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ANALYSIS OF' RESULTS OF' FALLOUT PROTECTION

SURVEY OF CANADA

JULY 1970

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CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION 1

II FALLOUT PROTECTION SURVEY OF CANADA 3

1. Purpose and Scope 2. Survey Response 3. Organization 4. Interim and Final Survey Results 5. Updating 6. Field Survey Statistios 7. Expenditures

III ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 11

1. Introduction 2. General Analysis Considerations 3. Population Distribution by Risk Area 4. Potential Fallout Shelter 5. Distribution of Shelter Space by Risk Area 6. Factors Affecting Usability of Potential Space

IV IMPLICATIONS 33

1. Introduction 2. Potential Space 3. Consequences of Exposure 4. Activity Steps and Related Costs

ANNEXES

A Population Distribution by Risk Area A-1 • Potential Shelter Spaces by Protection

Factor Category with Population B-1 Population by Risk Area and Total Potential Shelter Space C-1

D Development of Casualty Estimates D-1 • Casualty Estimates by Province E-1 • Development of Cost Estimates F-1 G Risk Area Maps by Province G-1

A

•

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1964 the Government of Canada agreed to a recommendationthat a national survey be carried out of all existing buildings to

identify the potential fallout-protected spaces available. * This

survey entitled the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada, and now

completed, provides:

a national inventory of existing potential

fallout shelter space

information on which to carry out necessary

shelter planning

information on which recommendations can be

made concerning future development of a

national fallout shelter program

•

The development of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada resultèdfrom a series of studies in Shelter Survey Techniques during theperiod 1959 - 1964. These studies are summarized as follows:

1959 - Brockville Pilot Study: Initial survey, by sampling, to

determine the feasibi,lity of survey techniques in conjunction with

a preliminary method of computation.

1961 - Survey of Federal Buildings: Conducted to evaluate the

fallout protection available in basements of federally owned buildings.,

In the Province of Ontario, the first computer program written for

calculation of protection factors was developed by the Department of

Highways of Ontario, in conjunction with the Department of Public

Works of Canada.

1962 - Survey of Mines: A preliminary survey to determine the

suitability of using mines as protected space,, The principal

factors under consideration were habitability, access and emergency

power supply.

1964 - Alberta Pilot Study: The purpose qf this pilot survey was

to:

Develop fallout protection survey techniqueswhich could be applied to a national survey.

Determine the amount of fallout protection in

the Province of Alberta, in terms of protection

factor and space which could be made available

for public use.

Memorandum to the Cabinet1'on Emergency Plans,,

Document CEP 4/64 dated August 10, 1964.

1

• 1965 - Analysis Study No. 1; Alberta Recion: This first analysis study on fallout protection, was aimed at estimating the costs of developing existing shelter potential, but without regard to geographic location.

1969 - Fallout Protection Survey of Canada - Completion: This event represents the culmination of a series of projects designed to determine existing national resources that may be made available for protection of the public against fallout gamma radiation in a nuclear war emergency. Analysis of the results of this work tcgether with details of the inventory, provides the basic information necessary for shelter planning and programming.

The present document - The Analysis of Results of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada, includes among other matters, an a.ttempt to correlate the risk of fallout to fallout shelter distribution as revealed by the Survey. The study does not take into account the potential shelter space that may be available in the various operating and disused mines across the country or the possible fallout protection that may exist in private homes. This analysis is essentially an examination of the number of potential communal shelter spaces located and identified in both public and private buildings across Canada.

In order to provide a better understanding of the results of• this study, a brief description of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada has been included as Section II.

2

II. FALLOUT PROTECTION SURVEY OF CANADA

•

1. Purpose and Scope.

The purpose of the survey was to determine the amount and quality of existing potential fallout shelter space that could be made available to the public in a nuclear war situation, on this continent.

The survey included all categories of buildings and structures having a minimum protection factor of 10 and a minimum floor area of 1000 square feet, with the exception of:

All DND owned and operated buildings . and structures.

Note: DND staff surveyed these departmental properties in 1961.

All residential dwellings including detached or double homes, town housing or row housing, duplex, triplex, fourplex and apartments with fewer than seven units.

All floor space above and below ground was considered and environmental factors recorded for each surveyed building. Special-entry cards were used to record essential services buildings such as relay stations and generator buildings.

2. Survey Response

In June, 1966, over 300 people were employed on the task of gathering building data for the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada. This task could not have been carried out without the adequate coverage given by the news media and all persons who generously gave permission to allow survey teams on their premises. Public reaction to this project was most positive and resulted in a great deal of interest as indicated by the many questions concerning the survey.

In addition, full industry, provincial and

While the project were excluded because of considerations.

cooperation was received from private municipal governments.

was widely acceptable, some buildings commercial and industrial seciirity

•

CANADA EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION

Figure 1. SURVEY WORK FLOW

pI 1-••■■

Distribution of output Tabulation

Sheets

Analysis of Results

Computer Program

Training Manual & Technical Advice

Initiation by Canada EMO

Development of Survey

Data Record Forms

• ..........

'Keypunching Agency •

Computer Programming

Data Processing

• ..• ....••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • •

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF CANADA

SURVEY

Field Survey Operation

an,

Field Operations and Admin.

Managament 1-)1 1••■•--->1

Plan including Areas of Survey

Saskatchewan Contract

Public Relations PLogram

.1■••

>

•

Training

•

TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

COMPUTER SERVICES BUREAU

COMPUTATION

Reports

Data Forms • Completed

A

3. Organization

The survey work flow and related areas of responsibilityare shown in Figure 1..The three main areas of Survey; Computation;Technical Management and Analysis were conducted by the Departmentof Public Works of Canada, the Computer Services Bureau and theCanada Emergency Measures Organization. A departure was madefrom normal survey procedures during 1967, when the Departmentof Public Works of Canada contracted with the University of

Saskatchewan to carry out field survey work in the Provinceof Saskatchewan. The value of the contract was $85,000.

Survey work has not been carried out in the Yukon andNorthwest Territories or Canadian Embassies and other buildingsabroad.

®

.4. Interim and Final Suryey Results

The Middle East crisis of 1967 gave impetus to allaspects of civil emergency planning, especially with regard

to crisis action planning. The inventory of potential shelterspace at that time was incomplete, yet it seemed appropriatethat the recorded information be made readily available.Subsequently, Interim Survey Results were produced and held

in readiness for any demand that might arise should therebe'further deterioration of the international situation.

in May, 1968, Final Survey Results for all provincesexcept Quebec and Ontario, were produced and distributed.

Because data collection was still continuing in the Provincesof Quebec and Ontario, Interim Survey Results were sent tothese provinces. The distribution of survey results enabledprovincial and municipal engineering staff to become familiarwith the survey result format and interpretation of data. FinalSurvey Results werè,issued ultimately to Quebec and Ontariôduring March, 1969..

5. Updating

A pilot updating survey was conducted in the Provinceof Alberta in fiscàl.year 1968/69 to identify problems likelyto occur in updating existing records. On completion of this

pilot survey, revisions were made to data processing routinesand to the Annual Updating-Survey Procedures.

Although a large number of new buildings and structureshad been erected throughout the country since the survey began,the amount of field survey work was restricted by the fundsavailable. During fiscal year 1969/70, some updating survey

5

Pl

work was carried out in the Provinces of Quebec, Ontario

and British Columbia, In the case of British Columbia, the

survey was completely updated for that province. However,

work in Ontario and Quebec was restricted to the peripheralareas of Toronto and Montreal.

Limited funds are being made available to continueupdating surveys within each fiscal year. ^-^ - 1 I I-^t_

6. Field Survey Statistics J ^^ iL113For the purposes of the survey, provinces were divided

into Zones and Subzones. Figure 2 gives the number of zones andsubzones in each province.' A bound set of Fiiial Sur%fey Resultshas been issued for each subzone which contains an acceptable'building part'.

A building part may constitute a whole structure or a

portion of a structure which has been subdivided for computationalpurposes. Figure 3 shows the number of structures surveyed and the

number of acceptable building parts derived from the survey.

POLITICAL

DIVISIONTotal Number

of ZonesTotal Numberof Subzones

Newfoundland 1 1

New Brunswick 2 25

Prince Edward Island 1 1

Nova Scotia 3 20

Quebec 8 47

Ontario 7 50

Manitoba 3 65

Saskatchewan 9 13

Alberta 3 112

British Columbia 6 102

TOTALS: 43 436

Figure 2, Provincial Zones and Subzones

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0

6

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W

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i

An important consideration in the preliminary planning

and development of the survey was the magnitude and extent of the

required field suryey work on a nationwide basis. This is reflectedin Figure 3 which ^hows, for each province, the total number of 9 r4`^structures surveyeA, tht number of building parts recorded for (N ^'these structures, and oLer pertinent details within the scope pO(H eof the surve.y ..

a^~ ' ^ 7_^^ ..1.(1 G

POLITICAL

DIVISION

SurveyCompletion

DateStructures

-Surveyed

Building

PartsRecorded

ShelterAnalysis

Cards

AcceptableBuildingParts

Newfoundland Dec.1966 1965 2785 178f 1477ff

New Brunswick Sept.1966 3,940 5741 118 4065b

Prince Edward July.1966 484 642 21 474 tipIsland

Nova Scotia Dec.1967 1582 2091 41 1827

Qu6bec Mar.1968 18989 27957 245 25003

Ontario Oct.1968 28548 54687 465 47201

Manitoba Sept.1967 3373 5258 132 4543

Saskatchewan Sept,1967 3070 4209 837 3221

Alberta(Pilot Survey)

Sept.1964 3310 4430 177 3657

Alberta(Updating Survey) Oct.1968 434 557 41 420

British Columbia Sept.1968 4704 6813 504 5536

CANADA Mar.1969 70399 115190 2759 97424

Figure 3. Survey Task Record

f'

is

In the survey, each building part was recorded

separately on a data collection sheet which had 406 rvcordingboxes for coded entries; the location of the building wasthen sketched on the reverse side of the sheet.

It is estimated that over 40 million recording boxeswere completed to record the data for the Fallout ProtectionSurvey of Canada.

7. Expenditures

Planning of the main durvey was carried out duringthe fiscal yeâ.r 1965/66 with field work commencing in five

provinces in the Spring of 1966. The majority of the fieldwork was completed during the Summer months of 1966, 1967and 1968, using stndents on the field survey teams.

Essentially, expenditures were allocated to twomajor functions; field survey work and data processing.Figure 4 shows a breakdown of expenditures for this project

for each of these two functions from fiscal year 1964/65 tofiscal year 1968/69. The expenditures incurred for the AlbertaPilot Study are included because they constitute an essentialpart of the whole survey and analysis.

Fiscal Year Field Survey

WorkData Processing Total

1964/65 $ 90,000 $ 10,000 $ 100,000

1965/66 139,000 38,000 177,000

1966/67 992,000 46,000 1,038,000

1967/68 447,000 66,000 513,000

1968/69 165,000 55,000 210,000

TOTAL: $1,833,000 $215,000 $2,038,000

Figure 4. Expenditures - Main Survey

0

•

0

8

teLy thf Au.otiAn „9.notex.17,4c

■•+

• Expenditures for the updating survey work carried out

during the fiscal year 1969-70 in the Provinces of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia were as follows:

Fiscal Year Field Survey Data Processing Total Work

1969-70 $45,000 $7,000 $52,000

Figure 4a. Expenditures - Updating Survey

In summary, the following statistics are noteworthy:

Main Survey_ (1965-69)

• 70,399 structures were surveyed at an average cost of $27.32 per structure.

S. Cost to completely process 115,190 data collection sheets averaged $1.81 per sheet.

• Average cost for field survey work and data processing was $17.69 per record.

. Cost per head of population for the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada was 9.7 cents.

• Cost per potential shelter space, 3.7 cents.

Updating Survey (1969-70 only)

• 1,360 structures surveyed at an average cost of $26,90 per structure (to January 31, 1970).

• Average cost for field survey work and data processing was $23.50 per record.

, Cost per potential shelter space, 2.9 cents (considering only spaces with PF 50 and better).

•

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III. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS ,^(1^

Introduction ^^^^^

1. Summary figures of the final results of the FalloutProtection Survey of Canada indicate that there are about 21

million potential fallout shelter spaces with protection factorsof 50 or better and about 31 million with protection factors of

25 or better. On a national basis, these figures may not appear

to be meaningful but when correlated with fallout risk areas,likely target areas and the relative geographic location of theseshelter spaces, to that of the population, they become extremely

s ignif icant.1 a t v"Pt ".6

• ^In November 1969, the paper, "The Thréat to Canada 1970" , ^uL

was produced to provide civil emergency planners with an est-mate ,"^

on which to base their program and their contingency plans for a ^J`^^

war emergency. This paper has been used as a basis for defining p

and locating the various risk areas of Canada, to develop a risk

oriented analysis. The emphasis of this analysis, therefore, is

on the correlation of risk to distribution of shelter space and

population. It should be noted, however, that the existing

deployment of Minuteman missile sites by the United States along

its northern border has not been considered in this study, sinceadequate information was not available at the time of preparation.

may exist in these figures at the Emergency Government Zone level,but they are sufficiently accurate for the purpose of this study.Population figures for those people likely to be subjected to directweapon effects were taken to be the likely target metro o itan area

2. General Analysis Considerations

Population figures used in this study were developed from

the latest information available from the Dominion Bureau of Statisticsand adjusted to match the 1970 population totals. Some discrepancies WN°

figures. Discrepancies may also exist here, but they should no r0rl*

be too significant.

The risk maps (see Annex G) included in this report, are a

development of the original risk maps from which Annex C3, of "Threatto Canada 1970" paper was prepared. The apparent precision of these

risk maps may be somewhat misleading and therefore, it should beemphasized that boundaries of the various risk areas cannot betaken as being so precisely defined.. The geographic areas used

to determine shelter spaces and population in given risk areaswere generally somewhat more extended than those on the attached

maps,.to allow for boundary variation.

