application for nomination to the florida supreme …

APPLICATION FOR NOMINATION TO

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

UNREDACTED

1 Rev. 100209-OGC

APPLICATION FOR NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT

(Please attach additional pages as needed to respond fully to questions.)

DATE: December 24, 2019 Florida Bar No.: 18409

GENERAL: Social Security No.:

1. Name Anne-Leigh Gaylord Moe E-mail: [email protected]

Date Admitted to Practice in Florida: December 10, 2005

Date Admitted to Practice in other States: N/A

2. State current employer and title, including professional position and any public or judicial office.

Circuit Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Florida

3. Business address: 800 East Twiggs Street

City Tampa County Hillsborough State FL ZIP 33602

Telephone (813) 272-5777 FAX (813) 301-3726

4. Residential address:

City County State ZIP

Since 2010 Telephone

5. Place of birth: Florida

Date of birth: Age: 40

6a.

Length of residence in State of Florida:

40 years, except for periods of out of state residence for school and my husband's prior service in the United States Air Force

6b. Are you a registered voter? Yes No

If so, in what county are you registered? Hillsborough County

7. Marital status: Married

If married: Spouse's name

Date of marriage 7/14/2001

Spouse's occupation Private equity fund manager

If ever divorced give for each marriage name(s) of spouse(s), current address for each former spouse, date and place of divorce, court and case number for each divorce.

N/A

§119.071(5)(a) F.S.

§119.071(4)(d) F.S.§119.071(4)(d) F.S. §119.071(4)(d) F.S. §119.071 §119.071(4)(d) F.S.

§119.071(4)(d) F.S.

§119.071(4)(d) F.S.

§119.071(4)(d) F.S.

----

------------- --- -- --------------

~ •

------

2 Rev. 100209-OGC

8. Children

Name(s) Age(s) Occupation(s) Residential address(es)

9. Military Service (including Reserves)

Service Branch Highest Rank Dates

N/A N/A N/A N/A

Rank at time of discharge N/A Type of discharge N/A

Awards or citations N/A

HEALTH:

10. Are you currently addicted to or dependent upon the use of narcotics, drugs, or intoxicating beverages? If yes, state the details, including the date(s).

No.

11a. During the last ten years have you been hospitalized or have you consulted a professional or have you received treatment or a diagnosis from a professional for any of the following: Kleptomania, Pathological or Compulsive Gambling, Pedophilia, Exhibitionism or Voyeurism?

Yes No

If your answer is yes, please direct each such professional, hospital and other facility to furnish the Chairperson of the Commission any information the Commission may request with respect to any such hospitalization, consultation, treatment or diagnosis. ["Professional" includes a Physician, Psychiatrist, Psychologist, Psychotherapist or Mental Health Counselor.]

Please describe such treatment or diagnosis.

N/A

11b. In the past ten years have any of the following occurred to you which would interfere with your ability to work in a competent and professional manner?

Experiencing periods of no sleep for 2 or 3 nights

Experiencing periods of hyperactivity

Spending money profusely with extremely poor judgment

Suffered from extreme loss of appetite

§119.071(4)(d) F.S. - -- -

•

3 Rev. 100209-OGC

Issuing checks without sufficient funds

Defaulting on a loan

Experiencing frequent mood swings

Uncontrollable tiredness

Falling asleep without warning in the middle of an activity

Yes No

If yes, please explain.

N/A

12a. Do you currently have a physical or mental impairment which in any way limits your ability or fitness to properly exercise your duties as a member of the Judiciary in a competent and professional manner?

Yes No

12b. If your answer to the question above is Yes, are the limitations or impairments caused by your physical or mental health impairment reduced or ameliorated because you receive ongoing treatment (with or without medication) or participate in a monitoring or counseling program?

Yes No

Describe such problem and any treatment or program of monitoring or counseling.

N/A

13. During the last ten years, have you ever been declared legally incompetent or have you or your property been placed under any guardianship, conservatorship or committee? If yes, give full details as to court, date and circumstances.

No.

14. During the last ten years, have you unlawfully used controlled substances, narcotic drugs or dangerous drugs as defined by Federal or State laws? If your answer is "Yes," explain in detail. (Unlawful use includes the use of one or more drugs and/or the unlawful possession or distribution of drugs. It does not include the use of drugs taken under supervision of a licensed health care professional or other uses authorized by Federal law provisions.)

No.

•

•

• •

4 Rev. 100209-OGC

15. In the past ten years, have you ever been reprimanded, demoted, disciplined, placed on probation, suspended, cautioned or terminated by an employer as result of your alleged consumption of alcohol, prescription drugs or illegal use of drugs? If so, please state the circumstances under which such action was taken, the name(s) of any persons who took such action, and the background and resolution of such action.

No.

16. Have you ever refused to submit to a test to determine whether you had consumed and/or were under the influence of alcohol or drugs? If so, please state the date you were requested to submit to such a test, the type of test required, the name of the entity requesting that you submit to the test, the outcome of your refusal and the reason why you refused to submit to such a test.

No.

17. In the past ten years, have you suffered memory loss or impaired judgment for any reason? If so, please explain in full.

No.

EDUCATION:

18a. Secondary schools, colleges and law schools attended.

Schools Class Standing Dates of Attendance Degree

Cambridge Christian

School (formerly

known as Seminole

Presbyterian School)

Furman University

Colorado Christian

University

Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University

Salutatorian

Cum Laude

N/A

Cum Laude

1985-1997

1997-2002

1999

2002-2005

High school

diploma

Bachelor of Arts

N/A

Juris Doctor

5 Rev. 100209-OGC

18b. List and describe academic scholarships earned, honor societies or other awards.

Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University: *Editor-in-Chief, Arizona State Law Journal (2004-2005) *Pedrick Scholar *Honors, Lawyering Theory and Practice *CALI Excellence for the Future Award, Oral Advocacy *Second Place, ABA Regional Representation in Mediation Competition *Pro Bono Distinction Furman University: *Alpha Kappa Delta Sociological Honor Society *Foreign Study, Northern & Eastern Europe *Spanish Language On-Campus Immersion Program *Vice President, Tri-Delta Sorority

NON-LEGAL EMPLOYMENT:

19. List all previous full-time non-legal jobs or positions held since 21 in chronological order and briefly describe them.

Date Position Employer Address

2001 Leasing Consultant Bella Springs Colorado Springs, CO

2001 Leasing Consultant RidgePointe Colorado Springs, CO

6 Rev. 100209-OGC

PROFESSIONAL ADMISSIONS:

20. List all courts (including state bar admissions) and administrative bodies having special admission requirements to which you have ever been admitted to practice, giving the dates of admission, and if applicable, state whether you have been suspended or resigned.

Court or Administrative Body Date of Admission

Florida Bar

United States District Court, MDFL

United States District Court, SDFL

United States District Court, NDFL

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

2005

2007

2014

2015

Inactive

LAW PRACTICE: (If you are a sitting judge, answer questions 21 through 26 with reference to the years before you became a judge.)

21. State the names, dates and addresses for all firms with which you have been associated in practice, governmental agencies or private business organizations by which you have been employed, periods you have practiced as a sole practitioner, law clerkships and other prior employment:

Position Name of Firm Address Dates

Equity Shareholder*

*I joined the firm as an associate, was promoted to shareholder, and then became an equity shareholder.

Bush Ross, P.A.

1801 N. Highland Avenue, Tampa, FL 33602

2007-2017

Law Clerk to the Hon. Virginia M. Hernandez Covington

United States District Court, Middle District of Florida

Ft. Myers, Florida

Jacksonville, Florida

2005-2007

Intern to the Hon. Kenneth B. Bell

Florida Supreme Court

Tallahassee, Florida

Summer

2003

7 Rev. 100209-OGC

Intern to the Hon. Jeffrey Hotham

Summer Associate

Maricopa County Superior Court

Jennings Strouss &

Salmon

Phoenix, Arizona

Phoenix, Arizona

Fall

2003

Summer 2004

22. Describe the general nature of your current practice including any certifications which you possess; additionally, if your practice is substantially different from your prior practice or if you are not now practicing law, give details of prior practice. Describe your typical clients or former clients and the problems for which they sought your services.

The general nature of my law practice was commercial litigation. Most clients were involved in some type of business dispute. Often the primary issue in the dispute involved a contract, failed business partnership or investment, or an employment relationship. I also represented clients with other types of legal issues, such as those relating to surety bonds, allegations of fraud, product liability, and recovery and defense of allegedly fraudulent transfers made in connection with Ponzi schemes. I often served as local counsel for non-resident lawyers who had cases pending in the United States District Courts for the Middle, Southern, and Northern Districts of Florida.

Representative cases included:

*Defense of a building materials manufacturer sued in a multi-party, multi-million dollar product defect suit. (Resolved through global settlement)

*Defense of the State of Florida in its gaming compact dispute with the Seminole Tribe of Florida. (Tried in the Northern District of Florida in October 2016)

*Defense of thirteen individuals who executed personal guarantees in connection with their investment in a limited liability company that was developing commercial waterfront real estate in Tampa. The LLC was subsequently unable to make its payments due to non-performing tenants. Rather than pursue the LLC or its managing members, the lender elected to pursue our clients on their personal guarantees in United States District Court. Thereafter, the LLC sought protection in United States Bankruptcy Court. Our clients then financed the plan of reorganization and on those grounds we secured a stay of the lender's claims against them in the District Court during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. (Plan of reorganization confirmed in the United States Bankruptcy Court in and for the Middle District of Florida, and the case filed by the lender in the United States District Court in and for the Middle District of Florida was dismissed)

*Prosecution of claims for breach of contract and injunctive relief in connection with the sale of salvage aircraft in an online auction. (Tried in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in 2012)

*Defense of various employment claims, including claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Family Medical Leave Act. (At the time of my appointment to the bench, a small number of these cases may have been pending but most had been resolved through settlements)

8 Rev. 100209-OGC

*Prosecution of numerous fraudulent transfer claims on behalf of the receiver appointed in connection with the Botfly Ponzi scheme. (Three bench trials in Pasco County, with the balance of the cases assigned to me resolved on summary judgment, default judgments, or through settlements)

*Defense of multi-million dollar fraudulent transfer claim brought by the receiver appointed in connection with the Nadel-Moody Ponzi scheme. Clients were accused of accepting significant referral fees in connection with recruitment of new investors in the scheme. Defense of related state and federal litigation filed by investors against the same clients. (Representation concluded)

*Service as local counsel to Fortune 500 and Fortune Global 500 companies engaged in intellectual property litigation in the Middle District of Florida. (In each case, representation concluded)

Earlier in my career, I defended claims involving medical malpractice, accounting malpractice, legal malpractice, premises liability, negligent supervision, and commercial foreclosure. A number of the premises liability and negligent supervision cases involved criminal acts by third parties that subjected a property or business owner to tort liability. For example, I defended (1) a security company that provided security services at an apartment complex in Tampa where Dontae Morris shot and killed a man one month before he killed two Tampa Police officers during a traffic stop, (2) managers of a shopping center where a gunman randomly opened fire in a RadioShack, shooting two employees and a customer before turning the gun on himself, and (3) an after school youth program in Manatee County at whose facility an adolescent girl alleged she was gang raped in the workout room.

Of my pro bono work, the two most significant matters involved representing (1) a federal prisoner in a civil rights claim in the Middle District of Florida and (2) a nun who was appointed guardian of a minor child in a juvenile dependency proceeding in Hillsborough County.

23. What percentage of your appearance in courts in the last five years or last five years of practice (include the dates) was in:

Court Area of Practice

Federal Appellate 1 % Civil 100 %

Federal Trial 49 % Criminal 0 %

Federal Other 0 % Family 0 %

State Appellate 0 % Probate 0 %

State Trial 50 % Other 0 %

State Administrative 0 %

State Other 0 %

%

TOTAL 100 % TOTAL 100 %

9 Rev. 100209-OGC

24. In your lifetime, how many (number) of the cases you have tried to verdict or judgment were:

Jury? 1 (5 days)

Non-jury? 4 (1 federal, 3 state)

Arbitration? 1 (2 weeks) Administrative Bodies? 0

25. Within the last ten years, have you ever been formally reprimanded, sanctioned, demoted, disciplined, placed on probation, suspended or terminated by an employer or tribunal before which you have appeared? If so, please state the circumstances under which such action was taken, the date(s) such action was taken, the name(s) of any persons who took such action, and the background and resolution of such action.

No.

26. In the last ten years, have you failed to meet any deadline imposed by court order or received notice that you have not complied with substantive requirements of any business or contractual arrangement? If so, please explain in full.

No.

(Questions 27 through 30 are optional for sitting judges who have served 5 years or more.)

27a. For your last 6 cases, which were tried to verdict before a jury or arbitration panel or tried to judgment before a judge, list the names and telephone numbers of trial counsel on all sides and court case numbers (include appellate cases).

1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. State of Fla., United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Case No.: 4:15-cv-516-RH/CAS

Opposing Counsel:

Barry Scott Richard, Esq.

Greenberg Traurig, P.A.

101 East College Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301-7742

(850) 425-8503

[email protected]

Joseph H. Webster, Esq.

Hobbs Strauss Dean & Walker

1899 L Street, N.W., Suite 1200

Washington, D.C. 20036

10 Rev. 100209-OGC

(202) 822-8282

[email protected]

Co-Counsel:

Jason L. Maine, Esq.

Woodburn & Maine, Attorneys at Law

204 South Monroe Street, Suite 201


(850) 296-2650

[email protected]

William N. Spicola, Esq.

P.O. Box 664


(850) 895-1056

[email protected]

J. Carter Andersen, Esq.

Bush Ross, P.A.

1801 North Highland Avenue

Tampa, Florida 33602

(813) 204-6405

[email protected]

Harold Holder, Esq.

Bush Ross, P.A.



(813) 204-6436

[email protected]

11 Rev. 100209-OGC

Robert Stocker, Esq.

Robert Stocker, PLLC

Post Office Box 13068

East Lansing, Michigan 48823

(517) 881-7687

Dennis Whittlesey, Esq.

Dickinson Wright, PLLC

1825 I St NW, Suite 900

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 659-6928

Patrick Sullivan, Esq.

Dickinson Wright

1825 I St NW, Suite 900

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 659-6928

2. Phoenix Aviation Managers, Inc. v. Woolie Enterprises, Inc. and Martin Slone, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County, Case No.: 08-8068, Div. 20

Co-Counsel:

J. Carter Andersen, Esq.

Bush Ross, P.A.



(813) 204-6405

Opposing Counsel:

12 Rev. 100209-OGC

Tyler Wolas, Esq.

Wolas Law Group, PLLC

13902 North Dale Mabry Highway, Suite 214

Tampa, Florida 33618-2452

(727) 475-1016

[email protected]

Stephanie L. Velasquez, Esq.

1890 West Bay Drive, Suite W5

Largo, Florida 33770-3019

(727) 831-0173

[email protected]

Richard Edward Huff, Jr., Esq.

PLG Law

1744 North Belcher Road, Suit e50

Clearwater, Florida 33765-1326

(800) 578-9149

[email protected]

Douglas J. Barnard, Esq.

Plane Law, P.A.

76 4th Street North, Unit 1023

St Petersburg, Florida 33731-7049

(888) 752-6352

[email protected]

Jesse James Waluda, Esq.(*)

Jesse James Law Firm

(727) 327-5700

(* I could not locate Mr. Waluda in the Florida Bar Member Directory.)

13 Rev. 100209-OGC

3. Michael Moecker as Receiver for Botfly, LLC v. Jeffrey Morzella and Marcia Powers, Sixth Judicial Circuit, New Port Richey, Case No.: 51-2011-CA-6063-WS/G

Co-Counsel:

Karen S. Cox, Esq.

Appleton Reiss, PLLC

501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 802


(813) 542-8888

[email protected]

Opposing Counsel:

W. Dale Gabbard, Esq.

Law Office of W. Dale Gabbard, P.A.

3609 West Azeele Street


(813) 877-8444

[email protected]

4. Builder [name withheld due to confidentiality agreement] v. Homeowners [same], Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Case No.: [same] (case filed in state court but thereafter tried in arbitration)

(Note: Due to a confidentiality agreement, details regarding party names and the case number have been withheld but are available on request.)

Co-Counsel:

Stephen French, Esq.

Bush Ross, P.A.

14 Rev. 100209-OGC



(810) 204-6499

[email protected]

Opposing Counsel:

Bryan Stayton, Esq.

Stayton Law Group, P.A.

3619 Lithia Pinecrest Road

Valrico, Florida 33596

(813) 662-9829

[email protected]

Leo Meirose, Esq.

Meirose & Lubliner, P.A.

500 N West Shore Blvd Ste 820

Tampa, FL 33609-1941

(813) 289-8800

[email protected]

5. Michael Moecker as Receiver for Botfly, LLC v. Jeffrey Collins & Marijulia Collins, Sixth Judicial Circuit, New Port Richey, Case No.: 51-2012-CA-721-WS/G

Co-Counsel:

Karen S. Cox, Esq.

Appleton Reiss, PLLC



(813) 542-8888

15 Rev. 100209-OGC

[email protected]

Opposing Counsel:

Constaintine Kalogianis, Esq. (*)

Kalogianis Law Firm, P.A.

8141 Bellarus Way, Suite 103

Trinity, Florida 34655-1789

(727) 817-0950

[email protected]

(*The Florida Bar Member Directory lists Mr. Kalogianis as disbarred.)

6. Michael Moecker as Receiver for Botfly, LLC v. Dominick Kemp, Sixth Judicial Circuit, New Port Richey, Case No.: 51-2011-CA-6057-WS/G

Opposing Counsel:

None. Defendant represented himself.

27b. For your last 6 cases, which were settled in mediation or settled without mediation or trial, list the names and telephone numbers of trial counsel on all sides and court case numbers (include appellate cases).

1. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Abdoney, et al., United States District Court, Middle District of Fla., Tampa, Case No.: 8:14-cv-00389-MSS-EAJ; United States Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Fla., Tampa, Case No.: 8:15-bk-03404-CPM

Co-Counsel:

Jeffrey W. Warren, Esq.

Bush Ross, P.A.



(813) 204-6423

16 Rev. 100209-OGC

[email protected]

Co-Defendants’ Counsel:

Harley Riedel, Esq.

Stichter, Riedel, Blain & Postler, P.A.

110 East Madison Street, Suite 200


(813) 229-0144

[email protected]

Edward Peterson, Esq.

Stichter, Riedel, Blain & Postler, P.A.

110 East Madison Street, Suite 200


(813) 229-0144

[email protected]

Opposing Counsel:

Andrew Brumby, Esq.

Shutts & Bowen, LLP

Post Office Box 4956

Orlando, Florida 32802-4956

(407) 423-3200

[email protected]

Ryan Reinert, Esq.

Shutts & Bowen, LLP

4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard, Suite 300


(813) 229-8900

17 Rev. 100209-OGC

[email protected]

Janelle Weber, Esq.

Shutts & Bowen, LLP



(813) 227-8152

[email protected]

Tirso Carreja, Esq.

Shutts & Bowen, LLP



(813) 227-8190

[email protected]

2. Andre Cooper v. United States of America, United States District Court, Middle District of Fla., Tampa, Case No.: 5:12-cv-00162-VMC-PRL

Co-counsel:

Meredith A. Freeman, Esq.

Shutts & Bowen, LLP



(813) 227-8115

[email protected]

Amanda Buffinton, Esq.

Shutts & Bowen, LLP


18 Rev. 100209-OGC


(813) 229-8900

[email protected]

Opposing Counsel:

Christopher Emden, AUSA

United States Attorneys Office

(813) 276-6000

Jeffrey Thomas Middendorf, Esq.

Federal Bureau of Prisons

(352) 689-7382

Matthew H. Perry, AUSA

United States Attorneys Office

(813) 276-6000

3. Duke Energy v. GreenPointe Communities, et al., United States District Court, Middle District of Fla., Tampa, Case No.: 8:14-cv-03163-VMC-TBM, consolidated with GreenPointe Communities, et al. v. Duke Energy, United States District Court, Middle District of Fla., Tampa, Case No.: 8:15-cv-00582-CEH-TGW

Co-Counsel:


Bush Ross, P.A.



(813) 204-6423

[email protected]

19 Rev. 100209-OGC

Opposing Counsel:

Scott McLaren, Esq.

Hill Ward Henderson

101 E Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 3700


[email protected]

(813) 227-8418

Patrick Mosely, Esq.

Hill Ward Henderson

101 E Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 3700


[email protected]

(813) 221-3900

Andrew E. Peluso, Esq.

Foley & Lardner, LLP

101 North Tampa Street

Suite 2700


(813) 229-2300

[email protected]

4. Wendy Tundis v. Car Guys Automotive, United States District Court, Middle District of Fla., Ocala, Case No.: 5:16-cv-00410-JSM-PRL

Co-Counsel:

Harold D. Holder, III, Esq.

Bush Ross, P.A.

20 Rev. 100209-OGC



(813) 204-6436

[email protected]

Opposing Counsel:

Matthew Birk, Esq.

The Law Offices of Matthew Birk

309 NE 1st Street

Gainesville, Florida 32601-5310

(352) 244-2069

[email protected]

5. Current Builders of Florida, Inc. & Industrial Development International, Inc. v. Trans Coastal Construction Company, Inc., et al., Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court, Broward County, Case No.: 11-11507-CACE-03

Co-Counsel:


Bush Ross, P.A.



(813) 204-

[email protected]

Co-Defendants’ Counsel:

William J. (“Bob”) Marell, Esq.

Glickman, Witters & Marell, PA.

The Centurion Tower

21 Rev. 100209-OGC

1601 Forum Place, Suite 1101

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 478-1111

[email protected]

Ferris G. Solomon, Jr., Esq.

Glickman, Witters & Marell, PA.

The Centurion Tower

1601 Forum Place, Suite 1101

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 478-1111

[email protected]

Christopher Garcia, Esq.

Taylor Espino Vega & Touron, PLLC

201 Alhambra Circle, Suite 801

Miami, Florida 33134-5108

(305) 443-2048

[email protected]

William M. Martin, Esq.

Peterson Bernard, P.A.

707 Southeast 3rd Avenue,5th Floor

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316

(954) 763-3200 x. 1102

[email protected]

Plaintiffs’ Counsel:

Vincent Vacarella, Esq.

Vincent F. Vaccarella, P.A.

888 East Las Olas Boulevard Suite 700

22 Rev. 100209-OGC

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-2396

(305) 932-4044

[email protected]

6. Leone Investment Properties, LLC v. Catavis Jackson, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

County Court Division, Case No.: 2017-CC-4986

Opposing Counsel:

None. The plaintiff was pro se.

27c. During the last five years, how frequently have you appeared at administrative hearings? 0 average times per month

27d.

During the last five years, how frequently have you appeared in Court? Varied widely, but 1-2 average times per month

27e. During the last five years, if your practice was substantially personal injury, what percentage of your work was in representation of plaintiffs? N/A% Defendants? N/A%

28. If during any prior period you have appeared in court with greater frequency than during the last five years, indicate the period during which this was so and give for such prior periods a succinct statement of the part you played in the litigation, numbers of cases and whether jury or non-jury.

Between approximately 2010 and 2013, my former law firm represented a receiver in a Ponzi scheme. I was one of a team of three lawyers responsible for 76 individual lawsuits that were all filed at approximately the same time in Pasco County. During that time, my court appearances were especially frequent.

23 Rev. 100209-OGC

29. For the cases you have tried to award in arbitration, during each of the past five years, indicate whether you were sole, associate or chief counsel. Give citations of any reported cases.

I have tried one case to award in arbitration. I was lead counsel. The arbitration lasted two weeks. Our clients prevailed and the award was confirmed in the 13th Judicial Circuit, but the case was not reported.

30. List and describe the six most significant cases which you personally litigated giving case style, number and citation to reported decisions, if any. Identify your client and describe the nature of your participation in the case and the reason you believe it to be significant. Give the name of the court and judge, the date tried and names of other attorneys involved.

1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. State of Fla., United States District Court, Northern District of Fla., Tallahassee, Case No.: 4:15-cv-516-RH-CAS

Court: United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division

Judge: The Hon. Robert Hinkle, United States District Judge

Date Tried: October 3-5, 2016

Client: The State of Florida and the Department of Business and Professional Regulation

Nature of Participation: Second chair. I delivered the closing argument and conducted the cross-examination of the Tribe's lead witness, James Allen. During discovery, I deposed each of the Tribe's fact witnesses. The transcripts of those depositions were read into evidence at trial. Additionally, I was directly involved in most other aspects of trial preparation, discovery, and summary judgment.

Significance: This case was significant because of its potential to shape the future of gaming in Florida. It was also significant because of the novel and interesting issues of federal and state law that it involved.

The State and the Tribe entered into a gaming compact in 2010. One of the terms of the compact required that the Tribe wind down its operation of “banking or banked card games” (casino-style card games like blackjack) five years later. However, in 2015, when the deadline for the Tribe to wind down the games passed, the Tribe refused to shut down the games.

The Tribe recognized that it agreed to wind down the games but pointed to a provision in the compact that the Tribe claimed allowed it to continue operation of the games if the State “permitted” anyone else to conduct banking or banked card games. The term “banking or banked card games” was not defined in the compact. Similarly, the compact did not define what it meant for the State to “permit” such gaming.

The Tribe’s position was that the State did, in fact, permit others to conduct banking or banked card games because licensed cardrooms in Florida (1) offered electronic games with thematic elements of banking games (for example, multi-player slot machines with blackjack themes), and (2) allowed poker to be played in a format that utilized a designated player.

The Tribe claimed that the electronic and designated player games were “banking or

24 Rev. 100209-OGC

banked card games” and, as such, the Tribe argued that the State permitted others to play “banking or banked card games” when it allowed those games to be played in licensed cardrooms. The State denied that it had permitted anyone but the Tribe to operate banking or banked card games. The State’s penal code defines “banking games” and specifically prohibits anyone but the Tribe from operating them.

As a matter of law, the Florida Constitution delineates the separation of powers within the State. The legislature has the exclusive authority to enact laws that permit or prohibit activity. The executive branch does not make law, and it could not through an executive branch agency either intentionally or by accident permit on behalf of the State of Florida activity that the legislative branch has prohibited.

Additionally, neither the electronic games nor the designated player poker games met the statutory definition of banking games. To the extent that the State obtained information that any licensed cardrooms conducted designated player games in an unauthorized banking manner, the State filed administrative actions against those cardrooms. Accordingly, the State’s position was that (1) as a matter of law, the State cannot “permit” the commission of a crime, (2) under the separation of powers established in the Florida Constitution, the executive branch cannot permit activity that the legislative branch has prohibited, and (3) as a matter of fact, the games at issue were not “banking or banked card games.”

2. Andre Cooper v. United States of America, et al., Middle District of Fla., Tampa, Case No.: 5:12-cv-162-33-PRL

Court: United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division

Judge: The Hon. Virginia M. Hernandez Covington, United States District Judge

Date Tried: The case settled in the late afternoon of Friday, January 30, 2016. Trial was set to begin at 9 a.m. on Monday, February 2, 2016. Although the case was never tried, it was fully prepared for trial at the time of the settlement.

Client: Andre Cooper

Nature of Participation: First chair

Significance: Mr. Cooper was a federal prisoner serving three life sentences for murder and other crimes at Coleman Federal Penitentiary in Sumter County, Florida when he was allegedly assaulted by a prison guard during a body cavity search conducted in violation of protocol. Immediately following the alleged incident and continuing for many months after, Mr. Cooper asked various prison guards-- both verbally and in writing-- to preserve evidence of the assault. Despite those numerous requests, that evidence was destroyed. As a result, the only evidence on key issues in the case was the testimony of a convicted murderer against the guard.

Mr. Cooper sued both the guard and the federal government, alleging that his civil rights were violated. Some of his claims survived summary judgment. Six weeks before the case was set to be tried, United States District Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington requested that I consider accepting an appointment to try the case pro bono on behalf of Mr. Cooper. I accepted the appointment.

25 Rev. 100209-OGC

Until his motion to appoint counsel was granted, Mr. Cooper represented himself pro se and had taken no discovery. Discovery was re-opened for limited purposes. As part of that limited discovery, I requested and reviewed key documents, deposed the guard, and visited the prison. Through that discovery, it was established that (1) Mr. Cooper repeatedly requested both verbally and in writing the preservation of certain video tapes, (2) the video tapes in question would have tended to corroborate Mr. Cooper's testimony that the search occurred (a fact the guard later denied), (3) although Mr. Cooper's requests had been received, the tapes were permitted to be destroyed, (4) before the tapes were destroyed, the guard in question had access to them, and (5) the guard had previously been accused of destroying evidence in another case.

On those and other grounds, a motion for spoliation sanctions was filed. Shortly thereafter, the United States made its first offer to settle the case. Although Mr. Cooper did not accept the initial offer, the case was ultimately resolved on the Friday afternoon before the trial was set to begin.

3. In re A.P., Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Case No.: 09-1039

Court: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County

Judge: The Hon. Tracy Sheehan, Circuit Court Judge

Date Tried: N/A

Client: Sister Anne Dougherty, Graduate Support Director, Academy Prep Center of Tampa

Nature of Participation: Over the course of our two-year representation of Sister Anne, the nature of my participation varied. My involvement was most significant in the first year and included numerous court appearances in the trial court and some involvement in an appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal.

Significance: Sister Anne Dougherty is a nun with the Order of Franciscan Sisters who was serving as the Graduate Support Director of Academy Prep Center of Tampa. Academy Prep is a tuition-free prep school for under-privileged children in Tampa. Through her work at Academy Prep, Sister Anne learned that the single mother of one of the eighth-grade students set to graduate from the school in a matter of months had died in a car accident. Prior to her death, the child’s mother, who had sole custody of her son, gave specific instructions that her son never be released to his purported father, who she described as dangerous.

Sister Anne intervened when, immediately following the mother’s death, the purported father, who at that point had essentially no known relationship with the child, expressed an intention to withdraw the child from school and leave the state. In addition to the school’s serious concerns about the child’s safety based on the information given by the mother prior to her death, withdrawal of the child at that point in time would jeopardize the child’s pending admission and full scholarship to a prestigious military boarding school. Very shortly before her death, the mother and the child had carefully selected that school, and for a host of reasons deemed it to be ideal for him. Along with Sister Anne, they believed that the boarding school represented one of the child’s best

26 Rev. 100209-OGC

chances at success in life, given circumstances at home.

Following Sister Anne’s petition for emergency determination of dependency, protective services were reactivated for the child and he was sheltered. Shortly thereafter, the Court modified his legal custody at Sister Anne’s request so that he would be sheltered with his best friend’s family (Sister Anne lives in a convent, and the child could not be sheltered with her) and Sister Anne was appointed as guardian of the child.

With the help of the school and the remarkable dedication of families in the school’s close-knit community, Sister Anne continued to serve as the child’s guardian for the next two years. Sister Anne remained the child’s guardian until the appointment of a surrogate parent in 2010.

4. Builder [name withheld due to confidentiality agreement] v. Homeowners [same], Case No. [same]

Court: The case was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Thereafter, the defendants moved to compel arbitration. The case was subsequently tried in arbitration. The arbitrator’s award was confirmed in the original state court case.

Judge: The Hon. Lamar Battles

Arbitrator: Steve Bennett, PE

Date Tried: June 22-26, 2016 (week one) and August 31-September 4, 2015 (week two)

Client: Homeowners

Nature of Participation: First chair

Significance: I was first chair in a two-week arbitration involving an emotionally charged dispute between our clients and their home builder. After hiring the builder to construct their South Tampa home, the homeowners became concerned with the pace of construction, which in total lasted about two and a half years before the builder was terminated. Ultimately, the homeowners retained counsel when the builder locked them out of their house.

Although we helped the homeowners quickly regain access to their home, at that point an already tumultuous relationship became irretrievably broken. Little to no work was being performed on the house and the homeowners lost faith that the builder intended to complete the home. The homeowners decided to terminate the builder, endeavor to finish the house themselves, and sue the builder for damages. Although they focused their efforts on completing the house, the homeowners initiated a suit for defamation and other claims in Hillsborough County, in part because statements by the builder led subcontractors to refuse to work with the homeowners to complete the home.

After a tentative settlement reached in mediation unraveled, the builder demanded arbitration and counter-claimed for rent. The builder's claim for rent was purportedly based on a term in the contract that provided for such a claim if the homeowners moved into the home before the builder completed it.

The contract between the builder and the homeowners was very one-sided. It provided

27 Rev. 100209-OGC

that a final arbitration hearing must be conducted within 90 days of the demand for arbitration. Shortly after arbitration was demanded, the homeowners learned that various aspects of the builder's work, including the stucco and certain egress doors and windows, were defective and did not comply with the Florida Building Code. They also learned that some significant portion of the work had been performed without a valid building permit. Additionally, the person who had been represented to them as an architect was found to have been unlicensed, which, while not illegal, contributed to their existing anxiety.

Due to the terms of their arbitration agreement, this contentious, complicated, and fact-intensive case was prepared for arbitration in 90 days. Although the builder invoked the arbitration provision and the homeowners were ready for arbitration within the specified time, the builder nevertheless requested an eleventh-hour continuance of the final hearing. The grounds for the request was that a second lawyer entered an appearance pursuant to an insurance policy, which the builder continued to maintain did not provide coverage. Further complicating matters, the builder exercised its right under Chapter 558 of the Florida Statutes to repair some but not all of the defects identified. That process became so complicated that it could not be completed before the arbitrator's final decision. One of the complications of that repair process was the builder's refusal to communicate directly with the homeowners. Consequently, virtually all communication regarding even the most minor repairs necessitated involvement of counsel and/or experts in some way.

Although the arbitration agreement did not provide for discovery, the builder requested and was granted expedited document discovery, which resulted in the need to review, redact for privilege, and produce approximately 5,800 pages of documents while preparing for the final hearing and facilitating the Chapter 558 repair process.

The arbitration hearing lasted two weeks. Due to the arbitrator's schedule and a death in his family, the first and second weeks occurred months apart. The arbitrator ultimately found in favor of the homeowners, awarded damages to them, and found that they were the prevailing party for the purposes of attorneys’ fees and costs. The arbitrator's award was subsequently contested vigorously but nevertheless confirmed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough County.

5. Office of the Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs, State of Florida v. Botfly, LLC, et al., Case No.: 51-2010-CA-2912-WS/G (Note: This case style and number is for the main case, which established the Receiver’s authority to bring each of the related recovery actions. I was part of a team of lawyers who handled the recovery actions.)

Court: Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pasco County

Judge: The Hon. Stanley Mills, Circuit Judge

Date Tried: Various dates between 2012 and 2013

Client: Michael Moecker, as Receiver for Botfly

Nature of Participation: Of the recovery actions assigned to me, including the three in which bench trials were conducted, I was first chair.

28 Rev. 100209-OGC

Significance: In early 2010, the Attorney General of the State of Florida determined that an investment scheme called “Botfly,” which was run by an individual named David Lewalski and his associate, Jon Hammill, was a Ponzi scheme. Though Lewalksi solicited investors with claims that he would use their principal investment to finance his foreign exchange trading through Botfly, and he promised a monthly return of up to 10% per month (with compounding interest), very little of investors’ money was ever used for foreign exchange trading. It was determined that no investor was ever paid with profits from such trading, and to the extent that Lewalski engaged in foreign exchange trading with Botfly investor money at all, he was not good at it and generally lost that money.

