arab constituent power
TRANSCRIPT
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Summary
Mostmodernstateshaveadoptedwrittenandrigidconstitu
tions.Theexistenceofaconstitutionpresupposesaconstituent
power,distinguishedfromotherconstitutedpowers,createdby
theconstitutionitself.Aconstituentpowerpresupposestheabil
ityofasocietytodevelopitscapacitytoactasacollective,inorder
togain(orregain)anactiveroleintheorganizationofthelivesof
individualsandtheirsocialrelationshipswithoneanother.
ForPanArabismdefenders,the(Arab)nationexistsasaco
hesivegroupwithitsownuniquecharacteristics,derivingfroma
commonlanguage,historyandtraditions.Theethnicconceptof
nationinitiallyhelpedtojustifyanArabrevolutionagainstother
Muslims,butitwasunabletodistinguishindividualArabpeo
plesorjustifyterritorialArabstates.Itwasunavoidablethento
switchtonarrowerconceptofnationthatcoverscitizenswithin
definedstatebordersandlivingunderthesamelaws.Despitethe
reference to theprincipleofpopular sovereignty in mostArab
Constitutionsandtheincreasingattachmenttoterritoriallyde
finedstates,thereexistswidepopulardiscontentwithArabre
gimesthatcontinuetolegitimizetheirauthoritybasedonArabor
Islamicnationalistdiscourses.
Constitutionsmayfillthegapoflegitimacycrisisincontem
poraryArabStates.Theyareanecessarytoolforthenationtoex
pressitswillbutalsofortheindividualsandcommunitieswithin
thestatetoprotectthemselvesfromthenationitselfandfromits
expression,thestate.Accordingly,thereshallberedlineswhere
thepeople,ortheirrepresentatives,shallnottransgress.Thosered
linesmaybeenumeratedinatext,withparticularlegalinviola
bilitythatwillbedifficult(almostimpossible)toamendwithout
joiningageneralconsensus,thatisnottheequivalenttounanim
ity(difficulttoobtain)normajority(easytorealize).
* The author is Associate Researcher at Birzeit University, ActingHeadofResearchattheInstituteofLaw.HehasaPh.D.inPublicLawfromFribourgUniversitySwitzerland,andaMasterinPublicadministrationfromENAFrance.Thispaper includesmostrelevantconclusionsofathesisthattheauthorhadpreparedforPh.D.inpubliclawattheUniversityofFribourg,underthedirectionofProf.ThomasFleiner,directoroftheInstituteofFederalism(Switzerland). See Asem Khalil, The Enactment of ConstituentPower in theArab World: thePalestinianCase,PIFF,Helbing&Lichtenhahn,2006.
Introduction
Constituentpoweristheauthoritytoframeoramendaconstitution.Aconstitutionisalegaltextwhichsupersedesallothers.Whatdistinguishesframingpowerfromamendingpoweristhatthelatterchangestheconstitutioninwaysprovidedtherein,whiletheformeramendsitoutsideconstitutional framework.Mostmodernstateshaveadoptedrigid,writtenconstitutions.Theexistenceofaconstitution
presupposestheexistenceofaconstituentpower,asdistinguishedfromotherconstitutedpowers,createdbytheconstitutionitself.Sinceaconstitutionisthehighestlawinthestate,constituentpowermustbevestedinthoseentitledtosovereignty.Tocomefullcircle,mostconstitutionsprovidethatthoseentitledtosovereigntyarethepeople,andconsequently,thepeopleareentitledtoconstituentpower.
Constituentpowerpresupposestheabilityofasocietytodevelopitscapacitytoactasacollective,inordertogain(orregain)anactiveroleintheorganizationofthelivesofindividualsandtheirsocialrelationshipswithoneanother.1Here,severalapproachesarepossible,dependingon
theconceptofnation.ForArabnationalists,the(Arab)nationexistsasacohesivegroupwithitsownuniquecharacteristics, deriving from a common language, history andtraditions.VariousattemptsatpanArabunityallendedinfailure,andthusArabnationalismbegantoexistonlywithin,asopposedtoacross,Arabterritorialstates.TheethnicconceptofnationinitiallyhelpedtojustifyanArabrevolutionagainstotherMuslims,butitwasunabletodistinguishindividual Arab peoples orjustify territorial Arab states.WhatmakesaJordaniandifferentfromaPalestinianoraLebanese fromaSyrian?Todistinguishbetween them, itwasinevitabletoswitchtonarrowerconceptofnationthatcoverscitizenswithindefinedstatebordersandlivingunderthesamelaws.
Mostmodernstateshavewrittenconstitutionsinwhichthey declare that sovereigntybelongs to the people. TheArabworldalsowitnessedsignificantconstitutionaldevelopmentsandtherecontinuestobeaconstitutionalmovement intheArabworld.Nevertheless,oneshouldnotbe
1 SeeUlrichK.Preuss,ConstitutionalPowermakingoftheNewPolity:SomeDeliberationsontheRelationsbetweenConstituentPowerandtheConstitution, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, ANDLEGITIMACYTHEORETICALPERSPECTIVES148(MichelRosenfelded.,DukeUniversityPress1994).
TheEnactmentofConstituentPowerintheArabWorld
AsemKhalil*
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deceivedintothinkingthatthelegislationcontainedintheconstitutioncorresponds toconstitutional law.There isaneed,infact,tostudytheconstitutionaltextinlightoftheenforcedandappliedlegislationineveryArabstate.
TherelationbetweentheArabnationandaparticularArabpeoplemaynotbeclearlyunderstoodbyusingtraditionalmeaningsofthoseconcepts.Infact,thesetwoconceptshavetobeunderstoodinthelightofthewideroneofumma,originallyusedto indicatetheIslamiccommunity,orthecommunityofbelievers.ThereisnoIslamicorArabstatethatembodiesallIslamicorArabumma;thosepopulationsneedtodealwithterritoriallydefinedstates.Incontemporary Arabstates, there is a partial return to shariaandanincreasingreferencetoIslamasajustificationforthestatesauthorityoritsrejection,maderespectivelybythe
stateapparatusandbyfundamentalistgroups.Incontemporary Arab states, the relationbetween Islamic umma,ArabnationandtheArabpeopleasawholeisbecomingincreasinglyproblematic.2
Modern constitutions are at the hierarchical apex ofnormativetexts.Theyaredistinguishedfromotherstatutes
bybeingaconstitutionofandinastate.Astateisborninaparticularmomentofhistory,butisalwaysastateofapeople,livingwithinaterritory.Theconstitutioninevitablyreflectsthestatesgeographicalandhistoricaldimensions.Aconstitutioninexorablybelongstothoseentitledtosovereigntysinceitisthehighestexpressionofselfdetermina
tion.Accordingly,
constituent
power
is
delegated
to
apeo
ple,but itsenactmenthasnoexistenceoutsideastate. Itmaybearguedthattheprocessofconstitutionmakingcan
beginbeforetheformationofthestate,buttheadoptionoftheconstitutionisalwayssubsequenttotheestablishmentofastate,althoughitmaycoincide,inchronologicalterms.
Theproblemremainshowtodefinetherelationshipbetween constituent power and the people. In democraticcountries,thepeoplearesovereignandexercisetheirconstituentpowerdirectlyorthroughrepresentatives.Inthisframework,thepeople represent the totalityofallcitizensofthestateandasdifferentfromtheconceptofthe
nation
which
includes
a
multitude
of
individuals
that
haveacommonidentityandareengagedincommonpoliticalactions,notnecessarilywithintheboundariesofagiv
2 AccordingtoIslamiclaw,sovereigntybelongstoGod:nostatehasthe right to exercise authority except in subordination and inaccordancewith theLawrevealedbyGodandhisprophet.ThePakistani,SayyidAbulAlaMaudoodi(thefounderoftheJamaateIslamiinPakistan)inventedanewconcept:alhakemmeyyameaningsovereigntyinreferencetoGod,whileseyyada(alsotranslatedas sovereignty) referring to the peoples power. This is only anapparentsolution,sincethemainquestionremains:whohasthesupreme power? For Maudoodi and his followers, no human
beinghaspowertotransgressGodswill.
enstate.Therelationshipbetweenconstituentpowerandthepeopleisnotapredeterminedone;itdependsinfact,onthemeaninggivento theconceptofnation.Thisrelationshipismuchmorecontentiouswhenthereisnocommon agreement over the concept of We the people, referredtointheconstitution.
Theproblemofwhoisentitledtoconstituentpowerisevenmorecomplicatedasitisrelatedtoanadditionaltwoquestions:thequestionoflimitsandoflegitimacy.Infact,manyauthorsdeterminelimitsinthelightofpreexistingelementssuchasculture,ethnicityandreligion,whichcandeterminetheidentityofthepeople.Thereflectionoftheconstitutiononsuchidentitymaydeterminethelegitimacyofsuchadocument;nevertheless,theremainingproblemistounderstandif,andwithinwhichlimits,thewillofthena
tionshallbeappliedbythestateandreflectedintheconstitution.Infact,all(oratleastthemajorityof)thoseconstituting a segment of the people and living in the territorywheretheconstitutionisenacted,shallconsideritastheirown.
ConstitutionalismwasinventedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica(U.S.A.)andFranceandwaspossibleonlyfollowingphilosophicalandpoliticalrevolutionsthatresultedinreplacingthemonarchorgodastheholderofsovereigntywiththenation,whichbecamethesourceofalllegitimatepower,derivedfromthesovereigntyofthepeople.Giventhishistory,isitpossibletoreadthetheoryofconstituent
powerin
Arabic
terms?
The
principle
of
popular
sover
eignty is included in most existing Arab Constitutions.Nonetheless,thereisacontradictionintheArabworld:anincreasingpopularattachmenttoterritorialstates,despitediscontent with these Arab regimes; while Arab regimescontinue to legitimize their authority, in some instances
basedonAraborIslamicnationalistdiscourses.
I. PanArabism,IslamismandcontemporaryArabStates
Despite the fact that Arab rulers oftenjustified theirpowerbasedontheconceptsofIslamicandArabnations(ornationalisms),modernArabstatesareundergoingthe
mostseriousanddangerouscrisesintheirhistoriesbasedonthreatsfromwithin.Infact,oneofthesalientquestionsinthestudyofcontemporaryArabstatesistounderstandhowthestatesapparatuscanfeignobediencetotherulerswithoutbeingrejectedforbeingillegitimatebyitscitizens?How can Arab states maintain their existence? How canthoseentitledtoconstituentpower,andthosewhoexerciseit,expressthevolontgnrale?Thelaterbeingnotonlythegeneralwillthatignoreindividuals,neitheristhesumofindividualswillthatactinegoisticandindividualisticwaywithoutanyconsiderationtotherulesofthelivingtogetherthatarenecessaryforthemaintenanceandtheunityof
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anysocialgroup,includingthepoliticalones,butratheracombinationofbothofthem.
1.Arab
States
vs.
