arab israeli war of attrition

8/13/2019 Arab Israeli War of Attrition

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T H E A R A B - I S R A E L I C O N F L I C T :

T H E WAR O F A T T R I T I O N A N DP R E PA R AT I O N S P R E C E D I N G

THE O c ' r o B E n 1975 WA R

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U . S . Hr tmyC u m m a n d and G e n e r a l S t a + f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l

d e g r e e

M AS TE R O F M I L I T A R Y A R T AN D S C I E N C E

f i . i l f i l l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e

b y

J E R RY R THORNBERRY, M A J , USAFD.S., U n i v e r s i t y o f W i s c o n s i n , 1 9 7 3

F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , b.ansasI186

f i p p r o v e d t o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e : d i s t r l b u t l o n i su n l i m i t e d .

27- l R Y 1


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MQSTER OF MILITARY m r FIND SCIENCE

THESIS A P P F t f l VA L PAGE

Name o f C a n d i d a t e : M a j o r J e r r y R 1 - h o r n b e r r y

T i t l e o f T h e si s : The A r a b - I s r a e l i C o n f l i c t -The War o f A t t r i t i o n a n d F r e p a r a t i o n s

P r e c e e d i n y t h e f lc t. ob e r 1977 War.

A p p r o v e d b y :

,

. . L b L L/ - I , ..IJc , r h e s i 5 C o m m i t t e e C h a i r m a n

Plaj. J o h n W. S t o n e , M.M.A.S.

A c c ep te d t h i s _ _ d ay o f &% 1986 b y :, D i r e c t o r , G r a d ua t e O e yre e

F r o g r a m 5

The o p i n i o n s a nd c o n c l u s i o n s e x p re s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h n s eat t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r an d d o n o t n e c e s s a r i 1 y r e p r e s e n tt h e v i e w s o f t h e U.5 . A r m y Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f fC o l l e g e o r a ny o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g en cy . ( H e f e r e n c e e1:a t h i s s t i i d y s h o u l d i n c l u d e t h e f o r e g o i n g s t a t e m e n t . )

i i


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ABSTRACT

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: THE WAR OF ATTRITION A N DPREPARATIONS PRECEEDING THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR. Ananalysis of Israeli and Egyptian war preparations

between th e end of t h e Six-Day War in 1967 and theOctober War of 1973, b y Major Jerry R . Thornberry,USAF, 162 pages.

This study is a historical analysis of two definitiveperiods of t h e conflict between Israel and Egypt - theWar of Attrition between July 1967 and August 1970, andt h e period of No Peace, No War" between August 1970and 6 October 1973. The study discusses t he lessonslearned by Egypt and Israel foll owing th e Six-Day War.T h e lessons of the Six-Day War were not lost on the

Egyptian leaders. President Nasser's assessment of th emilitary aspects o f th e war revealed several shartfal1.sin Egypt's military capabilities and superiarities ofIsrael's for ce s which needed modifying bef ore Egyptcould successfully mount a campaign against Israel.President Sadat believed Israel ' 5 intrasigence onretaining the occupied terr itorie s cauld only b echanged b y taking ac tions which would c aus e the UnitedStates, t he Soviet Union, and t h e United Nations tobecome involved. Sadat's decision t o g o to war was apolitical gamble designed to end th e stalemate.Israel's military leaders' constantly underrated the :Eg yp ti an *s armed forces potentials. Military and

political leaders continually misread Nasser's andSada t's intentions and their resolve to regain th eoccupied territories.

Gmong th e conclusions which were drawn from t h i s studyare: Th e Egyp tians prepared for t h e October War b ycorrecting their deficiencies in th e Six-Day War -restructured the High Command, improved trainingmethods, developed new tactics. incorporated newequipment into th e armed forces, constructed a high-density surface-to-air missil e system, and neutralizedthe Israeli superiorities of the air force, mobileground forces , and rapid mobili zation of reserves. The

Israelis prepared by developing a static defensestrategy along th e Suez Canal.

The study concludes that Egyptian preparations for theOctober War included recognizing their failures andIsraeli strengths and weaknesses of th e Six-Day War,then vigorously applying corrective measures, while theIsraelis analyzed t he weaknesses of t he Egyptians and

i ij


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the i r own s t rengths af ter t he Six-Day War, then d i dl i t t l e t o r eas s es s those v iews, r e t ain ing thepercept ion of the i r s t rength and th e Egypt ianweaknesses.


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TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S

C h a p t e r P a g e

T i t l e Page . . . . . . . . - . . . . . 1A p p r o v a l p a g e . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiA b s t r a c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiT a b l e o f C o n t e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . V

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . - . . . . . . 1E n d n o t e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

11. THE WAR OF A T T R I T I O N . . . - . . . . . . 1 1J u l y 1967 - A u g u s t 1970E n d n o t e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

111. E G Y P T I A N P R EPA R ATI O N S FO R L I B E R A T I O NO F T H E S I N A I . . . . . . . . - . . . . . 5 1

A u g u s t 1970 - O c t o b e r 1973

E n d n o t e s . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . 8 2I V. T HE I S R A E L I P E R S P E C T I V E . . . . . . . . 8 5

A u g u s t 1970 - 1973

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106V. C O N C L U S I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12;V I . S URVE Y O F L I T E R A T U R E . . . . . . . . . 125

E n d n o t e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A P P E N D I X 1

A p p e n d i x 1-1 A b b r e v i a t i o n s / A c r o n y m s . . 134A p p e n d i x 1-2 T e r m s D e f i n e d . . . . . . 135A p p e n d i x 1-3 Weapon's S y s t e m s . . . . . 138

A P P E N D I X 2A p p e n d i x 2-1 Pre -1947 P a l e s t i n e . . . . 1 4 3A p p e n d i x 2-2 UN P a r t i t i o n P l a n - 1947 . 144

V


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A ppend ix 2-3 I s rae l 1947-1967 . . . . . 145Ap p e n d i x 2-.4 I s rae l 1967-1973 . . . . . 146A ppend ix 2-5 I n c i d e n t s a l o n g C a n a l . . 147Ap p e n d i x 2-6 I D F C a s u a l t i e s . . . . . . 48Ap p e n d i x

2-7E g y p t i a n C = r e 1967 . . 149App e n d i x 2-8 E g y p t i a n C r e 1973 . . 150

B I B L I O G R A P H Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152I N I T I A L D I S T R I B U T I O N LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . 157


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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n r e q i o n h a s a l o n g h i s t o r y o f

m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l u n r e s t . S i n c e 1947 and t h e

c r e a t i o n of t h e s t a t e o f I s r a e l i n P a l e s t i n e , a num ber

o f w a rs be tw e en I s r a e l and t h e n e i g h b o r i n g A ra b s t a t e s

h a v e b e e n w aged. T he p r e c e d i n g t h r e e w a r s t h a t I s r a e l

and t h e A r a bs f o u g h t i n 1947-1948, 1956, and 1967 ended

w i t h d e f e a t o f t h e A ra b a rm i e s and e xpa nd ed I s r a e l ' s

b o r d e r s ( s e e A p pe n dix 2 - 1 t h r o u g h 2 - 5 ) . The wa rs d i d

n o t b r i n g pe a ce t o t h e r e g io n ; t h e y o n l y i n c re a se d t h e

h a t r e d be tw ee n t h e b e l l i g e r e n t s .

T h i s t h e s i s p r o v i d e s a c om p re he n siv e h i s t o r y

a n d a n a l y s i s o f t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s made b y E q y p t and

I s r a e l b e t w e e n t h e S i x- D ay War o f J u n e 1 96 7 a nd t h e

O cto be r 1973 War. I n d o i n g so, i t w i l l i n f o r m

i n t e r e s t e d m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l s o f l e s so n s le a r n e d b y

E g y p t a nd I s r a e l f o l l o w i n g t h e S ix -D a y War. I t w i l l

show how E g yp t a p p l i e d th e s e l e s s o n s t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e

l i b e r a t i o n o f t h e A rab t e r r i t o r i e s o c c u pi e d b y I s r a e l

a f t e r t h e S ix -D a y War. F u t h er m o r e , i t w i l l d e t a i l t h e

I s r a e l i p r e p a r a t i o n s and t h e e r r o r s and m i s p e r c e p ti o n s

t h a t e v o lv e d i n i t s m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s .

F i n a l l y , i t w i l l d e t e r m in e what t h e E g y p t i a n o b j e c t i v e s

were i n p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e ca mp aign - p o l i t i c a l l y and


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mil i ta r i ly (what d id Anwar Sada t h o p e t o achieve?).

Two de f in i t ive p e r i od s a r e ana lyzed - th e War

of At t r i t ion be tween Ju ly 1967 and August 1970, and the

per iod o f "No Peace, No War" be tween Augus t 1970 and 6

October 1973.

To bet ter unders t and th e even ts occur r ing

be tween 1967 and 1975, we need t o under s t and t h e s t a t e

of affa ir s in Egypt and Israel immedia tely fol low ing

t h e Six-Day War. The t e r r i t o ri a l ga in s made by t h e

I s r ae l i s a ft e r t he 1967 Six-Day War were subs tan t ia l

(see Rppendix 2 -4 ) . Th e expanded bo rde r s i nc luded t he

Sina i Peninsu la (more t h a n 20,000 s q u a r e miles of

Egypt ian te r r i to ry eas t a+ th e Suez Canal ); the West

Bank o f t h e Jordan River, including al l of Jerusalem

(f rom Jordan) ; and th e Gola n Hei ghts nor theas t and ea5 t

of th e Sea of Gal i lee ( + r a m Syria) . Th e Golan

Hei ghts was s t ra teg ica l ly impor tan t because i t

overlooked much of northe rn Israel and th e plain s east

of Damascus, Syria.

I

,,

. (

For t h e f i r s t t im e in i t s shor t h i story, I srael

had s t ra teg ic def ens ive depth be tween i t s majar

popula t ion c en t e rs and t he ne ighbor ing Arab s ta tes .