The Attorney General obtained an injunction to prevent further dissipation of funds by Lewalski and Hammill. At the same time, the Court froze bank accounts and enjoined Lewalski, Hammill, and Botfly from transferring or disposing of personal property. The Attorney General sought appointment of a receiver over the assets of Botfly. Our client, Michael Moecker, was appointed. He was tasked with locating, recovering, preserving, protecting, maintaining, managing, and safeguarding the assets of Botfly and various other entities in the receivership.

My role in the case primarily related to the Receiver’s efforts to marshal assets of the receivership estate through recovery of “false profits” from Botfly investors. False profits were defined as amounts paid to an investor above the investor’s principal investment.

Although each investor was promised returns of up to 10% per month, many investors made no withdrawals. Because the promised returns were compounding, those investors believed that by “letting it ride,” they were making a sound investment decision. These investors became “net losers” because they invested more in the scheme than they withdrew.

Other investors made withdrawals, and many of them withdrew funds well in excess of their initial investment. Those investors were referred to as “net winners.” Although those net winners in many, if not most, cases sincerely believed that those withdrawals were legitimate returns on their investment, in reality Lewalski and Botfly were distributing to them the principal investments made by other investors in an effort to make Botfly appear to be a legitimate investment.

On behalf of the Receiver, we sent over 110 letters demanding the return of false profits from the net winners. Among the team of litigators involved, I believe I managed slightly more than a third of these files at the outset.

Early efforts to recover false profits from net winners were complicated by a concerted campaign by certain investors (many of whom were net winners) to convince the entire investor group (including net losers who stood to benefit from the Receiver’s efforts) to oppose the Receiver. Even after Lewalski and Hammill both entered guilty pleas in federal court, some of those investors inexplicably maintained his innocence or for other reasons encouraged continued opposition to the Receiver.

Between April 2011 and December 2012, 76 lawsuits were filed in Pasco County against recipients of false profits.

At various points in time, I handled one third or more of the pending lawsuits. Most suits were either settled or resolved favorably through default or summary judgment. Of the cases for which I had primary responsibility, three were tried in bench trials. In each of

29 Rev. 100209-OGC

those three cases, the Receiver prevailed and obtained judgments for the full amount demanded. In one of those cases, the defendant was an ex-convict who became involved in the scheme after he completed his prison term for drug trafficking. Another case involved two teachers, one of whom was a childhood friend of David Lewalski. The third involved a used car salesman who formerly worked with David Lewalski’s cousin and confidant.

Ultimately, through successful claims for false profits and other efforts, the Receiver was able to return over five million dollars ($5,000,000.00) to the net losers in Botfly through a court-supervised claims process.

6. Phoenix Aviation Managers, Inc. v. Woolie Enterprises, Inc. and Martin Slone, Case No.: 08-8068-CI

Nature of Participation: Second chair. I argued various pre-trial motions, conducted voire dire, argued over 15 motions in limine, delivered the closing argument, and had a significant role in trial strategy and compliance with the court's pretrial orders.

Court: Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County

Judge: The Hon. George Jirotka, Circuit Court Judge

Client: Phoenix Aviation Managers, Inc.

Significance: Phoenix Aviation Managers, Inc., an aviation insurer, sold an aircraft in an online auction. The aircraft had been damaged beyond repair in a plane crash, and in the online auction it was clearly noted that the aircraft was not airworthy, should never be returned to flight, and could only be used for some of its parts. A page on the auction website indicated that any buyer must agree to cut certain parts of the aircraft to ensure that those parts were never returned to flight.

The defendants purchased the aircraft in the online salvage auction. They initially represented to Phoenix via email that they would cut the necessary parts, and at one point sent Phoenix photos purporting to show the cuts being made. However, when representatives from Phoenix determined that the photos were insufficient assurance that the cuts had been made (because upon inspection the cuts appeared to have been made to different parts of the aircraft) and requested further proof, the defendants refused to make the cuts. The defendants claimed that although the online auction did include notice that the cuts must be made, that information was conveyed on a page on the website that the defendants did not read, and therefore Phoenix did not adequately inform the defendants prior to the sale that the aircraft could not be returned to flight and the designated parts of it must be cut.

Believing that the potential that the defendants may try to return the aircraft to flight posed a grave risk to human life, Phoenix sued the defendants in Pinellas County to enforce the defendants' obligation. The defendants took various positions in the lawsuit, ultimately arguing at trial that so long as they never returned the aircraft to flight in the United States then it should be no concern of Phoenix if the defendants re-sold the aircraft "as is" in a third-world country outside the jurisdiction of the FAA. This particular type of aircraft was often used in medical missions in third-world countries.

30 Rev. 100209-OGC

After a five-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for Phoenix. Phoenix was also awarded its attorneys' fees and costs.

31. Attach at least one example of legal writing which you personally wrote. If you have not personally written any legal documents recently, you may attach writing for which you had substantial responsibility. Please describe your degree of involvement in preparing the writing you attached.

I personally wrote the attached writing sample.

PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE OR PUBLIC OFFICE:

32a. Have you ever held judicial office or been a candidate for judicial office? If so, state the court(s) involved and the dates of service or dates of candidacy.

Yes. I was appointed to the Circuit Court on March 31, 2017 by former Governor Rick Scott. I was elected to the Circuit Court without opposition in 2018.

32b. List any prior quasi-judicial service:

Dates Name of Agency Position Held

N/A

Types of issues heard: N/A

32c. Have you ever held or been a candidate for any other public office? If so, state the office, location and dates of service or candidacy.

No.

32d. If you have had prior judicial or quasi-judicial experience,

(i) List the names, phone numbers and addresses of six attorneys who appeared before you on matters of substance.

1. Michael Lundy, Esq.

Older Lundy & Alvarez

1000 West Cass Street


(813) 254-8998

[email protected]

2. Michael R. Carey, Esq.

31 Rev. 100209-OGC

Carey O’Malley Whitaker Mueller

712 South Oregon Avenue, Suite 100


(813) 250-0577

[email protected]

3. Robert L. Webster, Esq.

Jeanne T. Tate, P.A.

418 West Platt Street, Suite B


(813) 258-3355

[email protected]

4. Alan Wagner, Esq.

Wagner Vaughn McLaughlin, P.A.

601 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite 910


(813)225-4000

[email protected]

5. Phillip M. Piazza, Esq.

Law Offices of Robert J. Smith



(813) 222-8053

[email protected]

6. Phillip Wartenberg, Esq.

Allen Dell, P.A.

202 South Rome Avenue, Suite 100


(813) 223-5351

32 Rev. 100209-OGC

[email protected]

(ii) Describe the approximate number and nature of the cases you have handled during your judicial or quasi-judicial tenure.

During my time on the circuit bench, I have presided over civil, felony, drug court, Marchman Act, dependency, and domestic relations dockets. My current assignment in the domestic relations division primarily involves petitions for divorce, paternity, waiver of parental notification of abortion, adoption, and name change. At any given time, 600 to 800 cases are assigned to my division. Between service as duty judge and voluntarily assisting my colleagues throughout the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, I would conservatively estimate that I have presided over a thousand cases. It is likely that the exact number is much higher.

(iii) List citations of any opinions which have been published.

None of my orders are published.

(iv) List citations or styles and describe the five most significant cases you have tried or heard. Identify the parties, describe the cases and tell why you believe them to be significant. Give dates tried and names of attorneys involved.

1. In Re: the Marriage of D.P. and E.P.(*)

(*NOTE: For domestic relations cases, initials are used in this application out of respect for the privacy of the families involved)

Case Number: 16-DR-12838

Description and Explanation of Significance:

An exotic dancer married a real estate developer, and after a seven year marriage their relationship soured amid mutual allegations of infidelity. Prior to the breakdown of the marriage, the husband adopted the wife’s two very young children from prior relationships and the couple agreed to never tell the children that they were adopted. They went on to have two more children together. During the divorce proceeding, it was determined that three of the four children have significant special needs that had not been adequately addressed during the marriage.

Before they married, but without telling the wife, the husband had transferred substantially all of his assets into trusts. The husband filed for divorce in 2015. In connection with that case, the parties negotiated and signed a marital settlement agreement resolving the issues of alimony and equitable distribution of assets. Subsequently, they then attempted to reconcile and dismissed the case. The reconciliation proved unsuccessful, and the husband filed for divorce again in 2016. There were substantial disputes over the validity and impact of the 2015 marital settlement agreement.

The husband also filed civil claims against the wife, alleging that she stole about $90,000 in cash and several items of personal property from his home. The wife originally concealed the theft of cash by sandwiching $1 bills between the original

33 Rev. 100209-OGC

larger denominations. However, when the theft was discovered she admitted that she took the cash and the personal property.

In connection with the divorce, the husband also sought to avoid an allegedly fraudulent transfer of a promissory note given to the wife in connection with the 2015 marital settlement agreement. The wife had secretly factored that note while continuing to accept the payments the husband made to her in connection with it. This led to a foreclosure action initiated by the subsequent transferor during the pendency of the divorce action.

Among other things, in the course of the proceeding, there was no dispute that the wife also did the following: (1) told the two adopted children that the husband was not their biological father, (2) showed one of the children a video that the husband had taken to show the wife why he believed the child had special needs, and told that child that “your dad thinks something is wrong with you,” (3) committed perjury, (4) falsified documents, and (5) allowed her boyfriend to text the parties’ young daughter at all hours, expressing affection.

Date(s) Tried: November 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2018

Outcome: Following a seven day trial, a partial final judgment was entered dissolving the marriage, equitably distributing assets, and establishing a parenting plan. A further evidentiary hearing was set to resolve remaining issues, but the case was settled before that hearing.

Counsel:

Husband’s Attorney:

Michael Lundy, Esq.

Older Lundy & Alvarez

1000 West Cass Street


(813) 254-8998

[email protected]

Wife’s Attorney:

John Agnetti, Esq.

Hoffman Larin & Agnetti

909 North Miami Beach Boulevard

North Miami, Florida 33161

34 Rev. 100209-OGC

(305) 539-9446

[email protected]

Attorney for the Husband’s Trusts:

Michael R. Carey, Esq.

Carey O’Malley Whitaker Mueller

712 South Oregon Avenue, Suite 100


(813) 250-0577

[email protected]

Attorney for Third Party Defendant:

Zachary David Grimland, Esq.

Grimland Law, PLLC

1503 South U.S. Highway 301, Suite 8


[email protected]

2. In Re: the Matter of the Proposed Adoption of a Minor Child


Case Description and Explanation of Significance:

A child was born out of a relationship between a 15 year old girl and an 18 year old man. Under Section 800.04(4)(a)(1), Florida Statutes, “[a] person commits lewd and lascivious battery by engaging in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years old” and “an offender who commits lewd and lascivious battery commits a felony of the second degree.”

After the birth, the mother consented to her parents’ adoption of the baby. The father objected to the adoption and insisted that the baby could not be adopted without either his consent or a termination of his parental rights.

The maternal grandparents moved for summary judgment. They argued that the father’s consent was not required because, by having sex with a 15 year old girl, the father committed lewd and lascivious acts upon a minor.

35 Rev. 100209-OGC

Section 63.082(1)(d), Florida Statutes states that the statutory requirement that a biological father receive notice of an adoption proceeding, and the requirement that the father’s consent be obtained, “do not apply in cases in which the child is conceived as a result of a violation of the criminal laws of this or another state or county, including, but not limited to . . . lewd acts perpetrated upon a minor, or incest.”

The father opposed summary judgment. He did not dispute that his conduct met the definition of lewd and lascivious battery under Section 800.04(4)(a)(1), Florida Statutes. However, the father asserted that his consent should be required because he was never convicted of lewd and lascivious battery. Acknowledging that the plain language of Section 63.082(1)(d) did not require a conviction, the father nevertheless argued that under principles of fairness such a requirement should be inferred.

Date(s) Heard: Motion for Summary Judgment heard on September 12, 2019

Outcome:

Summary judgment granted in favor of the petitioners.

Counsel:

For the Petitioners:

Robert L. Webster, Esq.

Jeanne T. Tate, P.A.

418 West Platt Street, Suite B


(813) 258-3355

[email protected]

For the Father:

John DeGirolamo, Esq.

In Law We Trust, P.A.

1005 North Marion Street


(813) 415-3510

[email protected]

36 Rev. 100209-OGC

3. In Re: J.H., A Minor

Case Number: 19-DP-815


Florida’s Parental Notice of Abortion Act (the “Act”) provides that a physician may not perform an abortion on a minor child without first giving the minor child’s parent or legal guardian notice that the abortion will be performed. The Act provides an exception to the parental notification requirement where the minor petitions the Circuit Court for, and is granted, a judicial waiver of the notice requirement. Under the Act, to obtain such a waiver the minor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. If she meets that burden of proof, then the Act compels the court to enter an order authorizing the minor to consent to the performance or inducement of an abortion without notifying her parent or guardian. On the other hand, the petition must be dismissed if the minor does not present clear and convincing evidence that she is sufficiently mature to make that decision without parental notification.

When a petition is filed under the Act, it is immediately brought to a Circuit Judge who must then give it precedence over all other pending matters. For example, when this case was filed, I was in the middle of a complicated two-day trial. Consistent with the Act’s provisions, counsel was immediately appointed to represent the minor. Once counsel arrived at the courthouse, I recessed the trial, walked to another courtroom, and conducted the evidentiary hearing. The Act requires that a written ruling be issued within three days after the petition is filed, so the order making the statutorily mandated findings was entered the next day. The facts of the case are confidential by statute.

Date(s) Tried or Heard: Petition for Judicial Waiver of Parental Notice of Abortion Act heard on September 20, 2019

Outcome: Petition dismissed.

Counsel:

For the Petitioner:

Rinky Parwani, Esq.

Parwani Law, P.A.

9905 Alambra Avenue


37 Rev. 100209-OGC

(813) 514-8280

[email protected]

4. Tommaso Bellafemine v. Karen Sue Mansell

Case Number: 15-CA-11670


As a result of an accident on Brandon Boulevard in Tampa, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered back and neck injuries. The defendant admitted that she was at fault for the accident but disputed that the plaintiff suffered any long-term injury. At trial, the defendant put on evidence that after the accident the plaintiff continued to regularly play competitive pick-up basketball and worked for several years as a barkeeper, changing beer kegs and carrying heavy loads of glassware.

Date(s) Tried or Heard: Trial conducted July 22, 23, 24, and 25, 2019

Outcome: Verdict for the plaintiff. ($30,000)

Counsel:

For the Plaintiff:

Michael J. Vittoria, Esq.

Morgan & Morgan

201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor


(813) 223-5402

[email protected]

Paul B. Fulmer, III, Esq.

Morgan & Morgan

201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor


(813) 223-5505

[email protected]

For the Defense:

38 Rev. 100209-OGC

Phillip M. Piazza, Esq.




(813) 222-8053

[email protected]

Jessica D. Russ, Esq.




(813) 222-8056

[email protected]

5. In Re: the Marriage of M.O. and S.O.



A husband made the unilateral decision to move his mother into the marital home shortly after the parties’ first and only child was born. The wife, who had never particularly relished her mother-in-law’s company, quickly found herself in constant conflict with the mother-in-law. The conflicts became intense. Siding with his mother, the husband demanded that the wife leave the home and take the baby with her. Unsurprisingly, a divorce followed. Until the separation, the husband and wife had owned and operated a profitable business selling license plate covers online. Although the husband had designated the wife as president of that company, he unilaterally dissolved it within a month of the separation. He formed a new entity, which produced the same products using the assets of the former marital business. He then executed a shareholder agreement that granted his mother and brother a 97% ownership stake in the business, leaving the husband with only 3%. Notably, the shareholder agreement was drafted in English, while neither the mother nor the brother could read, write, or speak English. Additionally, the mother had already returned to Turkey when the agreement was allegedly signed. During the divorce, the husband refused to cooperate with a forensic accountant who sought to value the business. The husband also maintained throughout the trial that various assets in his possession, such as a boat in his garage, were actually owned by the brother living in Turkey. The husband also asserted that the case was governed by a

39 Rev. 100209-OGC

prenuptial agreement, which the wife contended she had never seen or signed. She asserted that the husband falsified the prenuptial agreement, hid information about their marital finances from her throughout the marriage, transferred his assets to family members living in Turkey just prior to the divorce, and lied to the court about the value and existence of various assets. The parties also disagreed on the appropriate timesharing schedule for their five-year old daughter, and specifically disagreed on the division of religious holidays where the husband was a practicing Muslim and the wife was a practicing Christian.

Date(s) Tried or Heard: September 18 and 19, 2017

Outcome: Final judgment entered. Affirmed on appeal.

Counsel:

For the Wife:

Phillip Wartenberg, Esq.

Allen Dell, P.A.

202 South Rome Avenue, Suite 100


(813) 223-5351

[email protected]

For the Husband:

Shazia N. Sparkman, Esq.

Sparkman & Sparkman, P.A.

313 South Bungalow Park Avenue


(813) 274-2000

[email protected]

6. In Re: the Matter of C.N. and C.D.

Case No.: 17-DR-13027


40 Rev. 100209-OGC

During a one-month relationship, the parties conceived a daughter who is now three years old. The father filed this paternity case to establish his custody rights. Early in the case, the father alleged that the mother used cocaine during the pregnancy and continued to abuse illicit drugs. The mother denied those allegations. To address the father’s concerns, drug testing of the mother was ordered. The drug tests were positive for cocaine and other substances, and a review of the mother’s medical records revealed that she tested positive for cocaine during the pregnancy. The mother’s timesharing with the child was ordered to be supervised. Promptly thereafter, the mother filed an emergency motion alleging that the father was sexually molesting the child. I appointed a forensic evaluator and suspended the father’s timesharing pending the results of that evaluation. The father then voluntarily submitted to a battery of examinations by various professionals, including a very personal psycho-sexual evaluation. Following extensive hearings and testimony from those professionals and the forensic evaluator, I determined that there was no credible evidence that the child had been sexually abused. The father resumed timesharing with the child pending a final hearing.