11

• The curves of population for each province by risk area, given at Annex A, show, among other matters, the distribution of unattenuated 14-day possible doses of gamma radiation by percent population surviving direct effects. Major plot points are given in the table above each chart. It is likely that some shelter occupants would be required to stay in shelters for periods up to 14 days. Since the radiation doses noted in the"Threat to Canada 1970" paper, are for 7 days only, projected 14 day doses have been included in this study. Converted dose figures are as follows:

7 - day dose . 14 • day dose

5000 5400

750 820

3. Population Distribution by Risk Area

Population figures developed for this study, show that about 112i million people are located outside likely metropolitan target areas. Of these, 4-1.- million are located in high fallout risk areas (see Figure 5) where, in the event of a nuclear attack, there is a high probability that the 14-day gamma radiation dose will exceed 5,400 roentgens. More than 2 million people would probably be subjected to 14-day doses varying from 5,400 roentgens down to 820 roentgens and a further 4 million subjected to something less than 820 roentgens.

Four risk areas were used in this study and they are compatible with the risk areas defined in "The Threat to Canada 1970" paper.

DIRECT - metropolitan areas of those likely target areas.

HIGH areas where there is a high probability of the unattenuated 14-day dose being in excess of 5400 roentgens. Although this category includes those areas which may be exposed to much higher radiation intensities, it is realized that such areas would have to be dealt with separately,

MEDIUM - areas where the unattenuated 14-day dose is likely to be in excess of 820 roentgens but less than 5,400 roentgens.

12

•

areas where the unattenuated 14-day dose is likely to be less than 820 roentgens (This risk area embraces the remaining areas of each province.)

Risk Area Population

Direct 9,592,000

High 4,518,000

Medium 2,327,000

Low 4,774,000

Total 21,211,000

Figure 5, CANADA - Population Distribution by Risk Areas

The risk area population distribution characleristics of Canada resemble those of Ontario, Quebec and Alberta, but are quite different from those of other provinces (see Figure 6). This is a result of the variation of risk across the country and it indicates that public protection requirements of each province may differ somewhat according to risk.

A set of curves . (see Annex A) was developed for all provinces showing the distribution of population surviving direct effects by risk area and the percent population that would be at risk to various unatten-uated 14-day doses of gamma radiation. The curves give only a general indication of the likely distribution of population by risk areas and therefore, should not be too precisely interpreted.

Protection factor levels marked on these curves indicate the percentage of people surviving direct effects that would be sufficiently protected to limit the 14-day exposure dose to 20 0R or less. For any given point on the curves, the protection factor required to limit the 14-day dose is derived as follows:

Protection Factor (PF) Unattenuated Dose Dose Limit

For example, if a 14-day dose of 200R is not to be exceeded, a protection factor of 25 would satisfy this requirement for about 58 percent of the population surviving direct effects (about 6.7 million). If the 14-day dose is to be limited to say, 100R, then a protection factor of 50 would be needed to satisfy this requirement for the same 58 percent of the

•

LOW

13

0

01

Figure 6

14 DAY DOSE - R

POLITICAL HIGH MEDIUM LOWDIVISION (> 5400R) (820R- 5400R) (<820R)

NEWFOUNDLAND - - 0.516

100%

NEW BRUNSWICK - 0.623 - -

100%

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND - 0.11 -

100%

NOVA SCOTIA 0.099 0.35 0.17

16% 57% 27%

QUEBEC 1.66 0.474 0.94

54°/a 15.4% 30.5%

ONTARIO 2.11 0.448 0.696

65% 14% 21%

MANITOBA 0.074 0.095 0.259

17% 22% 61%

SASKATCHEWAN - - 0.948

100%

ALBERTA 0.386 0.212 0.254

I 45% 25% 30%

BRITISH COLUMBIA 0.19 0.015 0.991

16% 1% 83%

CANADA 4.519 2.323 4.774

39% 20% 41%

Figure 6. POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS- DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREAS

(Expressed in millions and percentage ofsurviving population)

15

•

•

0

population. These figures are intended to illustrate the use of thecurves and should not be interpreted as constituting recommendedlevels of protection.

4. Potential Fallout Shelter

Of the 21 million potential shelter spaces in Canada, with

protection factors of 50 and better, more than 15 million of these arelocated in likely target areas. The total population of these likely

target areas is somewhat in excess of 9 million, indicating a probablesurplus of shelter. In other areas the situation is generally thereverse. Figure 7 shows numbers of potential shelter spaces in Canadafor given minimum protection factor levels.

Protection Factors

equal to or better

than

Existing PotentialShelter Spaces

100 15,184,699

50 21,256,457

20 36,555,040

10 53,785,552

Total 53,785,552

Population 21,211,000

Figure 7. CANADA - Potential Shelter

Spaces

These population - versus - shelter figures clearlyindicate a significant amount of existing potential fallout shelterspace, Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded from these figuresthat an adequate level of shelter space is available for thetotal population. This disparity is due mainly to localizeddeficiencies and surpluses of potential shelter space when equated

to all of the various degrees of risk and population densities.

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Ile

PROVINCIAL POPULATION

1970 Levels

516,000

623,000

110,000

765,000

6,004,000

7,567,000

978,000

948,000

1 ,586,000

2,116,000

21,211,000

PROTECTION FACTOR CATEGORY

POL IT ICAL PFC2 PFC3 PFC4 PFC8 PROVINCIAL

DIVISION PROTECTION FACTOR TOTAL

10-19 20-49 50-99 > 100

NEVVFOUNDLAND 184,980 133,151 28,741 106,480 496,879

NEW BRUNSWICK 458,050 252,806 109,104 219,809 1,039,769

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 58,421 28,012 7,089 20,794 114,316

NOVA SCOTIA 275,531 270,042 83,763 203,849 833,185

QUEBEC 5,702,974 4,930,748 1,155,267 6,037,366 18,625,059

ONTARIO 7,170,072 6,636,137 1,498,840 5,837,393 22,328,569

MANITOBA 789,761 646,433 248,590 702,573 2,387,357

SASKATCHEWAN 431,681 402,646 146,698 409,142 1,390,167

ALBERTA 836,048 792,434 287,039 784,000 2,699,521

BRITISH COLUMBIA 1,322,944 1,206,174 478,269 863,293 3,870,730

PF CATEGORY TOTALS 17,230,512 15,298,583 6,071,758 15,184,699 53,785,552

>

Figure 8

e

Figure 8. POTENTIAL FALLOUT SHELTER SPACES - Total Number from Survey Data (Based on 12 sq. ft./person)

e 19

Figure 9

0

0

AGENCY

POLITICAL: DIVISION

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

NEWFOUNDLAND 38246 204961 2595 46548 37491 920 166118

NEW BRUNSWICK 72693 75287 56972 219785 172321 9694 433017

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 7918 26503 922 21683 20391 582 36317

NOVA SCOTIA 74641 89016 92616 102313 99652 7841 367106

QUEBEC 530946 1108882 579576 2943376 2772200 123738 10566341

ONTARIO 1201260 799434 944750 2921578 1097672 86080 15277795

MANITOBA 135723 165023 142561 223707 99827 12255 1608261

SASKATCHEWAN 130639 171857 107826 252663 90995 23468 612719

ALBERTA 119262 450634 190391 243701 116168 28230 1151135

BRITISH COLUMBIA 239907 313484 260847 358089 106291 52831 2539281

TOTAL 2551235 3405081 2379056 7333443 4613008 345639 33158090

Agency refers to the ownership categories which are as follows;

Agency Code Agency Code

Federal 1 Religious Organizations 5Provincial 2 Public Utility Undertakings 6Municipal 3 AIIOthers 7School, Collegiate & Other Boards 4

Figure 9. SUMMARY - Potential Fallout Shelter Spacesby Province and Agency.

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21

Figure 10

TYPE

POLITICALDIVISION

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

NEWFOUNDLAND 151772 9891 70986 42183 49074 12109 47894 29914 83056

NEW BRUNSWICK 317482 27670 122774 164332 115991 42747 90450 53989 104334

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 37004 3643 17292 20781 13189 345 7306 3210 11546

NOVA SCOTIA 158652 27460 201244 126424 89421 8276 62850 26996 131862

QUEBEC 4409841 438709 4861574 2346043 780543 435852 1930441 1937461 1484595

ONTARIO 3724319 338950 8847657 3091872 1408471 919040 1584666 1111404 1302190

MANITOBA 328096 37397 715012 497121 133827 96120 155435 249629 174720

SASKATCHEWAN 307989 48057 255507 291159 118696 63789 89773 83570 131627

ALBERTA 472143 185058 619056 716406 170221 69828 114074 193128. 159607

BRITISH COLUMBIA 590887 70283 1106101 745527 283071 48771 321109 365096 339885

TOTAL: 10498185 1187118 16817203 8041848 3162504 1696877 4403998 4054397 3923422

Buildings are classified according to the Type Classification given in the NationalBuilding Code (1965). The assigned type codes for the different types are as follows:

Assembly 1 Commercial and IndustrialInstitutional 2 Division 1 6Residential 3 Division 2 7Business and Personal 4 Division 3 8Mercantile 5 Hospitals and Nursing Homes 9

Figure 10, SUMMARY - Potential Fallout Shelter Spacesby Province and Type.

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, 23

CANADA B.C.

3

ALTA SASK

MAN ONT QUE

N. B. N. S. PEI NFLD

Agency Code Agency Code

1111■

Agency refers to the ownership categories which are as follows:

Federal 1 Religious Organizations 5 Provincial 2 Public Utility Undertakings 6 Municipal 3 All others 7 School, Collegiate & Other Boards 4

Figure 11, DISTRIBUTION OF SHELTER SPACES BY AGENCY

2 2

ALTA SASI(

• MAN ONT 2

N.B.

6 7 8 9

1 Commercial and Industrial

2 Division 1 3 Division 2

Division 3 5 Hospitals and Nursing Homes

Assembly

Institutional Residential Business and Personal Mercantile

Buildings are classified according to the Type Classification given in the National Building Code (1965). The assigned type codes for the different types are as follows:

Figure 12. DISTRIBUTION OF SHELTER SPACES BY TYPE •

26

Figure 13

0

0

PROTECTION FACTOR

EQUALTO ORBETTER THAN

DIRECTHIGH

(>5400R)MEDIUM

(820R-5400R)LOW

(<820R)TOTAL

100 11,241,184 1,491,927 567,689 1,883,899 15,184,699

50 15,705,410 2,191,795 818,854 2,540,398 21,256,457

20 26,877,964 4,117,324 1,435,105 4,124,647 36,555,040

10 38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894 53,785,552

PERCENT 72 12 5 11 100

Figure 13. CANADA - Distribution of PotentialShelter Spaces by Risk Area.

27

•

•

• Figures 8, 9 and 10 contain details of provincial distribution of potential fallout shelter space by protection factor category, agency (that is, building ownership category) and type, as classified by the National Building Code.

A proportional graphic representation of the distribution of shelter spaces by agency and type is shown in Figures 11 and 12.

5. Distribution of Shelter Spaces by Risk Area

A major proportion of existing potential shelter space and the greatest.concentration of population are located within likely target areas. However, the very significant remaining balance of shelter spaces in the other areas of risk, totals some 14.9 million spaces and represents a valuable non-military defence inventory resource.

Distribution of shelter spaces for Canada by risk area is given in Figure 13 with spaces grouped by minimum protection factor. Distribution of shelter spaces for each province is given in Figure 14. Further breakdown by protection factor category for provinces can be found in Annex B.

POLITICAL RISK AREAS

DIVISION Direct High Medium Low

NEWFOUNDLAND - - 496,879

NEW BRUNSWICK - 1,039,769 -

PRINCE EDWARD - 114.316 ISLAND

-,

NOVA SCOTIA 585,436 700 179,056 67,993

QUEBEC 13,850,122 2,867,169 397.272 1,510,496

ONTARIO 17,149,689 3,464,376 565,598 1,148,906

MANITOBA 2,094,260 57,654 13,050 222,393

SASKATCHEWA - - - 1,390,167

ALBERTA 2,309,663 35,607 92,054 262,197

BRITISH COLUMBIA 2,857,857 96,675 5,335 910,863

CANADA 38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894

Figure 14 - PROVINCES - Distribution ofrSlié1i-er Spaces by Risk Area.

29

• 6. Factor; 3 Affecting Usability of Potential Space

Potential fallout shelter space in a building or structure means that the existing fabric of the building, in terms of construction and configuration, has a protective shielding capability against the effect of nuclear radiation, or to be specific, gamma radiation as a result of fallout. Usable fallout shelter space is that inherently shielded portion of a building or structure which has no impediment to the habitability of a sheltering population, commensurate with ventilation and volumetric requirements, and therefore, can be used as fallout shelter.

Some of the adverse factors likely to affect the usability and hence reduce the number of available shelter spaces, include:

availability of building

fixed or heavy equipment

ventilation ûlpiiit êtpeej11. 914"Y"'"e'("44

protection factor requirements

relative location

The data pertaining to potential fallout shelter spaces were derived from the shelter area figures given in the final results of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada, on the basis of 12 square feet per shelter space. The usable spaces however, will be considerably less than these because of the factors listed above. It is important to emphasize here that the main purpose of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada was to identify potential shelter space. Determination of the usability of this space was not included in the project, even though information on usable areas of basements was recorded.

Although a building could be made available during an emergency by special legislation, it may not be feasible to plan in peacetime for its use. Many areas of existing buildings are taken up with fixed or heavy equipment which would effectively prevent use of this space and since the ground floors and upper storey areas indicated in the survey results, are based on gross floor areas, there is likely to be a significant reduction in numbers. Ventilation requirements of a shelter space may not be adequate for maximum space utilization, although this is likely to be less of a problem for upper storeys than for basement and sub-basement areas. Protection factors may not be good enough to provide adequate protection and some potentip., shelter areas may not be conveniently located to plan on their use.

30

There is one other important consideration that should be

mentioned here. The AREA FACTORS used in the computation of shelter

areas (shown as S-AREA on results printout) are conservative in many

cases. 1rcŸ examp es i the dominant gamma radiation is from the roof,

then protection factors will generally be greater at the perimeterthan at the centre of a shelter area. It is quite likely, therefore,

that additional spaces could be found by further careful examination

of each shelter area

A realistic estimate of usable shelter space would be of theorder of 60 percent of the total surveyed potential spaces. This

represents a sz.gni ican y valuable life-saving capability - if plans

are developed in peacetime for use of those spaces in a war emergency.

