appeal 2002103 a20020001685 waikato maniapoto district · pdf filea20020001685 waikato...

Minute Book: 20 APWM 167

In the Maori Appellate Court Appeal 2002103

of New Zealand

A20020001685Waikato Maniapoto District

IN THE MATTER of an appeal by Arapeta Hokopursuant to Section 58 ofTe Ture Whenua MaoriAct 1993 against a decision ofthe Maori Land Court made on13 December 2001 at 68Tauranga 96-101 to dismiss anapplication to change the statusof the Maori Freehold landknown as Papamoa 2A1

Judgment of Judge A D Spencer,

Judge P J Savage and Judge S Te A Milroy

HEARING: At Tauranga on 11 December 2002

CORAM: Judge A D Spencer, Presiding

Judge P J Savage

Judge S Te A Milroy

JUDGEMENT: At Whangarei this day of September 2003


Background

Papamoa 2A1 is coastal land comprising 1.0583 hectares east of

Tauranga. It is extremely valuable land and is zoned Residential A. The

appellant had filed an application for partition, which was successful, and

an application to change the status of this land from Maori freehold land to

General land. The latter was declined by the Maori Land Court in

December 2001. It is from that refusal that this appeal stems.

The jurisdiction given to the Maori Land Court to change the status of land

as sought is contained in s136 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, which

reads -

The Maori Land Court may make a status order under

section 135 M of this Act where it is satisfied that

(a) The land is beneficially owned by not more than 10 persons as

tenants in common; and

(b) Neither the land nor any interest is subject to any trust (other

than a trust imposed by section 250(4) of this Act); and

(c) The title to the land is registered under the Land Transfer

Act 1952 or is capable of being so registered; and

(d) The land can be managed or utilised more effectively as

General land; and

(e) The owners have had adequate opportunity to consider the

proposed change of status and a sufficient proportion of the

owners agree to it. "

Paragraph d) above is the focus of this appeal.


In 1896, as a result of partition, Papamoa 2 Block remained as a residue

of 38 acres, 2 perches and 29 roods. It remained undeveloped and in

multiple ownership without a management structure until 1962. At that

stage a Trust was set up over the land. However, as the trial Judge found,

the land is still, by and large, the subject of little activity.

In 1995 there was an application by owners who held 18.64 shares seeking

a partition. This was granted in 1998. The result of that partition was that

Papamoa 2A comprising 5 acres was excised. That block is the parent

block of the land with which we are now concerned. The residue was

vested in trustees and is Papamoa 2B.

The partition application for Papamoa 2A, which is referred to at the very

beginning of this judgment, resulted in the further partition into

Papamoa 2A1, held solely by Mr Hoko, and 2A2, the balance. It is

important to note that the protagonists in this case have different kin group

affiliations. The trustees of Papamoa 2B are of Ng5 Potiki and Mr Hoko

affiliates to NgAti Pukenga.

It also needs to be said that at the hearing of the partition application for

Papamoa 2A, the trustees of 2B bitterly opposed the further partition on the

basis that the land was an urupa. They similarly oppose this application

for a change of status. Their concern is to retain their links with this land

and to retain their right of first refusal as members of the preferred class of

alien ees, ("PCA").


Evidence

There were four hearings before the Lower Court. At each of them

Mr Hoko appeared for himself. The evidence is remarkable for its paucity

and for its failure to contain anything other than highly generalised

assertions. The two relevant hearings are the 5th of December 2000

where the evidence was as follows:

" Court:

Arapeta Hoko:Court

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:Court:Arapeta Hoko:Court:

Arapeta Hoko:Court:

Arapeta Hoko:Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:Arapeta Hoko:

Now the next application is a change of status.

Mr Hoko, this is your application. This is to change

the status only of the land which you seek to

partition, that's right?

Yes, sir.

Alright. Mr Hoko, it's over to you to tell the Court

why you wish the status to be changed and this is

dependent on a Partition Order.

Yes. Okay well it's for development costs - for

development, sir. It's to get the maximum out of theblock.

To get the maximum?

Amount out of the block.

What?

In money terms.

When you're talking development, do you intend to

sell?

Yes, sir.

Subdivide and sell?

Yes sir.

Do you feel that you're restricted in doing this if this

remains Maori land?

