appendix in closing - nasa

A P P E N D I X

in closing

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Scott Hubbard serves as director of NASA’s Ames Research Center, in the heart of California’s Silicon

Valley. Hubbard’s tenure at Ames began in 1987 and has included a variety of management roles. From

1997 to 1999, he served as the deputy director of the Space Directorate at Ames Research Center. Prior

to his current appointment, Hubbard was deputy director for research at Ames. In March 2000, Hubbard

was called to NASA Headquarters where he successfully redefi ned all robotic Mars missions in response

to the Mars failures in 1999.

Scott Hubbard Director, NASA Ames Research Center

My job mainly right now is to roll the credits and thank a whole bunch

of people who made this all happen. Before I do that though, I’d like to take the prerogative

of the chair here and just make a few additional comments from things that I’d written

down in the last couple of days as well as some prethinking. One is the incredible speed

with which we are moving ahead in space exploration. Now that sounds perhaps silly on the

surface of it, but think for a moment. In the fi rst 50 years of aviation, a million aircraft were

built, most of them used multiple times. In the fi rst 50 years of space exploration, there

have been exactly 4500 launches total worldwide.

The difference, the gap, between where we are in commercial aviation today and

where we are in space exploration is huge. The fact that Burt Rutan and his group can be

so successful today is built on investments that were made, in some cases decades ago, by

the government. Now where does this lead us? This leads us to establishing a viable space

exploration industry eventually, such that there will be a trailing edge of people who can

make a business case and make money out of not only communication satellites, but types

of space travel.

Closing Comments

246

The two analogies that are already there are the railroads, and, as I said,

commercial aviation. The railroads that got the right of way, Union Pacifi c,

Southern Pacifi c, came together and drove that nail out there in Utah [joining the

two railroads]. In aviation, the government invested in mail routes. And, eventually,

this form of investment and technology and subsidies led to multibillion dollar

industries. I think we are just on the verge of being able to see something like this

come out in space exploration, beyond something like the commercial satellite

industry. And I think it’s going to be an absolutely fascinating journey over the

next 10 years or so—maybe it’s 5 years, we’ll see—as this plays out.

The second major point is to underscore the false dichotomy of human

versus robots. The only thing that will happen is the ratio will change over time.

And, at some point, a human being, I’m looking at Chris McKay here, will be the

tool of choice for exploring the Moon, and, particularly, exploring Mars. If we

could put him in a little box, I’m sure he would go with the MSL (Mars Science

Laboratory) in ’09.

So where do we go with this dialogue? I agree completely with what John

said, with what many of you said. This can’t be a one-of-a-kind. I think the

public will come along if we tell our story well, but we need professional help.

Some people say we’re beyond help; we need treatment.

But if we can talk about the risk of not exploring, the risk of losing our

imagination, and maybe, ultimately, a second home for humanity, I think that

we have some compelling things in addition to the kind of spinoffs that may

come from what Nathalie Cabrol found by exploring these lakes, that your blood

oxygenation goes up, your heartbeat goes down. What does that mean? What

does that mean for the biomedical community?

There are a lot of things in there, but telling the big future story, I think,

is something we haven’t done and we need to do. And we saw some storytellers

here in the last few days who just grabbed us. In giving a lot of talks, there’s

the pin-drop moment, and we hit the pin-drop moment in those places were

everybody was just absolutely transfi xed by the story.

So, where can we go with this dialogue? One thing is that taking risks can

prepare you for the future—often in ways you didn’t even think of. I’m going to

give you one or two examples from my own experience, which has been largely

taking programmatic and technical risks.

In 1975 very little was known about repairing neutron damage in gamma

ray detectors. So I conducted, at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, a bunch of

experiments with a 72-curie plutonium-beryllium source. Now, if you consider

that your smoke detector is picocuries, you get some idea of how hot this was.

So, we went through the safety procedures. I signed up to the risks. Twenty-

fi ve years later, at the age of 50 or so, I had dual cataracts in both eyes, which

was a possible outcome of doing that. But today, Bill Boynton with that same

detector orbiting Mars, fi guring out where all the water-ice is, is able to repair

his detector, because of what we learned doing those experiments, almost 30

years ago, about how you heat the detector and get rid of the neutron damage.

OPENING PHOTO:

The Space Shuttle orbiter Endeavour and

its crew of six glide in to Runway 15 at

Kennedy Space Center’s Shuttle Landing

Facility after spending nine days in space

on the STS-72 mission, the fi rst Shuttle

fl ight of 1996.

(NASA Image # 96PC-0155)

SCOTT HUBBARD CLOSING COMMENTSRISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS

247

You never know what kind of a risk, and what kind of information, is going to

prepare you for the future.

In a similar fashion, in April of 1990, I went in front of the Headquarters

folks and proposed the ridiculous mission of using a Delta-2 and a single probe

and a cruise stage going to Mars and landing, of all things, using an airbag.

The risk there was ridicule and being laughed out of the room, which almost

happened. Fortunately, Jim Martin, the legendary leader of the Viking mission,

thought there was something to it. And 14 years later, we have now used that

technology three times successfully.

So, what I’m building up to is the analogy of setting up the Astrobiology

Institute in 1998. We took a risk—and Keith Cowing was part of this—in bringing

together an interdisciplinary group of physicists, biologists, mathematicians,

astronomers, who never talk to each other. Or if they do, the intersection is only

at one point. And saying, let’s all think from our disparate points of view about

a much broader series of questions, like where do we come from, are we alone in

the universe, where are we going?

Out of that came a fi eld today, and you’ve heard references to it, of more

than 1,000 scientists worldwide who are engaged in this in everyday research

and view this interdisciplinary work, the interaction—the action is at the

intersections—as being where we’re headed for research in the future. So I

would say today, the group that has participated the last two and a half days at

this has been at a seminal, similar event of bringing together communities that

have perhaps not communicated as much as they should—robotic, human, risk-

evaluators, decision-makers. And, so, what we need to do to keep this moving is

have the dialogue; perhaps we have a road map, we certainly need a distillation

of lessons learned from this, and I would be willing to bet that we’re going to

ultimately have, if John takes his action items here, thousands of people, maybe

tens of thousands of people, who are engaged in doing the kind of work that we

got started here over the last two days.

So with that, let me roll the credits and, fi rst of all, thank the idea men—

John Grunsfeld, Keith Cowing, the people that had some of the initial concepts

for this. Let me thank the Naval Postgraduate School, Admiral Dunne, and,

““ ””IN AVIATION, THE GOVERNMENT INVESTED IN MAIL ROUTES. AND, EVENTUALLY, THIS

FORM OF INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY AND SUBSIDIES LED TO MULTIBILLION

DOLLAR INDUSTRIES. I THINK WE ARE JUST ON THE VERGE OF BEING ABLE TO SEE

SOMETHING LIKE THIS COME OUT IN SPACE EXPLORATION, BEYOND SOMETHING

LIKE THE COMMERCIAL SATELLITE INDUSTRY.

SCOTT HUBBARD CLOSING COMMENTSRISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS

248

particularly, Chris Walla for hosting us in this incredible venue. It’s just been

delightful being here. At NASA Headquarters, Bob Jacobs was the lead for pulling

this together. Trish Pengra, Al Feinberg, and the inestimable Tony Stewart of

NASA TV, thanks to you all.

The group from Ames, from my own Center, Rho Christensen, Danny

Thompson, event coordinators. Victoria Steiner and Ed Schilling, public affairs.

The video crew—I won’t go through all the names. There are many, many people

staffi ng the cameras here, but I do want to mention Jim Taylor and the planners

collaborative, Mark Shaddock and Spotlight Productions, Donovan Gates,

Donovan Gates Production, and Michael Ditertay and his staff on this 30-person

television crew. And out of this will come, I’m sure, an outstanding DVD.

Then there are a couple of other people from Ames that I want to mention—

Mike Mewhinney and Kathleen Burton of public affairs, who were part of the

advance group getting all this together. Then, fi nally, a contributor, I’m looking

at him right now—one of the real concept, idea, content contributors to this,

who through some personal adversity, has managed to stay focused on making

this entire thing very successful, Mel Averner. Mel, thank you. Then fi nally, our

moderators—Miles O’Brien of CNN, Chris McKay, Dave Halpern, and again,

John Grunsfeld, NASA Headquarters.

So, fi nally, to wrap it up completely, we want to thank all of you who have

spent the last two and a half days with us, and, of course, the honorable Sean

O’Keefe, the NASA Administrator. ■

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RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS

Back to Contents page

http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4701/frontmatter.pdf#page=7

RemarksI had to rearrange my thoughts after going through the day. I had

given some time to thoughts about risk and the way we use it and the way we misuse it

and all of those things. Well, as the morning went on, the fi rst speaker ticked off the fi rst

three or four of my items, and the next speaker came along and fi xed them all up. And, so,

most of the things that I thought I would like to comment on were gone. Then, just to put

the crowning blow on it all, we go in this afternoon and I listen to the most amazing set of

people that I could ever imagine. And I’m sitting here listening to this and saying, “Every

one of these people, individually, has done more than me and all my friends.” Now, how in

the world do you get up and talk after that?

Well, I decided that the fi rst thing I had to do was to talk about something different.

So, what I would like to do tonight is perhaps a little deviation, but I hope my thoughts are

in the context of what you are discussing.

We have a nomenclature issue when we talk about exploration and the word explore: to

some people, that means visit planets. To some people, it means do great science. To some

T. K. Mattingly is one of the 19 astronauts selected by NASA in April 1966. He served as a member of

the astronaut support crews for the Apollo 8 and 11 missions and was the astronaut representative in

development and testing of the Apollo spacesuit and backpack (EMU). He was designated command

module pilot for the Apollo 13 fl ight but was removed from fl ight status 72 hours prior to the scheduled

launch due to exposure to the German measles. He has logged 7,200 hours of fl ight time—5,000 hours in

jet aircraft. A veteran of three space fl ights, Mattingly has logged 504 hours in space, including 1 hour and

13 minutes of extravehicular activity (EVA) during his Apollo 16 fl ight. He was the command module pilot on

Apollo 16 (16–27 April 1972), was the spacecraft commander on STS-4 (26 June to 4 July 1982) and STS

51-C (24–27 January 1985). After retiring from NASA in 1989, Mattingly continued his work in space science

in the private sector, focusing on developing low-cost and reusable launch systems for commercial use.

Thomas “T.K.” Mattingly II Former NASA Astronaut


250

OPENING PHOTO:

Astronaut Thomas K. Mattingly II,

Apollo 16 Command Module pilot.

(NASA Image # S71-51295)

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS

of us—I like to call ourselves explorers—but I tell you what, the ride is one hell

of a good show. So I think we have different perspectives on what exploring is.

But once you get away from this community of ours, you fi nd that the word

takes on a different connotation. We use the expression “to explore business

opportunities” and the expression “explore new kinds of things.” And, in my

mind, this “explore” means to do or to learn something new. It doesn’t matter

whether it’s science or how to manage an organization or how to go places. It’s

when you do something new. And, in my mind, that can take on something of a

different connotation. And so, if you look at it that way, then there are a lot of

people in the world that take risks. In our business, we talk about risk and the

fi rst thing we think of is some poor kids’ young bodies laying there in the ashes.

Well, there are a lot of other risks, and they’re very, very real and they’re

very important. And for those of you that have tried to start a business or have

tried to run one with your own money, you understand what the word risk means.

And it is just as overpowering as anything else.

When I had an opportunity to launch the Atlas rockets—which, by the

way, I consider to be one of the highlights of my career opportunities—I can tell

you, it’s infi nitely easier to sit on top of one of the things that NASA launches,

because you are absolutely in the best hands you could ever be and you will never

fi nd a lower level of risk. When you go launch it and it’s your decision—it’s not

a committee—you’ve got investors that you’ve just assured it’s going to fl y. But

it’s the same old rocket hardware and it’s just as interesting. And that really gets

your attention.