Counsel:

For the Father:

Teresa O. Prescott, Esq.

Prescott Legal, P.A.

800 West Platt Street, Suite 5


(813) 530-8990

[email protected]

For the Mother:

James Joseph Wimsatt, Esq.

Ayo & Iken

703 West Bay Street


(813) 642-6997

[email protected]

41 Rev. 100209-OGC

(v) Has a complaint about you ever been made to the Judicial Qualifications Commission? If so, give date, describe complaint, whether or not there was a finding of probable cause, whether or not you have appeared before the Commission, and its resolution.

Not to my knowledge.

(vi) Have you ever held an attorney in contempt? If so, for each instance state name of attorney, approximate date and circumstances.

Not that I can recall.

(vii) If you are a quasi-judicial officer (ALJ, Magistrate, General Master), have you ever been disciplined or reprimanded by a sitting judge? If so, describe.

N/A

BUSINESS INVOLVEMENT:

33a. If you are now an officer, director or otherwise engaged in the management of any business enterprise, state the name of such enterprise, the nature of the business, the nature of your duties, and whether you intend to resign such position immediately upon your appointment or election to judicial office.

I am not.

33b. Since being admitted to the Bar, have you ever been engaged in any occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law? If so, give details, including dates.

Other than in connection with my interest in an LLC that owns a rental property, no.

33c. State whether during the past five years you have received any fees or compensation of any kind, other than for legal services rendered, from any business enterprise, institution, organization, or association of any kind. If so, identify the source of such compensation, the nature of the business enterprise, institution, organization or association involved and the dates such compensation was paid and the amounts.

Other than in connection with my interest in an LLC that owns a rental property, no.

POSSIBLE BIAS OR PREJUDICE:

34. The Commission is interested in knowing if there are certain types of cases, groups of entities, or extended relationships or associations which would limit the cases for which you could sit as the presiding judge. Please list all types or classifications of cases or litigants for which you as a general proposition believe it would be difficult for you to sit as the presiding judge. Indicate the reason for each situation as to why you believe you might be in conflict. If you have prior judicial experience, describe the types of cases from which you have recused yourself.

There is no type or classification of case that would present a conflict.

My father and brother have a statewide eminent domain practice. They represent private property owners whose property is being taken through eminent domain or inverse condemnation. My father’s name is S. Cary Gaylord. My brother’s name is Blake H. Gaylord. Their law firm is Gaylord Merlin Ludovici & Diaz, P.A. I would recuse

42 Rev. 100209-OGC

myself automatically from any case involving either my father or brother.

My husband, Benjamin ("Ben") Moe, manages a private equity fund called Osceola Capital Management (“Osceola”). Osceola acquires and operates businesses across the country. In the unlikely circumstance where a case was filed involving my husband, Osceola, or any of the businesses owned by Osceola, I would recuse myself automatically. Due to the nature of my husband’s work, it is possible (although unlikely) that other conflicts could arise. Should I become aware of such a potential conflict, I would analyze it under the applicable canons of judicial ethics and would err on the side of liberally recusing myself so as to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

Should any litigation come before me in which I have ever played a role representing either side as a lawyer, I would analyze it under the applicable canons of judicial ethics and would err on the side of liberally recusing myself so as to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

MISCELLANEOUS:

35a. Have you ever been convicted of a felony or a first degree misdemeanor?

Yes No X If “Yes” what charges?

Where convicted? Date of Conviction:

35b. Have you pled nolo contendere or pled guilty to a crime which is a felony or a first degree misdemeanor?



35c. Have you ever had the adjudication of guilt withheld for a crime which is a felony or a first degree misdemeanor?



36a. Have you ever been sued by a client? If so, give particulars including name of client, date suit filed, court, case number and disposition.

No.

36b. Has any lawsuit to your knowledge been filed alleging malpractice as a result of action or inaction on your part?

No.

36c. Have you or your professional liability insurance carrier ever settled a claim against you for professional malpractice? If so, give particulars, including the amounts involved.

No.

37a. Have you ever filed a personal petition in bankruptcy or has a petition in bankruptcy been filed against you?

43 Rev. 100209-OGC

No.

37b. Have you ever owned more than 25% of the issued and outstanding shares or acted as an officer or director of any corporation by which or against which a petition in bankruptcy has been filed? If so, give name of corporation, your relationship to it and date and caption of petition.

No.

38. Have you ever been a party to a lawsuit either as a plaintiff or as a defendant? If so, please supply the jurisdiction/county in which the lawsuit was filed, style, case number, nature of the lawsuit, whether you were Plaintiff or Defendant and its disposition.

No.

39. Has there ever been a finding of probable cause or other citation issued against you or are you presently under investigation for a breach of ethics or unprofessional conduct by any court, administrative agency, bar association, or other professional group. If so, give the particulars.

No.

40. To your knowledge within the last ten years, have any of your current or former co-workers, subordinates, supervisors, customers or clients ever filed a formal complaint or formal accusation of misconduct against you with any regulatory or investigatory agency, or with your employer? If so, please state the date(s) of such formal complaint or formal accusation(s), the specific formal complaint or formal accusation(s) made, and the background and resolution of such action(s). (Any complaint filed with JQC, refer to 32d(v).

No.

41. Are you currently the subject of an investigation which could result in civil, administrative or criminal action against you? If yes, please state the nature of the investigation, the agency conducting the investigation and the expected completion date of the investigation.

No.

42. In the past ten years, have you been subject to or threatened with eviction proceedings? If yes, please explain.

No.

43a. Have you filed all past tax returns as required by federal, state, local and other government authorities?

Yes No If no, please explain.

43b. Have you ever paid a tax penalty?

Yes No If yes, please explain what and why.

43c. Has a tax lien ever been filed against you? If so, by whom, when, where and why?

No.

•

•

44 Rev. 100209-OGC

HONORS AND PUBLICATIONS:

44. If you have published any books or articles, list them, giving citations and dates.

"The Supreme Court of Arizona: Its 2003-2004 Decisions" (Legal Ethics Section), 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 17, 93-105 (2005)

As President of the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Federal Bar Association, I also published messages in our Chapter's newsletter.

45. List any honors, prizes or awards you have received. Give dates.

AV Preeminent Rated by Martindale-Hubbell

Best Lawyers in America, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Florida Trend Legal Elite, 2014, 2015, 2016

Florida Trend Up and Coming Legal Elite, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Florida Super Lawyers, 2014, 2015, 2016

Florida Super Lawyers Rising Stars, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review, Arizona State Law Journal, 2004-2005

United States District Court Merit Selection Panel, Middle District of Florida, 2014-2015

Middle District of Florida Bench Bar Fund, United States District Court, 2016

Bench/Bar Relations Committee, Federal Bar Association, 2015-2017

Pro Bono Service & Excellence Award, Federal Bar Association, Tampa Bay Chapter, 2015

Pedrick Scholar, between 2002 and 2005 (approximate)

Honors, Lawyering Theory and Practice, 2004 (approximate)

CALI Excellence for the Future Award, Oral Advocacy, 2005

Second Place, ABA Regional Representation in Mediation Competition, 2002 (approximate)

Pro Bono Distinction, 2005

Alpha Kappa Delta Sociological Honor Society, 2001 (approximate)

1,000 Point Club (Basketball), Cambridge Christian School, 1997

Salutatorian, Seminole Presbyterian High School n/k/a Cambridge Christian School, 1997

Florida All-State Women’s Basketball Team, Honorable Mention, Class A, 1997

Athletic Hall of Fame, Cambridge Christian School, inducted 2013

46. List and describe any speeches or lectures you have given.

What You Need to Know About Practicing in the Middle District of Florida

Organization: Federal Bar Association, Tampa Bay Chapter

45 Rev. 100209-OGC

Location: Sam M. Gibbons United States Courthouse

Subject Matter: Local Rules, judicial preferences, and other practical guidance for federal practitioners

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Removal

Organization: Federal Bar Association, Tampa Bay Chapter, Young Lawyers Division Seminar on Basics of Federal Practice


Subject Matter: Subject matter jurisdiction and removal

Panelist, Bench-Bar Conference Family Law Break Out Session

Organization: Hillsborough County Bar Association

Location: Downtown Hilton

Moderator, A Conversation with Judge Covington Moderated by Judge Moe


Location: Stetson University College of Law (Main Campus)

Subject Matter: Federal court practice

Panelist, Privileged Communications: What’s Protected Under Federal and Florida Rules of Evidence

Organization: Federal Bar Association, Tampa Bay Chapter; Hillsborough Association of Women Lawyers


Subject matter: Distinctions between protections against disclosure of privileged communications in federal and state court

Remarks

Organization: Take Stock in Children / Leaders for Life Summer Institute

Location: Tampa Intercontinental Hotel

Subject Matter: Congratulations to young scholars who have demonstrated strong leadership skills, moral character, and academic success; encouragement to excel in the university setting; and explanation of my career path

46 Rev. 100209-OGC

Commencement Address

Organization: Cambridge Christian School

Location: Grace Family Church

Subject Matter: Congratulations and advice for new graduates

Welcoming Remarks, Legal Writing Workshop with Bryan A. Garner


Location: Stetson University (Tampa Campus)

Subject Matter: Excellence in written advocacy

Speaker, Eighth Annual Civil Seminar


Location: University Club

Subject Matter: Federal litigation practice tips

Remarks, Investiture of the Honorable Amanda A. Sansone as United States Magistrate Judge

Organization: United States District Court


Subject Matter: Congratulations and appreciation for judicial service, on behalf of the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Federal Bar Association

Client Education Seminar

Organization: Bush Ross, P.A.

Location: Bush Ross, P.A.

Subject Matter: Workplace investigations and retaliation claims

Remarks, Federal Bar Association Annual Luncheon



Subject Matter: Year in review, appreciation for board and judicial participation; appreciation for pro bono service award

47 Rev. 100209-OGC

Welcoming Remarks & Panelist, Staying in the Game: Women, Leadership, and the Law



Subject Matter: Leadership in the practice of law

Welcoming Remarks, Reception for U.S. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Jenkins


Location: Le Meridien Hotel

Subject Matter: Appreciation for judicial service

Welcoming Remarks, Reception Honoring Middle District of Florida Intensive Re-Entry Program & Former United States Attorney A. Lee Bentley



Subject Matter: Appreciation for service

Remarks, Luncheon

Organization: Saving Grace Ministries, Inc.

Location: Seminole Heights Baptist Church

Subject Matter: Desirability of assisting ex-offenders re-enter and find purpose and accountability within Tampa’s law-abiding community

Welcoming Remarks, Reception Honoring U.S. Magistrate Judges Julie Sneed and Mac McCoy



Subject Matter: Congratulations and appreciation for judicial service

47. Do you have a Martindale-Hubbell rating? Yes If so, what is it? No

AV Preeminent

PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER ACTIVITIES:

48a. List all bar associations and professional societies of which you are a member and give the titles and dates of any office which you may have held in such groups and committees to which you belonged.

- •

48 Rev. 100209-OGC

Federal Bar Association, Tampa Bay Chapter

President, 2015-16

Immediate Past President, 2016-17

President-Elect, 2014-15

Vice President, 2013-14

Treasurer, 2012-13

Secretary, 2011-12

Board Member, 2007-present

Florida Bar Grievance Committee 13-C

Chair, 2012-13 (approximate)

Member, 2010-13 (approximate)

Federal Bar Association (national)

Member, Bench / Bar Relations Committee, 2015-2017

Cheatwood Inn of Court (all dates approximate)

Master, 2017-present

Barrister, 2013-2017

Pupil, 2007-2013

Federalist Society

Hillsborough County Bar Association

Member, 2007 to present (approximate)

Co-Chair, Committee on Professionalism & Ethics, 2008

48b. List, in a fully identifiable fashion, all organizations, other than those identified in response to question No. 48(a), of which you have been a member since graduating from law school, including the titles and dates of any offices which you have held in each such organization.

1. Holy Trinity Presbyterian Church, 2007-2010 (approximate)

2. South Tampa Fellowship, 2010-2016 (approximate)

3. Grace Family Church, late 2016 to the present

4. Tampa Connection, Class of 2011

5. Hillsborough Association of Women Lawyers, 2007 to 2017(approximate)

6. Pearl Society of Bay Area Legal Services, 2016-17

7. Athena Society, 2017

8. Cambridge Christian School, Board of Trustees, 2017 to the present

49 Rev. 100209-OGC

9. Westminster Academy, Parent Council, President, 2018 to 2019

10. United States District Court Merit Selection Panel, Middle District of Florida, 2014-2015 (appointed by majority vote of the United States District Judges)

11. Litigation Counsel of America, 2017

12. Best of Tampa Bay Committee, Tampa Bay Performing Arts Center, 2008 to 2012 (approximate)

13. American Bar Association

14. United States District Court Bench Bar Fund Committee, Middle District of Florida, 2016 (appointed by Chief Judge Merryday)

48c. List your hobbies or other vocational interests.

I have always loved to read, and I spend some time reading every day. On the weekends, I enjoy spending time with my family, going to the gym, trying new restaurants, traveling, and generally being active and outdoors. We take a trip every August with my extended family to Key West for lobster season. I am a certified SCUBA diver.

48d. Do you now or have you ever belonged to any club or organization that in practice or policy restricts (or restricted during the time of your membership) its membership on the basis of race, religion, national origin or sex? If so, detail the name and nature of the club(s) or organization(s), relevant policies and practices and whether you intend to continue as a member if you are selected to serve on the bench.

I was invited to join the Athena Society in 2017. It is my recollection that the Athena Society restricts its membership to women. My involvement in the organization was brief and has not continued.

48e. Describe any pro bono legal work you have done. Give dates.

Between 2007 and 2009, I represented a nun who was appointed guardian of a minor child in a juvenile dependency proceeding.

Between approximately 2007 and 2008, I served as the pro bono chair of the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Federal Bar Association and provided one-time legal advice to a number of pro se litigants through that program.

In 2015, I was appointed to represent a pro se prisoner in a civil rights case in federal court. I was appointed six weeks before trial, and the case settled the day before trial was set to begin.

When I became President of the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Federal Bar Association, the chapter became involved in a program that assists ex-offenders from the federal prison system who have demonstrated a commitment to obtaining legitimate employment and

50 Rev. 100209-OGC

becoming law-abiding, productive, tax-paying citizens. One component of the program involves recruiting members of the chapter to meet specific one-time pro bono needs that arise for participants of the Middle District of Florida's Intensive Re-Entry Program (the "Re-Entry Program").

In 2017, I represented an ex-offender participating in the Re-Entry Program. My client was sued by his landlord in an eviction proceeding. He was required to maintain stable housing as a condition of the Re-Entry Program. I did not have any meaningful experience with eviction law but reached out to local experts in that field who graciously took my calls and walked me through the process. With their help, I identified a good faith strategy to halt the eviction long enough for my client to get his next paycheck. Ultimately, the landlord was paid in full and my client and his five-year-old disabled child were not evicted. He was also able to successfully complete and graduate from the Re-Entry Program.

In 2016, the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Federal Bar Association was asked to consider launching an informational clinic for pro se litigants with cases pending in the Sam M. Gibbons United States Courthouse. During my term as President of the Chapter, the Board of Directors voted to support that effort, began to plan for a program based on a similar one in Jacksonville, and entered into a contract with Bay Area Legal Services to staff the clinic.

Throughout my time in private practice, with some regularity I performed pro bono and volunteer work for Cambridge Christian School (formerly known as Seminole Presbyterian School), where I attended from first to twelfth grade. Although the work often related to legal issues or questions, I also have agreed to speak to students about the law, my career path, and other matters.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:

49a. Have you attended any continuing legal education programs during the past five years? If so, in what substantive areas?

Yes. My CLE history for the five years prior to taking the bench is attached as Exhibit A.

49b. Have you taught any courses on law or lectured at bar association conferences, law school forums, or continuing legal education programs? If so, in what substantive areas?

What You Need to Know About Practicing in the Middle District of Florida



Subject Matter: Local Rules, judicial preferences, and other practical guidance for federal practitioners

51 Rev. 100209-OGC

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Removal

Organization: Federal Bar Association, Tampa Bay Chapter, Young Lawyers Division Seminar on Basics of Federal Practice


Subject Matter: Subject matter jurisdiction and removal

Panelist, Bench-Bar Conference Family Law Break Out Session

Organization: Hillsborough County Bar Association

Location: Downtown Hilton

Moderator, A Conversation with Judge Covington Moderated by Judge Moe


Location: Stetson University College of Law (Main Campus)

Subject Matter: Federal court practice

Panelist, Privileged Communications: What’s Protected Under Federal and Florida Rules of Evidence

Organization: Federal Bar Association, Tampa Bay Chapter; Hillsborough Association of Women Lawyers


Subject matter: Distinctions between protections against disclosure of privileged communications in federal and state court

Commencement Address

Organization: Cambridge Christian School

Location: Grace Family Church

Subject Matter: Congratulations and advice for new graduates

Welcoming Remarks, Legal Writing Workshop with Bryan A. Garner


Location: Stetson University (Tampa Campus)

Subject Matter: Excellence in written advocacy

52 Rev. 100209-OGC

Speaker, Eighth Annual Civil Seminar



Subject Matter: Federal litigation practice tips

Client Education Seminar

Organization: Bush Ross, P.A.

Location: Bush Ross, P.A.

Subject Matter: Workplace investigations and retaliation claims

Welcoming Remarks & Panelist, Staying in the Game: Women, Leadership, and the Law



Subject Matter: Leadership in the practice of law

50. Describe any additional education or other experience you have which could assist you in holding judicial office.

Between 2005 and 2007, I served as a law clerk to United States District Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington in the Middle District of Florida. During that time, Judge Covington sat by designation on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on a panel with United States Circuit Judges William H. Pryor and Stanley F. Birch. To assist her in preparation for the oral arguments, each of her law clerks were assigned several cases. For the cases I was assigned, I reviewed the record, analyzed the briefs, researched the legal issues, and prepared bench memos. Judge Covington brought me with her to Atlanta for oral arguments. Following oral arguments, Judge Covington was tasked with drafting an opinion in a Fair Labor Standards Act case. I assisted her with research for and drafting of the opinion. The citation for the published opinion is Alicia Allen, et al. v. Board of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007).