Yes, sir. Well, to try and sell Maori land to a

European would be hard to sell.Anything further you wish to say about it?

No, sir. "


That was then followed by the 4th of July 2001 hearing where the evidence

reads as follows:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Court:

Arapeta Hoko:

Right, would you like to speak to your application, Mr

Kahotea. Sony, Mr Hoko I should say. I looked

one line down on my notes.

This application is going to disadvantage the

neighbouring block but it's also going to benefit a lot

of people.

Why do you want the status changed?

For development reasons.

Is it your intention to develop this land by way of

subdivision, commercial subdivision?

Apartments.

Apartments. And how does the fact that the land is

Maori land, how does that constrain you at all?

Money borrowing.

You would have problems.

I would have to borrow, yes.

And you would have problems borrowing money.

Have you made any enquiries?

Yes.

So what you're effectively saying is that the land

needs to be changed in status so that it can be

effectively utilised and developed. Anything more

you wanted to say Mr Hoko.

No, that's about it. "

That is the totality of the evidence that relates to sl 36(d) of Te Ture

Whenua Maori Act 1993, the central point in this case.


The Judge at first instance had dealt with this block on a number of

occasions. He said in the judgment on appeal at page 3:

In my decision on partition of Papamoa Part No 2 Block on

27 May 1997 at 57 Tauranga Minute Book 162-167 I accepted

the importance and significance of the block to Nga Potiki. I see

no reason to change my views. It may well be that this land now

assumes more significance because it is the last of the coastal

lands in this area which is in Maori ownership. "

Mr Ambler for the appellant took issue with the proposition that this was the

"last of the coastal lands . . . in Maori ownership". He is correct, but it is

certainly one of the very last and so the difference is but slight and of

degree only.

Decision of the Lower Court

After reviewing the history of the land, the evidence, and the legislation the

learned Judge at first instance gave judgment in the following terms:

I accept the evidence of the objectors that the area of land formerlyknown as Papamoa Part No 2 Block is highly important to theowners of (now) Papamoa 28 Block and to Nga Potiki as a whole.The right of first refusal is also important as it gives to the Trust itsonly real opportunity of regaining those areas which have beenpartitioned.

The applicant seeks change of status to facilitate his plans fordevelopment – a process which contemplates erection ofapartments and/or section sales. The ability to obtain finance ismentioned as a prime reason.


I accept that in many circumstances owners experience difficultiesin obtaining finance while their land is Maori land. Thoseapplications that come to Court seem invariably to involve housingsections or uneconomic parcels of land. Notably absent areeconomic holdings and lands of substantial value.

The land subject of the present application is by virtue of its locationhighly sought after for subdivision and of extremely high value.These factors are likely to influence financial institutions and I amnot convinced that the status of Maori land will militate against theobtaining of reasonable finance. While some prospectivepurchasers of sections or apartments, as the case may be, might beinfluenced by the status of the land, its location should lead othersto overlook any perceived disadvantages. Nevertheless I do acceptthat the land would be easier to develop and easier to market asGeneral land as opposed to Maori land.

After weighing up all the circumstances which are outlined both forand against the application I conclude that it is not appropriate thatthe Court at this stage should exercise its discretion to grant theapplication. The issues of convenience to the applicant which Ihave mentioned do not outweigh the importance of the land to andthe rights of the objectors when considered in context with thekaupapa, principles of interpretation and objectives of the Act.

It may well be that in the passage of time when development hasbeen completed or there have been sales where rights of firstrefusal have been available but not exercised, differentconsiderations might apply to a similar application.

The application is dismissed. "

Application to Adduce Further Evidence

The appellant by his Counsel Mr Ambler sought to commence the appeal

by introducing further evidence. This was hardly surprising given the


nature of the evidence given in the Lower Court. There were three matters

that he wished to traverse and they were more particularly:

1. The question of the ability to raise finance and the steps taken by Mr

Hoko in that regard subsequent to the decision now appealed from;

2. The ability of the PCA to purchase; and

3. Whether or not the Judge was in error in finding that this was the last

piece of coastal land in Maori hands.

The third matter is of little relevance now in view of what we have said

above.

It is important to note that this matter went to hearing over two years and

was the subject of four hearings in the Lower Court.

