was committing not to stand in the way of peace and keep the
struggle for Independence; it was proved by the establishment of a huge assembly
around Cotabato as the accommodation and base of the movement.34 There were still
many other examples and proves regarding to the rejections and disappointments that
would be discussed in the next chapter.
32 http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/Mindanao-Landfs.htm (accessed on: May 29, 2008 / 20:57)
33 Xinhua News Agency, 08/02/9634 http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/Mindanao-Landfs.htm (accessed on: May, 29
2008 / 20:57)
43
CHAPTER III
THE OBSTACLES TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATION
As mentioned previously, the interesting points to study and analyzed the
issue of separatism was relied on the dynamic of the conflict and the politics circled
it. In this time case, there are three points that difficult to the happening of negotiation
in the objective of peace situation in the Mindanao. First, the experiences of
negotiation as a trap, means that every effort of negotiation that have been conducted
were then on the contrary, only result to a worse problem and cause new opposition.
Second, the complexity of the conflict. And third, the stronger the Hawkish group.
A. Experiences of Negotiation as a Trap
The signing of the Tripoli Agreement 1976 was essentially aimed for the
betterment of the conflict situation in Mindanao. At one side, the conflict between the
GRP and the MNLF was calming down after the signing of the Agreement. But on
the other side, the Agreement was on the contrary being a trap for the MNLF itself.
And it was being a trap too at last, however, toward the government Republic of the
Philippines.
In the MNLF bodies, divisions were then happened after the signing of the
Agreement. The MNLF then split up to several factions, among them are the MILF
and the more radical group which was then called the Abu Sayyaf group. These
groups were separated themselves from the MNLF because they were disappointed
44
by Nur Misuari’s leadership and the result of the Tripoli Agreement. The content of
the Agreement was about the establishment of Mindanao autonomous region, which
was away from the struggle of those time movement. The Moros were demanded for
an Islamic Independent State, but Misuari were agreed to sign a resolution which was
not even closer to the Moros’ aspiration. The Moros was wanted to be, at least, a
Federal State that has their own jurisdiction, but the result of a common autonomous
region by the Tripoli Agreement sad them. By this, Nur Misuari considered to be too
obeyed to what the GRP’s wanted and less represented the Moro aspiration. The
plebiscite which was then ran by President Marcos was led to the re - launching of
sets of armed attacks by the MNLF and the other Muslim Moro groups, because of
their disappointment. Moreover, there was an economic policy proposed by President
Marcos as his strategy to handle the separatism movement in Mindanao. The
economic policy was described approximately as follows; if the level of rebellion was
decreased then the economic betterment in Mindanao would run faster, but if the
level of rebellion was increased then the economic betterment in Mindanao would run
slower.35 These thing was then increased the division among the Bangsa Moro, for
some groups wanted the economic improvement and some group remain wanted to
separate and establish Islamic Independent State.
However, these phenomena then led to the distrust over the two sides toward
each other. The MNLF was then could not any longer trust the GRP for its betrayal
35 Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (page 54) (unpublished)
45
toward the content of the Tripoli Agreement 1976 that has been agreed together.
While, the GRP was then decreased its trust toward the MNLF for the reoccurrence of
armed forces attacks after the GRP gave political concession (autonomous region) to
them.
Meanwhile, trap was also experienced by the government of the Philippines
after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. These traps were in the form of the break
of the Philippines’ military / political elites’ view of the Mindanao. According to the
military elites, the peace negotiation with the Moro liberation groups was meaning
useless. At that time (Marcos era), the Philippines military was having expand
function in the development of the country and became the partner of the Martial Law
and the authoritarian rule of Marcos.36 For them, serve the separatist movement was
mean legitimating to its existence. The military was regretting the President’s
decision to conduct peace and Agreement with the MNLF because according to them,
a State have right-to-force toward such kind of separatist movement in its territory,
and what have been done by the state these times (settle it militarily) was what a State
suppose to do. And that was why the military was massively launching its fights
against the threatening groups and organization in the country including the Moro
separatist movements.
While according the Philippines elite politics, what makes the President’s
decision pertaining to the Tripoli Agreement was useless was because the choice to
Mindanao autonomous region would cost the National budget enormously, and the 36 Noel M. Morada & Teresa S. Tadem. (2007) “Philippines Politics and Governance: An Introduction.” Quezon. University
of Philippines ( Page 395)
46
decision to establish a Mindanao autonomous region was worried to emerge such
sense of jealousy toward another regions. Just like the case of Aceh, where it was also
drawn controversies and worries from various parties, including the political elites in
the government, before the decision to a special autonomous region of Aceh, which is
now known as the Nangroe Atceh Darussalam was given.
B. The Complexity of Conflict
The complexity of the conflict in Mindanao also became the factors that
difficult to the running of negotiations. Actually, after the signing of Tripoli
Agreement 1976, the conflict was on the contrary got more acute, where it was
started from the religious-sentiment conflict (primordial conflict); then rose to the
instrumental conflict, even reached to the constructivist conflict.
Firstly, Mindanao conflict in the 1960 – 1980 was tending to caused by
primordial issues. For the Muslim Mindanao, the Marcos’ repressive policy for them
often to be considered as the representative of the Christian political power that
intentionally wanted to marginalize Islam, also, the Manila was often to identified as
Visayas that has the meaning and representing the Catholic. Joined with the republic
of the Philippines was mean a form of capitulation (surrendering) toward the catholic
community. 37
While for the government of the Philippines and the Filipinos, the Muslim
37Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (page 40) (unpublished)
47
Mindanao society was identified as a harsh, un-brained, and uncivilized nation. The
existence of Bangsa Moro in Mindanao was also often to be identified as the Moors, a
nation in Africa that ever irritated the Catholic community in Spain. This negative
point of view toward the moors was then be transformed to the Muslim Mindanao.
