Application of the Process Application of the Process Safety Management Safety Management Standard in CanadaStandard in Canada

Presented by:Presented by:Holly Elke, Holly Elke, CRSP, CSP, CMQ/OECRSP, CSP, CMQ/OE

Senior QHSE AdvisorSenior QHSE AdvisorSH&E System SolutionsSH&E System Solutions

Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management

Also called Safety Systems Also called Safety Systems Management or Process Management or Process Safety Management;Safety Management;

The purpose is to manage The purpose is to manage the risk to personnel, the risk to personnel, property, production, the property, production, the environment and the environment and the company reputationcompany reputation

Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management

Regulated in 1992 by OSHARegulated in 1992 by OSHA Known as the Process Safety Known as the Process Safety

Management (PSM) Standard Management (PSM) Standard of Highly Hazardous of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, Explosives and Chemicals, Explosives and Blasting Agents: OSHA 29 Blasting Agents: OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119.CFR 1910.119.

Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management

Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management

The main objective is to The main objective is to prevent the release of prevent the release of highly hazardous chemicals, highly hazardous chemicals, such as toxic, reactive, such as toxic, reactive, flammable and/or explosive flammable and/or explosive substances, which may substances, which may cause harm to humans.cause harm to humans.

Process Safety ManagementProcess Safety Management

Processes that involve:Processes that involve: Explosives, blasting agents Explosives, blasting agents

and pyrotechnics;and pyrotechnics; Chemicals, above a specified Chemicals, above a specified

quantity in Appendix A of the quantity in Appendix A of the PSM std.PSM std.

Flammable liquid or gas in Flammable liquid or gas in excess of 10000 lbsexcess of 10000 lbs

Must have a PSM program.Must have a PSM program.

Process Hazards Analysis Process Hazards Analysis

PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS

What can go wrong?

How likely is it?

What are the consequences?

PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS STRUCTURE

FOUNDATION FOR PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS

HistoricalExperience

PHA Methodology

Knowledge and Intuition

Qualitative Risk AnalysisQualitative Risk Analysis

Process Hazards Analysis Process Hazards Analysis is the predictive is the predictive identification of hazards, identification of hazards, their cause and their cause and consequence and the consequence and the qualitative estimation of qualitative estimation of likelihood and severity.likelihood and severity.

Qualitative Risk AnalysisQualitative Risk Analysis

Frequency of Exposure Probability Loss = Likelihood

FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE:

4 - Frequent (at least daily)3 - Occasional (> 1 occurrence per month)2 - Rare (< 2 occurrences per year)1 - No significant exposure (once every 3 years)

PROBABILITY OF LOSS:

4 - Expected (“Happens often”; > 1 per month)3 - Occasional (< 2 occurrences per year)2 - Rare (< 1 occurrence every 3 years) 1 - Very Rare (“Once in the life of the facility”)

Qualitative Risk AnalysisQualitative Risk Analysis

Severity Likelihood

= Risk Ranking

SEVERITY CATEGORY

HEALTH SAFETYENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACTFINANCIAL

LOSSPUBLIC IMPACT

6One or more

fatalitiesCatastrophic –

mutual aid required

Major environmental impact to

neighbouring receptors (public

streams, vegetation, air, ground water)

Extensive damage & extended downtime

(Corporate)

Serious impact - large

community

5

Serious injury - permanent

disability, life-threatening

occupational illnesses

Significant Event - full disaster

response

Off-site release or repeated non-

compliance issues with potential for

significant adverse impact

Major downtime (Division /

Area)

Serious impact - small

community

4

Serious injury - disabling

occupational illnesses

Serious threat - emergency

response (external agencies involved)

Contained within the facility - large impact

or repeat non-compliance issues

Minor damage or downtime (Department)

Minor – families affected

3

Temporary disability -

minor injuries, acute health

effects

Important occurrence -

potential emergency response

Contained within facility - minimal

impact & regulatory reporting required

Minor damage or downtime (Individual processes)

Minor – limited no. of individuals affected

2First Aid or

less

Noticeable occurrence - reportable

Contained within facility with no

adverse impact - below reportable

levels

Minor damage & no

downtime

Minimal to none

Qualitative Risk AnalysisQualitative Risk Analysis

Severity

Likelihood 1 2 3 4

1 1 2 3 4

2 2 4 6 7

3 2 6 7 8

4 3 7 8 9

RANK 1 AND 2: Lower priority. May require further study and/or action, as resources are available.