I know that the docs like to record the heart rate—they want to know what

Jim’s heart rate is at launch and at entry and when he steps around. I tell you

what—any of those statistics they collected on us won’t compare with making

the decision to launch something that’s got your money riding on it. That’s a

different ball game. And it is just as interesting as people.

So, my point is not to belittle people. My point is to say risk is a different

thing to a lot of different people for a lot of different reasons. And, so, when we

say we’re taking an acceptable risk or whatever we’re going to do, you have to put

yourself in the place of “risk to whom and for what?” One of the speakers this

morning reiterated that we all think of risk of life. Okay, that’s pretty easy. There

is a property risk, but, actually, I think we can take almost all physical property

and lump it together under fi nancial arrangement of some sort, except in those

rare cases when we’re going to use or deplete a natural resource that doesn’t get

refurbished. I remember one time in the Shuttle program, we just woke up one

day and discovered that our demands—if we met the fl ight schedule—would have

depleted the Earth’s supply of helium the fi rst year. So we kind of had to do some

more engineering. So there is an example of another kind of property that you

put at risk. But you also put at risk opportunities, and that’s opportunities for

you to do something else with your time. The investor could invest in something

that’s going to come out better—there’s a million things that could happen. So

the connotation of risk is something that you have to stop and think about.

THOMAS “T.K.” MATTINGLY I I REMARKS

251

John Young (left) and T. K. Mattingly in the recovery raft after

the splashdown of the Apollo 16 capsule.

(NASA Image S72-36510)


It seems to me that in a democratic world one of the principles we have is

that there are human rights that belong to everybody and we go to great lengths

to take care of those. And as school kids we were taught that our rights would

end when yours start. Okay? That was an easy principle.

That same thing applies to third parties. When we do our trick and we

launch things over people and around them, or when you run nuclear power

plants, or when you do all kinds of things, there are innocent parties who did not

get to vote on taking a risk. And one has to think very seriously about who it is

that has the authority to put in jeopardy somebody who didn’t even participate

in the decision. One of the nice things about the discussion this afternoon was

everybody that I listened to was in activities that did not put

third parties at risk. They were responsible for other people,

they were responsible for a lot of things, but the innocent

bystander was generally immune to their activities. And so

that [responsibility to innocent parties] puts an obligation on

all spacefl ight from the beginning.

When we go out of the atmosphere on those missions

and come back in, we’re going through something that’s

very traumatic and irreversible. Spacefl ight is complex by its

nature. It’s large in scope and it has a whole range of critical,

irreversible decisions in a harsh and unforgiving environment.

Other than that, it’s a wonderful place. [Laughter]

That fi rst step has got to be right, and with that comes

an obligation to all those kids out there in the world that

aren’t part of our club and aren’t having fun doing things that

we enjoy. It’s easy for us to decide, “Hey, this is good stuff,”

whether it’s good science or just a ball to go do, that’s one

thing. That’s different than saying, “I’m going to fl y over your cow pasture and

maybe drop something on your house.” People tend to get irritated at that.

So, what I wanted to do is step back for just a second and talk about some of

the perceptions so that it can help frame the question. Now, I’m not a visionary.

I don’t know what the world should do—I don’t have any idea about whether we

should explore Timbuktu or Saturn or whatever. But in my opportunities in life,

I’ve had a chance to do a lot of really neat things where you could have a vision

about how to get it done. And so I guess I’m one of those people you call an

implementer instead of a visionary. That’s what I enjoy doing, and I think that’s

the kind of things that have just worked out in my favor.

So while not a visionary, I have watched some. What I’d like to do is share

with you some thoughts about groups that I have watched and the characteristics

of them. Because I’m going to make two assumptions—and these are not

debatable, because they’re assumptions. I’m going to assume that you either

go forward or you die. Civilizations do that. So if you aren’t making progress,

you’re in deep trouble. Maybe it’ll take time to play out, but that’s the end. And

I can’t prove that, but, boy, do I believe it.


252


Somebody gave me the analogy that it’s like riding a bicycle. If you try to

sit still and not move, it’s a very diffi cult job. And if you can get up a little speed,

you can do a lot of things. That’s one assumption.

The other I’m going to assume is that there is no way we will not explore

the universe. I have no idea what the timeframe is, but one of my investor friends

gave me a piece of counsel one day when we were having trouble and couldn’t

fi gure out how we were going to make the next step. And he said, “Just don’t get

in the way of success.”

Going back to Jim Lovell’s [Apollo 13] mission, there’s one lesson that I

gathered from our ground risk management and getting a chance to watch the

real pros go do that. When we started, within an hour of Jim telling the world

he’s got a problem, we didn’t have electricity, we didn’t have oxygen, we’re on a

trajectory that’s not coming home, and we don’t have any ideas. And those cats

on the ground solved these problems one at a time. The only rule was, you’ve got

a problem to solve, you’ve got one to solve, and you’ve got one to solve, and we

do have a cutoff date when we need to have all this fi nished—it was later than Jim

wanted it, but it beat the deadline.

But the principle was, don’t get in the way of success. Assume that your

buddy is going to do his job and you don’t want to be the one that’s holding up

the show. With that, we went through a series of really challenging resolutions to

problems. Where folks really didn’t know, but they said, “Boy, if they can fi gure

out how to get the water to last, we’ll fi gure out how to get the electricity over

there.” And it all came together, as you know.

So I’m going to assume that we’re going to go do these things and that

we’re mature enough we recognize that, I think, every success is preceded by

a failure. At least in my experience, it’s not real clear you can have a success

without preceding it with something that’s humbling or threatening. Certainly

my career has gone through that sort of cycle.

The things we learn, we learn most easily from things that don’t work.

You’ve got to be objective, you’ve got to be honest with yourself, but the things

that fail are the things that teach us. I have known a few people who could learn

from success, but you know, when you’re feeling good, it’s really hard to be self-

critical. And so you miss a lot of lessons that you could have had. So don’t ever

be afraid of failure.

So, if that’s the case, if my premise is right—we’re going to make progress

and we’re going to go explore—then our job is don’t get in the way of success.

We don’t know from the government side what the funding profi les will be, what

the timing is, but we need to be prepared to do whatever opportunity presents.

So how do you do that? I don’t know. And I certainly wouldn’t tell you anything

other than sea stories about places I’ve been. But we’re not in those places. We’re

going forward. And that’s a new game and a new set of challenges and new places

to go. That means rethink.

So, in that vein, let me just summarize my observations from spending

20 years in government programs and then a few years working as a contractor


253

NUMBER ONE, YOU HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR, QUANTIFIABLE, SIMPLE-TO-

UNDERSTAND OBJECTIVE. STEP ONE. IF YOU DON’T FILL THAT SQUARE IN,

DON’T WORRY ABOUT THE REST OF THEM, BECAUSE THEY DON’T MATTER.

NUMBER ONE, YOU HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR, QUANTIFIABLE, SIMPLE-TO-““NUMBER ONE, YOU HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR, QUANTIFIABLE, SIMPLE-TO-“NUMBER ONE, YOU HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR, QUANTIFIABLE, SIMPLE-TO-

”DON’T WORRY ABOUT THE REST OF THEM, BECAUSE THEY DON’T MATTER.





on government programs and then the last ten years working on commercial

ventures. I’ve been in large corporations—government certainly is a large

organization, DOD’s a large organization—and I’ve been in some small startups

and entrepreneurial ventures. We’ve made mistakes and we’ve had some successes.

So I’ve tried to catalog for you the signatures that have shown up in every success.

And some were hinted at today and I just wanted to reiterate them.

Number one, you have to have a clear, quantifi able, simple-to-understand

objective. Step one. If you don’t fi ll that square in, don’t worry about the rest of

them, because they don’t matter.

Once you’ve got that, you have some more challenges. And it takes creating

an environment where getting it right is more important than who’s right. You

have to have a group—and big things can’t be done by small groups and by

individuals, only by large organizations. The trick in leadership is to create the

environment where getting it right is all that counts, because the job’s too hard

to do anything else.

So if you’ve got that, then you have to have competent practitioners.

Without that, you won’t go anywhere. Now, back in the Apollo days, that was one

thing no one had to worry about. Because if you just said, “Job opening—work

on Apollo,” you know, the line went all the way around the county, because it was

something every one of the young kids wanted to do.

Today we have to compete for opportunities and people, especially. They

will come to an electric environment. The kinds of things that you folks do will

draw people. They are there—and they’re the people who want to be there, people

who want to be personally accountable.

So in this group, this constellation of things that I have observed as uniform

qualities, you have got to have a good objective, you have got to have personal

accountability—eyeball to eyeball, participant to participant. That’s not an org

chart with lines on it, that’s real-world accountability based on human relations

that we have with each other. You have to be competent in your job.

I would caution that one place we’ve gotten trapped is the resume trap

or the logo trap. I’m the world’s worst in reading a resume and knowing what

somebody can do. I feel pretty good after working with them for a couple of days,

and then I know what kind of people I’m around. But I have a real hard time with

a resume; they can look really good or really bad.

The logo trap is the other side of that. How many times have we worked in an

industry that’s maturing, where the logo of the company is on the wall and it has a


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record of miraculous accomplishments—year after year they’ve done spectacular

things. All of us, including the employees, believe that we are part of that logo.

And it happens at NASA, it happens at any large organization with a history. We

identify with that logo, that’s a symbol of things that have happened.

Maybe, after a period of time, the people that do those things aren’t there

anymore. And unless somebody has been very, very careful to be prescient

enough to create an honest-to-goodness succession plan, you’ll fi nd people who

know the language, who look good, but do not have that personal, gut feeling for

what it’s about that’s necessary to do these things that push the envelope. When

you fi nd that situation, the places that succeed recognize it, and then they take

steps to fi x that.

There’s nothing magic about this except to face up to the fact that you know

what you know and you know what you don’t. And with that, those signatures

have shown up at every one of these little organizations that I’ve had a chance to

be exposed to.

So, while I can’t tell the answers to the next job and the next challenge,

because each one’s unique, I would commend to you that these observations,

that I think I picked up primarily from working at NASA; they have been

uniform signatures. We even applied the much-maligned aerospace management

process to turning around a very nonglamorous company, where we did a really

excellent job of turnaround, coming out of bankruptcy to create some almost

embarrassingly good results—done with people in a nonglamorous fi eld and a

group that two years ago was absolutely demoralized and hopeless.

It all came from just getting them all on the same page with the right orders.

So these are techniques that are not just peculiar to the high-tech business, they

work everywhere in life. So that’s my observation.

I do have one question I’d like to ask of you. When I was a kid, I lived in

Miami, and I used to go down to the beach, like all high school kids, and look up at

the sky and see the Moon, and you kind of wondered, “Gee,” you know, beer talk,

“Hmm, wonder what the Earth would look like [from] up there?” Well, that was

too preposterous for even high school kids to talk about. Strange things happen.

I had a chance to go and serve what I thought would be a couple-year tour

with NASA, and they were doing this program called Apollo and space-centered

life. I knew that when I got there, I wasn’t going to the Moon. But, you know, I

might be getting in at the right time to go to Mars. [Laughter] Well, that schedule

has been modifi ed a couple of times and I said, “Well, okay. I did get to go to the

Moon, I hope that doesn’t blow my trip to Mars.” [Laughter]

Then I woke up and said, “Maybe I could be the program manager to send

somebody to Mars.” So tonight, I would plead with all of you in the exploration

world. Before I turn the lights out, I want to see pictures of people bouncing on

Mars. And that’s your job. Thank you. ■





Michael FoaleNASA Astronaut


RemarksThis morning, we heard an awful lot of eye-opening stories

about how we are exploring the planet today. I’m awed to be in the presence of so many

notable people here in the Monterey Bay Aquarium. Actually, this aquarium has fi gured

inspirationally in motivational movies such as Star Trek and other grand works of science

fi ction. I should tell you I have been motivated by Star Trek, I think we heard that this

afternoon from Chris McKay.