The genocide incident conducted by the Ilagas and the GRP toward the Muslim
community in the 1970s was also triggered that the Mindanao conflict was meant a
primordial conflict.38
In the relation with the International actors, the protests and interferences
from the OIC, Libya, Malaysia, and the other Muslim Countries could not be
separated from the information stated by Nur Misuari in the effort of
internationalizing the Mindanao conflict as the conflict of Islam versus the Catholic-
characterized Philippines. In his several speeches, Misuari described that the
suffering of Bangsa Moro by the repressive policy of the GRP was similar to the
suffering of the Palestinian by the repressive policy of Israel.39
Primordial issue was also became the factor toward the division inside the
MNLF bodies after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. The action of Salamat
Hashim as the vice chairman of Misuari, to separate and establish new rebellion
organization (the MILF) was also because of primordial principle. In the point of
view of Hashim, the MNLF and Misuari were no longer expressed an Islamic-
liberation movement, because it has obeyed the Tripoli Agreement that obviously
38 Ibid., 39 Ibid.,
48
reduce the spirit to struggling the establishment of Islamic Independent State.40
The Mindanao conflict was raise to the instrumentalist conflict after the
signing of Tripoli Agreement. There was a big tendency that the actors of the conflict
tend to use the issue to gain support whether from the domestic as well as the
International community. The MNLF as one of the rebellion movements gained wide
legitimacy from the International community especially the Muslim Countries, it even
defeat the authority of the traditional Mindanao sultanates. In the view of Salamat
Hashim, the conflict within the GRP was finally placed the Misuari to be one of
important elites in the ARMM. In the certain point, the separation of Hashim from the
MNLF and establish the MILF was also to increased the bargaining position, in order
to reach its goal. The Abu Sayyaf group was an actor that uses the conflict more
uniquely. Different from another rebellion movement, Abu Sayyaf tend to use
kidnapping to get some ransom. There were, indeed, significant differences among
the MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf group. The MNLF gain financial support from
Libya, while the MILF struggle the International network such as Al-Qaeda.
Even though this matter was always be rejected, especially after the MILF
sign the Final Peace Agreement with the GRP.41
40 Ibid.,41 Ibid.,
49
Table 1Financial Resource:
No Mindanao Liberation Movement Financial Aid1 Moro National Liberation Front Libya, Malaysia, and the OIC2 Moro Islamic Liberation Front The Middle East, Pakistan, Al-Qaeda3 Abu Sayyaf Group Ransoms / Al-QaedaResource: Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (Page 42) (Unpublished) quoted from Asep Chaerudin’s thesis
So did with the GRP side especially in the Marcos era, conflict with the
Muslim Mindanao community was used as one of the instruments to prospering the
Luzon Island by exploiting the Mindanao natural resources, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, the Mindanao Island possesses huge numbers of natural resources
and potentiality. It is the second largest Island in the Philippines archipelagos, which
can accommodate huge numbers of populations for further years. Mindanao is also
rich in natural resources, it has fertile soil and tropical weather that spread evenly
along the Island which is very potential to the growing of tropical plants and
agricultural products, it has enormous stock of mining materials that would take long
to be finished, and it has skilled and trained human resources that use to process the
whole of it. So it was also became one of the factors for the GRP to defend its
authorization over the Mindanao Island. Also, by continuously conducting conflict,
Marcos was hoping to gain the domestic support especially from the Luzon Island
society. Other than that, by conflicting with the Muslim Mindanao, the GRP also gain
aids and support from ally countries such as the Unite States.
Constructivist conflict emerged when there is a primordial conflict added /
50
joined with an instrumentalist conflict. In this case, the constructivism was begin to
appear when the conflicting parties then could not seceded themselves from
primordial interests trade-offs and use the conflict for the economic and politics profit
for the elites. The option to continue the conflict or having peace was very depend on
the national and International construction. The MNLF options to settle the Mindanao
conflict in the way of negotiation could not be separated from the big construction of
International community that developed the peace principle. So did from the side of
the GRP, the Ramos’ options to negotiation could not be separated from the big
construction that the Mindanao conflict has spent enormous social, economic, and
time costs.42 So that the signing of Final Peace Agreement 1996 was happen.
There were also researchers that have conducted study on separatism conflict
with the view of primordial, instrumentalist, and constructivist point of view in their
thesis. Researchers that used primordial point of view in their separatism conflict
research were Anhar Gonggong, and Karl D. Jackson. Anhar Gonggong is a
researcher that analyzed the separatism done by Kahar Muzakkar in the northern
Celebes. On his research, he tend to analyze of relations between the role of the sirri
passé custom embraced by the political elites as the precipating factors for the
conflict of relations between the center military and district military. Political clash
from the elites became the main factor to the emergence of political choice to
separation.43
While, Karl D. Jackson researched the separatism movement which was done 42 Ibid.,43 Ibid., page 11
51
by Kartosuwiryo. According to him, separatism appeared as the part of mobilization
of an elite to the mass toward the political, economy, or cultural issues. He was
tending to trace the fundamental factors of why Kartosuwiryo was rebelling.44
Researchers that analyzed the separatism conflict from the instrumentalist
point of view were Einer Wigen, Abu Syed Lingga, and Surwandono. These three
people were analyzing the same separatism conflict in their thesis, the Mindanao
conflict. Wigen saw the Mindanao conflict from the political point of view, that the
Mindanao conflict could not be separated from the efforts of the actors to use the
conflict in order to maximize the reach of their each other’s interests. Conflict in the
certain limit could be mobilized and reduced according to the most beneficial
interest.45
While Lingga tend to analyzed the conflict from the view of negotiation
implementation to settlement. According to him, negotiation could not settle the
Mindanao conflict because there were defects / imperfections dealing with the issues
which would be negotiated, as the impact of the worry of the each conflicting parties
toward the negotiation and the prospect after the negotiation. 46
In his dissertation, Surwandono analyzed the relations between the negotiation
conducted with the continuing of conflict that remains happen between the Moro
groups and the GRP. He develops the concept of politization of negotiation by
Harold Nicholson. This concept was a crucial matter which caused the failure of a
44 Ibid., page 1145 Ibid., page 1346 Ibid., page14