RANK 3 TO 6: Medium priority. Should be considered serious and appropriate action should be taken.

RANK 7 TO 9: Very high priority. Immediate action should be taken to reduce risks to a level as low as practicable.

Qualitative vs. QuantitativeQualitative vs. QuantitativePROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS RISK ANALYSIS

IDENTIFIES HAZARDS, estimates likelihood and severity, suggests improvements.

USE ON EVERY PROJECT

QUALITATIVE - based on experience, knowledge and creative thinking.

Most often done by MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM

Several methodologies availableWhat-ifWhat-if/ChecklistHAZOPFMEAPreliminary Hazards Analysis

ASSESSES HAZARDS

SELECTIVE - use when other methods prove inadequate or excessively costly.

QUANTITATIVE - requires extensive data and special expertise.

Done by ONE OR TWO SPECIALLY TRAINED PEOPLE

Also called:• Hazan• Risk Assessment• Probabilistic Risk Assessment

(PRA)• Quantitative Risk Assessment

(QRA)

Elements of Facility RiskElements of Facility Risk

A systematic approach that considers A systematic approach that considers the following process components: the following process components:

Process Design and Technology;Process Design and Technology; Operational & MaintenanceOperational & Maintenance

Activities & Procedures;Activities & Procedures; Non Routine Activities & Non Routine Activities &

Procedures;Procedures; Emergency Preparedness plans/ Emergency Preparedness plans/

proceduresprocedures Training ProgramsTraining Programs

Process HazardsProcess Hazards

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS + PROCESS CONDITIONS

Flammable materialsCombustible materialsUnstable materialsReactive materialsCorrosive materialsAsphyxiatesShock-sensitive materialsHighly reactive materialsToxic materialsInert gasesCombustible dusts

High temperaturesExtremely low temperaturesHigh pressuresVacuumPressure cyclingTemperature cyclingVibration/liquid hammeringRotating equipmentIonizing radiationHigh voltage/currentErosion/Corrosion

Human Factors or ErrorsHuman Factors or ErrorsHUMAN FAILURE

ERRORS VIOLATIONS

• Deliberate actions• Different from those prescribed• Carries known associated risks• Ignores operational procedures• Violation errors occur because of a

perception of lack of relevance, time pressure or laziness.

• Competency exists• Intentions are correct• Slips occur while

carrying out habitual, routine, skill based activity.

• Incorrect intention• Inadequate knowledge• Incorrect information processing• Inadequate training• Mistakes occur because of incorrect

assumptions or incorrect “tunnel vision” application of rules.

SLIPSMISTAKES

Site or Location HazardsSite or Location Hazards

Adjacent facilitiesAdjacent facilities Nearby communitiesNearby communities Transport availabilityTransport availability Availability of Utilities;Availability of Utilities; Topography/ average Topography/ average weather conditions;weather conditions; Environmental sensitivity;Environmental sensitivity; Layout considerations regulations, Layout considerations regulations, standards location/spacing, occupancy, standards location/spacing, occupancy, extreme process conditionsextreme process conditions

Environmental IssuesEnvironmental Issues“LIVING” ENVIRONMENT POTENTIAL IMPACTS

Human impacts:Chronic and acute exposure to toxic materials through contaminated drinking water, agricultural products and air

• Allergies• Eye irritation• Lung damage• Genetic mutations• Poisoning

Wildlife impacts: • Migratory routes• Critical habitats for endangered

species• Genetic mutations

Domestic Animal Impacts: • Contamination of feed & water• Genetic mutations• Poisoning• Impact on agriculture and food

supply

Micro/Macro biological Impacts: • Ecosystems• Food chain• Surface and ground water• Air quality• Eradication of species