The orthodox approach to the reception of evidence on appeal is set out in

Dragicevich v Martinovich [1969] NZLR 306. Three tests must be met:

(1) It must be shown the evidence could not have been obtained with

reasonable diligence for use at trial

(2) The evidence must be such that if given it would probably have an

important influence on the result of the case although it need not be

decisive, and

(3) The evidence be such as is presumably to be believed although it

need not be controvertible.

Mr Ambler raised the issue that Dragicevich v Martinovich is not binding on

this Court because the case was not concerned with the admission of


further evidence in an appeal, but was concerned with Rule 276(e) of the

Code of Civil Procedure where a new trial is sought because of the

discovery of new evidence after the trial. The principles in Dragicevich were

adopted by the Maori Appellate Court in Whareongaonga v Skuse (1973)

30 Gisborne ACMB 158. In Whareongaonga it was actually Counsel for the

Appellant who wished to introduce fresh evidence and who referred the

Court to Dragicevich. Counsel there sought to persuade the Court that the

equivalent of what is now s 55(2)/93 gave the Maori Appellate Court a

wider discretion to admit fresh evidence than was given to the Court of

Appeal under the Court of Appeal Rules. The Maori Appellate Court

rejected that approach, preferring to act upon the rules enunciated in

Dragicevich.

The Maori Appellate Court has consistently held to the principles in

Dragicevich, and it seems to this Court that the principles provide

satisfactory guidelines for the admission of fresh evidence whether in the

appeal situation or where a fresh trial is sought.

An exception to the Dragicevich principles may be seen in Re White (1998)

1 Waiariki MB 116. In that case the Maori Appellate Court

allowed the introduction of further evidence, relying on the decision

in Re Motatau 5J2B Te Haki and Ors v Board of Maori Affairs (1963)

1 Tokerau ACMB 182. In the Motatau case the Appellate Court allowed the

application for leave to introduce further evidence, although it recognised

that if it followed the established principles the application should be

refused. It granted leave in that case because the proposal being appealed

would lead to dispossession of the Maori owners for a lengthy period of

time, and the hearing in the Appellate Court would be a final determination


of their rights. In the present case the owner will not be dispossessed, and

will have the opportunity to apply to the Maori Land Court in future for a

change of status, should circumstances change.

In the White case it should be particularly noted that the Judge at first

instance may have led the applicant to believe that relevant evidence could

not be led. It was also an important factor that there was only one party

before the Court on an unopposed application. Neither of the factors in Re

White occur in the present context. This application was fully contested.

We do not find the fact that Mr Hoko chose to appear unrepresented can

give him an advantage in this matter. He made that choice for himself.

Any alteration in the rules of engagement would be to significantly diminish

the rights of the respondent to have this appeal heard in the orthodox way

on the evidence given in the Lower Court, unless the principles of

Dragicevich can be met.

While the Maori Land Court does have an inquisitorial function, there are

limits to that, particularly in a contested hearing. To say that the Court has

inquisitorial powers is not to be taken as an encouragement for the Court to

coach a party or advise it to strengthen its evidence. Mr Hoko had ample

opportunity for a full exposition of his case before the Court.

It was said that the Court's approach to Mr Hoko's evidence was unfair

because the Judge indicated that he had accepted Mr Hoko's evidence

and, therefore, did not seek from him greater detail of the enquiries made

of banks in relation to the ability to borrow upon the land as Maori freehold

land. The transcript does not support that submission. It should be noted

that both of the portions of the evidence referred to earlier in this judgment

commence with an invitation to Mr Hoko to tell the Court about the


application, and end with an enquiry of Mr Hoko as to whether there was

anything further to be said.

In terms of the principles in Dragicevich, the evidence in relation to the

ability to obtain finance on the security of the land was readily available at

the time of the hearing. The ability of the PCA to purchase the block if they

retained the right of first refusal was not an issue in the Lower Court, and

should not now be raised in the Appellate setting. The evidence required

from both sides is such that it would really need a hearing at first instance.

The Appellate setting is not appropriate for a full-blown investigation into

facts fundamental to an appellant's case – these are meant to be

determined before the matter gets to appeal.

We indicated at the hearing of this appeal that we would not receive further

evidence and the foregoing provides the reasons for that decision.

Substantive Issues

The appeal then proceeded with the appellant's case being pursued on a

number of different footings.