Amu,L,^k( to

•

31

•

•

IV. IMPLICATIONS

1. Introduction

Development of plans and preparations in peacetime that will increase the nation's ability to survive and recover from a war emergency embraces a very wide range of non,mllitary national defence activities and protecting Canada's most important single resource, namely its people, is by no means the least important. Provision of protection for the public from the effects of nuclear weapons is not an easy problem, but the range of possible solutions is much clearer and more definitive than for many other defence problems. The casualty limiting usefulness of almost any step taken in this direction is very significant and the implications of providing various levels of protection compared with the consequences of no protection are given in this section. Other aspects of public protection such as dispersal and blast protection are not discussed here since this report is concerned only with the fallout protection component.

Before discussing the various implications of providing fallout protection, a few notes on some of the terms used in this section and in other parts of the report may provide additional clarification and avoid possible misinterpretation,

Radiation Dose Probable Early Effect Probable Effects on within.24 Hours

on Individuals Group (unit) Efficiency (roentgens)

100-150 r Acute effects of operational significance are Probably no significant loss in group (unit) improbable. Long-terni hazard. effectiveness. A few men may be incapacitated

for varying lengths of time.

150-250 r Nausea and vomiting within one day. Minor The effectiveness of a group (unit) would incapacitation after two days. possibly be reduced by one-third for periods of

about 48 hours.

250-350 r Nausea and vomiting in under four hours' fol. A group (unit) will be greatly reduced in effec-

lowed by a symptom-free period, lastingfrom tiveness during the nausea period, but less about the third day to the end of the second reduced If the emergency is great. The offer w eek after exposure. Some deaths in four to six tiveness may return almost to normal in two weeks and most of remainder incapacitated. days and remain so for up to a week but will

then fall off to complete ineffectiveness in about two weeks.

350-600 r Nausea and vomiting in under two hours. Death A group (unit) may be pa rt ially effective is almbst certain in four weeks. Incapacitation several hours, but the effectiveness will then until death , be steadily reduced to complete uselessness.

600 r Nausea and vomiting almost immediately. Any group (unit) will be quickly reduced to Death in one week, complete ineffectiveness.

5,000 r Immediate incapacitation. Death within 24 Any group (unit) will become ineffective hours , immediatel y.

Figure 15. Probable Early Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Individuals and Groups

WITHOUT PROTE 2TION

WITH PROTECTICN

SHADED AREA REPRESENTS DOSE IN SHELTER PF-100

INTENSITY REDUCED

BY FACTOR OF 100

FALLOU ARRIVES

RÉLATIVE DOSE iraieÉ Figure 15b

peeetzezeteue OUTSIDE DOSE RATE

1000 R/hr

GRAPHICAL

REPRESENTATION INSIDE DOSE RATE

10 R/hr

FALLOUT

ARRIVES

Figure 15a

TIME

Figure 15c PF 60-STRUCTURE = 100

SHADED AREA R-EPRÉSENTS DOSE RECEIVED IN OPEN

7///l /agooddsm,

-1-000

R/hr

DO

SE

RA

TE

34

.111.•

11111

Although it may be necessary to specify radiation dose limits for the general public and for personnel engaged in operations in a fallout environment, IT CANNOT BE OVER-EMPHASIZED THAT ALL RADIATION IS DANGEROUS AND THEREFORE, PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY TO KEEP DOSES TO A MINIMUM ARE ESSENTIAL. The table of probable early effects shown in Figure 15, gives some indication of the hazard of fallout gamma radiation.

Protection from this hazard can be achieved by removal of the sources of radiation, by remedial evacuation of the people from the radioactive environment or by providing shelter to reduce the radiation level. The ratio of the dose that would be received outside, without protection, to that received inside the shelter is referred to as the protection factor and this is the measure used to indicate the relative protective qualities of structures, (refer to Figures, 15e, 15b & 15c); the higher the protection factor, the better the fallout protection. A fallout shelter however, requires to have more than just protection from radiation if it is to perform its function. It must have adequate ventilation for its intended occupants, adequate sanitary facilities, i,,later and food. The provision of water and food could be undertaken at some U'age in the emergency, provided adequate plans had been made for this, but the provision of protection, adequate ventilation and even primitive sanitary facilities needs to be part of a peacetime program.

Adequacy of the various levels of protection referred to in this section, can only be estimated on the basis of risk location and anticipated radiation levels', and can only be determined specifically during the event, when radiation levels become known. It follows, therefore, that even low levels of protection could be adequate and may mean the difference between life and death . Planning, however, must consider the best protection that is available or that could be provided. Some shelter may be improvable from the point of view of protection and habitability. In most cases, the concept of improving the protective qualities of existing structures is rather difficult to implement, but many additional spaces could be made usable ifadequate ventilation were provided.

The term "potential space" refers to those spaces identified by the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada and provides for 12 square feet of floor space, but it does not imply that adequate ventilation exists. The term "usable space" means 12 square feet of floor space . adequatel ventilated.

In the paragraphs concerning the short-term consequences of exposure to fallout radiation, reference is made to people being fit, unfit, and unfit requiring medical care. The "fit" category refers to those people that might have been subjected to fallout radiation, but who have received 200 roentgens, or less, whole body doses in a period of two weeks. The "unfit" category includes those that may be sick, yet not requiring medical care, having received

two-week whole body doses of between 200 and 330 roentgens.

At the higher and of this exposu:;^-e range there may be up to5 percent deaths. Those people in the category "unfit, requiringmedical care", will have received two•-•week doses varying from

220 to 810 roentgens and many of these would die, as would thosereceiving greater closes.

2o Potential Spac•.=.

There a:-e more than 9 million people in Canada at riskfrom the direct effects of nuclear weapons. These, together

with the 11 miLlion people outside the likely target areas, couldbe subjected to various levels of dangerous radiation. Analysisof the results of the fallout protection survey shows that a

significant amount of potent:i_a1. fallout shelter space exists

that could be developed into a .7aluable life-saving and injury

limiting defen:,ive system for the people of Canada, if plans aremade in peacetime for its use in an emergency.

In the :l.ikel.y target areas, potential shelter spaces withprotection factors of 7_00 or better, exceed 11 million, many of

wh.i.ch may have some inherent low level blast protection capability.Planning for the use of these spaces however, must includeconsiderations not contained in this study, but they do provide a

base for contingency shelter planning within these highly vulnerableareas.

The high fallout risk areas across Canada contain about2 million potential spaces with protection factors of 50 or better

for a population of 4.5 million. In the medium and low risk areag,there are near:-y 5.5 million potential spaces with protection factors

of 20 or better for a population of about 7 m:^lliofi (see Figure 16).

Direct_^

High...- .-^ Mediüm

--

^

Low

Population 9,592,000 4,518,000 2,327,000..^....

4,774,000

PF 100 or better 11,241,184 1,491,927 567,689 1,883,1399

PF 50 or better 15,705,410 2,191,795 818,554 2,540,398

PF 20 or better 26,877,964 4,117,324 1,435,105 4,124,647

PF 10 or better 38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894

Figure 16. Population and Relative Potential

Shelter Spaces by Risk Areas

36

While these figures indicate a shortage of potential

spaces in the high and medium risk areas, they also show thatthere is a very significant amount of shelter, which represents

a valuable potential asset, Recent studies* show that the bestreturns for defence expenditures would result from development

of fallout shelter and therefore, existing facilities shouldbe exploited by the development of plans for their use in anemergency.

As a continuing function, identification of additional

spaces, development of spaces in areas where there is a deficit

of shelter, and incorporation of these spaces into municipalshelter plans, would contribute to an increase in the populationsurvival potential.

3. Consequences of Exposure

General

0

Exposure to fallout gamma radiation can produce acuteradiation sickness, with symptoms appearing in hours to days

and resulting in illness and possible death. Variations in

biological response, however, do not permit accurate prediction

of the effect of any individual dose and therefore, only the

probable consequences can be predicted. Additionally, althoughclinical evidence exists Lo indicate the probable short-termconsequences, no such evidence exists to indicate the severity,

or indeed the nature, of the long-term consequences to persons

who receive radiation or to future generations.. Having regardfor these two points, the following sections indicate the possibleconsequences to people,'of exposure to fallout gamma radiation

resulting from a nuclear attack..**

The Short Term

Four categories of exposure effects have been developed

in order to illustrate the casualties that might result from

different radiation dose levels. These are given in Figure 17,"Possible Short-Term Consequences of Various 2 Week Doses ofFallout Radiation". It should be noted that this chart applies

only to average healthy individuals and the effects on the sick,

the young, the aged and pregnant women would be much more severe.

These groups comprise 47 percent of the total population.

ID

^ "The Strategy and Economics of Intercontinental Missile Defence"

by J. S. Vigder, 1968.DORE cost effectiveness study of shelter options, 1968,

See Group 3 attack effects given in the paper "Threat to Canada.-1970"

The short-term consequence chart was developed from information given

in Table II of "Radiation Protection in Emergency Health Service Units",

EHS, 1965; from Section 5 of "Casualties from Nuclear Weapons", EHS,1968;and from "The Effects of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation",Canada EMO,

January 12, 1970.

37

•

PE

RC

ENT

OF

EXP

OSE

D PO

PU

LA

TIO

N

100%

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

•

Figure 17

POSSIBLE SHORT—TERM CONSEQUENCES OF VARIOUS 2 WEEK DOSES OF FALLOUT RADIATION

UNFIT UNFIT AND REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE

100 200 300 400 500 600

Figure 17. 2 WEEK DOSE IN ROENTGENS

t

What are the possible short term consequences to persons exposed to a 2-week radiation dose of 500 roentgens (500 R)

STEP 1• Note the 500 R level on baseline of chart

(N.B. This baseline is the only entry on the chart).

STEP 2 Enter chart at 500 R; the vertical line above this value intercepts point P on curve C. In the case of 500 R, only

one curve is intercepted by the corresponding vertical line.

STEP 3 The related horizontal value at point P, in the example, is 20 percent of the exposed population.

STEP zh Below point P, 20 percent of persons exposed w-ill die from the effects of this radiation dose (500 R). Above

point P, 80 percent (i.e., 100-20 percent) of persons exposed to 500 R will be unfit and in need of medical

care (see values on vertical line).

FIT DEATH

700 800 900 1000

EXAMPLE USE OF CHART

39

•

II

Application of figures from the "Consequence" chart to

portions* of the population at risk indicates a range and number

of possible casualties. These figures do not include deaths andinjuries likely to be sustained from the direct effects, that is,from the effects of blast and initial nuclear and thermal radiation.Aggregated figures ** for Canada are shown in Figure 18, and are

based on the assumption that the population is sheltered in homesto the extent bf PF 2 for those wit ou asemen s, an for

Chose with basements.

CANADA

CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

FIT

UNFIT

UNFIT REQUIRINGMEDICAL CARE

DEATHS

NUMBERS & PERCENT

OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS

0"5%

10.5%

13%

Figure 1E - CASUALTIES FROM FALLOUT - FROM THREAT EVALUATION III

These casualty figures, while relatively small compared

with estimated likely casualties from direct effects, are not so

small that they can be ignored, The Fallout Protection Survey of

Canada indicates that there is much better protection availablethan that provided by homes only. Considerable usable fallout

shelter space with higher protection factors does exist and theimplications of its use in an emergency are reflected in Figure 19

and in a comparison of Figures 18 and 19.

* Casualty figures produced from Canada EMO Threat Evaluation III

Study were used to determine the numbers of people that would

likely be exposed to various dose levels in the event of an

attack. For details see Annex D.

Aggregated figures for Canada were produced from figures developed

for each province. For provincial figures see Annex E.

See assumptions of study given at Annex D.

76% 8,824,405

58,095

1,213,600

1,522,900

41

100% CANADA

13%

7.5%

THREAT EVAL THREAT EVAL THREAT EVAL THREAT EVAL EXISTING SPAcES

EXISTING SPACES

0.5%

EX ISTING SPACES

2.8%

10.5%

EXISTING SPACES

7.7%

FIT FOR WORK UNFIT REQUIRING UNFIT MEDICAL CARE DEATHS

ADDITIONAI

FI

82% ,

L PERSONS

ADDIT ONAL CASUALTIES

.255,200

ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED 321,140

ADDITIONAL DEATHS PREVE NTED 658,825

CANADA

NUMBERS & PERCENT CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY

OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS

FIT 82% 9,549,470

UNFIT 2.8% 313,295

UNFIT REQUIRING

7.7% 892,160 MEDICAL CARE

DEATI-15 7.5% 864,075

Figure 19. CASUALTIES FROM FALLOUT - Using Existing Space

The short-term survival capability as shown in Figure 18 could be enhanced by bringing into use all usable shelter space. This would improve Canadals overall defence posture against nuclear attack and thus reduce the number of casualties. Casualties likely to be prevented are given in Figure 20.

PE

RC

ENT

OF

PO

PU

LA

TIO

N S

UR

VIV

ING

DIR

EC

T E

FF

EC

TS

Figure 20, ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED - USING EXISTING SPACE

(comparison of charts 18 and 19)

42

0

The Long-Term

The objectives of all radiation protection are to prevent

or minimize somatic injuries and to minimize deterioration of thegenetic constitution of the people. Ionizing radiation can result

in injuries to exposed individuals and to their descendents.

Injuries to the exposed individuals are called somatic and those

to his descendents, genetic. Late somatic injuries include leukemia

and other malignant diseases, impaired fertility, cataracts and

shortening of life. Genetic injuries manifest themselves in theoffspring of irradiated individuals and adverse hereditary effects

may not become apparent for many generations.

In a nuclear war emergency, the national objectives of providing

fallout protection would be the LEAST NUMBER OF DEATHS, THE FEWEST

PEOPLE REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE, THE SMALLEST AMOUNT OF GENETIC INJURYAND LOWEST PROBABILITY OF LATE SOMATIC EFFECTS. The long-term goal

of any fallout shelter program, therefore, should be fallout shelter

wtth`t1ze ig est protection, say minimum 1 00, for all people at risk.

The possibil"i y o gene ic in^ury an a e matic effects, however,

should not be the principal determining factor when making decisionsduring a war emergency, but they should be considered in the peacetime

planning.

Consequence of Application of Various Levels of Protection

The relative casualty reducing capability of providing

fallout protection -for the people outside direct effects areaswill vary according to the number of shelter spaces available and

to the protection factor levels of these spaces, At one end of theprotection spectrum is a desirable PF 100 or more for all at risk,while at the other end is the inadequate miscellany of existing

shelter space with PFs varying from 10 to 100.