Th i s g av e t he I s r a e l i s a " f a ls e " s ense o f securi ty and

a strategic opt ion. = T h i s sense of securi ty was well

i l lustrated in a s tat ement by Israel's Minister of

'

2


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happened. Th is denial took a number of forms:

; poli t ical , ideological , and l inguist ic. 7i,

Th e jo int poli t ica l pol icy of denia l towardsIsrael wa s formula ted at th e Khar toum Summit Conf erence

29 A u g u s t t o 1 September 1967. The s t a t ed Arab

pos i t i on adop ted by t he pa rt i c ipan t s o f t he Confe rence

is r e f l ec t ed in th i s excerp t f r om Ar t i c l e Three of t he

Resol ut on:

"The Arab hea ds of s t a t e have ag reed to

un i t e the i r poli t ical e ffor ts a t th e in ternat ionaland d ip lomat ic level t o e l imina te t he e ff ec t s o ft he aggres s ion and t o ensure th e wi thdrawa l of t h eaggre s s ive I sr ae li fo rces f rom the Arab l ands whichh a v e been occup ied s ince the aggres s ion of J u n e 5 .T h i s w il l b e done wi thin the f r amework o f t he ma inpr i nc i p le s by which th e Arab s ta t es abide , namelyno pea ce with Is rael , no recogni t ion of Is rael , noneg ot i a t i ans wi th i t , and ins is tence on t he r igh tof t h e Pales t in ian people wi thin the i r owncountry."

;i

By adop t ing th i s r e solu t ion , t he Arab l eade r s r e fused

t o accep t t he ex i s t ence o f t he i r conquero r.

They expressed th is denial l inguis t ica l ly in

desc r i p t ive ph raseo logy a s uncompromis ing a s the i r

pol i t ica l s tatements . Off ic i a l l y, th e descr ip t ion of

defea t w as expressed a s "al -naksa" ( th e se tback or t h e

degenera t ion) . The term "hazima" (def ea t ) was used

only inf requent ly t o expla in t he real s i tua tion.

Occupat ion of Arab la nds by Israel wa s

charac ter is t ica l ly te rmed, th e "consequenc es of th e

aggress ion .


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cIdeologica l ly, Arabs genera l ly e xpla in ed away

the i r mi l i t a ry defea t by I s rael o n t h r ee fac:tors.

N a ss e r e l a b o r a t e d o n t h e C ir s t f a c t o r i n J u n e 1967,w h e n h e s t a t e d t h a t t h e A r a b f o r c e s sh o u l d n o t h a v e

e xpec t e d t o w in w i t h I s r ae l i r e ce iv ing Un i t ed S t a t e s

mi l i t a ry, e c onom ic , and moral suppo r t. Th e s econd

fa c to r wa s d e sc r i b e d by K ing Husse in of Jo rdan whe n h e

s t a t e d t h a t A r a b m o r a l e h a d n o t b e e n b r o k e n o r

we a ke ned ; t he r e fo r e , I s r ae l had no t won a r e a l m i l i t a ry

v ic tory. I s rae l ' s war a i ms - " t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of F r a bradical regimes' ' - had no t been accompl ished . F ina l l y,

o n ly a ba t t l e aga in s t I s ra e l had b e e n l o s t , n o t t h e

war. Th e wa r w a s n o w e n t e r i n g a new ph ase . I*

T h i s p h a s e w ou l d a d o p t a n e w s t r a t e g y d e v e l o p ed

b y Egyp t , w h o bel i e ved t ha t Israel c o u l d b r de fea t e d

thr oug h a long-term "at t r i t ion al war." A war tha t

Nas se r b e l i eved wo u l d dec r ea se t h e I s rae l i

t e chno log i ca l and mi l i t a ry supe r io r i t y, make I s r ae l i

r e t e n t i o n o f t h e l a n d s t o o e x p e n s iv e i n t e r m s o f

mone ta r y and c a s u a l t y losses, and a t t a i n pa r i t y be tween

t h e IDF and Arab a rmies .

P r e s i d e n t N a s s e r b e g a n p l a n n i n g h o w t o r e d e e m

Arab respec t . He would conduc t an " a t t r i t i onal wa r "

a g a i n st t h e I s r a e l i s in a n a t t e m pt t o r e s t o r e A ra b

s e l f - e st e em a nd t o r e c ove r t e r r i t o r i e s l o s t t o I s r ae l

5


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d u r i n g t h e S ix -D a y War. The n e x t t h r e e y e a r s ( 1 9 6 7 -

1970) w ou ld b e c r u c i a l t o N a s s e r 's o v e r a l l p l a n .

However, N ass er d i d n o t l i v e t o se e t h e

c u l m i n a t io n o f h i s s t r a t e g y . W i t h h i s d e a th i n 1970,

t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s e x e c u t io n r e s t e d w i t h h i s

s u c c e s s o r , Anwar S a da t. The c o n f l i c t t h e n e n t e r e d

a n o t h e r p h a s e ( 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 3) . a p e r i o d o f "No Peace, No

W ar". A l t ho u g h t h e s t r a t e g y d u r i n g t h i s a i x y ea r

p e r i o d d i d n o t r e c o v e r l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s , i t d i d l a y t h e

g r o u n d w o r k f o r t h e October War.

The Oc tobe r War i s a l s o known as th e "Yom

K i p p u r War" i n t h e W e s t and t h e "Ramadan War" i n t h e

A r a b c o u n t r i e s ; I w i l l r e f e r t o t h e war t h ro u g h o u t t h i s

t h e s i s a s t h e O c to b e r War.

To c o n t r o l t h e l e n g t h o f t h i s s t ud y ,

r e s t r i c t i o n s h a ve been imposed. T h i s t h e s i s i s

r e s t r i c t e d t o o n l y I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n p r e p a r a t i o n s t h a t

i m p a c t o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h o c c u r r e d a l o n g t h e Suez C an al

and i n t h e a re as a d j a c e n t t o t h e C an al. I t d o e s n o t

d i s c u s s e i t h e r t h e I s r a e l i - S y r i a n p r e p a r a t i o n s n o r t h

a n d e a s t o f t h e Sea o f G a l i l e e o n t h e G o l a n H e i g h t s , or

t h e I s r a e l i - J o r d a n i a n r e g i o n s a l on g t h e Jo rd an R iv e r

b etw ee n t h e Sea o f G a l i l e e and t h e G u l f o f Aqaba. The

m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t io n s i n t he s e r e g i o n s d i d

n o t d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s a l o n g t h e


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Suez C a n a l, t h e r e f o r e , t h e y w i l l n o t b e d i s c x s s e d i n

t h i s t h e s i s . H ow ever, p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s be tw een

E g yp t , S y r i a , and J o rd a n w h ic h a f f e c t e d E g y p t i a n

p r e p a r a t i o n s w i l l b e d is c u s s e d . F u r t h e r , t h i s t h e s i s

w i l l a n a ly z e t h e e v e n ts t h a t o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e

o n s e t o f t h e O c t o b e r War.

T h e m e t ho d o lo g y was b as ed o n an h i s t o r i c

r e s e a r c h o f E n g l i s h l an g u a g e docum ent.s, p e r i o d i c a l s ,

books , and p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t u d i e s . The a n a l y s i s

and a rg um en ts s u p p o r t i n g t h i s t h e s i s and i t s

c o n c l u s i o n s and r e co m m e n d at io n s a r e b a s e d on t h e s e

p r i m a r y and s ec on da ry m a t e r i a l s . R e se arc h o c c u r r e d i n

t h e F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h C om bin ed A r m s R e se arc h L i b r a r y .

D o c um e n ta t io n f o r t h i s t h e s i s w a s r e s t r i c t e d t o

a v a i l a b l e u n c l a s s i f i e d s ou rc es .

The War o f A t t r i t i o n , t h e p e r i o d be tw een J u l y

1967 and August 1 9 7 0 , w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d i n C h a p t e r 1 1 .

Emphas i s w i l l b e on t h e E g y p t i a n s t r a t e g y and t h e

c o u n t e r s t r a t e g y t a k en by I s r a e l . I t w i l l l o o k a t t h e

t h r e e p ha se s o f t h e a t t r i t i v e war N aese r w ou ld

u n d e r t a k e t o r e c o v e r t h e o cc up ie d t e r r i t o r i e s and

r e s t o r e A ra b p r i d e and m o ra le .

C h a p t e r I 1 1 w i l l a n a ly z e t h e E g y p t i a n

p r e p a r a t i o n s f r om A ug us t 1970 t o 6 O c t o b e r 1970. W i t h

t h e a s ce nd a nc y o f Anwar S a d at t o t h e P r e s i d e n c y o f

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Egypt, th e war with Isreal took a differen t course. I

wil l d iscuss th e pol i tica l and mi l i ta ry prepara t i ons

tha t occurred , t he revi ta l iza t ion and t ransformat ion of

t h e Egypt ian mi l i ta ry, and th e Egypt ian a t tempt s t o

sol id i fy Arab coopera t ion in to a uni f ied coal i t ion

against Israel. I will discuss t h e Soviet impact on

th e Egyptian Flrmy and th e circ umst ance s that led t o t h e

"expulsi on" of t he Soviet advisors.

Chapter I V wil l descr ibe t he Is rae li

p repa ra t ions a f t e r t h e War of Flttrition. I will

ana lyze t h e s t ra tegic changes Is rae l developed and how

these cha nge s led to a d i fferent concept of defense. I

will d iscuss th e prepara t ions tha t I s rael tak es t o

prep are for war with Egypt. Finally, I will discuss

th e Israe li in te l l igence fa i lur e and pol i t ica l and

mili tary miaperceptions about Egypt.

In Chapter V I wil l prov ide som e conclus ions

based on my analysis of th e Egyptian-Israel i act ions

preceedi ng th e October War. Chapter V I provides a

r ev i ew of l i te ra ture re la t ing to the s tudy. Because of

t h e vast amount of material on th e subj ect , t h i s r ev i ew

a t t empt s t o del imi t t h e s cope of l i te ra ture avai lab le

t o aid fu ture researchers of th i s subject .

Appendix 1 is a glossary of terms, acronyms,

and abbr evia t ion s used in th is thesis . Appendix 2

8


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con ta i ns r e f e rence maps and t ab l e s u sed in t h i s thesis.

I reta ined Arab and Israeli wo rds and proper' nam es in

th e Angliciz ed form for familiari ty and ea5w of

reading.


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CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

1 Harvey Sicherman, The Yom Kippur Wars End ofIllusion? (1976): 5-6.

Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War andPeace in t he Middle East (1984): 195.

Chaim Herzog, The War o f Atonement, October1973 (1975): 3.

4 H e r z o g , Th e Arab-Israeli Wars: 195.

Peter Clllen, The Yom Kippur War (1982): 16.

John W. A m o s 11 , Arab-Israeli Military andPolitica l Relations: Arab Perceptions and t h e Politicsof. Escalation (1979): 69.

Ibid.

0 Ibid.

Ibid.

* O Ibid.: 70.

Mohamed Heikal, The Road t o Ramadan (1975):164.