Preparing for this talk, I continually asked myself why I, of all people, have been asked

to speak to you this evening. And I kind of went through the thoughts. Maybe because

I most recently returned from space—that seems an obvious one. Or because I’ve been

fortunate enough to survive six fl ights to space. Or worse, because somebody sees me as

prone to avoiding near disasters throughout my life. I know someone in my management

chain believes that.

I do not feel I’m a particular specialist in risk-taking or taking risks personally. Rather,

I see myself as rather conservative about mitigating risks that I see ahead of myself and

my family.

Michael Foale was selected as an astronaut candidate by NASA in June 1987. He served as a mission

specialist on STS-45, STS-56, STS-63, and STS-103. He was fl ight engineer 2 on Mir 23 and Mir 24

(ascent on STS-84 and return on STS-86). On his last fl ight, 18 October 2003 to 29 April 2004, Foale

served as International Space Station (ISS) Expedition-8 Commander. The Expedition-8 crew launched

from Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan aboard Soyuz TMA-3 and docked with the ISS on 20 October

2003. His six-month tour of duty aboard the International Space Station included a 3 hour, 55 minute

extravehicular activity (EVA). Mission duration was 194 days, 18 hours, and 35 minutes and, at its

conclusion, Foale became the U.S. record holder for most cumulative time in space, having logged 374

days, 11 hours, and 19 minutes.

Michael Foale NASA Astronaut

256

OPENING PHOTO:

Equipped with a bungee harness,

astronaut Michael Foale, Expedition 8

commander and NASA’s science offi cer

on the International Space Station (ISS),

performs squat exercises on the Treadmill

Vibration Isolation System (TVIS) in the

Zvezda Service Module, the ISS living

quarters. (Zvezda is Russian for “star.”)

(NASA Image # ISS007-E-17762)

There are many guests amongst us who do not work at NASA, but have very

relevant experience in exploration. Please believe that I see risk perception and

its mitigation as a rather subjective issue—I think we’ve heard that a number

of times today.

I, and NASA, do not know all the answers. In fact, I feel we may have strayed

off course concerning our approach to risk in some areas. We, NASA, need to

hear more than anything else not Mike Foale’s point of view on risk, but those of

people outside of NASA looking in. I feel my job today is to sort of set the scene

and issue provocative opinions to you—I mean, I’m opinionated—and you are

obliged to dispute them in the coming days.

That said, I’m going to give you my personal view of America’s space

exploration and the risk that comes with it. But fi rst, I’d like to set the scene for

space exploration in the future, inspired by the President’s vision for exploration,

by showing the fi rst part of a video made within the astronaut offi ce by astronauts

and narrated by astronauts—one of whom is myself.

[Narration from video is indented.]

Female speaker: We are, by nature, explorers. Look at the centuries of

histories where people were committed to fi nding new worlds and

establishing them. And now I think it’s time for us to go beyond low

Earth orbit and do the very same thing.

Female Speaker: Human beings are insatiably curious. We want to

know what’s out there in the stars. It’s part of who we are; it’s part of

what we are.

Male Speaker: Being outside on a spacewalk is the coolest thing you

can imagine—beyond belief. You’re doing this important thing,

you’re building a spaceship and the world is rolling by. It’s absolutely

breathtaking.

Male Speaker: The Space Station is teaching us how to explore. Before

we can go to the Moon or to Mars, we have to learn a lot about the

human body. What happens when you put yourself inside a spaceship

for weeks and even months? What food are we going to eat? Are we

going to bring it all in cans or are we going to grow some food on

board? What sort of spaceships do we have to build?

Michael Foale: When we look back 50 years to this time, we won’t

remember the experiments that were performed, we won’t remember

the assembly that was done. What we will know was that countries

came together to do the fi rst joint international project, and we will

know that that was the seed that started us off to the Moon and Mars.

Male Speaker: I think you have to learn to live and work on the Moon

fi rst, so you can make mistakes when you’re only two and a half days

away from a can of beans.

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS MICHAEL FOALE REMARKS

257

Male Speaker: Human beings can do things that robots will never be able

to do. They can anticipate, and they can handle, unexpected problems.

Male Speaker: On the Moon, we ran into about 97 problems that

nobody thought we’d run into, and we fi xed every one.

Male Speaker: We are going to continue to explore. We can confront the

majority of the problems by going to the Moon. And then, building on

that will give us the confi dence and the technical ability to be able to

step further into the solar system and turn our sights towards Mars.

Male Speaker: We go to places where human beings typically can’t

live because these environments offer discoveries that defy our

imagination. We’re going to say, “Wow!”

Male Speaker: We want to know where we should land; we want to

know where the water is. The robots blaze the trail—provide us with

a path to get there. They’re fi nding out whether we could stand on

the surface of Mars. Those robots have raised their electronic eyes

and given us those fi rst glimpses of the horizon of Mars. To be able to

stand on the surface of Mars and feel the wind blowing of Mars’s thin

atmosphere is going to be a tremendous achievement.

Female Speaker: Can we use some of these resources? Can we prosper

here? Can humans live here?

Male Speaker: So far, we have only sent people as far as the Moon,

and sent our robots just as far as the edge of our solar system. We are

just starting to understand our place in the universe, the perspective

that the universe gives us, and the tremendous, infi nite variety that

the rest of the universe holds. That’s where we are headed, and that’s

where we’ll go after Mars.

[Video segment ends]

After watching that video, or others just like it, I fi nd myself kind of

naturally responding with enthusiasm and excitement. I kind of go, “Wow!” It

makes me feel that we humans can do anything if we agree on a common purpose

and simply put our minds to it.

However, evocative and inspirational as my astronaut colleagues can be,

we are leaving out of the message something terribly important—risk. Why is

that? It’s because we feel instinctively, maybe—especially in this year—it will

spoil the mood of our message. That it will conjure up very painful and recent

memories of lost friends and failed missions.

My theme to you this evening is that we must always talk about risk when

we enthuse about exploration. The two are inevitably connected. And I think that

message is coming home today.

Risk—what is it? It’s obvious when disaster strikes, such as when Shackleton’s

ship, Endurance, was forestalled in his second attempt to reach the South Pole,


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crushed by the ice while trapped far from his goal. We consider an activity to

have risk if a foreseeable outcome has undesirable or dangerous consequences.

Everybody knows what risk is, but it’s according to their own subjective standards.

Risk today, in Western society, might be perceived to be—as T. K. Mattingly

referred to—a fi nancial activity or the stock market, allowing your children to take

the bus to school, not evacuating in advance of a hurricane warning, or not wearing

a seatbelt. And these examples are seen as risks because the consequences can

signifi cantly change our lives through fi nancial ruin or loss of life.

So this evening when I speak of risk, I mean the risk of people being killed.

Historically, or even today in underdeveloped countries, loss of life was an

unfortunate, but commonplace, occurrence within families and all other types

of social units. Every child experienced soon in their childhood somebody dying

or they saw a dead person. This might have included the ravages of marauding

neighbors, war, starvation, and disease.

Before Christopher Columbus, if a proposal of exploration was made—be it

to scout the far hills and tribes at a distance, or to utilize substantial resources

of the community to send ships on marauding or exploring adventures—the risk

entailed would appear to carry consequences not worse, and possibly better than,

the risk of inaction.

Inaction might simply mean waiting for unknown peoples to fi nd and attack

the community or running out of food or tradable goods. So the imperative to

explore then and to take risks then was strong, because the risk was understood

widely to be a means to survival and the reduction of future risk.

When a ship that had carried away a large fraction of the able-bodied

community did not return or became known to be lost, the news would be just as

painful then as it is today, but I think the shock should have been less.

How do exploration and risk play a part on Earth now? I see exploration

taking place under the sea, such as underwater archaeology, or on land, such as

the search for Mars meteorites in deserts or Antarctica, or in mountaineering—

and in space, as we develop human and robotic space missions beyond the realm

of Earth. I do not see these combined exploration activities consuming anything

but a small fraction of the world’s economic and human production.

I do not know how today’s activity should be compared to that [of] more

than a hundred years ago, but my feeling is that outlays for exploration today

represent a smaller fraction of our output than in the past. So, in risk terms,

nowadays activities are just as dangerous for participants as any exploration

undertaken in history—dying is dying. There has been no change in the fact that

people can be injured today and lose their lives while exploring.

What has changed is the public expectation for success, and the public

shock when risk and danger show themselves as injury and loss of life. We’re

not often exposed to death and severe illnesses or injury in our personal lives,

unless we’re in a group that we could label as thrill-seekers—and we’ve been

avoiding that term here today—or work in medical or emergency services, or in

a war zone.

MICHAEL FOALE REMARKS

259


I’m going to show you slides of a series of missions that I did not take part

in. I was too young. I was just an enthusiastic, dreamy watcher of these events

that took place in the ’60s. I’m going to show you astronauts walking out to their

vehicle and then the vehicle launching. And I want to tell you to think about how

you, the manager sending that astronaut out to the launch pad, might feel—or

the family. And then I think about how you, as the astronaut or the risktaker

walking out to that launch, might feel about your risk.

[slide] This is Alan Shepherd getting into his Mercury capsule in 1961, May

5th. After the Soviet Union had orbited Yuri Gagarin, April 12th of that year,

President Kennedy stated in a press conference, “No one is more tired that I am

in seeing the U.S. second to Russia in the space fi eld.” And he went on to say,

“We are, I hope, going to be able to carry out our efforts with due regard to the

problem of the life of the men involved this year.”

So he did not say it directly, but he was referring to the high risk of putting a

human into space. James Webb, the then NASA Administrator, issued a statement

no more optimistic. “NASA has not attempted to encourage press coverage of

the fi rst Mercury Redstone manned fl ight.” I think that’s incredible in today’s

environment. “We must keep the perspective that each fl ight is but one of many

milestones we must pass. Some will completely succeed in every respect. Some

partially, and some will fail. From all of them will come mastery of the vast new

space environment on which so much of our future depends.”

[slide] This is Alan Shepherd’s lift off on a Redstone rocket, fl ying for no

more than 15 minutes until splashdown. The fl ight was a success. Afterwards,

the risk perceived by the public may have been assuaged a touch. But my point

to you is, because this was a fi rst fl ight of a new nature carrying a human, it had

great risk. So, like a test pilot, I believe any fi rst fl ight with a human being carries

increased risk, especially in recently designed, new space vehicles.

I’m going to show you a series of slides of space missions, as I mentioned,

that I believe carried a particularly high and increased risk. Initially, these

missions are ones I did not take part in, and so your opinion is as strong as mine.

I think you should hold your opinion and see if it corresponds with that which

I’m going to express to you.

In some cases, this risk may have been well understood by the public, such

as this fi rst fl ight of Al Shepherd. Other slides I will show, the public was much


WHAT HAS CHANGED IS THE PUBLIC EXPECTATION FOR SUCCESS, AND THE PUBLIC

SHOCK WHEN RISK AND DANGER SHOW THEMSELVES AS INJURY AND LOSS OF LIFE.

WHAT HAS CHANGED IS THE PUBLIC EXPECTATION FOR SUCCESS, AND THE PUBLIC ““WHAT HAS CHANGED IS THE PUBLIC EXPECTATION FOR SUCCESS, AND THE PUBLIC “WHAT HAS CHANGED IS THE PUBLIC EXPECTATION FOR SUCCESS, AND THE PUBLIC

”SHOCK WHEN RISK AND DANGER SHOW THEMSELVES AS INJURY AND LOSS OF LIFE.




260


less aware of how great the risk was and found themselves surprised. [slide]

Here’s John Glenn, 20 February 1962, walking out to the fi rst human fl ight of the

Mercury-Atlas vehicle. John Glenn walked out to a much more risky launch than

the one before him by Gus Grissom, which had also been on a Redstone rocket.

Why? In my opinion, it’s pretty clear. Because the vehicle had been changed.