52
negotiation. In this research, he analyzed why the negotiation that conducted in the
aim of conflict resolution where the actors having fractionalization was often fail. 47
While researchers that saw the separatism conflict from the constructivist
point of view in their research were Majul, Ferrer, Asep Chaerudin, Zulkipli Wadi,,
and Prescillano D. Campodo and Saleem Adam. Cesar Adib Majul conducted
analysis about factors that base the Bangsa Moro revolution in the decade 1970s. The
thesis of Majul stated that the rebellion of Bangsa Moro in the Mindanao toward the
GRP was based in the GRP’s policy the tried to eliminate the Moro identity with the
Philippines identity. So that the decrease of the conflict was very depend on the
political will of the Philippines then the demand or action of the Moro society. 48
Julkipli Wadi, and Prescillano D. Campodo and Saleem Adam were
researching the success of the FPA in reducing the conflict tension. They discussed
about the success of the OIC mediation and effort in the negotiation between the GRP
and the MNLF so that alleviate the conflict.49
Mirriam Coronel Ferrer more to focused on the unresolved conflict that has
been lasted long and has been treated in various way whether mediation, and
negotiation to resolution. According to Ferrer, the unresolved conflict was caused by
multi factorial reasons such as the disappointment of result of the development, the
failure of the State to provide cohesive response, and the easy of choice to war. The
thesis of Asep Chaerudin was approximately same with Ferer’s. Chaerudin stated that
47 Ibid., 48 Ibid., page 1249 Ibid.,
53
the entering of terrorist issue in the Mindanao conflict was also complicating the
conflict and the settlement process.50
Graphic 2
Matrix of Research about Conflict and NegotiationConflict Perspective in the South East Asia and the Philippines
Anhar Gonggong, Karl D. Jackson
Primordially
Abu Syed Lingga, Einer Wigen, Surwandono
Instrumentalist
Majul, Ferrer, Asep Chaerudin Zulkipli Wadi, dan Prescillano, Saleem Adam
Constructivist
Resource: Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report. Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007.(unpublished)
C. The Stronger the Hawkish Group
Another reason why, actually, it was very difficult to conduct negotiation was
because there were stronger the hawkish groups than the dove groups. Hawkish group
is a term in the political study for the group that tends to wanted to the continuation
of the conflict until reached to a particular goal. While the dove group is a term that
50 Ibid.,
54
represents the peaceful group that wanted to the resumed of the conflict and got
peace. In fact, in this Mindanao conflict, there were more the hawkish groups then the
dove groups. So however, it minimizes the possibility to the running of negotiations
as well as peace Agreements.
During the Mindanao conflict with the Government Republic of the
Philippines until the signing of the Final Peace Agreement 1996, the dove group (the
group that wanted peace) was lesser, actually, compared to the hawkish group (the
group that wanted conflict). At that time, the groups that wanted peace and
negotiation to be conducted were only the MNLF, the Philippines government, the
OIC, and several Muslim countries that were being the mediator. While the groups
that being disappointed by and rejected the Tripoli Agreement were, the Philippines
military, the Church and Christian Filipino society, the MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf
group.
The Philippines military was considered the hawkish for, once again,
according to this group, service the separatist movement means legitimating to its
existence. What have been done by the GRP these time (settle the conflict by armed
forces) were what should be did by a State, for a state have right-to-force toward
such kind of separatist movement in its exclusive territory. So it would be better to
just eliminate (militarily) the separatist groups and slaughter its entire member. This
is proven by a report:
The military’s role as the partner in Martial Law and authoritarian rule was enhanced further by its key role in combating the twin armed conflicts that surged following regime change in 1972,
55
namely, a Maoist communist insurgency under the newly established Community Party of the Philippines, its armed wing (the New People Army) and its National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF); and ethnic separation led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The use of coercion in governance was palpable in these conflicts, highlighting the military's function as the holder of the monopoly of the use of legitimate force in society, and exposing it to the dangers of committing human rights violations during internal security operations (ISO).51
Several Minister in the Philippines government also disappointed by the
Tripoli Agreement 1976, as reported as follows:
May to December 1977 the 8th ICFM (in Tripoli) allow Misuari, for the first time, to address the conference. Ministers express disappointment over the outcome of negotiation. By this time, however, the improved image of the Philippines is working in its favour and the ICFM simply recommends that negotiations continue…52
In February 29, 1996, several government functionaries were rejected the
meeting with Misuari for the discussion of new autonomous region.
Several mayors and provincial governors in the south refuse to participate in a meeting with MNLF leader Nur Misuari to help prepare the region for autonomy.53
The Church and Christian Philippino society also considered the hawkish, for
them also rejected the Tripoli Agreement and wanted that the GRP remain fight
against the Muslim Mindanao rebellion groups, perhaps until it is surrenders or
defeated. These are proven by reports as follows:
51 Noel M. Morada & Teresa S. Tadem. (2007) “Philippines Politics and Governance: An Introduction.” Quezon. University of Philippines ( Page 395)
52 http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/Mindanao-Landfs.htm (accessed on: May, 29 2008 / 20:57)
53 UPI, 02/29/96
56
In the President Aquino administration, the Christian society was rejected the
act for the Autonomous Registration of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734).
On August 1, an Organic Act for the Autonomous Registration of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734) is signed as a bill by President Aquino. It is submitted to a plebiscite on November 9. The MNLF and right-wing Christian groups oppose the act while the OIC first condemns and then supports the act…54
In the era of President Ramos, the establishment of the “Southern Philippines Council
for Peace and Development” in 1996 was gained extreme response from churches and
the Zamboanga Christian Congresswoman by holding mass demonstration.
A Christian Congresswoman from Zamboanga is threatening to lead mass demonstrations to protest the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development. Church officials have also expressed concern over the role Muslim rebels will play in governing the region55
As he arrives in Zamboanga, President Fidel Ramos is greeted by around 20,000 Christians protesting the peace agreement with the MNLF. Ramos is traveling in the region to garner support for the accord.56
The Church also warn the President that the peace agreement with the Muslim
Mindanao rebellion movements will led to a war by the Christian community.
