april 19, 20011 what happened in russia, 1991-2001, and why? (and what are the implications?) simon...

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April 19, 2001 1 What Happened in Russia, 1991- 2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan [email protected] http://web.mit.edu/sjohnson/www/ research.htm

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Page 1: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 1

What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001,

and Why?(And what are the implications?)

Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan

[email protected]

http://web.mit.edu/sjohnson/www/research.htm

Page 2: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 2

What happened in Russia, through August 1998?

Page 3: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 3

What happened in Russia, in August 1998?

Page 4: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 4

What happened in Russia, since August 1998?

Page 5: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 5

Explaining divergence in transition

• Convergence across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in stabilization, liberalization and privatization

• No convergence in economic outcomes: most of the former Soviet Union trapped with high unofficial economy and low tax revenues/few public goods

What explains this divergence?

Extent of “institutional reform” (EBRD 1999 measures: e.g., regulatory burden, corruption)

see also micro surveys of entrepreneurs

Page 6: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 6

Solutions: to protect entrepreneurs(1) Reform of bureaucracy and regulation

• control of corruption is key (Daniel Kaufmann)

• reduce and simplify regulations

(2) Need local government to support development

• fiscal reform helpful (Shleifer and Treisman)

• lessons from China

(3) Stronger constraints on arbitrary executive action

• improve functioning of court system

• oversight and transparency from legislature (Poland)

Page 7: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 7

Conclusion: institutions are a first-order macroeconomic issue

1) Protect entrepreneurs against expropriation • Essential for investment and growth• Helpful for registration of activity/payment of taxes• Need effective constraints on the executive

2) Protect outside investors (against entrepreneurs!)• Rapid growth is possible with weak outside investor

protection, tending to favor large incumbents/powerful families

• But crises are larger and more persistent when outside investors are more vulnerable

• New rules are essential, new regulators are helpful, new markets are possible almost everywhere

Page 8: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 8

Short-term prospects

• August 1998 crisis: a blessing in disguise?

• Output and export boosted by devaluation

• Real exchange rate steady

• Inflation under control, for now

• GDP recovery, hard to sustain

BUT

important problems are not being resolved

Page 9: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 9

Four Trends

• Better managed firms consume the weak

• Successful firms are tied to local government

• Local/regional governments delay restructuring

• No serious pressure for protectionism

Page 10: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 10

How normal is Russia?

Normal aspects

• response to devaluation

• firms make money

• capital is leaving

Page 11: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 11

Unusual features

• low revenues for federal government relative to spending

• large firms and banks do not go bankrupt

• incredible system of barter (the most effective corruption in the world?)

• bank credit doesn’t matter

Page 12: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 12

Four scenarios (to 2005)

#1: Leap to a liberal market economy

(like Poland)

• local governments like control not free entry

• large firms prey on small firms

• who will dismantle the political barriers to entry/growth for new small firms?

Page 13: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 13

#2: Strong business groups + government

(like Malaysia or Korea or Mexico)

• already evident in Moscow (e.g., Sistema)

• could grow at 2-5% per year and attract capital inflows

• but vulnerable to collapse: confidence is fragile with weak institutions (see Asia)

Page 14: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 14

#3: “Roving bandits”

• continual fighting for control of assets

• gradual decline of physical assets

• increase in emigration

• high level of violence

Page 15: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 15

#4: Russia turns inward

(like Belarus)

• large protectionist barriers

• would have to defeat the large enterprises

• could have an initial boom, followed by decline and even collapse

Page 16: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 16

One summary picture

• Weak institutions (corruption/rule of law)

do NOT necessarily prevent growth

(see Indonesia)

• but they do create fragility

• capital comes in when a boom is expected

• and then runs if a slight downturn

management and government theft

is endogenous

Page 17: April 19, 20011 What Happened in Russia, 1991-2001, and Why? (And what are the implications?) Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan sjohnson@mit.edu

April 19, 2001 17

Fat tails in Russia’s Future

Pre-Crisis

Post-CrisisOops...

Our View

Pre and PostCrisis

Conventional models