The mission was very different. Launched to orbit with 3 times the speed of the

Redstone, 10 times the energy to gain getting into orbit, and 10 times the energy

to dissipate in excess heat reentering from orbit.

This is the basic fact of the physics of spacefl ight into orbit and away from

the Earth. The energies needed to be acquired or dissipated are huge, roughly 300

times the kinetic energy of airliners, 290 that of supersonic jets, 25 times that of

SpaceShipOne this week, on which I, personally, pin much hope, and I think the

rest of you do, also.

Was this huge difference compared to Alan Shepherd’s fl ight understood

by the public? Kennedy did say only later that year, in September, “We choose to

go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things not because they are easy,

but because they are hard.”

[slide] When Gus Grissom and John Young walked out, in March 1965, to

Gemini 3, the risks were again increased, in my opinion. It was a new human

launch vehicle, a fi rst fl ight for humans, and it was a new, larger spacecraft,

the Gemini capsule. On the previous rockets, there was an escape tower. The

crew escape system was reduced in this case—ejection seats—diminishing its

capability compared to Mercury. It was a big, risky step for our nation’s space

program, but probably not perceived [as so] by the public.

[slide] This is Ed White on the fi rst U.S. spacewalk—defi nitely a new risk

in our space program, adding to others as a fi rst-time test.

[slide] Here’s Neil Armstrong and Dave Scott docking with the Agena upper

stage, only to experience high rotation rates when they docked. They undocked

and experienced even worse rotation rates, tumbling. They saved themselves

by switching to a different attitude control jet system and made an emergency

splashdown thousands of miles from the planned recovery area.

So the risk of human space exploration then, in this program up to that

point, had been successful. Shows itself as a real hazard, but in NASA parlance,

we call that a close call. It’s where we go, “Whew! That was dangerous,” breathe a

sigh of relief, but nobody lost their life.

[slide] The death of the Apollo 1 crew—Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger

Chaffee—in January 1967, in a fi re inside the command module while on the

launch pad, pulled NASA and the Nation up short. But the tragedy brought the

best out in NASA and the Nation at that time, with new public resolve and tough

lessons learned.

[slide] Two years later, an incredibly bold and risky decision was made

by George [Mueller] and others to send Apollo 8 to the Moon after only one

manned Apollo fl ight. Jim Lovell talked about that this morning. I think it is an

incredible fl ight, especially risky because they did not take a lunar module with


261


them, which, because of its independent systems as a spacecraft in its own right,

mitigated for future Apollo missions the risk of command-module failure.

[slide] Apollo 11 was well-perceived by the public to be risky. I think failure

would have been tragic, in their minds, and awful, but not a shock. There was the

unknown risk of landing on the lunar surface, plus the high risk of the Apollo

system as a whole, but, so far, successfully fl own. I remember as a young boy of

about 12 or 13, the success made me sigh with relief, as if the risk had somehow

gone away at that point.

The reward for the United States, for the Nation, when we are willing to

take risks and to explore, is really so obvious in lunar rendezvous; the liftoff

from the lunar surface with just one engine—only one engine to get you into

orbit—carried a whole other set of risks with it.

And then we come to Jim Lovell’s fl ight with Apollo 13. Its emergency was

more of a type—in my mind, Jim—that NASA actually expects and tries to plan

for. Risk again showed itself as real. I’ve wondered how I might have felt leaving

the Earth when the accident happened.

As he pointed out, it was a fortuitous place—200,000 miles from the

Moon—from his point of view. But, in my case, I think of not being able to turn

around as the power systems of their command module failed. I think of what

the cold, dead spacecraft may have seemed like when I was on Mir, when we lost

energy, lost power, without a single sound and no power and the cold of space

sucking the heat out of the spacecraft and yourself and your crewmates. It’s a

very, very hard task dealing with a dying spacecraft because it gets so cold and so

wet. For Apollo 13, the risk was seen to be a close call. I don’t mean to diminish

that, Jim Lovell, but it was a close call because we pulled it off—you pulled it

off—no one died, thanks to thousands of people on Earth and your crew.

[slide] STS-1, with John Young and Bob Crippen. This was the fi rst powered

fl ight of a Space Shuttle. I feel this was the boldest, riskiest fl ight in NASA’s history.

But if you mention that to John, he just seems to mutter some understatement

characteristic of only John Young. The launch involved three characteristically

different components to work perfectly and all together for the fi rst time in

a manned test. These were the external tank, the solid rocket boosters, and the

orbiter. And within these, the main components—engines, hydraulic power units,

fuel cells—all had to work reliably, but at least these had been tested in an integrated

fashion before powered fl ight. This was not true of all three components together.

No unmanned fl ight of the STS had been conducted. And the buildup to STS-1 was

slow and diffi cult for NASA, so the public heard about its risk in the press as much

because it had been so long since the last manned launch of Apollo to Skylab. For all

that risk, the crew escape system—ejection seats—was especially limited compared

to that of Apollo, adding even greater risk to the crew for this fi rst fl ight.

But STS-1 was a success, as were subsequent fl ights up to the 25th,

Challenger. The ejection seats were removed. Our public and NASA seemed to

expect space exploration to be like that of airline operations. And to be fair to the

public, this is an understandable misconception.


262


Only recently—just two weeks ago when I was climbing Mt. Baker—we

were discussing the loss of Columbia with people who do not work in the space

program. And the genuine question goes, “After all, the Shuttle lands like an

airliner, right? So it must be as risk-free as an airliner. You spent all that money on

it.” I’ve heard this from generally well-informed people in different professions.

So the public is especially shocked when the Shuttle is destroyed.

Okay, so why do astronaut applications to NASA actually increase after

we’ve had a disaster, including me in 1981, watching STS-1 from Cambridge,

England, driven to become an astronaut. Would-be astronauts do risky things to

acquire the skills of explorers—I think Bill Stone overdid it this morning—such

as fl y gliders or scuba dive on expeditions in Greece; this is something I thought

was really captivating and interesting. Or excavating human remains in the low

visibility and cold conditions on the Mary Rose in the English Channel. There

was risk in these exploration activities for me and the two people who preceded

me. Two people had died in the course of many dives on the Mary Rose [before I

joined the] project. But the excitement of discovering new things was compelling

and it pushed me to do more.

[slide] Becoming an astronaut in Group 15 in 1987, after Challenger. Yeah,

you’ll recognize some characters here, it’s an in-crowd, but it was a result of my

desire not to take risk, but to experience space exploration. My desire outweighed

the risk I perceived, a risk greater than I probably realized at the time.

[slide] This is astronaut spacefl ight readiness training, and it carries risk.

We may have to eject out of a T-38 or be picked up by helicopter in search-and-

rescue exercises. Or—this is not hazardous—overeat during a survival exercise.

But these training activities to prepare astronauts are undertaken to reduce our

future risks during space missions.

So our training carries risk also, and this is to be balanced carefully with the

higher risks that we are trying to mitigate in the conduct of our space missions. Our

remote outdoor expedition training is a key to preparing crew members to make use

of local resources, solve technical and mechanical failures in diffi cult conditions.

[slide] Here John Young and Charlie Duke are being trained in geology to

increase the science return of Apollo 16, which was highly successful. I believe

we need to place future exploration astronauts into geology fi eld work, in a long-

duration expedition context, as part of scientifi c expeditions where scientists

have a stake in these activities of the astronauts. So the astronauts feel the

pressure that stake has on them, [as] for example, searching for and recognizing

Martian meteorites in the deserts or in Antarctica.

Post-Challenger, my fi rst fl ight was on STS-45 in 1992. And my family

took the risk very seriously, as the families of all astronauts do, as did my fi rst

commander—Charlie Bolden. And he was already a three-time fl yer, I think, at

that point. And he strongly encouraged me—and I was a bit surprised by this—

to write a will. It was honest advice for a risk-taker from a risk-taker.

NASA managers work to the very best of their ability to manage our risk

when we fl y, but they are limited to the tools at hand, the architecture of the


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Space Shuttle system, and the inherent risk in all launch systems attempting

orbital speeds.

In the late 1990s, NASA was directed to work with the Russian Space Agency

to build the International Space Station (ISS), providing sustaining fi nancial

support to, at that time, a Russian space industry in severe diffi culty. And it

jump-started the redesign of the ISS and initiated a series of joint Shuttle-Mir

missions throughout which a NASA astronaut would be left aboard the Mir to

gain experience in the conduct of long-duration space fl ight.

[slide] So here a few of us and our Russian support staff are gathered in front

of Yuri Gagarin’s statue in Star City. As Charlie Precourt and our crew brought me

towards Mir in 1997, I was anxious actually not about the risk, not for my safety,

but my ability simply to interact well with my Russian hosts, my cosmonaut crew.

The launch was behind me, and I reckoned the on-orbit phase should be less risky.

Lloyd’s of London must have thought the same, because they charged me the

same $1,500 for mission life insurance, just as they had for my shorter Shuttle

missions. They would have been horrifi ed as that mission unfolded, I think.

The risk of the U.S. working with Russia in the conduct of these expeditions

was that the two sides did not, and could not reasonably, know everything about

each other’s decisions and processes. I certainly did not know or understand that

well at the time. A lesson learned during this program was that we are obliged to

know as much as possible about each other’s operations that carry risks.

Jerry Linenger, who I was replacing, happened to tell me in the handover a

hairy story about a manual Progress docking attempt, which Vasili Tsibliev had

been instructed to carry out earlier and which, in the end, failed, fi nishing in a

close call, a fl y by of the station. I listened attentively, but did not know how to

calibrate it as a risk. At any rate, I considered the presence of an independent

space vehicle—the Soyuz—to be suffi cient to insure our lives in the event of

bad events on the space station. And, as it would turn out, we came very close to

testing my supposition.

I’m going to show you, very briefl y, a clip of a collision of a Progress vehicle

that took place while I was on board the space station Mir in 1997. Before the

actual collision takes place in this video, I will show you the way this docking

attempt should have taken place. There you will see a Progress vehicle coming

in towards the space station, towards the docking axis. And it will dock in a


LLOYD’S OF LONDON MUST HAVE THOUGHT THE SAME, BECAUSE THEY CHARGED ME THE

SAME $1,500 FOR MISSION LIFE INSURANCE, JUST AS THEY HAD FOR MY SHORTER SHUTTLE

MISSIONS. THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN HORRIFIED AS THAT MISSION UNFOLDED, I THINK.

LLOYD’S OF LONDON MUST HAVE THOUGHT THE SAME, BECAUSE THEY CHARGED ME THE ““LLOYD’S OF LONDON MUST HAVE THOUGHT THE SAME, BECAUSE THEY CHARGED ME THE “LLOYD’S OF LONDON MUST HAVE THOUGHT THE SAME, BECAUSE THEY CHARGED ME THE

”MISSIONS. THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN HORRIFIED AS THAT MISSION UNFOLDED, I THINK.




264


nominal fashion, stopping at about 100 meters, and then the crew takes over,

using manual controls.

In this successful attempt, carried out by Anatoly Soloviev and Pavel

Vinogradov, that I witnessed actually later on in that year, they were using all of

the full capabilities of the Progress docking system—the range and range rate,

the radar system—that allow a normal automatic docking to take place. Vasili

Tsibliev, my commander in Mir 23, had been asked to turn off that equipment—

not use it. Why? Because the program in Russia wanted to cut the cost of buying

a $2 million electronic box in the Ukraine. That was the rationale for this test. As

it unfolded, and as I learned about it, I realized this was a gross miscalculation of

what we were ready to do that day, and it was very improperly thought through

[about] how to carry out this docking test.

[video] The sound you hear is in the Soyuz as I was fl ying around in

there looking at the damage, actually. This is the docking module that we’re

talking about—the docking core. Here’s Anatoly monitoring the TORU docking

equipment. And he sees the Mir in his sights as he fl ies the Progress manually,

looking through a camera from the Progress towards the Mir.