The Roman Catholic Church urges President Ramos to defer a peace agreement with the Moros, warning that its implementation could lead to war by the Christian majority in the area.57
There were extreme gun battles and armed attacks done by Christian society /
54 http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf (accessed on: July, 12 2008 / 15:53)55 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 06/25/9656 Reuters, 07/02/9657 Ibid., 07/08/96
57
organization to express their disappointment and rejection. Several Christian gunmen
were bombing a mosque after before there was a church bombing that left on 151
injured.
Christian gunmen bomb a mosque in the south shortly after explosions in a Roman Catholic Church result in seven deaths and 151 injuries. Abu Sayyaf, also referred to as the MNLF Lost Command, is believed to be responsible. It opposes talks with the government.58
These actions could be analyzed that, first, the establishment of the act and
agreement toward the establishment of Mindanao autonomous region would transfer
the Christian society’ existence that has been the major population in the Mindanao
Island these times. Second, they considered that Bangsa Moro were abject and
inferior which inadvisability to be struggled but should be just finished.
While the MILF was considered the Hawkish for they also rejected the peace
process and negotiation between the GRP and the MNLF. The establishment of the
MILF was caused by the disappointment of the MNLF members such as Salamat
Hashim and his friends, toward the Misuari’s leadership and the result of the Tripoli
Agreement 1976 which was not even closer to what they have expected these times.
Since the first time, Bangsa Moro were struggling to separate themselves from the
control over the Republic of the Philippines and intent to establish an Islamic
Independent State. But negotiation conducted by Misuari and the GRP was result to
the disappointing status of the Mindanao Island for the Muslim Mindanao society.
58 UPI, 12/27/93
58
…This shakes the MNLF leadership, and a split emerges. In Jeddah on 26 December, Salamat Hashim announces an ‘Instrument of Takeover’ of the MNLF leadership, a move supported by traditional leaders Rashid Lucman, Domacao Alonto and Salipada Pendatun. Misuari counters by expelling Hashim and charging him with treason. Arab supporters are equally divided: Egypt supports Hashim while Libya leans towards Misuari. Mediation by the OIC and Muslim World League fails. Not wishing to be used by the traditional politicians, Hashim transfers to Cairo and goes on to form the ‘new MNLF’, eventually the Moro Islamic Liberation Front…59
Armed contact with the GRP armed forces also happen several times.
A clash between the MILF and Ituman, a Christian militia organization, results in the deaths of five Ituman members. 60
Battles between the MILF and government forces in North Cotabato result in 11 deaths.61
For further, the MILF then continue its struggle to independent by its own, by
strengthen the organization militarily, financially, and politically, to increase the
bargaining position domestically and internationally.
The Abu Sayyaf group was having the same intention with the MILF in its
separation from the MNLF membership. It was started by group of people (Abdul
Razaq Djaljalani which was then be the leader, was one of them) that also
disappointed by the Misuari’s leadership and the result of the Tripoli Agreement
1976. But Abu Sayyaf was a more unique in its movement. It was different from the
MNLF and the MILF for it prefers to run its movement more radically and tend to be
underground. This group’s style of rebellion was in the form of foreign civilian
59 http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/Mindanao-Landfs.htm (accessed on: May, 29 2008 / 20:57)
60 Reuters, 12/13/9561 UPI, 04/10/96
59
kidnapping, bank-raid, and church bombing, and it is believed to have relation with
the Al-Qaeda.
Around 200 Muslim rebels, reportedly members of Abu Sayyaf, raid three banks and attacks buildings and civilians in the town of Ipil on Mindanao Island. Authorities state that over 45 people are killed and another 40 injured…62
Gun battles between security forces and Abu Sayyaf rebels on Basilan Island result in the deaths of 15 rebels and 7 soldiers. Officials state that Abu Sayyaf has links with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef who is on trial in New York in connection with the bombing of the World Trade Center building.63
62 Reuters, 04/05/9563 ibid., 06/07/95
60
CHAPTER IV
FACTORS THAT CAUSED THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MNLF TOOK PLACE
One of the interesting points to study conflict and negotiation was lie on the
politics circled it. As explained in the previous chapter, there are factors and
reasons that difficult the running of negotiation and peace process between the
GRP and the MNLF. These difficulties (experience of negotiation as a trap,
the complexity of conflict, and the stronger the hawkish group) were actually
enough to prove that the negotiation and peace process in the Mindanao was
not yet ripe / ready to be effort. But in this case, in fact, the process of the
FPA was actually being monopolized by the main actors of the both
conflicting parties, Nur Misuari and President Ramos, for their own political
interests. As an article said:
Participation of a critical mass of constituent, from various sectors that have a stake in the conflict, was also absent in the process. Inputs from civil society groups have largely been ignored in the 1996 peace process. This showed that the parties to the signing of the agreement were oblivious of a critical factor in the success of a peace process: wide public participation. For a peace process to succeed, it must be a public peace process.64
This was also agreed at least by Amina Rasul, by stating it in her presentation:
64Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007.(unpublished)
61
The Politics of Disagreement: Philippine Congress had minimal involvement in the negotiations, but had a central role in its implementation. Congressmen opposed the Interim Agreement. The Senate agreed to support the agreement only if amendments would be introduced, which dilute the powers and autonomy of institutions to be set up under Phase I of the agreement. Politicians, led by Senators, even filed a 54-page petition asking the Supreme Court to nullify the Agreement.65
So at this point, we will go to discuss about what was actually happen
between these two actors so that they finally sign the Final Peace Agreement 1996. In
this chapter, the writer will try to answer the question using the “ripeness” theory by
William Zartman, which has been explained in the first chapter. Based on the theory,
the signing of the Final Peace Agreement was finally took place because there were
Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and the Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO).