As a law clerk for Judge Covington, my responsibilities otherwise included assisting with analysis of arguments raised in motions, responses, and other briefs, analyzing and researching legal issues, and drafting orders. I assisted on civil as well as criminal matters and participated in several significant criminal trials. For example, I was in court with her nearly every day for an approximately six-week workers' compensation fraud case, preparing bench memoranda, jury instructions, verdict forms, assisting with research regarding evidentiary issues, and assisting with research, analysis, and drafting orders on significant post-trial motions. I also assisted her in preparing for hearings on matters such as requests for injunctive relief in civil cases, and motions to suppress in

53 Rev. 100209-OGC

criminal cases.

In 2002, I interned for Florida Supreme Court Justice Kenneth B. Bell. My primary responsibility was analysis of the existence of conflict jurisdiction, but I also performed research and drafted memoranda and attended oral arguments.

While in law school, I also interned for Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Hotham, who had a felony docket. During my internship, Judge Hotham presided over a multi-week double homicide trial and I attended and assisted him nearly every day of the trial, performing research as needed.

As a Circuit Judge, I have attended intensive skills courses for judges assigned to felony and domestic relations dockets. I have also attended judicial education courses relating to topics such as judicial ethics and professionalism, early childhood development, administrative law, domestic violence, financial issues in litigation, and traumatic brain injuries.

51. Explain the particular potential contribution you believe your selection would bring to this position.

First, my career reflects the intellectual capacity and diligence required for this position. Justices are generalists who must be capable of quickly gaining high-level proficiency in new subject areas, comprehensively analyzing issues, courageously making the right decisions, and clearly and convincingly articulating a thought process through written work product. The work I have done over my career demonstrates the ability to perform those tasks.

Second, my background reflects the ability to lead and earn the respect of colleagues, which is important in a role tasked with administration of an entire branch of government. As a lawyer, I was elevated to equity partner in a large commercial law firm. I was peer-review rated at the highest level by Martindale-Hubbell (AV Preeminent) and routinely recognized in publications such as Best Lawyers in America. I was also the president of one of the largest and most active chapters of the Federal Bar Association in the United States. As a law student, I was elected Editor-in-Chief of the law review at a law school frequently ranked in or near the top 25 in the country.

Third, though appellate judges generally function at the tail end of a case's life cycle, they are greatly aided by an intimate understanding of how a case progresses through the legal system. By virtue of my experience counseling clients and trying cases as a lawyer, and also trying cases as a Circuit Judge, I have that understanding.

54 Rev. 100209-OGC

Fourth, although the lion's share of my experience is at the trial court level, my experience with the appellate system has been meaningful. I gained that experience at high levels, through clerking for a United States District Judge who sat by designation on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and interning for the Florida Supreme Court. More recently, as a Circuit Judge I have reviewed the decisions of General Magistrates.

Fifth, justices play an important role in ethical and disciplinary matters. My past service as Chair of a Florida Bar Grievance Committee and, more recently, as a bar referee, equips me to do that work.

Sixth, I bring the benefit of having worked with and learned from exceptional judges. My colleagues on the Thirteenth Circuit are widely regarded as a gold standard for professionalism and proficiency in our state court system. Judge Covington and Justice Bell also modeled at earlier points in my career judicial restraint, intellect, humility, preparedness, hard work, professionalism, and a concern for others.

Last, I respect the enduring genius of the American system of government. The people of the United States decided what laws would apply to them, established a government to effect their will, conceived of checks and balances between the separate branches, and—because of their mistrust of government—established a constitution that binds the government against unwelcome intrusion into their lives. Appreciation for the freedoms we enjoy because of the wisdom of our founders and the sacrifices made by those who followed them is a generational legacy in my family. My father is a graduate of West Point and a former United States Army JAG officer. My older brother is a veteran of the United States Army who served in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and in Kuwait as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He graduated from the United States Merchant Marine Academy. My grandfather served under General Patton in the United States Army during World War II. My husband is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy who served as an officer in the United States Air Force for the first years of our marriage. Although my service could never compare to theirs, I am driven by the same desire to protect and defend the freedoms our forefathers secured for us. As a judge, I view my work as an outgrowth of my gratitude for the sacrifices of those who came before me, establishing and protecting the freedoms I enjoy in our country and this great State.

52. If you have previously submitted a questionnaire or application to this or any other judicial nominating commission, please give the name of the commission and the approximate date of submission.

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Judicial Nominating Commission, December 2016

Florida Federal Judicial Nominating Advisory Committee, November 2019

53. Give any other information you feel would be helpful to the Commission in evaluating your application.

55 Rev. 100209-OGC

N/A

REFERENCES:

54. List the names, addresses and telephone numbers of ten persons who are in a position to comment on your qualifications for judicial position and of whom inquiry may be made by the Commission.

1. The Hon. Virginia M. Hernandez Covington, United States District Judge, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Sam M. Gibbons United States Courthouse, 801 North Florida Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33602, (813) 301-5400

2. The Hon. Kenneth B. Bell, Gunster, 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 601, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804, (850) 521-1708

3. Will Weatherford, Weatherford Capital, 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 2320, Tampa, Florida 33602, (813) 751-4250

4. David ("Dave") Shell, 828 South Bayside Drive, Tampa, Florida 33609, (813) 928-8089

5. The Hon. William F. Jung, United States District Judge, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Sam M. Gibbons United States Courthouse, 801 North Florida Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33602, (813) 301-5220

6. Scott Meister, Owner/Principal, Cornerstone Solutions Group, 14620 Bellamy Brothers Boulevard, Dade City, Florida 33525, (813) 995-5909

7. Wm. Bradley ("Brad") Russell, Jr., Foley & Lardner, LLP, 1 Independent Drive, Suite 1300, Jacksonville, Florida 33202, (904) 633-8928

8. Gary Downing, Managing Director / Co-Head of Investment Banking, Raymond James Financial, 1913 South Ardsley Street, Tampa, Florida 33629, (813) 390-5661

9. Representative James W. Grant, Florida House of Representatives, 417 House Office Building, 402 South Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300, (850) 717-5064

10. Elizabeth ("Libby") Ridley, Esq., Foley & Lardner, 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 2700, Tampa, Florida 33602, (813) 225-4163

56 Rev. 100209-OGC

CERTIFICATE

I have read the foregoing questions carefully and have answered them truthfully, fully

and completely. I hereby waive notice by and authorize The Florida Bar or any of its

committees, educational and other institutions, the Judicial Qualifications Commission,

the Florida Board of Bar Examiners or any judicial or professional disciplinary or

supervisory body or commission, any references furnished by me, employers, business

and professional associates, all governmental agencies and instrumentalities and all

consumer and credit reporting agencies to release to the respective Judicial Nominating

Commission and Office of the Governor any information, files, records or credit reports

requested by the commission in connection with any consideration of me as possible

nominee for appointment to judicial office. Information relating to any Florida Bar

disciplinary proceedings is to be made available in accordance with Rule 3-7.1(l), Rules

Regulating The Florida Bar. I recognize and agree that, pursuant to the Florida

Constitution and the Uniform Rules of this commission, the contents of this

questionnaire and other information received from or concerning me, and all interviews

and proceedings of the commission, except for deliberations by the commission, shall

be open to the public.

Further, I stipulate I have read, and understand the requirements of the Florida Code of

Judicial Conduct.

Dated this 24 day of December , 2019.

Printed Name Signature

(Pursuant to Section 119.071(4)(d)(1), F.S.), . . . The home addresses and telephone numbers of justices of the Supreme Court, district court of appeal judges, circuit court judges, and county court judges; the home addresses, telephone numbers, and places of employment of the spouses and children of justices and judges; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by the children of justices and judges are exempt from the provisions of subsection (1), dealing with public records.

Anne-Leigh Gaylord Moe

57 Rev. 062414-OGC

FINANCIAL HISTORY

1. State the amount of gross income you have earned, or losses you have incurred (before deducting expenses and taxes) from the practice of law for the preceding three-year period. This income figure should be stated on a year to year basis and include year to date information, and salary, if the nature of your employment is in a legal field. Current year to date $160,688

List Last 3 years

$160,688

(2018)

$185,480

(2017)

$204,025

(2016)

2. State the amount of net income you have earned, or losses you have incurred (after

deducting expenses but not taxes) from the practice of law for the preceding three-year period. This income figure should be stated on a year to year basis and include year to date information, and salary, if the nature of your employment is in a legal field.

Current year to date $160,688

List Last 3 years

$160,688

(2018)

$185,480

(2017)

$204,025

(2016)

3. State the gross amount of income or loses incurred (before deducting expenses or

taxes) you have earned in the preceding three years on a year by year basis from all sources other than the practice of law, and generally describe the source of such income or losses.

Current year to date

$30, 201.31

(gross rental

income through

10/21/19 for the

asset held by Gulf

Drive Ventures,

LLC)

List Last 3 years

$33,455.20

(gross rental

income for the

asset held by

$10,100

(gross

rental

income for

the asset

$13,990

(gross rental

income for

the asset

held by Gulf

58 Rev. 062414-OGC

Gulf Drive

Ventures, LLC

in 2018)

held by

Gulf Drive

Ventures,

LLC in

2017)

Drive

Ventures,

LLC in 2016)

4. State the amount of net income you have earned or losses incurred (after deducting

expenses) from all sources other than the practice of law for the preceding three-year period on a year by year basis, and generally describe the sources of such income or losses.

Current year to date

$30,201.31

(rental income

from the asset

held by Gulf Drive

Ventures, LLC

through 10/21/19)

List Last 3 years

$33,455.20

(rental income

from the asset

held by Gulf

Drive Ventures,

LLC in 2018)

$0

(the expenses of

Gulf Drive

Ventures, LLC

exceeded its

rental income in

2017)

$0

(the expenses of

Gulf Drive Ventures,

LLC exceeded its

rental income in

2016)

FORM 6 FULL AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 2018 Plmeprintortypeyourname, mailing OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS addroas, agency namo, and position below:

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:

LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME.

Moe, Anne-Leigh Gaylord MAILING ADDRESS:

§119.071 (4)(d) F.S.

CITY :

NAME OF AGENCY :

hi rteenth Judicial Circuit

ZIP :

NAME OF OFFICE OR POSITION HELD OR SOUGHT :

ircuit Judge

CHECK IF THIS IS A FILING BY A CANDIDATE 0

COUNTY :

PART A - ET WORTH

Please enter the value of your net worth as of December 31 , 2018 or a more current date. (Note: Net worth is not calculated by subtracting your reported liabilities from your reported assets, so please see the instructions on page 3.)

My net worth as of December 31 , 20 _18_ was $ _1 _,8_2_2,_3_26_._13 _____ _

PART B -· ASSETS HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS:

Household goods and personal effects may be reported in a lump sum If their aggregate value exceeds $1 ,000. This category includes any of the following, 1f not held for investment purposes: jewelry; collections of stamps, guns, and numismatic rtems; art obJects, household equipment and furnishings; clothing; other household items: and vehicles for personal use. whether owned or leased.

The aggregate value of my household goods and personal effects (described above) is$ See Exhibit A attached

ASSETS INDIVIDUALLY VALUED AT OVER $1 ,000: DESCRIPTION OF ASSET (specif ic description Is requi red • see Instructions p.4)

PART C - LIABILIT I E:

LIABILITIES IN EXCESS OF $1,000 (See Instructions on page 4): NAME AND ADDRESS OF CREDITOR

See Exhibit A attached

JOINT ANO SEVERAL LIABILITIES NOT REPORTED ABOVE: NAME AND ADDRESS OF CREDITOR

CE FORM 6 - Elleebve January 1 2019 lnco,po,ated by reference ,n Rule 34-S.002(1) FAC.

ICorilrued on reverse side)

VALUE OF ASSET

AMOUNT OF LIABILITY

AMOUNT OF LIABILITY

PAGE 1

PART D -- INCOME

Identify each separate source and amount of income which exceeded $1 ,000 during the year, including secondary sources of income. Or attach a complete copy of your 2018 federal income tax return, including all W2s, schedules, and attachments. Please redact any social security or account numbers before attaching your returns, as the law requires these documents be posted to the Commission 's website.

• I elect to file a copy of my 2018 federal income tax return and all W2's, schedules, and attachments. [If you check this box and attach a copy of your 2018 tax return, you need not complete the remainder of Part D.]

PRIMARY SOURCES OF INCOME (See instructions on page 5):

NAME OF SOURCE OF INCOME EXCEEDING $1,000 ADDRESS OF SOURCE OF INCOME AMOUNT

State of Florida $160,688.00

SECONDARY SOURCES OF INCOME [Major customers, clients, etc., of businesses owned by reporting person--see instructions on page 5]:

NAME OF NAME OF MAJOR SOURCES ADDRESS PRINCIPAL BUSINESS BUSINESS ENTITY OF BUSINESS' INCOME OF SOURCE ACTIVITY OF SOURCE

PART E -- INTERESTS IN SPECIFIED BUSINESSES I Instructions on page 61

BUSINESS ENTITY# 1 BUSINESS ENTITY# 2 BUSINESS ENTITY# 3 NAME OF BUSINESS ENTITY

ADDRESS OF BUSINESS ENTITY PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY POSITION HELD WITH ENTITY I OWN MORE THAN A 5% INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS NATURE OF MY OWNERSHIP INTEREST

PART F - TRAINING

For officers required to complete annual ethics training pursuant to section 112.3142, F.S.

• I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE COMPLETED THE REQUIRED TRAINING.

OATH ~g;J~r%'.LORIDA f/tlM,,w?f!!:, I, the person whose name appears at the s~ , ,m,~,, '"' sobm;bed be~ ;, d / day of beginning of this form, do depose on oath or affirmation / I/JIP ./ , :: J_q hv , , ,/'/ ~~ /1J!)-P, and say that the information disclosed on this form I f7 Cl

aod aoy attaoh~ofs here o .~"""RUTH J CICEROuj~~ " "' ~ bh~Sfafe of F10,;da) & '"' C t?:'&···' MV COMMISSION. GG16 4 1✓-A ~11 ~. ',, .'"._: s November 26, 2021 ✓-, -·r •~t;,r,;,-:,.'?-• EXPIRE (Prin T~e. or Stamp Co~ issione~ me of Notary Public)

~ Personally Known ✓ OR Produced Identification

SIGNATURE OF RElillORTING OFFICIAL OR CANDIDATE Type of Identification Produced

If a certified public accountant licensed under Chapter 473, or attorney in good standing with the Florida Bar prepared this form for you, he or

she must complete the following statement:

1 , prepared the CE Form 6 in accordance with Art. II , Sec. 8 , Florida Constitution, Section 112.3144, Florida Statutes , and the instructions to the form. Upon my reasonable knowledge and belief, the disclosure herein is true and correct.

Signature Date

Preparation of this form by a CPA or attorney does not relieve the filer of the responsibility to sign the form under oath.

IF ANY OF PARTS A THRO GH E ARE CONTI ED ON A SEPARATE SHEET, PLEASE CHECK HERE • CE FORM 6 - Effective January 1, 2019 PAGE 2 Incorporated by reference in Rule 34-8.002(1 ), F.A.C.

Exhibit A

Itemization of Assets and Liabilities for Form 6

Assets Value of Asset

Household Goods & Personal Effects $45,000.00 Residence (valued at zillow.com's estimate) $1 ,947,482.00

Interest in Gulf Drive Ventures, LLC (valued at zillow.cow's estimate of Gulf Drive Venture's sole asset, which cons ists of real property located at 202 78th St. , Holmes Beach, Florida) $666,010.00 Vehicle (Kelly Blue Book's private party value as of 6/20/19) $5,023.00

Florida Prepaid 4-Year University Plan Account -9727 (summary of plan as of 6/20/19) $26,289.45

Florida Prepaid 4-Year University Plan Account -3564 (summary of plan as of 6/20/ 19) $1 , 130.62 40I(k) Voya Retirement Account (balance as of 6/20/ 19) $294,650.92 529 account (approx balance 6/20/ I 9} $500.00 Money market account, USAA (balance as of 6/20/ 19) $102.39 '"'heckmg account, USAA (balance as of 6/20/ 19) $149,407.57 Ket1rement account, eTrade Roth IRA account ending -I 753 (balance as of 6/20/ 19) $16,094.25

Total Assets $3 , I 5 I ,690.20

Liabilities Amount of Liability

Mortgage, IO Sandpiper Road (as of 4/18) $1 ,329,364.07

Total Liabilities $1,329,364.07

Net Worth (Reported Assets Less Reported Liabilities) $1 ,822,326. 13

Date of CLE

11/21/16

11/08/16

10/11/16

09/23/16

05/17/16

04/13/16

04/12/16

02/25/16

01/12/16

11/19/15

11/17/15

11/10/15

10/29/15

10/13/15

07/17/15

02/27/15

02/10/15

01/29/15

11/11/14

10/14/14

06/06/14

05/01/14

02/12/14

02/03/14

11/12/13

11/14/12

11/10/12

06/06/12

05/31/12

05/05/12

03/28/12

02/21/12

02/17/12

Course Description

Exhibit A Anne-Leigh Gaylord Moe

5-Year CLE History*

Legal Writ ing Workshop Presented by Brian Garner

Impeachment and Ethics

Ethically Marketing and Developing Your Practice

Hot Topics in Employment Law

Demyst ifying the JNC Process

Judicia l Luncheon -Trending: #Know Your Court -The Circuit Civil Division Judiciary Panel

Civil Rights & The Law: Related Eth ica l Issues

Staying in the Game: A Call to Action

Technology-The Way We Were & Ethics

Is a Building a Product?

