arctic sovereignty - hans island

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Conflict Analysis

Arctic Sovereignty Using the Hans Island Dispute as a Diplomatic Laboratory

Michael Mitchell, OMM, CD September 3, 2014 Executive Summary

• The Canadian Arctic Archipelago consists of more than 36,000 islands. The only island in this group over which sovereignty is currently contested is Hans Island, which lies midway between Canada and Greenland (Denmark). Since the 1970’s Canada and Denmark have not been able to reach an accord as to how title to this uninhabited rock should be decided.

• As ice packs recede, the extent of the continental shelves of nations bordering the Arctic is becoming more defined. This situation is prompting a reappraisal of the delineation of national borders, and raising questions regarding how national sovereignty over land, water, and airspace is to be determined.

• The increasing navigability of Arctic waterways is prompting a marked rise in global political and corporate interest in exploiting this transportation route, as well as the oil, gas, and other resource wealth in the region. Some uncertainty exists as to who can take advantage of these opportunities, and what regulations come into play.

• The Hans Island territorial dispute may provide a test case opportunity that can be used to not only resolve this single issue, but also provide a model with which some potential future claims may be settled.

ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY – HANS ISLAND 2

“Sovereignty is not given, it is taken.” - Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Introduction

This paper introduces a proposed resolution to the ongoing dilemma of the determination of sovereignty over Hans Island, a small, yet potentially significant geographic feature located in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. A contextual outline of the situation is followed by a conflict analysis, and intervention proposals. It is this author’s view that the cornerstone of a resolution to this problem lies in a belief, brought forward by Mayer (2012), that a deeper understanding of the identity issues, rather than “negotiated agreements based on identified interests” (p. 175) defines the preferred course of action. Successful outcomes resulting from this problem-solving approach might provide a model by which comparable future territorial disputes could be addressed in a collaborative and transparent manner (Folger et al., 2013). Geographical and Historical Context

The Arctic Archipelago (see Figure 1) consists of more than 36,000 islands that lie to the North of mainland Canada in the Arctic Ocean between North America and Greenland (see Figure 2), encompassing a landmass in excess of 1.4 million square kilometers (Canadian Geographic, 2005). The only currently disputed exception to Canada’s sovereignty over these Arctic Islands is Hans Island (Byers, 2014).

Hans Island (see Figure 3) is a 1.3 square kilometer, uninhabited rock lying midway between Canada’s Ellesmere Island and Greenland, an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark. The island is situated in the narrow Kennedy Channel in Nares Strait, midway between the Canadian and Danish (Greenland) territories. Hans Island has never held a permanently occupied settlement, and there is no current evidence that it contains any natural resources of note (Huebert, 2005).

Figure 1(left): Islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (darker region at top of map). Greenland is the large landmass lying to the Northeast of those islands. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Canadian_Arctic_Archipelago


Stevenson (2007) detailed how Canada’s claim to sovereignty over this

area lies predominantly in the fact that this region was ceded to Canada by the United Kingdom in 1880. That claim was further strengthened by continuous occupation of the region, and determination by the inhabitants to continue to be governed by the Government of Canada. The second (continuous occupation) and third (will of the inhabitants) determinants are not easily defended in specific relation to Hans Island (Dufresne, 2007). Denmark’s claim centres on the assertion that the island was discovered by a Greenland Inuit named Hans Hendrik, that there are certain geographic linkages to Greenland, and that Greenland Inuit (Inughuit) may have used the island in the past as a hunting staging place (Stevenson, 2007). Since the 1990’s, both countries have attempted to strengthen their claims by periodically sending military units to visit the island in furtherance of the principal that occupation of territory is integral to the claim of title in accordance with United Nations doctrine (Byers, 2013).

The similarity of the claims to ownership taken by each country, as well as the common self-perceptions regarding objective legal claim to title and national identity associated with the island, infer a homogenous perception of reality, which Fisher and Kelman (2011) refer to as a centrality of perceptions. This observation will bear consideration when crafting an intervention strategy. There has never been any armed dispute between the two countries, and political interchange has usually been cordial (Stevenson, 2007). There is even precedence for establishing official accords on the issue of Hans Island as evidenced by the original bi-lateral survey treaty in 1973 (UNLT, 2002). Positions, Issues, Values, Interests and Needs

Canada and Denmark are in what Galtung (1990) defined as a state of

negative peace. A series of small-scale military occupations, as well as

Figure 3: The barren rock that is Hans Island. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Hans_Island

Figure 2: Map of Hans Island. Source: http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/hansIsland/maps.asp


diplomatic and legal quibbling, has created disharmony between two otherwise friendly nations (Huebert, 2005). However, by Coleman’s (2003) definition, the otherwise stable and friendly relationship that exists between the two countries characterizes this as a tractable, albeit protracted conflict.