11.619 MILLIONS

POPULATION

SURVIVING DIRECT

EFFECTS

8.96

5.81

3.33

USABLE

SPACES

(millions)

2.37

PF10 PF20 PF50 PF100

OR BETTER OR BETTER OR BETTER OR BETTER

Figure 21 - ESTIMATED USABLE SHELTER SPACES OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS

43

The estimated number of usable shelter spaces (see Figure 21) shows there to be insufficient shelter particularly at the higher levels of protection. The penalties for using the lower grade spaces, however, must be examined and compared with the penalties for not providing shelter and for providing various levels of protection. Figure 22 gives a comparison of these penalties in terms of casualties likely to be sustained for a range of protective options. It should be emphasized that in selecting an option, by keeping the protection factors as high as is practicable, the solution will remain reasonably stable with changes in risk. Additionally, the higher the protection factors, the sooner can people be released from shelter.

Fallout Shelter in Likely Direct Effects Areas

Although little has been said about the use of fallout shelter in direct effects areas, its potential cannot be ignored, since such areas may flot in fact be subjected to direct effects in a nuclear war emergency, but could very well be subjected to fallout from weapons detonated elsewhere. A public protection program for these direct effects areas must, of course, consider the implications of such actions as blast protection, fire and dispersal as well as fallout protection. It follows, therefore, that because of the uncertainties about the size, distribution and timing of any possible attack, some consideration should be given to contingency fallout

shelter planning in likely direct effects areas.

4. Activity Steps and Relative Costs

An examination of Figure 22, referred to in the previous section, shows that the existing shelter space constitutes a very significant casualty reducing asset. It also shows that, while provision of shelter with a protection factor level of 100 would result in a minimum of casualties, shelters of PF levels 40 to 50 would also provide a high degree of protection approaching that of the 100 level, if only the short-term survival requirements are considered. With minimum levels of protection less than these a rapid increase in casualties would result as indicated in Figures 23 and 24.

Commencing with the planned use of existing space, a number of graduated steps that could be taken to provide fallout shelter for the population at risk are described in Figures 25 and 26. Information presented in Figure 25 is for the total population (excluding that of Yukon and Northwest Territories) and that presented in Figure 26 is for the population outside likely direct effects areas. The same information for the population outside likely direct effects areas is also presented (Figure 27) in a form in which the benefits and costs can be more easily compared. The relative costs for deaths averted in this Latter population group are shown in Figure 28.

44

Figure 22.

CANADA

PROTECTION Requiring Medical FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS

LEVEL Care

r /

PF 100 99,9% TRACE TRACE TRACE

y

89.5%

50

/

/ 10,404,150

.4 4 1,140,962 bums 13,840

e

40 ,

4

e

30

/ 4 . . :.,:%

20 1,067,246 266,332 9,549,470 / A 735,952

d , :

10 76% 10.5%

e 13%

8,824,405 À ,5. e

4 1,522,900

À 1,213,600

'. 58,095

.,

EXISTING ::;::::::::::: 827 2.8% 7.7% 7.5% ..::.:•:-*

SHELTER USED :::::::::::..:-:: 9,549,470:::-.: - • ... ... 313,295 892,160 864,075

:::::::::.:....:•.:.:.•....;.:.:.:.:.-...:.:•:-: ...: ... - •

100% = 11,619,000

Figure 22. CASUALTIES LIKELY TO BE SUSTAINED FOR A RANGE OF PROTECTION LEVELS OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

•

45

It is quite apparent from the foregoing that a most

significant step in providing the people of Canada with fallout

protection is to take the action necessary to be able to bringinto use in an emergency the existing shelter space. The planneduse of this space alone would form a sound base for furtherdevelopment towards the long-term goal and would provide a firstphase casualty limiting defensive system at lowest cost.

47

3.0

2.0

1.0

15

0 7, < 1— 0 Z 15 LU

t CY co LLJ `..- CL

4- Z u 0 02

-0 D

0 n

PE

RC

EN

TA

GE 10

5

CA

SU

ALT

IES

(MIL

LIO

NS)

24% Percentages relate to population outside

17.8% direct effects areas -

10.4%

0.1% __...... 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

PROTECTION FACTORS

Figure 23. TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR GIVEN LEVELS OF PROTECTION

1 EATHS UNFIT REQUIR NG

/ MEDICAL CARE

UN FIT'

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

PROTECTION FACTORS

Figure 24. CASUALTIES FOR GIVEN LEVELS OF PROTECTION

10 90 100

90 100

48

0

tww Pr 4 lb,^® C11aqa,"-k ^-A I ftg) W;Jow jzqj

1 W^ l

O^ ^,î . "Mi- »a4re1% Ce-^^ 4",

^^ ^ r10 1°1 laaa 'Zvy'" ^'20

PA^I

^ Soo^

Figure 25

BASIC STEPSADDITIONAL CASUALTIES ESTIMATED COSTS $ STEP DETAILPREVENTED (CUMULATIVE) (CUMULATIVE)

STEP A Includes:

MAINTAIN UPDATED $1.00 000 ^ • Updating field surveyA INVENTORY OF MARGINAL NUMBER ONLY

,

NNUAL REQUIREMEf^POTENTIAL FALLOUT • Data processing ofSHELTER SPACE recorded information

• Distribution of results ^ Qp

STEP 9 includes:

^%^ ry^,^• Development of Commu ity Shelte lans

B PREPARE PLANS FOR 725,065 11,059,000 by professional urban plannersUSE OF EXISTING SPACE

•Shelter marking and licensing, provision

of emergency sanitary facilitieso

STEP C Includes:

EXPLOIT EXISTING • Exploitation of existing space by ventilationC POTENTIAL SPACE TO

947,335 30,268,281 improvementto increase usable spaceINCREASE USABLESPACE ^^Q^

• Activities in Step B (O,yf{y

STEP D includes:

• Use of all existing usable spaces

PROVIDE SHELTER having minimum PF 50D WITH MINIMUM PF 50 1,579,745 299,336,000

FOR TOTAL POPULATION• Provision of additional shelter spaces n

• Activities in Steps B and C

STEP E includes:7.

PROVIDE SHELTER• Use of all existing usable spaces

PF 100i i ih av n mumng mE WITH MINIMUM PF 100

^FOR TOTAL POPULATION

2,794,595 $398,580,000• Provision of additional shelter

spaces minimum PF 100


Figure 25. ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED & ESTIMATED COSTSFOR TOTAL POPULATION

49

•

Figure 26

ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES ESTIMATED COSTS $ BASIC STEPS STEP DETAIL PREVENTED (CUMULATIVE) (CUMULATIVE)

STEP A Includes:

MAINTAIN UPD ATED • Updating field survey

A INVENTORY OF MARGINAL NUMBER ONLY $50,000 POTENTIAL FALLOUT

ANNUAL REQUIREMEN'. • Data processing of SHELTE R SPACE

recorded information

• • Distribution of results

STEP B includes:

PREPARE PLANS FOR • Development of Community Shelter Plans B 725,065 5,587,000 by professional urban planners le 6

USE OF EXISTING SPACE 1

• Shelter marking and licensing, provision of emergency sanitary facilities.

STEP C Includes:

EXPLOIT EXISTING

POTENTIAL SPACE TO • Exploitation of existing space by ventilation C 947,335 13,268,281 INCREASE USABLE improvement to increase usable space

SPACE

• Activities in Step B

STEP D includes:

• Use of all existing usable spaces having minimum PF 50

PROVIDE SHELTER

D wiTH MINIMUM PF 50 1,579,745 229,766,774 FOR TOTAL POPULATION • Provision of additional shelter spaces

minimum PF 100

• Activities in Steps 13 and C

STEP E includes:

• Use of all existing usable spaces PROVIDE SHELTER having minimum PF 100

E WITH MINIMUM PF 100 2794,595 266,097,778 FOR TOTAL POPULATION • Provision of additional shelter

spaces minimum PF 100


Figure 26. ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED AND ESTIMATED COSTS OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS

51

•

I

ES

TIM

AT

ED

CO

ST

(MIL

LIO

NS

*)

400

500

300

200

100

ES

TIM

AT

ED

CO

ST

IN (

MIL

LIO

NS)

500

400

200

300

100

O 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

O 2.5 0.5 1 1.5 2

Figure 27 CASUALTIES PREVENTED (MILLIONS)

OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS

Figure 28 DEATHS AVERTED (IN MILLIONS) OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS

53

ANNEX A

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

BY RISK AREA

I

ANNEX A

L±NADAA

0POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS

DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA

14 DAY DOSE - RTOTAL SURVIVING^

5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS

4,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 11,619,000

39% 20% 41% 100%

100 00080 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

C420 000

8 000

HH

zR

60005400

4000

3000

2000

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

PF figures sh own based on an Potential Shelter

d 14 DAY DOSE 200 Spaces in each Riskassume , of RArea (Millions)

PF 50or better

PF 100

or bett re

PF 100

igh riskh PF 50/^i 2 191,795 1,491,927:,

FF 25

PF 20

b ttPF 50

bor e er or etter

medium risk ^

1,435,105 818,854

^

I PF 10 PF 20

or better or better

^ I 6,009,894 4,124,647

low risk,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 . 60 70 80 90 100

PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)

A- 3

ANNEX A

•

rL

POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS


NEWFOUNDLAND

14 DAY DOSE - RTOTAL SURVIVING


516,000 516,000

100% 100%

100 0008o 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

^

10 000

8000

H 60006 5400

z4000

3000

o

2000

1000

820

600

500

400

300

.200

100

Potential Shelter

Spaces in each Risk

Area (Millions)

PF 50

or better

PF 100

or better

high risk I - -

PF 20

or better

PF 50

r bettero

medium risk - -

PF 10 PF 20

or better or better

496 879 311 899

low r isk

, ,

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100


A- 5

ANNEX A

Î NEW BRt7NSVV^ICK



100 00080 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

10000

8000. ^

0

60005400

4000

3000

2000

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

14 DAY DOSE - R "TOTAL SURVIVING:


623,000 _ 623,000

100% 100%

ure shown based on anPF fiPotential. Shelterg

f 200R Spaces in each Riskassumed 14 DAY DOSE oArea (Millions)

!•

PF 50or better

PF 100

or better

high risk

PF 25

tti PF 20

or b tt r

PF 50

r bettere e o

med•ium risk

E 581,719 328,913

-^-

(î ^ PF 10 PF 20or better or better

lM1ow r isk

0 . 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 8


A-7

100 000

80 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

e 8000

E-4 6000 5400

•-••• 4000

W 3000 o

>4 2000 ‹ A

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

I 1 1 1 - PF figure shown based on an Potential Shelter _ assumed 14 DAY DOSE of 200R Spaces in each Risk .

Area (Millions)

PF 50 PF 100 or better or better

high risk

LPF2 I-- PF 20 PF 50

or better or better -

medium ris( r

55.895 27,883

- , -

PF 10 PF 20 _ or better or better _

'

— — _

low risk

H 10 000

70 100 90 50 80 60 40

ANNEX A

I PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 1



14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING


110,000 110,000

_ — 100% 100%

o 10 20 30 • PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)

A-9

•

•

ANNEX A

NOVA SCOTIA I POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS


14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING

5400 R 82 0R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS

99,000 350,000 170,000 619,000

16% 57% 27% 100%

100 000

80 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

r4

E-4 10 000 ‹

Fl8000

6 000

‹

5400

4000

ti) 3000

o

y, 2000 ‹

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

L [ 1 1 1 PF figures shown based on an Potential ShelËer

assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 20 0R Spaces in each Risk Area (Millions)


high risk PF50 _ _

,-

[IF 25


97,239 40,528 medium risk

A-

l_ PF 10 PF 20 . or better or better

low risk 67,993 38,231 -r

o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ....


A.-11

ANNEX A


r` ^ TRTBrTTION BY RISK AREA

QUEBEC

14 DAY DOSE.- RTOTAL SURVIVING


-----------.-1,660,000 474,000 940,000 . . 3,074,000

54% 15% 31% 100%

100 00080 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

..;

^ 10000

P 8000

H ' 60005400

40)0

wC/)oQ

3000

2000

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelterassumed 14•DAY DOSE of 200R Spaces in each Risk

Area (Millions)

PF 50b t

PF 100bor et er or etter

PF 100

high risk PF 50'_00^ 1,092,419 786,567

PF 25

I. T I PF 20 PF 50or better or better

medium riskf I 264,191 169,344

PF 10 PF 20I I or better or better

I ^_ -- - -----

1 510 496 1 131 452

low r isk

, , , ,

0

100 ,10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

-----------------------PERCENT (OF POPULATION.SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)

ii

A-13

100 000

80 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

• 20 000

10 000

8 000

6000 5400

4000

3000

2000

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

I I 1 I I ' . . .

____ PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelter - _ assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 20 0R Spaces in each Risk _

Area (Millions)

PF 50 PF 100 - or better or better -

PF 100 -

high risk PF 50 1,034,314 662,723 .

-

PF 25

I PF 20 PF 50 or better or better -

-

363,870 212,172 medium risk


low risk I

1,148,906 804,147 .

14 D

AY

D

OS

E (U

NA

TTEN

UA

TED

)-R

o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 . 80 90 100

ANNEX A

ONTARIO



14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING 5400 R 820R -,540OR 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS

2,109,000 448,000 696,000 3,253,000

65% 14% 21% 100%

• PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)

A-15

•

•

o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 9

ANNEX A

MANITOBA



14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING 5400 R 82 0R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS

74,000 95,000 259,000 428,000

17% 22% 61%' 100%

•

100 000

80 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

1:4 1

Ç:1

E-1 10 000

8 000

,E-4 6 000 5400

- 4000

cn 3000

- o

2000

P

- 1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelter

assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 20 0R Spaces in each Risk Area (Millions)


high risk PF 50 25,009 18,704 '

.■Miii PF 25

I PF 20 PF 50 /

ri or better or better

I I

I / 1 1 7,484 3,908

medium risk r I■1IMIIBIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII■W/

j'

FF 10 FF 20 I or better or better

I

222,393 137,943 I I

low risk -- --


A-17

ANNEX A

0

CPOPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS


100 000 -- -------



948,000 . 948,000

100% 100%

0

0

80 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

-20 000

10000

8 000

60005400

4000

WLno

3000

2000

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

high

medi

r isk

um ris

low risk

I

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

1

80 90

SASKATCHEWAN

Potential Shelter

Spaces in each Risk

Area (Millions)

PF 50

or better

PF 100

or better

PF 20

or betterPF 50

or better

PF 10

or better

PF 20

or better

1,390,167 958,486

100


A-19

ANNEX A

A L3CPl TA





386,000 212,000 254,000 852,000

45% 25% 30% 100%

100 00080 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

E-4 10 000

8000

60005400

4000

3000

2000

1000

820

600

500

400

300

200

100

ô

PF figures shown based on an

assumed 14• DAY DOSE of 200R

high risk

medium risk

low risk

]0 20 .