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CHCIPTER I 1

THE WCIR O F CITTRITIONJuly 1967 - August 1970

"The f i r s t pr ior i ty, th e absolu te pr ior i tyin t h i s ba t t l e is th e mil i ta ry f ront , for we mustrea l iz e that t he enemy wi ll not wi thdraw unless wef o r c e h i m t o wi thdraw through f ight ing . Indeedt h e r e c a n b e n o hope of any poli t ical solut ionun le s s t he enemy rea l i z e s tha t we a re capab le o ffo rc ing to h i m t o withdraw through f ighting." l

Thi s s t a t emen t , made b y President Nasser and

qu ote d in t h e ne ws pa pe r CI1-Clhram on 21 January 1968,

su ms up th e Egypt ian s t ra tegy used dur ing t he

subsequent t hre e year per iod t o regain t he te rr i tory

los t dur ing the Six Day War. Nasaer wa s real is t ic i n

h i s es t ima te of t h e c h a n c e s of Israel withdrawing from

te r r i tor ies occupied s i nc e th e Six-Day war wi thout

direct mil i tary force. He viewed Israel 's refusal t o

accept a poli t ical set t lement, United Nati ons ' Securi tyCouncil Resolution 242, which coincidental ly had been

endorsed by both t he Uni ted Sta tes and t he Sovie t

Union, as leaving only a mil i ta ry a l te rna t ive to t h e

problem.

The bas ic pr inc ip les conta ined in Resolu t ion

242 were: ( 1 ) a withdrawal of I s rae l i fo rc es f ro m

ter r i tor ies occupied in the Six-Day War, 2 ) cmssat ion

of hos t i l i t i e s b y all parties, (3) respect fo r each

oth ers sovere ignty and independence , and ( 4 ) their

i t


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r i g h t t o l i v e i n p e a c e w i t h i n s e c u r e a n d r e c o g n i z e d

b o r d e r s f r e e f ro m t h r e a t s o r a c t s o f f o r c e . O th er

a r t i c l e s o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n s t a t e d t h e ne e d f o r

g u a r a n t e e in g fr e ed om o f s h i p s t o n a v i g a t e t h r o u g h

i n t e r n a t i o n a l w a te rw ay s i n t h e a re a; f o r a c h i e v i n g a

j u s t s e t t l e m e n t t o t h e r e f u g e e p ro b le m ; a nd f o r

q u a ra n t e e i n g t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y t h ro u g h

e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f d e m i l i t a r i z e d z ones . a

A m b i g u i t i e s i n t h e f i r s t p r i n c i p l e o f

w i t h d r a w a l of I s r a e l i f o r c e s f r om t e r r i t o r i e s

o c c u p i e d was a b a s i s o f c o n t e n t i o n b etw e en I s r a e l and

E gy pt . E g yp t i n t e r p r e t e d i t a s w i th d r a w a l f ro m a l l

t e r r i t o r i e s , ' ' w h i l e I s r a e l i n t e r p r e t e d i t a d w i t h d r a w a l

f r om p a r t o r some o f t h e t e r r i t o r i e s . I s r a e l ' s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w ou ld a l l o w i t t o a d j u s t i t s b o r d e r s and

r e t a i n t h e s t ra t c r g y o f d ef e ns e i n d e p th t h a t i t had so

1 o n g d e s i r e d . =

T h er e w ere a l s o d i s a g re e m e n t s b etw e en I s r a e l

a n d E g y p t c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t e p s t o b e ta k e n f o r pe ace

n e g o t i a t i o n s . I s r a e l demanded t h e f o l l o w i n g s t e ps :

': " ( 1 ) d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s be tw ee n I s r a e l and t h e A rab

s t a t e s , l e a d i n g t o ( 2 ) p eac e t r e a t y , f o l l o w e d by 3 )

I s r a e l i w i t h d ra w a l t o t h e b o r d e r s a gr ee d upon i n

n e g o t i a t i o n s . E gy pt i n s i s t e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g o r d e r

f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s : ( 1 ) I s r a e l i w i t h d r a w a l t o t h e

I:


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pre-1967 l ines , before 2 ) ind i rec t negot ia t ions

through t he Uni ted Nat ions , (and not d i rec t ly wi th

Is rael , which would h ave meant r ecogniz ing I srael a s aleg i t imate en t i ty ) l ead ing to (3) a peace agreement."

It would be d i f fi c u l t t o h a ve a mor e d i ve rgent

requi rement f o r peacefu l negot ia t ions than these s t e p s

outl ined between Israel and Egypt . Although so me

con ces s ion s were made by both I s rae l and Egypt, the

gu l f b e tween t hem c on t i nued t o be insurmountab le for

peaceful negotiat ions. In th e context of t h e s e

d isagreements, Nasser e lec ted to take th e mi l i t a ry

opt ion of forc ing I s rae l t o re turn th e occupied

terr tor i es.

In September 1967, Nasser del ivered a speech to

a mas s demons t ra t ion pr ior to a meet ing of t he People ' s

Assembly in Cai ro . Dur ing th i s speech he e labora ted on

th e s t r at e gy t o be used against Israel s tat ing:

I. . . that all that had been taken b y f o r c ecould only b e re turned b y f o r c e . . . Egypt ianmil i tary pol icy . . . [ w o u l d be1 based on t h r e ephases: th e 'defens ive rehabi l i t a t ion ' phase, t h e' o ffens ive defence ' phase and , f ina l ly, t he

1 ibera t ion phase"

Sporadic f igh t i ng , a t many t im es ex t remely

fierce, continued between Egypt and Israel from 1 Ju ly

1967 t o 8 Augus t 1970, when both co unt r ie s agreed to a

cea sef i re or ig ina l ly proposed b y t h e Un it ed S t a t e s

Secre tary of St at e Wil l iam Rogers. Th is period of

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c o n f l i c t , known a s t h e War o f A t t r i t i o n , e x e c u te d

N a s s e r 's t h r e e m i l i t a r y phases .

The d e f e n s i v e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n p ha se was

r o u g h l y b etw e en 1 J u l y 1967 and September 1968,

r o u g h l y b ec a u se t h e r e a r e v a r y i n g d a t e s g i v e n f a r t h e

s t a r t o f t h e War o f A t t r i t i o n . The p u r p os e o f t h i s

s t a g e o f N a s s e r ' s p l a n was t o r e b u i l d t h e b a t t e r e d

arm ed f o r c e s a nd p r e p a re t h e c o u n t r y f o r a l o n g e r

p e r i o d o f c o n f l i c t t o e v e n t u a l l y d r i v e t h e I s r a e l i s

f r o m t h e o cc up ie d t e r r i t o r i e s . D u r in g t h i s p e r i o d t h e

S o v i e t U n i o n b eg an a m a s s iv e r e b u i l d i n g and r e a r m i n g o f

t h e E g y p t i a n f o r c e s w i t h q u a n t i t i e s and q u a l i t i e s o f

arm s t h a t s u r pa s se d t h e e qu ip me nt l o s t d u r i n g t h e

Six-Day War.

The c o s t o f m a i n t a i n i n g f o r c e s a l o n g t h e C an al

p r o v ed e x p e n s i v e t o I s r a e l , and e s p e c i a l l y , E gy pt .

E g y p t ' s m a in s o ur c e o f r e v e nu e w a s t h e Suez C a n a l ,

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 260 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a y e a r . T h i s

s o u r c e o f inc om e, h ow ev er, ha d b ee n c l o s e d t o t r a f f i c

b ec au se o f s h i p s sunk b y b o t h I s r a e l and E gy p t d u r i n g

t h e S ix -Day War. W i t h i t s c l o s i n g , E g y p t ' s p r i m a r y

s o u r c e o f h a r d c u r r e n c y was l o s t . F u r t h e r co mpo un din g

t h e loss o f r e v e n u e f r o m t h e c a n a l was t h e d e c re a s e o f

in co m e f r o m t o u r i s m a nd l o s s o f in co me fr o m t h e

4


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f l e w t o Moscow w i t h t h e w e ap o n's " s h o p p i n g 1 , i s t . " T hey

c o n c lu d e d t h e b i g g e s t S o v i e t a rm s d e a l t o d a t e .

I n c l u d e d i n t h e d e a l w ere 100 MIG-Zls, sever-a1 MIG-17,

M IG -1 5, a nd SU-7 a i r c r a f t , MI-8 h e l i c o p t e r s , a b r i g a d e

o f m o b i le SAM-6 m i s s i l e s , a n d ZSU-23rnm a n t i a i r c r . a f t

g un s. The E g y p t i a n s b e l i e v e d t h a t th e s e arm s w ere

s t i l l i n s u f f i c i e n t t o r e p e l I s r a e l i a i r s t r : t k e s i f h e y

w ere g o i n g t o c r o s s t h e S uez C a n a l. I *

B e h i n d t h e s c e n e s a n d i n s e c r e c y o f t h e S 0 v i e t. s

and a l l b u t a few o-f t h e s e n i o r E g y p t i a n s t a f f members.

t h e E g y p t i a n s w ere d e v e l o p i n g an e ve n m ore l i m i t e d

o f f e n s i v e p l a n , "The H i g h M i n a r e t s " p la n . T h i s p l a n :

I . . . was b a se d m ore c l o s e l y o n t h e a c t u a lc a p a b i l i t y o f o u r a rm ed f o r c e s , a s o pp os ed t o somen o t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y a f t e r u n t o l d a rm s sh ip me nts .I t s o b j e c t i v e s w ere t h e l i m i t e d q o a l I [Gene ra lS h a i l y l had s e t o f a f i v e o r s i x - m i l e p e n e t r a t i o n . "1 3

The p r e p a r a t i o n and p l a n n i n g o f O p e r a t i o n 4 1

and H i g h M i n a r e t s c o n t in u e d t h r o u g h t h e r e s t o f 1971

and i n t o 1972. O p e r a t i o n 4 1 was renamed G r a n i t e Tw o i n

1972. I t r em a in e d b a s i c a l l y t h e same w i t h o n l y v e r y

minor changes . 1 3

B e f o r e t h e E g y p t i a n s c o u l d l a u n c h t h e s u r p r l s e

a t t a c k a c ro s s t h e Ca na l u s i n g e i t h e r t h e H i g h M i n a r e t s

o r G r a n i t e Two p l a n s , many p r e p a r a t i o n s were r e q u i r e d

t o s u c c e s s f u l l y co n d uc t t h e c r o s s i n g . The E g y p t i a n

4rmy had many problems - l o w m o r a l e , i m p r o p e r o r

15


22/162

i n s u f f i c i e n t t r a i n i n g , o f f i c e r s h o r t a g e s , u n w o r k a b l e

m o b i l i z a t i o n p l an s, a n d u n e m p l o y a b l e t a c t i c s a nd

i n s u f f i c i e n t e q u i p m e n t for r i v e r , or c a n a l , c r o s s i n g

o p e r a t i o n s .

