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“Thugs-for-Hire”:StateCoercionand“EverydayRepression”inChina

LynetteH.Ong

May,18,2015

Abstract

Thispaperexamines“thugs-for-hire”asaformofstatecoercionandeverydayrepression.Third-partyviolenceiscommonlydeployedbythestatetoevicthomeownersandtodealwithpetitionersandprotestorsinChina.Thisstudycontributestothestaterepressionliteraturebyelaboratingtheroleofthugsandgangstersasarepressivemeasure.Violenceiseffectiveandefficientinimplementingunpopularandillegalpolicies.Third-partyviolenceasaformofprivatizedcovertrepressionalsoallowsthestatetoevaderesponsibilityandtomaintainaveneeroflegitimacy.However,itcomesatacosttoregimelegitimacyandtrustingovernment.Borrowedviolencebolstersonlytheregime’sdespoticpowerandmakesnocontributiontostrengthenitsinfrastructuralcapacitytogovern.ItwillultimatelyweakenregimedurabilityinChina.Keywords:“Thugs-for-hire”,thugs,coercion,violence,China.Prepared for “A Workshop on CollectiveProtestandStateGovernanceinChina’sXiJinpingEra,Harvard-Yenching Institute”, Harvard University on May 18, 2015. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the University of Michigan China Center Noon Lecture Series, and the University of Columbia Workshop on Chinese Politics.

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I. Introduction

IntheheightoftheOccupyCentralprotestsinHongKonginOctober2014,where

thousandsofresidentspeacefullyoccupiedthestreetstodemanduniversalsuffrage,

unidentifiedthugsandgoonsweredeployedtodismantlebarricades,teardown

posters,andassaultpeacefulprotestors.Rumorsspeculatedthatthethugswere

hiredbythepro-BeijingHongKongSARgovernmenttointimidateprotestorsinto

givinguptheiractivism.Someofthegangsterswerereportedtohavelinkswiththe

undergroundcriminalgroupsortriadsinHongKong,whileotherswerehiredfrom

theneighboringGuangdongprovinceinChina.i

ThisincidentparallelsapervasivephenomenoninmainlandChina—thugsand

gangstersareregularlyhiredbytheChinesestatetorepresscitizensandcoerce

themintocomplyingwithitspolicies.Thugsarerecruitedtoevicthomeownersin

demolitionprojectsandtodislodgefarmersinurbanizationandindustrial

developments.Thestatealsoregularlydeploysthird-partyviolencetointercept

petitionerswhotrytolodgepetitionswiththecentralauthorityandthreaten

activistswhotaketheirgrievancestothestreets.Thestateco-optstheextralegal

coerciveforceofthethugswhenimplementingunpopularandillegalpoliciesand

whentakingrepressiveactions.Thesehiredthugsaredefinedprimarilybytheuse

ofviolenceinexecution.Thispaperbringsintofocusthenatureofthe“thugs-for-

hire”,theirrelationshipswiththestate,andtheimplicationsofthisrelationshipfor

statepowerandregimelegitimacy.

Thisstudycontributestotheliteratureonstaterepressionbyaugmentingthe

discussionoftheuseofthugsandgangstersasarepressivemeasure.Repressionis

actionintendedtoraisethecontender’scostofcollectiveaction(Tilly1978).iiMost

studiesofrepressionfocusonovertactionscarriedoutbyagentsconnectedwith

nationalpoliticalelites(Earl2003).AsChristianDavenport(2007)andJenniferEarl

(2003,2011)havecorrectlynoted,wecurrentlyknowverylittleaboutcovert

repressivemeasuresorthecircumstancesunderwhichthestatedeploysthem.This

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paperarguesthathiredthugsarebestperceivedasaformofprivatizedcovert

violentrepression.Theyofferthestateadistinctadvantagebyallowingthestateto

evaderesponsibilityandmaintainaveneeroflegitimacy—intheeyesofeither

higherauthorities(withinamulti-levelgovernment)ortheinternational

community.Awidevarietyofcountriesrangingfromeconomicallydevelopedand

underdevelopedstates,autocraciesandproceduraldemocraciestothosereliant

uponexternalaidshaverelieduponprivatizedstateviolencetofightwarsandcarry

outrepressiveactions(Carey,Mitchell,andLowe2013;Alvarez2006;Kirschke

2000;Roessler2005;Mazzei2009).

Alargenumberofscholarlyworkshaveinvestigatedthequestionofregime

durabilityoftheChineseCommunistPartyfromvariousperspectives.These

perspectivesincludepoliticalparticipation(Shi1997),foreigndirectinvestment

(Gallagher2002),co-optationofthemiddleclassandprivateentrepreneurs

(Dickson2006;Tsai2006),theroleofpeople’scongresses(Manion2008),cadre

evaluationsystemanddecentralizedauthoritarianism(Landry2008),mediaand

informationcontrol(StockmannandGallagher2011),socialmobilization

perspectives(O’BrienandLi2006;Lorentzen2013),andcoerciveinstitutions(Cai

2008;Y.Wang2014).Thisstudyjoinsthisvastbodyofliteraturetoexplainhowthe

ChineseCommunistregimeaugmentsitscoercivepowerbyrelyingonviolent

extralegalthird-partyagentstocarryouteveryday(unpopular)policy

implementationandrepression.However,thispaperdivergesfromtheexisting

bodyofliteratureontheimplicationoftheexpandedcoercivepower.While

privatizedstateviolencemayhelptheregimetocoercecitizensintocomplianceand

acquiescenceintheshort-term,thiscomesatacosttoregimelegitimacyandtrustin

government.Itisdetrimentaltoregimedurabilityinthelongrun.

Theprimarydatainthepaperweredrawnfromapproximately100interviews

conductedwithvillagersandresidentsaffectedbyhousingdemolitionandland

expropriationintheprovincesofHenan,Sichuan,YunnanandAnhuiovertheperiod

2011-14.Duringavisittotheinfamous“petitionvillage”inBeijinginthesummerof

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2014,theauthorsspoketopetitionerswhotraveledfromafartochanneltheir

grievancesthroughtheofficialpetitionsystem.ThepaperalsodrawsonChinese-

languagescholarlyliteratureandmediareportsassecondaryevidence.

Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.SectionIIsituates“thugs-for-hire”inthecontext

oftheliteratureonorganizedcriminals.Thesehiredthugs,asagentsofthestate,are

distinctfromGambetta’sSicilianMafiosiorVolkov’s“violententrepreneurs”in

Russia.Demandfortheserviceofhiredthugsispremisedupontheefficiencyand

effectivenessofthird-partyviolence.SectionIIIengagestheliteratureonstate

repression,particularlythatregardingwhysomestateschooseprivatizedstate

violenceasarepressivetool.Likeengagingparamilitaries,militiasandvigilantesto

fightwars,hiredthugsoffertheadvantageofreducedliability.Statescan

strategicallymanipulatetheargumentofmoralhazard,stemmingfromdelegation

ofauthority,totheiradvantageinordertoavoidaccountabilityfortheiractions.We

showhowthisstrategyhasbeensimilarlyimplementedbythelocalandcentral

governmentsinChina.Inspiteofthat,covertstaterepressionleadstofalling

legitimacyandtrustingovernment.Itnecessitatesfurtherstatedeploymentof

third-partyviolencetoexecutepoliciesandtorepress,andtherefore,itexacerbates

existingstateweakness.Thelastsectionconcludesthestudy.

II. ViolentAgentsinComparativePerspective

Whoarethese“thugs-for-hire”?Whatservicesdotheyprovide?Whyistherea

demandfortheirservice?Howaretheydifferentfromothercriminalgroups?This

sectionshedslightonthesefundamentalidentityquestionsbycomparingthe

“thugs-for-hire”withsimilarviolentagentsandcriminalgroups.

“Thugs-for-hire”refertoruffians,hooligans,thugsandgangsters,aswellas

legalizedprofessionalizedwhorenderviolenceasaformofserviceforprofitorin

exchangeforin-kindbenefits.Itissimilartotheconceptof“violententrepreneurs”

firstcoinedbyVolkov(2002a)todescribebusinessesthatconvertedorganized

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forceorviolenceintoprofit-makingenterprisesinRussiainthelate1980sand

1990s.However,thugs-for-hireinChinaarenotentirelythesameasVolkov’s

“violententrepreneurs”.Aswewillillustrate,theyemergefromdifferentneeds,and

theyprovidedifferentiatedservice.

ThebreakdownoftheSovietsystemerodedtheruleoflawandotherinstitutions

necessaryforbusinessestofunctioninYeltsin’sRussia.Politicaltransitioncorroded

thebasicinstitutionsforamarketeconomytofunction—namely,publicsecurity,

contractenforcement,disputesettlementmechanisms,andtransactioninsurance,

usuallysuppliedbythepoliceandthecourtsystem(Volkov2002b).The“violent

entrepreneurs”steppedintosupplybusinesseswithprotectionandalternative

mechanismsofsettlingdisputesandenforcingcontractsbycoercivemeans.By

providingkrysha,aRussianconceptdenoting“roofs”,whichloweredtransaction

costsandminimizedoperationalrisks,theseentrepreneursfacilitatedsmooth

runningofbusinesses(Volkov2002b).TheideadatesbacktoGambetta(1996),who

attributestheemergenceoftheSicilianmafia—abusinessproviderofprivate

protection—tolowsocialtrustandweakstateinstitutionsthatwereincapableof

providingprotectiontothecitizens.Russia’stransitionaleconomyhadsimilar

formativeconditionsformafiasastheearlycapitalSicily(Varese2001).Similar

reasoninghasbeenappliedtothemafiagroupYakuzainJapan(Hill2006).The

Mafiosiand“violententrepreneurs”alikebothcameabouttofilltheinstitutional

vacuumofweakstates.

Organizedcrimecanbedividedintovarioustypes.Organizedcrime,anall-

encompassingtermforallcrimesthatareorganized(Schelling1984),isan

organizationalattempttoregulateandcontroltheproductionanddistributionofan

illegalcommodityorservice(Varese2010,14).TheMafiosiisaparticulartypeof

organizedcrime,asitattemptstoregulateandcontroloneservice:thesupplyof

privateprotection(Gambetta1996).Theuseofcoercionandviolencebythemafia

isthekeytoestablishingitselfasacredibleprotector(Gambetta1996,40).

Sometimes,inordertocreateaneedforprivateprotection,themafiawillfirst

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deployviolentintimidation.Theexistenceofviolentthreatswillbegetademandfor

privateprotection.

“Thugs-for-hire”isalsoasubsetoforganizedcrime.However,thesethugsare

agentsofthemasterswhopayfortheirservices.Theassociationsarebasedupon

principal-agentrelationships.Thugs,asagents,renderservicesrangingfromviolent

threats,harassment,andbeatingstophysicalabusesandmurders.Thecommon

denominatoroftheseservicesistheuseofcoerciveforceintheirexecution.The

scopeofserviceisthereforebroaderthantheprovisionofprivateprotectionoffered

bytheMafiosi.Moreimportantly,becausethesethugsareagentsofthepaying

masters,theiractivitiesarepremisedonmeetingtheobjectivesoftheirmasters,

ratherthanthoseoftheirown.

Tobesure,thisdoesnotmeanMafiosiasdepictedbyGambettaandVolkovdonot

existinChina.Theydo,andtheyindeedthriveinsomeregions.AsWang(2011)has

documented,mafiasinChinahelpsettledisputes,suchasneighborhoodquarrels,

trafficaccidents,andpropertydisputes.iiiTheyworklike“shadow”policewhen

policeofficialsdonothavethecapabilitiestohandletherisingnumberofcivil

disputes.Theyalsoserveasa“shadow”judicialsystemwhenthecourtsfailto

protectpropertyrightsandenforcecontracts.Additionally,undergroundbanks,

gamblinghousesandotherillegalestablishmentsalsousemafiastocollectdebts

andtoprotecttheirbusinessesthatfalloutsidethepurviewoftheformalcourtand

policeinstitutions.ivInstead,thisstudyfocusesontheunder-studiedphenomenonof

state-hiredthugs.

Efficiencyandeffectivenessofthird-partyviolence

Whydostatesprefertoengagehiredthugsinsteadoftheirowncoerciveapparatus

inexecution?Mafiasandalltheviolentagentsalikearedefinedbythecentralityof

violenceintheiractions.Thelocalstate,asthebuyerofsuchservicesinChina,

perceivesvalueinviolenceasthemostefficientandeffectivemeansofexecuting

someactions.Thestatedoesnotutilizeviolenceallthetime,butonlyindealingwith

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certaincitizengroupsandintheexecutionofselectedtasks.Thestate’suseof

violenceiscommonwhencitizensdonotcomplywithillegalorunreasonablestate

directivesorpoliciesaswellasinstaterepressionofcitizens’actions.Simplyput,

violenceisexpedientinpushingthroughunpopularstatepoliciesandillegal

directivesandforrepressionpurposes.Violenceexecutedbythirdparties,fromthe

buyerorstate’sperspective,hastheaddedadvantageofaccountabilityevasion.We

willaddressthelastpointinthenextsection.