Panel Discussion Featuring Judges of the U.S.

The Art of Simplicity & Ethics

8th Annual Civil Practice Seminar

Qua lity of Life & Ethics

Lecture: Federal Court Practice

2014 Masters Seminar on Ethics

Pro Bono -To Give or Not to Give

Staying in the Game: Women, Leadership & The Law

Ethical Issues in Social Networking

Practical & Ethical Tips for Practice Development

What You Need to Know About Federa l Court Practice

How to Speak to the Media

FLSA & Electronic Overtime

Grievance Committee CLE

EEO Internal Investigations

How the JNC Process Works

Microsoft Office 201 and Adobe

New Rule 2.526 Digital Accessibility of Documents

Practicing with Ethics

Legal Risks of Monitoring

New Federal Court Jurisdiction

Master Seminar Ethics

12t h Labor & Employment Certificat ion

Date of CLE Course Description

01/ 24/ 12 Whistleblower and Reta liation

01/ 17/ 12 Individua l Course Credit

10/ 27/ 11 Basic Labor Employment - 2011

*Information obtained from available Florida Bar records.

INSTRUMENT#: 2018160588, BK: 25715 PG: 1064 PGS: 1064 - 1087 04/24/2018 at 09:07:11 AM, DEPUTY CLERK:SCHRISTIAN Pat Frank,Clerk of the Circuit Court Hillsborough County

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

FAMILY LAW DIVISION

IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF:

THAXTER A. COOPER,

Petitioner/ Husband,

and

ELAINE L. COOPER n/k/a ELAINE L. THOMPSON,

Respondent/ Husband.

-------------

Case No.: 16-DR-8077

Division: C

I

SUPPLEMENTAL FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE RESPONDENT/WIFE'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on March 6, 2018, at an evidentiary hearing on the Respondent, Elaine L. Cooper n/k/a Elaine L. Thompson's request for attorneys' fees. At all times during the hearing, the Petitioner, Thaxter A. Cooper (the "Husband") was present and represented by his counsel, Alan F. Wagner, Esq. The Respondent, Elaine L. Cooper n/k/a Elaine L. Thompson, Esq. (the "Wife") was at all times during the hearing present on her own behalf and was also represented by her counsel Christopher Rumbold, Esq. The Wife's trial counsel, Carmen S. Miller, Esq. was also present. The Husband's fee expert, Matthew Felix, Esq., and a court reporter were present as well. Following the evidentiary hearing, both sides submitted closing memoranda on March 13, 2018.

I. LEGAL ST AND ARD

The legal authority to grant a request for attorneys' fees in a dissolution of marriage action comes from Section 61. 16, Florida Statutes. The statute provides that "[t]he court may from time to time, after considering the resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount of attorney's fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter." The purpose of Section 61.16 is "to ensure that both parties will have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel." Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 699 (1997).

Dissolution of marriage cases are suits brought in equity, "governed by basic rules of fairness as opposed to the strict rule of law." Id. at 700. "The legislature has given trial judges wide leeway to work equity in chapter 61 proceedings" and the Florida Supreme Court has stated that "section 61. I 6 should be liberally-not restrictively-construed." fd This means that, in addition to the financial resources of the parties, it is appropriate to consider "any other factor necessary to provide justice and ensure equity between the parties." Id.

04/17/2018 06:37:09 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit. Page 1

Bk 25715 Pg 1065

Cooper v. Thompson Case No.: 16-DR-8077

The requesting party's need, and the responding party's ability to pay, are the "primary" though "not exclusive" factors that a trial court considers when asked to make an award of fees. Id. at 698. When need and ability to pay have been considered, a lodestar method, in which the number of hours reasonably expended is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, "may be used as a starting point in determining a reasonable attorney's fee." Id at 701. However, when considering what constitutes a reasonable fee, it is appropriate for the court to "consider all the circumstances surrounding the suit." Id. Relevant circumstances that a trial court should consider include "factors such as the scope and history of the litigation; the duration of the litigation; the merits of the respective positions; whether the litigation is brought or maintained primarily to harass ( or whether a defense is raised mainly to frustrate or stall); and the existence and course of prior or pending litigation." Id at 700.

The trial court quite clearly has the authority to decline to require one spouse to underwrite the other spouse's expenses in maintaining unnecessary, vexatious, or harassing actions. See, e.g., Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("A party's financial status should not insulate them from the consequences of their conduct within the judicial system."). "[I]n situations where a court finds that an action is frivolous or spurious or was brought primarily to harass the adverse party ... the trial court has the discretion to deny a request for attorney's fees to the party bringing the suit." Rosen, 696 So. 2d at 701. When a party's inequitable conduct causes needless litigation and legal fees, the consequences of that conduct cannot be avoided "by using her diminished :financial status as a shield." .Mettler, 569 So. 2d at 498.

II. THE EVIDENCE

In making the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case, the Court considered and weighed all of the evidence provided. The Court observed the candor of the witnesses and determined their credibility. The Court has the responsibility to weigh the evidence and determine what is reliable, what is credible, and what evidence should be discounted.

In evaluating the testimony of each witness, the Court must apply the same standards for determining witness credibility as are instructed to civil juries, since in family law cases the Court serves as trier of fact. In determining the believability of any witness (and the weight to be given their testimony), the Court considered: (1) the demeanor of the witness while testifying; (2) the frankness ( or lack thereof) of the witness; (3) the intelligence of the witness; ( 4) any interest the witness may have in the outcome of the case; (5) the means and opportunity the witness had to know the facts about which he or she testified; (6) the ability of the witness to remember the matters about which he or she testified; and (7) the reasonableness of the testimony of the witness, considered both in the light of all the evidence in the case and the Court's own experience and common sense.

The Court considered whether the statements themselves defied logic. The Court, serving as trier of fact, is never bound to believe any witness, even a witness who was not contradicted.

The Court resolved all of the conflicts in the evidence. In making the determinations set out below, the Court has attempted to distill the testimony and salient facts together with the

2

04/17/2018 06:37:09 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit. Page2

Bk 25715 Pg 1066

findings and conclusions necessary to a resolution in this case.

lll. ANALYSIS


The Husband stipulated to the Wife's entitlement to attorneys' fees. Although the Court did not find that the Wife has a need for alimony (and that finding is unchanged), it accepts the Husband's stipulation to the Wife's entitlement and construes it to be a stipulation that the financial resources of the parties are such that the Wife has the need and the Husband has the ability to pay for a reasonable amount of the Wife's attorneys' fees.

A. The Wife's Claim

Five (5) attorneys have entered an appearance on the Wife's behalf during the course of this case. The Wife, herself an attorney, is one of those five attorneys. The Wife has requested that the Husband be required to pay the fees that she has been invoiced by her four ( 4) co-counsel. She has also requested that the Husband pay the costs that she and her counsel have incurred.

Pursuant to an Order requiring her to do so, she disclosed to the Husband the fees and costs that she has asked that the Court direct the Husband to pay. The Husband stipulated to the reasonableness of the rates charged. The Wife provided affidavits and invoices reflecting the invoices she received for fees and costs. 1

During the hearing on fees, the Court requested that the Wife provide an Excel spreadsheet itemizing her fee and cost claim in Excel format so that the Court could conduct the analysis required by the case law. Approximately one month later and after repeated follow up efforts by the judicial assistant, on April 3, 2018, the Wife provided such a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet does not appear to reflect all of the fees and costs itemized on the invoices submitted at the fee hearing. To the extent necessary, the Court has appended to Exhibit A its handwritten notes on cost invoices submitted by Mason Black & Caballero and the Wife, because the same were not included on the Wife's spreadsheet.

B. Equitable Factors

1. Scope and History of the Litigation

The scope and history of the litigation was initially reasonable and typical given the issues. Over time, and particularly following the withdrawal of the Wife's first counsel, the course and scope of the litigation took a turn. An effort is made here to describe, briefly, the history of the litigation. 2

The Husband, acting prose at the time, filed the petition on or about May 26, 2016. The

1 The Court set a schedule for disclosure of this information. The Wife objected, and the Husband agreed to accept certain late disclosure of the fees and costs incurred. The record will reflect the dates on which the various disclosures were made. 2 This description is not meant to be a complete play by play of the litigation; it is limited to the aspects of the litigation that are relevant to the decision on attorneys' fees.

3


Bk 25715 Pg 1067

Cooper v. Thompson Case No.: l 6-DR-8077

Wife timely responded to the petition and filed a counter-petition through her first counsel, Alexander Caballero, Esq. The counter-petition was filed on July 13, 2016. Both parties filed timely certificates of compliance with mandatory disclosure.

The case was mediated for one half day on or about October 7,2016. Shortly before the mediation, the Husband"s counsel, Alan Wagner, Esq., entered his appearance.

The Wife filed a motion for temporary relief on or about October 3, 2017. The motion for temporary relief identified her need to pay the retainer for her attorney, Mr. Caballero, and to retain an accountant to determine the Husband's income and a real estate appraiser to appraise the marital home and real estate in Virginia. The Husband filed a motion for vocational evaluation of the Wife on or about October 4, 2017.

On or about December 7, 2016, the Wife filed an emergency motion for temporary ex parre relief, seeking to enjoin the Husband from dissipating what the Wife asserted was a large fee that he would receive on or before December 15, 2016. The motion was granted on an exparte basis. The Husband thereafter filed a response disputing the factual basis for the Wife's ex parte motion.

On or about December 8, 2016, the Wife's counsel filed an affidavit of his attorneys' fees. He indicated in that affidavit that, to date, he and others in his firm had expended 32. l O hours, amounting to $11,149 in fees, and that costs had been reasonably and necessarily incurred by the wife in the case in the total amount of $1,826.56. He asserted that the Wife needed to "employ a certified public accountant as there are commingling issues of Husband's non-marital assets with the Wife's marital assets, along with the need of tracing, valuation of Husband's business interests, and determination of Husband's income for purposes of his ability to pay Wife alimony." He further asserted that he anticipated future fees in the amount of $17,800, plus $ I 0,000 to retain the forensic accountant.

In preparation for a hearing on the Wife's motion for temporary relief, the Wife filed a temporary relief memorandum in which she summarized her request for temporary alimony in two scenarios: one in which she remained in the home ($1,667), and one in which she moved out ($3,500). On or about December 16, 2017, the parties entered into a Stipulation Regarding Temporary Relief. The Stipulation provided that the Husband would pay the following, subject to reallocation by the Court: (1) a lump sum of $10,000 as temporary support; (2) a monthly payment of $3,000 until modified by the parties or the Court; (3) the first $10,000 in fees and costs for forensic CPA Kristin DiMeo, who would be the parties' jointly-retained expert; and (4) a lump sum of $20,000 as and for the Wife's temporary fees.

In return for these payments, the Wife agreed to move out of the marital home and the temporary injunction was dissolved. Judge Tibbals, who was assigned to the case at the time, ratified the Stipulation on Temporary Relief by order dated December 15, 2016.

By Order dated January 31, 2017, Judge Tibbals set a two-day final hearing for May P1

and 2nd, 2017, with a pretrial conference on March 23, 2017. A second mediation was set for

March 6, 2017.

4


Bk 25715 Pg 1068

Cooperv. Thompson Case No.: l 6-DR-8077

The mediation was conducted on or about March 6, 2017. At mediation, the Husband offered to settle for one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($ I 50,000.00). The Wife rejected that offer and demanded two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) plus a payment of an unspecified amount of attorneys' fees.

On or about March 20, 2017, the Wife filed her pretrial memorandum estimating her attorneys' fees and costs in excess of $60,000 through the final hearing. She estimated that the time needed for trial was two (2) days.

The pretrial conference went forward on March 23, 2017 as scheduled. At the pretrial conference, Judge Tibbals granted the Wife a final judgment of name change, restoring her maiden name.

On March 29, 2017, the Wife filed a verified motion to disqualify Judge Tibbals. Judge Tibbals entered an order of disqualification on the same date, and the case was re-assigned to Division C. Division C was at that time assigned to a senior judge. The Husband's counsel filed an affidavit responding to the Wife's motion to disqualify Judge Tibbals on April 3, 2017.

On May 5, 20 I 7, the Husband filed a motion to set the case for final hearing in Division C. The Husband's position in that motion was that the pretrial had already been conducted, the case was then and continued to be ready for trial, and that the Wife had gained "a strategic advantage by forcing the Court to recuse itself without cause" and that "[t]urther delay in this matter, unnecessarily caused by the Wife's filing that required the Court to recuse itself, would be unwarranted and would operate to unjustly and unfairly penalize the Husband." The motion further stated that "[e]fforts to coordinate a final hearing date by communicating with opposing counsel have been fruitless and this too appears to be a strategic effort by the Wife or her counsel to obtain furiher delay."

On May 12, 2017, the Wife's counsel, Alexander Caballero, moved to withdraw.

On May 24, 2017, the Husband offered the Wife one hundred forty-five thousand dollars ($145,000.00), comprised of eighty-five thousand dollars ($85,000.00) cash and sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00) distributed from the Husband's Morgan Stanley retirement account. That offer was inclusive of what was paid pursuant to the December 2016 stipulation, bringing the total value of the proposal to approximately two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00).

The Wife rejected the Husband's offer, stipulated to Mr. Caballero's withdrawal, and Mr. Caballero's withdrawal was permitted.

It is at this point-roughly the one-year mark in the litigation, when the final hearing would have been completed had the Wife not obtained Judge Tibbals' disqualification-that the litigation departed from a reasonable course, and the volume of discovery began to increase.

It is not necessary or efficient to describe each of the discovery filings. However, the docket reflects that at the one-year mark in the case, the Wife had served, and the Husband had served his responses to, four ( 4) separate requests for production. The docket reflects that over

5


Bk 25715 Pg 1069

Cooper v. Thompson Case No.: I 6-DR-8077

the next five (5) months, the Wife served (and the Husband served responses to) an additional ten ( 10) separate requests for production, bringing the total number of her requests for production to fourteen (14 ).

On June 13, 2017, the Wife's new counsel, Carmen Miller, Esq., entered her appearance. On June 14, 2017, the Wife requested a case management conference and also moved to set the case for trial. The Wife's motion was supported by an affidavit that contains significant redactions, attributed to the Wife's concern that the redacted material contained attorney-client privileged and confidential information. The Wife indicated that she did not intend to waive her privileges. (These filings suggest that an unredacted copy was provided ''in camera" although it does not state when, or to whom, those in camera submissions were made. There is a procedure for submission of materials in camera that does not appear to have been followed.) A case management conference was scheduled for July 5,2017.

On July 2, 2017, the Wife filed a notice of withdrawing "all pretrial memoranda, pretrial witness lists, pretrial stipulations regarding evidentiary proceedings for final hearing, and pretrial witness lists."

On July 6, 2017, the Court entered an Order Setting Final Hearing and Pretrial Conference. That order set that the case for a two-day final hearing on October 30 and 31, 20 l 7, with a pretrial conference on September 26, 2017. It established a discovery cut-off of fourteen (14) days before the pretrial conference.

On July 30, 2017, the Wife filed a Notice of Limited Appearance on her own behalf, for "all hearings conducted by the court." The Wife filed a Motion for Entry of Confidentiality Order on that same date. In that motion, the Wife stated that her "theory regarding valuation of the law practice requires consideration of the cases which were pending with the Law Office of Thaxter A. Cooper P.A. at the time the Petitioner filed the petition for dissolution." She further stated that "Respondent recognizes that the Petitioner's clients' cases probably contain confidential information, attorney-client privileged information, and work product. Nevertheless, the potential value of the pending cases is relevant to the valuation of the Law Office of Thaxter A. Cooper, P.A. Therefore, the Respondent seeks entry of a confidentiality order to facilitate the discovery process, to protect the interests of the clients involved in those cases, and to ensure that both parties have equal access to information necessary to value the Law Office of Thaxter A. Cooper P.A." For reasons not explained, the Wife then filed the same motion a second time, through her counsel, on August 1, 2017. The Husband noticed a hearing on the Wife's request for a confidentiality order on August 16, 2017. The confidentiality order was signed on August 17, 2017.

Discovery closed on September 12, 201 7, pursuant to the July 6, 20 l 7 Order Setting Final Hearing and Pre-Trial Conference.

After the discovery deadline had passed, on September 16, 2017, the Wife filed a Motion for Entry of Order Enlarging Discovery Deadline and Continuing Pre-Trial Conference Date Due to Hurricane Irma Aftermath. The Wife represented that prior to Hurricane Irma, "the parties were successful in participation in discovery and moving toward readying this case for final hearing" and that prior to the hurricane, there were only four ( 4) depositions to complete, which were

6


Bk 25715 Pg 1070


scheduled to occur either on the discovery cut-off date or before it. The Wife indicated that the parties needed "up to and including September 29th

, 2017, in order to complete the outstanding depositions in this case." The Wife requested a postponement and rescheduling of the pretrial conference date, and stated that"[ c ]ounsel for each party can and should be available to appear as originally scheduled on September 261

\ 2017, at which time the Court may consider and determine an alternate date for the pretrial conference. The parties are NOT requesting a continuation of the final hearing, currently set for October 30th-3151, 2017 ... " The Wife also requested a delay in the deadlines to submit exhibit and witness lists, statements of the issues, equitable distribution worksheets, etc.

On September 18, 2017, the Husband responded and objected to the continuance of the pretrial conference on the basis that the depositions impacted by the hutTicane had been rescheduled by agreement of the parties, and therefore no continuance of the pretrial conference and no extension of the discovery deadline was necessary. He noted that because the case had already been to pretrial conference once before Judge Tibbals, there was no reason why the documents required to be submitted prior to the pretrial conference could not be submitted and "Irma is irrelevant to the parties' ability to identify their exhibits, list their witnesses, produce a proposed equitable distribution schedule, and identify the issues to be tried." He noted the absence of any outstanding discovery requests and no outstanding motions to compel.