A. Mutually Hurting Stalemate
According to the theory, MHS is a situation where the both conflicting parties
were already stuck and could not find another way to betterment except for having
negotiation. In this case, why then the FPA was finally singed were, actually,
because the main actors of the both conflicting parties, Nur Misuari (from the MNLF)
and President Ramos (from the GRP) were experiencing various declines. If they
rejected the proposal to negotiation from the third parties (the OIC and several
Muslim Countries), they will got collapsed and will no longer have any position as
well as support in the domestic and International world. The facts were as follows:
65 Amina Rasul Presentasion_pdf
62
Why then Misuari agreed to sign the FPA was because his position and
support were in danger, he was experiencing various declines and pressures from
various parties. If he did not do the negotiation, he would get collapse and lose what
he has got these times.
Misuari’s popularity started to decrease after the signing of the Tripoli
Agreement 1976. Many of its members were then withdraw their support from the
MNLF caused by the disappointment over the Misuari’s leadership and the result of
the Tripoli Agreement. Many of the MNLF supporters were then on the contrary
transferred their support from the MNLF to the MILF and other Moro liberation
groups such as Abu Sayyaf. Sources indicate that the MNLF now has a force of
14,000 compared to around 21,000 in 1977 (Madale 1984, 185). The drop is likely
due to the creation of other Moro groups.66
Table 2Basis Region of the MILF
Resorce: Commo Carlos L Agustin, “Report on The State of Radicalization in Muslim Communities in the Philippines”, Regional Conference on The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia, 1 December 2005
66 http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Moros/moros.pdf (accessed on: July, 12 2008 / 15:53)
63
Table 3The Basis Region of Abu Sayyaf
Province/City % Affected Barangays
Identified Members
Identified Firearms
Sulu 46% 206 181Basilan 24% 176 180
Zamboanga City 18% 96 25Tawi-Tawi - 21 23
Average 33% 499 499
Resorce: Commo Carlos L Agustin, “Report on The State of Radicalization in Muslim Communities in the Philippines”, Regional Conference on The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia, 1 December 2005
These tables also indicate that the position of the MNLF was even more
decreasing, while the other Moro Groups (Abu Sayyaf and the MILF) increased in
term of basis region and, automatically, influence.
During the implementation of Marcos’ economic strategy toward the
Mindanao Island, Marcos also promotes and exploits the division happen among the
Bangsa Moro by stated that the MNLF was also the representation of Communist
Party just like the NPA, the aim was to discredit the MNLF image in the Islamic and
International world. This thing was then also played a role in the declining of MNLF
and Misuari image as the leader.
Marcos also tries to promote and exploit divisions among the Moros. In the early and mid-1970s, for example, the government tries to discredit the MNLF by focusing on Misuari’s ’Maoist tendencies'. There were minimal links between the MNLF and the communist New Peoples’Army and the MNLF generally distanced itself from the NPA.67
Misuari’s position over his governorship was also criticized.
…He led the MNLF with the hope of an independent Muslim state,
67 May 1988, 56
64
but with the influence of the OIC, he was left with a shaky autonomy. He was hailed as an instrumental figure in bringing an end to 24 years of war in 1996. Although considered a great leader by many Muslims, his term as Governor of the autonomous region was heavily criticized and conditions in Mindanao did not significantly improve. 68
Pressures to conduct negotiation also came from the third parties which have
being the main back up of the MNLF. The OIC, Libya, and Malaysia, were insist
Misuari to run peace talks and negotiation with the GRP, if he was rejected it, the
OIC and those Muslim Countries would withdraw their financial and military
assistance from the MNLF and would allocated it for another liberation Group.
MNLF also gain serious pressure if it’s remained to choose to confrontation. Very serious pressure came from the OIC, Libya, and Malaysia, these three actors was the strongest back up from the MNLD side in the Internationalization of Mindanao conflict. The three of them asked Misuari to start to run peace and diplomatic option in resolving the Mindanao conflict. If Misuari remained to choose to conflict then the probability to International support toward the MNLF’ struggle would be decrease or even lose or overflowed to another organization such as the BMLO.69
The GRP also insist Misuari to conduct negotiation by persuasive approach.
That the willing of Misuari to conducts negotiation would give him a governor
position in the ARMM. Misuari would be joined in the candidacy of regional election
for the ARMM by using the President’s political party.
MNLF leader Nur Misuari states that he will seek the governorship of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in elections this
68 Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (unpublished) 69 Ibid., page 48
65
September. He will run under a coalition with President Ramos’ Lakas Party. The MNLF leader says his decision signals the return of the entire MNLF to the constitutional fold.70
…and in the final phase, no less than the MNLF Chairman took the radical step of accepting the GRP offer to run as candidate for ARMM Governor in the 1996 regional elections, paving the way for a political compromise that led to the signing of the Agreement.71
In 1986, Misuari was reported to gives up the demand for independence after popular
pressures. This was analyzed as the pressures given by the third Parties and also the
GRP.
Pressure from the OIC and others does lead Marcos to try to negotiate a deal. But a lack of commitment from Marcos and the idealistic demands of the MNLF lead to the breakdown of talks.72
The second Bangsa Moro Congress is held. Reports reveal that Misuari concedes to popular pressure and gives up the demand for independence.73
The pressure from the mediators which strongly gave an option to the MNLF
as the only representation of the Muslim Mindanao in the middle of numbers of
Mindanao liberation groups was narrowing the MNLF choice. If the MNLF remain in
conflict with the GRP, there was tendency that the International support toward the
MNLF would be transferred to another actor. 74
70 Reuters, 07/12/9671 Iribani, Abraham: (2006) “Give Peace a Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks”. Magbassa Kita Foundation /
The Philippines Council for Islam and Democracy. The Philippines Press ( page 337)72 May 1988, 6073 Ibid., 1988, 5974 Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam
Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (page 48) (unpublished)
66
While from the President Ramos’ side, the declines were in the form of his
position as a President, where has was considered to be fail, or done little, in his job
to making improvements in the Country. If Ramos was rejected the negotiation, he
would get collapsed and threaten his legitimacy as a President. Ramos’ jargon in the
Presidency election was the economic betterment and development, but an article in
the reviewing Ramos presidency by International Woman’s Right stated;
Despite the promise of "Philippines 2000" and four years of macro-economics growth, a greater percentage of Filipinos live in poverty than in the other countries of Southeast Asia. President Ramos' liberalizing and deregulating measures have been attacked by many groups as "anti-poor." The struggle between social welfare and wealth-creation pervades every political and economic debate in the Philippines.75
Corruption and nepotism were also remaining in the Ramos administration.