HiredthugsaremostfrequentlyrecruitedbytheChinesestatetobeinvolvedin

housingdemolitionandevictions,landexpropriations,collectionoftaxesandillegal

fees,anddealingwithprotestorsandcitizenactivists.vThe1994fiscal

recentralizationsignificantlyreducedlocalgovernments’shareofrevenue,while

keepingtheirshareofexpendituresunchanged.(TsuiandWang2004;Shueand

Wong2007).Withskyrocketinglandandrealestatepricesinthelasttwodecades,

land-salesrevenue,whichisnotsubjecttosharingwiththehigher-levelauthorities,

hasbecomethemajorcontributortotherevenuestreamsoflocalandmunicipal

governments.viLocalgovernmentsarethereforestronglyincentivizedto

expropriatelandeithertobuildindustrialzonesandcommercialrealestateorfor

infrastructurepurposes.Inrecentyears,localgovernmentshavealsobeen

feverishlyclearingexisting“urbanvillages”(chengzhongcun)orother“urbanslums”

tomakewayfornewconstructionaslandhasbecomescarcer.Urbanprojectsand

realestatedevelopmentsalsogeneraterevenuefrombusinesstaxespaidbyservice

industries,whichisataxlargelyexclusivetolocalgovernments(Tao2014).

Thisstrongrevenuedriveresultsinhastygovernmentdevelopmentpolicyactions

andsometimesevenillegalactions.Localgovernmentsfacetightdeadlinesto

completeurbandevelopmentprojectsbecausethecostsofresettlingresidents,

interestfrombankloans,andopportunitycostsofunsoldrealestateproperties

increaseovertime.Citizens’resistancetohousingdemolitionandland

expropriationislargelyduetoloworunreasonablemonetarycompensation.Others

refusetocomplybecauseofinferiorresettlementhousing,corruptionand

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embezzlementbyofficials,andproceduralconcerns,suchaslackofnoticeor

consultationovertheevictionprocess.Tosuccessfullyimplementtheseprojects,

(forced)consentoftheentirecommunityisoftenrequired.Anurbandevelopment

projectstallsifonlyafewfamiliesoutofanentirevillageorneighborhoodrefuseto

vacatetheirproperties.Therefore,hiredviolenceprovidesaswiftandeffective

solutiontothedeadlocks.Othertimes,townshiporvillageofficialsmaydecideto

expropriatefarmlandwithouthigher-levelapprovalsbecausetheywantto

personallypocketalargershareoftheproceeds.viiWhenillegalactionstakeplace,

officialsareunabletoproduceofficialevictionnotices,andtheiractionswill

encounterevenfiercerresistancefromvillagers.Violencebecomesanevenmore

necessarymeansofeffectuatingacquiescenceintheseillicitcases.

Therearealwayssomeintransigenthouseholdswhorefusetocomplyregardlessof

thelevelofcompensationoranywrongdoingoflocalofficials.Inanycase,whether

ornottheintransigenceisjustified,the“nailhouseholds”(dingzihu)areparticularly

vexatiousforlocalauthorities.Deploymentofstrong-armtacticsandcoerciveforces

arebothefficientandeffectiveinobtainingacquiesce.Aprominentresearcheratthe

ChineseAcademyofSocialSciences,YuJianrong,hasestimatedthat90percentallof

demolitionandrelocationcasesinvolvethugviolence(Yu2009).

Belowisadescriptionofsomeofthestrong-armtacticsdescribedbythevillagersin

YunnanprovincewithwhomIconductedafocusgroupinterview.Thevillagers

havecollectivelyresistedseveredemolitionpressuresince2010(Villagersin

Yunnanprovince2012):

“Thefirstmeasurestaken(bythevillageauthority)werecuttingoff

waterandelectricitysuppliestohomes.Then,theysentthugstospray

paintourhouseswithintimidatingwords:‘Ifyourefusetomove,the

housewillbebulldozedwhileyouareasleep!’,and‘Thosewhodon’t

vacate,watchoutforyoursafety!’”(Boththreatswereindeedcarried

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out.Somevillagersfoundtheirhomesbeingbulldozedinthemiddle

ofthenight.Otherswerebeatenup.)

“Atnight,theydrovetrucksthroughthepaddiesandfarms,destroying

ourcropsandvegetables,killedourpoultry,andfedourdogspoison.”

“Theysetfiretomycourtyardbuiltwithteakwoodinthe19thcentury.

Fourgenerationsofmyfamilyhavelivedinthistraditional

quadranglehome.MylifewassparedonlybecauseIwasn’tathomeat

thetime”,saida76-yearoldmanwholedtheresistanceagainst

homedemolition.

“Thoseofuswhosubmittedapetitionletterwereparticularly

targeted.Theeldestdaughterofoneofthepetitionorganizerswas

badlybeatenbyabunchofthugswhenshereturnedfromworkone

night.Shewasleftunconsciousandhadtobehospitalizedforafew

weeks.”

InavillageinHenanprovincewherewehaveconductedfieldresearch,villagers

whohadsimilarviolentencountersspokeofruffians(xiaohunhun),whoareusually

unemployedyoungsters,hiredbythelocalgovernmentto“teardownhouses”and

“manhandlevillagers”.Thejobstheyarehiredtodorequirenospecificskills,aside

fromphysicalstrengthandsomeboldness.Violenceisusedforthepurposeof

disruptingvillagers’businesses,suchas“ransackingstores”,“tearingdown

billboards”,“lootingbusinesses”and“intimidatingcustomerswithvulgarlanguage”.

Whentheresidents’incomesourcesareseverelydisrupted,theyoftenhadno

choicebuttocomplywiththegovernment’sdemolitionnotice.Thethugsdonot

hesitatetouseforcetodealwiththe“nailhouseholds”whostubbornlydefendtheir

homesortheorganizersoftheresistance.Inthisrespect,third-partyviolenceisan

integralpartofthelocalgovernment’srepressivemachinery.

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Theidentitiesofthesecamouflage-donningthugsandgovernmentofficialswerefar

fromdistinct,asrecountedbysomeofourinformants.Insomeplaces,theycalled

themselves“patrolofficers”(xunfangrenyuan).Inotherplaces,theywerethe“law

enforcers”(zhifarenyuan)inchargeofimplementingthelocalauthority’s

demolitiondirectives,buttheycarriednoofficialpass.Inanycase,their

camouflageduniformsprovidethemwithapseudo-militaryorgovernmentsecurity

identity.Yet,onotheroccasions,theyseemedtobemoreintegratedwiththeformal

governmentbureaucracies.Thephysicalactsofdemolishinghousesareusually

carriedoutbylocalgovernments’“demolitionteams”or“demolitionoffices”.The

informantshavereportedthattheseteamsorofficesaremadeupofgovernment

officialsorvillagecadresandhiredthugs.Whiletherewasadivisionoflabor

betweenthetwo—thegovernmentorvillageofficialsprovideleadershipandlocal

knowledge,whilethethugsareinchargeofexecutingtheactions—itisnotalways

easyfortheinformantstodistinguishbetweenthem.Thisisnotleastbecauseallof

themidentifiedthemselvesaspartoftheofficialdemolitionunit.

