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FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus - CRIM. CASE NO. S8-17-CRM-2416For: Violation of Sec. 3 (e), RA 3019

HELEN C. DE CASTRO, ET AL.Accused. Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J., Chairperson

ECONG, J.CALDONA, J.

Promulgated on:

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RESOLUTION

DE LA CRUZ, J.:

This resolves the following:

1. Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration [RE: Resolution datedMarch 2, 2018j, dated March 8, 2018;

2. Accused Helen de Castro's Comment/Opposition (Re:Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration dated 08 March 2018), datedMarch 21, 2018;

3. Accused Shirley R. Baldon's Opposition (to Plaintiff's Motion forReconsideration), dated March 21, 2018; and

4. Accused Toby C. Gonzales' separate Motion to Dismiss andMotion to Lift Order for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, both datedFebruary 19, 2018. At the hearing of the said motions on March 28,2018, Prosecutor Ma. Althea Rholene J. Raypon manifested that theprosecution will no longer file any comment/opposition to the motion to

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Helen C. De Castro, et al.Crim. Case No. S8-17-CRM-2416

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dismiss as the accused-movant had failed to appear in court, indicatinghis lack of interest to pursue the said motion. As to the motion to liftorder for issuance of warrant of arrest, Prosecutor Raypon orallyopposed the same on the ground that the Court has not issued yet anywarrant of arrest against the accused-movant.

Prosecution's motion forreconsideration

A judicious perusal of the prosecution's motion for reconsiderationreveals that the arguments set forth therein are a mere reiteration andrehash of those stated in its Comment, dated February 2, 2018, onaccused De Castro's Motion to Quash with Motion to Dismiss and DeferArraignment, dated January 25, 2017, and its Comment, dated February19, 2018, on accused Baldon's Motion to Quash the Information, datedFebruary 7, 2018, which this Court had already thoroughly consideredand passed upon.

In Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Ine. v. Court of Appeals,' theHonorable Supreme Court held:

In the same manner, we readily found that, despite the lengthyand repetitious submissions of petitioner in its pleadings filed with thisCourt as earlier enumerated, all the arguments therein are also mererehashed versions of what is posited before respondent court. Wehave patiently given petitioner's postulates the correspondingthorough and objective review but, on the real and proper issues socompletely and competently discussed and resolved by respondentcourt, petitioner's obvious convolutions of the same arguments areevidently unavailing. xxxIn Pan/ilio v. COMELEC,2 the High Court ruled:

A cursory reading of the motion for reconsideration shows thatthe grounds raised therein were a mere rehash of the ground raised inhis Answer, which prayed for the dismissal of the election protest.There was no point in reiterating and discussing anew the issuespreviously resolved.

In the same way, the Supreme Court elucidated in People v.Agacer:3

1 289 seRA 604, 6202593 seRA 139, 1493688 seRA 42,46-47

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Helen C. De Castro, et al.Crim. Case No. SB-17-CRM-2416

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Appellants' contention that the prosecution's evidence isinsufficient to prove conspiracy and treachery is a mere rehash of theirargument set forth in their brief, which we already considered,weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to bereconsidered. It is not a new issue that needs further judicialdetermination. There is therefore no necessity to discuss and ruleagain on this ground since this would be a useless formality of ritualinvariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already setforth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the argumentsadvanced by the movant.

In any event, a thoughtful assessment of the records of this caseand the questioned Resolution convinces the Court that theprosecution's motion for reconsideration is bereft of merit.

Accused Gonzales' motion to dismiss

In his motion to dismiss, accused Gonzales contends in essencethat he is similarly situated as that of accused De Castro and Baldon, andthat if the Court found that there was inordinate delay in the preliminaryinvestigation of accused De Castro and Baldon, the same finding shouldequally apply to him.

The prosecution opted not to file any comment/opposition to thesaid motion, arguing that the accused-movant's failure to appear at thehearing of his aforesaid motion should be construed as lack of intereston his part to pursue the same. The Court is not convinced, consideringthat in the notice to the prosecution setting the hearing of the saidmotion on March 28, 2018, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the accused-movant informed the prosecution that he is submitting to the court hissubject motion "without further argument," which is not indicative oflack of interest to pursue the same.

In any case, in granting the motions to dismiss of accused DeCastro and Baldon, the Court found and ruled:

However, with respect to the argument that theaccused-movants' right to a speedy disposition of their casesis violated, the Court is convinced that the Office of theOmbudsman indeed committed inordinate delay in theconduct of the preliminary investigation.