M a ny l e s s o n s w e r e l e a r ne d i n t h e 1967 d e f e a t

a n d t h e War o f A t t r i t io n . M a n y o f t h e p r o b l e m s a n d

l e s s o n s l e a r n e d i n t h e 1967 Wa r h a d b e e n c o r r e c t e d a n d

i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a r m y d o c t r i n e , a nd m a n y f r o m t h e Wa r

o f A t t r i t i o n w o u ld b e c o r r e c t e d b e f o r e t h e O c t o b e r

War.

O n e o f t h e p r o b l e m s i n t h e S i x- D ay Wa r h a d b e e n

t h e i n c om p e t e n t a nd h i g h l y p o li t ic a l E g y p t i a n s e n i o r

m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s hi p . I n 1967 a n d 1968 a p u r g e o f t h e

m i l i t a r y l e d t . o t h e r e m o v a l o f m a ny o f t h e s e

i n c o m p e t e n t c o mm a nd e rs . D u ri n g t h o s e t w o y e a r s t h e r e

a l s o w a s a m a j o r s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i g n me n t w i t h i n t h e h i ghc o m m a n d . T h e g o a l o f t h e s e c h a n g e s , i n i t i a t e d by

N a s s e r , w a s t o c r e a t e a u n i t y of c o m m a n d a n d p u r p o s e

w i t h c l e a r l i n e s o f a u t h o r i t y a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , w h i c h

w a s m i s s i n g d u r i n g t h e S i x- D a y War. I s

P r e c e d i n g t h e S i x- D ay Wa r , r i v a l r y, m i s t ru s t ,

a n d p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e b e t w e e n C om m a nd e r -i n - Ch i e f F i e l d

M a r s h a l l M u h a m m a d A b d u l H a k i m A m e r, C h i e f o f S ta.l.f

G e n e r a l M u h a m m a d F a w z i , a n d M i n i s t e r o f Wa r B r i g a d i e r

S h e m s a l -D i n B a d r a n, l e d t o a n u n w o r k a b l e c h a i n o f

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command w h i ch p ro d u c e d c o n f l i c t s a n d o v e r l a p p i n g

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . F e l t t h ro u g h o u t t h e m i l i t a r y

e s t a b l i s h m e n t , t h e s e p r o b le m s ca u se d w i d e sp r e a d

c o n f u s i o n and d i s u n i t y .

These p rob lem s were compounded when F i e l d

M a r s h a l l Amer c r e a t e d a new command i n May 1967, t h e

F r o n t Command, l e d by an Amer c ro n y Ge ne ral Abd

a l - M u l s e n K a ma l M u r t a g u i . A new he ad qu ar t e r s was

i n t r o d u c e d b etw ee n t h e Command f o r t h e E a s t e r n M i l i t a r y

D i s t r i c t , commanded b y L t . G e n e r a l S a l a h a l - D i n M ohsen,

a nd t h e G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s (C lm er). T he E a s t e r n

M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t became t h e F i e l d Army Command, i n

o p e r a t i o n a l command and c o n t r o l of a l l a s s e t s i n t h e

e v e n t o f w a r w i t h I s r a e l . I n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e F r o n t

Command ( M u r t a q u i ) b e t w e e n t h e C h i e f o f S t a f f a nd t h e

F i e l d Army Command w a s d i s a s t r o u s i n t h e Six-Day War

b e ca u se t h e command c r e a t e d c o n f u s i o n i n t h e c h a i n o f

command, a nd s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s d e v e lo p e d b etw ee n

M ur ta gu i and Mohsen. (See Appendix 2-7. c h a i n o f

command d u r i n g t h e 1967 War.) l 7

A f t e r t h e S ix -D a y War, N a ss er r e s t r u c t u r e d t h e

a rmed fo rc e s . Amer, M ur ta gu i , Badran , and many s e n i o r

a i r f o r c e com manders w e re d i s m i ss e d . Many, i n c l u d i n g

B adra n, f a ce d p u b l i c t r i a l s . A new law was iss u e d

r e q u i r i n g p r e s i d e n t i a l a pp ro va l f o r a l l p ro m o ti o n s t o

1 7


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1 1 killed and 92 wounded. Evidently th e at tack had a

deter rent e ffec t upon t he Egypt ians, for an eleven-

month per iod of r e la t iv e ca lm exis ted a long th e Canal,

wi th th e except ion of occasional art i l lery f ires, air

batt les , and cr os s canal patrols . Th is period

cont inued in to th e summer of 1968. L -

September 1968 saw the end of N a s s e r s f i r s t

phase, def enmi ve rehabil i tat ion. I Th e Sovie t Union

had rearmed th e Egypt ian Army quant i ta t ive ly to a leve l

exceedin g pre-1967 strengths. New, higher quali ty

weap ons had also been introduced into th e army and air

force. MIG-21s replaced MIG-17s. and T-54 and T-55

ta nk s replaced T-34s. Soviet involvem ent also

increased in the number of mili tary personnel coming

t o Egypt to t ra in and h e l p organize th e armed forces .

In i t ial ly number ing only a fe w hundred in 1968; theyeventua l ly would number in the thousands becoming

involved in vir tual ly al l aspects o f t h e Egy pti an firmed

Forces.

The s t ruc tu re o f th e Egypt ian h igh command had

been reorganized t o improve uni ty of command and

purpose ( i t was t o undergo fur ther cha nge s which wi ll

be discussed in Chapter 1 1 1 ) . Incompetent senior

officers had been removed, in some c a s e s

court-mart ialed. and replaced by competen t ,

18


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professional commanders.

T h e calm of th e first half of 1968 was

interrupted by a concentrated barrage of over 1000

pieces of Egyptian artillery along t he entire length o f

th e Suez Canal on 8 September 1968. T h e 5econd phase

o f Nasser's plan, offensive defense. had begun. One

purpose was to rais e the morale of the army and t he

country and t o erase th e psychological effects o f the

defeat o f t h e S i x Day War. To accomplish thi s Nasser

wanted t o begin a limited o ffen siv r campaign against

Israel to d i s p e l th e superiority of the Israeli

forces. A second purpose w as to bring t o bear on t h e

Israeli military in the Sinai th e strategy Of

attrition. Nasser was well awa re of th e high value

that Israel placed on human life. He h o p e d that

concentrated attacks on t he Israeli f orc es would bring

pressure on t he Israeli government t o withdraw rather

than sustain high casualties. The forthcoming

off ens ive operations were to increase not only Israel's

economic burden of retaining t he occupied territories,

but to increase Israeli casualties. undermining their

morale. I

During thi s second phase of Nasser's plan,

through March 1969. fig hti ng raged almost continually

along th e Canal, especially during th e first fe w

1 1


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months. I s rae l i cas ual t ie s dur ing th e f i r s t

bombardment on 8 September and t he second o ne on 26

October numbered 25 killed and 51 wounded. a m Itappeared tha t t he Egypt ian s t ra tegy of at t r i t ion was

working; Israel wa s taking heavy casualt ies . Israel i

re ta l ia t ion af te r th e f i r s t bombardment wa s an

ar t i l le ry bombardment of th e c i t ies o f Suez and

Ismai l ia and t he ref in er i es in Suez .

The scope of t h e war began t o sp read as Egypt

and Is rae l both conducted comma ndo ra i ds across the

Cana l , a t t ime s qu i t e d e e p into enemy terr i tory. On 31

October he l icopter borne Is rae l i comma ndo es s taged a

successfu l ra id agains t t hre e ta rge ts a long th e Ni le

River be tween Cai ro and 4swan, over 200 miles west of

th e Canal in re ta l ia t ion for the 26 October Egypt ian

art i l ler y bombar dment along th e Canal .

Th e Israel i-adopted policy of reprisal was

meant to explo it Egypt ian mi l i ta ry, economic , and

psychologica l sens i t iv i t i es and was an extension of

Is rae l ' s defense s t ra tegy. Th e Is rae li s t ra tegy was

"at i t s sourc e reac t ion t o and repr isal for Egypt ian

brea ches of the cease-fi re, ac companie d by a policy o f

ref ra in ing f rom any i n i t ia t ive tha t might lead to

esca lat i on of mil i tary a ct ivi ty along t he canal ."

They in i t ia l ly b e l i e v e d t hat t he cea ee f i r e cou ld b e

2 0


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r e i m p o s e d b y l i m i t i ng m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y t o a r t i l l e r y

c o u n t e r s t r i k e s a ga i n s t E g y p t i a n a r t i l l e r y, e c o n o m ic ,

and civ i l ian i n s t a l l a t i o n s a l o n g t h e C an al . " T h e s e

c o u n t e r b o m b a r d m e n t s w e r e i n t en d ed t o s h o w t h e E g y p t i a n s

t h e c o s t of t h e i r m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y, no t o n l y f r o m t h o

m i l i t a r y s t a n d p oi n t b u t a l s o f r o m t h e e c o n o m i c a nd

ci vi 1 i an s tandpoin t . ao

W h en E g y p t i n c r e a s e d t h e m i l i t ar y a c t i v i ty

a l o n g t h e Ca na l a nd c o m m a n d o r a i d s on t h e ea s t b a n k ,

t h e I s r a e l i s r e a l i z e d t h a t m e r e l y r e t u r n i n g t h e f i r e

w a s n o a n s w e r to Egypt ' s s t ra tegy. I4 new Is rae l i

m i l i t a r y a c t i o n w a s n e e d e d t o i m p o s e a c e a s e f i r e o n t h e

E g yp t ia n s. A n a p p r o p r i a t e r e s p o n s e w o u l d b e r e p r i s a l

r a i d s d e e p i n t o E gy p t a g a i n s t t a r g e t s c o n s i d e r e d

s e n s i t i v e - m i l i t a r y, e c o n o m i c , a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l .

T h i s l e d to t h e p r e v i o us l y m e n t i o ne d 31 O c t o b e r r a i d s

o n t h e Nile R i v e r t a rg e t s at N a j h H a m a d i a n d Q e n a ,

w h i c h a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e d E g y p t ' s v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o

Is rae l i at t acks . Th e I s rae l i' s a l s o hoped tha t the

r a i d s w o u l d f o r c e E g y pt t o s p re a d i t s f o r c e s a nd r e d u c e

t h e t r o o p c o n c e n t r a t i o n a l o n g t h e w e st b an k o f t h e

Canal. A p e ri o d o f c o m p a r a t i v e c a l m r e t u rn e d a l o n g t h e

C a na l. T h i s l ul l i n f i g h t i n g b e g a n i n e a r l y N o v e m b e r1968, a n d c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h t h e f o l l o w i n g M a rc h.