Arab
Nation
TheconceptofnationalismhasinvadedtheArabmentalitybutithasnotbeenmetwithacleardefinitionofwhatandwherethenationis.3Differentapproachesarepossible:PanArabismdefenderssubscribetoatheoryoftheArabnation whilst Islamists talk about the Islamic umma;meanwhile,territorialnationalismisdevelopingandterritorialaffiliationisbeingconsolidated.4ThesepositionscoexistintheArabworldbutreconcilingthemisnotaneasytask.ThesituationmaybeexplosiveintermsoftheabilityofdiverselocalcommunitiestocoherewithinArabstates.5
Arabstatescontinuetobeconsideredbycitizensastheir
first
enemy.
a) OriginsofArabStates
Accordingtosomeauthors,theconceptofstateisalientoArabs,sinceoriginallytheywereatribalsociety,notcitizenstheywereonlykinsmenunitedbybloodties.6Thisideaislargelytakenasagivenbyauthors,whobelievethatconceptoftheArabterritorialstatewasaphenomenoncreatedinEurope.7Someothersgoevenfurther,positingthatthose states (mainly in the Fertile Crescent), which werecreatedwiththebreakupoftheOttomanEmpire,areartificial.8Certainly,asfarastheboundariesareconcerned,externalfactorspredominatedintheterritorialdefinitionof
someArabstates;9butthisisacommonexperienceinotherregions,suchasAfricaandLatinAmerica.Besides, ifthe
3 See Ghassan Salam, Introduction, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEARABSTATE4(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).
4 Thetermsnation,peopleandstateareoftenconfused.Thesameoccurs in Arabic terminology. The concept umma (translated asnation) is used when it refers to Islamic and/or Arab nation,while shab (translated as people) refers to single Arab peoplesanddawla(translatedasstate)referstotheterritorialArabstates(dawlaqutryya).Thetermdawlaisrelativelymodernandreferstoarulers(ordynastyofrulers)administrationintherecentpast,similar to the concept of Sultanate in the Ottoman Empire. Theconcept of ard or arady (territory or territories) refers to all theArabterritoriesasoneunit,ortotheterritoryofsingleArabstates,whiletheconceptquturrefersonlytotheterritoryofasinglestate.In addition, the adjective of the word nation (translated asnational)isqawmiyyawhenitreferstotheArabnation,whileitiswataniyya(alsotranslatedasnational)whenitisrelatedtoterritorialArabnationalism,alsomeaningpatriotism.Whiletheconceptofmuwatanareferstocitizenship;thisconcepthasitsoriginin watan homeland, although sometimes it is used to refer toArabland,alwatanalarabi!
5 ThereferencetoArabcountriesdoesnotmeanthattheyreflectageneralsituation.WeareconsciousthateveryArabstatereflectsaparticular history developed over a period of time. In fact, thecommonness with other Arab countries in relation to language,culture,history,habitsdidnothinder thegrowthof territorialnationalism;ratheritencouragedandfavoreditsdevelopment.
6 SeeP.JVatikiotis,IslamandtheState,19(CroomandHelm,1987).
foreignoriginexplainsthecontradictionsofArabterritorialstates,howcanforeignoriginalsoexplainitsconsolidationandascendancy?10
Inmoderntimes,thedebateovertheoriginalsintoquoteGhassanSalamehofArabstatecreationhasneverceased.11AccordingtoBurhanGhalioun,thestatebecamethecoreofthedebateovernationalism.12BytracingtheoriginofvariousArabstates,IliyaHarikconcludesthattheyarenotthecreationofcolonialism.Nevertheless,thesameauthor recognizes the fact that colonialism did affect the
bordersofcontemporaryArabstates.13Furthermore,territorialArabstatesarealsonottheembodimentoftheorientalorIslamiststate.AsconfirmedbyGhalioun,theyarethereactiontoorfearofanarchyintheArabworld.Arabsinfactfeltthenecessitytoadaptthemselvestothenewworld
order.14Thosewhodonotsharethisviewshouldatleastassesstheextenttowhichtheseinternationallyrecognizedcountrieshavetakenrootintheheartsandmindsoftheirinhabitants.15Infact,Arabstatesarebecomingincreasinglyentrenched and naturalized. Nevertheless, the growingstrengthoffundamentalistIslamisacontinuousreminderoftheprecariousstatusofthestatesystemandsecularisttrends.16
b) ArabNationalism
The term umma, throughout the Islamic era, has referredtotheuniversalMuslimcommunity.Aroundtheendofthenineteenthcentury,however,thistermbegantobeusedinthepoliticalliteratureofthetime,withreferencetotheuniversalArabcommunity, thusacquiringapreponderantlysecularmeaning.17Notonlythis,ArabnationalistsinsistthattheArabnationistheonlytruenation,eitherinassertivewayorinmoresubtleprose.SomehaveconceivedPanArabismasanoutgrowthofWesternthought;manyothersnowthinkthatitwasengenderedbyattemptstoreformIslam.18
7 SeeBahgatKorany,AlienandBesiegedYetHeretoStay:theContradictionsoftheArabTerritorialState,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE48(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).
8 SeeBurhanGhalioun,LeMalaiseArabe.lEtatcontrelaNation24(LaDcouverte/ENAG,1991).
9 Salam,supranote3,at6.10 SeeBahgatKorany,AlienandBesiegedYetHeretoStay:theContradic
tionsoftheArabTerritorialState,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE73(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).
11 SeeSalam,supranote3,at3.12 SeeGhalioun,supranote8,at53.13 SeeSalam,supranote3,at56.14 SeeGhalioun,supranote8,at5366.15 SeeSalam,supranote3,at3.16 SeeIliyaHarik,TheOriginsoftheArabStateSystem,inTHEFOUN
DATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 20 (Ghassan Salam ed., CroomHelm,1987).
17 Seeid.at2021.18 SeeEncyclopediaofNationalism1,489(AcademicPress,2001).
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This conceptofnation isbasedon thesameunifyingculturalcharacteristicsthatweregeneratedthroughcommonlanguageandreligionthroughouttheages,whichbequeathedasenseofcollectiveidentity.19Thesecommonelementshavebeenenforcedbyasimilarhistorythroughoutthecenturies.ForMichelAflaq,ummaistheArabnation,sinceanationexistswhen thepopulationbelieves that itconstitutesone,independentlyfromthe increasingordecreasingofnumbers;forAflaqanationisanidea,amatterofwill.20MostArableaderssubscribedtoArabnationalism, a reference to which is made in most constitutionaltexts.21
Nevertheless,panArabismwasnotcapableofdefyinginternational and local forces which protected the Westphaliadivisionofterritoryintointernationallysanctioned
territorialstates.MostArabstatesdonottoleratetheviolationoftheirsovereigntyforthesakeofArabpannationalism.22 Many newly established countries in the region(suchasKuwaitandQatar)retainthewordStateintheirofficialname,asiftheirstatehoodweretoovulnerablenottobesystematicallyreasserted.23
Nowadays,Arabismistakingadifferentcourse:ratherthananappealtoconstructonesinglestate,areferenceisincreasinglymadetoanArabAllianceoranArabunionofstatesavisionthatwasinstitutionalizedwiththeestablishmentoftheArabLeaguein1945.QuestionsremainrelatingtofurtherintegrationofArabstates,inacontextof
increasedregionalization
all
over
the
world.
In
fact,
the
stateislosingpartofitssovereigntyinfavorofsupranationalandinternationalentitiesandorganizations.Historicalandcontemporaryexperiencesshowthatsuchcollaboration between states can be the source of mutualdevelopment.Inthoseterms,theunityofArabstatescanbeenvisionedandencouraged,24alwaysconsideringtheterritorialandculturalparticularitiesandrequirementsofindividualArabpopulations.
2. ReturntoIslaminContemporaryArabStates
AlthoughArabnationalismcontinuestoexertanemotionalappealintheregion,itspowerhasbeensappedby
someoftheveryfactorswhichaideditsearliergains.Today,IslamismseemstoenjoytheappealthatoncemarkedArabnationalism.Infact,oneofthemostsalientfeaturesof
19 SeeHarik,supranote16,at20.20 AcommonbelongingtotheArabnationcontinuestofeedpublic
debatesandofficialdiscourses.SeeSaidBensaid,AlWatanandAlUmma in ContemporaryArab Use, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEARABSTATE166167(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).
21 SeeEncyclopedia,supranote18,at385.22 Seeid.at488.23 SeeSalam,supranote3,at2.24 SeeKorany,supranote10,at55.
contemporaryMiddleEasternpoliticsistheresurgenceofpoliticalIslam.25Manycallthisphenomenon Islamicnationalismwhileothersconsider it tobe theantithesis orantinationalism.26SomebelievethatIslamistthinkersacceptthebasicprinciplesofaconstitutionalsystemonthegroundsthatsuchprinciplesnotonlyagreewith,butarealsoderivedfromIslam;forSaidBensaid,theIslamistattitude towards theEuropeanpoliticalmodel ismoreopenandpositivethanthatofthepanArabists.27
Nevertheless,Islamistsdonotrecognizestateborders.As Hasan alBanna, the spiritual father of the MuslimBrothers puts it: Islam does not recognize geographicalfrontiersanddoesnottakeintoaccountracialdifferences.Onthecontrary,itconsidersalltheMuslimsasoneummaandregardsallMuslimcountriesasonewatan,regardless
ofthedistanceandboundarieswhichseparatethem.28Atthesametime,alBannashowsaninterestintheprinciplesthat direct a constitutional government since they correspondwithIslam.29Accordingto AliOumlil:AlBannaadopts the notionsof watan, umma, and constitution,buttriestotranslatethemislamically.ThisiswhythereisnoinconsistencyinalBannasviewwhichconsidersthatoneindividualcanatthesametimebeacitizenofawatanlikeEgypt,forinstance,andamemberofIslamicumma.30
Infact,theproponentsofanIslamicummaovershadowingalltheseterritorially,linguisticallyorethnicallydefinedasabiyyas (group feelings), touse IbnKhaldnsconcept,
tendto
view
these
loyalties
as
pre
Mohammed
(Jahiliyya)
andthusantiIslamicconcepts,whichshouldhavedisappeared when the Islamic Dawa (Call) emerged.31 Moreover,IslamdistinguishesbetweenthelandofMuslimsandthat of nonMuslims, the firstbeing termed DaresSalam(abode of peace), whereas nonMuslim political entitiesrepresentedDaralHarb(abodeofwar).32AccordingtotheIbnManzursLexicon(LisanalArab),the landofIslam istheMuslimcommunitywhichnecessarilyconstitutesoneumma, which includes every country in which Islam isfreelyacceptedasareligionandwhereIslamiclawsreignoverMuslimaswellasovernonMuslimcitizenswhoen
joyprotectionbypayingJizya.33
25 See Eichelman, Changing Perceptions of StateAuthority:Morocco,Egypt and Oman, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 200(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).
26 Otherauthorshavedissimilaropinions,andconsiderArabnationalismasanideology,moresothanIslam,whichdenieslegitimacytothestatesystem.SeeHarik,supranote16,at20.
27 SeeBensaid,supranote20,at169170.28 Id.at171.29 Seeid.at170.30 Id.at171.31 SeeSalam,supranote3,at5.32 SeeKorany,supranote10,at57.33 Bensaid,supranote20,at151152.