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While the COA audit investigation started in 2008; theCourt agrees with the prosecution that the computation ofthe period in determining whether or not there was delayshould be reckoned from the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit on December 17, 2012. Indeed, it was only fromthis period that the OMB was apprised of the facts of thecase. Nevertheless, even with the exclusion of the periodspent by the COA in its audit investigation, the Court findsand so holds that there was inordinate delay in the conductof the preliminary investigation by the OMB.

In the present case, it is not disputed that from thefiling of the complaint-affidavit on December 17, 2012, theResolution finding probable cause was approved by theOmbudsman on September 23, 2016, and the Informationwas filed only on December 11, 2017. Thus, a total of four(4) years, eleven (11) months and twenty-four (24) dayspassed from the filing of the complaint until the Informationwas filed. To the mind of the Court, such delay, in view ofthe attendant circumstances, is inordinate andunreasonable.

The right to a speedy disposition of a person's case isguaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution. Section16, Article III thereof states:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to aspeedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition ofcases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedingsbut extends to all parties in all cases, including civil andadministrative cases, and in all proceedings, includingjudicial and quasi-judicial hearings."

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayn,s the Supreme Courtelucidated that the right to speedy disposition of casesshould be understood to be a relative or flexible concept

4 People v. Sondiganbayan, December 11, 2013, 712 SeRA 359, 4115 July 15, 2013, 701 seRA 188


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such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the timeinvolved would not be sufficient. Hence, it is settled injurisprudence that the right is deemed violated only whenthe proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, andoppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements ofthe trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause orjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapsewithout the party having his case tried."

In Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman/ the SupremeCourt held that "in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rightstakes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute,and when weighed against each other, the scales of justicetilt towards the former."

In resolving a criminal complaint, inordinate delaybeing violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right todue process and to the speedy disposition of cases, warrantsthe dismissal of the criminal case. It is thus incumbent forthe State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that thedelay was not attributable to it. 8

The prosecution argues that several events transpiredwhich justified the almost five-year delay. It cited themotions for extension filed by accused De Castro andBaldon, the private complainant's reply-affidavits, and hismotion for preventive suspension to which accused DeCastro filed her Comment. The Court is not convinced. Therecords will show that accused De Castro was able to file herCounter-Affidavit as early as March 25, 2013,9 while accusedBaldon filed hers on April 23, 2013.10 Verily, the extensionsought which is only for 11 days neither justifies theinordinate delay nor makes the accused-movantscontributory thereto. Likewise, the blame cannot be placedupon private-complainant's motion for preventivesuspension as it was filed only on August 8, 2016, or three

61bid7 June 27,2008,556 SeRA 73, 101; citing AI/ado v. Diokno, May 5, 1994, 232 SeRA 192, 2108 People v. Sandiganbayan, December 11, 2013, 712 SeRA 359, 412; citing Angchonco, Jr. v.Ombudsman, February 13, 1997,268 SeRA 3019 Records, Vol. I, p. 7810 Records, vol. I, p. 410


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(3) years after the accused-movants filed their respectivecounter-affidavits.

The right to speedy disposition of cases, as elucidatedby the Supreme Court in Coscolluelo, has the followingpurpose:

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedydisposition of cases is not merely hinged towards theobjective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justicebut also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding acriminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinitetime. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective"is to assure that an innocent person may be free from theanxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of havinghis guilt determined within the shortest possible timecompatible with the presentation and consideration ofwhatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Thislooming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carriedby the passage of time should be weighed against the Stateand in favor of the individual. In the context of the right to aspeedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan (Corpuz)illumined:

A balancing test of applying societal interests andthe rights of the accused necessarily compels the court toapproach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of theinterest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designedto protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trialincarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of theaccused to trial; and to limit the possibllltv that his defensewill be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,because the inability of a defendant adequately to preparehis case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is alsoprejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recallaccurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accusedis not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged byrestraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud ofanxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resourcesmay be drained, his association is curtailed, and he issubjected to public obloquy.

In failing to resolve the complaint with such haste andprudence as dictated by law and jurisprudence, the Office ofthe Ombudsman placed accused De Castro and Baldon in atactical disadvantage and opened the possibility that theirdefense will be impaired.


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As to the argument that accused-movants did notseasonably assert their right to a speedy disposition of thecase, the Supreme Court has reiterated its ruling inCoscolluela that a defendant has no duty to bring himself totrial, as it is the State's duty to do so. In Inocentes v.People, 11 the High Court held:

The prosecution likewise blames Inocentes for notseasonably invoking his right to a speedy disposition of hiscase. It claims that he has no right to complain about thedelay when the delay is because he allegedly slept on hisrights.