InChina,amajorityoftheseviolentagentshavecriminalrecordsthatcreate

obstaclestotheiracquiringproperjobsandbeingreintegratedintosociety.These

thugstendtoberecruitedfromdifferentvillagesortownswithinthesameregions.

Theyarerelativelyfamiliarwiththelocalesandspeaklocaldialects,yettheyhave

anescaperouteiftheygetintotrouble.Outsidersalsohaveanadvantageofnot

beingrecognizabletothelocalsorsubjectsunderattack,whichisusefulinblame

shifting.Thethugsarenotparticularlywelleducated,andtheyhavenotreceived

anypreviousmilitaryorsecuritytraining.Becomingahiredthugisthereforea

meansofmakingalivingfortheseindividuals.Bywayofcontrast,thosewhojoined

theranksof“violententrepreneurs”inRussiawereformerpoliceorstatesecurity

officers,includingex-KGBofficers,whowerelookingtodiversifytheirincome

sourcesduetohighinflationorretrenchmentfromthestatesystem,asaresultof

theSovietcollapse(Volkov2002b,96-8).Inshort,violentagentsinChinaarenotas

professionallytrainedastheretiredstatesecurityofficersinRussia.

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Someinfamousundergroundkingpins,suchasQiaosiinHarbinandLiuYongin

Shenyang,madetheirfortunesbyofferinghiredthugservicestostateagentsin

demolitionandevictionprojects.Qiaosiwasknownasthe“undergroundmayor”in

thecityofHarbininnortheastChina.Hebeganmakingmoneyinthethugs-for-hire

businessin1987,whenthecityunderwenturbandevelopmentandrenewal.

Workingwithvariousconstructioncompanies,theybecamegovernment

contractorsindemolitionprojects.Hewouldorganizeandsenddemolitionteamsto

assisttheHarbinmunicipalgovernmentinrelocationworks.Theteamsweremade

upofhooligansandruffianswhoutilizedviolencetoeffectuateforcefulevictions.

Qiaosi’sbusinessestablishmentwassosuccessfulthatitdominatednearly80

percentofthedemolitionmarketinHarbinatthattime.Thereafter,hegrewhis

empirebybranchingoutintoconstruction,gambling,prostitutionandothervices.

However,itwaswiththugs-for-hireindemolitionprojectsthathisillegalempire

sprouted(Zhang2012).viiiWhenQiaosiwasputontrialinthemid-2000s,hehad

nearly100accomplices,andmorethan60policeofficerswhowereallegedtohave

beeninvolvedinhisringwereputunderinvestigation.

Qiaosi’ssuccesscouldbeattributedtohisabilitytosupplythevoidinmarket

demand.Inurbanrenewalprojects,demolitionandrelocationworksareoutsourced

tothese“professionalthugs”or“securitycompanies”thatemploythemosteffective

meanstoproducedesiredoutcome.Thestatecannotsenduniformedgovernment

officials,includingthepolice,toforcefullyevictresidentsfromtheirhomes,but

outsourcingittothirdpartiesmakesitpracticallyfeasible.Oftentimes,whenafew

“nailhouseholds”orstubbornshopownersrefusedtorelocate,theycanholdupthe

entireproject,imposingsignificantcostsintimeandinfinancialterms.Therefore,

outsourcingviolenceisalsocost-effectivebecauseitraisesprojectefficiencyand

lowersthecostsofurbandevelopmentforlocalgovernments.Whenjob

effectivenessandcostefficiencyareprioritizedaheadofthewelfareofcitizens,

hiredthugsbecomeanareawheregenuinemarketdemandexists.

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LiuYonginthecityofShenyangisanotherkingpinwhohadmadehisinitial

fortunesinthugs-for-hireservicessincethelate1980s.In1999,whenadrugstore

ownerfailedtoobeyanevictionorder,Liuorderedthugsarmedwithlethal

weaponstobreakintothedispensary,wheretheykilledthedutymanagerandsome

oftheemployees.Hehadsimilarlydeployedindiscriminateviolenceagainstother

evictees.Lootingsofproperties,physicalabusesandslayingofordinarycitizens

werewidelyobserved.WhenLiuwasarrestedinthelate1990s,theJiayangGroup,

thecompanyhefounded,hadventuredintolegalbusinesses,suchasclothing,food,

entertainment,andrealestatebusinesses.Liuwasalsoanelecteddeputyofthe

People’sCongressinShenyangmunicipality.ix

OtherprominentMafiosifiguresincludeHaoweiinChangchun,ZhouQiangin

Nanjing,andWangPinginChongqing.xTheytendedtoshareacommon

characteristicinthattheybegantheircriminalactivitieswiththugs-for-hireservices

inurbanrenewalprojects.Therudimentaryorganizations,oftenconsistingofa

handfulofarmedfighters,thugs,organgsters,thendevelopedintofull-scale

criminalorganizationswithwide-rangingbusinessinterests,includingarms

smuggling,gamblingandprostitution,andconstructionandrealestate,spanning

bothlegalandillegalrealms.Incriminalstudies,scholarshaveidentifiedacommon

patternofhoodlumsinChinaevolvingfromvagrantsandhooliganstoacriminal

underworldthroughaprocessofcontinuousdevelopment.xi

Beforetheabolitionofruraltaxesandfeesinthemid-2000s,localgovernmentsalso

engagedthugstohelptocollecttheseexactions.Notdissimilartocasesofhousing

demolitionandlandexpropriation,compliancewasvexatiousforlocalofficials.The

exactionswereoftenarbitrarilyimposedbygrassrootsgovernments—rangingfrom

theagriculturetaxandvariousagriculturalsurchargestofinesforviolatingtheone-

childpolicy,educationsurcharges,andmandatorycontributiontowardslocal

infrastructurebuilding—andcouldreachashighas30-40percentofafarm

household’stotalannualincome(Kennedy2002;Ong2012).Accordingly,third-

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partyviolencewasdeployedbecauseofitsefficiencyandeffectivenessinextracting

compliancefromthevillagers.xii

Theaboveanalysisillustratestheefficacyofborrowedviolenceinforcing

compliancewhenstatepoliciesareunpopularanditsactionsillegal.Separately,

violencealsoservesasanextremelyeffectiverepressivemeasure.Gangstersand

privatesecuritycompaniesarewidelyengagedbylocalgovernmentsto“intercept”

and“retrieve”(jiefang)petitionerswholodgecomplaintsoflocalofficial

malfeasancewiththecentralauthorityinBeijing.Thepetitionsystem,originatingin

theimperialtimes,allowedcommonerswrongedbylocalofficialstoseek

interventionfromtheImperialCourt.IncontemporaryChina,therightstopetition

areconstitutionallyenshrined.Althoughthecentralgovernmentintendsforthe

systemtoserveasagaugeforlocalmisconduct,italsosetstargetsforlocalcadres

toensurethatthenumberofpetitionsdoesnotspinoutofcontrol(Li,Liu,and

O’Brien2012).Petitionisa“vetotarget”(yipiaofojue)inlocalcadreevaluation.