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a) ReligionandStateinEarlyIslam
TherearedifferentnarrativesregardingthefirstMuslimcommunityandthewaypowerwastransferredtotheKhalifat RasulAllah (normally translated as Vicar of theProphet of God). The appellation was not neutral.34 AlthoughtheProphetleftbehindhimacompletereligionandstate,35therealproblemremainedafterHispassing:thatofmaintainingtherelationbetweenreligionandstatewhich,during his lifetime, he had done through his authority
basedontheWordofGodandonhisconcretecommandoftheMuslimcommunity.36
Thingsweredifferentforhissuccessorwhowascompelled to impose his authority upon the clans who werecontemplatingdissociationfromthestate,astheyconsidered the liaison with theProphetas personaland consequently,dissolvableafterhisdeath.Forthisreason,oneofthemainchallengesof theCaliphwas tocrackdownonapostasy,whichwasnotnecessarilyrelatedtotherejectionoftheIslamicmessagebutrathertothepayingofsadakaorzakat,37which,althoughofareligiousnature,wasthemostvisibleaspectoftheirsubjugation.TheProphetssuccessor,AbuBakr(632634),believedthatthingsshouldremainastheywereleftbytheProphet,andaccordingly,stateandreligionwereoneandthesame.38
Therapid election(mubayaa,actsofalliance)ofAbuBakrcanbeexplainedbyvariousfactors,suchastheroleplayedby thenew religion which unifieddifferentclans
thatwerepreviouslyatconstantwar.Inotherwords,itnotonlydependedonthewayAbuBakrwasableto imposehimself on the various clansbut also on the support ofUmarIbnalKhattab. UmarIbnalKhattabscompellingpersonalitymadehimoneofthemostinfluentialconsultantstotheProphet,whopromotedhimtoatoprankmu
34 AsHichamDjat,aTunisianhistorian,putsit:LappellationdesuccesseurdelEnvoydeDieuestelleseuletoutunprogrammedecontinuitdupouvoirprophtique,nonpasdanssapartsuprahumaineliela Rvlation mais dans sapart transmissible, liaupouvoir temporel
pour lessentiel. Le Calife est le chefde la communaut islamique, il ahritduprophtelecommandement.HishamDjat,LaGrandeDiscorde. Religion et Politiques dans lIslam des Origines, 5253 (Gallimard,1989).
35 For some authors, such as Abdou FilaiAnsary (who took thereflectionsofAliAbdelRaziq),consideringthattheProphethadcreatedinthemedinathefirstnucleusoftheIslamicstateisbasedonaconfusionbetweentwoformsoforganisationthatneedtobedistinguished since their respective natures are totally different:thestateandthereligiouscommunity.Forboth,infact,itisnormallyusedtoreferatwiththetermummathatistranslatedsometimes community and others nation. See Abdou FilaliAnsari,Islam,Lacit,Dmocratie,inPOUVOIRS104,8(2003).
36 SeeDjat,supranote34,at47.37 Zakat:Islamicreligioustax,oneofthefivebasicpillarsofIslam.38 SeeDjat,supranote34,at5354.
hajirun.Theansarandmuhajirungaveallegiance(baya)toAbuBakrandtheCaliphatewasfounded.39
Still,
the
conditions
under
which
Abu
Bakr
was
elected
werealsotheoriginsofanumberofdivisions,whichthefirstcommunitysurpassed,notwithoutdifficulties.40Althoughthecircumstanceswere inAbuBakrs favor,theywerenotsoforhissuccessors.Infact,theotherthreeRightgoingCaliphs(alkhulafaalrashedun)(UmarIbnalKhattab,634644;UthmanIbnAffan,644656;andAliIbnAbiTaleb,656661)wereallkilled,resultinginacivilwarwhichlastedformanyyears.41
WiththedeathofAliIbnAbiTaleb,hisson,alHassan,acceptedthepassingofpowertoMuaweyyaIbnAbiSufian thusendinga longcivilwarwhichhadstartedwhenUthmanwaskilledandreplacedbyAli,signaling,thefirstdivision in the Islamic umma. Those who considered thefirstfourCaliphsaslegitimate,arecalledtheSunnis;theywere(andare)themajorityofMuslims,whoacceptedthe
faitaccompliandthedefeatofAlibyMuaweyya.Sunnism,infact,opposesshiismandkharajisminregardtothepoliticotheological question of Caliphate.42 The Shiites arethosewhotookthesideofAliwhilethekhawarijarethosewholefttheranksofthefollowersofAli(kharaja)afterheacceptedarbitrationwithMuaweyya,during thebattleofSiffn.43
b) WhyEarlyIslamSeemsAttractive
The
Muslim
community
had
already
organized
itself
intoastatelikesystembeforethedeathoftheProphet,andthequestionoftheheadofIslamicummawasnotrelevant
beforehispassingsinceheensuredthatrole.However,after his death, the Islamic umma, similar to other social
39 Seeid.at51.Muhajirunmeanstheemigrantswhileansarmeanstheauxiliaries.
40 Suchasneglectingtoinvitesomeofthemembersofthebayt,family,totheassemblyofsaqifa.Seeid.at52.
41 The Umayyads governed for 90 years (661750) and the Caliphsofficebecamehereditary.Theywerethendefeatedbytheircousins,theAbbassids (thedescendentsof theProphetsuncleAbbas),whokilledmostofthebayt(family)oftheUmayyads,butAbdelrahmanIescapedtoSpainandwasthefirstUmayyadCaliphofCordoba. There were seventythree Abbasid Caliphs, based inBaghdad,andthedynastyremainedinpowerforalmostfivehundredsyears(7501258)!Nevertheless,itwasundertheirauthoritythat the Islamic Statebegan to lose itsunity, especially after the
beginningofmilitarychaosinwhatthehistorianscallthesecondAbbasid era (8471258). It should be noted that some of theAbbasid firstera Caliphs, and most of the second era, werereplacedbyforceorkilled.WiththeendoftheAbbasiddynasty,theMamelukesseizedpower (12501217).Thedifferencebetweenthem and their predecessors was that they were not Arabs,butrather good soldiers, originally slaves, taken from central Asia.AftertheirreplacementbytheOttomans(12811921),theycontinuedtogovernEgyptuntiltheyweredefeatedbyMuhammadAliin1811.
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groups,requiredaleader,achieftohandletheaffairesdtat,andtheyalsoneededanimamtoguidetheMuslimsintheirprayersandtodefendIslam.Thoseroleswereentrustedtothesamepersoninthebeginning:theCaliph.Thisnecessitatedparticularqualitiesinachiefwhichphilosopherstriedtoenumerate.
Shouldthechiefviolateorinfringehisduties,aproblemoflegitimacywouldarisewhich,inIslamicandArabhistory,sometimesmeanthislossofpower(andhislife).Nevertheless,hecouldcontinueastheleaderbyimposinghisauthority by force. This explains the readily apparentphenomenon in the history of ArabIslamic empires thatmany Caliphs were assassinated and replacedby force.Transferenceofpowerwasaccompaniedbybloodshed,especiallywhenitwastransferredfromonetribeorfamilyto
another.Ofcourse,thismeantthatthenewholderofpowercouldalsobeusurped in the future, for thesamereason.Thismaysuggestthattherealmotivebehindsucheventswas notbeing necessarily the zeal for Islam or faithbutratherforpower.Inotherwords,itwasmostlyastrugglefor powerbetween individuals, families or clans ratherthanaquestionoffaith,moralityorculture.
Butnowadays,isitreallynecessarytorefertoearlyIslaminordertounderstandcontemporaryterritorialArabstates?IsitreallycrucialtomakereferencetotheArabparticularityinacontextofgeneralacceptanceofmodernstatestructure?Itmaybeconsideredawasteoftimeandenergy
toreturn
to
such
aperiod,
but
in
fact
it
is
not,
especially
due
toacertainresurgentnostalgiaforthisperiodofIslambysomegroups.Suchgroupsmaydedicateconcertedpoliticalefforts to restoringan Islamicstatebydemocraticmeans(throughpopularlegitimacyandelections),orclandestinely,byopposingthosegovernmentswhichdonotfollowthetrueteachingsofIslam.
ThisnostalgiamotivatedthefathersofIslamistgroupstostudyandwriteaboutearlyIslam.TheypresentedtheprinciplesthatcanbeconsideredasthebasisofthepoliticaltheoryofearlyIslam.ThiswasthecasewithSayyidAbulAlaMaudoodi.Forhim,theassumptionofpoliticalpower
in
Islam
was
founded
on
certain
clear
cut
principles
such
as: sovereigntybelongs to God; all Muslims have equalrights;shariaisthesupremelaw;thegovernment,itsauthorityandpossessionsareaheldintrustforGod;theheadof state shouldbe appointedby mutual consultation of
42 FortheShiites,theimamat(similartoaCaliph)representsdivinelaw, and his power is simultaneously temporal and spiritual.Accordingly, as confirmed by Ahmad Beydoun, Le ChiismepartagelemalaisequprouventlesdoctrinesreligieusesduPouvoir face au principe dmocratique de souverainet populaire.SlimLaghmani,LescolesjuridiquesduSunnisme,POUVOIRS104,43(2003).
43 Seeid.at2122.
Muslims;andtheCaliphortheEmiristobeobeyedunreservedlyinwhateverisrightandjust(maruf).
Such
a
system
seems
attractive
to
Maudoodi,
especially
in thecaseof the first fourCaliphs,whodidnot imposethemselvesbyforce,butratherwereelectedbythepeople,oftheirownfreewill.44Itisclearthatbehindsuchpresentationthereisahiddenmessage:thecurrentgovernmentsintheMuslimandArabworldarenotfollowingtheexampleoftheearlyCaliphs.Suchauthorsseemtohaveonefootinthepresentandtheotherinthepast.Notonlyisitacontradictionbutdiametricallyopposed.
Manyproblemsarisefromahistoricaldiscoursewhenappliedtocontemporarytimes.First,mostArabandMuslimcountrieshaveadoptedaconstitutionanddeclaredthepeople as sovereign; what Maudoodi invented (alhakemmeyyawhichreferstoGod,whileseyyada,translatedalsoassovereignty,referstothepowerofthepeople)doesnotresolvetherealproblem.
Second,theequalityofallMuslimsdoesnotrecognizeterritoriallimitsorborders.Infact,IslamistgroupsenvisagetheestablishmentofanIslamicstateforallMuslims.ThemembershiptoIslamicummaisbasedonjusreligionisandnotonjussanguinisorjussolis.45Inwhichcase,whataboutthenonMuslimcommunitiespresentinthoseterritories?
Third,anylawthatcontradictsthesharia,includingtheconstitution,isillegitimate,andMuslimsshallnotobeyit.Thisgivesrisetotheproblemoffindingthepoliticalgamerulesnecessaryineverysocialorganization.Whatisthesupremelawoftheland?Shallshariahaveasuperconstitutionalvalue?Ifso,howcantheconstitutionbethesupremelaw?
Fourth,authorityisentrustedbyGod;iftheoneinpower misuses itby contradicting sharia, he loses his raisondtreandmayberemovedfromhisposition,resultingintheinstabilityofthestate.
Fifth, theconsultationdoesnotmeannecessarily freeelectionsortheparticipationofallcitizensinthedecisionmaking process directly or indirectly since consultationmaybelimitedtothewisepeoplethatknowandareabletodistinguishthetruth,asrevealedbytheKoranandtheHadith.