D u r i n g t h e c e a s e f i r e t h e I s r a e l i s w e r e f a c e d


28/162

with a strategic di lemma: how best t o defend

thems e lves agains t t he Egyp ti an s t r a t egy of attrition.

There wer e bas ica l ly tw o al te rna tives . The firstopt ion for t he Is rae l i s was to pull back f rom th e

Canal , out of t he range of a r t i l le ry, and mainta in

armored f o r c e s capable of caunt r ra t tacking if , and

when, th e Egypt ians a t tempted a c ross ing . This opt ion

was more charac ter i s t ic of the mobile , rap id reac t ing

armored and mechanized maneuvers that the Israel i

fo rc es had su ccessfu l ly used in previous c ampaigns and

wars. Th is option, however, meant EQypt might b e ab le

t o successfu l ly c ro ss the Canal and es tabl i sh a

br idgehead on the eas t bank before t he I F could

repu lse them. An Egyptian bridgehead establis hed on

t h e east bank could also present th e Egyptians with a

dip lomat ic oppor tuni ty t o for ce Is rae l i concess ions on

the occupied terr i tories. =as

Th e second opt ion was to bui ld a for t i f ied l ine

a long the edge of the Canal. Thi s opt ion of s ta t ic

def ens e meant devia t ing f rom the standard Is rae li

s t r a t egy o f mobi le defense. I t would a lso leave the

I F personnel s ta t ioned a long the l ine vulnerable t o

th e Egypt ian s t ra tegy of a t t r i t ion from art i l lery

bombardments , unles s suff ic ient pro tec t ive fac i l i t ies

wer e built. It would also mean adop ting t h e s ta t ic

22


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defense strategy, which favored Egypt with its

superiority in artillery tu bes and its willingness t o

accept human and equipment losses f o r th e long-rangegoal of regaining the occupied territories. zaX

According t o most sources, t h e Israeli military

high command was divided on which option to select to

counter th e growing Egyptian belligerence. Major

General Avraham ( W e n ) Adan, Commander of Armored

Forces, was chosen by Lieutenant General Chaim Bar-Lev,

Chief o f th e General Sta ff, to head a military board t o

develop a concept fo r a defen siv e system in the Sinai.

Adan's plan basically used the second option. He would

situate approximately 17 small fortif ication s along t he

length of the Canal to give maximum coverag e and

observation. A small contingent of infantry would man

each fort res s while larger armored and artillery fo rce s

would be stationed behind t he outposts, patrolling

between th e outposts and acting a s reserve s to b e

brought to t he Canal to stop any attemptad Egyptian

crossing. =*

Major General Yeshayahu Gavich, Commander of

th e Southern Command, and Lt. Gen Bar-Lev approved of

Adan's plan. Major General CIriel Sharon, Head ofTraining, IDF, and Major General Israel Tal, attached

to the Ministry of Defense, disapproved of Adan's plan


30/162


31/162

forces . Th e outpos ts would be bui l t so l id ly enough to

withstan d heavy art i l ler y bombardments. This concept

reduced casua l t ies whi le thwar t ing , or a t l eas t

delaying , a crossing and enabling impleme ntat ion of t h e

mobil izat ion plan of th e IDF. Th e second defens ive

l ine would consist of armored, ar t i l ler y, and

mechanized fo rc es s t ra teg ica l ly s ta t ioned a t pos i t ions

t o t h e r e a r of the main for t ressas and s t ronqpoin ts.

They could move la te ra l ly a long the main defens ive l in e

- giv ing them th e ab i l i ty t o move immedia te ly to oppose

enemy crossings. 31

In early 1969 Lt. Gen. Bar-Lev acc ept ed Adan's

p lan . in sp i te of th e vehement a rguments of Sharon ,

Tal , and the i r supporte rs . Dur ing the cea eef i re in

January and February 1969 th e cons t ruc t ion of th e

Bar-Lev Line, a s i t beca me known, was hast i ly

comple ted . Thi s complex ne twork o f fortresses. patrol

roads, earth walls , mine f ielde, approach roads,

undergro und control cen ters , and tank and art i l lery

pos i t ions w as upgraded a t l east th ree t im es dur ing th e

next tw o years . Mass ive sand rampar ts were cons t ruc ted

on th e eas t edge of th e Canal , t ransform ing i t in to a

"gian t tank t rap." Th e rampar ts provided f ie lds off i r e a long th e cana l whi le provid ing o bs tac les to

infantry and armored units .

25


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There were basically three component s of thi s

defens ive concept. The first was a ser ies of stone-

and sand-reinforced bunkers maozim, situated atintervals of 10-30 kilometers (17 in all along the

length of the Canal), which were the main observation

posts and t he first lin e of defense ( a trip wire for

activating t he mobilization of the IDF). Later another

20 strongholds (taozim) were built along a road, known

as th e Artillery Road, which paralleled th e Canal 8-10

kilometers east of it. Thi s road was t o b e used to

move artillery along t h e line as the flow o f battle

dictated. Further east another road, th e Lateral Road,

running parallel to t h e Canal and about 30 kilometers

from it was constructed to move the other two

comp one nts of t he def ense concept, armored and

artillery units, between sectors along th e Canal. In

all approximately 500 million dollare was spent in

constructing, upgrading, and repairing th e defe nsi ve

network. =o

By early 1969 Nasser was totally dissatisfied

and disillusioned with th e diplomatic at tempts to bring

concessions from Israel concerning t h e occupied

territories. T h e construction of th e Bar-Lev Lin ereinforced h i s opinion of Israeli intransigence in

remaining in the Sinai. He saw the l i n e not only as

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Israel 's at tempt to i n s u r e t h e s t a t u s q u o of i t s

pres ence and mil i tary super iori ty along t he Canal and

, d s a way t o block Egypt 's crossin g, but als o as Egypt 's

a t t emp t t o impose a f ixed pol i t ica l boundary a long the

Canal . These cons idera t ions were pr imari ly respons ib le

fo r Nasser ' s dec is ion t o renew th e f ight ing and the War

, of Attrition. = a

Yet Narser wa s aware of severa l fa c to rs which

would de t e rmine t he level of war he pursued, a l imited

war rather than a general war against Israel . Egypt

had not fu l ly recovered in mi l i tary s t rength and was

st i l l unab le to obtain a posi t ion of equali ty with

Israel 's mil i tary strength, especial ly air power.

Althoug h Egypt had rece ived large numb ers of modern

a i rc raf t f rom t he Sovie ts and many p i lo ts had been

t ra ined , they were s t i ll incapable of neut ra l iz ing or

counterba lanc ing the IAF in th e air-to-air arena.

L ikewi se , t he ground fo rce s d i d not have suff ic ien t

surface- to-a i r def ens es to neutra l ize th e Iawaeli c lo se

air support and interdic t ion capabil i t i t ies . They

needed an improved air defense system because the IAF

had effec t ive ly neut ra l ized the S A M - 2 s and SAH-3s

dur ing 1968. Egypt a l so needed increased t ra in ing for

the i r p i lo t s t o successfu l ly offse t the se I s rael i

SuDeriori t ies . ==

27


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I s r a e l i v ie w i n t o E g y p t and h e l p e d c o n c e a l some of t h e

p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e u pc om ing b a t t l e . 3L

A n en orm ou s l o g i s t i c a nd c o m m u n ic a ti o ns n e tw o r k

wa5 b u i l t b e h in d t h e de fe n se w a l l a s w e l l .

E x t e n e i v e c o m m u n i c a t io n n e t w o r k s w e reb u i l t , r oa ds , r a i l r o a d s , d o c k s : on t he s e , b o t hm i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n v e h i c l e s , r a i l r o a d s , andw a t e r t r a n s p o r t w e re u se d t o move s u p p l i e s ande qu ip me nt t o t h e f r o n t . A s e r i e s o f . f u e l d e p o tse s p e c i a l l y s e cu re d a g a i n s t a i r a t t a c k s w erec o n s t r u c t e d , m os t o f th em u n d e r g r o u n d . Wa te r t a n k sw ere s e t up f ro m P o r t S a i d n o r t h , i n a l l s e c t o r s o ft h e f r o n t . . . Much o f t h e m a t e r i a l wa5 moved t ot h e f r o n t p r i o r t o O c t o b e r 6 ; s p e c i a l c a r e wase x e rc i s e d t o t r a n s p o r t i t g r a d u a l l y t o a v o i da l e r t i n g t h e I s r a e l i s . 37

P r e p a r a t i o n s and r e f i n e m e n t s f o r G r a n i t e Two

and H i g h M i n a r e t s c o n t i n u e d a t an i n c r e a s i n g p ac e w i t h

s e c u r i t y p r e c a u t i o n s r e m a in in g s t r i c t f o r H ig h

M i n a r e t s . Ve r y fe w p e o p l e w ere a w ar e o f t h e s ec o nd

p l a n . A c c o r d in g t o G e n er al S h a zl y o n l y f o u r t e e n p e o p l e

w ere e v e r aw are o f t h e e n t i r e H i gh M i n a r e t s p l a n a5 i t

e v o l v e d . T h o s e i n t h e know were s even members o f t h e

E g y p t i a n H i g h Command, s i x i n t h e S y r i a n H i g h Command,

p l u s one E g y p t i a n o f f i c e r who r a n t h e s p e c i a l s t a f f s e t

up i n J a nu a ry 1973 t o c o o r d i n a t e E g y p t i a n and S y r i a n

p l a n n i n g .

A s m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s c o n t in u e d i n 1972 and

1973 f o r t h e i n e v i t a b l e w ar w i t h I s r a e l P r e s i d e n t

S ad a t pu rs ue d d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s f o r a s e t t l e m e n t .

A 5 s t a t e d e a r l i e r S a d a t s a t t e m p ts a t a d i p l o m a t i c

28


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b u r d e n s o n t h e e co n o m y, a n d d e s t r oy a s m u c h of t h e B a r-

L e v L i n e a n d I s r a el i w a r e q u i p m e n t a s p o s si b l e .

T h i s a t t r i t i v e w a r w o u l d, l i k e w i s e , k e e p t h e

p o l i t ic a l i s s u e a l i v e i n t h e U ni t e d N a t io n s ,

i n t e n s if y i n g p r e s s u r e o n I sr ae l f o r r e t u r n i ng t h e

o c c u p i e d la nd s. N a s s e r a l s o h o p e d t h e p r o l o n g e d w ar

w o u ld i n c r e a s e t h e o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t of t h e E g y p t ia n

f o r c e s a n d r a i s e m o r a l e o f t h e E g y p t i a n p u b l i c t h r o u g h

a r iucceesful c ampa ign aga in s t t he I s rae l i s . F ina l l y, h e

h o p ed t h e wa r w o u l d e l e v a t e E g y p t i an s t a t u s an d

l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e 4 r a b w o r l d a n d e s t a b l i s h a uni f ied

f r o n t a g a i n s t t h e I s r a e l i s w h ic h w o u l d u l t i m a t e l y l e ad

t o a genera l war and I s rae l ' s des t ruc t ion .