A central issue in this conflict involves the disagreement between Canada and Denmark (the Primary parties in this conflict) on which country has sovereignty over Hans Island. In 1973, when both countries were drawing their maritime boundaries, it was discovered that Hans Island fell almost exactly on the demarcation line between both countries. Rather than delay the progress of the survey, a demarcation line was drawn up to one end of the island and continued from the opposite end, with the understanding that title to the island would be determined at some future date (Byers, 2014; UNLT, 2002). Galtung (1990) warned that the act of conflict avoidance is akin to “orchestrated confrontation” (p. 293), a non-kinetic, but nonetheless tangible style of conflict. Poole, and Stutman (2013) contended parties, that adopt an avoiding style, risk fomenting apathy or isolation.

The presence of aboriginal peoples in the region, dating from a time before recorded history, establishes the origins of a cultural identity element to this issue (Dufresne, 2007). On a more contemporary note, the concept of sovereignty plays a significant role in modern nationalistic perceptions of identity on the part of both Primary parties, as explored by Kriesberg (2003).

The rhetoric related to assertions of sovereignty emanating from both countries has been manifestly partisan. Following a visit to the island in 2005 by Canada’s foreign affairs minister, the head of the department of International Public Law at Denmark's Foreign Ministry was quoted as saying, "We consider Hans Island to be part of Danish territory and will therefore hand over a complaint about the Canadian minister's unannounced visit" (BBC, 2005). Canada’s position with regard to the importance of the Arctic to Canada and its people is just as pointedly reflected in policy documents, and even public opinion polls. Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (GoC, 2009), the federal government’s principal Arctic policy document, begins with the assertion: “Canada is a Northern nation. The North is a fundamental part of our heritage and our national identity, and it is vital to our future” (p. 3). A public opinion poll of almost 3,000 Canadians showed that they considered the Arctic to be “a cornerstone of national identity” and “our foremost foreign policy priority” (EKOS, 2011). It may be unwise to ignore this human value for, as Kriesberg (2003) asserted, to do so could impel a devolution from a tractable to an intractable state. The basic, enduring characteristic of national identity raises this component from a simple interest to a need in this case (Mayer, 2012).

Aside from the structural (legal, geographic) and cultural (nationalistic, historic) issues, there is another, yet to be fully evaluated, economic interest at stake. As the Arctic sea ice diminishes, waterways become more navigable, and resources become more readily exploitable. Consequently, interest is growing to capitalize on the natural resources that lie beneath the waters of all Arctic regions (Huebert, 2005). If the seabed surrounding Hans Island is determined to have


resource value, any derived largesse will benefit whoever holds title to the island (Byers, 2013).

Secondary Parties

In addition to the usual international players, such as the United Nations and NATO, who could play a part in negotiations related to this issue, there are a host of other organizations with special interests in the region including the International Arctic Science Committee, and even the Association of World Reindeer Herders (Lytvynenko, 2011). But perhaps the most significant player is the Arctic Council, a forum consisting of the eight circumpolar nations (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, USA, Russia, Finland, Norway and Sweden) as well as many observer nations including China and Germany. The Arctic Council is a collaborative, cooperative, and forward-thinking body that has a track record of arriving at rational solutions to concerns pertaining to the Arctic (Stevenson, 2007; Byers, 2014). This organization has the potential to provide a neutral, trusted, and sustainable open line of communication between all parties which many scholars, including Fisher (1994), Rothman (1997), and Maiese (2003) consider essential to resolving conflict.

Claims to sovereignty in the Arctic Archipelago have come under increasing scrutiny and dispute (Byers, 2014). As reported by Godoy (2011), a spokesperson from Pierre and Marie Curie University stated, “Our main concern is the regulation of potential economic activities in the Arctic and the identification of Arctic governance options for European countries” (para. 13). This statement reflects the desire of other states to assert their presence in the Arctic region. This should be a signal to Canada and Denmark that it would be prudent to establish precedence for resolving a bi-lateral territorial claim in the Arctic before other nations or organizations are able to impose their will in the region by other means. As diminishing icepacks expose feasibly navigable sea-lanes, not to mention increasingly large, and previously uncharted tracts of land and seabed, questions arise regarding the demarcation of national boundaries and authority over waterways (Baker & Byers, 2012).

Confrontation and Intervention The current cordial state of relations between Canada and Denmark, coupled with rising international pressure suggest that now might be the optimal time to bring the issue of title to Hans Island to a final, mutually agreeable conclusion. Canada and Denmark have a long history of common alliances within such organizations as NATO and the Arctic Council. These associations could provide a rich pool of third-party consultants who could facilitate an accord, providing what Fisher (1994) identifies as a vital requirement to build trust, enforce norms, and otherwise establish a foundation for settling a dispute.