Accordingly,ifapetitionweresuccessfullylodgedinBeijing,eveniftheprobability

ofpetitionsyieldingsuccessfuloutcomesisextremelylow,itwouldadverselyaffect

thecareerprospectsoflocalleaders.

Giventheenormouspressuretoquashpetitions,localofficialsmakealleffortsto

preventcitizensintheirjurisdictionsfromtakingtheirgrievancestoBeijing.This

createsademandforprofessionalinterceptors.Whilelocalgovernmentscouldsend

theirownofficialstodothejob,itmaynotbecost-effective,giventransportand

lodgingexpenses.Justasimportantly,localofficialsdonotknowthecityaswellas

theBeijing-basedprofessionalsdo.Professionalscanalsobemoreeffectivein

handlinganddealingwithaggrievedcitizens.Accordingly,localgovernments

outsourcetheworkof“intercepting”and“retrieving”petitionerstoBeijing-based

privatesecuritypersonnel.Thejobofthe“interceptors”istodeployallnecessary

meanstoensnarepetitionersbeforetheyreachthecentralpetitionbureauwhere

petitionsarefiled.Thesehiredviolentagentsregularlyassaultpetitioners,detain

themillegallyin“blackjails”or“blackhouses”,andthenhaulthembacktothe

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villages.Therearealsowidespreadreportsofrapesanddeathsofpetitionerswhile

incustody.xiii

Themosthighlypublicizedcaseofsuchprivatesecuritycompaniesistheinfamous

Anuyuandingsecuritycompany.TheBeijing-basedsecuritycompanywasfounded

byZhangJun,amiddle-schooleducatednativeofHebeiprovince.Hedecidedto

moveBeijinginthe1990sinorderto“makealiving”.Intheearlieryears,hetookon

variousoddjobsandhadadifficulttimeinBeijing.ThoughZhangwasaleaderof

thepeople’smilitiainthevillage,thesecuritypersonnelheemployeddidnotseem

tohaveanymilitaryorsecuritybackground.Theirprofileswerenotsignificantly

differentfromtheunemployedhooligans,thugsandgangstershiredfordemolition

projects.Thecompanymade8.6millionRMBinsalesrevenuein2007.Inthe

followingyear,thecompanyestablishedan“escort”departmenttoprovidesecurity

servicetolocalgovernmentsforhandlingpetitioners.Thoughitwasonlyoneoften

departmentsinthecompany,the“escort”businessprovedtobeextremelylucrative

anddrovethecompany’sgrossrevenueupto21millionRMBin2008(Linand

Zhang2010).

TheBeijinggovernmentengagedAnyuandingtoprovidesecurityprotectionfor

dignitariesduringthe2008SummerOlympicGames.Thecompanyalsowonseveral

awardsfromtheBeijingSecurityServicetradeassociationinrecognitionofits

“serviceexcellence”from2007to2009.Thismaybeanindicationofthecompany’s

scaleamongitspeersratherthananyformalrecognitionbytheBeijinggovernment.

However,itisclearthatitsservicestraversebetweenlegalandillegalareas.

Thecompanywassubjecttocriminalinvestigationin2010thatledtoZhang’s

convictionandimprisonment.Thiscameaboutwhenadozenpetitionersfrom

variouspartsofthecountrywhohadbeenabusedandillegallydetainedcollectively

pleadedtothemediatoexposetheirordeals.Thecompany’sbackgroundandits

abuseofpetitionersbecameanintensesubjectofinvestigativejournalisminthe

Chinesemedia.xiv

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III. EverydayRepression:PrivatizedStateViolenceandthePrincipal-Agent

Problem

Authoritarianregimesrelyonaplethoraofinstitutionstopreserveitscoercive

power,includingthemilitary,thepolice,andtheintelligenceagencies(Bellin2004,

2012).Borrowedviolenceaugmentsthestate’scoercivecapacitytogaincompliance

withitsdirectivesanditsabilitytorepress.However,itdiffersfromthetraditional

coerciveinstitutionsthatundergirdauthoritarianstatesinafewdimensions.First,a

privateagentastheactorisdistinctfromthestateagents,suchasthemilitaryand

police,connectedwithpoliticalelites.Second,itisacovertasopposedtoanovert

formofcoercionandrepression.FollowingEarl’sdefinition,overtorobservable

formsofrepressionareintendedtobeknowntothepublic,whereascovertor

unobservablerepressionisintendedtobehiddenfromthepubliceye(Earl2003,

48).Commonexamplesofcovertcoerciverepressivemeasuresincludeanonymous

deaththreatsandthreateningphonecallstoactivists(Earl2003,50).

Thisstudyjoinsagrowingbodyofliteraturethataddresseswhysomestatesprefer

usingprivatizedviolenceasarepressivemeans.“Privatizedstateviolence,asa

subsetofstateviolence,iscoercionorchestratedbythestateagainstrealor

perceivedopponentsbutcarriedoutbynonstateactors,suchasvigilantes,

paramilitaries,andmilitias,whoaredirectlyorindirectlysupportedbythe

government”(Roessler2005,209).Carey,MitchellandLowe(2013)uncover281

relationshipsbetweenthestatesandpro-governmentmilitiasintheperiod1981-

2007regardlessofwhetherthestateschosetoformallyacknowledgethem.These

relationshipsarepresentineconomicallyundevelopedstates,suchasSudanand

Haiti,aswellasinmoredevelopedstates,suchasSouthAfricaandChile.Theycan

alsobefoundinautocracies,suchasMyanmarandZimbabwe,andinprocedural

democracies,suchasIndiaandTurkey.Thisstudycontributestotheliteratureon

privatizedstateviolenceshowingthat,inadditiontoparamilitariesandmilitias,the

statecanalsoengagethugs,gangstersandcriminalgroupstoperpetuateviolence.

16

Whilemilitiagroupsandparamilitariesareusedtofightwarsandforethnic

cleansingpurposes,thugsandgangstersarehiredtoengageintheeverydaypolitics

ofpolicyexecutionandovertrepression.

