Applying the HIPPORecommendations to Darfur:Toward Strategic, Prioritized,and Sequenced Mandates

JUNE 2017

Introduction

In advance of the expected renewal of the mandate of the United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in June 2017, theInternational Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security CouncilReport organized a workshop on May 3, 2017, on the challenges faced byUNAMID. This workshop aimed to help member states and UN actorsdevelop a shared understanding and common strategic assessment of thesituation on the ground in Darfur and to use that common assessment toinform the political strategy and design of UNAMID. The discussion wasintended to help the Security Council make informed decisions with respectto the strategic orientation, prioritization, and sequencing of the mission’smandate. The first session of the workshop began with a discussion of the situation onthe ground in Darfur. Experts presented a brief analysis of the security andpolitical dynamics in Darfur (and more broadly in Sudan), and participantsthen discussed how UNAMID’s current political strategy could be adapted torespond to the evolving context. In the second session, participants discussedthe highest priority objectives for the mission, and how to sequence them inorder to advance the political strategy discussed in the previous session.

Context Analysis and Political Strategy

Several factors have coincided to create an opportune moment to shift thepolitical strategy in Darfur, particularly with respect to the relationshipbetween the international community (including UNAMID, the AU Peaceand Security Council, and the UN Security Council) and the Sudanese govern-ment:• The relationship between the Sudanese government and the internationalcommunity is showing signs of improvement. In January 2017, the USgovernment announced its intention to lift trade sanctions on Sudan in July,subject to improved humanitarian access and halting of governmentsupport to groups that threaten civilians.

• The Sudanese government has also shown greater willingness to cooperatewith UNAMID in the past few months. For example, the mission is nowable to access some areas that had previously been restricted by the govern-ment, and the government issued a revised directive on humanitarianaction, which is significantly less restrictive than the previous regulations.

• The Sudanese government has repositioned itself as an active, influential,

On May 3, 2017, the International

Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson

Center, and Security Council Report

organized a workshop on the

challenges faced by the United

Nations–African Union Hybrid

Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This

was the fourth in a series of

workshops bringing together

member states, UN actors, and

independent experts to analyze how

UN policies and the June 2015

recommendations of the High-Level

Independent Panel on Peace

Operations (HIPPO) can be applied

to country-specific contexts.

This meeting note was drafted

collaboratively by IPI, the Stimson

Center, and Security Council Report.

It summarizes the main points raised

in the discussion under the Chatham

House rule of non-attribution and

does not necessarily represent the

views of all participants.

2 MEETING NOTE

and constructive player in the region. This hasled to further improvements in relations withclose neighbors (such as Chad), as well as withneighbors on the Mediterranean, thanks in partto its collaboration with EU partners onmigration issues.

• Former Chadian foreign minister Moussa FakiMahamat has taken office as the new chairpersonof the AU Commission. He brings with himconsiderable expertise and experience on theDarfur conflict, as well as relationships withSudanese authorities.

• Divisions within the Sudanese government mayincentivize President Omar al-Bashir to complywith political agreements. In particular, theSudanese Armed Forces may be growing discon-tent with the government’s use of militias(including foreign fighters) and with theelevation of the Rapid Support Forces, a paramil-itary group controlled by the NationalIntelligence and Security Services and thatincludes a number of former Janjaweed fightersand leaders. Despite these improvements, relations betweenthe mission and the Sudanese government remainextremely difficult. The government continues torestrict the mission’s access to areas such as JebelMarra where violence is ongoing and to obstructthe mission’s activities in numerous other ways(such as by denying visas to human rightsmonitors). The African Union, and particularly theAU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)chaired by former South African President ThaboMbeki, continues to lead political engagement withthe government.SECURITY, MILITIAS, AND REBELGROUPS