This now is the scene as Vasili saw it. We’d already gotten too high above

the Mir. You can see the solar arrays of the Mir here, this is the long axis. I snuck

this video, by the way, which is why it’s such poor quality. They didn’t know I

took it. And the docking was along this axis, it was meant to be. You can see

we’re high above the Mir. Vasili is not really saying anything in this audio yet. I’m

just watching over his shoulder. Sasha is nearby. We should be docking on this

axis, but we’re now moving this way.

Sasha is saying, “You should move out.” Sasha is saying, “Break out! Break

out!” He says to me, “Get to the spacecraft.” This is my feet coming by the scene

here. And then, that’s the crash as the Progress hits. At this point, I’m fl oating

into the space towards the Soyuz and the pressure’s already falling, I can feel the

pressure, in my ears falling.

This is the classic klaxon that you hear when you have a loss of pressure.

Afterwards, when we did the survey, fl ying around in the Soyuz spacecraft, we

looked at the damage and we saw that the solar array had been badly crashed.

After big events—after risk—you relax. And I wanted to show you what the

handover’s mood looked like as we fi nished up. After that pretty terrible day for

Vasili Tsibliev and the rest of us, but particularly bad for the commander who

suffered the stigma of this collision, every day we would look out of the window

at this scene.

The damage to the Spektr module was serious, and it broke the foundation

of that solar array that comes in here towards the Spektr module—so much [so]

that I feel that the bearing was the location of the breach in the hull or [the]

leaks. And Anatoly Soloviev and I did a space walk in Russian suits to survey the

damage and try to fi nd a hole, but we were not successful.

More serious and risky were the successive—and this takes me back to Jim

Lovell’s experience—times when we would lose complete attitude control of the


265


space station and tumble slowly. When we had isolated that module—the Spektr

module, Sasha and I—after the collision, we had cut off 30 percent of the Mir’s

power supply in so doing. And so now, the Mir was in a very critical energy state.

Actually, orienting the Mir using the Soyuz, which was the way we did this

to overcome the loss of attitude control, always made me nervous that we would

have inadvertently stabilized it in a spin, so stable that we would forever be stuck

in it and direct the arrays away from the Sun and then, therefore, kill the station.

[slide] This is for John Grunsfeld. To put risk on Mir in perspective, I have to

add that the risk of a Space Shuttle fl ight, for me, after the Mir, was just as real to

me. It was while participating in a Hubble repair mission—with John Grunsfeld,

by the way, over here—on STS-103 in 1999, commanded by Kurt Brown, that

I felt the most anxious about what we’re planning to do. And the task simply

was performance anxiety for me. To change out the brain, the

main computer, of the telescope—that made me more nervous

that day, about my own performance and the risk of my actions,

than anything I have ever experienced in all of six space missions.

To leave Hubble worse off than we had found it, now that was a

nightmare I did not ever want to contemplate.

Coming back to Russia again, NASA’s experience on Mir,

I believe, went a long way to reducing risk in working with the

Russians on the International Space Station. We gained insight

into their commissions and launch decision-making processes.

[slide] So here you see me. I want to show you, this is

the management point of view, and it’s a serious one of launch

readiness. Ten days before launch on that Soyuz TMA-3 in October

of last year, I am being presented as kind of an item—Exhibit

A—to the Russian commission. Not only as a risk-taker, but as a

form of risk mitigation. The argument was presented, in front of

me and my crew, by Star City that our training was complete and

suffi cient and so, therefore, our performance did not represent a

risk to the completion of Expedition 8. It was kind of a unique

situation to be in for me.

As we approached the time of departure from Star City to

the launch site in Baikonur, Kazakhstan, my family—Rhonda, Ian,

and Jenna, and those are my crewmates, Aleksandr Kaleri and

Pedro Duque—were toasted very seriously by the Russians and

thoughtfully, acknowledging the unspoken risks in front of us as we embarked on

Expedition 8. At this point, no one talks about risk.

[slide] I’m going to show you the walk out from the suit-up building in

Kazakhstan out to our designated squares, and then the salute, and then on

to the launch pad for a Soyuz launch. On the way out to a Shuttle launch, you

become introspective, somewhat, as you notice all the other vehicles for a Shuttle

launch are leaving. On the way out to a Russian launch, I’m always amazed that

in Kazakhstan, when you get to the base of the rocket, you’re surrounded by


Astronaut Michael Foale, Expedition 8

commander and NASA’s science offi cer on

the International Space Station, gives thumbs

up after he and his crewmates successfully

landed in north central Kazakhstan on

30 April 2004 in their Soyuz TMA-3 capsule.

(NASA Image # JSC2004-E-21242)

266

hundreds of senior fi gures and VIPs, and they’re all clamoring to be there, right

next to a steaming, hissing, breathing rocket. I guess they want to take part in the

same risk as we three have to at that point in the launch sequence.

At this point, though, they’ve moved everybody away. The ride is incredible.

I don’t know how to describe it. There’s a lot of rumbling noise, vibration. Very

abrupt cutoffs as we go through staging, and then there’s peace and quiet when you

get to orbit. And all the hoopla you went through getting to the launch pad is kind

of behind you.

You think about, if you have a refl ective moment, your family back at the

launch pad, thousands of miles away already.

If you were to watch the faces of launch teams at Cape Canaveral, and the

managers, you would fi nd expressions of concern and nervousness and prayer

and hope written all over their faces. At this moment, if people have forgotten

the risk of the launch, then they remember it.

On board, it’s more simple. Crew members have to only perform reliably and

carefully. In my mind, once embarked on a risky phase, be it crossing a crevice

fi eld on a glacier or carrying out procedures using dynamic operations in a space

vehicle, at that point, you have to stop worrying and move on to minimize the

risk of your own failure. That’s the risk-taker’s point of view.

Of course, there’s time to relax sometimes, such as New Year. A long-

duration mission is very much an act of endurance and perseverance. The risk

I take most seriously is being part of a crew that cannot shift out of relaxation

from routine to operational readiness for dynamic operations. An example of

that would be shifting to operational readiness for reentry in a space vehicle after

you’ve spent 194 days in space.

This transition for our crew, including a long-time unseen fl ight engineer,

was probably the greatest risk we were exposed to during this otherwise pretty

nominal expedition. The ride is incredible. From four hours ago, [when] we

were enjoying chocolate and drinks, and then, after a deorbit burn, pyro belts

fi ring, tumbling, the shock of parachute opening, rapid depressurization of the

spacecraft, and then the smell of cordite coming in through the vents of the

spacecraft into the cabin; fi nally, you touch down onto the Kazakhstan plain.

[video] He’s saying, “I congratulate you.” This is the hole made by a thruster

made on the Soyuz spacecraft as it did the braking burn.

After the risk is past, crew members, family, space managers, all of us are

relieved, and we celebrate how we have cheated death once more. It shows in our

faces that the risk of spacefl ight and space exploration is always present, and

we must always be honest about it, explain it, and do our utmost to reduce it,

without hiding it. That way, when we risk-takers are back with our families and

we talk about committing to new space exploration—she says, “Don’t you dare

fl y again!” [joking] No, you talk about it. Nobody should ever, ever be shocked if,

in taking those steps, we should falter and not return home.

Exploration today carries risk just as dangerous as it did in history. I believe

we must honestly explain that risk, just as we move forward to carry out the


267

President’s space exploration vision. Americans can suffer discomfort, hardship,

and overcome the greatest diffi culties when the goals and risks are laid out plainly

side by side. We must take on these most challenging adventures, while looking

into the face of risk. In that way, we will achieve some incredible things in space.

You’ve listened this evening to me and the excellent discussion today.

Please continue to let me and us know what you, the public, and our

Congress, think about risk-taking in space exploration. Thank you for being here

this evening. ■




269

About the EditorsSteven J. Dick is the chief historian for NASA. He has a B.S. in astrophysics

(1971), and an M.A. and Ph.D. (1977) in history and philosophy of science from Indiana

University. Dick worked as an astronomer and historian of science at the U. S. Naval

Observatory in Washington, D.C. for 24 years before coming to NASA Headquarters

in 2003. Among his books are Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life

Debate from Democritus to Kant (1982), The Biological Universe: The Twentieth Century

Extraterrestrial Life Debate and the Limits of Science (1996), and Life on Other Worlds

(1998), the latter translated into Chinese, Italian, Czech, and Polish. His most recent

books are The Living Universe: NASA and the Development of Astrobiology (2004) and

a comprehensive history of the U. S. Naval Observatory, Sky and Ocean Joined: The U. S.

Naval Observatory, 1830–2000 (2003). The latter received the Pendleton Prize of the

Society for History in the Federal Government. He is also editor of Many Worlds:

The New Universe, Extraterrestrial Life and the Theological Implications (2000). Dick is

the recipient of the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Medal and the NASA Group

Achievement Award for his role in NASA’s multidisciplinary program in astrobiology.

He has served as chairman of the Historical Astronomy Division of the American

Astronomical Society, as president of the History of Astronomy Commission of

the International Astronomical Union, and is the immediate past president of the

Philosophical Society of Washington.

Keith L. Cowing is the editor of the online publications NASA Watch and

SpaceRef.com. He received both a B.A. (1984) and M.A. (1987) in biology from Central

Connecticut State University. Cowing is the coauthor (with Frank Sietzen, Jr.) of

New Moon Rising (2004) which examines the events leading up to the formulation of

the Vision for Space Exploration as put forth by President Bush. Cowing has served

as guest editor of Ad Astra Magazine, written for United Press International, and

Air&Space Magazine (among others), and appeared on all major U.S. television and

radio networks as a commentator on space policy and technology. Prior to being

an online journalist, Cowing was a NASA civil servant and served as manager of

Pressurized Payload Accommodations at the NASA Space Station Freedom Program

Offi ce. Prior to, and immediately after, working for NASA, Cowing was employed

by the American Institute of Biological Sciences where he managed a series of large

biomedical peer review activities for NASA and the U.S. Army. Cowing has been a

participant in the NASA Haughton Mars Project located on Devon Island, Nunavut,

Canada. Together with his business partner Marc Boucher, SpaceRef Interactive

donated and constructed the Arthur Clarke Mars Greenhouse, now in operating on

Devon Island. Cowing was also part of the early organizational meetings that led

to the establishment of NASA’s astrobiology program and the NASA Astrobiology

Institute. Cowing helped to organize the symposium and donated his services in the

preparation of these proceedings.