Given the proximity of its filing to the date of the pretrial conference, the Wife's motion to continue the pretrial conference and enlarge the discovery period was not set for hearing prior to the pretrial conference.

On or about September 21, 2017, the Husband moved to exclude the Wife's second forensic CPA expert, Paul Baumann3, on the basis that Mr. Baumann was deposed on September 20, 20174 and testified that he had no opinion about the value of the Husband's law firm. The Husband's position was that Mr. Baumann had no opinion because the Wife had not timely provided him with the documents necessary to perform his work. The Husband noted that Mr. Baumann indicated that he would require more information to begin the analysis needed to form an opinion, and that it would take him "a few weeks" to reach the opinion once the information was provided.

The Husband argued that "[ a Jll of the information that Mr. Baumann says he needs was provided long ago or was readily available and could and should have been obtained by the Wife for her expert well in advance of the close of discovery. There is no reason why Mr. Baumann should not have been able to have an opinion as of the close of discovery." The Husband noted that "[s ]ince retaining Mr. Baumann, the Wife has served 10 separate requests to produce and 2 additional sets of interrogatories. The Husband has provided the records requested to which there was no objection and has done so, quite frequently, before the response was due. Additional

3 The first forensic CPA expert was Kristin Di Meo, the jointly retained expert agreed upon and identified in the December 2016 temporary support stipulation.

4 This deposition occurred after the close of discovery, and just days before the pretrial conference. The motion explained that the date was selected because Mr. Baumann was initially set to be deposed on September 7, 2017 but had not yet formed an opinion, so his deposition was rescheduled for September 20. 2017.

7


Bk 25715 Pg 1071


information has been provided by the Wife's other CPA expert, Kristin DiMeo, in response to questions she has posed-many times-at the direct request of the Wife."

The Wife responded to the motion to exclude Mr. Baumann. She argued that the original September 7, 2017 deposition could not be conducted because of counsel's need to prepare for the hurricane, not because Mr. Baumann was unprepared to render an opinion. However, she stated that, at the rescheduled deposition thirteen ( 13) days later on September 20, 2017, Mr. Baumann was unable to testify because Mr. Baumann's efforts to prepare were "frustrated due to the Husband's willful refusal to provide pertinent documents in discovery." She further argued that "[ o Jf the partial selection of documents \Vhich the Husband has provided, Mr. Baumann has not had adequate time subsequent to Irma's aftermath to complete his review and compile his valuation report, and the effort is further substantially frustrated due to non-production of the 'green sheets."' The Wife asserted that Mr. Baumann needed the "green sheets" in order to "properly complete his reports." The Wife further asserted that the Husband's counsel had not tendered the necessary discovery responses until on or about September 8, 2017, which coincided with a time when the Wife's counsel's office was closed due to the Hurricane.

At 10:00 pm on the night before the pretrial conference, the Wife filed a Motion to Compel. In that motion, she noted that the parties had not reached an agreement on a methodology to value the Husband's law practice, and that the Wife had been unable to have her valuation analysis performed because "the Husband refuses to produce pertinent necessary documents which have been requested of him on at least two occasions to date." She noted that she had served an Eleventh Request for Production on August I I, 20175 ( one month and one day before the close of discovery), requesting "green sheets," which "[bJased upon the Wife's working experience and internal knowledge of the Husband's operating practices, these 'green sheets' provide the best infonnation for estimation and valuation purposes of the work product of the law firm, most specifically when any and all of the firm's work on behalf of a client actually begins." She noted that the Husband had produced, in response to the Eleventh Request to Produce, "a client list in excel format, some 39 closing statements, and approximately 39 or 40 settlement agreements" but argued that those documents were not sufficient. The Wife also noted that she had also requested the "green sheets" in a September 4, 2017 subpoena duces tecum served on the Husband. (The subpoena duces tecum appears to have been served two days before the Husband's scheduled deposition.)

Needless to say, the motion to compel filed the night before the pretrial conference was not set for hearing prior to the pretrial conference.

The Husband timely filed his pretrial memorandum as required by the order setting the final hearing and pretrial conference. The Wife did not timely file her pretrial memorandum.

The pretrial conference convened at 10 a.m. on September 26, 2017 as scheduled. A court reporter was present6, so it is not necessary to recite in detail what occurred at the pretrial

5 Which means that the Husband's responses on September 8, 2017 were served early.

6 And the transcript of the pretrial conference is part of the Court file. The circumstances of that filing are discussed infra.

8


Bk 25715 Pg 1072


conference except to say that (]) the Court noted that the Wife had not filed a pretrial memorandum, (2) the fact that the case was set for a two-day final hearing was discussed and the Wife and her counsel did not raise any concern with the two days allotted for the final hearing, (3) the Court, consistent with its normal pretrial practice, advised that undisclosed documents, witnesses, and expert opinions would not be permitted at the final hearing, ( 4) both sides were advised that they would be afforded equal time, which the Court would endeavor to track to promote fairness, (5) both sides should be mindful to leave sufficient time for both a case in chief and cross examination 7, and (6) notwithstanding the close of discovery, by agreement of the parties certain specified depositions would occur outside the discovery period.

Sometime after the pretrial conference was underway, the Wife's counsel ale1ied the Court to the motion to compel and the motion to continue the pretrial conference and enlarge discovery. Although it was not noticed and was filed well after the close of discovery and only twelve hours before the pretrial conference, both parties consented to hearing the motion to compel at the pretrial conference. The Court heard argument, reviewed the cases cited by the Wife, and denied the motion.

Any issues caused by the Wife's decision not to file a motion to compel until twelve hours before the pretrial conference were of the Wife's own creation. Had the issues been brought before the Court sooner, t\vo things would have happened. First, the Wife would not have wastefully and unproductively sought the same documents in multiple separate requests for production.8 Second, the Wife would have given herself more time to adapt her trial strategy to the Court's ruling that the attorney-client and work product privileges that belonged to the clients of the Husband's law practice could not be violated in furtherance of a valuation of that asset.

Three days after the pretrial conference (six days after it was due), the Wife filed her pretrial statement. Although not stated at the pretrial conference, the pretrial statement indicated that the Wife estimated that "at least two full days, possibly three days'' were needed for the final hearing.

On October 6, 2017, the Wife moved to disqualify the undersigned. The Wife sought disqualification on the basis that, among other things, the Court had "denied Respondent the opportunity to gather factual evidence necessary to value Petitioner's law practice" when it denied the motion to compel at the pretrial conference. The Wife asserted that disqualification was necessary because the denial of the motion to compel "effectively prevents Respondent from presenting ANY evidence of the value of Petitioner's law practice." In her affidavit in support of the motion to disqualify, the Wife (I) took issue with the fact that her counsel "had very limited time to present her argument" on the motion to compel, (2) expressed concern that the undersigned

7 ·'Everybody needs to understand that I'm going to have clocks going, one for your side, one for your side. You both will get equal time. You can use it how you want. Make sure you have enough time to offer a case in chief In other words, don't-if you have five hours, don't spend your five hours cross-examining the other witness and then wonder why you didn't get to put on a case in chief That would be your choice. But you will have time to offer a case in chief as long as you use your time wisely." Tr. of Pretrial Conf., 9:25- l 0: I I.

8 It appears that, when the Wife served a request for production and the Husband objected, the Wife did not seek hearings on those objections. Instead, she served another round of requests.

9


Bk 25715 Pg 1073


had not read the motion that was filed twelve hours before the pretrial conference, and (3) asserted that there was "no reason articulated as to why Respondent would be limited to presenting argument to less than five minutes on such a critical issue."

The Husband responded to the Wife's motion to disqualify on October 9, 2017. The motion to disqualify was denied by Order dated October 12, 20 I 7. As a successor judge, the undersigned addressed the merits of the motion in some detail in the Order.

As the Court had indicated was pennissible at the pretrial conference, the Husband filed a detailed Trial Memorandum and Opening Statement on or about October 27, 2017. The Trial Memorandum and Opening Statement was ten ( I 0) pages in length and, consistent with the purpose of an opening statement, outlined the Husband's evidence, introduced the core disputes, and provided a roadmap of how the case was expected to unfold. The Wife did not provide a written opening statement or trial memorandum.

A two-day final hearing was held, as scheduled, on October 30 and 31, 201 7. The parties were allotted equal time to present their evidence. The record of that proceeding will speak for itself, and should be read in conjunction with the Court's concerns about the need for counsel to exercise reasonable time management and present evidence in an efficient way, as expressed at the pretrial conference. Without the benefit of a transcript of the final hearing, the Court will not endeavor to otherwise summarize those proceedings but expressly acknowledges its growing concern by that point in time that the Wife was engaging in dilatory tactics designed to ensure that the final hearing could not be timely concluded.

This concern was only magnified by subsequent events.

The Wife filed three (3) separate post-trial motions, not including a third motion to disqualify. The amended final judgment addresses the Wife's opposition to the Court's efforts to have the Wife's post-trial motions and her attorneys' fees' claim heard. While attempting to prevent her own motions from being heard, the Wife leveraged the absence of a ruling on her motions to prevent the Husband from having his post-judgment issues resolved. One example of this was the Husband's motion requesting clarity on what he should do with the personal property assigned to the Wife in the final judgment that the Wife refused to collect from the former marital home.

During this same time period, the Court had ordered the parties to confer regarding the existence of material contained in the trial exhibits that appeared to be privileged and confidential. The Husband sought to have that material redacted or sealed. The Wife refused. Orders were entered and hearings were held on this issue. It was not at all clear to the Court that the Wife appreciated its concern about the attorney-client and/or work product privilege. For that reason, the Court at one point brought the original trial exhibits into a hearing and prepared to identify such material by reading examples from the trial exhibits. Before reading those examples aloud at that hearing, the Court noted the presence of observers in the courtroom. Given that potentially privileged material would be read aloud, the Husband requested that the observers be excused. The Wife objected to the removal of the observers from the courtroom. Thereafter, examples of the potentially attorney-client privileged material was by necessity read in the presence of

10


Bk 25715 Pg 1074


observers. Even after those examples were specifically identified, the Wife apparently refused to agree to any reasonable solution to protect the interests of clients of the Law Office of Thaxter Cooper, P.A. This is despite the fact that, as of July 2017, she had recognized the existence of attorney-client privileged information associated with the Husband's practice and the need "to protect the interests of the clients involved in those cases." Even though she herself had a professional obligation to protect the attorney-client privilege by virtue of her representation of the clients at issue when she worked at the Husband's fim1, and although she clearly appreciated the sacrosanct nature of the attorney-client privilege in her June 2017 affidavit and July 2017 motion, when it came to the privileges that belonged to third parties, she opposed reasonable efforts to protect them.

Even on this last remaining issue of attorneys' fees, the Wife's conduct has unreasonably delayed the entry of this order. At the evidentiary hearing, she was requested to provide an itemization of her requested fees and costs to the Court in Excel format. After representing that it would be provided promptly, the Wife took weeks to provide it to the Court, and only then after it was repeatedly requested in follow-up correspondence.

Based on these facts, the Court finds that the history and scope of this litigation is a factor that favors the Husband. The Wife failed to meet her burden of establishing that the fees and costs incurred after Mr. Caballero's May 12, 2017 motion to withdraw were reasonably incurred in light of the history and scope of the litigation. Fees and costs incurred after that date are appropriately disallowed on that basis.9

2. Duration of the Litigation

This factor favors the Husband. Delays in bringing this litigation to a close were nearly all attributable to the Wife.

3. Merits of the Respective Positions

This factor favors the Husband. The merits of the respective positions are addressed in the amended final judgment and it is not necessary to reiterate those findings here. There was no merit in the Wife's contention that she was denied an opportunity to value the Husband's law practice. She made a strategic choice to conduct discovery in a wasteful and unproductive manner and then waited until the pretrial conference to seek relief, which was promptly heard and denied on the merits. Additionally, there was no merit to the Wife's claim that she needed a second forensic CPA, Mr. Baumann, when the parties had jointly retained a forensic CPA, Ms. DiMeo. Ms. DiMeo testified that she performed the analyses requested by the Wife, and those analyses resulted in the conclusion that even using the Beers analysis advocated by the Wife, the law practice did not appreciate. The Wife's retention of Mr. Perkins, the appraiser of the Virginia property who offered no valuation opinion, was likewise without merit. Those aspects of the claim are appropriately disallowed.

9 To the extent not noted elsewhere herein, whether because they are not included on the Excel spreadsheet provided by the Wife or otherwise, it should be clear that all fee and cost entries for Attorneys Miller, Jackson Sanders, and Rumbold are disallowed on this basis.

11


Bk 25715 Pg 1075


4. Whether Litigation is Brought or Maintained Primarily to Harass (or Whether Defense is Raised Mainly to Frustrate or Stall)

This factor favors the Husband. As noted elsewhere herein, the Wife's litigation conduct from the pretrial conference through the evidentiary hearing on the post-trial motions appeared to be brought or maintained primarily to harass, frustrate, or stall.

5. Existence and Course of Prior or Pending Litigation

This factor is not found to apply.

C. Legal Issues

1. Inadequate Documentation

When utilizing the lodestar method of computing the number of hours reasonably expended, "Florida courts have emphasized the importance of keeping accurate and current records of work done and time spent on a case, particularly when someone other than the client must pay the fee." See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d I 145, 1150 ( 1985). A trial court may appropriately disallow any portion of a claim that is found to be inadequately documented. Id

Certain of the itemized fees and costs requested are found to be inadequately documented. Those fees and costs that were disallowed on this basis are indicated on the spreadsheet attached as Exhibit A. Disallowed amounts in this category include time and/or cost entries that are (I) block billed, (2) too vaguely described to ascertain the relationship to the fee claim (see below), (3) duplicative of other entries, ( 4) insufficiently documented or described (for example costs which appeared excessive or unreasonable on their face and for which insufficient other evidence ofreasonableness was presented, such as exorbitant copying and scanning costs, "loans," overhead expenses of a law firm such as binders, indexes, dividers, etc., and meal expenses), and (5) strongly suggestive ofinaccuracy or incredibility because they are uniformly rounded to the next hour (this is a problem exclusive to Ms. Jackson Sanders' billing-common sense and a comparison to the other lawyers' billing entries compels the conclusion that that these billing entries are not a credible and accurate reflection of the actual time spent). Additionally, to the extent that any fees or costs are later determined not to have been itemized on the spreadsheet submitted to the Court by the Wife for the purpose of its preparation of this Order, they are treated as abandoned and are disallowed under this category, except as provided herein.

2. Fees for Fees

A portion of the Wife's fee claim appears to be for fees incurred relating to the issue of the reasonable amount of her fees. A trial court may appropriately disallow any portion of a claim that is found to be related to litigating the amount of a fee claim. Wight v. Wight, 880 So. Id 692, 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004 ).

12


Bk 25715 Pg 1076

Items disallowed under this category are indicated on Exhibit A.

3. Reasonable Settlement Offer Rejected; Results Obtained


A significant portion of the Wife's fee claim is for fees incurred atler the settlement offers made by the Husband on or about March 6, 2017 and May 24, 2017. On the date of the May 24, 2017 offer, the Husband expressed a willingness to pay to the Wife a settlement valued at nearly two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00). Both of those offers exceeded the results she obtained following the trial held in October of 201 7.

A trial court may appropriately disallow any portion of a claim that is found to have been incurred after a settlement offer, the refusal of which was unreasonable and consequently unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. Hallac v. Hallac, 88 So. 2d 253, 256-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 20 I 2) ("While Florida law holds that a refusal to accept an offer to settle a divorce case is not a ground to deny all fees, the refusal to accept settlement offers is a 'relevant circumstance' that a court may properly take into consideration in determining Chapter 61 fees under Rosen v.

Rosen.").

The settlement offers that the Wife rejected in March of 201 7 and May of 201 7 were both reasonable and more favorable than the results she obtained at trial. Looking purely at the results obtained, the Wife's refusal of the May 6, 2017 offer suggests that it would be appropriate to disallow fees and costs after March 6, 2017. But the Court does not make this decision purely on results obtained. Here, it is the refusal of the reasonable settlement offer conveyed on May 24, 2017 that most clearly coincides with the unnecessary prolonging of the case. For that reason, it is the May 24, 201 7 date that represents the end of the reasonable fees and costs incurred. From that date forward, the equities demand that as between the Husband and the Wife, it is the Wife who should shoulder the financial responsibility for her choices. All fees and costs incurred after May 24, 201 7 are disallowed on this basis, as indicated on the spreadsheet attached as Exhibit A.

4. Duplication of Work By Multiple Attorneys

The Wife was represented by five (5) different attorneys in this case: Alexander Caballero, Esq., Elaine Thompson, Esq., Carmen Miller, Esq., Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esq., and Christopher Rumbold, Esq. While the case law is clear that a party's fee claim should not be disallowed merely on the basis that she has more than one attorney, billing for duplicative work is not appropriately charged to the opposing spouse. See Grover v. Grover, 59 So. 3d 333, 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) ("The issue is not whether there is a need to hire or have more than one attorney, but whether the attorneys engaged in duplicative billing, and, if so, the amount by which the award must be reduced."); Tomaino v. Tomaino, 629 So. 2d 874, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (reversing fee award for failure to exclude "evident duplication" in attorneys' fees, and recognizing that "[t]his problem of escalating litigation and fees has to be solved. There must be an incentive on both parties to economize on legal fees and costs if the cost of divorce is to be controlled.").

It is appropriate to disallow the duplicative billing entries reflected on Exhibit A. Additionally, it should be noted that Exhibit A does not appear to be a completely accurate picture

13


Bk 25715 Pg 1077


of the duplicative nature of the billing. As submitted by the Wife, Exhibit A appears to omit certain entries by Carmen Miller, Esq. that are duplicative of work performed by subsequentlyretained counsel Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esq. The credible evidence at the fee hearing reflected that the Wife and Ms. Miller had an oral agreement pursuant to which Ms. Miller would perfom1 all of her work for a fee not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00).