In a c c o m p li s h i n g t h e l im i t ed a i m s of t h e

" l i b e r a t i o n p h a s e " , t h e E g y p t i a n s p o s s e s s e d s u p p r i o r i t y

a v e r t h e I s r a e l i s i n t h e o n e w e a po n r e qu i re d f o r t h i s

t y p e o f w a r - ar t i l l e ry. The E g y p t i a n ' s p r i m a r y t a c t i c

w a s c o n t i n u e d b o m b a r d m e n t s s u p p l e m e n t e d by c o m m a n d o

r a i d s o n t a rg e t s o n t h e e as t b a n k of t h e S ue z. T h i s

s t a t i c w a r w o u l d n e g a t e t h e I DF 's a d v a n t a g e of

maneuv erab i l i ty and speed. I t would a l l ow th e

E g y p t i a n s t o w i p e o u t a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f t h e

f o r w a r d p o s i t i o n s of t h e B a r- Le v L i n e a s w el l a s t h e

m o b i l e f o r c e s n e a r t h e C a na l , w h i l e a l l o w i n g t h e m t o

s e i z e a n u m b e r of b r i d g e h e a d s o n t h e e a s t b a nk . L

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I n mid-March 1969 t h e c e a s e f i r e e nded w i t h

c o n c e n t r a te d E g y p t i a n a r t i l l e r y b a r ra g e s a g a i n s t t h e

I s r a e l i d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s a lo n g t h e C an a l . The

l i b e r a t i o n p ha se o f t h e War o f A t t r i t i o n had now

begun. I t w ou ld c o n t i n u e w i t h o u t r e s p i t e f o r t h e n e x t

s i x t e e n m o n ths u n t i l t h e j o i n t a cc ep ta nc e of t h e

R o g e r ' s P l a n i n A u g u s t 1970. D u r i n g t h i s s ev en te en -

m onth p e r io d , num erous r a i d s , a i r b a t t l e s , a r t i l l e r y

d u e l s , an d o t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l a nd u n c o n v e n t i o n a l

b a t t l e s o c cu rr ed .

I s r a e l ' s b a s i c a im s d u r i n g t h i s p h a s e w e r e

f u n d a m e n t a l l y w h at t h e y h a d be en s i n c e Ju n e 1967 - t o

m a i n t a i n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y

s t a t u s q uo c r e a t e d a f t e r t h e S ix -D a y War. To m a i n t a i n

t h i s c o n d i t i o n , t h e y f o r m u l a t e d f i v e i n t e r m e d i a t e a im s:

1 ) p r e v e n t E g y pt f r o m c r o s s i n g t h e Suez and

e s t a b l i s h i n g f o o t h o l d s on t h e e a s t b ank ; 2 ) r e m a i n

f i r m l y i n c o n t r o l o f t h e e x i s t i n g l i n e t o show t h a t

I s r a e l ha d t h e d e t e r m i n a t io n and c a p a b i l i t y t o d o so ;

3 ) p r e v e n t t o t a l war w h ic h w ou ld u p s e t t h e s t a t u s quo

b r o u g h t a b ou t b y p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s f o r change b e f o r e

I s r a e l r e a l i z e d i t 5 p o l i t i c a l - s t r a t e g i c a l a im s o f a

p o s i t i v e p e a c e t r e a t y : ( 4 ) r e f r a i n f r o m v i o l a t i n g t h e

c e a s e f i r e , w h ic h c o u l d l e a d t o e s c a l a t i o n a nd g e n e r a l

war ; and (5) e f r a i n f r o m e s c a l a t i n g a nd e x t e n d i n g t h e


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war t o a to ta l war in th e event Egypt in i t ia ted

inc idents a long th e Canal. =7

Throughout March, Apri l , and early May, the

Egypt ians cont inued t he heavy ar t i l le ry bar rages

against t h e Bar-Lev Li ne and Israel i fo rc es al l along

th e eastern bank. In Apri l Egypt ian commando ra ids

agai nst t he Bar-Lev Li ne, Israeli patr ols, and logistic:

rou tes and areas esca la ted the in tens i ty of t he

' conflict. The Bar-Lev Line he ld , but w as battered.

The Is rae l i s suffered heavy casual t ies , but d i d not

l e ssen the i r r e so lve t o ma in t ain t he s t a tu s quo. In

mid-April Israel i co mm an do s struck again along t h e Nile

cutt ing high-tension powerl ines between Aswan and Cairo

' and at tackin g a brid ge near Idfu. Israel i

counter-art i l lery f i re and commando ra ids inf l ic ted

heavy casu alt ies and loss es on thee Egyptians. Howe ver ,

these l o s se s and casua l t i e s d i d not seem to lessen

Egyp ti an r e so lve t o impose thei r will on Israel.

Th e Is rae li def ens ive measure s dur ing th e March

t o Ju ne per iod were pr imar i ly re ta l ia tory. I s rael i

counter-ar ti l le ry f i r es answered the in it ial Egypt ian

art i l ler y barrages. When Egypt began using comm ando

ra ids on t he eas t e rn s ide o f t he Cana l , t he I s rae li s

re ta l ia ted wi th commando ra ids d e e p into Egypt - a

tact ic that had worked in 1968 t o br ing about a


38/162

c e a s e f i r e . D u r i n g t h i s t i m e f ra me i n 1969, I s r a e l , a s

w e l l a s E gy pt , h a d r e f r a i n e d f r o m u s i n g t h e i r a i r

f o r c e s i n any s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e c o n f l i c t .

I n The War o f A t t r i t i o n , B ar-S im an-Tov

d i s c u s s e s t h e a i r f o r c e s ' n o n - ro l e up t o t h e m i d d le

o f 1969. He s t a t e s t h a t b o t h n a t i o n s a b s t a i n e d f ro m

u s i n g a i r p ower b e c a u s e o f t h e e s c a l a t i o n t h e i r u se

w o u l d p r o d u c e i n t h e l i m i t e d w ar; E g y p t ' s A i r F o r c e

was n o t r e a d y t o c o n f r o n t t h e IPF, b ec au se t h e y d i d n o t

h a v e enough q u a l i f i e d , p r o f i c i e n t p i l o t s c a p a b le o f

d e f e a t i n g I A F p i l o t s i n h e a d -t o -h e a d c om b a t. L i k e w i s e ,

t h e a i r d ef e ns e n e tw o r k was n o t w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . The

I s r a e l i s f e l t t h a t i n t r o d u c i n g t h e a i r f o r c e w ou ld b e

c o u n t e rp r o d u c t i v e a g a i n s t E g y p t i a n t a r g e t s ( i n f a n t r y ,

g un s. a nd m o r t a r e m p l a ce m e n t s ), a nd c o u l d a l s o

i n t e n s i f y t h e war. I s r a e l d i d n o t w an t t o r a i s e t h e

p r o f i l e or i n t e n s i t y o f t h e war f o r p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y

r e as on s d e s c r ib e d e a r l i e r . O th er p o l i t i c a l r e as on s

i n c l u d e d t h e u n c e r t a i n t y o f U n i t e d S t a t e s a nd S o v i e t

r e a c t i o n t o t h e e s c a l a t o r y n a t u r e o f i n t r o d u c i n g t h e

a i r f o r c e and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a g e n e r a l war.

M a i n t a i n i n g t h e w a r ' s s t a t i c n a t u r e w h i l e a l s o

m a i n t a i n i n g s u f f i c i e n t i n t e n s i t y t o r e i m p o s e t h e

c e a s e f i r e on t h e E g y p t i a n s was i n I s r a e l ' s v i t a l

i t e r e s t . 3


39/162

Meanwhi le , I s rae l i casual t ies cont inued to

mount. In May and Ju ne 1969 Israel suffered 76

casua l t i e s 2 2 kil led and 54 wounded), over one-half

caus ed by artillery. On 10 July another incident

occurred which influenced Israel i s trategy i n t h e

coming months. An Egyptian commando raid successfu ly

attacked on Israel i armored unit south of P o r t Tewfik

in dayl ight , inf l ic t ing eleven casual t ies on the

Israeli force. The escalato ry natur e of th e war,

publ ic and pol i t ica l sens i t iv i t ies towards the

in to lerable increase in casualt ies , and Israel 's

reevaluation of Egyptian aims, l ed t o fo rmula t ion o f

new Israel i aims and strategy in mid-July;

in t roduct ion of th e a i r force in to t h e war; and a

swi tch f rom a defens ive t o a l imi ted , offens ive

strategy. 4o

Dissent in the armed f orc es onc e again

accompanied t h e decis ion to employ t h e air force.

Among th ose oppos ing t h e use of th e a i r for ce

were Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan; Chief of Staff

Chaim Bar-Lev; and senior air fa rc e staff headed by

Commander Mordekhai Hod. Dayan opposed using th e air

fo r ce due to t he imp l i ed e sca l a to ry s ign if i cance . It

should only b e used i f a ser ious Egypt ian threat

occurred (i-e., an at tempted crossing in force) .

3 3


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O t h e r s d i d not wish to use a ir f o r c e d u e t o t h e

extens ive Egypt ian miss i les a long th e canal . Unless

t h e I A F obta ined new e lec t ronic countermeasure (ECM)equipment t o counter th e threa t , they wer e not in favo r

of us ing t h e a i r f o r ce t o bomb Egyp t i an i n f an t ry or gun

emplacements. **

In sp i te of the se misg iv ings , o n 19 J u l y 1969

t h e IDF and the I s rael i government dec ided t o use the

ICIF. Th e Is rael is bel ieved that. th e increased act ivi ty

a long t he Canal was a pre lu de t o a near- te rm cross ing .