271

IndexAAccidents in North American Mountaineering, 211

Agena, 260

Advance Base, 31

Advanced Camera for Surveys, 215

Albertson, Ray, 179

Allen, Paul, 38

Alvin (American submersible), 103

Ames Research Center, 24, 46, 65, 81, 229, 238, 242

Amundsen, Roald, 22–23, 28, 29–30, 37, 49

Annapurna, 49

Andersen, Dale, 43–48, 67, 86, 88, 236

Andrea Doria, 98

Andrews, David, 188, 193

Antarctica, 23, 25, 33, 43–47, 101, 170, 222, 258, 262; dry valleys, 44–46

Apollo program, 56, 93, 147, 153, 154, 155, 157, 167, 169, 189, 193, 199, 221, 226, 227,

240, 253, 260, 261

Apollo 1 (Apollo 204), 39, 187, 188; fi re, 188–191, 260

Apollo 7, 13, 18

Apollo 8, 12–13, 17, 18, 36

Apollo 9, 18, 193

Apollo 10, 18, 19

Apollo 11, 14, 18, 260

Apollo 12, 14–15, 18

Apollo 13, 15–20, 36, 82, 99, 128, 151, 156, 194, 220, 252, 261; lessons learned, 19

Apollo 14, 36

Apollo 15, 193

Apollo 16, 262

Apollo 17, 154

Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP), 156

Aquarius Laboratory, 221

Arctic, 47, 101, 210

Armstrong, Neil, 130, 195, 260

Asrar, Ghassem, 239

Assembly Test and Launch Operations (ATLO), 178

Asteroids, 200

Astrobiology, 46, 55, 61–64, 124, 247

Atlas launch vehicle, 250, 260

Australasian-Antarctic Expedition, 29

Averner, Mel, 235, 248

272

BBachelard, Claude, 35

Balboa, Vasco Núñez de, 131

Barney, Mitch, 202

Barton, Otis, 102

Bathyscaphe, 102–103

Beagle, voyage of, 28

Beagle II (mission), 168

Beebe, William, 102

Belgian Antarctic Expedition, 28–29

Belgica, 28

Bergreen, Laurence, 129–138

Big Bang, 184

Bismarck (ship), 123

Bolden, Charles, 262

Borman, Frank, 12, 188–191, 198

Boston, Penny, 55–60, 67, 87–88, 94, 147, 173

Bowersox, Ken, 26

Boynton, Bill, 246

Breashears, David, 83

British trans-Antarctic Expedition, 30

Brown, Kurt, 265

Budden, Nancy Ann, 236

Bunger Hills, Antarctica, 46–47

Burns, Ed, 77

Burton, Kathleen, 248

Bush, President George W., 10, 236

Bush, President George H.W., 236

Byrd, Richard, 31

CC-141 Starlifter, 46

Cabana, Robert, 210

Cabrol, Nathalie, 61–68, 88, 231, 232, 234, 246

Calypso (ship), 7

Cameron, James, 119–128, 140, 143, 145, 148, 154; Ghosts of the Abyss, 121

Cantrell, Walter, 217

Cape of the Feast of the 11,000 Virgins, 133

Cape Canaveral, 160, 173, 175, 266

Cape Crozier, 79

Carlin, George, 192–193

INDEXRISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS

273

Carter, Jimmy, 155, 156

Cartography, 134

Cassini (mission), 151, 235

Cauffman, Sandra, 231

Caves, 55–60; organisms in, 58–59; underwater, 69–75

Cepollina, Frank, 214

Ceres, 200

Chafee, Roger, 189, 190, 260

Chaikin, Andrew, 187

Challenger (ship), 102

Challenger Space Shuttle, 39, 183, 204; accident, 182, 192, 193, 194, 198, 200, 224,

261, 262; TV movie, 198

Chandra X-ray Observatory, 151

Chatterton, John, 97–100, 140, 146; Shadow Divers, 99

Cherry-Garrard, Apsley, 23, 78–79

China: and exploration in 15th century, 7, 34, 232

China: space program, 145

Christensen, Rho, 248

Clancy, Bill, 238

Clarke, Arthur C., 34

Clementine (lunar mission), 154

Closed loop ecosystems, 146

COBE—Cosmic Background Explorer, 181–186, 204

Collins, Eileen, 217

Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), 2, 7, 198, 202, 212–213, 214, 230

Columbia Space Shuttle accident, ix, 7–8, 39, 191, 198, 200, 213, 214, 225, 262;

compared to Titanic disaster, 122–123

Columbia Hills, 173, 210

Columbus, Christopher, 22, 24–25, 102, 131, 132, 133, 141, 258

Command Service Module (Apollo), 12, 13, 15, 17, 19

Communications, 36

Congress: United States, 86, 157, 209, 218, 230

Cook, Frederick, 28

Cook, Captain James, 136

Cook, Steve, 82

Corps of Discovery, 26–27

Cortez, Hernando, 37

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, 216

Cousteau, Jacques, 7, 106, 108, 109, 210

Cousteau, Jean-Michel, 107–110, 139, 140, 210

Cowing, Keith, 3, 90, 91, 229, 236, 237, 238, 247

Cueva Cheve, 70–76

Cueva de Villa Luz, 59


274

Dda Gama, Vasco, 3, 131

Darabont, Frank, 188

Darwin, Charles, 28

Dawn (mission), 200

Decompression illness/sickness (DCI/DCS), 92, 98, 111–114, 116–118, 139

Deep rover submersible, 124

Deepworker submersible, 105

Delta launch vehicle, 182, 183, 247

Denali (Mt. McKinley), 210, 212

Department of Defense, 231, 240, 253

Department of State, 240

Department of the Treasury, 240

Devil’s Tower, 226

Dick, Steven, 229, 232, 234

Ditertay, Michael, 248

Diving, caves, 69–76; commercial, 111–118; fi lming, 119–128; and spacefl ight, 116

Duke, Charles, 262

Dumont d’Urville, Jules-Sébastian-César, 25

Dumont d’Urville Station, Antarctica, 33

Dunne, Patrick, 247

EEarle, Sylvia, 101–106, 124, 141, 142, 144, 146, 148, 200, 226

Earth Observing System, 166; EOS, 239

East Pacifi c Rise, 142

Elcano, Juan Sebastián, 138

Elephant Island, 30

Endeavour (shuttle), 205

Endurance (fi lm) 205

Endurance (book), 49

Endurance (ship), 35, 232

Europa, 199

European Space Agency, 185

Error, human, 17

Exobiology (see Astrobiology)

Expedition: 21–34; Beagle, 28; Australasian-Antarctic, 29; Belgian Antarctic,

28–29; idea of, 27, 71, 85; Lewis and Clark, 26–28; Norwegian polar, 31–32;

Shackleton, 31–32

Expedition 8 (ISS), 265

Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV), 156


275

Exploration: consequences of forsaking, 7, 104; disease, 135; education/

inspiration, 146; government vs. individual, 38, 88–89, 93, 94; nature of,

83–84; reasons for, 5, 21–22, 130, 144–145, 147; robotic vs. human, 82–83,

86–91, 94, 101, 121, 165–171, 194; staged approach, 84, 86, 117; urge to,

232–233. See also caves, lakes, mountains, oceans, risk, space.

Extravehicular Activity (EVA), 72–75, 116, 163, 169, 217, 260

Extrasolar planets, 198–199

FFailure, acceptance of, 126–128

Feinberg, Al, 248

Feynman, Richard, 194

FIDO (rover), 178

Fincke, Mike, 151

Fisher, Scott, 51

Fitzroy, Robert, 28

Flatirons, 77

Foale, Michael, 26, 29, 151, 192, 216, 219, 220–222, 223, 227, 255–267

Fram, 32–33

From Earth to the Moon, 187–193, 198

Fuller, Joe, 201

GGaff, John, 240

Gagarin, Yuri, 259, 263

Gans, John, 210, 226

Garvin, Jim, 89, 145, 165–171, 197, 199, 203, 204, 233, 235, 236, 238, 241

Gast, David, 237

Gates, Donovan, 248

Gemini program, 86, 93, 189, 227, 260

Gemini 3, 12, 260

Gemini 4, 12

Gemini 5, 12

Gemini 7, 12, 86

Genesis spacecraft, 120

Gernhardt, Michael, 75, 92, 111–118, 139, 228, 230

Gilruth, Robert, 156

Glenn, John, 40, 132, 260

Glenn Research Center, 240

Goddard Space Flight Center, 86, 182, 202, 205, 212, 214, 216, 231

Gould, Stephen Jay, 239


276

Greeley, Ron, 56

Great white shark, 110, 139–140

Grissom, Betty, 189

Grissom, Gus, 189–190, 260

Grumman Corporation, 12, 189, 195

Grunsfeld, John, 3, 151, 191, 197, 200, 201, 204, 209–218, 219, 222, 224, 226, 227,

228, 229, 230, 231, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 246, 248, 265

Gusev crater, 177

HHackett, Peter, 62

Hagglund track vehicles, 45

Hall, Rob, 52

Halpern, David, 143, 148, 200, 219, 238, 241, 248

Hanks, Tom, 187

Hazards: see Decompression illness; radiation

Helium-3, 143, 154

Heyerdahl, Thor, 102

Hillary, Edmund, 7, 104

Howard, Ron, 82

Hubbard, Scott, 1–2, 148, 198, 225, 233, 242, 245–248

Hubble Space Telescope, 87, 151, 184, 232, 265; servicing mission 37, 209, 212, 213,

214, 215, 216; deep fi eld/ultra deep fi eld, 216–217

Hydrothermal vents, 123–124, 142

IILC-Dover spacesuit, 75

Intelligent Mechanisms Group, NASA, 46

International Space Station, 24, 29, 34, 36, 118, 123, 151, 215, 217, 263

Io, caves on, 57

Isolation, effects of, 23–24, 25–26, 28–29

ISAT satellite, 166

JJacobs, Robert, 229, 248

James Webb Space Telescope, 181–186, 198

Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), 217

Jarvis, Greg, 193

Jefferson, President Thomas, 26

Johansen, Hjalmar, 32–33

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS INDEX

277

Johnson Space Center, 24, 27, 142, 162

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 60, 87, 142, 175, 176, 178

KK2, 51, 52, 70

Kaiko (robot), 103

Kangchenunga, 51

Kelly, Jim, 217

Kennedy, James, 6

Kennedy, President John F., 259, 260

Kennedy Space Center, 6, 17, 71

King Charles V of Spain, 130, 131

Knoll, Andrew, 179

Kranz, Gene, 19, 20, 156

Krause, Tom, 224, 228

LLagrange point L2, 185

Lakes: Antarctic, 43–47; highest, 61–67

Laguna Blanca, 63–67

Laguna Verde, 63–67

Lake Hoare, 45

Lambertsen, C. J., 113

Langley Research Center, 60

Lapu-Lapu, 136–137

Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 246

Lawrence, David, 140

Lawrence, Wendy, 217

Lechuguilla Cave, 55, 59

Leckrone, David, 232–233

Lee, Dave, 77

Lemke, Larry, 94

Leonov, Alexi, 13

Lessons learned: 21–34; from Apollo 13, 19; from Lewis and Clark expedition,

26–28; from Mir, 24; from polar expeditions, 24; from Skylab, 24

Levine, Joel, 170

Lewis and Clark expedition, 26–28, 103

Lhotse, 52

Licancabur, 62–67

Lim, Darlene, 81

Lindbergh, Anne Morrow, 102, 104


278

Linenger, Jerry, 192, 263

Liskowsky, David, 230

Lloyds of London, 263

Lockheed-Martin, 168, 195, 216

Long-duration missions, 24

Longnecker, David, 139

Lovell, James, 11–20, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 61, 81, 82, 93, 130

Low, George, 156

Lucid, Shannon, 159–164, 193, 200

Lunar and Planetary Institute, 236

Lunar Prospector, 1, 154

Lunar rover (Apollo), 156, 193

Lunar (Excursion) Module, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 189, 193, 260; Block II, 156

MMcAuliffe, Christa, 193

McCandless, Bruce, 94

McGuinness, Scott, 92, 229–230

McKay, Chris, 55, 81, 81–94, 104, 219, 222–223, 224, 225, 228, 236, 246, 248, 255

McMurdo Sound, 43, 46, 47

Mactan, 137

Magellan, Ferdinand, 3, 129–137, 139, 141, 144, 197, 229, 231

Magellan (Venus mission), 168

Magellanic Clouds, 135, 136

Mallory, George, 99

Malloy, Larry, 198

Makarov, Oleg , 13

Marianas Trench, 102

Mariner 3 and 4, 177

Mariner 8 and 9, 177

Mark, Hans, 156

Mars, 154, 166, 168, 200, 221: analogues, 47, 55, 62–67, 124; caves, 56–57, 173;

fossil record, 142; geology, 170; human missions, 140, 144, 169, 195, 222,

241, 254; meteorites, 258, 262; program, 1–2, 23, 24; robotic probes, 167.

See also Pathfi nder.