Faced with the task of solving the problems Aquino had failed to solve, Ramos had little success. In economic policy he attacked the monopolies and cartels, especially in telecommunications, yet allegations of corruption and nepotism were leveled at his own government.76
The Estrada’s assassination effort linked by Ramos’s Anti-Crime Commission
activities in the aim to alleviate corruption, to realize order and stating law, was then
on the contrary; invite the International attention toward the acute law and order
problems in the Country. The President’s new law-enforcement in combating crime
as the prior focused was even rejected by the Congress for it was feared to be the
75 http://iwraw.igc.org/publications/countries/philippines.htm (accessed on: June, 14, 2008 20:04)Ramos was implementing an IMF - World Bank prescribed reform program, called "Philippines 2000," which aims to convert the country's agrarian-based economy into an industrial, market-driven one. The government is attempting to attract foreign investment through legal and fiscal reforms, keeping wages and union activity low, and expanding export processing zones, with garments and electronics constituting fifty percent of Philippine exports.76 http://sbs.com.au/theworldnews/Worldguide/index.php3?country=159&header=4 (accessed on: June, 14, 2008 / 21:19)
67
degeneration of Marcos’ authoritarian.
Such initiatives, however, were not successful. In Apr. 1993 an assassination attempt on Vice-Pres. Estrada, linked to his anti-crime activities, focused international attention on the country’s acute law and order problems. Kidnappings for ransom had become a regular occurrence, with the security forces themselves believed to be involved. Aware that the law and order problem could imperil foreign investment, Pres. Ramos made the fight against crime a priority. However, Congress rejected a tough new law-enforcement bill in early 1996 as too draconian and a regression to the authoritarian days of Marcos.77
In 1997, Ramos decided to amend the constitution arranging about the only-
one-time presidency position in the Country. This statement drew controversies from
various parties even before it was run, because Ramos was worried to be an
authoritarian, just like Marcos. This action was automatically declined Ramos’
position and support from the Philippines political life.
Ramos’ Popularity fell somewhat in 1997 when it appeared he would seek a second term by amending the country’s constitution, which expressly forbids a presidential incumbent from serving more than a single term of office. This was a sensitive issue for most Filipinos, since Marcos suspended the constitution for the same reason in 1972. After opposition from the Supreme Court, the Catholic Church and many others, Ramos backed down and ruled out seeking an extension of his term.78
Opponents of charter change say the amendments threaten the Philippines' young democracy by setting a bad precedent, opening the democratic constitution to other changes, and distracting the government at a time when it needs to respond to an Asia-wide currency crisis.79
77 Ibid., 78 Ibid.,79 http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19970921&slug=2561739 (accessed on: June,14 2008 / 22:03)
68
The declines of Ramos position was even worsened by a media report which
discover that actually, several bombings were launched in order to threaten the
protesters of the amendment. However, the amendment was undone.
Businesses, media outlets and Sin's office have received dozens of bomb threats in recent weeks in what is widely believed to be attempts to frighten people from attending the protest.80
At the first time elected, Ramos was trusted to be able to resolve the issues in
the Country, including the Mindanao conflict, for he was manner more proactively in
resolving the Mindanao conflict during the Aquino’s government. But years further,
the popularity of Ramos was decline sharply and significantly even reached to the
zero level. A national survey was showing it as follows:
Table 4
Resource: 071707-Philippines.ppt
80 Ibid.,
69
The pressure from the OIC was also experienced by the GRP. The OIC was
persuasively insisting the GRP to having negotiation with the MNLF.
…The OIC’s “persuasive power” was also used to pressure the GRP since 1974 to reach a negotiated political settlement with the MNLF. It came in the form of various OIC resolutions, OIC visits to the country, and even unconfirmed reports of arm supplies to the MNLF by some OIC member States.81
These third parties also threatening to stop their oil supply to the GRP, if the
GRP refuses to conduct negotiation with the MNLF.
B. Mutually Enticing Opportunity
So, with the condition above, the only way that seems acceptable, and has
been in the air additionally, was to negotiate. In this case, the choice to negotiation
was then run by the both conflicting parties (Nur Misuari and President Ramos), in
the aim to regain their position and support from the local society and the
International community, which ever leave them. If Misuari and Ramos conducting
negotiation, each of them would gain political, economic, and image-betterment
benefits as follows:
Politically, if Misuari was willing to have peace negotiation with the GRP, he
would gain a position as a Governor. President Ramos was promised Misuari to make
him the ARMM Governor through the President’s political party, Lakas, if Misuari
was willing to conduct negotiation with the GRP.
The operation of the new Regional Autonomous Government would 81 Iribani, Abraham: (2006) “Give Peace a Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks”. Magbassa Kita Foundation /
The Philippines Council for Islam and Democracy. The Philippines Press ( page 338)
70
mark Phase 2 of the peace formula. In the meantime, in addition to this formula inside the Peace Agreement, outside it was the GRP offer accepted by the MNLF for a politico-electoral alliance with the Ramos ruling party, which enabled the MNLF to gain control over the existing ARMM through elections with all-out administration support. Indeed, Misuari successfully ran unopposed for ARMM Regional Governor barely a week after the Peace Agreement, also in September 1996.82
While for President Ramos, the choice to run negotiation with the MNLF was
aimed to regain support, increase his power and legitimacy as a President. As
mentioned previously, the Ramos administration was achieving less Country’s
developments, and on the contrary, his policies and action toward corruption, crime,
and the treatment over the rebellion groups such as the NPA and the Moro groups
was draw controversies and disappointment from the GRP political elites, military,
and also his supporters, that decreased his popularity. His jargon in economic
improvement was also less succeeds proven by the amount of poverty, crime, and
prostitution that was still high. In addition, his plan to amend the Constitution was
even worsen his position and legitimacy as a president. With all of those declines,
negotiation with the MNLF was seems to be the very shining hope to improve his
condition. An article ever state that:
The most basic role of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in dealing with insurgency is to protect the sovereignty and Constitution of the country and maintain its stability. For any President, peace in Mindanao during his/her administration can be viewed as a major political victory.83
82 Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007.(unpublished)
83 Ibid.,
71
By conducting negotiation with the MNLF, he hoped to save his position,
increase the legitimacy over his Presidency, and regain the support.