Sixth,thegovernormaypretendobedienceonlyinthecase of right andjust commands (alamr bel maruf); the
44 SeeM.M.Sharif(ed.),AHistoryofModernPhilosophy,659(PakistanPhilosophical Congress, 19631966), published also online at:http://www.muslimphilosophy.com (accessed on 7 February2006).
45 SeeVatikiotis,supranote6,at31.
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problemhereisthatjusticeorrightnessremainsageneralconceptwhichdoesnothaveaprecisecontent.
There
seems
to
be
a
hidden
message
behind
all
the
writ
ingsofMaudoodithatthecurrentgovernmentsareservingevilandMuslimsshouldnotobeythem.TherealIslamicStateisthepureoneofthefirstfourCaliphsorbetteryet,itistheonewhichI(Maudoodi)decideupon.Therealproblemwith thesegroupsandall religious fundamentalistgroups ingeneral isthat theyclaimtohaveexclusivityoverthetruth.Infact,therealproblemistoknowwhowill
beinchargeofdecidingwhatisrightorjust.Somemaysaythatitisthesharia,butthenanotherquestionarises:Whatissharia?Isthereonesharia?Infact,theKoran,considered
byMuslimsasGodsWorddictatedtohisprophet,cannotbecalledintoquestion.Nevertheless,therearemanysitua
tions thatneedananswer thatmaynotbedirectlymentionedintheKoranorintheHadith.Whatshouldbedone,then?
Thereisnodoubtthattherearedifferentinterpretationsfor thesame text.Thisexplains theexistenceofdifferentschoolsoftheLawofIslam,besidesthedifferentsecessionswithintheIslamiccommunity(SunniandShiitesforexample)andthemultipleIslamicsectsthatdevelopedthroughouthistory,whichfurthercomplicatesthistask.Accordingly,itwouldbepreferabletospeakaboutmultipleIslamicconcepts,andmultiplesharias,ratherthanone,unique,collectionofpreciseandclearprinciples.Somemaythensug
gestleaving
the
task
of
interpreting
the
sharia
to
agroup
of
specialized persons: the Muslimtheologians.Now, thesamefactthatthistaskisgiventocompetentandinformedpersonalitiesmeansthatshariadoesnothaveastableandprecisecontentbutrather,isadaptedtonewandunattended circumstances, related to a specific context (time andspace),andassuchneedsinterpretationandexplanation;
but,thesepeoplearehumanbeings,andassuch,notinfallible.TheirviewsmayreflecttheirownwillandnotnecessarilythatofGod.Whatisthesolution?Notforgettingthat,inthemeantime,thestateneedstobegovernedanddecisionsneedtobetaken.
3.Arab
States
and
Popular
Sovereignty
According to some authors, the European distinctionbetweensecularanddivineruleledtoamoremodern,realistic approach towards politics while a similar rupturewithmedievalphilosophydidnotoccurintheArabtradition.46Thisabsenceled,inCharlesButterworthsview,toaquietistacceptanceofnondemocraticgovernmentsbythecitizensofArabcountries.47
46 See Charles Butterworth, State and Authority in Arabic PoliticalThought,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE9192(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).
a) ArabCultureandpopularSovereignty:AnyCompatibility?
Westerncountrieshavehadtworevolutions:theAmericanandtheFrench;thosewereprecededbyanumberoftheoriesthatjustifiedthepowerofthestatebypopularwillratherthanthatofGodortheking.48Thiswaspossibleinacontextof(firstpartialthencomplete)separationbetweenChurchandState.Nevertheless,theconsequencesoftheserevolutionsarenotlimitedtowesterncountries:theestablishmentofmodernstatesandthedispersionofnationalism and theories of popular sovereigntyglobally are theproof.
Nevertheless, theconceptofpopularsovereigntywaspossibleinEuropeonlyinthecontextofaseparationfromthe Church and the subsequent approaches to the new
bearerofsovereignty,andnotassomemaythinktotheFrenchorAmericanRevolutions.Infact,thosetworevolutionsgavebirthtothenewmodernstates,basedontheseparationandbalancebetweenthethreebranchesofgovernment (legislative, executive andjudicial). However, theconceptof popularsovereignty ismuch older; these tworevolutionschangedonlythewaythatsovereigntymaybeexercisedandbalanced.
BytheendoftheFirstWorldWar,therewasaturningpoint in the Arab worlds modern history, when SheikhHusseinofMeccadeclaredarevoltagainsttheOttomans,
justifyinghisallegiancetoChristianEuropeansagainsttheMuslimOttomanCaliph, through theneed toestablisha
modernstateforArabs.Thisrevolutiondidnothavetheconsequencesof theAmericanandFrench revolutions intermsoffulfillment,buttheideasbehinditareinteresting:whatprevailedforSheikhHusseinwastherealizationofapoliticalunityofArabs(ormostofthem)inonestateratherthanofallegiancetootherMuslims.Todothat,hepledged
47 See id.at9192.Thisposition issomewhatexaggeratedalthoughnottotallyvoidoflogic,aswewillshowinthefollowingsections.
48 Accordingly, power has no more its origin in God than in Hisearthlyrepresentative(thePope).Consequently,itwasnecessaryto find out who were the newly entitled to sovereignty. BODIN(15301596)answeredthatthebearerofthisindivisibleandunlimitedsovereigntywasthemonarch.HOBBES(15881679)saidthatitwasthehighestrepresentativeofthestatewhohadundividedandunlimitedsovereignty,sincethepeopleformedasocialcontract,andeverypersoncedeshis/herfreedomsandpowerstoonepersonandcommunity.WhileJohnLOCKE(16321704)proposedthat itwas therepresentative(s)of the statewho hadundividedpower,but it was not unlimited since it wasboundby naturallaw. Rousseau (17121778)related the sovereignty to thepeople,whichexpressedvolontgnrale;assuch,arationalandjuststatewas governedby direct democracy. Inbrief, the shift in sovereigntycanbeexpressedinthefollowingway:whileBODINstillrelied on the notion of the rule over the people, HOBBES andLOCKEintroducetheruleforthepeopleandRousseauarguedinfavoroftheruleforthepeoplebythepeople.SeeNicoleTpperwien, NationState and Normative Diversity 28 (Helbing & Lichtenhahncoed.,2001).
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loyalty tononMuslimsagainst theMuslimOttomans, inthe name of an Arab nation. This was the revolutionaryconsequenceof thatunsuccessfuland incompleterevolution.
Asaresult,newtheoriesonstatelegitimacyintheArabworld started to appear. Arabs in fact, needed tojustifytheirrevolutionandtheirrighttostatehoodbyreferringtotheconceptofArabnationand/ortotheconceptofpopularsovereignty,basedonthepeoplesrighttoselfdetermination.These twoconceptshelpedArabs ingeneral,andsingle Arab states in particular, tojustify their authoritywithin,andtotheoutsideworld.Thefirstconceptprovidedinternallegitimacyandtheother,internationallegitimacy. Inotherwords,Arabsjustified their rebellionagainstotherMuslimsthrough theconceptofanArabnation,as
opposed to othernations (although they were also Muslims),whileArabterritorialstatesjustifiedtheirterritorialautonomyandindependencethroughtheconceptofpopularsovereignty.
ContemporaryArabsocietiesaremuchmorecomplexthanancientones; for thisreason, theyhaveadapted themethodsandtechniquesofpositive law inordertofunction.Thiswaspossibleaftertheendoftraditionaldoctrineswhichwereattachedtoreligion,andtheirreplacementbyelaborateconceptsbasedonmodernscienceandmodernthinking. Religious law was then confined to a limitedsphere,suchaspersonalstatus.Thiswasthecaseinmost
Arabcountries.
The
problem
is
that
there
is
sometimes
con
fusionbetweenreligiouscommandmentandreligiouslaw,two concepts that need tobe distinguished in order toavoidanamalgamandmisunderstanding.49
Some may advocate then, that ideas such as popularsovereigntyintheArabworldwereassertedmostlyagainstcolonialism;onthewhole,itisperceivedmostlyasagroupselfdeterminationratherthanindividualselfrule.50Thisistrue,butthedebateregardingthecontentofpopularsovereigntyanditsrelationshiptoindividualshasneverended,eveninWesterncountries.Thedifferentconceptsofnation,asdemonstrated in the foregoingsections,determine the
concept
of
constituent
power
which
is
the
expression
of
that
selfdeterminationofacommunityinternally.
b) AReturntoCulturalOrigins
Arabphilosopherstriedtojustifyroyalpower.Theydidthatwithoutnecessarilyreferringtoreligion,thoughitremainedimportantasanelementinhelpingdiversepopulations(orclans)staycohesiveunderonepoliticalsystem.Islam was a necessary unifying element for the variouscommunitiesintheIslamicEmpire.Twodifferentauthors
49 SeeFilaliAnsari,supranote35,at78.50 SeeButterworth,supranote46,at9192.
arepresentedhereascasestudies:AbuNasralFarabiandIbnKhaldn.
Those
authors
do
not
cover
all
possible
theories
and
po
sitions inancientArabandMuslimhistory;nevertheless,theyrepresentthreedifferenthistoricalmoments,withdifferentattemptstoanswerdoctrinalproblems.AbuNasralFrbiwasbornabout870anddiedin950A.D.Hewastheeminent founder of a philosophical system and devotedhimselfentirelytocontemplationandspeculationandkepthimselfaloof frompoliticalandsocialdisorder.He leftaconsiderablebodyofliteratureincludingKitbAra Ahlal
MadinatalFddilah(BookontheViewsofthePeopleoftheExcellent State); Kitb alSiysat alMadaniyyah (Book onCivicAdministration);KitbTahsilalSaddah(BookontheAchievement of Happiness); Kitb alTanbih ala Sabil al
Saddah(BookonCautiononthePathofHappiness);andtheBodleianmanuscriptofhisFuslalMadini(Chaptersonthe Civilian). The second author is Ibn Khaldn whosedeathin1406signaledtheendofArabicpoliticalphilosophy,andwasfollowedbyfivehundredsyearsofpoliticalthought, whose sole exponents werejurists and theologians.51
Wewilldiscusstheirmainideasregardingthestate,thequalitiesoftheheadofstateandtherelationshipbetweentheonewhogovernsandthosewhoaregoverned.52
i) AlFarabi
In
his
famous
book
Opinions
of
People
of
the
Perfect
State,alFarabidedicatedchaptertwentysixtothehumanneedsofsocietyandcooperation,andthetwosuccessivechapterstotheneedforaleader/sandhis/theirqualities.53
Humansocietiesforhimareeitherperfectorimperfect;theperfectsocietymaybelarge,medium,orsmall.Alargehumansociety(mamoura) isoneconsistingofseveralumam(pluralofumma)unitedandmutuallysupportive.Amediumoneisthesocietyofonenation(umma)insomepartoftheworld,andthesmalloneisthesocietyofthepeopleofacity(madina).Itisinterestingtonotethatonlymadinais
51 SeeSharif,supranote44,at96,405,704.52 To avoid misunderstandings, one shall keep in mind that in no
way, does this paper insinuate that problems regarding democracyortherespectofhumanrightsislinkedtotheculturalparticularityof Arabs; nordoes itsuggest that the solution to suchasituation is the return to preIslamic concepts such as asabeyya(social cohesion), to which Ibn Khaldn dedicated some of hisanalyses. The situation in the Arab world is predominantly theresultofitsrecenthistory,beginningwiththefourcenturiesunderthe Ottoman Empire,but also to European colonialism in thetwentiethcentury.