Mars Climate Orbiter, 174, 197, 198

Mars Exploration Rovers, 61, 62, 87, 90, 198, 203, 204, 215

Mars Global Surveyor, 168

Mars Observer, 168, 197

Mars Odyssey, 198


279

Mars Pathfi nder, 46, 131, 237

Mars Polar Lander, 131, 168, 173, 197, 198, 238

Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, 168, 198

Mars sample return, 199

Mars Science Laboratory, 246

Mars Scout, 170, 204

Marshall Spacefl ight Center, 82

Mary Rose, 262

Martin, James, 167

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 60, 87

Mattingly, T.K., 198, 249–254, 258

Mauna Kea, 166

Mawson, Douglas, 29

Melvill, Mike, 217, 219, 220

Mewhinney, Michael, 248

Mercury Program, 189, 259, 260

Meridiani, 177

Microbial communities: in Antarctica lakes, 46; in caves, 58–59

Microgravity, 11, 35, countermeasures, 40

Micrometeroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD), 139

Mid-Atlantic Ridge, 123, 125, 142

Mir (Russian submersible), 103, 124–126

Mir (Soviet/Russian space station), 24, 152, 160–164, 192, 194, 263; Progress

collision, 263–265

Mir 23 mission, 264

Mission Control, 15, 19, 23–24, 35, 36, 156, 160, 221

Mission to Mars, 187

Mojave Desert, 178

Mondale, Walter, 188–191

Monterey, California, 3

Monterey Bay Aquarium, 255

Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute (MBARI), 142

Moon, circumnavigation, 13; human missions, 140, 151, 154, 169, 195, 199–200,

221, 222, 241, 254; lava tubes, 56; mining, 143; mission to, 116; robotic

missions, 167

Mountaineering, 49–53, 72–79, 82–84

Mt. Baker, 262

Mt. Everest, 7, 50–53, 62, 70, 79, 82–84, 210

Mt. Huntington, 77

Mt. Ranier, 50

Mt. Washington, 77

Mueller, George, 260


280

NN-1 rocket, 13

Naderi, Firouz, 175

Nagle, Bill, 98

Nansen, Fridtjof, 22, 31–33

NASA, name recognition, 234–235; public affairs, 230, 231, 236, 237; website, 148,

236, 238

NASA Engineering and Safety Center, 232

NASA Inspector General, 230–231

NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC), 57

NASA Safety Offi ce, 62, 64

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), 156

National Geographic Society, 74, 105, 161, 210

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 104, 116

National Outdoor Leadership School, 210, 220, 221, 222, 226

Natural resources conservation, 144

Nautile (French submersible), 103

Naval Postgraduate School, 209, 247

Navigation, 132

NEEMO (NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations), 116

Newman, Jim, 216

Next Generation Space Telescope (see James Webb Space Telescope)

Nixon, President Richard, 156

NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), 116

Nobile, Umberto, 29

Noguchi, Soichi, 217

Norgay, Tenzing, 7

Northrop Grumman, 185

North American Aviation, 191, 195

North Pole, 31–33

Norwegian Polar Expedition, 32–33

OOccupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 102

Oceans: deep sea exploration, 101–106, 239, 241

Ocean Futures Society, 109

O’Brien, Miles, 35–40, 219, 220, 248

O’Keefe, Georgia, 171

O’Keefe, Sean, ix, 3–10, 148, 192, 212, 213, 214, 248

Olympus Mons, 56–57


281

Opportunity Mars Rover, 151, 173, 178, 179, 225

Orlan spacesuit, 75

Osinski, Gordon, 140

Oxygen toxicity, 98

PPadalka, Gennady, 151

Parker, Bob, 212

Pathfi nder (mission), 2, 46

Pawelczyk, Jim, 146

Pellerin, Charles, 183

Pew Ocean Commission, 108

Pengra, Trish, 248

Phillips, Sam, 156

Phoenix (mission), 168

Pigafetta, Antonio, 136

Pinch, John and Susan, 57

Pinta (ship), 24

Pinzon, Martin Alonzo, 24–25

Pizzaro, Francisco, 37

Pope Leo X, 133

Port Hueneme, 23

Portable Life Support System (PLSS), 72–75, 92, 193

Powering Apollo, 181

Precourt, Charles, 263

Presby, Andy, 142, 145, 223

Primordial cosmic background radiation, 182, 184

Progress (spacecraft), 263, 264

Proton rocket, 13

Ptolemy, 134

RRadiation, 92–93

Ramsey, Becky, 88, 234

Readdy, William, 6

Reagan, President Ronald, 153

Redstone rocket, 259, 260

Remotely operated vehicle (ROV), 46, 115, 121, 124

Resnik, Judy, 193

Rice, Jim, 46

Rio de la Plata, 135


282

Risk: acceptance of, ix, 1, 9, 20, 101–102, 117–118, 194, 225; in Age of Discovery,

129; as agent of change, 110; in Apollo program, 11–20; automotive, ix, 1,

21; controlling, 84–85, 116–117; early human missions, 259–261; escape

systems, 15; families and, 262, 266; government vs. individual, 38, 88–89, 93;

and group thinking, 52; ignorance as, 108; individual responsibility for, 120;

and luck, 18; and Lunar Prospector, 1; and Mars program, 1–2; mitigation,

73; in mountaineering, 50–51; to oceans, 107–110; overestimating, 12, 14,

21; perceptions of, 1, 45, 127; with polar explorers, 37; mission, 250–251,

266; reasons for taking, 2, 4, 65–66, 78, 102, 109–110; and redundancy, 14,

25, 36; and reliability, 36; and reward, 36, 39, 78; and simplifi cation, 14; in

Soviet space program, 13; underestimating, 21. See also Apollo; exploration;

failure, acceptance of; risk, types of; risk aversion

Risk, types of, 174–178, 182–183; assigned, 44–45; catastrophic, 67; cost, 174–176;

daily life, 13, 21, 102; environmental, 176–177; personal (human), 1, 2, 43, 87,

113–114, 119–120; mission, 43; monetary, 11; operational, 177; programmatic,

1, 87, 112, 176; schedule, 177–178; technology, 176; transportation, 45. See

also decompression illness; radiation; oxygen toxicity

Risk aversion, 20, 102, 114–115, 126–128

Risk-reward equation, 111–118

Roberts, David, 77–80, 199

Roberts, Donna, 91

Robinson, Steve, 217

Robotics: see exploration, robotic vs. human

Roddenberry, Eugene, 93, 139, 143

Rogers Commission (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger

Accident), 194

Ross, Jerry, 4

Russian Space Agency, 263

Rutan, Burt, 38, 89, 93, 230, 234, 245

SSagan, Carl, 141

Santa Maria (ship), 25

Sanlucar de Barrameda, 130

Saturn, 151

Saturn V, 204

SALT II Treaty, 156

Schilling, Ed, 248

Schmitt, Harrison (Jack), 61, 153–157, 169, 174, 193

Schuman, David, 211

Scobee, Richard, 193

Scott, David, 188, 193, 194, 195, 260

Scott, Robert Falcon, 23, 39, 49, 78, 79

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS INDEX

283

Scurvy, 135

Seamans, Robert (Bob), 156

Shackleton, Ernest, 30–31, 35, 37, 78, 79, 232, 233

Shackleton Crater, 81

Shaddock, Mark, 248

Shepard, Alan, 38, 259, 260

Shinkai (Japanese submersible), 103

Shipwrecks, diving, 97–100

Shuttle Laser Altimeter (SLA), 166

Shuttle-Mir program, 263

Silver Lake, 178

Simonson, Eric, 50

Skylab, 24, 162

Snow, C.P., 147

Soloviev, Anatoly, 264

Soviet space program, 13, 36

Soyuz, 163, 264, 265, 266

Soyuz TMA-3, 265

Space Exploration Vision: see Vision for Space Exploration

Space Shuttle, 73, 85, 117, 155, 182, 194, 204, 209, 215, 217, 224, 261, 262, 263, 265;

see also Challenger, Columbia, Endeavour, STS missions

Space Station, 117–118

SpaceShipOne, 216, 219, 220, 224, 229, 260

Spelunking, 55–60

Spice trade, 130

Spice Islands, 131, 136

Spektr module, 264, 265

Spirit Mars Rover, 151, 173, 178, 179

Spitzer Telescope, 151

Spudis, Paul, 147

Squyres, Steve, 2, 87, 90, 93, 167, 173–179, 186, 197, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204, 235

Star City, 161, 162, 263, 265

Star Trek, 93, 255

Steffanson, Vilhjalmar, 70

Stone, Bill, 69–76, 79, 81–85, 91, 262

Strait of Magellan, 130, 133, 136

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 153

Stromatolotes, 64

STS-1, 261, 262

STS-45, 262

STS-69 “Dog Crew II,” 115

STS-72, 205

STS-103, 265

STS-107, 217

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS INDEX

284

STS-114, 217, 218

Stuster, Jack, 21–40, 232

Sullivan, Kathy, 141

Surveyor Program, 167, 169

Surveyor 7, 167

Survival training, 222

T2001: A Space Odyssey, 34

T-38, 262

Tahue, George, 239

Taylor, Jim, 248

Tenzing, Norgay, 104

Terra Australis, 134

Terray, Lionel, Conquistators of the Useless, 78

Thagard, Norman, 160

The Ladder to the Moon, 171

Theisinger, Peter, 175–176

Thomas, Andrew, 217

Thomas Jefferson High School, 171

Thompson, Danny, 248

Titan, 200

Titanic, 119–128; lessons learned, 122; see also Columbia Space Shuttle

TORU docking equipment, 264

Trieste, 102

Tsibliev, Vasili, 263, 264

Twain, Mark, 34

Twin Otter (airplane), 43, 47

Tycho (crater), 167

UU-boat-869, 96–98

Ultraviolet radiation, 66

VV-2 rocket, 11–12

Vandenberg Air Force Base, 205

Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), 6, 71

Venus, 200; caves on, 57; Soviet missions, 168–169

Verne, Jules, 130


285

Very First Light, The, 183

Vespucci, Amerigo, 3

Vesta, 200

Victoria (ship), 130

Viesturs, Ed, 49–54, 79, 82–84

Viesturs, Paula, 52

Viking (missions), 166, 167

Vinogradov, Pavel, 264

Vision for Space Exploration, 8, 9, 19, 20, 127, 230, 232, 241, 267

von Braun, Wernher, 11, 109

WWakulla Springs, 74

Walker, David, 115

Wallace, Matt, 178

Webb, James, 155, 181, 259

weightlessness (see microgravity)

Weiler, Edward, 212

White, Edward, 189, 190, 260

White House, 157

White Sands, 11

Wilson, Edward, 144

Wingo, Dennis, 84

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 103, 142

XX-Prize, 230

YYost, Graham, 187–195, 197, 198, 200

Young, John, 260, 261, 262

ZZero gravity (see microgravity)

Zheng He, Admiral, 34

Zond spacecraft, 13


287

The NASA History SeriesREFERENCE WORKS, NASA SP-4000:Grimwood, James M. Project Mercury: A Chronology. NASA SP-4001, 1963.

Grimwood, James M., and C. Barton Hacker, with Peter J. Vorzimmer. Project Gemini Technology and Operations: A Chronology. NASA SP-4002, 1969.

Link, Mae Mills. Space Medicine in Project Mercury. NASA SP-4003, 1965.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4004, 1964.





Ertel, Ivan D., and Mary Louise Morse. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume I, Through November 7, 1962. NASA SP-4009, 1969.

Morse, Mary Louise, and Jean Kernahan Bays. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronol-ogy, Volume II, November 8, 1962–September 30, 1964. NASA SP-4009, 1973.

Brooks, Courtney G., and Ivan D. Ertel. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume III, October 1, 1964–January 20, 1966. NASA SP-4009, 1973.

Ertel, Ivan D., and Roland W. Newkirk, with Courtney G. Brooks. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume IV, January 21, 1966–July 13, 1974. NASA SP-4009, 1978.


Newkirk, Roland W., and Ivan D. Ertel, with Courtney G. Brooks. Skylab: A Chro-nology. NASA SP-4011, 1977.

Van Nimmen, Jane, and Leonard C. Bruno, with Robert L. Rosholt. NASA Histori-cal Data Book, Volume I: NASA Resources, 1958–1968. NASA SP-4012, 1976, rep. ed. 1988.

Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume II: Programs and Projects, 1958–1968. NASA SP-4012, 1988.

288

Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III: Programs and Projects, 1969–1978. NASA SP-4012, 1988.