First it was said that the Judge had taken an unfair approach to the

evidence. It was said that, as a result of this wrong approach, the Court

wrongly concluded that Mr Hoko could obtain finance while the land is

Maori land, that Mr Hoko could develop the land while it is Maori land, and

that the change of status was merely a matter of convenience.

It was said that the unfairness arose in three respects:

The first complaint is that the Court did not ask Mr Hoko to provide further

evidence of the enquiries he had made at the banks in relation to finance.


It is true the Court did not do this. As we have said earlier the Court was

not obliged to do this and indeed if it had done so may well have prejudiced

the other parties in the case. Mr Hoko was invited to give his evidence

and gave inadequate evidence. Mr Hoko was asked if he wished to add

anything more to the evidence he gave and he declined to do so. If there

was implied criticism in the Lower Court judgment of Mr Hoko's failure to

give further evidence, as Mr Ambler suggested, then it was warranted.

However, to this Court, it seems that the judge simply stated the fact that

Mr Hoko had not given evidence about the enquiries he made regarding

obtaining finance.

In the circumstances of this case the learned Judge was in our view quite

correct in the approach that he took. To take the position that Mr Hoko's

Counsel proposes would have involved the trial Judge descending into a

"coaching" role. It is for the Applicant to make his case, not the Court.

Counsel for the Appellant referred to the decision of the High Court in

Harney v Police (High Court, Napier Registry, AP 9/02, 11 June 2002,

Gendall J) as authority for the proposition that Mr Hoko, as a lay litigant,

should have been asked to provide further evidence of enquiries made of

banks. However, Harney involved circumstances completely different from

the present. That was a charge of careless driving where evidence

tendered in the form of a sworn statement was rejected by the JPs without

giving the litigant the opportunity to adjourn to bring the deponent to Court

to give viva voce evidence. Here the evidence was within Mr Hoko's

knowledge and moreover, the Court accepted the evidence provided by

Mr Hoko, such as it was. With respect, the Harney case cannot be an

authority in the present circumstances.

The second matter for complaint is that the Court did not explain to

Mr Hoko its misgivings or lack of conviction about his inability to obtain


finance, and thereby deprived him of the opportunity to address that issue.

We do not accept this. Section 136(d)193 was always the central issue in

the case. Mr Hoko must have known that this was the very point in the

whole proceedings. If one looks at the first passage of evidence referred

to earlier, there is nothing there that the Court could possibly have based a

judgment upon. In the second passage of evidence there is no detail as to

the problems with the borrowing of money that might be encountered,

neither does Mr Hoko tell the Court of the enquiries. We do not know who

the enquiries were made of, or the result of those enquiries. The evidence

is therefore so vague as to be completely unhelpful. The Court has not

declined Mr Hoko the opportunity of dealing with this core issue in his case.

Neither should the finding have taken him by surprise. The evidential

burden was on him and he has completely failed to meet it.

The third complaint is that the Court concluded that Mr Hoko could obtain

finance without any evidential foundation for that finding. It needs to be

said at the outset that Mr Hoko did not say he could not obtain finance. He

simply said he would have problems borrowing money. The Court was

given so little evidence as to the nature and extent of the proposed

development that it was impossible to tell the extent of borrowing which

might be necessary to finance the development. The land was valued at

$1,728,000 at the time of the application, and, naturally, the Lower Court

was entitled as a matter of common sense and common knowledge to find

that some level of borrowing would be possible on land of that value, even

if it is Maori land.

Nevertheless, the Maori Land Court is very well aware of the difficulties in

obtaining funding to develop Maori freehold land. It is a recurrent theme

before all Judges throughout Aotearoa. Almost all Maori freehold land

would be more attractive security to a lender were it General land. That


does not, however, mean that all Maori freehold land will meet the test

imposed by s136(d) of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. It is as always a

question of degree and of balance. , Here Mr Hoko provided almost nothing

which would provide weight to his side of the scales.

Moreover, the Lower Court, despite the learned judge's view that finance

could be obtained, still found that s 136(d)193 was fulfilled. The learned

Judge said (at p 5 of the judgment):

" Nevertheless I do accept that the land would be easier to develop

and easier to market as General land as opposed to Maori land. "

In light of this finding, and the paucity of evidence provided by Mr Hoko, we

do not accept that the Lower Court was required to "test" Mr Hoko's

evidence, as suggested by Counsel for the Appellant.