An analysis of the current situation reveals thatsecurity has improved in some areas whileremaining poor in others. The success of govern-ment campaigns against rebel groups over the pasttwo to three years (including Operation DecisiveSummer) has confined violence to a smaller areathan before while also reducing the politicalrelevance on the ground of the main rebel groupsthat have signed on to the 2011 Doha Documentfor Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The government’s reliance on and strengthening

of the Rapid Support Forces is alarming, given thatthese forces are believed to be a major perpetratorof serious human rights violations includingattacks on civilians. There is also a troublingpossibility that violence has decreased in WestDarfur because non-Arab groups have fled thearea. The Sudanese government claims manydisplaced people have returned to this region, butthe corresponding figures for refugees returningfrom eastern Chad (where most of those displacedfrom West Darfur have fled) do not corroboratethis claim. The regional dimension of the conflict remains ofcritical importance. Some rebels groups arebelieved to have moved into Libya, where they areattempting to regroup. Militia groups move backand forth between Sudan and neighboringcountries such as Chad, the Central AfricanRepublic, Libya, and South Sudan, which couldfurther destabilize those areas. Many refugeesremain in neighboring countries such as Chad andSouth Sudan. Progress toward a political solution has laggedbehind progress on security. The 2011 DDPD andthe national dialogue process launched by thegovernment in 2015 have produced frameworks forthe political path forward, but both are flawed. Thenational dialogue has not been an inclusive process.Similarly, three key rebel groups have not signedonto the Doha process, many internally displacedpersons remain skeptical that the Doha agreementwill respond to their needs, many local communi-ties feel that they have no stake in the process, andimplementation has lagged. Following a 2016referendum, Darfur remains divided into five statesfor administrative purposes. The mission’s politicalstrategy thus has to respond to variations in thenature and intensity of conflict in each state, as wellas with five sets of state authorities.HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIANACCESS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Despite the improvement in security in some areas,the human rights situation in Sudan has deterio-rated over the past year. The types of violationsvary across the country. In areas of active violence(whether related to militia activity or intercom-munal tensions), human rights violations occurwithin the context of these clashes. In areas withlarge numbers of internally displaced persons,

violations include sexual violence, attacks bygovernment or government-aligned forces oncamps, and restrictions on movement. Further, asthe government attempts to limit democratic space,violations include arbitrary arrest and attacks onfreedom of assembly and expression. The humanitarian situation remains seriouslyconcerning and is compounded by a relative lack ofinterest in Sudan by the donor community. Anestimated 2.6 million persons are displaced inDarfur; 1.6 million of these live in camps, wherethey are vulnerable to attacks by militias and relianton humanitarian assistance because of the threatsthey face if they try to leave the camps to seek liveli-hood opportunities. Conditions in the camps fallbelow international humanitarian standards inmany cases. The population in Darfur has high expectationsfor transitional justice, but so far very little progresshas been made on investigations or accountabilitymechanisms. For example, the DDPD provides forthe creation of a truth, justice, and reconciliationcommission, but this would require significantadditional support, both operationally and politi-cally, to implement.CORE DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE

The three core drivers of violence in Darfur atpresent are disputes over land and resources, thecomplex network of militias and paramilitaryforces, and the weakness of rule of law and securityinstitutions. These drivers are interrelated. Land and resource disputes lie at the heart ofmany conflicts in Darfur—intercommunalconflicts between pastoralist and farmingcommunities, attacks on civilians by militia groupsseeking to assert control over land or resources,and the inability of some displaced populations toreturn to homes that have been occupied bymilitias. The absence of legislation to clearlyelaborate land rights, the weakness of rule of lawand security institutions that could adjudicate andenforce those rights, and the government’s hostilityto traditional conflict settlement mechanisms haveprompted community groups and militias to useviolence as a means of claiming land. Militia and paramilitary groups continue to

inflict deliberate and incidental violence againstcivilians. Many of these groups are used as proxiesby the government; in return for conductingattacks, they are permitted to loot their areas ofoperation. In West Darfur, in particular, they havemoved from looting to seizing and occupying land,reportedly even changing the names of somevillages. These groups have frequently changedallegiances, and some groups may now be harderfor the government to control as they have becomedissatisfied with their financial and politicalcompensation and may seek to occupy a moreformal position in the security sector.1