Folger et al. (2013) provided a useful tool, in the form of a decision tree, to select the optimal procedure to engage the two primary parties (Canada and Denmark). By determining the relative weight given to the five characteristics noted along the top of the decision tree (see Figure 5), it is evident that the problem-solving conflict style is the tactic of choice. However, the pairing of problem-solving with another supportive style, like collaboration, may reinforce the undertaking. This pairing may enhance the resolution process, as collaboration is proven to be effective when the focus is on interests and issues, as is the case here (Folger et al., 2013).

Figure 5: Style Selection Decision Tree Validation of the problem-solving workshop approach was supported by the findings of Fisher (2007) who illustrated its efficacy in Cyprus, the Middle East, and other locations embroiled in territorial disputes. He detailed how problem-solving workshops can facilitate a better understanding between parties of their differences and commonalities, and promoted the usefulness of this approach in the pre-negotiation phase of the process. Workshops provide an opportunity for unique synergies to evolve. In the pursuit of innovative alternatives to the Hans Island stalemate, the first step


would be to consider the range of conventional, and not so conventional participants, from whom the kernel of a progressive idea might emerge. Various case studies chronicled by Fisher (2007) inspired the following embryonic list of participants for expert panels, symposia, cultural exchanges, or other workshop formats:

1. Government and diplomatic delegates who could share official, and unofficial policy and viewpoints.

2. Aboriginal groups that could advise on traditional means of dealing with territorial and cultural issues.

3. Lawyers and jurists familiar with national and international law, as well as similar precedents set in other locales.

4. The Arctic Council and other official organizations with expertise in the region.

5. Non-government organizations (NGO’s) with insights on peripheral issues such as ecology, climate change, aboriginal affairs, or fish and wildlife.

6. Institutes for Peace that collectively possess an enormous and varied body of conflict expertise.

7. Academics, students, and other practitioners of anthropology, political science, ethnography, geology, geography, history, arts et al.

8. Citizen action committees, and other special interest groups that may impart alternative, extreme, or even revolutionary viewpoints.

9. Writers, journalists, bloggers, and other media practitioners who can generate controversy, discussion, and also elicit input from the public at large, using both traditional and newer social media platforms.

10. Corporations having an interest in Arctic capitalization. This list is far from exhaustive, and would be subject to constant reshaping. Various workshop formats can be fashioned to provide the richest environment for creative discourse. As Mayer (2012) pointed out, it is preferred that parties to a conflict not relinquish the power to resolve an issue between themselves by ceding authority to a third party—the International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example. In his view, “powerlessness does not promote a constructive approach to conflict” (p. 334). So this option should likely be discounted in the case of Hans Island. Dialogue, as advocated by Maiese (2003) offers a vehicle by which the humanistic aspects of identity and values can find voice and dispel some of the polarization that exists on some issues. As a component of both pre-negotiation and para-negotiation, dialogue, in a workshop setting, can foster trust and communication not only between Canada and Denmark, but also with secondary parties. This may encourage others to join the conversation on an interpersonal and intergroup level. The Hans Island case appears to provide an ideal scenario for the application of the Rothman (1997) ARIA (Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action) framework, especially in the pre-negotiation phase. This process allows for an expression of the seminal underlying humanistic motivations that


underscore the conflict, provides the opportunity to explore common and divergent opinions, and promotes investigation of novel solutions. Fisher (1994) draws a clear distinction between the settlement of an issue and the resolution of it. The former usually involves compromise, or enforced submission to a process, and is a less than ideal outcome. The latter promises a more enduring outcome because it meets the needs of all concerned parties (p. 59). Resolution appears achievable in the case of Hans Island for several reasons:

1. A variety of interchangeable approaches are available to transform the relationship between parties.

2. Cordial relations exist between Canada and Denmark. 3. The two countries share common interests and associations, which

nurtures accord. 4. The situation is uncomplicated by any current human occupation,

ecological, or security issues. 5. The remote location of Hans Island, far removed from any imminent

development or commercial water transit concerns, eases the pressure that might be imposed by a rigid timetable for resolution of the matter.

6. The opportunity exists for Canada and Denmark to be seen as pioneers in crafting a new model for Arctic geopolitical statesmanship and cooperation.

In a world teeming with violent conflicts, the Hans Island dispute can provide an opportunity to experiment with innovative, collegial methods of resolving an international disagreement in a peaceful manner. Should wisdom and good will prevail, we may bear witness to the birth of a significant new model that could one day find its way into the conflict resolution toolbox.


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