7

30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Potential Shelter

Spaces in each Risk

Area (Millions)

PF 50 PF 100or better or better

9,044 .7,652

PF 20 PF 50or better or better

61,842 33,449

PF 10 PF 20

or better or better

262,197 165,048

100


A-21

(

•

100 000

80 000

60 000

50 000

40 000

30 000

20 000

10 0 0 0

8000

6000 5400

4000

3000

2000

100

820

60

500

400

300

200

100

L . I ' I 1_

- PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelter assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 200R Spaces in each Risk

Area (Millions)

PF 50 PF 100 - or better or better -

high riSk PF 50 31,009" 16,281

PF 25

PF 20 PF 50 . I or better or better

i

I 1 2,865 2,657

medium risk I I 1


910,863 577,441

I 1 low risk I

14

DA

Y

DO

SE

(U

NA

TT

EN

UA

TE

D)-

R

o 1 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

ANNEX A

BRITISH COLUMBIA I POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS

DISTRIBUTION BY RISK . AREA

14'DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING

5400 R 82 0R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS

190,000 15,000 991,000 1,196,000

16% 1% .83% 100%

PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS) .

A-23

ANNEX B

POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACES BY PROTECTION FACTOR

CATEGORY WITH POPULATION

•

i

•

POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACES BY PROTECTION FACTOR CATEGORY (PFC) WITH POPULATION ANNEX B

POLITICALDIRECT EFFECTS AREA HIGH RISK AREA (above 5,400 roentgens) - 14 day dose

DIVISION PFC 2 PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTALPOPULATION PFC 2 PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTAL POPULATION(PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100+ ) SPACES (PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100+ ) SPACES

CANADA 11,969,063 11,172,554 4,464,226 11,241,184 38,847,027 9,592,000 2,404,857 1,925,529 699,868 1,491,927 6,522,181 4,518,000

NEWFOUNDLAND - - _

NEW BRUNSWICKPRINCE EDWARD

ISLAND

NOVA SCOTIA 163,252 191,923 66,021 164,240 585,436 146,000 700 - - - 700 99,000

QUEBEC 4,200,008 3,728,514 1,446,819 4,474,781 13,850,122 2,930,000 990,841 783,909 305,852 786,567 2,867,169 1,660,000

ONTARIO 5,281,825 5,105,952 2,106,586 4,655,326 17,149,689 4,314,000 1,341,760 1,088,302 371,591 662,723 3,464,376 2,109,000

MANITOBA 680,950 558,360 222,391 632,559 2,094,260 550,000 18,795 13,850 6,305 18,704 57,634 74,000

SASKATCHEWAN - - - - - - - - - -

ALBERTA 691,132 695,926 252,469 670,136 2,309,663 732,000 17,555 9,008 1,392 7,652 35,607 386,000

BRITISH COLUMBIA 951,896 891,879 369,940 644,142 2,857,857 920,000 35,206 30,460 14,728 16,281 96,675 190,000

MEDIUM RISK AREA (820 - 5,400 roentgens) LOW RISK AREA ( below 820 roentgens)POLITICAL

DIVISION(PFC 2) PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTAL

POPULATIONPFC 2 PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTAL

POPULATION(PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100 + SPACES (PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100 + SPACES

971,345 616,251 251,165 567,689 2,327,000 2,327,000 1,885,247 1,584,249 656,499 1,883,899 6,009,894 4,774,000

NEWFOUNDLAND - - - - - - 184,980 133,151 72,268 106,480 496,879 516,000

NEW BRUNSWICK 458,050 252,806 109,104 219,809 1,039,769 623,000 - - - - - -

PRINCE EDWARD 58,421 28,012 7,089 20,794 114,316 110,000 - - - - - -ISLAND 58,421 28,012 7,089 20,794 114,316 110,000 - - - - - -

NOVA SCOTIA 81,817 56,711 14,850 25,678 179,056 350,000 29,762 21,408 2,892 13,931 67,993 170,000

QUEBEC 133,081 94,847 43,137 126,207 397,272 474,000 379,044 323,478 158,163 649,811 1,510,496 940,000

ONTARIO 201,728 151,698 63,761 148,411 '- 565,598 448,000 344,759 290,185 143,029 370,933 1,148,906 696,000

MANITOBA 5,566 3,576 2,782 1,126 13,050 95,000 84,450 70,647 17,112 50,184 222,393 259,000

SASKATCHEWAN - _ - - - - 431,681 402,646 146,698 409,142 1,390,167 948,000

ALBERTA 30,212 28,393 10,236 23,213 92,054 212,000 97,149 59,107 22,942 82,999 262,197 254,000

BRITISH COLUMBIA 2,470 208 206 2,451 5,335 15,000 333,422 283,627 93,395 200,419 910,863 991,000

TOTAL SPACES IN ALL T^HREcT AREAS

PFC 2(PF 10-19)

17,230,512

PFC 3(PF 20-49)

15,298,583

PFC 4(PF 50-99)

6,071,758

PFC 5-8(PF 100+ }

15,184,699

TOTALS

53,785,552

PFC 2(PF 10-19)

5,261,449

TOTAL SPACES IN FALLOUT RISK AREAS ONLY

PFC 3(PF 20-49)

4,126,029

PFC 4(PF 50-99)

1,607,532

PFC 5-8(PF 100+ }

3,943,515

TOTALS

14,938,525

3

ANNEX C

POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE

•

•

ANNEX C

Figure Cl

POLITICAL RISK AREAS DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW

516,000 P NEWFOUNDLAND

496,879

623,000 NEW BRUNSWICK

1,039,769 S

110,000 P PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

114,316 S

146,000 99,000 350,000 170,000 P NOVA SCOTIA

585,436 700 179,056 67,993 S

2,930,000 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P QUEBEC

13,850,122 2,867,169 397,272 1,510,496 S

4,314,000 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P ONTARIO

17,149,689 3,464,376 565,598 1,148,906 S

550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P MANITOBA

2,094,260 57,654 13,050 222,393 S

948,000 P SASKATCHEWAN

1,390,167 S

732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P ALBERTA

2,309,663 35,607 92,054 262,197 S

920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 P BRITISH COLUMBIA

2,857,857 96,675 5,335 910,863

9,592,000 +,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 P CANADA

38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894 S

P POPULATION S - SHELTER SPACES

(Potential)

Figure Cl. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF10 or better)

C-3

•

•

ANNEX C

Figure C2

RISK AREAS POLITICAL DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW

NEWFOUNDLAND 516,000 P

311,899 S

NEW BRUNSWICK 623,000 P

581,719 S

110,000 P PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

55,895 S

146,000 99,000 350,000 170,000 P NOVA SCOTIA

422,184 97,239 38,231 S

2,930,000 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P QUEBEC

9,650,114 1,876,328 264,191 1,131,452 S

ONTARIO 4,314,000 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P

11,867,864 2,122,616 363,870 804,147 S

550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P MANITOBA

1,413,310 38,859 7,484 137,943 S


958,486 S

732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P ALBERTA

1,618,531 18,052 61,842 165,048 S

920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 BRITISH COLUMBIA

1,905,961 61,469 2,865 577,441 S

9,592,000 4,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 P CANADA

26,877,964 4,117,324 1,435,105 4,124,647 S

P POPULATION S = SHELTER SPACES

(Potential)

Figure C2. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF20 or better)

C-5

ANNEX C

Figtite C3

RISK AREAS POLITICAL DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW

516,000 P NEWFOUNDLAND

178,748 S

623,000 P NEW BRUNSWICK

328,913 S

110,000 PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

27,883

146,00C 99,000 350,000 170,000 P NOVA SCOTIA

230,261 40,528 16,823 S

2,930,00C 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P QUEBEC

5,921,60C 1,092,419 169,344 807,974 S

4,314,00C 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P ONTARIO

6,761,912 1,034,314 212,172 513,962 S

550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P MANITOBA

854,950 25,009 3,908 67,296 S


555,840 S

732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P ALBERTA

922,605 9,044 33,449 105,941 S

920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 P BRITISH COLUMBIA

1,014,082 31,009 2,795 293,814 S

9,592,000 4,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 P CANADA

15,705,410 2,191,795 818,854 2,540,398 S

P = POPULATION S = SHELTER SPACES

(Potential)

Figure C3. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF50 or better)

ANNEX C

Figure C4

POLITICALRISK AREAS

DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW

516,000 P

NEWFOUNDLAND 106,480 S

623,000 P

NEW BRUNSWICK 219,809 S

110,000 P

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 20,794 S

146,000 99,000 350,000 170,000 P

NOVA SCOTIA 164,2401 25,678 13,931 S

2,930,000 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P

QUEBEC 4,474,781 786,567 126,207 649,811 S

4,314,000 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P

ONTARIO 4,655,326 662,723 148,411 370,933 S

550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P

MANITOBA 632,559 18,704 1,126 50,184 S

( ^ 948,000 P

SASKATCHEWAN

-

409,142 S--I

732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P

ALBERTA 670,136 7,652 23,213 82,999 S

920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 P

BRITISH COLUMBIA 644,142 16,281 2,451 200,419 S

9,592,000 4;518,000 I 2,327,000 4,774,000 P

CANADA 11,241,184 1,491,927 567,689 1,883,899 S

P = POPULATIONS = SHELTER. SPACES

(Potential)

Figure C4. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTALPOTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF100 or better)

'0

C-9

ANNEX D

DEVELOPMENT OF CASUALTY ESTIMATES

•

• ■■•

Dl

s

s

•

DEVELOPMENT OF CASUALTY ESTIMATES

1. Assumptions

Risk areas were determined using the Group 3 attack situation given in the Canada EMO paper "The Threat to Canada 1970" and form the basis for an assessment of likely benefits that would result in the event of a nuclear attack, from provision of fallout protection for the public.

e Canada EM0e;;;;--E7—ki-dria-a-fibil III)study provides Canadian casualty igures for a speci ic attack on 'or erica and these have been used as the datum for comparing the consequences of sheltering the population of Canada at various levels of fallout protection.

1966 population figures used in the Threat Evaluation III Study have been updated to 1970 estimated population figures and casualty figures adjusted accordingly. It has been assumed that 50 percent of the difference in casualties resulting from this adjustment occur in the direct effects areas.

The number of usable shelter spaces (refer to paragraph 6, Section III) in direct effects areas and outside direct effects areas are taken as 40 percent and 60 percent respectively of the potential shelter spaces in these areas. It has also been assumed that in direct effects areas and outside direct effects areas the potential shelter space which can be made usable by adding ventilation is 10 percent and 20 percent respectively.

Casualty figures developed in Threat Evaluation III, were based on the assumption that the total population would have protection factors of 2 (no basement) and/or 14 (basement). For the purposes of this study, however, it was assumed that the same casualties given in Threat Evaluation III for outside direct effects areas, would occur if the population were sheltered in an average protection factor level of 10. If these casualties occurred with PF 10, then the unattenuated dose ranges creating these casualties would be ten times the doses received. As a simplified approach to determining casualty changes, those people receiving 2-week doses in the range of 220 to 820 roentgens were assumed to have received an average- dose of 485 roentgens. Those people receiving doses in excess of 820 roentgens were assumed to have received an average dose of 1,100 roentgens in the 2-week period.

Existing shelter spaces are grouped in protection factor categories (PFC) each category containing a range of protection factors (e.g. PFC 3 includes all spaces in the range of PF 20 to 49). For the purposes of determining casualty changes, all spaces in each PFC were assumed to have protection factors equal to the minimum for that particular PFC. •

Since there is a shortage of usable space for people at

risk outside the direct effects areas, spaces were allotted to

casualties as follows:

paces allotted = number of casualties x usable spaces

persons at risk

By varying the protection factor levels of the Threat Evaluation

III casualties, changes occu.r.red.in the radiation doses received

and, hence, in the number and severity of casualties. These

casualty changes were derived from Figure 17, "Possible Short-Term

Consequences of Various 2-week Doses of Fallout Radiation", using

the changed radiation dose levels.

In all cases, consequence figures are based on the use of all

existing usable space equal to and better than the protection factor

level specified, except for the Threat Evaluation III figures.

2. PROCEDURES FOLLOWED TO DETERMINE CASUALTIES

Step 1. Updated Threat Evaluation III Casualties

a. Survey Analysis figures for population

surviving direct effects obtained from

Annex B.

b. 1966 population figures for each province

obtained from Threat Evaluation III.

C. The ratio of the 1970 population figure to

the 1966 population figure (group 3) forany province determines the upgrading

factor for the province.

d. Casualties (injured and deaths) obtained from

Threat Evaluation III.

e. Upgrading factors revised to reflect those

casualties assumed in direct effects areas.

f. Updating casualty figures obtained by applying

revised upgrading factors to Threat Evaluation

III casualties.

g• 0.5 percent of the 1970 population outside direct

effects areas assumed to be unfit. The population

receiving 2-Week doses of radiation in excess of

200R but less than 220R in Threat Evaluation III

Study has been assessed at 0.5 percent of the

population surviving direct effects.

h.

J.

d.

e.

f.

g.

•

a.

c .

The difference between the population. surviving direct effects and the sum of all..casualties in each province determines. the nUmber Of persOns said - to be

Summary of fit,,unfit, unfit_requiring . _ _ medical care and deaths in each province shown in Figure D1, Annex D.

Step 2. Casualties Using Existing Usable Shelter Spaces

The totai number of potential shelter spaces by protection factor category (PFC) determined for each province.

. - b. Percentage distribution of shelter spaces calculated in each PFC for each province.

CasUalty ratioa.determined for'each -proVince: The casualty ratio iS equal to the total number of persons injured and dead in a province divided by the population surviving direct effects for that province.