The l imited use of the IAF was des igned to prevent th i s

cross ing b y showing th e Egypt ians tha t I s rae l s t i l l

maintained superiori ty i n th e air, and that no cross ing

attempt could succeed. Other Israel i ai ms were to

prevent Egypt f ro m increas ing th e leve l of war t o a

general war and forc e her to decr ease t h e number of

mil i tary along th e Canal . Israel bel ieved t hi s would

decr ease casualit iea. General Bar-Lev later

character ized th is s trategy by saying:

I. . . put t ing p la nes in to ac t ion cur ren t ly on thecanal is ' e scala t ion for the sak e ofde-escalat ion, ' an increase of act ivi ty for thepu rpose of securing a reduction of act ivi ty." 41

On 20 Ju ly the IAF in i t ia ted a i r a t tacks

agains t t he Egypt ian fo rce s on th e west bank which

lasted through 28 July. They hoped th e Egyp tian s would

b e fo r ced t o g i v e up th e idea o f a crossing. Targ ets


41/162

w ere m a i n l y n o r t h o f Q a n t a r a and w i t h i n a fe w m i l e s o f

t h e C a n a l. The a i r a t t a c k s w ere d i r e c t e d a t a r t i l l e r y

emplacemen t s , SAM-2 s i t e s , commando bases , r a d a r

s t a t i o n s , and s t r o n g p o i n t s o f t h e E g y p t i a n a rm ed

f o r ce s . The l i m i t e d n a t u r e o f t h e s e t a r g e t s was a g a i n

due t o t h e I s r a e l i d e s i r e t o d ec re as e t h e a p p a re n t

e s c a l a t o r y n a t u r e o f e m p lo y in g t h e IAF . *=

T he re i s some i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e em ploym ent o+

t h e I AF d i d f o r c e N as s e r t o p o s tp on e t h e c r o s s i n g o f

t h e C a n a l. He d i d n o t i n t e n d t o c a n c e l t h e c r o s s i n g ,

o n l y p o s t p o ne i t and c o n t i n u e t h e w ar o f a t t r i t i o n . *-

G round a c t i v i t y c o n t i n u e d un ab a t ed t h r ou g h J u l y

and A ug us t by b o t h b e l l i g e r e n t s . O n 19 J u l y t h e

I s r a e l i s l au n c h ed a n i g h t i m e commando r a i d o n G ree n

I s l a n d i n t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t o f t h e G u l f o f Suez . FI k e y

r a d a r s i t e f o r t h e E g y p t i a n a n t i - a i r c r a f t n e tw o r k h a s

ho used on t h i s i s l a n d . The I s r a e l i s d e s t r o y e d t h e

r a d a r e q ui pm e n t a nd g un e m pla ce m en ts . The I s r a e l i s

c o n d u c t e d n i n e m ore commando r a i d s i n t o E g y p t t h r o u g h

27 December 1969. Two o f t h e s e r a i d s w ere s i g n i f i c a n t

t o I s r a e l i aim s, b ec au se t h e y d e m on s tr a t ed t h e

v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f Eg yp t. The I s r a e l i s hope d t h e r e s u l t s

o f t h e s e s u c c e s s f u l r a i d s and t h e a i r f o r c e ' s e n t r a n c e

i n t o t h e war w o u ld l e a d E gy p t t o renew t h e c e a s e f i r e

a nd en d t h e i r b e1 1 i e r e n c y. -*

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On 9 S ep te m be r a f o r c e o f s e v e r a l h u n d r e d

I s r a e l i s , e qu ip pe d w i t h S o v i e t t a n k s a n d p e r s o n n e l

c a r r i e r s c a p tu r e d i n t h e S ix -D a y War, was t r a n s p o r t e d

b y a m p h i b io u s v e s s e l s t o t h e w es t b an k o f t h e G u l f o f

S ue z, n o r t h o f E l - K h a f i r . Th ey p r o ce e d e d s o u t h a l o n g a

c o a s t a l r o a d d e s t r o y i n g a r a d a r s i t e a t Ras Ab u-D ara j,

t h e m ain o b j e c t i v e . IA F a i r c r a f t a s s i s t e d them i n t h i s

o p e r a t i o n . They p ro c ee d e d s o u t h , v i r t u a l l y u no pp os ed

b y E g y p t i a n f o r c e s , an d d e s t ro y e d a se co nd ra d a r s i t e

a t Rae Z a a f ra n a . The I s r a e l i f o r c e t h e n re em b ark ed on

a m p hib io us c r a f t and r e t u r n e d t o t h e S i n a i . 4

L a t e r i n December h e l i c o p t e r s t r a n s p o r t e d

I s r a e l i f o r c e s t o an E g y p t i a n r a d a r s t a t i o n a t Ras

t i h a r i b w h i c h was e q u i p p e d w i t h a new, l o w - l e v e l t a r g e t

a c q u i s i t i o n r a d a r , known a s t h e P-12 r a d a r . T h i s w a s

o ne of t h e S o v i e t s mo st modern r a d a r s w i t h

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s u nknown t o w e st e rn m i l i t a r y and

i n t e l l i g e n c e a g en c ie s a t t h a t t im e . A team o f I s r a e l i

e n g in e e rs r emoved tw o p a r t i a l l y b u r i e d t r a i l e r s

c o n t a i n i n g t h e r a d a r sys te m, and u se d t wo h e a v y - l i f t

h e l i c o p t e r s t o t r a n s p o r t them to I s r a e l . T h e

t e ch n o lo g y and i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a in e d f ro m t h e I s r a e l i

s t u d y was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t a c t i c s a nd ECM e q u i p m e n t

u se d t o d e f e a t t h e E g y p t i a n s sy ste m. The r a d a r was

l a t e r s e n t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r s tu d y . 47

36


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The second phase of th e ai r force ' s involvement

began on 13 August and cont inued through 19 August

1969. Th e f i r s t phase ended on 28 July when Israel

assumed Egypt had put off th e crossing. Between 28

July and 13 August t he re were mainly small arms,

mortar, and art i l lery f ires. When Egyptian art i l lery

f i r e began t o increase dur ing th e second week o f

August , Israel reacted with air s tr i ke s against

Egyptian art i l lery posi t ions. The Israel i aim during

th i s phase was to b r ing modera t ion t o t he Egyp t ian

activi ty. Counter-bombing art i l lery posi t ion s fai led

to de ter Egypt' s f i r es across th e Canal .

Th is led to a third period of Israel i air

a t t ack s agains t Egypt ian pos i t ions a long t he Canal.

The per iod cont inued f rom 9 Septembe r until th e end o f

December 1969. During th is t ime the Is rae l i s wagedthei r own air war of at tr i t ion against th e Egyptians.

St r ikes were s t i l l l imi ted to ta rge ts a long the length

of th e Canal . Israel 's aim was st i l l destruct ion of

Egypt ian ar t i l le ry pos i t ion6 and a i r defense sys tems

along t he Canal and the Gulf of Suez , and cont inuat ion

of Israel i air supe rior i ty through out t he region. By

t he end of December Egypt ian d efenses a long th e Canal

were basical ly ineffect ive against the IAF. 4 9

As s ta ted ear l ie r, one of th e prerequis i tes f or


44/162

an E g y p t i a n c r o s s i n g o f t h e Canal was n e u t r a l i z a t i o n o f

t h e I s r a e l i a i r 5 u p e r i o r i t . y . B u t t h e c o n t i nu e d

i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e E g y p t i a n A i . r F o r c e an d t h e n t h e

d e s t r u c t i o n of a l a r g e p o r t i o n o f t h e i r a i r d e fe n s e

s ys te m d i c t a t e d m o d i fy i n g t h i s s t r a t e g y . L i k e w is e ,

a n ot he r p r e r e q u i s i t e was a t l e a s t a t w o - fr o n t a t t a c k

a g a i n s t I s r a e l . N a s s e r ' s a t t e m p t s a t A rab u n i t y d u r i n g

1968 and 1969 had p ro v e d f r u i t l e s s - t h e A r a b s w e res t i l l u n a b l e t o a r r i v a t a c on ce ns us f o r d e a l i n g w i t h

I s r a e l , a s w e l l a s N a s s e r ' s a c ce p ta n ce i n t h e A r a b

w o r l d a s i t s l e ad e r .

A t t h e end o f 1969 E g y p t ' s d e s i r e t o l au n ch an

a t t a c k a c r o s s t h e Ca na l was f u r t h e r d e l a y e d due t o t h e

s t a t u s o f t h e ai r d e f e n s e sy s te m s and Ar ab d i s u n i t y .

However, Na sser had no i n t e n t i o n o f d i s c o n t i n u i n g t h e

p l a n n e d a s s a u l t . He w o u ld m e r e l y d e l a y i t . A l t h o u g h

t h e i n i t i a t i v e had gone o v e r t o t h e I s r a e l i s b y y e a r ' s

end, N a s s e r ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o c o n t i n u e was n o t

dam pen ed a nd I s r a e l s i m i t e d a c t i o n p r o ve d

i n s u f f i c i e n t t o im pose a c e a s e f i r e . The I s r a e l i a i r

war d i d n o t b r i n g an end t o t h e h o s t i l i t i e s , b u t d i d

m o d e r a t e i t . Appendix 2-5 c h a r t s t h e a c t i v i t y f r o m

March t o December 1969 and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b etw een

I s r a e l i c a s u a l t i e s ; t h e number o f E g y p t i a n a r t i l l e r y ,

m o r t a r , and s m a l l a rm s f i r e s a c r o s s t h e C an al; and

'38


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Israeli air attacks.

Early 1970 saw major changer in both

belligerents attitudes and strategies. T h e Israelis,sensing a cha nce to exploit their successfully

damaging t h e Egyptian air defense systems, escalated

the air war to include military targets in t h e Egyptian

interior. Thi s was viewed a s a major increase in

escalation. Israel still had doubts about American and

Soviet responsrs to their campaign of. in-depth raids.

Israel felt the USSR would not intervene militarily t o

keep Nasser fr om losing control of th e government o r

risk a confrontation with t he US should t he Soviet

Union ta ke direct military action against her. The

Israelis believed that Soviet intervention would be

very limited i n a worst case scenario.