The weakness—and, in many places, absence—ofrule of law and security institutions feeds into bothproblems. Unaddressed grievances and impunitycan boil over into violence. This also prevents thereturn of displaced persons whose homes havebeen occupied by militia groups and who have norecourse to state institutions that could enforce andprotect their land rights or provide assurances ofsecurity if they were to attempt to return.IMPLICATIONS FOR UNAMID’SPOLITICAL STRATEGY

All these factors suggest that UNAMID’s politicalstrategy should shift in several ways. First, themission should adopt a division of labor with theAU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP),with the panel continuing to focus on engagementat the national level while UNAMID increases itsengagement at the state level. The mission shoulddevelop tailored strategies for engaging withauthorities in the five states in Darfur to addressthe implications of the DDPD, intercommunaltensions, militias, land use, and displacement. Second, the mission should strengthen engage-ment with local communities and traditionalleaders to address the core drivers of violence. Themission’s efforts on this front have been receivedwell by communities but have been limited, in partbecause the government has attempted to blockpolitical dialogue with local community leaders.The mission’s recent improvement in relationswith the government provides an opening to stepup local mediation and engagement. This engage-ment should include sensitizing people in Darfur

Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to Darfur 3

1 Jérôme Tubiana, “Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and Pro-Government Militias,” Small Arms Survey, April 2017, available atwww.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-27-Sudanese-paramilitary-forces.pdf .

4 MEETING NOTE

on how the DDPD can affect their lives (not onlythe lives of those in Khartoum) to encourage themto have a stake in its successful implementation;supporting local dispute mediation and resolution;and supporting community dialogues to developideas for how to demobilize or integrate militiamembers into the state security sector. Third, the mission should take advantage of thegovernment’s interest in the lifting of US sanctionsby strengthening its public reporting. Continuedaccess constraints on both the mission andnongovernmental organizations have reducedpublic information about attacks and about thelinks between militia groups and the government,stifling understanding of the conflict among theSudanese population and the internationalcommunity. The government’s ability to retaliateagainst the mission for public reporting is limited ifit wants to meet conditions for the lifting of USsanctions; the mission should capitalize on thisopportunity.

Prioritization andSequencing

UNAMID’s current mandate identifies threestrategic priorities for the mission:2

1. The protection of civilians, the facilitation of thedelivery of humanitarian assistance and thesafety and security of humanitarian personnel;

2. Mediation between the Government of Sudanand non-signatory armed movements on thebasis of the DDPD, while taking into accountongoing democratic transformation at thenational level; and

3. Support to the mediation of communityconflict, including through measures to addressits root causes, in conjunction with the UNcountry team.

While these broad priorities remain relevant, thenew mandate should be updated to reflect thechanged context. Given the diversity of conditionsand dynamics in different parts of Darfur, it iscritical that the new mandate allows the missionflexibility to apply different approaches in differentareas.

In some parts of the country, the mission shouldstart to implement peacebuilding-focused activi-ties. Efforts have been made in the past to shiftpeacebuilding responsibilities from the mission tothe UN country team. However, experience overthe past few years has shown that the country teamhas limited capacity, access, and funding to take onsuch activities. Under these circumstances,transferring peacebuilding activities out of themission could call their continuation into question.The prioritization and sequencing of UNAMID’smandate should incorporate a realistic assessmentof the UN country team’s capacity. The process offurther developing benchmarks leading toward anexit strategy offers an opportunity to align theinterests of the Sudanese government, the UNcountry team, and the mission. Based on the discussion at the workshop, thethree priority areas above could be amended to takeinto account the changing context as follows.PRIORITY 1: PROTECTION OF CIVILIANSAND FACILITATION OF HUMANITARIANASSISTANCE