The Deviation ListThe Deviation List

# DEVIATION MEANING

1. Low / No FlowReduction / partial or total loss of flow.Ex. Valve closed.

2. High FlowExcessive Flow.Ex. Control valve malfunction.

3. Reverse / Misdirected Flow Process stream not following primary path.

4. Leak / Rupture Leak - minor leak Ex. - Flange leak.Ex. Rupture - exchanger tube ruptures.

5. Loss of ContainmentSerious facility leak.Ex. Storage tank leaks - are adequate dykes and berms in place?

6. Hydraulic Surge Pressure wave. Ex. - Water Hammer. Consider high flow.

7. High Pressure Above design pressure or MAWP.

8. Low PressureBelow operating pressure.Ex. Pump failure.

9. VacuumCondensing of gases, loss of liquid level.Ex. Maintenance - steaming of vessels.

10. HP / LP Interface PressureIntroduction of high pressure into a low pressure system.Ex. DP across control valve when flow on one side is 600 psig and flow on other side is 900 psig.

11. High Temperature Higher than design temperature.Ex. Temperature control valve failure.

PHA MethodologiesPHA Methodologies

Hazard & Operability Study;Hazard & Operability Study; What-IF, Checklist or What What-IF, Checklist or What

If/Checklist study;If/Checklist study; Failure Mode and Effects Failure Mode and Effects

Analysis (FMEA, FMECA);Analysis (FMEA, FMECA); Fault Tree Analysis (FTA);Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); Or an appropriate equivalent Or an appropriate equivalent

methodology (Hazid, Hazcan)methodology (Hazid, Hazcan)

HAZOPHAZOP

Rigorous review of the design Rigorous review of the design and operability of a system;and operability of a system;

Identify potential hazards Identify potential hazards and/or operability problems;and/or operability problems;

Uses guidewords & Uses guidewords & parameters;parameters;

Drawings broken into Nodes Drawings broken into Nodes are assessed.are assessed.

What – If / ChecklistWhat – If / Checklist

Requires experienced and Requires experienced and knowledgeable team members;knowledgeable team members;

A series of “what if” questions A series of “what if” questions are asked for each system / are asked for each system / subsystem;subsystem;

Each question represents the Each question represents the potential for equipment failure or potential for equipment failure or an error in operating procedure.an error in operating procedure.

PHA MethodologiesPHA Methodologies

FMEAFMEA

Initially used in aerospace and Initially used in aerospace and automotives to predict the automotives to predict the reliability of complex products;reliability of complex products;

The method determines how The method determines how and how often the components and how often the components of a product could fail;of a product could fail;

Evaluates the effects of failures Evaluates the effects of failures on a system.on a system.

Fault Tree AnalysisFault Tree Analysis

Developed by Bell Laboratories Developed by Bell Laboratories for the US Air Force;for the US Air Force;

Focuses on the possibility of Focuses on the possibility of one undesired event occurring;one undesired event occurring;

Maps the complex relationships Maps the complex relationships that can cause the event by that can cause the event by including all of the contributory including all of the contributory factors that are known.factors that are known.

Selecting the “Right Method”Selecting the “Right Method”

Purpose of the study;Purpose of the study; Type of results desired;Type of results desired; Type of information available;Type of information available; Relative risks associated with Relative risks associated with

the chemicals, the process the chemicals, the process and/or the facility location;and/or the facility location;

PHA team experience level;PHA team experience level; Past IncidentsPast Incidents Development stage of facility.Development stage of facility.

Corrective Action Management Corrective Action Management and Closureand Closure

““Due diligence” can only Due diligence” can only be shown if every effort be shown if every effort has been made to has been made to implement and verify that implement and verify that the actions needed to the actions needed to make the process safe make the process safe have been taken.have been taken.

The Closure LoopThe Closure Loop Assign responsibility to Assign responsibility to

recommendations;recommendations; Use a flexible CAR management system Use a flexible CAR management system

that leaves a “paper trail”;that leaves a “paper trail”; Document the resolution of Document the resolution of

recommendations;recommendations; Acceptance, rejection, substitution, or Acceptance, rejection, substitution, or

modificationmodification of any recommendation of any recommendation must be documented;must be documented;

Rejection of a recommendation must be Rejection of a recommendation must be communicated to the study team.communicated to the study team.

QUESTIONS ?QUESTIONS ?