53 SeeAlFarabi,OpinionsofpeopleofthePerfectstate{Arabic: Ara ahlalMidniaalFadilah},112126(Bumelhamed.,AlHelal,1995).Published also online at: http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/farabi/works/fadilah.pdf(accessedon7February2006).
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definedterritorially,sincetheummareferstoacommunityofpeople,54whilemamourareferstotheworldasawhole.
The
madina
is
compared
to
a
human
body,
in
which
dif
ferentorganshavedifferentroles.Thereisadissimilaritythat is outlined: in a humanbeing, the collaborationbetweenorgans isnatural, inamadina,thiscannotbeotherthanvoluntary.55Althoughconsideredasthesmallest(perfect)society,themadinaconstitutesthemostbasicone.Infact,theidealcitystateisthecityinwhichthemembersofthesocietycooperatetoattainhappiness.Thesameappliestoumma,butthecollaborationisnotbetweenimperfectsocieties56,norisitbetweenindividualsbutrather, itisbetweenthemudunthemselves.Theidealmamourathenistheoneinwhichdifferentumma(eachdistinguishedbyitsnaturalcharacter,temperament,habits,andlanguage)cooper
ate to attain happiness. Accordingly, the madina is not aclosed society; itcooperates with other mudun (the sameprincipleofvoluntarywillcanbeappliedbyanalogyhere).Thesameisvalidforumma.
Now, for a similar existence of the almadina alfadelathereisaneedforaleaderwhocannot,bydefinition,besoifhe issubjugatedtosomeoneelse.The leadercannotbe
justanyone,norisanyoneexcludedapriori.Theonlyconditionistohavethequalitiesofaleader(theidealleader,the imam, according to alFarabi, has twelve characteristics57).Itishowever,impossibletohaveallthesequalitiesinoneperson(aman);thereforeitisnecessarytoconsider
thesecond
option:
aleader
who
has
at
least
six
of
the
ideal
qualities.58 AlFarabi calls this ruler the traditional king.Accordingly,itisnotnecessarythatthisroleisensuredbyonephysicalperson;thesequalities,infact,maybedistributedindifferentpersonswhoconstitutethen,perfectlead
54 Seeid.at113.55 Seeid.at113.56 Theimperfectsocietyisthatofthepeopleofavillage,alocality,a
lane,orahouse,thelastbeingthesmallest.57 Soundhealth;Intelligenceandsagacity;Goodmemory;Prudence
and talent; Eloquence; Devotion to education and learning; Nogreedforfood,drink,andsex;Friendlinesstowardstruth;Bignessof heart; Indifference to dirham and dinar and other forms ofwealth;Devotionbynaturetojustice;Strongresolution.SeeSharif,supranote44,at712.
58 (1) He shouldbe wise and philosophical; and (2) learned andabreastwith the laws,customs,rites,andritualsadoptedbyhispredecessor to discharge the function of the ideal State with allperfection. (3) He shouldbe an expert in deriving principles incasehedoesnotfindairy law,and (4) farsighted,possessinganinsighttoframerulesandregulationsinaccordancewiththeconditions and circumstances he finds himself in, and capable ofkeepingupthereformsheintroduces.(5)Heshouldalsobewellexperiencedandeloquentingivingdirectionstourgethepeopleto follow him in accordance with the Sariah. (6) In addition heshouldbeskilful inphysicaldisplayofexercisesneeded inwarfare,andintheuseofarms,ammunition,andotherequipments.Seeid.at713.
ers.59Ifthesecharacteristicsarepresentinmorethanoneperson, together they form ideal heads of state. If thesecharacteristicsarenotpresentinanyone,thentherewould
benosovereignandthestatewouldbeexposedtodestruction.60
ForalFarabi,thesovereignsofanidealstate,whosucceedoneanotherandthegroupofpeoplewhoadministerthatstate,areconsideredasoneandsovereign.Thepeopleofanidealstatehavesomethingincommon,althoughtheymayenjoyhappinessindifferentways.Theidealstate,asexplainedabove,isthestateadministeredbythebestandmosttalented,whoaimatprosperityandhappiness.Ifitsconstitution fails to provide the people with prosperity,andtherulersdonotpossessthequalitiesofidealrulers,thenthestateceases tobe idealand iscalled thestateof
evildoing(almadinatalfsiqah),theignorantstate(almadinataljhilah)orthestatewhichhasgoneastray(almadinataldllah).61
ThissectionwillconcludewiththreecommentsonalFarabisconcept.First,thereisonlyadescriptionaposteriori,ofthequalitiesofaperfectleader,notthewayinwhichheischosenordesignated.Accordingly,theconsequenceofnothavingaperfectleaderfortheperfectmadinawillbethedestructionofthemadinaitself.Perhapsitisakindof
justificationforregimechangesandthedestructionofmonarchies/rulers,andnot theway theyare tobepreserved.Second,thequalitiespresentedareallhumanqualitiesand
notrelated
to
religion,
gender
or
aparticular
dynasty.
Nev
ertheless,itisnoteasytohaveaperfectleader(thesequalitiesarerarelyfoundinoneperson,unlessheisaprophetorphilosopher).62Inthiscase,akingisenoughtoguidetheaffairsoftheperfectmadina.Hisqualitiesareofadifferentorder:hejustneedsthewisdomtofollowinthestepsofhispredecessor.Third,governanceisnotrelatedtotheumma
buttoamadinathatisterritoriallydefined.63Accordingly,whereveraperfectleaderexists,hewillbetheheadofthemadina,andtheummaandalsothemamoura.Nevertheless,thisisoftendifficulttorealize,sotheotherqualitiesmaybeheldbydifferentpersonswhoshallreigncollectivelyastheperfectleadership.
59 SeeAlFarabi,supranote93,at126.60 Seeid.61 SeeSharif,supranote44,at964.62 SeeAlFarabi,supranote93,at14.63 According tosomeauthors, thepostmedieval ideaofa statea
territoriallydefinedentityapartfromaruleroradynastyorganized in accordance with manmade rules was alien to Muslimpolitical theory. Ottoman theories of state andgovernment werederived from the Muslim concept that God is the source of allauthorityandlawandthatgovernmentexiststoenablethecommunityoftruebelievers(Muslims)tofulfilitsobligationstoGod.Thecommunity,notthestate,constitutesthebasicMuslimpolicytranscendingallboundaries.SeeKorany,supranote45,at75.
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ii) IbnKhaldn
It was through the examination of culture that IbnKhaldn investigated the phenomenon of governmentwhichisconsideredtobetheconstituentpartandform(e.g.theorganizingprinciple)ofculture.64ThisparticularandindependentscienceofIbnKhaldn,thatis,thescienceofculture,isnotanartconcernedwithhowmanoughttolive,orhowsocietyshouldberightlygoverned,orhowthemultitudeshouldbeconvinced,butratherascientificinquiryintohowhumanbeingshaveactuallylivedinthepast.Hisstudyincludesanexaminationofthenaturalcausesdeterminingthemodesofhumanassociationwhichnecessitatethoseactivitiesandwaysoflife,pursuedindiversehumansocieties;whichcanbejudgedbyhistory.65
IbnKhaldnpresentedvariouspoliticaltheoriesofhispredecessors,buthedidnotdothatmerelyasahistorian;heseverelycriticizedthem,basinghiscriticismsontheoreticalandpracticalconsiderations.Infact,hedemonstratesthenecessityforsocialorganizationandaruler,butinordertodothat,somephilosophersrefertodivinelaw.ForIbnKhaldn,thisisclearlyfalse,sincearulercanrulebyvirtueofroyalauthorityalone,andevenapoorlyeducatedperson knows that there havebeen innumerable rulerswithoutdivineauthority.66
OftheMuslimphilosophers,itwasIbnRushdwho(likeIbnKhaldn)wasarecognizedreligiousjudge(qdi),andaphilosopherwhocriticizedalFarabiandIbnSinaforimitat
ing thedialectical theologians. IbnRushdwhowrote themost celebrated treaties on religion and philosophy, themainthemeofwhichwasthedefenseofthelegitimacyofreligionandphilosophyintheirproperspheresadevastatingattackuponthecombinationofreligionandphilosophyintheformoftheology.67
AccordingtoIbnKhaldn,humanscannotlivewithoutsocial organization and solidarity, since these are indispensableinprocuringbasicnourishmentandobjectsofprimalnecessity.Thisabsolutehumanneedforsocialorganization is fundamental to civilization (umran).68 For him,asabiyya (social solidarity or group feeling) is a specific
propertyof
the
human
soul,
acombination
of
the
natural
feelingforonesrelativesandfriends,andtheneedfordefenseandmeansofsurvival.Itcementsagrouptogether,dictates theneed foraruler, leads toconflictswithothergroups,andgeneratesthepowerofconquestleadingtovic
64 SeeSharif,supranote44,at962.65 Seeid.at966.66 Seeid.at968.67 Seeidat937.68 SeeIbnKhaldn,TheMuqaddimah,AnIntroductiontoHistory,4548
(FranzRosenthaltrans.,N.J.Dawooded.,BollingenSeries/Princeton,9thprinting1989).
toryoverothers.Itsinitialpowerdeterminestheextentofthisconquest;thefulfillmentofappetitesanddesires;andfinally,weakensitandleadstothedisintegrationofpoliticalpower.69
Political life, as practicedby all human communities,has to take into account the nature of all humans, andshouldbedirectedtothecommongoodofthemultitude.Thisrequiresarulerandalawbasedontherationalunderstandingoftheircommonneedsandinterestsinthisworld,oradivinelawbasedontheircommongoodinthisworldand the next. Accordingly, for every social organization,politicalgovernmentisnecessary;humanbeingsrequireapersonwhowillmakethemdowhatisgoodforthem,andwhowillforbidthembyforce(ifnecessary)todowhatmayharmthem.However,obeisancetoasuperiordependson
hisbeinggoodandfair;heisso,whenhedoesnotoppressthepopulationwithunjustlaws,andtreatseveryoneequally.
Inthecaseofaholderofauthoritydespisinghisownpeople,hewillberejectedbythem,and,afterascertainingthequalitiesofasuccessorinthenameoftheclan,hewill
beremoved,andhisauthoritygiventoanother.Infact,theallegianceoath,albaya,consistsofpayinghomagetoobeisance.Thepersonwhotakestheoath,bindshimselfincontracttohisemir,andindoingso,confersuponhimthegoverningofhisaffairsandthoseofallMuslims;heisboundtorecognizehisemirsauthorityandtoexecutehis instruc
tions,whether
he
is
in
accordance
with
him,
or
not.