However, there is one aspect of the learned judge's finding which may

need consideration. We accept the term development is encapsulated

within the terms "managed or utilised" in s136(d)/93, but there is an issue in

our mind as to whether the term "market" would be so included. It is

interesting to compare the course of the litigation relating to Kairakau 2C5B

Block culminating in the decision of the High Court in Brown v Maori

Appellate Court [2001] 1 NZLR 87. That litigation, of course, concerned

partition with a view to sale. The Judges of the High Court agreed that it

was wrong to hold that an application for partition, where the applicants

intend to sell the land partitioned to them, can never succeed. The last


sentence in para 64 at page 18 reads:

Where owners are at an impasse in the management and

development of the land, partition may facilitate overall use and

occupation even if some of the land partitioned out is later sold.

The High Court then were only contemplating the sale of part of the land.

While an intention to so sell is not fatal to an application, a real question

arises as to whether it could in fact form the basis for an application. In a

nutshell, then, if it is enough for owners of Won freehold land to say the

land will be easier to sell as General land, then the kaupapa of the Act is

subverted. The very term taonga tuku iho connotes something that is

handed down from earlier generations, and the scheme of the Act

envisages that wider kin groups will have some say, and generations to

come may have some expectations. Balancing these interests with the

rights and wishes of the present owners is a core function of the Maori

Land Court. Applications pursuant to s136 of Te Ture Whenua Maori

Act 1993 are therefore serious matters and require full and cogent

evidence.

As a further ground of appeal it is said that it is significant that the trial

Judge referred to s17(1) of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 but failed to

refer to s17(2). In this regard it is suggested that there is a misdirection in

similar terms to that referred to in the judgment of Ronald Young J in

Edwards v Maui Land Court (unreported, 11 December 2001, High Court,

Wellington CP 78/01), namely that subsection (1) should not be

emphasised to the derogation of subsection (2). To put it in another way,

the suggestion is that the• retention of Mori land, or other lands in the


hands of Maori, must not be given such primacy that the wishes of the

owners of the land are effectively ignored.

It is of course a question of balance. The Judge had this application

before him on a number of occasions and had granted Mr Hoko a partition

order in accordance with his wishes. Although the learned judge's

reference was to s17(1)/93, when reading the judgment as a whole it is

clear to us that the Court had sufficient regard to Mr Hoko's wishes. For

example, in the last two paragraphs of the judgment the learned judge

says:

After weighing up all the circumstances which are outlined both for and

against the application I conclude that it is not appropriate that the

Court at this stage should exercise its discretion to grant the

application. The issues of convenience to the applicant which I have

mentioned do not outweigh the importance of the land to and the rights

of the objectors when considered in context with the kaupapa,

principles of interpretation and objectives of the Act.

It may well be that in the passage of time when development has been

completed or there have been sales where rights of first refusal have

been available but not exercised, different considerations might apply

to a similar application. "

This passage indicates that the wishes of the owner, in this case Mr Hoko

have been considered, but that countervailing considerations were found to

outweigh those wishes at that point in time.


It

A further ground of appeal relates to that portion of the judgment which

reads (at p 5):

I accept the evidence of the objectors that the area of land formerly

known as Papamoa Part No 2 Block is highly important to the

owners of (now Papamoa 2B Block) and to Ngapotiki as a whole.

The right of first refusal is also important as it gives to the Trust its

only real opportunity of regaining those areas which have been

partitioned. "

Mr Ambler suggested that the Court had overstated the right of first refusal

and the advantage that it gives to the PCA. He said first that the

opportunity did not arise in the Act, but rather was governed by the financial

ability and willingness of the Trust and Nga Potiki to purchase. He also

said that there was no right to a concessionary purchase price and that the

prospect of repurchase was basically the same whether the land was Maori

freehold land or General land. He said that the right of first refusal was

really illusory where the market is active and transparent as is the case in

relation to this land. He said that the PCA and Nga Potiki had merely what

was referred to as a "hope", as is referenced in para 72 of the Court of

Appeal decision Bruce v Edwards (Keith, Blanchard and Glazebrook JJ,

CA 19/02, 18 November 2002). He complains that the Court had no real

evidence before it as would have allowed it to reach the conclusion that

there was prejudice.