Table1differentiatesphysicalcontrolofandpurposeintheuseofviolenceby

“public”and“private”domains.Themostlegitimateuseofviolenceisdeployedby

publicagents,namely,thepoliceandmilitary,forthepublicpurposesofprotecting

itsbordersorcitizens.Attheendofthespectrumisviolenceusedbyprivate

entities,suchasmafias,organizedcrimegroups,andprivatemilitias,fortheprivate

purposesofdecimatingopponentsandprotectingtheirturforcommercialinterests.

Thecrossoverbetweenpublicandprivatepurposesandtheuseofviolencearethe

mostcontentious.Thetopright-handquadrantrepresentstherealmofprivatized

stateviolence,whenthestateengagesthugs,paramilitaries,militiagroups,or

vigilantestofulfillpublicobjectives.Thestate’sengagementofprivateviolent

agentscouldtaketheformofprovidingweapons,personnel,logistics,intelligence,

orfinancialsponsorshiporrefusingtoquellviolentandrepressiveactivitiesof

thesegroups(Roessler2005,209).

Table1.Publicvs.PrivateDeploymentofViolence&PurposesA.PhysicalControlB.Purpose

A1)Public A2)Private

B1)Public Police,military Stateuseofprivateagents,suchasthugs,militias,andvigilantestocarryoutviolenceforpublicpurposes

B2)Private Publicofficials’useofviolenceforprivatepurposes

Mafias,organizedcrimegroups

Source:Author’sanalysis.

Whydosomestatespreferusingprivateagentstoexecuteviolentrepressionandto

fightwars?Existingstudiespointtotheadvantageofreducedliabilityofthird-party

violence.Inastudyofregimes’useofmilitiasingenocide,Alvarez(2006)argues

17

that“thefirstobviousbenefittorelyingonparamilitarygroupisdeniability.The

militaryandpoliceforcesofanationarealwaysovertlyanofficialandrecognizable

branchofthestate.Thereisnoconcealingthefacttheyarerepresentativesofthe

governmentandtheirinvolvementingenocidemakescleartheroleofthe

governmentinthemurderofthetargetedpopulationwhichthoseregimesareoften

atpaintoconceal…”(Alvarez2006,17)xvTypically,weakdemocraciesandthose

countriesreliantonforeignaidfromdemocraciesaremorelikelytoengagein

privatizedstateviolenceinordertomaintainaveneeroflegitimacyand

accountabilityintheeyesofthedonorcountries(Carey,Colaresi,andMitchell

2015).Studieshavealsofoundsuchevidenceinsub-SaharanAfricaandinLatin

America(Mazzei2009;Stanley1996).

Thepresentstudydiffersfromtheexistingliteratureinthatitislocalstates,rather

thannationalstates,thatusethirdpartiestoperpetuateviolence.Notwithstanding

thatfact,asimilarquestioncouldbeaskedoftherationaleforprivatizedstate

violencebylocalstates.WearguethatlocalauthoritiesinChinaaresimilarly

concernedwithmaintainingaveneeroflegitimacy—butintheeyesofthecentral

government.Theuseofviolenceinhousingdemolition,landexpropriation,and

interceptingpetitionershasneverbeenformallysanctionedbythecentral

authority,thoughitisunlawful,anditswidespreaduseiswidelyknown.Although

thecentralgovernmentmaybecomplicitbycondoningthebehavioroflocal

officials,itfallsfarshortofsanctioninglocaluseofviolence.Tobesure,theState

Council,China’sequivalentofacabinet,issuedaregulationin2011entitled

“RegulationsontheExpropriationofHousesonState-ownedLandand

Compensation”thatprohibitsforcedevictionsofanykind,includingcuttingoffthe

utilitysuppliesofoccupiers,demolitionbyimplication,andtheuseofbruteforce.xvi

However,thisregulationisrarelyobservedandenforcementisnon-existent.Bythe

sametoken,privatesecurityand“blackjails”,insteadoflocalpoliceorarmed

personnel,areusedagainstpetitionersbecausetherightsofChinesecitizensto

petitionarerecognizedbythelawandbythecentralgovernment.

18

Whencaughtred-handed,third-partyagentsallowlocalgovernmentstoshift

responsibilitymoreeasily.InanurbanvillageinZhengzhouthatwevisitedin2014,

thevillagersresistingevictionshadviolentlyclashedwithlocalgovernment-linked

personnelandthugs,whichhadresultedinthedeathofanelderlywomanand

scoresofinjuries.Theviolentclashwasrecordedbyclosed-circuittelevisions

privatelyinstalledbyvillagers.Whenthehigher-upgovernmentspressedforthe

culpritsresponsibleforthecasualties,thevillageauthorityclaimedthattheviolent

agents,whowerenotwearingofficialuniforms,werenotpartofitsadministration

andwerenotonitspayroll.Thus,withthat,villageleaderswereabletoshrugoff

responsibility.Thisisalltoocommoninthethousandsofhousingdemolitionand

landexpropriationcasesoccurringacrossChinaeveryyear.AmnestyInternational

(2012)hasdocumenteddozensofdemolitioncasesinvolvingthuggishviolenceand

humanrightsviolationsinextensivedetail.

Thefactthatdelegationofauthorityresultsinagencyproblemsiswellknownin

economicsandpoliticalscience(SpenceandZeckhauser1971;WeingastandMoran

1983;Miller2005).xviiWhenprivatemilitiasareengagedbythestateasanagentfor

repressionpurposes,studieshavefoundstrongevidenceofagent-centeredhuman

rightsviolations,suchasexcessiveviolenceandsexualabuseofrepressedcitizens

(Mitchell2004;Boharaetal.,n.d.;AlisonBrysk2014;CampbellandBrenner

2002).xviiiIndeed,hiredthugsandsecuritypersonnelinChinacouldbeandhave

beenabusivetotherepressedtargets.Excessesintheirbehaviorcouldbeprivately

motivatedinwaysthatgobeyondtheinstructionoftheprincipal.Theseagent-

centeredviolationsexplaintheroutinenessofexcessiveviolenceusedagainst

evicteesandpetitioners.Italsoshedslightonwhysexualviolence,anarguably

unnecessarymeasureforinterceptingpetitioners,iscommonamongcaptivesof

“blackjails”.

However,thelogicofdelegationgivingrisetomoralhazardcanbesimilarlyapplied

totheprincipals(Miller2005;Mitchell2004;PothandSelck2009).Because

governmentswhohaveworkingrelationshipswithprivatemilitiasareusually

19

punishedbytheinternationalcommunity,intheformofnamingandshaming,

withholdingforeignaid,reducingtraderelationships,orexcludingfrom

internationalorganizations,claimsofinformationasymmetryanddivergenceof

objectivesvariancecanbecomeastrategicadvantage—ratherthanaproblem—for

theprincipals(Mitchell,Carey,andButler2014).Accordingly,localgovernmentsin

China,theprincipal,mayintentionallyengageagentswithpenchantsforviolence

andexerciseloosecontroloverthem.Agentsprovideopportunitiesforthe

principalstoshifttheblameifandwhenhigher-levelauthoritiesdecidetopressfor

responsibility.