Activities under this priority should be amended toreflect that the types of protection activities neededare different in different parts of Darfur. In areas ofactive violence such as Jebel Marra, troops mustremain deployed to work alongside civilians andpolice to implement physical protection activities.In areas where there is no active violence, themission can shift from immediate physical protec-tion to activities intended to create a protectiveenvironment in the longer term. In “gray areas”where there remains some risk that violence mayreignite, some uniformed presence (troops orformed police units) will still be required to protectcivilians through activities focused on building aprotective environment.PRIORITY 2: MEDIATION ON THE BASISOF THE DDPD

As described above, the mission should cooperatewith the AUHIP, with the panel taking the lead onmost engagement at the national level and themission shifting to focus on democratic transfor-mation activities at the state and local levels. One area where UNAMID should begin to

2 UN Security Council Resolution 2296 (June 29, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2296, para. 2.

engage strongly at the national level is on securitysector reform. UNAMID does not have thecapacity to support the full suite of security sectorreform efforts. However, due to divisions betweenthe Sudanese Armed Forces and the president andthe government’s interest in having US sanctionslifted, the moment is ripe for the mission toadvance this agenda where it can use its compara-tive advantages. For example, the mission shouldreport privately and publicly on abuses by theRapid Support Forces, encourage oversight of andaccountability for these forces, and publicly reportwhen it is attacked by government-backed militias.The mission’s efforts to support the integration ofmilitia groups into the security sector (see below)should be accompanied by support to the govern-ment to develop a national integration strategy. UNAMID and the AUHIP could providepolitical support for reinforcing the Sudanesepolice—the least empowered branch of the securitysector—and deploying police to fill securityvacuums in communities with less rebel activity.The mission could also provide operationalsupport to the police, for example by havingformed police units conduct mixed patrols withSudanese police or by co-locating individual policeofficers at local police stations to mentor and advisethem.PRIORITY 3: MEDIATION OFCOMMUNITY CONFLICT BYADDRESSING ITS ROOT CAUSES

The UN country team has shifted gears in Sudanfrom providing relief toward addressingunderlying causes of violence. This has beenreflected, for example, in pilot programs looking atdurable solutions for internally displaced persons,efforts to better coordinate humanitarian anddevelopment activities, and the shift from annual tomulti-year strategy plans that are linked to adevelopment framework.

In areas where violence has receded, the missionshould correspondingly shift toward addressing thethree core drivers of violence identified earlier(land and resource disputes, militias and paramili-tary forces, and weak rule of law and securityinstitutions), taking note of its comparativeadvantages and limitations. The mission shouldwork to promote the rule of law by engaging at twolevels. At the national level, the mission shouldadvance efforts to set up institutions andmechanisms such as the truth, justice, and reconcil-iation commission that are provided for in peaceagreements. At the state and local levels, themission should support the redeployment of stateauthorities (particularly police and justiceofficials), carefully applying the Human Rights DueDiligence Policy to avoid enabling human rightsabusers and to manage risks. With regard to disputes over land and resources,UNAMID should work at the state level to facilitatedialogue, mediation, and policy development. Itcould also support initiatives enforcing land rights,for example by monitoring and protectingpastoralists’ migratory routes and by conductingjoint patrols with the Sudanese police.Simultaneously, the AUHIP should push for aninclusive national dialogue on land use. UNAMIDcan also build on its successes with intercommunalmediation to address land use and ownershipdisputes in such fora. With regard to militia activity, UNAMID shouldengage where it can to deter violence and supportsustainable solutions. Mission personnel shouldengage with local community leaders and facilitatediscussions between community groups and stateor national authorities to find options forintegrating militia into the state security sector topromote representative national security forces anddiscourage militia violence. Simultaneously, theAUHIP should engage at the national level to detergovernment mobilization of militias.

Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to Darfur 5

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Agenda

Wednesday, May 3, 2017

9:00–9:15 Opening RemarksArthur Boutellis, Director of the Center for Peace Operations, International Peace InstituteAditi Gorur, Director of the Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, Stimson Center

9:15–11:00 Session 1: Political StrategyIn this session, experts will present a brief conflict analysis, outlining the recent developmentsand the major threats to peace and security in Darfur. They will assess the progress that hasbeen achieved toward the mission’s benchmarks and the major challenges facing the transition.Participants will then discuss a political strategy for the mission that responds to the threatsoutlined in the conflict analysis.

Discussion questions: What does an analysis of the conflict in Darfur tell us about the driversof the conflict? What is the political strategy underlying UNAMID’s current mandate? Is thatpolitical strategy still viable, or does it need to be revised? What are the primary obstacles tosuccessful implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur? What are the primaryobstacles to the successful transfer of tasks to the Sudanese government and to the UN countryteam? What mission capabilities and approaches have proven effective at influencing theconflict? What is the current understanding of local capacities and effective local arrangementsfor peace? How can the Security Council remain engaged in support of UNAMID’s politicalstrategy?

ChairYoussef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute, and former member ofHIPPO

SpeakersDaniela Kroslak, Darfur Integrated Operational Team Leader, UN Department ofPeacekeeping OperationsChloé Marnay-Baszanger, Chief, Peace Missions Support Section, Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Human RightsWafaa Saeed, Chief, Eastern & Southern Africa Section, UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian AffairsJérôme Tubiana, Independent Researcher, Small Arms Survey

11:00–11:15 Coffee Break

11:15–12:55 Session 2: Prioritization and SequencingIn this session, participants will identify the mission’s highest priority objectives in order toadvance the political strategy defined in the previous session. Participants will also discuss thesequence in which priority objectives should be undertaken. By sequencing the objectives,participants will aim to ensure that the mission is not burdened by too many tasks at the sametime. Participants will also aim to sequence objectives so that the mission is not asked to carryout certain tasks prematurely, before the conditions for their success are in place.

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Discussion questions: On the basis of the secretary-general’s latest report and subsequentdevelopments, which objectives in the current mandate should be prioritized? What aspects ofthe mandate has the mission been successful at implementing? What obstacles have preventedthe mission from translating mandated tasks into action, and what conditions need to be inplace for those tasks to be carried out? How could the mandate better allow the mission toadapt to changing conditions on the ground? How can UNAMID’s mandate better facilitateprogress toward the benchmarks identified as an exit strategy for the mission? When and howshould the mission draw down?

ChairIan Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report, and former member of HIPPO

SpeakerJessica Philips, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UnitedNations

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Mr. Mohammad AboulwafaPermanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egyptto the United Nations

H.E. Dr. Adonia AyebareAfrican Union Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations

Lt. Col. Raoul BazatohaPermanent Mission of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations

Mr. Alexis BerthierPermanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Mr. Arthur BoutellisInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Victor Casanova AbosSecurity Council Report

Ms. Lesley ConnollyInternational Peace Institute

Mr. James Della-GiacomaCenter on International Cooperation

Ms. Cindy GarayPermanent Mission of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations

Ms. Aditi GorurStimson Center

Ms. Teale HaroldPermanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Mr. Yoshitaka KinoshitaPermanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Ms. Daniela KroslakUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Mr. Kevin LynchUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Youssef MahmoudInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Ralph MamiyaUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Ms. Chloé Marnay-BaszangerOffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

Mr. Ian MartinSecurity Council Report

Mr. Ameya NaikInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Fredrik NivaeusPermanent Mission of Sweden to the UnitedNations

Ms. Jessica PhilipsPermanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Mr. Ashish PradhanInternational Crisis Group

Mr. Wafaa SaeedUN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Mr. Daniele SfregolaPermanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations

Ms. Alma TafaniUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Mr. Didar TemenovPermanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstanto the United Nations

Ms. Madeline VellturoStimson Center

Participants

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