The total number of usable shelter spaces, that is 60 percent of the total number of potential shelter spaces, calculated for each province. .The number of usable shelter spaces multiplied by the casualty ratio determines the number of usable shelter spaces : allotted to casualties in each province.

In provinces where the number.of casualties exceeds.the_number of.allotted'usable,spaces, those casualties without usable shelter Space remain injured or dead in the ratio given by Threat Evaluation III.

The number of casualties provided with usable shelter space were given : space by.distributing Spaces,:using the. percentages - calCUlated • previously for each PFC.

Likely casualties using existing usable space determined for each province by applying protection factors of existing space to average unattenuated doses.

•

h. Casualties si.rnunari:-,cd when usingexist in^.7 usable shelter spaces.Refer to Figure D2, Annex D.

Step 3. Casualties Resulting From Exploiting

Exi.st:iny Shelter Sraces

a. The estimated number of existing usable shelter

spaces increased from 60 to 80 percent of the

total existing potential shelter spaces.

.b. Number of spaces in each PFC calculated for

each province. Redundant spaces determined

and spaces allotted in each PFC.

C. Casualties determined when exploited'

existing shelter space used. Refer to

Figure D3, Annex D.

Step 4. Casualties PF 20 For Entire Population

a. All existing usable shelter spaces in PFCys 4

to 8 allotted and the remaining casualties

provided with a protection factor equal to 20.

b. Casualties determined resulting from persons

allotted spaces in PFC's 3 to 8.

c. Casualties summarized when a minimum protection

factor of 20 provided for entire population.

Refer to Figure D4, Annex D.

Step 5. Casualties - PF 50 For Entire Population

a. All existing usable shelter spaces in PFC's

5 to 8 allotted and the remaining casualties

provided with a protection factor equal.to 50.

b.. Casualties determined resulting from persons

allotted to spaces in PFC's 4 to 8.

c. Number of persons unfit and requiring medical

care calculated in provinces subject to high risk.

d. Risk factors determined for each province. Therisk factor is equal to the provincial numberof persons unfit requiring medical care, divided

by the total number of persons un.fit requiring

medical care.

0

e.

f.

g.

a.

b.

Number of deaths in Canada estimated. It was assumed that one percent of the population surviving direct effects would be subjected to unattenuated doses in excess of 20,000R during the 2-Week period and with a protection factor of 50, the minimum dose received would be 400R. At this dose level about 12 percent deaths are likely to occur (see Figure 17).

Number of deaths estimated in each province. The total number of deaths calculated was allocated to those provinces subject to high risk. The percentage of deaths apportioned to each province was assumed to be the same as those unfit requiring medical care in each province.

Casualties summarized when a minimum protection factor of 50 provided for entire population. Refer to Figure D5, Annex D.

Step 6. Casualties - PF 100 For Entire Population

All persons with a PF equal to or better than 100 were assumed to have received less than 200R.

Casualties noted for Threat Evaluation III in Figure D1, Annex D, would therefore be prevented. Refer to Figure D6, Annex D for summary of casualties prevented with a protection factor equal to 100 for entire population.

As an example of the above procedures, casualty estimates made for the Province of Quebec are detailed below,

3. CASUALTY ESTIMATES FOR THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

Step 1.

Population surviving direct èffects: 3,074,000 - Survey Analysis.

b. 1966. Toial population figure for Quebec: 5,764,000 - Threat Evaluation III.

•

• D-7

c. 1970 Total population figure for Quebec: 6,004,000 - . Survey Analysis

6,004,000 5,764,000

1.04 (upgrading factor)

d. Casualties obtained from Threat Evaluation III

Deaths: Injured:

- 373,100 - 324,900

e. 1.0 (50% x 0.4) 1.02 (revised upgrading factor)

f. Revised casualty figures:

Deaths: - 373,100 x 1.02 = 380,000 Injured: - 324,900 x 1.02 332,000

Population surviving direct effects = 3,074,000

Casualties:

Deaths - 380,000 Injured - 332,000

Total - 712,000 712,000

Remaining persons 2,362,000

g. 0.5% x 3,074,000 = 15,370 unfit

h. 2,362,000 - 15,370 = 2,246,630 fit

j- Summary of Threat Evaluation III Casualties.

POLITICAL UNFIT Requiring DIVISION FIT UNFIT Medical Care DEATHS

QUEBEC 2,246,630 15,370 332,000 380,000

Step 2.

a. Potential Shelter Spaces

• D-8

• (a) (b) (a)-(b) = (c)

PF TOTAL SPACES IN SPACES OUTSIDE CATEGORY SPACES ' DIRECT DIRECT

2 5,702,974 4,200,008 1,502.966 '

3 4,930,748 3,728,514 : ' 1,202,234 -

4 1,953,971 1,446,819 "--507,152 -,-.

5-8 6,037,366 4,474,781 1,562,585

TOTAL 4,774,937

b. Percentage distribution of potential shelter spaces:

PFC2: 1,502,966 x 100 = 31.4%

4.774,937

PFC3: 1 202 234 x 100 = 25.2%

4,774,937

PFC4: 507,152 x 100 = 10.6% 4,774.937

32.8% PFC5-8-.'. 1,562,585 x 100

4,774,937

c. Casualty Ratio.

Total Casualties = 712,000

Population surviving direct effects = 3,074,000

Casualty ratio = 712.000 = 0.23 - 3,074,000

d. Usable Spaces.

60% x potential shelter spaces =

60 x 4,774,937 = 2,860,000 100

0.23 x 2,860,000 660,000 (allotted to casualties)

•

• e, Casualties versus Usable Spaces:

Total Casualties Usable Space

Difference

712,000 660,000

52,000 casualties without shelter

f.

Ratio of deaths to total casualties

= 380 000 712,000'

Ratio of injured to total casualties

.7, 332 000 712,000

Deaths:

Number of persons without shelter = 52,000x0.54 28,000

Injured:

Number of injuries without shelter = 52,000x0.46 = 24,000

Deaths:

Number of persons with shelter . 380,000-28,000 = 352,000

Injured:

Number of persons with shelter = 332,000-24,000 = 308,000

Distribution of Existing usable shelter spaces:

Deaths:

0.54

0.46

•

352,000x31.4 76-

= 352,000x25.2 100

= 352,000x10.6 100

Spaces allotted to PFC5-8= 352,000x32.8

. 110,700

= 88,000

= 37,300

= 116,000

Spaces allotted to PFC2



100

0

g•

Injured•

Spaces allotted to PFC2 = 308,000x31.4 _ 96,800100

Spaces allotted to PFC3 = 308,OOOx25.2 - 77,500100

Spaces allotted to PFC4 = 308,000xlO.6 = 32,700100

Spaces allotted to PFC5-8 = 308,000x32.8 = 101,000100

Consequences of placing casualties

into existing.shelter:

Number of persons PFC Consequence

with shelter

Revised Threat Evaluation III deaths

110,700 2 110,700 deaths (100%)

88,000 3 22,000 deaths (25%) ±66,000 unfit RMC* (75%)

37,300 4 1,920 unfit iL^IC (5%) +35,380 unfit (95%)

116,000 5-8 116,000 fit (100%)

Revised Threat Evaluation III Injuries

96,800 2 17,200 deaths (18%) +79,600 unfit RNC (82%)

77,500 3 23,250 unfit RMC (30%) +54,250 unfit (70%)

32,700 4 32,700 fit (100%)

101,000 5-8 101,000 fit (100%)

Requiring Medical Care.

D-11

h. Summary of casualties for existing usable space.

Change in status fromThreat Evaluation III

POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHSDIVISION M-qC gIKC

QUEBEC 2,611,700 89,630 194,770 177,900 265,070 74,260 137,320 202,100

+ + - -

Note:

Increasing values found in Step 2(f) by 33.33% determines

the number of 80% usable spaces for each PF category.

In addition advantage is taken of the higher PF categoriesnow found.

a. Increase usable spaces to 80%

b, Deaths: PFC2 110,700 x 1.33 = 144,250PFC3 88,000 x 1.33 = 177,300PFC4 37,300 x 1.33 49,700

PFC5-8 116,000 x 1.33 = 154,650

TOTAL: 410,650

Redundant Spaces - usable spaces - casualties

for deaths 465,900 - 380,000 = 85,900

for injuries = 410,650 -- 332,000 = 78,650

+ increase

- decrease

TOTAL: 465,900

Injured: PFC2 96,800 x 1.33 = 129,050PFC3 77,500 x 1.33 = 103,350PFC4 32,700 x 1.33 = 43,600

PFC5--8 101,000 x 1.33 = 134,650

D-12

-.2., 908 deaths (18%) + 49,492 Unfit RMC (82%)

t .

50,400

103,350

43,600

31,00.0 Unfit RMC (30%) - '1250 Utfit . 00%)

43,6'00:fié.*(100%)

8 134,650 fit (100%)

C.

Deduct redundant spaces Irom lowest PFC spaces

Deaths: 144,250 - 85,900 = 58,350 PFC-2. üsabla

Injured: 129,050 - 78,650 50,400 PFC 2 usa:b.1e

Consequences of placing casualties into exploited existing shelter spaces:...

•

Number of persons with shelter

PFC Consequence


58,350 2 58,350 deaths (100%)

117,300 3 29,350 deaths (25%) A- 87,975 Unfit RMC (75%)

49,700 4 2,485 Unfit RMC (5%) + 47,215 Unfit (95%)

154,650 578, : 154,650 fit (100%)

Revised Threat Evaluation ULU -juries

d. Summary of casualties exploiting existing shelter space.

Change in status from

. Threat Evaluation III POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS DIVISION RMC_ RMC

QUEBEC 2,694,900 119,565 170,952 88,583 348,270 132,095 188,948 291,417

St_ep 4: (PF equal to or better than 20)

a. Deaths: Total casualtiesa. .., ......,.380,000

PFC5-8 spaces ...a ..... 116,000

PFC4 spaces ..,,, ... 37,300

Sub-total 153,300 153,300

PFC3 space,_ .......... 226.,700

Injured: Total casualties ........... 332,000

PFC5-8 spaces ........ 101,000PFC4 spaces ........ 32,700

PFC3 spaces

Sub-Total 133,700 133,700

• ., • p • . e • 198,300

b. Consequences of placing above casualties intoshelters equal to or better than PF 20



226,7003 56,675 deaths (25%) +

170,025 Unfit RMC (75%)

4 1,865 Unfit RMC (5%) +35,435 Unfit (95%)

37,300

116,000 5-8 116,000 fit (100%)

Revised Threat Evaluation III in_juries

198,300 3 60,490 Unfit RMC (30%)137,810 Unfit (70%)

32,700 4 32,700 fit (100%)

s

101,000 5^8 101,000 fit (100%)

101,000 fit (100%)

231,000 fit (100%)

• c. Summary of casualties using PF20

Change in status from Threat Evaluation III

POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS DIVISION RMC RMC

QUEBEC 2,611,700 173,245 232,380 56,675 265,070 157,875 99,620 323,325 +

+

Step 5. (PF equal to or better than 50)

a .

•

Deaths: Total Casualties

PFC8 spaces

PFC4 spaces

Injured: Total casualties

• PFC5-8 spaces

PFC4 spaces

380,000

116,000

264,000

332,000

101,000

231.000

b. Consequence of placing above casualties into shelter spaces equal to or better than PF 50.



116,000 116,000 fit (1007 )

264,000 4 13,200 Unfit RMC (5%) •+ 250,800 Unfit (95%)

Revised Threat Evaluation III Injuries

101,000 5-8

231,000 4

•

Ç .

g.

• Total number of persons Unfit FISC in provinces subject to high risk is 54,643. The provinces subject to high risk, and therefore some deaths even with a PF-50, are Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia.

Total number of persons Unfit RMC in the Province of Quebec is 13,200.

d. Risk factor = Unfit RMC-Quebec = lq,?oo , 0.24 Unfit RMC-Canada 54,643 ..

e. Total estimated deaths in Canada

, 1% x Population Surviving DE x 12%

= 1 x 11,619,000 x .12 100 100

= 13,942

Estimated deaths in Quebec

= 13,942 x 0.24 ;:.; 3,300

Summary of Casualties using PF 50


POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEAT1,S DIVISION RMC RMC

QUEBEC 2,806;700 250,800 13,200 3,300 460,070 235,430 318,800 376,700

Step 6. (PF equal to or better than 100)

a. With PF 100 minimum, most casualties indicated by Threat Evaluation III Study will be prevented.

b. Summary of casualties using PF 100


POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS DIVISION RMC RMC

QUEBEC 3,074,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE 727,370 15,370 322,000 380,000

C.