Theuseofthird-partyagentsinrepressionalsoallowsthecentralgovernmentto

denyculpabilityunderthewatchfuleyesoftheinternationalcommunity.In

preparationforthe2008BeijingOlympicsandthe2010ShanghaiExpo,hundredsof

thousandsofresidentsinbothcitieswereforciblyevictedfromtheirhomestomake

wayforconstruction.Whiletheworld’sspotlightwasonChinafor“comingofage”

asthehostoftheseglamorousinternationalevents,thousandsofcitizensendured

humanrightsviolations.xixHousingrightsadvocatesandotherhumanrights

activistsweresilencedthroughbeatings,intimidation,anddetention.Petitioners

whotriedtobringtheirgrievancestothecentralpetitionbureauwereviolently

roundedupandillegallydetainedat“blackjails”.xxTheChinesegovernmentflatly

deniedtheexistenceof“blackjails”whenquestionedbyaforeigncorrespondentin

apressbriefinginJune2009.xxi

Privatizedstateviolenceandextralegalchannelsofdetentionenabled(local)state

agentstocarryouttheseegregiousacts,whileallowingthecentralstatetoavoid

condemnationbytheinternationalcommunity.Theextralegal“blackjails”emerged

aftertheabolitionoftheofficialcustody-and-repatriationcenters(shourong

qiansongzhongxin)in2003,afteramigrantworkerinfamouslydiedwhilein

custody.Beforetheclosure,theofficialdetentionsystemwasusedtoholdcaptive

petitionersanddissidents,alongwithbeggarsandvagrantswhomtheauthorities

wantedtokeepoffthestreets.xxiiTheprevalenceof“blackjails”canalsobe

20

attributedtothe“petitionrankingsystem”introducedbythecentralgovernmentin

2004.Thissystem,whichrankedallprovincesaccordingtothenumberof“non-

normalpetitioncases”,wasintendedtoputpressureonlocalauthoritiestolimitthe

numberofpetitionersfromtheirjurisdictions.xxiiiItwasthecentralgovernmentthat

madepetitioncasesa“vetotarget"inthecadreevaluationsystem.Thesystem

punishedlocalofficialswhofailedtomaintain“socialstability”bytheirfailureto

preventdisgruntledcitizensfromlodgingcomplaintsinBeijing.xxivExtralegal

violenceandchannelsthereforeservetheinterestsofbothcentralandlocal

authoritiesalike—theyareeffectiverepressiontoolsbutalsoallowthe

governmentstodissociatethemselvesatthesametime.

Notwithstandingthatfact,statelegitimacyandtrustingovernmentnecessarily

sufferasaconsequenceofcovertviolentrepression.Thisisparticularlythecasefor

localofficialswhodirectlyengageviolentrepression.Duringournumerousfield

visitstovillagesandcommunitiesthathaveenduredviolenceorderedbythelocal

government,weheardunflatteringanddebasingadjectives,suchas“Communist

thugs”(gongfei)and“bandits”(tufei),usedtodescribelocalofficials.Wewere

repeatedlytoldbythevictimsoflocalgovernmentviolencethat,“wewouldrather

belackeysfortheJapanese,thenbethesubjectofthelocalauthorities”xxv.Ina

countrywherethecitizenshadenduredenormoushumiliationandhardshipsunder

theJapanesecolonizationandwhereanti-Japanesesentimentstillrunhigh,the

greaterdisdainandindignationforlocalofficialsistelling.Otherinformantstoldus

that,“wewouldratherreturntotheKuomintangrule!”xxvi

Existingliteraturesuggeststhatlocalrepressioncanalsonegativelyaffectthetrust

ofthecitizenryinthecentralgovernment.Weakeningtrustinthecenterinturn

inducesfurthercitizenactivismandradicalactions.Li(2008)arguesthat

petitioninginBeijingbecomes“amomentoftruth”forthosewhohaveindeed

participatedinit.Citizenswhohavehadexperiencechannelingtheirgrievances

throughthecenter-endorsedpetitioningsystem“haveseenthroughthecentral

government’sduplicity(ofsanctioningcitizen’slodgingclaimsontheonehand,and

21

tacitlyapprovinglocalgovernment’scrackdownsontheother),astheybecame

doubtfulaboutthecenterwhentheysufferedrepressionbylocalgovernments.”xxvii

Furthermore,owingtothecovertnatureoftherepressivemeasures,thecentral

governmentcanfendoffpressurefromthemediaorcitizenrythatmightotherwise

compelittogiveintoprotestors’demands.xxviiiDistrustinthecenter’scommitment

toupholdjusticeandtheenduringlocalabusestendtoinducemoreconfrontational

anddisruptivepopularactions,suchasstreetprotestsandriots,whichposefurther

threatstosocialstability.xxix

IV.Conclusions

Thisstudyintroducesanewdimensiontotheliteratureonstaterepression—the

useofthugsandgangstersasaformofprivatizedstateviolence.Undercertain

circumstances,statespreferusingviolenceexecutedbyhiredthugs,insteadoftheir

ownmilitaryorpoliceofficials,toexecutepoliciesandperformrepressiveactions.

InChina,alongside“relationalrepression”,xxxmonetaryexchangeforsocial

stability,xxxiandasecuritystate,xxxii“thugs-for-hire”isanotherinstrumentinthe

authoritarianstate’srepressivetoolkit.Undercertainconditions,“thugs-for-hire”

hasprovedtobethemostefficient,effectiveandevasiverepressivemeasure.

Tobesure,authoritarianregimesarenottheonlystatesthatutilizecriminalgroups

forrepressivepurpose.Hybridregimeshaveusedsimilarstrategies,xxxiiisuchasthe

employmentofvigilantesportsmen‘skinheads’orTitushkybyYanukovych’sParty

ofRegionstoattackpoliticalopponents,journalistsandactivists.xxxivTherearealso

historicalprecedentsofthestate’suseofgangsterstosuppressoppositional

movementsinChina.Inrecenthistory,theKuomintang(KMT)instrumentallyco-

optedtheGreenGangtobrutallysuppressCommunistopponentsinShanghaiin

1927whenitsforcewastooweaktodoso.xxxv

Wecontendthatemploying“thugs-for-hire”comesatacostfortheauthoritarian

regimeinChina—fallinglegitimacyandtrustinboththelocalandcentral

22

governmentsforthosewhohavebeendisenfranchisedbytheformalinstitutions.