Economically, the both parties would gain financial aids if they agreed to
conduct negotiation proposed by the third parties. For Misuari, he would gain
financial Aids from the GRP and the International Community such as the ODA, the
World Bank, and the USAID. A presentation by Amina Rasul showed several
evidences regarding the financial aids that would receive by the MNLF following the
signing of the Final Peace Agreement with the GRP.
The provision by the govt. of development assistance amounting to P67.88 billion from 1996-2000 and the facilitation of the channeling of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), for ARMM and the SZOPAD Social Fund.84
According to NEDA’s ODA Monitoring System, $87.4-million worth of on-going ODA Loans directly benefiting ARMM. 1. $55.2-million ARMM Social Fund Project. 2. $32.2-million Central Mindanao Road Project. Another $515-million worth of loans in 5 projects of which provinces of ARMM are part.85
The World Bank for example has completed its SZOPAD Social Fund Project ($21.5-million, around half of which came from OPEC and Japan) and the Mindanao Rural Development Project (MRDP1 at $1.25-million). It has the ARMM Social Fund ($33.6-million), and initiated the Mindanao Trust Fund with a $1.525-million infusion. MRDP2 has recently been approved with $83.7- million dollars, for all provinces in Mindanao.86
The USAID has given financial assistance in the basic education, conflict
mitigation in Mindanao, health, environment and energy, and economic growth and
84 Amina Rasul Presentasion_pdf85 Ibid.,86 Ibid.,
72
governance aspect. USAID has given a total of $292-million to Mindanao from 1996-
2006.87
Ibirani also stated that the OIC was also will provide financial aids if Misuari
was agreed to conduct the peace negotiation with the GRP.
This “persuasive power” of the OIC came with what Zartman and Touval also called “side payment.’ It was addressed to both parties in the form of “guarantees or financial aid in accomplishing changes required by the agreement.” This was made very clear by the OIC from the very start of the talks. At the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1996, the OIC official announced from its headquarters in Saudi Arabia a financial aid of US$ 16 Million to help improve health and education facilities in the Autonomous Region. The “side payment” would make the agreement more attractive to both parties.88
In the Ramos side, he would also gain financial aids from the International
Community. Conflict with the MNLF, has spent huge numbers of cost and lost
whether in term of lives, financial, infrastructures, also psychological damage. An
electronic article reported that “By the time the Agreement was signed, the war is
estimated to have cost the GRP over $3 billion since it began in 1972.”89 A thesis of
Surwandono also quotes a speech on war cost experienced by the GRP during its
conflict with the MNLF.
Available data from the Armed Forces of the Philippines indicates that over a period of 26 years since 1970, more than 100.000 persons were killed in the conflict in the southern Philippines. The government suffered about 20% of casualties; the rebels more than 50%; while civilians caught in the crossfire came to about 20% of
87 Ibid.,88 Iribani, Abraham: (2006) “Give Peace a Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks”. Magbassa Kita Foundation /
The Philippines Council for Islam and Democracy. The Philippines Press ( page 338)89 http://www.ices.lk/publications/esr/articles_jul99/ESR-Philippines.pdf. (access on: July, 18, 2008 / 19:51)
73
total casualties. About 55.000 persons were wounded, not counting those from the rebel side. From 1970 to 1976 alone, an average of 18 people was slain everyday. All in all, the AFP has spent about 73 billion pesos I connection with the Mindanao conflict since 1970; or an average of 40% of its annual budget. If this figure could be multiplied by the inflation rate over the years, it is truly a gargantuan expense. Presently, about 30% of the budget of the Philippines Air Forces is pent in Mindanao; so is 40%of our naval budget and 60% of our Army Budget.90
In its official report, the government stated:
The government says that it has spent US $2.78 billion during the last 26 years in its conflict with the Moros. It also states that of the 100.000 recorded casualties, half were Moro rebels while government troops accounted for 30% and innocent civilians are the remaining 20%.91
So by the giving of the financial aids, the GRP hope to be able to rebuild the
infrastructure and damages caused by the conflict.
The financial aids that would be given to the Mindanao Island, actually, were
not directly delivered there, but most of them would through the office of the GRP
firstly, as stated in the Amina Rasul presentation. From data could be found by the
writer regarding the aids activities in the Philippines, the donators were the Australia
with its AUSAID, the UNICEF, the WHO, and the World Bank, which have been
continuously assisting the Philippines to run its improvements and developments. 92
Support to the Mindanao Peace and Development Process. The signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Philippines (GOP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) paved the way for greater Australian involvement in Mindanao. A major initiative supported by Australia was the GOP-
90 Surwandono, “Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. ( Page 46) (unpublished)
91 Xinhua News Agency. July,30,199692 http://www.australia.com.ph/mnla/ausaidphil.html (accessed on: June,18,2008 / 07:00 pm)
74
UN Multi-Donor Program. With an Australian grant of A$17.2 million, Australia was the single largest donor to this program.93
Quoted from the research report on “the Dynamic of Mindanao Conflict,”
these donors then used by President Ramos to make various improvements. The
funds were then being corrupted by the President to be used to pay the President’s
image-betterment efforts. 94
From the image-betterment point of view, these two actors would regain the
support and legitimacy over their each other position, from the domestic and
International Community, for each of them has proven to be able to resolve the
Mindanao conflict in the peace way. For Misuari, other than to regain support, the
OIC was convincing him that he and the MNLF would remain to be the one and only
representative of the Bangsa Moro in the International level; none would replace that
only if Misuari would sign Peace Agreement with the GRP. While for Ramos, the
signing of Peace Agreement with the MNLF was meant to help his image-recovery
effort pertaining to his administration achievements. This image-betterment was then
proven by the giving of award, from the United Nation though it’s UNESCO, to
appreciate them (Ramos and Misuari) as the peacemakers.