• ,

Political Unfit

Division Fit Unfit. Requiring Medical Deaths

Care

Newfoundland 513,420 2,580 - -

New Brunswick 381,285 3,115 105,400 133,200

Prince Edward Island 34,150 550 72,100 3,200

Nova Scotia 444,505 3,095 128,000 43,400

Quebec 2,346,630 15,370 332,000 380,000

Ontario 2,145,935 16,265 427,800 663,000

Manitoba 351,860 2,140 15,000 59,000

Saskatchewan 937,360 4,740 5,500 400

Alberta 760,740 4,260 46,300 40,700

British Columbia 908,520 5,980 81,500 200,000

Canada 8,824,405 58,095 1,213,600 1,522,900

Figure D 1. CASUALTIES OBTAINED FROM "THREAT EVALUATION Ill STUDY"

m > Z

c z m

Change in status from Threat Evaluation III Study

. Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths

requiring requiring Division medical care medical care

Newfoundland 516,000 - - - + 2,580 - 2,580 - -

New Brunswick 446,100 31,220 70,530 75,150 + 64,815 + 28,105 - 34,870 - 58,050

Prince Edward Island 45,950 7,880 49,685 6,485 + 11,800 + 7,330 - 22,415 + 3,285

Nova Scotia 456,310 7,420 114,255 41,015 + 11,805 + 4,325 - 13,745 - 2,385

Quebec 2,611,703 89,630 194,770 177,900 + 265,070 + 74,260 - 137,230 -202,100

Ontario 2,444,700 150,350 322,300 335,650 + 298,765 + 134,085 - 105,500 - 327,350

Manitoba 361,850 3,320 16,990 45,840 + 9,990 + 1,180 + 1,990 - 13,160

Saskatchewan 944,060 975 2,515 450 + 6,700 - 3,765 - 2,985 + 50

Alberta 772,900 3,120 40,655 35,325 + 12,160 - 1,140 - 5,645 - 5,375

British Columbia 949,900 19,380 80,460 146,260 + 41,380 + 13,400 - 1,040 - 53,740

Canada 9,549,470 313,295 892,160 864,075 +725,065 + 255,200 -321,440 -658,825

Figure D:2. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF UTILIZING EXISTING USABLE SHELTER SPACES FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

•

0

•

• Change in status from

Threat Evaluation Ill Study

Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Division requiring requiring

medical care medical care

Newfoundland 516,000 - - - + 2,580 2,580 - -

New Brunswick 466,650 41,588 65,310 49,452 + 85,365 - 38,473 - 40,090 - 83,748

Prince Edward Island 49,720 10,531 43,562 6,187 + 15,570 - 9,981 - 28,538 + 2,987

Nova Scotia 459,200 9,910 109,690 40,200 + 14,695 - 6,815 - 18,310 - 3,200

Quebec 2,694,900 119,565 170,952 88,583 + 348,270 - 104,195 - 161,048 -291,417

Ontario 2,538,900 200,065 308,310 205,725 + 392,965 - 183,800 - 119,490 -457,275

Manitoba 364,460 4,430 17,645 41,465 + 12,600 - 2,290 + 2,645 - 17,535

Saskatchewan 944,710 1,308 1,641 341 + 7,350 + 3,432 - 3,859 - 59

Alberta 775,500 4,153 38,849 33,498 + 14,760 + 107 - 7,451 - 7,202

British Columbia 961,700 25,815 80,195 128,290 + 53,180 - 19,835 - 1,305 - 71,710

Canada 9,771,740 417,365 836,154 593,741 + 947,335 -359,270 -377,446 -929,159

Figure D3. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF EXPLOITING EXISTING POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACES FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

-T1 - • > z c CD rn

x

• Change in status from

Threat Evaluation III Study

Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Division requiring requiring


Newfoundland 516,000 Trace - - + 2,580 - 2,580 - -

New Brunswick 446,100 63,630 90,520 22,750 + 64,815 + 60,515 - 14,880 - 110,450

Prince Edward Island 45,950 42,954 20,414 682 + 11,800 + 42,404 - 51,686 - 2,518

Nova Scotia 456,310 85,378 67,065 10,247 + 11,805 + 82,283 - 60,935 - 33,153

Quebec 2,611,700 173,245 232,380 56,675 + 265,070 + 157,875 - 99,620 - 323,325

Ontario 2,444,700 268,885 427,165 112,250 + 298,765 + 252,620 - 635 - 550,750

Manitoba 361,850 11,183 42,205 12,762 + 9,990 + 9,043 + 27,205 - 46,238

Saskatchewan 944,060 2,582 1,292 66 + 6,700 - 2,158 - 4,208 - 334

Alberta 772,900 30,070 39,905 9,125 + 12,160 + 25,810 - 6,395 - 31,575

British Columbia 949,900 58,025 146,300 41,775 + 41,380 + 52,045 + 64,800 - 158,225

Canada 9,549,470 735,952 1,067,246 266,332 + 725,065 + 677,857 - 146,354 - 1,256,568

Figure D4. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF PROVIDING A PROTECTION FACTOR

EQUAL TO 20 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

-r«.1 z

ni c z

"ci3

0

•

• `

Change in status fromThreat Evaluation III Study

Political

Division

Fit Unfit Unfitrequiring

medical care

Deaths Fit Unfit Unfitrequiring

medical care

Deaths

Newfoundland 516,000 - - - + 2,580 - 2,580 - -

New Brunswick 518,000 99,750 5,250 Trace + 136,715 + 96,635 - 100,150 - 133,200

Prince Edward Island 107,150 2,710 140 Trace + 73,000 + 2,160 - 71,960 - 3,200

Nova Scotia 576,700 39,653 2,087 560 + 132,195 + 36,558 - 125,913 - 42,840

Quebec 2,806,700 250,800 13,200 3,300 + 460,070 + 235,430 - 318,300 - 376,700

Ontario 2,728,000 492,575 25,925 6,500 + 582,065 + 476,310 - 401,875 - 656,500

Manitoba 374,200 50,464 2,656 680 + 22,340 + 48,324 - 12,344 - 53,320

Saskatchewan 947,700 285 15 Trace + 10,340 - 4,455 - 5,435 - 400

Alberta 814,000 35,625 1,875 500 + 53,260 + 31,365 - 44,425 - 40,200

British Columbia 1,015,700 169,100 8,900 2,300 + 107,180 + 163,120 - 72,600 - 197,700

Canada 10,404,150 1,140,962 60,048 13,840 + 1,579,745 + 1,032,867 - 1,153,552 - 1,509,060

Figure D 5. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF PROVIDING A PROTECTION FACTOR EQUALTO 50 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

•

•

•

• • Change in status from

Threat Evaluation III Study

Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths

Division requiring requiring


+ _ Newfoundland 516,000 - - -

2,580 2,580 ' - -

New Brunswick 623,000 Trace Trace - +

241,715 3,115 105,400 133,200

+ Prince Edward Island 110,000 Trace - -

75,850 550 72,100 3,200

+ Nova Scotia 619,000 Trace Trace Trace

174,495 3,095 128,000 43,400

+ _ Quebec 3,074,000 Trace Trace Trace

727,370 15,370 332,000 380,000

+ _ Ontario 3,253,000 Trace Trace Trace

1,107,065 16,265 427,800 663,000

+ _ _ Manitoba 428,000 Trace Trace Trace

76, 140 2,140 15,000 59,000

+ _ _ Saskatchewan 948,000 Trace - -

10,640 4,740 5,500 400

+ _ Alberta 852,000 Trace Trace -

91,260 4,260 46,300 40,700

+ British Columbia 1,196,000 Trace Trace Trace

287,480 5,980 81,500 200,000

+ _ Canada 11,619,000 Trace Trace Trace

2,794,595 58,095 1,213,600 1,522,900

Figure D6. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF PROVIDING A PROTECTION FACTOR EQUALTO 100 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

(.;" CD

o

•

•

0

• •

CASUALTIES ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED

BASIC STEPSSE

OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS DIRECT EFFECTSOUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS

DIRECT EF F CT

AREAS FIT UNFIT * *UNFIT RMC DEATHS AREAS FIT UNFIT ;UNFITRMC ; DEATHS

PREPARE PLANS FOR _9,549,470 313,295 892,160 864,075 725,065 255,200 321,440 658,825

USE OF EXISTING SPACE

EXPLOIT EXISTING

POTENTIAL SPACES ITllO *9,771,740 417,365 836,154 593,741 - 947,335 359,270 377,446 929,159

INCREASE USABLE

SPACE

PROVIDE SHELTER

SPACE FOR TOTAL

POPULATION WITH 10,404,150 1,140,962 60,048 13,840 1,579,745 1,082,867 1,153,552 1,509,060

MINIMUM PF 50

PROVIDE SHELTER

SPACE FOR TOTAL- 11,619,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE - 2,794,595 58,095 1 213,600 1,522,900

POPULATION WITH,

MINIMUM PF 100

THREAT EVALUATION III

(THE BASIS,OF COMPARISON) - 8,824,405 58,095 1,213,600 1,522,900

* REDUCTION OF NUMBERS OF DEATHS AND UNFIT

REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE INCREASES THE NUMBER OF

PEOPLE IN THE "UNFIT" CATEGORY.

CASUALTIES IN DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS ATTRIBUTABLE

TO FALLOUT ONLY ARE LIKELY TO BE VERY SMALL AND

THEREFORE NONE HAS BEEN INCLUDED.

Figure D 7. ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED

** RMC - REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE

•

ANNEX E

CASUALTY ESTIMATES

BY PROVINCE

0

•

•

0

ANNEX E

NEWFOUNDLAND

PF FIT UNFITUNFIT REQUIRINGMEDICAL CARE DEATHS

100 516,000 - - -

50 516,000 - e. -

20 516,000 TRACE - -

THREAT EVALUATION III 513,420 2,580 - -

EXISTING SHELTERUSED

516 ,000 - - -

•

NOVA SCOTIA

PF FIT UNFITUNFIT REQUIRING DEATHSMEDICAL CARE

l00 619,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE

50 576,70v 39,653 128,000 560

20 456,310 85,378 67,065 10,247

THREAT EVALUATION III 444,505 3,095 2,087 43,400

EXISTING SHELTER 456,310 7,420 114,255 41,015USED

^

•

_

ANNEX E

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT MEDICAL CARE DEATHS

100 110,000 TRACE -

_50 107,150 2,710 140 TRACE

20 45,950 4 2 954 20,414 682

THREAT EVALUATION III 34,150 550 72,100 3,200

EXISTING SHELTER USED

45,950 7,880 49,685 6,485

NEW BRUNSWICK

UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT

AL DEATHS

MEDIC CARE

100 623,000 TRACE TRACE -

50 .518,000 99,750 5,250 TRACE

446,100 63,630 90,520 22,750

THREAT EVALUATION IH 381,285 3,115 1Q5,400 133,200


446,100 31,220 70,530 75,150

•

A.NNEX E

QUEBEC

PF FIT UNFIT UNFIT REQUIRING DEATHS MEDICAL CARE

100 3,074,000 Trace TRACE TRACE

50 2,806,700 250,800 13,200 3,300

20 2,611,700 173,245 232,380 56,675

THREAT EVALUATION III 2,346,630 15,370 . 332,000 • 380,000

EXISTING SHELTER

2,611,700 89,630 USED

194,770 177,900

ONTARIO

UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT DEATHS MEDICAL CARE

100 3,253,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE

50 2728,000 492,575 25,925 6,500

20 2444,700 268,885 427,165 112,250

THREAT EVALUATION III 2,145,935 16,265 427,800 663,000


2,444,700 150,350 322,300 335,650

•

•

ANNEX E

MANITOBA


100 428,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE

50 374,200 50,464 2,656 680

20 361,850 11,183 42,205 12762


EXISTING SHELTER 361,850 3,320 16,990 45,840 USED

SASKATCHEWAN

UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT ' MEDICAL CARE DEATHS

100 948,000 TRACE -• -

50 , 947,700 285 15 TRACE

20 944,060 2,585 1,292 66

THREAT EVALUATION III 937,360 4,740 5,500 400

EXISTING SFIELTER

944,060 975 2,515 450 USED

•

ANNEX E

ALBERTA


100 852,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE

50 814,000 35,625 1,875 500

20 772,900 30,070 39,905 9, 125

THREAT EVALUATION III 76 0,7 40 4,260 46,300 4Ô,700

EXISTING SHELTER

772,900 3,120 40,655 35,325 USED

BRITISH COLUMBIA

15-F-- FIT UNFIT UNFIT REQUIRING DEATHS MEDICAL CARE

fod 1,196,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE

50 1,015,000 169,100_

8,900 2,300

--26- 949,900 58,025 146,300 41,775


EXISTING SHELTER -5-+ 49;960 19,380 80,460 146,260 USED

0

•

•

•

ANNEX F

DEVELOPMENT OF

COST ESTIMATES

F--1

•

•

•

DEVELOPMENT OF COST ESTIMATES

The cost figures produced for this study are only approximate and are based on some of the cost information given in "Analysis Study No. 1, Alberta Region", EMO 1964 and on that given in the United States Office of Civil Defense "Annual Statistical Report", 1969.

Costs are developed for the following five basic steps:

A. Maintain updating inventory of potential fallout shelter space;

B. Prepare plans for use of existing space;

C. Exploit existing potential space to increase number of usable spaces;

D. Provide population with shelter minimum protection factor 50;

E. Provide population with shelter minimum protection factor 100.

STEP A Maintain Inventory of Existing Spa.ce

Estimated costs for:

Direct Effects Areas = $50,000 annually Outside Direct Effects Areas = $50.000 annually

Total: = $100,000 annually

STEP B Plans for Use of Existing Space

1. Direct Effects Areas. Include for licensing, marking, provision of emergency sanitary facilities and for development of community shelter plans.

Potential shelter spaces: 38,847,027

therefore usable shelter spaces = 40% x.38,847,027 = 15,538,810

Population of direct effects areas = 9,592,000

Since there are more usable spaces than population, costs are based only on number of spaces required, that is, 9,592,000 spaces.

a. Licensing and Marking

The cost of licensing and marking is estimated to be $0.15/shelter space, therefore, total cost for this work is:

41, 9,592,000 x $0.15 = $1,439,000 ... (1)

50 100 150 200

b. Sanitation

The estimated cost of sanitary facilities is $0.25/shelter space (U.S, figure $0.16/shelter space), therefore total cost is:

9,592,000 x $0.25

c. Community Shelter Plan (CSP)

$2,398,000 (2)

Since there is little or no experience in Canada of preparing community shelter plans, no useful Canadian cost statistics exist. It was necessary therefore, to use United States cost figures as a basis for developing approximate estimated costs for this type of work in Canada. Cost and population data from over one hundred United States Office of Civil Defense contracts, awarded since the beginning of 1966, were plotted and from a regression analysis of these plots, a rough cost estimating chart was developed.

Mathematically, the line on the chart shown at Figure Fl, is represented by the equation:

COST = $(0.136 x POPULATION) + 5920)

•

POPULATION x 1000

Figure Fl. Community Shelter Planning - Rough Cost Estimating Chart

Costs shown in Figure F2 are derived from

Figure F1 and have been increased by 25 percent

because of general price and wage increases.

They include only for the proper development

of cummunity shelter plans by professional

urban planners in conjunction with local and

provincial emergency planning staffs.

CSP

Risk Area Population Estimated Costs

Direct 9,592,000 $1,635,000

High 4,518,000 795,000

Medium 2,327,000 395,000

Low 4,774,000 812,000

Total 21,211,000 $3,637,000

Figure F2. ESTIMATED COSTS FOR

COMNiUNITY SHELTER PLANNING

0

Community shelter plans for direct

effects areas = $1,635,000 ...... (3)

Total cost for Step A for Direct

Effects Areas = (1) + (2) + ( 3) $5,472,000

2. Outside Direct Effects Areas. Include for licensing,

marking, provision of emergency sanitary facilities

and for development of community shelter plans.