Third-partyviolentagentsmayhaveaugmentedthestate’scoercivepower,butthey

arenotpartofthestate’spermanentinfrastructurethatgovernsitscitizenry.In

MichaelMann’sterm,“thugs-for-hire”augmentsthestate’s“despoticpower”,as

opposedto“infrastructuralpower”(Mann1984).SlaterandFenner(2011)

differentiatesbetweencoerciveinstitutionsthataredisciplined,suchasthemilitary,

andthosethatareundisciplined,suchasrandomthird-partyviolence.Disciplined

coerciveinstitutionsarecapableofdeployingviolenceina“controlledmanner”that

doesnotgobeyond“specifiedtargetsandlimits”(SlaterandFenner2011,20).They

arepartofthestate’sinfrastructuralpowerthatsustainsauthoritarianregime

durability(SlaterandFenner2011;Bellin2004).

Themilitaryisapermanentinstitution,whichundergirdstheinfrastructuralpower

ofauthoritarianstates.Itisalsopartofthepowerconfigurationbetweenthestate

andsociety.AftertheTiananmenIncident,societycanreasonablyexpectthat

whoeverisinchargeoftheCentralMilitaryCommissionholdstheultimatedecision-

makingindeployingthecoerciveforces.Thisexpectationmakesforadurableand

stableregime.

Stateshavetorelyonthird-partyviolencebecausetheyarefundamentallyweak:

withoutco-optingtheextralegalcoerciveforcesofviolentagents,theyareincapable

ofexecutingeverydaypolicyandrepression.AsJohnLucas(1998)hasargued,when

autocratsfacetrade-offsbetweeninfrastructuralanddespoticpowers,thosein

weakstatestendtochoosetopersistentlyrelyontheirdespoticpower.Relianceon

third-partyrandomviolencebolstersonlytheregime’sdespoticpowerand

contributesnothingtostrengtheningitsinfrastructuralcapacitytogovern.

Furthermore,whenaweakstatedeploysextralegalcoerciveforcetogetitsjobs

done,theveryactofdoingsocontributestofurtherweakness.Weakstatesbeget

weakstates.Whenastatehaslostitslegitimacyintheentirety,itwillhavetoresort

tomoreandharsherrepressivemeasures.Itisaviciouscyclethatweakensregime

durabilityinthelongrun.

23

i(Lim2014).ii(Tilly1978).iiiPengWang,“TheChinesemafia,”GlobalCrime12,no.4(2011):290-311.iv(P.Wang2011,308).vWedonotruleoutthestateuseofviolenceinawiderangeofscenarios,butwebelieveitismostcommonlyusedwhendealingwiththesesubjects.viLocalgovernmentshererefertocounty,townshipandvillageauthorities.Unlikevalue-addedtaxandotherformaltaxes,land-salesrevenuescollectedbythesemunicipalandlocalgovernmentsarenotsubjecttosharingwiththecentralandprovincialgovernments.Formoredetails,see(Tao2014).viiThelawstatesthatcountygovernments(alevelabovetownship,andtwolevelsabovevillageauthorities)havetherighttoapprovelandexpropriationprojectsbecauseofthecentralgovernment’spolicyobjectiveofprotectingarablelandareasforthepurposeoffoodsufficiency.Whenlandisexpropriatedillegally,grassrootsofficialscanpocketasubstantialproportionoftheproceedsthatwouldhaveotherwisegonetogovernmentcoffers.viiiYuanhuangZhang,“Zhongguoyouzuzhifanzuidefazhanxianzhuangjilifawanshanduice”[CurrentdevelopmentofChina’sorganizedcrimeandmeasuresforlegislativeimprovement],Fazhiyanjiu,no.2(2012).ix(LiaoshenWanbao2000).xSee(ChengshiWanbao2010;172539642012;C.Chen,Yang,andZhu2009).xi(M.Xia2009).xiiTownshipandvillagegovernments’engagementofgangsinthecollectionofruraltaxesandfeesisdocumentedingreatdetailinChen(2010).See(BaifengChen2010).xiiiForexamplesofmediareportsonthis,see(Jacobs2009,2012).xiv(LinandZhang2010;LongandYang2010).xv(Alvarez2006).xvi(StateCouncil2011).xviiSee(SpenceandZeckhauser1971;WeingastandMoran1983;Miller2005).xviii(CampbellandBrenner2002).xix(StandingTheirGround:ThousandsFaceViolentEvictioninChina2012,31).xx(StandingTheirGround:ThousandsFaceViolentEvictioninChina2012,146-7).xxiPerhapsitwasnocoincidencethattwoforeignjournalists,MelissaChanofAlJazeeraandChrisBuckleyofReuters,whoinvestigatedtheseextralegaldetentioncenters,wereexpelledfromthecountryandhadtheirreporterpermitsrevokedbyBeijing.See(AnAlleywayinHell2009;AlJazeera2012;R.Xia,n.d.).xxiiSee(TheEconomist2013;AnAlleywayinHell2009).xxiii(Li,Liu,andO’Brien2012).xxiv(Li,Liu,andO’Brien2012).xxvWehaveheardthisdescriptioninvillagesfromSichuantoHenanprovinces.InChinese,ninyuandangribenrendezougou,yebuyuanyibeidifangzhengfuguanzhi.xxviTheKuomintang(KMT)partyruledChinaduringtheRepublicanerabeforebeingdefeatedbytheChineseCommunistPartyledbyMaoduringthecivilwar.xxvii(Li2008).Li’ssurveyresultsshowthatregardlessofthepetitionoutcome,petitionerswhohadbeentoBeijingwere31.2percentlesslikelytoagreethatthecentertrulycaredaboutfarmersthanthosewhohadnot,40.8percentlesslikelytoagreethatthecenterwelcomedfarmerstopetition,and46.5percentlesslikelytoagreethatpetitioningBeijingwasveryuseful.

24

xxviiiOntheargumentofthecostsandbenefitsofrepressionandconcessionswithinamulti-levelgovernment,see(Cai2008).xxixSee(Li2008;X.Chen2011).xxx(DengandO’Brien2013).xxxi(LeeandZhang2013).xxxii(Y.WangandMinzner2015).xxxiii(LevitskyandWay2010).xxxiv(Kuzio2014).xxxvMartin,BrianG.1996.TheShanghaiGreenGangpoliticsandorganizedcrime,1919-1937.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.IntheQingdynasty,secretsocietieshadalsoexistedascomplementstostatepower.SeeDavidOwnby(1996),BrotherhoodsandSecretSocietiesinEarlyandMid-QingChina,StanfordUniversityPress.