Similar
toabuyerbeingboundbyacontractwithaseller,thosewhotaketheoathofallegianceto,andenterintoacontractwith,anemir,puttheirlivesinhishands.70
ThefirstformofgovernmentwastheCaliphate.TheoriginofthewordmeanstoreplacebecausetheCaliphistheonewhorepresentstheProphet,inIslam.TheCaliphislikethevicarofthelawgiver(Mohammed).71IbnKhaldndistinguishesbetween theobjectivesof natural royalpowerandthoseoftheCaliphate:theexerciseofthefirstconsistsinmakingitpossibleforthemassestooperateinharmonywiththeirprojectsanddestinies,thatis,allowingthemto
safeguard
their
material
interests
and
avoid
what
may
harmthem,inaccordancewithreason.Asforthesecond,itistheguidanceofpeopleaccordingtodivinelaw,inordertoensuretheirhappinessinthisworldandthenext.72
WhentheProphetdied,hiscompanionstooktheiroathofallegiancetoAbuBakrandchargedhimwithdirectingtheiraffairs;peoplewereneverleftopentoanarchy.GovernmentalfunctionsdependedontheCaliphate,whichis
69 Seeid.at160f.70 Seeid.at166167.71 Seeid.at170.72 Seeid.at154f.
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way.78Thedistinctivepointhereistheexistenceorabsenceofaconsensusbythepeoplewhowillbegovernedbytheconstitution.Peopleexercisethissovereigntythroughrepresentatives,aspecialassemblyorreferenda.79Inthecaseofahypotheticaldemocracy, the framingpower iseffectivelyinthehandsoftheautocracy,whichcanbeoneperson,oragroupofpeople.
Thewilloftheconstituentpoweraimsattransformingitselfintoanobjectiveandenduringincarnation:aconstitution;butitcannotsimultaneouslysubmititselftoitsowncreationwithoutlosingitscharacterasthesupreme,secularpower.Theexperienceofthelasttwohundredsyearshasprovedthattheleadingforcesoftherevolutionendeavoredtoconsolidatetheachievementsoftherevolution,particularlythenewdistributionofpoliticalpower,inaconstitu
tiona legaldocumentwhichbears theunequivocalauthority of a written text superior to all other laws of theland.Howeverimportantthecharacteroftheconstitutionasawrittentextmaybe,itslastingauthoritydependsonthepersistenceoftheauthorityofitscreator.Bymakingaconstitution,therevolutionaryforcesarediggingtheirowngraves; the constitution is the final act of the revolution.Constitutionmakingisanactofselfliquidationoftherevolution.80
FirstIwillpresentthedifferentconceptsofconstitutionand its relationship to the nation and/or the people, andthenIwillpresentchallengesofcontemporaryArabstates
inrelation
to
constitutionalism.
1. ModernConstitutions
Thereare twodiverseapproaches to theconstitution:thematerialandtheformal.Tobeginwith,theconstitution,initsmaterialsense,referstothewholesystemofgovernmentofacountry.According to thisdefinition,constitutionallawisthatpartofthelegalsystemwhichregulatesthestructureoftheprincipleorgansofthestate,theirrelationship toeachotherand to thecitizen,anddeterminestheirmainfunctions.Second,theconstitution,initsformalsense,meansadocumenthavingaspeciallegalinviolabili
78 Thefirstcanbeopenlyauthoritarian:thechartersgrantedby(a)Louis XVIII in 1814, and (b)by Nicolas II to Russia in 1905, orveiledsuchaswhenthepeopleapparentlyparticipateinratifyingaconstitution thathasbeenpreparedby anonelectedgroupofpeople appointedby the executive, that continues to exercisepoliticalpressureonthatdesignatedcommittee.Democraticwaysare those which confer the election of the constituent assemblyuponthepopulation,andmayrequesttheirratification.SeePierre
Pactet, InstitutionspolitiquesDroitConstitutionnel,70 (Masson 15e
d.,1996).79 See Shiba, Le Pouvoir Constituant, in MODERN CONSTITUTION 107
(InternationalAssociationofConstitutionalLaw,FirstWorldCongress,BelgradeAugust29thofSeptemeber2nd1983).
80 SeePreuss,supranote1,at144145.
tywhichsetsouttheframeworkandtheprincipalfunctionsof theorgansof the state, and declares theprinciplesbywhichthoseorgansmustoperate.81
Thewider (material)senseofconstitutioncoversalsothenarrower(formal)onebutnotviceversa;besides,everystate,bydefinition,hasaconstitutioninitsmaterialsense(a comprehensive system of government)but it may nothaveaconstitutioninitsformalsense(onedocumentdeclaredtobesupreme).AccordingtoAdhemarEsmein,theeighteenthcenturyconceptofconstitutionasafundamentalandsystematicwrittenlawisbasedonthreeideas:first,thesuperiorityofawrittenlawoveracustomaryonewasgenerallyagreeduponatthetime:thesameshouldapplytoconstitutionallaw;second,thepeopleoftheeighteenthcentury (French and American) revolutions considered a
newconstitution,editedbynationalsovereignty,asatruerenewalofthesocialcontract.Assuch,itwasnecessarytoregistertheclausesofthatcontractinthemostsolemnandcompleteform;third,theythoughtthataclear,systematicpresentationofsuchadocumentinaclearandsystematicwaywouldprovideanexcellentmeansofpoliticaleducation, since itwouldprovide the citizens with theknowledgeanddesirefortheirrights.82
TheAmericanandFrenchmodelofawrittenconstitutionwasadoptedbystatesworldwide;accordingly,constitutionallawsweredistinguishedfromordinaryones.Theconstitution,infact,wasconsideredtheinitialactofnation
alsovereignty,
while
the
other
acts
were
only
its
conse
quence.83Someotherswentfurtherbyconsideringtheconstitution as a limit to the sovereignty of parliamentbysubordinatingittoasuperiorlaw.84Infact,ifsovereigntyresidesinparliament,thenthereisnoneedtoestablishaconstitution,sincethereisnoneedtolimitparliamentbyalawthatdeterminesitspowers.If,onthecontrary,thesovereigntyofthestateissharedbythethreebranchesofgovernment,whichareseparateandnotnecessarilyhierarchically structured, then a constitution is necessary to limitthose powers and establish the relationship betweenthem.85
a) TheConstitutionandthenationAccordingtoSieyes,86theconstitutionisnotbased,nor
is it dependent upon, tradition, historical legacy, or religiousrevelations,butoriginatesfromasecularwillpower.
81 SeeE.C.S.Wade&GodfreyPhillips,ConstitutionalandAdministrativeLaw,15(9thed.,LongmanGroupLtd.,1977).
82 SeeAdhemarEsmein, Elments de Droit Constitutionnelfranais etcompar,603604(Sirey,1927).
83 Seeid.at607.84 SeePierreAvril,LaSparationdesPouvoirsAujourdhui, in1789ET
LINVENTION DE LA CONSTITUTION 299 (Michel Troper & LucienJaumeeds.,Bruylant,1994).
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Theconceptof theconstituentpowerofanation impliesthattheempiricalsubjectofthispoweristhepeople,notamonarchoraristocraticlites.Assuch,thenationswillisapreconstitutionalsourceoftheconstitution,whichinturn,isnothingmorethantheinstitutionalizationofthenationswill.87Atthispoint,thequestionarisesregardingthecontentofthewordnation.
i) TheDefinitionofNation
Thetermnationisacceptedasacentralpoliticalconcept of recent times; sometimes it is synonymous with astate,itsinhabitants,orwithahumangroupboundtogetherbyloyaltyandcommonsolidarity.88Authorsusedtodistinguishbetweendefiningpeopleasdemosorasethnos.Demosrefertothetotalityofcitizenswhileethnosisacom
munity
based
on
the
belief
in
a
common
descent
or
cul
ture.89Whenanationsubstitutesthepeopleasanelementofthestate,wehaveanationstate.
Now,ifthoseentitledtoconstituentpowerarethepeople,then,theywhohavetherighttolimitthemselvesinaconstitutionarethesovereignpeople,consideredasthecitizensintoto.Incasethepeopleasdemosdonotconcurwiththepeopleasethnos,aproblemexists:whatistherelationshipbetween thesegroups?It isclearthatvitaldecisionsneedtobetakenandthoseentitledtosovereigntyneedtomakeakindoflegalfiction,actingasiftheyrepresentthepeopleintheirtotalityincludingthosewhoarenot,ornotyet,citizensofthestate(postWorldWarIIGermany,forexample).90
Definingtheconceptofnationisessentialtostatebuilding(inthecaseofanonexistentstate)ortopreservationofthestate(ifthestateexistsalready);infactthenationprovidesanidentityfortheindividualandlegitimacyforthestate.Thedifferentconceptsofnationdeterminetheinterpretationwegivetotheconstitution.Accordingtotheradicaldemocraticone, we always refer to the people to re
85 Thisiswhy,inacountrylikeEngland,thereisnoneedforaconstitution,whereasincountrieslikeFranceandtheUSA,itisessential. Consequently, it is completely logical that in the Englishsystem the question ofconstituentpower is irrelevant, since thepowertoissuelaws,organizethestateandlimitthepowerofitsorgans,isleftentirelytoparliament.SeeRaymondCarrdeMal
berg,ContributionlaThorieGnraledelEtat,541(TomeII,1922).86 EmmanuelJoseph Sieys, known also as lAbb Sieys (1748
1836)isaFrenchrevolutionaryandstatesman,authorofQuestcequeletierstat?(Whatisthethirdestate?),in1789.
87 SeePreuss,supranote1,at149.88 SeeSeeVatikiotis,supranote6,at31.89 SeeTpperwien,supranote48,at45.90 InthePalestiniancase,thecitizensofthefuturestateofPalestine
wouldexercisetheirconstituentpowerandwouldadaptaconstitution.Thisconstitutionneedstodiscusssomekeyargumentsbywhich the regulation interests all the Palestinian people,not thePalestiniancitizensonly.
solveproblems:aconstitutionisacontinuousrevolution,andassuch,unstable.Theotherinterpretationistheinstitutionalizedone,whichcreatesinstitutionsthatwillallowpeopletoreturntotheirnormallives.91
ii) Wethepeople92andtheConstitution
InquotingHugoGrotius,whocontendedthatapeoplemaysubmit itself to aking,JeanJacques Rousseaucommentedthat,accordingtoGrotius,apeopleissoevenbeforeithassubmitteditselffortheking.Thesubmissionitselfisacivilact;itpresupposespublicdeliberation.Hence,
beforeconsideringtheactbywhichapeoplesubmitstoaking,weoughttoscrutinizetheactbywhichapeoplebecomesapeople,forthatact,beingnecessarilyantecedenttothesubmissiontothekingitself,istherealfoundationof
society.93Somemodernconstitutionsexpress this fact, inthesameconstitutionaldocumentindicatingthatWe,the
peopleofadopttheconstitution.94
Nevertheless,asoutlinedbyHannaLerner,thereisnotalwaysacommonunderstandingofthatWe,especiallyindividedsocieties.95Forher,sincethepeoplearetheauthorsoftheconstitution,itshouldreflecttheirspecificidentityanddelineatetheirsharedvaluesandprinciples.Infact,national identityplayedanecessaryrole intheemergingphaseofthenationstate,bymakingpossibleanewmodeofsecularlegitimizationtothestate,basedonanewformofsocialintegration.This isalsothecasewithcontempo
rarynewstates.Theproblem istounderstandwhetheraconstituent power will necessarily reflect a preexistentidentityorwillitreflectapoliticalorganizationofasociety?96
Theanswerissimple(atleasttheoretically):bothcasesarepossible.Itdependsinfact,onthecountryandtheparticularcontextinwhichaconstitutionisenacted.Nevertheless, thesecondquestion is, then, toknow ifthere isanyconnectionbetweentheconstitutionandthecollectivewhoholds theconstituent power.97Although the constitutiondoesnotalwaysexpressapredefinedidentity,itisneverthelessimportantthattheconstitutionbefeltastheresult
of
the
act
of
all
those
who
compose
the
we
of
the
consti
tution.Otherwiseitwilllacknecessarylegitimacy.Thecon
91 SeePreuss,supranote1,at145.92 QuotingBruceAckermannsreflectioninhisvolumeWethePeople.
Foundations(Cambridge,Mass./London,1991).93 SeePreuss,supranote1,at161.94 Forexamplethepreambleof1996SouthAfricaconstitution.95 SeeHannaLerner,Thepeopleof theConstitution:Constitutionmak
ing, legitimacy and identity 2 (paper presented at the miniAPSA,Department of political science, Columbia university, April 30,2004). Hanna Lerner is Ph.D. candidate in Columbia University.Thepaperwasnotpublishedyet.