Population = 11,619,000

Usable spaces assumed to be 60 percent of

identified potential spaces, that is 8,963,115 spaces

High Risk, Medium Risk Low Risk Total

Population 4,518,000

Licensing & $ 587,000Marking.

Sanitary

Facilities

Community

$ 978,000

Shelter $ 795,000

Planning

Total Costs: $2,360,000

Usable Spaces 3,913,308

2,327,000

$ 217,000

$ 361,000

$ 395,000

$ 973,000

1,443,870

4,774,000 11,619,000

$ 541,000 $ 1,345,000 ..... (4)

$ 901,000 $ 2,240,000 ..... (5)

$ 812,000 $ 2,002,000 .. ... (6)

$2,254,000 $ 5,587,000

3,605,936 8,963,115

0

• Step A - Direct Effects Areas $5,472,000

Outside Direct Effects Areas

Total Cost: $11,059,000

STEP C Exploit Existing Potential Space to increase number of Usable Spaces

1. Direct Effects Areas. Include for licensing, marking, provision of emergency sanitary fàcilities, community shelter planning and additiônal ventilation. In casting this step, only potential shelter spaces with protection factors of 50 or better, have been exploited. It is assumed that only 10 percent of the total potential spaces can be improved by additional ventilation. For a PF 50 or better level, there is a shelter deficit of 3,340,639.

5,587,000

Spaces that can be developed by additional ventilation

Additional spaces required

= 1,570,541

= 1,770,098

a. Licensing and Marking

refer to Step B = $1,439,000 ,. (1)

b. Sanitation

refer to Step B = $2,398,000 (2)

c. Community Shelter Planning

refer to Step S = $1,635,000 . (3)

d. Cost of Ventilating Additional Spaces

From Analysis Study No. 1, average cost per space for various sizes of shelter are given below:

Shelter Ventilation Cost/Space Capacity Costs

50 $ 573 $ 11.46

100 761 7.61

200 1253 6.27

500 2203 4.40

1000 4020 4.02

Average Cost = $6.75/space. Use $7.00/space.

Cost = 1,570,541 x $7.00 .4 $10,993,787 (7) •

Total cost for Step C for Direct Effects Areas

(1) + (2) + (3) + (7)

$16,465,789

2. Outside Direct Effects Areas

Again consider only Pr 50 or better.

Shelter deficit at PF 50 level = 8,288,394 spaces

Spaces that can be developed by

adding ventilation assumed to be

20 percent of total potential spaces.

Spaces to be developed20% of 5,551,047 = 1,110,202

a. Licensing and Ilarkinâ

refer to Step B = $1,345,000 ....... (4)

1,110,202 x $0.15 = 166,530 ....... (8)

Total: _ $1,511,530 ....... (9)

b. Sanitation

refer to Step B = $2,240,000 ....... (5)

1,110,202 x $0.25 = $ 277,550 ....... (10)

0 Total: _ $2,517,550 ....... (11)

c. Community Shelter Planning

refer to Step B = $2,002,000 ....... (6)

d. Ventilation

11.110,202 x $7.00 = $7,771,414 ....... (12)

Total costs for areas outside direct

effects = (9) + (11) + ( 6) + (12) $13,802,494

Total costs Step C:

Direct Effects Areas = $16,465,789

Outside Direct Effects Areas = $13,802,494

Total: $30,268,281

0

Costs for Steps D and E are based on the premise that new additional spaces can be most economically provided by a program of shelter space development in new buildings at the design stage. This could be accomplished by paying the additional costs required to provide shelter and these costs are based on a shelter space costing as follows:

Current new construction costs F $25.00/square foot 10 percent of $25.00 per square foot F $ 2.50/square foot Cost of shelter space = $2.50 x 12 sq.ft,

$30.00/space.

•

STEP D, Provide Shelter Spaces Minimum PF 50 for Total Population, but all new space provided as mentioned above to have a minimum PF 100

Include for provision of space, licensing, marking, provision of emergency sanitary facilities, community shelter planning and ventilation.

1, Direct Effects Areas. The number of additional shelter spaces required is 1,770,098 '(see Figure F3, Annex F)

a. Additional pace

Cost: $30.00/space

Cost for additional spaces F 1,770,098 x $30.00

:7 $53,102,940 , (13)

b. Licensing and Marking

refer to Step C $1;439,000 .„ (1)

c. Sanitation

refer to Step C $2,398,000 (2)

d. Community Shelter Planning

refer to Step C $1,635,000 .

e. Ventilation

refer to Step C F $10, 993,787 e (7)

Total costs for Direct Effects Areas = (13) + (1) + (2) + (3) + (7) := $69,568,727

0

2. Outside Direct Effects Areas. The number of additionalshelter spaces required is, 7,178,192 (see Figure F4,Annex F)

a, Additional Space

Cost: $30.00/space

Cost for additional spaces 7,178,192 x $30.00

_ $215,345,760 ........... (14)


0

Population: 11,619,000

Cost = 11,619,000 x $0.15 $1,742,850 ............. (15)

c. Sanitation

Cost = 11,619,000 x $0.25 = $2,904,750 ............. (16)


refer to Step C = $2y0021,000 ............. (6)

e. Ventilation

refer to Step C $7,771,414 ............. (12)

Total costs for areas outside Direct Effects

(14) + (15) + (16) + ( 6) + (12) _ $232,638,050

Total costs for Step D

Direçt Effects Areas - $69,568,727

Outside Direct Effects Areas = 229,766,774

Total: _ $299,335,501

0

STEP E. Provide shelter spaces m^nimum PF 100 for Total

Population, but all new spacesprovidedto have PF 100

Include for provision of space, licensing, marking,

community shelter planning, provision of emergency

sanitary facilities and venl:ilation.

1. Direct Effects Areas. The number of additional shelter

spaces required is 3,971,409 and the number of

spaces that can be improved is 1,124,116 (see Figure F6,

Annex F)

a. Additional Space

Cost: $30.00/space

Cost for additional spaces _ 3,971,409 x$30.00

$1.19,142,270 .......... (17)


refer to Step C = $1,439,000 .......... (1)

c. Sanitation

refer to Step C = $2,398,000 ........ .. (2)


refer to Step C $1,635,000 ... ....... (3)

e. Ventilation

Cost: $7.00/space

Cost for ventilation = 1,124,116 x$7.00

_ $7,868,812 ............ (18)

Total cost for Direct Effects Areas

- (17) + (1) + (2) + (3) + (18) ^ $132,483,082

2. Outside Direct Effects Areas. The number of additional

shelter spaces required is 8,464,224-and the number of

spaces that can be improved is 788,694 (see Figure F6,

Annex F).

a. Additional Space

Cost: $30./space

Cost for additional space ^ 8,464,224 x $30.00

$253,926,720 .......... (19)

0

• b. Licensing and Marking

refer to Step D $1,742,850 (15)

c. Sanitation

refer to Step D = $2,904,750 (16)


refer to Step C = $2,002,000 (6)

e. Ventilation

Cost: $7.00/space

Cost for ventilation = 788,694 x $7.00

= $5,520.858 (20)

Total cost for areas outside Direct Effects

= (19) + (15) + (16) + (6) + (20)

= $266,097.178

Total Costs for Step E

Direct Effects Areas = $132,483,082

Outside Direct Effects Areas = 266,097,178

Total: = $398,580,260

•

• •

d + e = (f) (9) g - f = (h) Political (a) (b) (a + b) = c (d) (e) Increased usable i Population inside PF 50 Shelter Division PF 100 + PF 50- 99 PF 50+ 40% x c 10% x c spaces direct effects areas spaces needed

Newfoundland - - - - - - - -

New Brunswick - - - _ - - - -

Prince Edward Island _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Nova Scotia 164,240 66,021 230,261 92,104 23,026 115,130 146,000 30,870

Quebec 4,474,781 1,446,819 5,921,600 2,368,640 592,160 2,960,800 2,930,000 0

Ontario 4,655,326 2,106,586 6,761,912 2,704,764 676,191 3,380,955 4,314,000 933,045

Manitoba 632,559 222,391 854,950 341,980 85,495 427,475 550,000 122,525

Saskatchewan - - _ _ - -

Alberta 670,136 252,469 922,605 369,042 92,260 461,302 732,000 270,698

British Columbia 644,142 369,940 1,014,082 405,632 101,408 507,040 - 920,000 412,960

Canada 11,241,184 4,464,226 15,705,410 6,282,164 1,570,541 7,852,702 9,592,000 1,770,098

Figure F3. -n (E . Z c z

rn

ta

NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOR

EQUAL TO 50 FOR POPULATION INSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

• • (g)

d + e = (f) g - f = (h) Political (a) (b) a + b =- (c) (d) (e) Increased usable

Population

Division PF 100 + PF 50 - 99 PF 50 + 60% x (c) 20% x (c) outside direct P.F. 50 shelter

spaces effects area spo-c. e.,,- pie ed ed

Newfoundland 106,480 72,268 178,748 107,244 35,748 142,992 516,000 373,008

New Brunswick 219,809 109,104 328,913 197,346 65,782 263,128 623,000 3.5.9,8.72

Prince Edward Island 20,794 7,08 . 27,883 16,728 5,576 22,304 110,000 87,696

Nova Scotia 39,609 17,742 57,351 34,410 11,470 45,880 619,000 573,120

Quebec 1,562,585 507,152 2,069,737 1,241,838 413,946 1,655,784 3,074,000 1,418,216

Ontario 1,182,067 578,381 1,760,448 1,056,264 352,088 1,408,352 3,253,000 1,844,648

Manitoba 70,014 26,199 96,213 57,726 19,242 76,968 428,000 351,032

Saskatchewan 409,142 146,698 555,840 333,504 111,168 444,672 948,000 503,328

Alberta 113,864 34, ',.- 0 148,434 89,058 29,686 118,744 852,000 733,256

•

British Columbia 219,151 108,329 327,480 196,488 65,496 261,984 1,196,000 934,016

Canada 3,943,515 1,607,532 5,551,047 3,330,606 1,110,202 4,440,808 11,619,000 7,178,192

> C z

rn ><

Figure F4. NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOR


-11 -n

i

•

0

i R

Pol iticalDivision

(a)

PF 100 +

(b)

40% x ( a)

(c)

10% x (a)

b + c = (d)

Increased usablespaces

(e)

Populationinside directeffects areas

e - d - (f)

PF 100 shelterspaces needed

Newfoundland - - - - - -

New Brunswick - - - - - -

Prince Edward Island - - - - - '

Nova Scotia 164,240 65,696 16,424 82,120 146,000 63,880

Quebec 4,474,781 1,789,912 447,478 2,237,390 2,930,000 692,610

Ontario 4,655,326 1,862,130 465,532 2,327,663 4,314,000 1,986,337

Manitoba 632,559 253,023 63,255 316,279 550,000 233,721

Saskatchewan - - - - - -

Alberta 670,136 268,054 67,013 335,068 732,000 396,932

British Columbia 644,142 257,656 64,414 322,071 920,000 597,929

Canada 11,241,184 4,496,471 1,124,116 5,620,591 9,592,000 3,971,409

Figure -F5. NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOREQUAL TO 100 FOR POPULATION INSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.

azzrnX

•

•

•

CD ni

• • (e)

Political (a) (6) (c) b , c .,_ (d) population e - d = (f)

Division PF loot 60% x ( a ) 20% Increased usable , outside direct PF 100 shelter

•x (a)

spaces effects areas spoces needed

Newfoundl and 106,480 63,888 21,296 85,184 516,000 430,816

New Brunswick 219,809 131,880 43,960 175,840 623,000 447,160

Prince Edward Island 20,794 12,474 4,158 16,632 110,000 93,368

Nova Scotia 39,609 23,760 7,920 31,680 619,000 587,320

Quebec 1,562,585 937,548 312,516 1,250,064 3,074,000 1,823,936

Ontario 1,182,067 709,236 236,412 945,648 3,253,000 2,301,352 -

Manitoba 70,014 42,006 14,002' 56,008 428,000 371,992

Saskatchewan 409,142 245,484 81,828 327,312 948,000 620,688

Alberta 113,864 68,316 22,772 91,088 852,000 760,912

British Columbia 219,151 131,490 43,830 175,320 1,196,000 1,020,680

Canada 3,943,515 2,366,082 788,694 3,154,776 11,619,000 8,464,224

Figure F6. NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOR


•

•

•

\ 6..__

ANNEX G

RISK AREA MAPSBY PROVINCE

Is

•

•

...

e

L

ANNEX GNEWFOUNDLAND

0

•

G-3

• ■

NEW BRUNSWICK MEDIUM RISK

ZONE BOUNDARY

ANNEX G NEW BRUNSWICK

.■

..

G-5

• •

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND MEDIUM RISK

ANNEX G PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

•

•

• G-7

• e

d>

ANNEX GNOVA SCOTIA

•

0

0

NOVA SCOTIA

HIGH RISK

MEDIUM RISK

ZONE BOUNDARY

G-9

QUEBEC

HIGH RISK

MEDIUM RISK

LOW RISK

ZONE BOUNDARY

•

•

ONTARIO HIGH RISK

MEDIUM RISK

LOW RISK

ZONE BOUNDARY

./.

./.

./*

•

•

. . ^ r

ANNEX GMANITOBA

0

i

i

U

mMniiuoM

HIGH RISK

MEDIUM RISK ^

LOW RISK ^

ZONE BOUNDARY

G-15

? ! •

SASKATCHEWAN LOW RISK

ZONE BOUNDARY

i

i 7

i L •■■•• ■■

I 6

•

ANNEX G SASKATCHEWAN

G-17

• •

i

I

2ALBERTA

HIGH RISK

MEDIUM RISK

LOW RISK

ZONE BOUNDARY

0

ANNEX GBRITISH COLUMBIA

4

1

1

!

^ BRITISH COLUMBIA

I

HIGH RISK

MEDIUM RISK

LOW RISK

ZONE BOUNDARY

5

PSEPC/SPPCC LIB/BIBLIO

IIIIIIIIII 0000067334 r UA Analysis of results of fallout

927 protection survey of Canada A53a • / •

1970

DATE DUE SLIP

o F255

PSEPUSu111^1^0111 'iu i^^iUA Analysis of results of fallout927 protection survey of CanadaA53a I1970

DATE DUE SLIP

F255 II 0

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