Israeli con cern s with t h e Rmerican response

were likew ise considered. Lack of US response to

earlier ra ids caused Israel to believe that t he US

would not condemn th e raids. Likewise, Israel felt

that th e US opposed Nasser's government and would be

sympathetic t o any action which would hasten h i 5

removal from office. Futhermore, Israel believed t h e

US was primarily concerned with its own interests i nthe M i d d l e East. Th e prest ige Nasser h a d gained in the

Arab world sin ce th e Six-Day War and h i s anti-American

39


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s tance impai red US inte rest s in th e region. Finally,

Israel had received F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers i n

1969. I f t h e US hadn' t approved of the Israel is t ra tegy, would she have supp li ed the se modern a i r c r a f t

to Israel? Israel's f inal conc ensu s w a e , whi l e t he

Amer i cans d i d not actua l ly en courage t he Is rae li

policy, they d i d not explicity oppose it.='

I s rae li a i r ra id s began on 7 January 1970 and

continued unti l 13 April. The f i r s t ra id was

directed at Egyptian Army and Air Forc e bases near

Inchas and Hilwan. Other ta rge ts near Cai ro were

periodic al ly bombed throughout th e rest of January and

February. The re were c iv i l i an ca sua l t i e s f rom the

ra id s at Abu Zahaal and Bakr el-Bakhar. .aa During

March and Apr il th e ra id s focused on SAM-2 miss i le

s i t es and radar s ta t ions in th e Ni le Del ta. These

ra ids exposed the Egyp t i an ' s i nab i li t y t o de fend

against th e IAF. The Egyptian peop le 's dissat is fact ion

wi th th e mi l i ta ry ' s ineptness threa tened t o br ing down

Nasser 's government. Nasser needed t o d o something

qu ick ly t o d if fu se t h e situation. es4

In early December 1969 t he i ne ff ec t ivenes s o f

t h e SAM-2 missiles agains t t he IAF and t he growing

civ i l ian unres t prompted Nasser t o send a de legat ion t o

Moscow t o secure so l id Sovie t ass i s tance . On 9

40


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D ec em ber Anwar S a d a t , h e a d o f t h e E g y p t i a n N a t i o n a l

A s se m b ly , F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mahmoud R i a d , a nd M i n i s t e r

o f D e f e n se G e n e r a l Mohammed F a w z i l e f t C a i r o w i t h a

m i s s i o n o f o b t a i n i n g m ore s o p h i s t i c a t e d arm s f ro m t h e

S o v i e t s . T hey d i d n o t s uc ce ed i n g a i n i n g a n y t h in g

o t h e r t h a n a S o v i e t u n d e r s t a n d i ng o f E g y p t ' s m i l i t a r y

n ee ds . T he S o v i e t s w e re n o t c o n v i n c e d t h a t m ore

s o p h i s t i c a t e d w ea po nry w o u ld h e l p .

T h e r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e I s r a e l i a i r r a i d s i n t o

t h e h e a r t of E g y pt i n J a n u a r y 1970 s u b s t a n t i a l l y

i n c r e a s e d t h e n eed f o r S o v i e t s u p p o r t. On 22 J a n u a r y a

v e r y ill N a s s e r , a l o n g w i t h G e n e r a l F a w z i a n d

I n f o r m a t i o n M i n i s t e r Mohamed H e i k a l , made a s e c r e t t r i p

t o M oscow, a g a i n s e e k i n g m o re a rm s. N a s s e r ' s a i m was

t o g e t t h e S o v i e t s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d . He t h r e a t e n e d t o

s t e p down a s P r e s i d e n t o f E g y p t and h an d t h e c o u n t r y

o v e r t o a p ro -A m e ric an p r e s i d e n t i f h e y d i d not

p r o v i d e t h e s u p p o r t h e r e q u i r e d . N as ee r r e q u e s te d

SAM-3s . a lo w-to -m ed iu m a l t i t u d e s u r f a c e - t o - a i r

m i s s i l e , a nd M I G f i g h t e r s t o com bat t h e I s r a e l i F -4

Phantoms and A - 4 Skyhawks . Howeve r, Eg yp t had no

m i s s i l e c r e w s t r a i n e d t o o p e r a t e t h e new s ys tem , so h e

r e q u e s t e d S o v i e t c r ew s t o man th em u n t i l t h e E g y p t i an s

c r e w s w ere t r a i n e d . T h i s w ou ld d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e S o v i e t

m i l i t a r y p e r s o n ne l i n t h e w ar w i t h I s r a e l - a m a j o r

4 I


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e s c a l a t o r y move. S o v i e t P r e m i e r L e o n i d R re zh ne v

summoned t h e P o l i t b u r o t o d e c i d e on t h i s c r i t i c a l

i s s u e . T hey d e c i d e d t o s en d SAM-3s p l u s S o v i e t cr e w s

t o E g yp t and i n s t a l l t h e new m i s s i l e sys te m. E i g h t y

S o v i e t a i r c r a f t , i n c l u d i n g f o u r MIG-253, w o u l d a l s o be

s e n t . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 1000 E g y p t i a n s w o uld b e s e n t t o

R u s s i a f o r s ix -m o n th s t r a i n i n g on t h e new m i s s i l e . A

g r e a t l y i n c re a s e d S o v i e t p re se nc e and r o l e i n t h e

I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n c o n f l i c t was f o r th c o m i n g . The S o v i e t

d e c i s i o n w as b as ed i n l a r g e p a r t be ca use o f t h e i r

d e s i r e t o r e t a i n t h e N asse r go ve rnm en t i n power. I

g0vernm en.t f r i e n d l y t o t h e USSR i n t h e r e g i o n w a s

c r i t i c a l f o r them i n r e d u c in g US p r e s e n c e i n t h e M i d d le

E as t. R e s t o r i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c b a la n c e i n t h e C a n a l

r e g i o n w ou ld a l l o w them t o p u r su e d i p l a m a t i c

e f f o r t s .

S o v i e t e q u ip m en t and p e r s o n n e l b eg an a r r i v i n g

s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e N asse r-R rezhn ev c on fe re nc e . I n l a t e

F e b ru a r y t h e f i r s t o f t h e SAM-3 m i s s i l e s and c rew s were

i n p la ce . I s r a e l i a i r a t t a c k s c o n t i n u e d a g a in s t t h e

SAM-2 s i t e s and a t t h e SAM-3 c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e s .

A r t i l l e r y bom bardm ents a nd E g y p t i a n r a i d s a c ro s s t h e

C a n a l c o n t i n u e d . I n F e b r u a r y an E g y p t i a n

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u n i t p e n e t r a t e d t h e M i l t a Pass i n

w e s t - c e n t r a l S i n a i . E g y p t i a n a i r r a i d s and a i r b a t t l e s

42


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in tens i f ied i n Februar y and March. Personne l and

equipment losses on both sides of the Canal mounted. a7

With t he growing "Sovie t iza t ion" of th e war,

Israel faced a di lemna. Should it cont inue th e b o m b i n g

of th e miss i le s i tes , m ore f requent l y manned b y Sovie t

c rews , and chance a d i rec t confronta t ion wi th the

Soviet Union, o r should i t s top o r l imi t t he a t t a cks

al l together ? Minister o f Defense Dayan ini t ial ly

favored l imit ing t h e in -depth a t tacks t o avoid c lashes

with th e Soviets. Vic e Prem ier Yigal FIllon and many of

the o the r Min i s t e r s d i d not shar e Daya n's view. They

viewed th e Sovie t in te rvent ion as l imi ted in na ture and

not l ikely to expand. However, the governm ent d i d not

accept Dayan's proposal . Israel d i d beg in t o l i m i t i t s

r a i d s t o missile s i t es and radar s ta t ions in the

nor theas t a rea of th e Ni l e Del ta. an

In early CIpril Israel 's di lem na wa r fur the r

compou nded. MIG-Zls, pilote d by Sov iets , began

defending th e miss i le s i t es and o ther s t ra teg ic s i t es

in th e in te r ior of Egypt. When Dayan was infarmed of

this. he proposed s topping the in-depth ra i ds en t i re ly

to avoid confront in g th e Sovie t Union . On 13 CIpril the

Is rae l i s ha l ted th e in-depth ra ids , whi le cont inuing

and intensifying t h e a t tacks a long t h e Canal Zone. B y

discont inuing th e in-depth a t tacks Dayan h o p e d that a

43


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51/162

and antiaircraft network up t o th e edge of the

battlezone, halfway between Ismailia and Suez, 30

kilometers fro m th e Canal. The Sovi ets had transferred

their activity from th e rear a reas to t he Canal Zone.

O n 30 Jun e Israel attacked thes e sites, beginning a

direct confrontation with the Soviets. The Israelis

directed their heaviest efforts at these sites,

resulting in increased losses of Israeli aircraft and

pilots. Between 30 June and 7 July Israel lost three

Pha ntom s while destroying or damaging f iv e of t he

twelve SCIM-2 sites. Tawards th e end o f July

Russian-piloted MIGs intercepted and h i t one of t h e

attacking Israeli aircraft . Israel 5 resolve remained

firm and t h e attacks against t h e missile sites

continued. O n 30 July Soviet pilots again engaged

Israeli aircraft over t h e northern sector of the Gulf

of Suez. In th e ensuing dogfight, five Soviet-piloted

MIG-21s were shot down with no Israeli losses.

A f e w days later on 7 August 1970, Israel and

Egypt accepted an American proposal for a ceasefire

negotiated through the United Nations Emissary Gunnar

Jarring. It wa5 not an easy decision for Israel. The

deta ils surrounding t his decision will be discussedfurther i n Chapter IV.

After more than three years of conflict t h e War

4 5


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af Attrition ended without a clear-cut military

decision o r victor. Both Israel and Egypt had suffered

heavy casualties. The military-balance between the twohad changed significantly sinc e th e Six-Day War. Egypt

had considerably improved its strategic position

through Sovie t intervention. From a military

standpoint Egypt had failed because they had not

succeeded i n forcing Israel from the Sinai o r the Suez

Canal. But the military failure was responsible for

the political S U C C ~ S ~ , ecause it involved Soviet

intervention which prevented Israel from affirming its

strategic superiority. Israel's military strategic

standing had declined signficantly from the clear

superiority i t had durin g th e Six-Day War. The

political balance was altered even though the

territorial stat us quo remained unchanged. Israel's

acceptance of t h e ceasefi re and the superpowers

entrance into the process had reduced her political

claut and could lead to fut ure military and political

pressures b y the US and USSR to sec ure Israeli

withdrawal from part or all of th e occupied

territories.

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CHAPTER I 1

ENDNOTES

Yaa co v B a r- Sim a n-To v, The I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a nWar o f A t t r i t i o n , 1969-1970 (1980): 44. C i t i n g61-Ahram, 21 J a n u a r y 1968.

a T he I n s i g h t Team o f t h e S un da y ( L o n d o n )Ti mes I n s i g h t o n t h e M i d d l e E a s t War (1974): 16-17.

= I b i d .- I b i d . : le.I b i d .

C ha im H e r z og , T he A r a b - I s r a e l i Wars (1984):197.

I b i d . : 195.

A. J. B a r k e r , A r a b - I s r a e l i Wars 1 9 8 0 ) : 100.

Nadav S a +ra n, I s r a e l , The E m b a t t l e d A l l y(1978): 260.

O I t m a r R a b i n o v i c h a n d H a im S ha ke d, e d s. , FromJ u ne t o O c t o b e r , The M i d d l e E a s t B etw ee n 1967 and 1973(1978): 141.

'I H e r zo q , A r a b -

arab israeli war of attrition

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