96 Seeid.at6,11,19.
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stitutionshallbeconsideredbythemajorityofthepolity(asindividualsorasgroupsethnic,religious, linguistic)as
beingtheirownandtheyshallidentifythemselveswiththedocument.98Inotherwords,theimportanceoftheconstitutiondoesnotlieinitsexpressionofpoliticalidentity,butinitsabilitytotransformitintoacivicone.99Thisiswhyconstituentpoweristightlyrelatedtothequestionofconstitutionallegitimacy.Incontemporarytimes,theconstitutionthatisadoptedthroughdemocraticmeansisconsideredlegitimate.100Hereanotherdebatemayarise,butistangentialtoourmain inquiryhere: is itsufficientthatanationwantssomething,forthiswilltobeconsideredgood?Theproblemwithacceptingthisconjectureisthattheguidingpoliticalstatuswillloseallrationality.
b) TheNationandtheConstituentPower
The father of constituent power (EmmanuelJosephSieyesdefinesthenationexclusivelyasdemos;forhim,thenationisabodyofassociateslivingundercommonlawsand representedby thesame legislative assembly.101 Inotherwords,thenationconsistsofthetotalityofitscitizenry.ThisreflectstheFrenchideaofnation.AccordingtotheGermanandEasternEuropeanconcept,thenationisaprepoliticalcommunity,which isconstitutedbycommonalitiesinorigin,race,language,religion,culture,historyandthelike.TheFrenchconceptofnation,basedontheideaofcitizenship,isanexampleofastatenation(thenationisthedemos). In contrast, the German perception includes the
ideaofanethnicnation(thenationistheethnos).Anationbasedoncommoncitizenshipisnecessarilyastatenation,whereastheethnicnationcanbeentirelystatelessandcan
bepoliticallyorganizedinapluralityofstates.102
i) TheConstitutionasaReflectionofapreexistententity
Incontemporarystates,itisveryrareevenimpossiblethatonehomogeneousethnosispoliticallyorganizedinanation;normallytheethnosandthedemosofastatearein
97 Here there are two options: First, there is no connection at allbetweenthetwo.This isthepositionofHansKELSEN;withhislegalpositivism,hesolvestheparadoxofconstitutionallegitimacy
byseparatingthelegalfromthepolitical;secondly,thereisadirectconnectionbetween the constitution and the people. Here therearethreealternatives:a) the identityofWe thepeoplederivesfromthemakingoftheconstitutionitself;b)thepeopleaswellastheirconstitutionemergesimultaneously inagradualand incrementalmanner;orc)theconstitutiondoesnotcreatethecollectivitybut mirrors a prepolitical unity while recognizing the preconstitutionalexerciseofahomogeneousnationsgeneralwill.Seeid.at1314.
98 Seeid.at12.99 Seeid.at26.100 Seeid.at11.101 Preuss,supranote1,at149.102 Seeid.at149150.
congruous.Thishasseriousconsequences,asithasfortheconceptofselfdetermination,forexample,asshownbyUlrich Preuss: In Western Europe it [selfdetermination]meantthatthedemoticnationtookoverthegovernmentofanexisting sovereignstate, therebysafeguarding itsselfdetermination.InthefreedommovementthatspreadfromGermanyeastandsouth,however,thetermselfdeterminationmeanttheliberationofapreestablishedethnicsocietyfromalieninfluenceandforeigndomination.103
Infact,differentconceptsofnationwouldhaveseriousconsequencesontheconceptofconstituentpower;forexample,accordingtotheFrenchconceptofnation,theconstituentpoweristhepowerofacollectivebody,which,bytheveryactofconstitutiongiving,exercisesitsrighttoselfrule.Theconstituentpowerofanationpresupposestheno
tionofademoticentiretyofindividualsthecitizenryanentiretywhichoriginatesfromthisveryactofcreatingcommonlawsandacommonrepresentativebody.Therefore,itwasnotthecommonnessofthelanguagethatconstitutedthenation,but,conversely,itwasthenationthatrequiredandcreatedthecommonnessofthelanguage.104
AccordingtotheGermanconcept,themeaningofnationstate is that a nation (in its ethnic sense, defined intermsofcommonnessoflanguageand/orreligion,culture,origin,etc.)acquiresitspoliticalexistenceinitsownstate.Thenationisprestate,prepolitics,existentialandalmostaneternalentity,whereasthestateisaquasiaccidentaland
ephemeralphenomenon,
which
supports
the
survival
of
thenationinitshistory,butisnotreallytheembodimentoftheessenceofthenation.However,thepoliticalselfdeterminationofanationrequiresstatehood;butitisastatehood
basedonethnichomogeneity.Itistheselfdeterminationofethnos,directedagainstalieninfluence,ratherthanthepolitical selfrule and freedom of demos, which is directedagainstpoliticalpressureandsocialinequality.105
ii) TheConstitutionasaSocialContract
Studyingthefoundationofthelegitimacyoftheconstitution,oneshouldinevitablyconsiderthesocialcontractasthebasisofitslegitimacy.Socialcontractmeansthatpopu
larsovereignty isexpressedby theconstituentassembly.Rousseau wrote: Each one of us puts into the commonstockhispersonandallhispower,underthesupremedirectionofthegeneralwill;andwereceiveasabodyeachmemberofanindivisiblepartofthewhole.106
Yet,therearedifferentsocialcontractapproaches:a)theBritishapproachwhichdidnotneedawrittenconstitutionemphasizesthepoliticalselfgovernmentofsociety
103 Id.at150.104 Seeid.at150,152.105 Seeid.at152.
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throughparliament;b)theFrenchapproachwhichhadfewscruplesinreplacingitsconstitutionsemphasizesthenationasitismanifestedinthestate;c)theAmericansocialcontract approach which reflects the American concernwith a society consisting of a multitude of individualswhosemutualcontractiscontainedintheSupremeConstitution.107
Nevertheless, many authors expressed serious criticismstowardsthesocialcontractasthefoundationofconstitutional legitimacy. For them,justifying lawby socialcontractisfiction;lawhastobejustifiedbysomethingoutside itself.Theconstitution, indeed,hastobeeffective.Itmustbeadoptedandputintooperationwithauthority.Inaconstitutionalstate,authorityischaracterizedbydemocraticlegitimizationtowhichalsothedemocraticminority
acquiesces.Theoriginalsupremacyoftheconstitutionistherefore
foundedintheauthorityoftheconstitutionwritingentity,butthisdoesnotexplaintheperpetuationofitspredominance. In fact,predominanceof theconstitution is maintainedbytheoperationofthelegitimatelyestablisheddevicesoftheconstitutionitself,whichcanremaineffectiveonlyaslongascitizenryandtheauthorityofthestatesorganswhicharegovernedbytheconstitutioncontinuetolendlegitimacytoits institutionsthroughtheproperemploymentofthemechanismsandproceduresprovidedbytheconstitution.Theforceoutsidetheconstitution,which
ensuresits
primacy,
is
its
practical
legitimacy,
since
it
gives
reasonable and realistic expression to the principles andneedsofthelegalcommunitythatitserves.Accordingly,alegitimateconstitutioncanbeconsideredasolemncodificationofbasicrulesfortheoperationofthestate.Ittendstoreflectnationalcustomsandrulesfromwhichthelegalcultureof thestate isstrongly influenced, ifnotdetermined
by.108
106 Nevertheless,oneshalldistinguishbetweenthefoundationofthesocietyandthetheconstituentpower.AsexplainedbyPREUSS:ROUSSEAUspeaksofthefoundationofcivilsociety,notoftheprocessofconstitutionmaking.Wemustdistinguishbothsteps,althoughempiricallytheywillnormallycoincide.Itishardlyconceivablethatinreallifetheformationofagroupoutofmultitudeofindividuals,andthedeterminationofthestructureaccordingtowhichthegroupisenabledtoactasanentity,canbeseparatedfromeachother.However,thedistinctionisanalytically important because thegeneration of a constitutionfor a
grouppresupposes the very existence of thegroup. Hence, before thegroupgives itselfa constitution, it must clarify who is subject to thisconstitutionaldetermination,and who is entitled toparticipate in thisdecision.Inotherwords,whoisamemberofthegroup.Id.at161.
107 See Franois Venter, ConstitutionMaking and the Legitimacy of theConstitution,inNATIONALCONSTITUTIONSINTHEERAOFINTEGRATION1012(AnteroJyrankied.,KluwerLawInternational,1999).
108 Seeid.at12.
2. ModernConstitutionsinContemporaryArabStates
IntheArabworld,constitutionsmaycodifyavarietyofpoliticalstructures:federal,asintheUnitedArabEmiratesandtheSudan;unitary,asinTunisia;aconstitutionalmonarchy,asinJordan;arepublic,asinEgypt;oratraditionalhereditarymonarchy,asinSaudiArabia.WhilemostArabconstitutions are documents with roughly similar provisions,someconstitutionsarenoteworthyproductsofhistoricalandpoliticalcircumstances.InSaudiArabia,forexample, the Koran itself is considered the constitution,accompaniedbyaseriesofroyaldecreescompiledtofunctionasamanualfortheapplicationofitsprinciples.Proceduresforconstitutionalamendmentsvary;sometimesrequiringdirectreferendaorlegislativeaction,whileinsomecountries,theheadofstatemayissueamendmentsbyde
cree.Thecomparisonofconstitutionsindifferentregionsof
theworlduncoversaremarkablevarietyof fundamentaltexts,since theyare the product of theirunique historyandgeography.109ThisisalsothecaseintheArabworld,eventhoughsomestudiestreatArabconstitutionsasiftheywere identical (which they are not). There are of coursecommon features and similarities, since they may haveadapted texts from thesamesources;nevertheless,everyArabstatehasitsownconstitution,anditsownconstitutionalhistory.110
a) NationPeopleinArabConstitutions
ManyConstitutionsintheArabworldrefertothewordArabtoqualifytheState.Forexample,theArabRepublicofEgypt,mentionedintheconstitutionsfirstarticle.ThesameappliestoJordan(Art.1)andtoSyria(Art.1).Specialattention shouldbe drawn to the Tunisian Constitution,where thepeoplemakepartof thegreaterArabMaghreb(Art.2)whiletheLebaneseConstitution,withoutreferringtoitselfasanArabnation,mentionsonlythatArabicistheofficiallanguage(Art.11).ThisisnoteworthysinceitrecursinmanyotherconstitutionsofArabstates:Egypt(Art.2);Syria(Art.4);andTunisia(Art.1).