It is important to note that Mr Hoko's plans and proposals were nebulous as

to what development was to take place before sale. There was no date

given for sale, valuation was never contested at the hearing, and it was

highly doubtful that Mr Hoko had met the evidential burden required by

s136(d)/93 as would then bring in to focus whether the rights of the


preferred class were illusory or real. The PCA's ability to purchase was not

an issue in the Lower Court, and therefore there is no evidence one way or

another as to their financial situation. In that regard it should be

remembered that the PCA are the owners of a block of coastal land

themselves, which should serve to point to the speculative nature of

discussion about their financial abilities.

In Bruce v Edwards the Bruces were bona fide purchasers for value without

notice that-the new status of the land as general land had been obtained in

questionable circumstances. A reversion of the land to the status of Maori

freehold land would have involved the possible cancellation of their

agreement for sale and purchase, considerable financial detriment, and

other difficulties, which might not be compensated for with damages.

Moreover there was evidence before the Court of Appeal regarding the

PCA's ability to purchase. That situation, then, is a far cry from the present

one.

We would also take issue with Mr Ambler's submission that an active and

transparent market means that there is no real advantage to the PCA in

having a first right of refusal. Whether that is the case must depend to a

large degree on the circumstances prevailing at the time the land, or any

part, comes up for sale. Whereas members of the PCA may be unable to

purchase immediately, this may change over time. One can well imagine

that people who are currently living elsewhere may decide to retire to

Papamoa, and once having sold up other property, would be in a position

to buy a part of their ancestral land. In such a situation the right of first

refusal may well have considerable value to those people in giving them a

surer opportunity to obtain a share in land of considerable value to them in

both financial and cultural terms. These matters are for the Lower Court to

consider when exercising the discretion to change the status of the land.


This leads us on to Mr Ambler's next point which relates to the exercise of

the discretion by the trial Judge. In our view the exercise of the discretion

only arises at such time as the terms of s136(a) to (e)/93 have been met.

A reading of the judgment makes it clear that the Judge at first instance

found that the terms of s136/93 had been met, but, in relation to (d), only to

the bare threshold as disclosed by the evidence to be a mere matter of

"convenience" to Mr Hoko. Having regard to the importance of the land as

one of the last pieces of coastal land, in our view the learned Judge

exercised his discretion in an entirely proper manner. Whether or not this

Court would have exercised its discretion in any other way is entirely

irrelevant. To overturn the discretion, as the Appellant seeks, he would

have to carry the burden of showing that the Judge had acted on a wrong

principle, or failed to take into account some relevant matter, or took into

account some irrelevant matter, or was plainly wrong: Harris v McIntosh

[2001] 3 NZLR 721. The appellant has not achieved that. The short point

is that the evidence in relation to s136(d) of Te Ture Whenua Maori

Act 1993 is so unsatisfactory that it merely discloses an advantage at the

level of convenience to the Appellant in obtaining a change of status. On

the other hand, the land concerned represented a "last chance" at coastal

land of deep significance for this PCA, and therefore the exercise of the

discretion in this manner is not surprising.

Where an application has more substance, and where a change of status

would result in reaching a higher level of advantage to the Applicant in the

management and utilisation of the land, the reality of the PCA's exercise of

the right of first refusal will have much more potency as a factor in the

exercise of the discretion.

Mr Ambler finally referred to a number of cases in the Papamoa area

before and after the coming into force of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993,

where the Maori Land Court had granted a change of status' from Maori

freehold land to General land. It is not known whether the PCA objected in


those cases or what the facts were that moved the Court to grant such

applications. The applications were not subject to appeal and their

correctness is not called into question in this Court. They do not bind this

Court and as such are of no relevance.

The appeal is therefore dismissed.

If there is an issue of costs arising, Counsel for the respondents may file

such application together with Memoranda within the next 28 days and if so

received Counsel for the appellant has a further 28 days to respond, at

which stage the file is to be referred to us for a decision on costs.

JUDGE A D SPENDERPRESIDING

--JUDGE S TEA MILIN:—

Appeal 2002-03 - A02-1605 • Paparnoa 2A1

appeal 2002103 a20020001685 waikato maniapoto district · pdf filea20020001685 waikato...

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