We find this argument unworthy of merit, in thesame way we did in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:

Records show that they could not have urged thespeedy resolution of their case because they were unawarethat the investigation against them was still ongoing. Theywere only informed of the March 27, 2003 resolution andinformation against them only after the lapse of six (6) longyears, or when they received a copy of the latter after itsfiling with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they couldhave reasonably assumed that the proceedings against themhave already been terminated. This serves as a plausiblereason as to why petitioners never followed up on the casealtogether. Instructive on this point is the Court'sobservation in Outerte v. Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Petitioners in this case, however, could nothave urged the speedy resolution of their casebecause they were completely unaware that theinvestigation against them was still ongoing.Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact thatpetitioners were merely asked to comment, andnot file counter-affidavits which is the properprocedure to follow in a preliminary investigation.After giving their explanation and after four longyears of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally,had reason to assume that the charges againstthem had already been dismissed.

On the other hand, the OMB failed topresent any plausible, special or even novel reasonwhich could justify the four-year delay interminating its investigation. Its excuse for thedelay-the many layers of review that the case had

11 July 7, 2016, G.R. Nos. 205936-64


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to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had toentail-has lost its novelty and is no longerappealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case.The incident before us does not involvecomplicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic)in view of the fact that the subject computerizationcontract had been mutually cancelled by theparties thereto even before the Anti-Graft Leaguefiled its complaint.

Being the respondents in the preliminaryinvestigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty tofollow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it wasthe Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite thesame within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view ofits mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged beforeit. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:

A defendant. has no duty to bring himself totrial; the State has that duty as well as the duty ofinsuring that the trial is consistent with dueprocess.

The same pronouncement was echoed in Remulla v.Scmdtqanbovon." where the Court held:

Remulla argues that the assertion or non-assertionof the right to a speedy disposition of cases determineswhether the court must dismiss the case for inordinate delayor continue the proceedings. Such argument, however, failsto persuade. It must be emphasized that the balancing test isa relative and flexible concept. The factors therein must beweighed according to the different facts and circumstancesof each case. The courts are given wide judicial discretion inanalyzing the context of the case, bearing in mind theprejudice caused by the delay both to the accused and theState.

In addition, there is no constitutional or legalprovision which states that it is mandatory for the accused tofollow up his case before his right to its speedy dispositioncan be recognized. To rule otherwise would promote judiciallegislation where the Court would provide a compulsoryrequisite not specified by the constitutional provision. Itsimply cannot be done, thus, the ad hoc characteristic of thebalancing test must be upheld.

12 April 17, 2017, G.R. No. 218040


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Thus, the Court is constrained to decree the dismissalof the present case for violation of the accused-movants'constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their case.

Considering that accused Gonzales is similarly situated as that ofaccused De Castro and Baldon in regard to the preliminary investigationconducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court has no choice butto also dismiss this case as to him for violation of his constitutional rightto a speedy disposition of this case.

Accused Gonzales' Motion to LiftOrder for Issuance of Warrant ofArrest

In his subject motion, accused Gonzales prays that the Court'sOrder for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him for his failure toappear at the hearing on March 9, 2018 be lifted and set aside, on theground that on that day, he was immobilized due to another attack ofvertigo. The prosecution opposes the said motion on the ground that nosuch order to issue a warrant for his arrest has been issued.

The prosecution is correct in that the Court had not issued anyorder for the arrest of the accused for his failure to appear at the hearingon March 9, 2018. In its Order, given in open court on March 9, 2018,the Court merely required accused Gonzales to explain in writing why heshould not be cited in contempt of court for his failure to appear on thatdate. In any event, the Court will just treat his subject motion as hiswritten explanation for his failure to appear at the hearing on March 9,2018, and considers the explanation stated therein as satisfactorycompliance with its order.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court resolves to:

1. DENY the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, for lack ofmerit.

2. GRANT accused Gonzales' Motion to Dismiss, dated February19, 2018, and to DISMISS this case as to him, for violation of hisconstitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case.


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The hold-departure order issued against accused Gonzales byreason of this case is hereby ordered LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and thebond he posted for his provisional liberty RELEASED, subject to the usualaccounting and auditing procedures.

3. TREAT his Motion to Lift Order for Issuance of Warrant ofArrest, dated February 19, 2018, as his satisfactory compliance with theCourt's Order, given in open court on March 9, 2018.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.

EFREN ~W LA CRUZchairpersO~A~ciate Justice

WE CONCUR:

UJl . Clt1fv ~r...--I -

"'-•...•~"..,.RDOM. CALDONAAssociate Justice

~ tJUhri AI1/Y~fLGERALDINE FAITH A. BCONG

Associate Justice

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