…That is why I am deeply grateful for this award that the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have bestowed on Governor Misuari and myself; especially since it bears the name of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who embodied for so many people humankind’s longing for peace and
93 http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/cbrief.cfm?DCon=1148_8702_9418_7487_8517&CountryID=31 (access on: June,18,2008 / 06:55 pm)
94 Surwandono,“Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao)” Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007. (Unpublished)
75
brotherhood.95
So at the end, the Final Peace Agreement then signed by the both parties, Nur
Misuari and President Ramos in Sept 2nd 1996 in Manila, witnessed by the OIC
Secretary General Hamid Algabid and the representation of several Muslim
Countries.
95 http://www.unesco.org/prixfhboigny/le_prix/laureats/1997/ang/ramos.htm (accessed on: June,18,2008 / 06:39 pm)
76
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Mindanao conflict was started in the time of Spain colonization in 1521; its
aim was to widen the colonial area and Catholicism. Spain was used violation and
military forces in its effort to conquer the Island and the society, which was why the
Spain regime was, get nothing except the foot stand. In 1989, Spain was defeated by
the United State in the “Perang Pantai Manila”, Spain were then forced to surrender
all of its colonial regions to the US in the Paris Agreement. The second wave of
colonization in Mindanao was replaced by the US. But differed from the Spain, the
US was used softness to attract the Mindanao society’s attention. It used political
penetration and concessions to win the siding of the Mindanao elites and Sultans. In
the 1935, the Philippines Commonwealth was established which unilaterally transfer
the authorization of the Mindanao from the US to the Philippines which were refused
by the Mindanao society, for then they conducted rebellion to the GRP demanded for
independence. The political Organization then established to increase the level of
Bangsa Moro rebellion to be an armed forces rebellion. Later on, the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) lead by Nur Misuari, was then known to be official
representative of the Bangsa Moro.
The bloodiest era in the Mindanao conflict was in the time of President
Marcos. His implementation of Martial law toward separatist movement in the
Mindanao causing enormous numbers of killings, torturing, and infrastructure
77
damages so that created misery and trauma for the Mindanao society, which then
inspired Nur Misuari to internationalize the conflict. Attention the gained from the
OIC and several Muslim Countries. These third parties then proposed peace way to
resolve the Mindanao conflict. As the result, Tripoli Agreement 1976 was signed by
the MNLF and the GRP. The conflict was decrease after the signing of the Tripoli
Agreement, but conflict inside the MNLF bodies was on the contrary break down.
Division happens among the MNLF member caused by difference objective and
dissatisfaction over the Misuari’s leadership and the result of the Tripoli Agreement.
The separation then leads to the establishment of the MILF and Abu Sayyaf group.
Armed conflict was reoccurred because Marcos considered betraying the
content of the Tripoli Agreement by conducting plebiscite over the region being
agreed before. Viewing this, the third party were rearranged the more comprehensive
formula to settle the conflict in Mindanao. The OIC then established the Quadripartite
Commission that tasked to investigate the Mindanao conflict and approach the both
conflicting parties to go the negotiation table. After many times of meeting and
accord signings, the Final Peace Agreement then took place in Malacanang Palace
signed by Nur Misuari and President Ramos in Sept 2nd 1996.
The core problem in this final paper was the fact that actually there were more
things to impede the conducting of the peace negotiation than the things that support
the promise of the improved condition by the peace agreement. The experiences of
negotiation as a trap, the complexity of the conflict, and the stronger the hawkish
group was actually enough to prove that the FPA was not ready yet to be signed. But
78
how come the FPA 1996 then, however, be signed. The answer was then; lie on the
actors played it. As implementing the Zartman theory, the FPA was then singed
because the both conflicting parties, Misuari and President Ramos, were experiencing
break down and declines. Misuari was leaved by his supporters for he considered fail
or disappointing, to struggle the Mindanao status. He also got ignored by the GRP for
his declined support and legitimacy among the Bangsa Moro. And he got the
International pressures such as the OIC and several Muslim Countries which threaten
to stop their assistance to the MNLF, if Misuari choose to remain in conflict and
refuse to conduct negotiation with the GRP. These going-down phenomena were
insist Misuari to sign the Peace Agreement in order to defend his position. While
Ramos, he was experiencing the decreasing of legitimacy from the national and
International world for many failures during his administration. His jargon on the
economic improvement was less work proven by the corruption, poverty, and crime
was that was still high during his position. His power was also decreased among the
political elites, the military, and his supporters, for he considered too soft in treating
the separatist movement such as the NPA and the Mindanao rebellion groups. His
plan to amend the constitution in order to be able to take hold of the next Presidency
position once again, was derived controversy and rejection from various parties
which then even worsen his position. These conditions then insist him to conduct
negotiation with the MNLF, once again, in order to defend his position.
If they refuse to go to the negotiation table, they would get collapse and loss
all they have previously. But if they would, besides they will get survived, they will
79
get many kinds of additional and gaining whether politically, economically, and re-
acknowledgement from the domestic and International Community for their success.
Misuari would gain the ARMM Governor position, financial aids from the
International Community to build and develop the region, and regain his good-image
as the peacemaker. So would the President Ramos, the signing of the FPA would help
him to recover his image over his failures during his administration, he would also
gain financial assistance from the International Community, and regain his legitimacy
as a succeed president that able to resolve the Mindanao conflict in the peace way,
which then ended by the giving of peacemaker-award from UNESCO to both the
President Ramos and Nur Misuari.
80
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