Now, what makes a state an Arab one? Is it a statewhosepopulationspeaksArabic?TheEnglish,FrenchandSpanishlanguagesarecommonlyspokenindifferentcountries;thisdoesnotmeanthatthosecountriesconstituteor
109 See Eric CanalForgues (ed.), Recueil des Constitutions des PaysArabes,X(Bruylant,2000).
110 Sincethesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury,theconstitutionalmovementbegan,andneverstopped,intheArabworld.TheArabworldwasfamiliarwithevolutioninrelationtoconstitutionalism;thedemocratizationprocessexperiencedarelativelypacifictransformation.There isalsoabrandofcreativity intheArabworld,whereinnew techniquesand institutionsthatareunknownelsewhereareinvented.Seeid.atVII.
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arepartofasinglenation.Althoughimportant,languagethenisnotsufficientbyitself.Ifweconsiderdifferentelements such as history, culture, language and traditions,theysuggesttheexistenceofanArabnation.Tosomeextent,religionisalsorelevant,sincethemajorityofArabsareMuslim (mostly Sunni). Nevertheless, not all Arabs areMuslims,norareallMuslimsArab.
TheexistenceofsuchanArabnationmeansthatitisoneunitdividedintodifferentArabstates(notthefirsttimeithasbeenhistoricallyso);consequently,ArabstateswouldsimplybeatransitoryperiodontheirwaytotheconsolidationofanArabNation.Nevertheless,thisassertioncontradictstherealityofArabpeopleswhoareattachedtotheirstatesandtotheirindividuality,eventhoughtheymaynot
behappywiththeachievementsoftheirrulers.Thiscanbe
oneoftheeffectsoftheexistenceofindividualArabstates.ThedreamofArabunityswitchedtoanewgoal:itdoesnotcall for the establishment of one centralized state whicheliminatesallparticularities;ratheritmeansatendencytowards collaboration and harmonization of the existingstates.UnityinthissensesimilartothatoftheEuropeanUnionbecomesthefuture,whenthefutureisintendedto
beprosperous,secureandprogressive.
ThepreamblesoftheArabconstitutionsmayprovideabriefvisionof theunitaryArabstate, regarding the relationshipbetween the people and the Arab nation. SomesubmitthatthestateispartoftheArabworld,andothersthat
thepeople
of
asingle
Arab
state
are
part
of
the
Arab
nation.
Hereareafewexamples.
The1952JordanianConstitutionwasappliedtotheWestBankwhichwaspartoftheKingdomofJordan,untilitsoccupationby Israel in 1967 and the formal separationbetweentheEastandWestbanksin1987.Initsfirstarticle,the
Jordanian Constitution states thatJordan is a sovereignArabstate.Thesamearticlestatesthatthepeople(shab)of
JordanarepartoftheArabnation(umma).Thesovereigntyof thestateand its independence fromothercountries isemphasized in that constitution, and this canbe understoodinitshistoricalcontextofrivalrybetweenArablead
ers,
especially
in
relation
to
the
Palestinian
territories
that
wereunifiedwith(orannexedto)Transjordan.TheJordanianconstitutionhasaparticularity:itreferstotheJordanianpeopleasumma.ThisisthecaseinArticle24:(i)TheNationisthesourceofallpowers.(ii)TheNationshallexerciseitspowersinthemannerprescribedbythepresentConstitution.Besides,theJordanianconstitutionreferstotheJordanianParliamentasMajlesalumma(Art.29).NormallytheArabparliamentsaretranslatedasNationalAssembly.But infact,theNationalAssemblyisusuallyunderstood to mean almajles alwatanee, where wataneereferstohomeland(watan)andnottonation(umma).This
confusion in terms disappears in theJordanian NationalCharterof1990wherethetermumma(nation)referstotheArabnationandshab(people)referstotheJordanians.
We read in the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 that theEgyptianpeoplearepartoftheArabnation.Theamendmentof1980introducedtheinterestingconceptofcomprehensiveunityintheconstitutionsfirstarticle:TheEgyptianpeoplearepartoftheArabNationandworkfortherealization of its comprehensive unity. What does thiscomprehensiveunitymean?Itmaybeaconstitutionaladaptationto,andharmonywith,theactualterritorialdivisionsofArabstates;fewwouldenvisionaunitedArabstatein thenear future,butmostArabsencourageArabunitythatisbasedontheactualdivisionofArabstates.Thisunitywouldenvisagespecialrelationsbetweenthestatesthat
haveacommonculture,languageandhistory.Infact,sovereigntyofasingleArabpeopleisenhancedinalltheArabconstitutionaldocumentsandnostatewouldcompromiseit; intheEgyptianConstitution,Article3:Sovereigntyisforthepeoplealone,theyarethesourceofauthority.Thepeopleshallexerciseandprotectthissovereignty,andsafeguardnationalunityinthemannerspecifiedintheConstitution.
b) ReligionandStateinArabConstitutions
Indifferentwaystoday,legalsystemsintheArabstateshavebecomepositivesetsofprinciples,withastatuscomparabletothoseofWesterncountries,andIslamiclawhas
becomeabranchofpositivelaw(e.g.personalstatus).Infact,mostcontemporaryArabstatesincludeintheirconstitutionthearticlethatIslamisthestatereligionandshariaisaortheprinciplesourceoflegislation:asymbolicconcession to the ideologyofpolitical Islamaccording tosome,andasteptowardsthereevaluationofitsjudicialsystem,accordingtoothers.
Islam is considered the State religion (alislam din aldawla),inthefirstarticlesoftheconstitutionofmostArabstates(Algeria,Bahrain,Egypt,Emirates,Jordan,Kuwait,Morocco,Sudan, andTunisia). Some constitutions forbidtherevisionofthisarticle,suchasthatofAlgeria(Art.178),
forexample.ItisthisauthorsviewthatdeclaringIslamastheofficial religiondoesnotraiseproblemsassuch.Theonlyquestionthatarisesiswhether,undersuchconstitutionalprovisions,allindividualscanenjoyfreedomofconscienceandreligion.Infact,thereferencetoareligionofstate isnotparticulartotheAraborMuslimworld;untilvery recently,somewesterndemocraciesdeclaredChristianityoraparticularconfessionastheofficialreligionofthe state, without necessarily infringing the sensibilitiesandrightsofothers.Ontheotherhand,ArabstateshaveshowndifferentwaysinassimilatingIslamicprinciples,de
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8/3/2019 Arab Constituent Power
17/19
AsemKhalil TheEnactmentofConstituentPowerintheArabWorld
104 ANCILLAIURIS(anci.ch)2006:88 Article
pending on their particular geographical, historical, andpoliticalcontext.
The
problem,
in
fact,
lies
elsewhere.
In
the
last
few
de
cades,agrowing tendency toreturn to sharia inMuslimandArablegalsystemsisaccompaniedbyaparticularity:itisnotshariaaspresentedbyulama(Muslimexpertsinreligionrelatedaffairs)butasimposedbythestate;accordingly, there are now sharia systems as much as Muslimand/orArabstates.Infact,mostArabstatesrefertoshariaasa/themainsourceoflegislation.Othersreferalso(suchastheAlgerianandtheJordanian)orexclusively(suchasSyria)tothereligionoftheHeadofStateasIslam.111Thesubstanceoftheproblemremainsunresolved:whichisthesupremelaw:theconstitutionorsharia?Inotherwords,inthecaseofacontradiction(inrelationtowomensrights,
forexample),whatshouldprevail,theconstitutionalprovisionsorsharia?112
Themainquestionthatariseshereisthefollowing:isIslamareligion,astateorboth?Apparently,twooptionsarepossible:first,Islamisonlyareligion,aspresentedbyAliAbdalRaziq,KhaledMuhammedKhaled,andIbnBadis;second,Islamisreligionandstate,aspresentedbyShaykhMuhammadBakhitalMutii,HasanalBanna(founderofMuslimBrotherhoodin1928),andAbdalQadirAwdah.The first approach wanted religion tobe free ofpoliticalmanipulation;theseparationbetweenthereligiousandthepoliticalwasintendedtoprotectreligion.Thispositionwas
rejectedby
the
others,
who
considered
Islam
to
be
away
of
life.113
The ideaofIslamasreligionandstatedevelopedfurther,arrivingataradicalpositionofcallingfortheestablishmentofanIslamicstate(AbdalKarimalKhatib,TahaAbdBaqiSuru,MuhammadYusufMusa,MuhammadalMubarakandYusufalQadrawi).ForthemtheIslamicsystem isunique: it isneither theocraticnormonarchic, it ismerelyIslamic.Regardingtheformofgovernment,twopositionsdeveloped:somebelieved that Islamdoesnot impose a form of government that is welldefined and detailed (such as alMubarak); while othersbelieved that
Islam
should
serve
as
the
basis
and
the
pillars
of
such
a
gov
ernment(suchasTaqiadDinanNabhaniandhisHizbalTahriralIslamiorIslamicLiberationParty).114
111 The Constitution of Lebanon,because of the unique relationsbetweenthecommunities,makesnoreferencetoIslam
112 This is in substance whatjustifies such a paper: who has thesupreme powers? Who or what is the source of authority? Thisquestionneeds tobeclarifiedespecially incaseofconstitutionalreview.
113 SeeFahmiJadaane,NotionsoftheStateinContemporaryArabIslamicWritings,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE112148(GhassanSalamed.,CroomHelm,1987).
114 Seeid.at128132.
Maybe there isamiddlegroundbetweenthetwoextremepositionsofAbdalRaziq,whoreducedreligiontotherealmofspirit,pushingpoliticsawayfromitsdomain,andthatofalBanna,whostrivedfortherestorationofanIslamicstateandtheCaliphate.TheformerconsidersIslamasonlyareligionwhilethelatterconsidersitasareligionand state; the latter was the solution presentedby thosewhopredictedalegislativeroleforsharia(AliAbualFutuh, Abd alAzizJawish, Abd alRazzaq asSanhuri).SayyidQutb(19071966)refusedsuchmoderatesolutions.HisradicalpositionisalsoexpressedbyYusufalQardawiwhopresentstheIslamicsolution:theestablishmentofanIslamicstatebasedonpureIslamicrule,whichtakesIslamiclawasitsoneandonlyguideandreferenceforallitsrulings.115
With time, the ideaofa legislativerole forshariabecamefurtherdiffused.In1939,thelawyerAhmadHusayncalledfortherevisionofconstitutionallawsinthelightofIslamicsharia,maintainingthatIslamisthesourceoflegislation. In 1940 the Iraqi Abd alRahman alBazzaz condemnedthosewhodispelshariafromtheconstitutionoftheircountry.HeconfirmedthedoctrinethatIslamiclegislation is open to evolution and does not deny canonicalchange.AllaalFasi,thehistoricleaderoftheIstiqlalPartyinMorocco,agreesingeneraltermswiththethesisofalBazzaz.Hecondemned AbdalRaziq,sincereligioncannot
beputoutsidethedomainofsociopoli