On that basis, it is appropriate to disallow all of Ms. Miller's fee over and above the agreedupon sum often thousand dollars ($10,000.00). Moreover, given that the Wife had an agreement with a competent attorney to handle the case for a fee not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), the Wife failed to meet her burden of establishing that it was reasonable to require the Husband to pay the fees of Ms. Jackson Sanders for the same work. Ms. Jackson Sanders did not testify regarding her fee, and the credible evidence that was introduced indicates that Ms. Jackson's billing was both duplicative of the work performed by Mr. Caballero, Ms. Miller. and Ms. Thompson and the documentation of her billing was otherwise found to be inadequate in its description of the work performed. Fees disallowed on this basis are reflected on Exhibit A.

5. Other Considerations

The purpose of the trial court's statutory authority to entertain a fee request in a Chapter 61 proceeding ;'is to ensure that both parties will have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel." See Rosen, 696 So. 2d at 699 ("The purpose of this section is to ensure that both parties will have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel."). The question in this case is to what degree the Wife incurred fees reasonably necessary to ensure that she would have a similar ability to obtain competent counsel.

Over the course of this litigation, the Wife has chosen five (5) attorneys to appear on her behalf. Each were competent. As noted elsewhere, one of the five lawyers who appeared on behalf of the Wife is the Wife herself.

In this unusual case, it would have been true that the Wife had a similar opportunity to obtain competent legal counsel even if she had chosen only herself as her attorney. Both parties agree that the Wife is a competent, skilled attorney. They could agree on so little else that their agreement about this is remarkable. The Wife's broad range of experience over the course of her accomplished legal career has not included a considerable amount of family law, but this is also true for the Husband's counsel of choice, who as noted in the record is a personal injury attorney. Although she retained four (4) other attorneys with more family Jaw experience than she had, the extent of the Wife's involvement directing the course of the litigation was apparent, even ,vhen she terminated her limited appearance and did not speak on her own behalf in court. 10

The fact that a party to a divorce proceeding is himself or herself a capable attorney is not a bar to recovery of attorneys' fees in a Chapter 61 proceeding. It is hardly unheard of for an attorney to be a party to a divorce proceeding. Nor is it unusual for a party who is an attorney to hire a lawyer. What has taken this case outside the norm are the facts that (1) the Wife entered an

10 Evidence of record reflects, for example, the degree of her direction in the discovery process and communications with expert witnesses.

14


Bk 25715 Pg 1078


appearance on her own behalf and (2) chose to direct at least some aspects of the litigation, but (3) also hired four other lawyers to represent her and ( 4) demanded that the Husband pay for them. Additionally, (5) the Wife's appearance on her own behalf granted her access to the filing system, which she utilized liberally, in some instances to make explicit end runs around her own cocounsel, and (6) the Wife's own attorney testified about the time unnecessarily spent complying with the Wife's demands and strategic choices. This at times multiplied the litigation in a manner that appeared to have no purpose other than frustration or harassment.

There are multiple examples of this. Some are described in this order, or are clear from docket activity and transcripts. Other examples will be less obvious from the record. The Wife's filing on March 2, 2018 is example that will be clear from both docket activity and transcripts.

In that March 2, 2018 filing, the Wife explicitly directed her counsel to disobey a court order to submit a copy of the transcript of the pretrial conference. Before that order was entered, the Court requested a copy during a hearing on the Wife's post-trial motions. The Wife agreed to provide the transcript at that time. The judicial assistant then followed up on the request, and the Wife's counsel agreed to provide it. Shortly thereafter, the Wife responded and directed him not to do so.

The complete transcript of the pretrial conference was requested for multiple reasons, not the least of which was the preparation of this order. The request was made in light of the fact that the Wife filed multiple post-trial motions arguing that the Court prohibited her from being recalled after she testified in the Husband's case-in-chief. In the post-trial motions themselves, the Wife stated that the ruling was made at the final hearing. However, at the hearing on the post-trial motions, the Wife argued that the ruling was actually made at the pretrial conference.

At the hearing on the post-trial motions, the Wife sought to introduce the testimony of one her lawyers as evidence of this ruling at the pretrial conference. The hearing on the post-trial motions was not an evidentiary hearing 11 , so the Court did not accept the testimony of the Wife's counsel but permitted her to make argument on that issue.

The following exchange between the Court and the Wife's counsel from the pretrial conference, Ms. Jackson Sanders, ensued:

THE COURT: And so I'm asking-you have-the Wife's position is that she was precluded from offering testimony outside of the Husband's case-in-chief: and I was asking, when was that issue raised? How was it raised? Please refresh my recollection. Was there an objection made? Those arc the things that I believe I want to hear about today. And if you prefer to defer to her [the Wife], I'm

11 The purpose of the February 27, 2018 hearing was to hear argument on the issue of whether or to what extent the post-trial motions should be granted. To the extent the post-trial motions were to be granted, separate hearing time was set aside to hear evidence.

15


Bk 25715 Pg 1079

MS. SANDERS:

comfortable with that.

Cooper v. Thompson Case No.: I 6-DR-8077

I think it would be helpful for me to tell the Court what my memory is regarding the discussion. I vaguely recall at the pretrial conference on September 26, 2017-when the Court was providing to us all of the procedural and housekeeping instructions with regard to how we were going to conduct the final hearing, I recall us talking about the presentation and order of witnesses and how, in order to properly use the allocated time that each side would have, that once we got a witness on the stand, whatever questions either party was going to ask that witness, the expectation was that we get it done so that we could properly preserve the respective equal time that we had been allotted.

Critically, as she sought to have testimony to this effect introduced through Ms. Sanders, the Wife had in her possession (unbeknownst to the Court at that time), sitting in front of her on counsel table, a copy of the complete transcript of the pretrial conference. The ruling about which she had sought to have Ms. Jackson Sanders testify does not appear in the transcript. 12

12 This is what the Court said about witness testimony at the pretrial conference:

THE COURT: So you need to make sure your witnesses are available when their testimony is called-or when you are about to call them because we can't recess or continue the case because somebody's not available. However, you can use your time however you want. And so this [the pretrial conference order] says that a party can introduce the testimony of an expert outside of his or her direct case.

If it's absolutely necessary, you could probably introduce another witness based on their availability because you can-in my view, you can use your time how you want.

Everybody needs to understand that I'm going to have clocks going, one for your side, one for your side. You both will get equal time. You can use it how you want. Make sure you have enough time to offer a case in chief. In other words, don't-if you have five hours, don't spend your five hours cross-examining the other witness and then wonder why you didn't get to put on a case in chief. That would be your choice.

But you will have time to offer a case in chief as long

16


Bk 25715 Pg 1080


At a later stage in the same hearing on the post-trial motions, however, one of the Wife's other attorneys made reference to that transcript in connection with a different argument. At that time, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT:

MR. RUMBOLD:

THE COURT:

Okay. Then the attorney fees issue.

Yes, Judge.

I've already said that-in the final judgment, I said we'll have a separate hearing on that issue. I expected the hearing would get set; it wasn't, so I

as you make sure you use your time wisely. So I need you to please make every effort to stipulate to preliminary, uncontrovcrtcd matters and then reduce those stipulations in writing.

This case will be tried come hell or high water on October the 30th, and it wi II be finished on October the 31 st

. And because it must be finished on time, it will be helpful to you and to me if you just agree on whatever facts you can agree on.

If you can't agree on any facts, I understand sometimes that's just the way the cookie crumbles, but just the consequences of that are borne by you in the sense of having to put on your evidence in a timely way and make sure you get it al I in. Because at the end of the day, if you don't get it in, I can't consider it. So I recommend that to the extent you can, just stipulate.

And the reason why I'm saying this, it's kind of fresh in my mind, I had a trial last week where they were sitting there having to prove the date of the marriage I don't understand why you can't stipulate to the date of marriage in a divorce case. Usually that's one of those things that maybe we don't need to use up our precious time on. But if for some reason the date of the marriage is an issue, then by all means make sure you pack it all in there efficiently.

Tr. of Sept. 26, 2017 Pretrial Conference, 9: 13-11: 12. It is impo1tant to note that, unlike the Wife, who had a flagged copy of the transcript in front of her when she sought to introduce Ms. Jackson Sanders' testimony, there is no indication that Ms. Jackson Sanders had seen the transcript when she was asked about her recollection of the pretrial conference. Ms. Jackson Sanders made it clear that she did not author or sign the post-trial motions, and it appeared that her argument, while inconsistent with the transcript, was made in good faith based on a flawed recollection. This is noted because, while one could conclude that there was an effort to misdirect the Court into granting a new trial based on the argument that it had made a ruling that the transcript showed it did not make, Ms. Jackson Sanders did not appear to be a willing participant in it. Young v. Hector, 884 So. 2d 1025. 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Rule 4-3.2(a)(4), Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

17


Bk 25715 Pg 1081

MR. RUMBOLD:

THE COURT:

MR. RUMBOLD:

THE COURT:

MS. THOMPSON:

THE COURT:

MR. RUMBOLD:

MS. THOMPSON:

MR. RUMBOLD:

THE COURT:


went ahead and set one. That will be decided on March the 6th . Other than that, is there any additional issue that you want to argue about the attorney fees issue?

Yes, Judge, if I could have one moment. You Honor, on page 13 of the pretrial conference dated September 26, 2017, there was a colloquy between the Court and Ms. Jackson Sanders in which-

ls that a copy of the transcript of that hearing?

Yes, Judge.

Can I get that? Can I take a look at that? Is it a complete copy of the transcript of the pretrial conference?

Your Honor, we have a concern. Yes, but your Honor told us to submit all of our evidence, and so for purposes-evidentiary purposes, we'd ask that the Court look at the documents that were submitted, but as a professional courtesy and you're the judge ...

As a professional courtesy, can I see that, please?

Yeah. Absolutely.

Absolutely, but we don't want it to be considered evidence.

So let me just, Judge, give you the red tab.

Because I've read what was attached, but what I wasn't sure is that anybody ordered a total copy of that transcript.

18


Bk 25715 Pg 1082

MR. RUMBOLD:

MR. WAGNER:

THE COURT:

MS. THOMPSON:


Oh, I'm sorry. It's addressed, r think, in two locations. Just one second.

Can the petitioner get a copy as well, your Honor?

We'll both get copies. Do you mind sending him a copy?

Oh no. We may do that.

The Com1 took a brief recess to quickly skim the Wife's copy of the complete transcript of the pretrial conference. Given the brevity of the recess and the fact that the transcript was over 50 pages in length, the Court's review was only long enough to confirm the Court's recollection that it had not made the ruling about which the Wife had just sought to have Ms. Jackson Sanders testify. The transcript of the pretrial conference was helpful to the Court for additional matters that remained before the Court (including the preparation of this order) and so, with the Wife's representation that she would provide the Court with a copy, the Wife's copy of the complete transcript was returned to the Wife and the hearing resumed.

Believing that a copy of the transcript was forthcoming given this exchange, the Court waited for a copy to be provided to chambers thereafter. When no copy was provided, the judicial assistant followed up on the request for a copy. At that time, the Wife's counsel indicated that he would send a copy. Almost immediately thereafter, the Wife directed him not to. This necessitated the entry of the following order:

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court following a hearing on February 27, 2018 on the Respondent's post-trial motions. The Petitioner was present with his counsel, Alan Wagner, Esq. The Respondent, Elaine Thompson, Esq. was present and represented herself along with her co-counsel, Christopher Rumbold, Esq. and Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esq.

At the hearing, the Respondent at her counsel sought to present the testimony of Attorney Sanders regarding her recollection of the pretrial conference. The Court inquired as to the existence of a transcript of the pretrial conference. It was established that a court reporter had been present at the pretrial conference and the Respondent had ordered and received the complete transcript of the pretrial conference prior to the February 27, 2018 hearing.

A complete copy of the transcript of the pretrial conference would assist the Court.

Accordingly, it is now

19


Bk 25715 Pg 1083

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:


1. The Respondent shall provide a PDF copy of the complete transcript of the pretrial conference by email to the Division C email address no later than noon on March 2, 2018.

The Wife thereafter filed a document titled "Wife's Objection to Court's Order Entered on March 1, 2018" which stated as follows.

Respondent, acting as counsel, hereby responds to this Court's order entered on March 1, 2018, and states:

1 . Respondent, Elaine L. Thompson, will be responding to this court's March 1, 2018 [sic] exclusively. No other counsel for Respondent is authorized to address this matter and no other counsel should be held responsible for the decisions made by the client, Elaine L. Thompson, who has served her notice oflimited appearance.

2. Respondent, Elaine L. Thompson, is the sole owner of a transcript of the pretrial conference held in this matter on September 2017.

3. Respondent does not authorize her counsel to distribute, donate, give, lend or otherwise share the transcript with anyone.

4. This court requested to read the transcript of the pretrial conference during a hearing on February 27, 2018. The entire transcript has not been filed in this proceeding or otherwise been made public. The Respondent objected since the comi had determined it would not be taking evidence but only hearing argument. The court then represented that it would read only the portion of the transcript which had been provided to the court to respond to the Husband's memorandum of law regarding the Wife's entitlement to attorney fees. That portion was four pages. It was marked with flags.

5. After being provided with the transcript, for the purpose of reading the pages which had been marked, the court called a recess. During the recess, the court exceeded the scope of the limited authorization.

6. That same day, the court denied the Respondent's post-trial motion for new trial and motion for rehearing with two exceptions. One of the issues argued in the motion for rehearing involved the court's failure to determine the Respondent's

20


Bk 25715 Pg 1084


entitlement to attorney fees. Prior to the court's ruling, the Petitioner stipulated that the Respondent would be entitled to attorney fees. The other issue involved the court's failure to include approximately $10,768.00 to the Respondent in the calculation of payments due to the Respondent under the court's equitable distribution scheme.

7. Having denied the remaining claims, the sole issue which remains pending before the court, after the court's rulings on February 27, 2018, is the amount, if any, of attorney fees which should be awarded to the Respondent's counsel.

8. The following day, on February 28, 2018, the court sent an email directing Christopher Rumbold, Respondent's specially retained counsel to provide a copy of the entire transcript. The Respondent, Elaine L. Thompson, personally objected.

9. On Thursday, March 1, 2018, the Court issued an order directing the Respondent, Elaine L. Thompson, to file the entire transcript, in PDF format, with the court by 12:00 pm on Friday, March 2, 2018.

l 0. The Respondent will not provide a copy of her property to the court. There is no lawful basis for the court to attempt to compel the Respondent to provide her property to the court.

11. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the Respondent's right to refuse to surrender the transcript of the pretrial conference:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to searched.

12. Article I section 12 of the Florida constitution reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity

21


Bk 25715 Pg 1085


with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

13. A1iicle 1 section 9 of the Florida constitution reads:

No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself

14. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

15. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger: nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

16. The court's order, issued March 1, 2018, violates the Respondent's rights under the constitutional principles set forth above. The court's order provides no legal authority to compel the Respondent to give the court the Respondent's private property.

17. Accordingly, the Respondent, Elaine L. Thompson, will not comply with the court's order to provide a copy of the transcript of the pretrial conference to the court. Respondent does not authorize her counsel to violate her rights set forth under the constitutional principles set forth above.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Respondent, Elaine L.

22


Bk 25715 Pg 1086


Thompson, will not provide the transcript as the order of this court is unconstitutional.

See Wife's Objection to Court's Order Entered on March 1, 2018, pp. 1-4, filed March 2, 2018 at 3:04 a.m.

The Husband's counsel thereafter ordered the transcript, at the Husband's expense, and filed it. After the Husband had done so, the Wife's counsel, Mr. Rumbold, filed a "Notice of Compliance" indicating that he had emailed the transcript to chambers.

This is but one example of the impact that the Wife's appearance as counsel on her own behalf has had in this case. She is largely insulated from the consequences because the Husband does not have a fee claim. Certainly, at a minimum, the Court would have ordered her to reimburse the Husband for the cost of ordering the transcript if the Husband had asked.

All of this is relevant and appropriate for consideration of what is equitable under the circumstances of this case, pursuant to Rosen.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. The Wife's claim for fees and costs pursuant to Section 61. I 6, Florida Statutes is GRANTED IN PART;

2. The reasonable amount of the Wife's attorneys' fees and costs is found to be thirty three thousand forty one dollars and seventy-two cents ($33,041.72), which the Husband shall pay as follows:

a. Within ninety (90) days, the Husband shall pay to the law firm of Mason Black & Caballero, P.A. the amount of twelve thousand three hundred eight dollars and forty-seven cents ($12,308.47), which represents a reasonable amount of the Wife's attorneys' fees and costs by Mason Black & Caballero, P.A. ($32,308.47) less the amount of fees the Husband has already paid the firm of Mason Black & Caballero, P.A. as temporary attorneys' fees and costs ($20,000.00) pursuant to the Order Regarding Temporary Relief dated December 16, 2016; and

b. Within ninety (90) days, the Husband shall pay to the Wife the amount of seven hundred thirty-three dollars and twenty-five cents ($733.25), which represents the total reasonable costs incurred by her directly; and

23


Bk 25715 Pg 1087


3. All other aspects of the Wife's claims for attorneys' fees and costs are DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida on this

/ ?iday of April 2018.

Copies to:

Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esq. 2126 E. Edgewood Dr., STE 5 Lakeland, Florida 33803 Counsel.for Respondent

Carmen Sarita Miller, Esq. Lee & Lazzara, PLLC 3804 W. North B St. Tampa, Florida 33609 Counsel for Respondent

Alan F. Wagner, Esq. Wagner McLaughlin 601 Bayshore Boulevard, STE 910 Tampa, Florida 33606 CounselfiJr Petitioner

ANNE-LEIGH GAYLORD MOE Circuit Court Judge

24