Gawdiak, Ihor Y., with Helen Fedor, compilers. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume IV: NASA Resources, 1969–1978. NASA SP-4012, 1994.

Rumerman, Judy A., compiler. NASA Historical Data Book, 1979–1988: Vol-ume V, NASA Launch Systems, Space Transportation, Human Spacefl ight, and SpaceScience. NASA SP-4012, 1999.

Rumerman, Judy A., compiler. NASA Historical Data Book, Volume VI: NASA Space Applications, Aeronautics and Space Research and Technology, Tracking and Data Ac-quisition/Space Operations, Commercial Programs, and Resources, 1979–1988. NASA SP-2000-4012, 2000.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy.NASA SP-4014, 1970.










Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1979–1984: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4024, 1988.


Noordung, Hermann. The Problem of Space Travel: The Rocket Motor. Edited by Ernst Stuhlinger and J. D. Hunley, with Jennifer Garland. NASA SP-4026, 1995.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1986–1990: A Chronology. NASA SP-4027, 1997.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1990–1995: A Chronology. NASA SP-2000-4028, 2000.

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS THE NASA HISTORY SERIES

289

MANAGEMENT HISTORIES, NASA SP-4100:

Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of NASA, 1958–1963. NASA SP-4101, 1966.

Levine, Arnold S. Managing NASA in the Apollo Era. NASA SP-4102, 1982.

Roland, Alex. Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915–1958. NASA SP-4103, 1985.

Fries, Sylvia D. NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo. NASA SP-4104, 1992.

Glennan, T. Keith. The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan. J. D. Hunley, editor. NASA SP-4105, 1993.

Seamans, Robert C., Jr. Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans, Jr. NASA SP-4106, 1996.

Garber, Stephen J., editor. Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Forty Years of U.S. Human Spacefl ight Symposium. NASA SP-2002-4107, 2002.

Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People, Volume I. NASA-SP-2005-4110, 2005.

Laufer, Dr. Alexander, Todd Post, and Dr. Edward J. Hoffman. Shared Voyage: Learning

and Unlearning from Remarkable Projects. NASA-SP-2005-4111, 2005.

PROJECT HISTORIES, NASA SP-4200:

Swenson, Loyd S., Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander. This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury. NASA SP-4201, 1966; rep. ed. 1998.

Green, Constance McLaughlin, and Milton Lomask. Vanguard: A History. NASA SP-4202, 1970; rep. ed. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971.

Hacker, Barton C., and James M. Grimwood. On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini. NASA SP-4203, 1977.

Benson, Charles D., and William Barnaby Faherty. Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations. NASA SP-4204, 1978.

Brooks, Courtney G., James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr. Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft. NASA SP-4205, 1979.

Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles. NASA SP-4206, 1980, rep. ed. 1997.

SP-4207 not published.

Compton, W. David, and Charles D. Benson. Living and Working in Space: A History of Skylab. NASA SP-4208, 1983.


290

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. NASA SP-4209, 1978.

Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger. NASA SP-4210, 1977.

Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science. NASA SP-4211, 1980.

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958–1978. NASA SP-4212, 1984.

Pitts, John A. The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980. NASA SP-4213, 1985.

Compton, W. David. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions. NASA SP-4214, 1989.

Naugle, John E. First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experi-ments. NASA SP-4215, 1991.

Wallace, Lane E. Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley’s Boeing 737 Flying Laboratory. NASA SP-4216, 1994.

Butrica, Andrew J., editor. Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communi-cation. NASA SP-4217, 1997.

Butrica, Andrew J. To See the Unseen: A History of Planetary Radar Astronomy. NASA SP-4218, 1996.

Mack, Pamela E., editor. From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners. NASA SP-4219, 1998.

Reed, R. Dale, with Darlene Lister. Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story. NASA SP-4220, 1997.

Heppenheimer, T. A. The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle. NASA SP-4221, 1999.

Hunley, J. D., editor. Toward Mach 2: The Douglas D-558 Program. NASA SP-4222, 1999.

Swanson, Glen E., editor. “Before this Decade Is Out . . .”: Personal Refl ections on the Apollo Program. NASA SP-4223, 1999.

Tomayko, James E. Computers Take Flight: A History of NASA’s Pioneering Digital Fly-by-Wire Project. NASA SP-2000-4224, 2000.

Morgan, Clay. Shuttle-Mir: The U.S. and Russia Share History’s Highest Stage. NASA SP-2001-4225, 2001.

Leary, William M. “We Freeze to Please”: A History of NASA’s Icing Research Tunnel and the Quest for Flight Safety. NASA SP-2002-4226, 2002.

Mudgway, Douglas J. Uplink-Downlink: A History of the Deep Space Network 1957–

1997. NASA SP-2001-4227, 2001.


291

CENTER HISTORIES, NASA SP-4300:

Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center.NASA SP-4301, 1985.

Hartman, Edwin P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940–1965. NASA SP-4302, 1970.

Hallion, Richard P. On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946–1981. NASA SP-4303, 1984.

Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940–1976. NASA SP-4304, 1985.

Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Labora-tory, 1917–1958. NASA SP-4305, 1987.

Dawson, Virginia P. Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American Propul-sion Technology. NASA SP-4306, 1991.

Dethloff, Henry C. “Suddenly Tomorrow Came . . .”: A History of the Johnson Space Center. NASA SP-4307, 1993.

Hansen, James R. Spacefl ight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sput-nik to Apollo. NASA SP-4308, 1995.

Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: 50 Years at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center. NASA SP-4309, 1996.

Herring, Mack R. Way Station to Space: A History of the John C. Stennis Space Center. NASA SP-4310, 1997.

Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and the Creation of the American Space Program. NASA SP-4311, 1997.

Wallace, Lane E. Dreams, Hopes, Realities: NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, The First Forty Years. NASA SP-4312, 1999.

Dunar, Andrew J., and Stephen P. Waring. Power to Explore: A History of the Mar-shall Space Flight Center. NASA SP-4313, 1999.

Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Sixty Years at the NASA Ames Research

Center. NASA SP-2000-4314, 2000.

GENERAL HISTORIES, NASA SP-4400:

Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958–1968: A Historical Summary. NASA SP-4401, 1971.

Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie Karegeannes. Origins of NASA Names. NASA SP-4402, 1976.


292

Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915–1980. NASA SP-4403, 1981.

Sloop, John L. Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945–1959. NASA SP-4404, 1978.

Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spacefl ight. NASA SP-4405, 1985.

Bilstein, Roger E. Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915–1990. NASA SP-4406, 1989.

Logsdon, John M., editor, with Linda J. Lear, Jannelle Warren-Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I, Organizing for Exploration. NASA SP-4407, 1995.

Logsdon, John M., editor, with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. Launius. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II, Relations with Other Organizations. NASA SP-4407, 1996.

Logsdon, John M., editor, with Roger D. Launius, David H. Onkst, and Stephen J. Garber. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume III, Using Space. NASA SP-4407, 1998.

Logsdon, John M., general editor, with Ray A. Williamson, Roger D. Launius, Russell J. Acker, Stephen J. Garber, and Jonathan L. Friedman. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume IV, Accessing Space. NASA SP-4407, 1999.

Logsdon, John M., general editor, with Amy Paige Snyder, Roger D. Launius, Stephen J. Garber, and Regan Anne Newport. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume V, Exploring the Cosmos. NASA SP-2001-4407, 2001.

Siddiqi, Asif A. Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945–

1974. NASA SP-2000-4408, 2000.

MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY, NASA SP-4500:

Launius, Roger D. and Aaron K. Gillette, compilers, Toward a History of the Space Shuttle: An Annotated Bibliography. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 1, 1992.

Launius, Roger D., and J. D. Hunley, compilers, An Annotated Bibliography of the Apollo Program. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 2, 1994.

Launius, Roger D. Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis. Monograph in Aerospace His-tory, No. 3, 1994.

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS THE NASA HISTORY SERIES

293

Hansen, James R. Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 4, 1995.

Gorn, Michael H. Hugh L. Dryden’s Career in Aviation and Space. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 5, 1996.

Powers, Sheryll Goecke. Women in Flight Research at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, from 1946 to 1995. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 6, 1997.

Portree, David S. F. and Robert C. Trevino. Walking to Olympus: An EVA Chronol-ogy. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 7, 1997.

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Legislative Origins of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Proceedings of an Oral History Workshop. Monograph in Aero-space History, No. 8, 1998.

Rumerman, Judy A., compiler, U.S. Human Spacefl ight, A Record of Achievement 1961–1998. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 9, 1998.

Portree, David S. F. NASA’s Origins and the Dawn of the Space Age. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 10, 1998.

Logsdon, John M. Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Cooperation in the Space Station. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 11, 1998.

Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey in Aeronautical Research: A Career at NASA Langley Research Center. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 12, 1998.

Braslow, Albert L. A History of Suction-Type Laminar-Flow Control with Emphasis on Flight Research. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 13, 1999.

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Managing the Moon Program: Lessons Learned From Apollo. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 14, 1999.

Perminov, V. G. The Diffi cult Road to Mars: A Brief History of Mars Exploration in the Soviet Union. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 15, 1999.

Tucker, Tom. Touchdown: The Development of Propulsion Controlled Aircraft at NASA Dryden. Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 16, 1999.

Maisel, Martin D., Demo J. Giulianetti, and Daniel C. Dugan. The History of the XV-15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft: From Concept to Flight. NASA SP-2000-4517, 2000.

Jenkins, Dennis R. Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: A Concise History of the X-15 Research Airplane. NASA SP-2000-4518, 2000.

Chambers, Joseph R. Partners in Freedom: Contributions of the Langley Research Center to U.S. Military Aircraft in the 1990s. NASA SP-2000-4519, 2000.

Waltman, Gene L. Black Magic and Gremlins: Analog Flight Simulations at NASA’s Flight Research Center. NASA SP-2000-4520, 2000.

Portree, David S. F. Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 1950–2000. NASA SP-2001-4521, 2001.

RISK AND EXPLORATION: EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS THE NASA HISTORY SERIES

294

Thompson, Milton O., with J. D. Hunley. Flight Research: Problems Encountered and What They Should Teach Us. NASA SP-2000-4522, 2000.

Tucker, Tom. The Eclipse Project. NASA SP-2000-4523, 2000.

Siddiqi, Asif A. Deep Space Chronicle: A Chronology of Deep Space and Planetary Probes, 1958–2000. NASA SP-2002-4524, 2002.

Merlin, Peter W. Mach 3+: NASA/USAF YF-12 Flight Research, 1969–1979. NASA SP-2001-4525, 2001.

Anderson, Seth B. Memoirs of an Aeronautical Engineer—Flight Tests at Ames Research Center: 1940–1970. NASA SP-2002-4526, 2002.

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A Bibliography Commemoratingthe One-Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered Flight on December 17, 1903.NASA SP-2002-4527, 2002.

No monograph 28.

Chambers, Joseph R. Concept to Reality: Contributions of the NASA Langley ResearchCenter to U.S. Civil Aircraft of the 1990s. SP-2003-4529, 2003.

Peebles, Curtis, editor. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Dryden History, The Early Years. SP-2003-4530, 2003.

Jenkins, Dennis R., Tony Landis, and Jay Miller. American X-Vehicles: An Inven-tory—X-1 to X-50. SP-2003-4531, 2003.

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright Chronology. Monographs in Aero-space History, No. 32, 2003. NASA SP-2003-4532.

Bowles, Mark D., and Robert S. Arrighi. NASA’s Nuclear Frontier: The Plum Brook Reactor Facility, 1941–2002. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 33, 2004. NASA SP-2004-4533.

McCurdy, Howard E. Low-Cost Innovation in Spacefl ight. Monographs in Aero-space History, No. 36, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4536.

Seamans, Robert C. Project Apollo: The Tough Decisions. Monographs in Aero-space History, No. 37, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4537.

Lambright, Henry W. NASA and the Environment. The Case of Ozone Depletion.

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 38, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4538.


